The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War

The authorities whose views have been most definitely stated are Lord Haig, Lord Allenby, and the two Generals who commanded in Mesopotamia, Maude and Marshall.61 The last two have been already quoted as to the Cavalry work in the advance to Baghdad, and beyond. General Allenby has written as follows regarding the operations in Palestine:—

“The Desert Mounted Corps took some 46,000 prisoners during the operations. The complete destruction of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish armies depended mainly on the rapidity with which their communications were reached, and on quick decision in dealing with the enemy’s columns as they attempted to escape. The vigorous handling of the Cavalry by its leaders, and the rapidity of its movement, overcame all attempts to delay its progress. The enemy’s columns, after they had out-distanced the pursuing Infantry, were given no time to reorganise and fight their way through.”

Of course, the Cavalry did not effect their work alone. General Allenby says that the breaking of the enemy’s entrenched lines by the Infantry enabled the Cavalry to accomplish its mission. But this is no detraction from the merit of either. Both arms did their duty, and the result, in Palestine as in Mesopotamia, was what Henderson calls the most important operation of grand tactics—the surrounding and destruction of an enemy’s army.

General Haig is perhaps the most important witness of all, not only because of the greatness of his command, but because the Western Front, with its immense system of trenches, stretching from end to end of the theatre of war, was the one where Cavalry was at special disadvantage. In his final despatch, summing up the features of the war, he deliberately takes up the question, and gives his answer. I quote the following words:—

“The Value of Cavalry in Modern War.

“17. From time to time, as the war of position dragged on, and the enemy’s trench systems remained unbroken, while questions of man-power and the shortage of shipping became acute, the wisdom or necessity of maintaining any large force of mounted men was freely discussed. In the light of the full experience of the War, the decision to preserve the Cavalry Corps has been fully justified. It has been proved that Cavalry, whether used for shock effect under suitable conditions, or as mobile Infantry, have still an indispensable part to play in modern war. Moreover, it cannot safely be assumed that in all future wars, the flanks of the opposing forces will rest on neutral states or impassable obstacles. Whenever such a condition does not obtain, opportunities for the use of Cavalry must arise frequently.”

General Haig proceeds to justify his opinion by examples, and concludes with a reference to the position of the British Cavalry on the morning of the Armistice which closed the war. “There is no doubt that, had the advance of the Cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy’s disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout.” In fact, the Armistice deprived the British Cavalry of the certainty of striking, in the last and greatest of all wars hitherto fought, and in that theatre of the war where they were at special disadvantage, the most stupendous blow ever struck by a body of armed horsemen since the history of the world began.

The British Cavalry consisted of Regiments similar to the Thirteenth Hussars. The story of such a Regiment is not therefore, as some think, the story of one unit of an arm which is now useless in war—as useless, it has been said, as bows and arrows. On the contrary, Cavalry has proved its usefulness up till now, and we may be sure that in the near future at all events, whether used on horseback for battle-shock, or as mobile Infantry, or in any other way of duty, it will still do good service to its country, as it has done in the past. The Cavalry spirit, please God, will never die in our people so long as war endures in the world, nor is there any reason to fear that we shall soon see the last of the famous squadrons in which that spirit is so gloriously embodied.

APPENDIX I.

ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO BELONGED TO OR SERVED WITH THE REGIMENT BETWEEN AUGUST 1914 AND NOVEMBER 1918.

ROLL OF WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND MEN, WHO SERVED WITH THE REGIMENT DURING THE WAR.

Those marked with an asterisk (*) did not serve in Mesopotamia with the Regiment.-