The Trent affair

The fact of Messrs. Mason and Slidell’s appointment, the nature of their mission to Europe, and their desire to escape through the blockade and proceed to their respective destinations, was well understood throughout the northern states before the commissioners left Charleston. All of these matters had been published in the New York and other northern newspapers before the close of October, 1861. To this was added in due time an account of the running of the blockade at Charleston by the Theodora with the envoys on board. Knowing the character of these men, and the disposition of the governments of France, and especially of England, toward the United States, the loyal people of the North felt somewhat solicitous concerning the outcome of this traitorous mission.

When Captain Wilkes came ashore at Fortress Monroe on November 15, and announced that he had captured the envoys, and had them prisoners on board his vessel, and when the telegraph flashed this news throughout the northern states, the people were prepared to receive it with the greatest demonstrations of delight. No event of the war up to that time caused so much genuine rejoicing in all of the states except those composing the Confederacy. The people of the North had been so completely engrossed by the peculiar spirit of war time that they were not prepared to consider correctly the real issue which was certain to be involved in this act of a popular sea captain. The masses did not stop at first to consider its policy, neither did they question its legality. It was to them only the capture of two dangerous rebels. To the masses it was a matter which concerned only themselves and the public enemy in the South. In the beginning it never occurred to any one that the envoys had been taken from the protection of the flag of a great maritime nation beyond the sea—a power that was disposed to be unfriendly to the United States, and that this semi-hostile nation might deny the right to make such a seizure and offer only the alternative of war, in case of a refusal to liberate the prisoners.

War times are productive of heroes and hero-worship. The name of Captain Charles Wilkes was at once added to the list of heroes which the war had thus far developed. Praises of the gallant captain and his wonderful exploit were sounded throughout the length and breadth of the loyal states. Newspapers and public officials could not say too much in support of his act. The bookwrights at once incorporated into their war histories not only the story of the hero and his valor in seizing the ambassadors, but also an account of his intimate acquaintance with international law from which he had deduced an unanswerable argument to justify his action.

On November 26, two days after the arrival of Captain Wilkes in Boston harbor, a banquet was given to him and his officers at the Revere House in that city. Hon. J. Edmunds Wiley presided. The conservative Bostonians became quite enthusiastic over the recent capture of the commissioners. The presiding officer highly applauded the act. He was followed by Hon. John A. Andrew, governor of Massachusetts, who thought the act exhibited “not only wise judgment but also manly and heroic success.” He declared that it was “one of the most illustrious services that had made the war memorable,” and rejoiced in the idea that the gallant captain then present had “fired a shot across the bows of the ship that bore the English lion’s head.” Chief Justice Bigelow delivered a speech containing similar sentiments. Captain Wilkes and Lieutenant Fairfax also made speeches, in which the capture was briefly described. In the course of his speech Captain Wilkes said: “Before deciding on the course I adopted, I examined the authorities—Kent, Wheaton, and the rest—and satisfied myself that these ‘commissioners’ or ‘ministers’ as they styled themselves, had no rights which attach to such functionaries when properly appointed, and finding that I had a right to take written dispatches, I took it for granted that I had a right to take these ‘commissioners’ as the embodiments of dispatches. I therefore took it upon myself to say to those gentlemen that they must produce their passports from the general government, and as they could not do that, I arrested them.” At New York an ovation was given to Captain Wilkes, and the hospitality of that city was offered to him. At a stated meeting of the New York Historical Society at which he was present, on December 3, he was elected by acclamation an honorary member of that body. Special honors were also tendered to him at Washington about the middle of the month.

Everybody was electrified by the good news. Every member of the cabinet was elated by the capture except Mr. Blair.⁠[1] When the message which announced the capture was brought into the office of Simon Cameron, secretary of war, Governor Andrew of Massachusetts and a number of other distinguished men were present. Cheer after cheer was given with a will by the delighted assemblage, led by the secretary and heartily seconded by Governor Andrew.

In the beginning Mr. Seward, secretary of state, approved of the proceeding of Captain Wilkes and rejoiced over it. At first “no man was more elated or jubilant over the capture of the emissaries than Mr. Seward, who, for a time, made no attempt to conceal his gratification and approval of the act of Wilkes.”⁠[2]

Hon. Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy, was much pleased, and sent the following congratulatory letter to Captain Wilkes:

“Navy Department, Nov. 30, 1861.

Captain Charles Wilkes, Commanding U. S. S. San Jacinto, Boston:

Dear Sir—I congratulate you on your safe arrival, and especially do I congratulate you on the great public service you have rendered in the capture of the rebel commissioners, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, who have been conspicuous in the conspiracy to dissolve the Union, and it is well known that, when seized by you, they were on a mission hostile to the government and the country.

“Your conduct in seizing these public enemies was marked by intelligence, ability, decision and firmness, and has the emphatic approval of this department. It is not necessary that I should in this communication—which is intended to be one of congratulation to yourself, officers and crew—express an opinion on the course pursued in omitting to capture the vessel which had these public enemies on board, further than to say that the forbearance exercised in this instance must not be permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter for infractions of neutral obligations.

“I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

“Gideon Welles.”

In his annual naval report, issued a few days after the congratulatory letter was written, Secretary Welles said: “Captain Wilkes, in command of the San Jacinto, while searching in the West Indies for the Sumter, received information that James M. Mason and John Slidell, disloyal citizens and leading conspirators, were, with their suite, to embark from Havana in the English steamer Trent, on their way to Europe, to promote the cause of the insurgents. Cruising in the Bahama Channel he intercepted the Trent on the 8th of November, and took from her these dangerous men, whom he brought to the United States. His vessel having been ordered to refit for service at Charleston, the prisoners were retained on board and conveyed to Fort Warren, where they were committed to the custody of Colonel Dimmick, in command of the fortress.

“The prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes on this occasion merited and received the emphatic approval of this department, and if a too generous forbearance was exhibited by him in not capturing the vessel which had these rebel emissaries on board, it may, in view of the special circumstances and of its patriotic motives, be excused, but it must by no means be permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter for the treatment of any case of similar infraction of neutral obligations by foreign vessels engaged in commerce or the carrying trade.”

On Monday, December 2, congress assembled and before the close of the first day’s session, Mr. Lovejoy, of Illinois, by unanimous consent, offered a joint resolution which read as follows:

“Resolved, That the thanks of congress are due, and are hereby tendered, to Captain Wilkes, of the United States navy, for his brave, adroit and patriotic conduct in the arrest and detention of the traitors, James M. Mason and John Slidell.”

Mr. Edgerton, of Ohio, moved the following resolution as a substitute, viz.:

“That the president of the United States be requested to present Captain Charles Wilkes a gold medal, with suitable emblems and devices, in testimony of the high sense entertained by congress of his good conduct in promptly arresting the rebel ambassadors, James M. Mason and John Slidell.”

This substitute was not agreed to, however, but the joint resolution offered by Mr. Lovejoy was promptly passed.

On the same day Mr. Colfax, of Indiana, offered the following preamble and resolution:

“Whereas, Colonel Michael Corcoran, who was taken prisoner on the battlefield of Manassas, has, after suffering other indignities, been confined by the rebel authorities in the cell of a convicted felon; therefore,

“Resolved, That the president of the United States be requested to similarly confine James M. Mason, late of Virginia, now in custody at Fort Warren, until Colonel Corcoran shall be treated as all the prisoners of war, taken by the United States on the battlefield, have been treated.”

This preamble and resolution was adopted without dissent.

Just before adjournment on the same day, Hon. Moses F. Odell, of New York, introduced the following preamble and resolution:

“Whereas, Colonel Alfred M. Wood, of the fourteenth regiment of New York state militia, who was wounded and taken prisoner at the battle of Bull Run, has now, by rebel authorities, been ordered to confinement in a felon’s prison, and, by the same order, is to be treated as a prisoner convicted of infamous crimes; therefore,

“Resolved, That the president of the United States be respectfully requested to order John Slidell to the same character of prison, and to the same treatment, until Colonel Wood shall be treated as the United States have treated all prisoners taken in battle.”

This was read, considered and agreed to.⁠[3]

When the news of the capture was first received, the press throughout the North heartily indorsed the act and indulged in the most extravagant expressions of joy. One metropolitan newspaper said: “There is no drawback to our jubilation. The universal Yankee nation is getting decidedly awake. As for Captain Wilkes and his command, let the handsome thing be done. Consecrate another 4th of July to him, load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest and costliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved such a victory.” Another prominent newspaper said: “Two of the magnates of the Southern Confederacy, two, perhaps, who have been as potent for mischief as any that could have been selected (out of South Carolina) from the long list of political ingrates, have ‘come to grief’ in their persistent attempts to destroy the noble government to which they owe all the honorable distinction they have hitherto enjoyed.”

Amateur poets all over the country found Captain Wilkes’s exploit a fitting theme to be celebrated in the best verse which they were able to produce. The columns of the New York Evening Post, the Brooklyn Times, the Indianapolis Journal and other leading newspapers were graced by original contributions of this kind.

In the great storm of applause that passed over the country immediately after the capture had been announced, no dissenting voices could be heard. The more conservative opinions must needs wait for an opportunity to be heard. While most of the cabinet, the house of representatives, the people and the press were bestowing praises without stint upon Captain Wilkes and his heroic deed there was one grave, thoughtful man who was able to look beyond the mere fact of the capture of two dangerous traitors and conspirators of the South, and see the real issues which he felt certain would be involved in the affair. In that man at that time was vested a greater executive power than has been wielded by any English-speaking person during the last two hundred years. In his opinion it was not a matter for rejoicing.

In the evening of the day when the news of the capture was first received in Washington, Dr. Benson J. Lossing, the eminent historian, and Hon. Elisha Whittlesy, comptroller of the treasury, called at the White House and were accorded a brief interview with President Lincoln. To them he said: “I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting, by theory and practice, on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protest against the act, and demand their release, we must give them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years.”

We are also told by a member of Mr. Lincoln’s cabinet that while the rejoicing was well-nigh universal, the president was troubled with doubt and anxiety concerning the final result of the seizure. He could not see the matter in the same way as did his secretary of state. Having taken counsel with Senator Sumner concerning the matter, Mr. Lincoln’s doubts and apprehensions were much increased.

It is a fact worthy of notice that no mention whatever is made of the capture in Mr. Lincoln’s annual message to congress, December 3, 1861. He probably thought it inexpedient under the circumstances either to discuss the matter or even to allude to it. He may have been considering in his own mind what the final outcome of the matter would be when he penned the following significant passage which appears in his message: “Since, however, it is apparent that here, as in every other state, foreign dangers necessarily attend domestic difficulties, I recommend that adequate and ample measures be adopted for maintaining the public defenses on every side, while under this general recommendation provision for defending our coast line readily occurs to the mind, and also in the same connection ask the attention of congress to our great lakes and rivers. It is believed that some fortifications and depots of arms and munitions, with harbor navigation improvements at well selected points upon these, would be of great importance to the nation’s defense and preservation, and ask attention to the views of the secretary of war expressed in his report upon the same general subject.”

Mr. Blair, Lincoln’s postmaster-general, seems from the first to have held more radical views concerning the matter than did the president or any one else. He did not publicly discuss the case, but to the other members of the cabinet he denounced Captain Wilkes’s act as an outrage on the British flag, which, he said, the English ministry would seize upon to make war upon the United States. Not being an admirer of Captain Wilkes, Mr. Blair said that he should be ordered to take the Iroquois, with Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board, proceed to England and deliver them over to the British government. This, he thought, would be a manifestation of the greatest contempt and indifference for the Confederate ambassadors, and a severe rebuke to whatever of alleged intrigues that may have existed between the insurgents in the United States and the English cabinet.

After the first wave of universal rejoicing had passed over the country, the legality of the act was publicly discussed at length by the press and the ablest jurists. The Baltimore American said that it was “a violation of the laws of neutrality strictly considered.” Afterward the same journal said that it was a matter which was “beyond the reach of mere diplomacy,” since “in numerous ways the government and people have fully indorsed the act of Captain Wilkes, and the verdict will never be reversed, although all Europe, with England at its head, demand it.” One of the principal newspapers of Washington⁠[4] said: “The British government should direct Lord Lyons to return the thanks of her majesty to the United States government for its forbearance in not having seized the steamer Trent, brought her into port, and confiscated ship and cargo, for an open and flagrant breach of international law. The queen’s proclamation of May last acknowledged the rebel states to be belligerents—enemies of the United States—and by their own principles of international law, British ships were thereafter to abstain from carrying dispatches, or doing any act that favored the Confederates, under penalty of seizure and confiscation. Slidell and Mason should be held in rigid custody until they can be tried and punished for their crimes against the government of the United States. Their sham character of ambassadors affords no protection. It is a lawful right of belligerents to seize an ambassador, as soon as any other person, if he can be caught at sea.” The National Intelligencer said: “The proceeding of Captain Wilkes is fully justified by the rules of international law as those rules have been expounded by the most illustrious British jurists and compiled by the most approved writers on the law of nations.” This position was maintained by citing numerous British authorities. Such a position had been taken by the British government in the declaration of war against Russia in 1854, when the following language was used: “It is impossible for her majesty to forego her right of seizing articles contraband of war, and of preventing neutrals from bearing enemies’ dispatches.” Hon. Lewis Cass expressed the opinion that the seizure was justifiable from the standpoint of international law.

Hon. Edward Everett expressed a like opinion in an address before the Middlesex Mechanics’ Association at Lowell. He said that “the commissioners imprisoned in Fort Warren would no doubt be kept there until the restoration of peace, which we all so much desire.” It was said by another equally good authority that “the act of Captain Wilkes was in strict accordance with the principles of international law recognized in England, and in strict conformity with English practice.”⁠[5] Numerous other opinions were volunteered, among them one from the English consul at New Orleans, who thought the act entirely in accord with the principles of international law as based upon English precedents, and from them furnished material for an editorial in one of the city newspapers. George Ticknor Curtis, the well known constitutional lawyer of Boston, said the Trent should have been brought into port for adjudication in a prize court.

On November 21, at a diplomatic dinner in Washington, there was a full and free discussion of the act of Captain Wilkes. The opinion prevailed with almost perfect unanimity that the seizure was wholly unauthorized by the principles of international law, and some of the ministers took even more advanced grounds than these and asserted that the act, if not disavowed by the United States government, would be a justifiable cause of war.

A special correspondent of one of the principal western newspapers a few days later took a view of the case different from the most common ones at that time. Among other things he said: “But there is another view of the case, and a highly important one, which ought to be well considered. By justifying the act of Captain Wilkes, the United States justifies also that very conduct on the part of England toward this country, our resistance to which caused the war of 1812, namely, the right of search; and we abandon the vantage on this great question on which we have heretofore stood. The question then is simply and absolutely this: Is it expedient for the sake of a mere temporary advantage, and a slight one at that, for us to abandon the position on the question of the right of search which we have heretofore held, and assume England’s position on that question? It is by no means certain that the arrest of these gentlemen may not be a positive advantage to the South, as the developments of the next two weeks may show. Besides, and over and above all other considerations, it is always better for nations to maintain such a strong and impregnable position as ours was on the right of search than to abandon it for such a slight advantage as this will be. If we give up the ground we occupy on that question, as we shall have to do if we justify the arrest of Mason and Slidell, we will have to submit tamely to the indignities of having all of our merchant vessels searched by every English cruiser that crosses their path, and of having our seamen impressed again into the British naval service.”⁠[6]

It was also asserted in New York about this time that the queen’s neutrality proclamation, which had forbidden her subjects to carry dispatches for either of the belligerents, had been violated by Captain Moir of the Trent, and it was proposed that an English subscription should be taken for the purpose of prosecuting him in case the queen’s attorney-general or the owners of the vessel declined to bring a suit against him.

Such was the effect of the capture as far as the northern states were concerned. At first there was universal rejoicing. This was followed by more or less of doubt, and by discussion in justification of the act. As the weeks progressed, anxiety developed concerning the position which England would assume in regard to the matter. At that time there was no ocean telegraph and weeks must necessarily elapse before any news could be received from the opposite side of the Atlantic. Meantime Lord Lyons maintained absolute silence in regard to the matter. If, during this time, he expressed any opinion, there is no record of it. It was said by the press that “his lordship was in a pet.” He was too discreet to express any opinion when he did not know what position his government would assume in regard to the act.

The sentiments of the Confederacy were freely expressed as soon as it was known there that the envoys had been captured and brought to the United States. The New Orleans Crescent said that Captain Wilkes’s act was a “high-handed interference with a British mail steamer by the Lincoln government,” and that it would “either arouse John Bull to the highest pitch of indignation or demonstrate that there has been an understanding between the two governments for a long time—that England has been and is assisting the abolition government to the detriment of the South.”

In a few days after the seizure, Jefferson Davis sent a message to the Confederate congress, in the course of which he said: “The distinguished gentlemen, who, with your approval at the last session, were commissioned to represent the Confederacy at certain foreign courts, have recently been seized by the captain of a United States vessel-of-war while on board a British mail steamer, while on a voyage from the neutral Spanish port of Havana to England. The United States have thus claimed a general jurisdiction over the high seas, and, entering a British ship sailing under its country’s flag, have violated the rights of embassy for the most part held sacred even among barbarians, by seizing our ministers whilst under the protection and within the dominion of a neutral nation.

“These gentlemen were as much under the jurisdiction of the British government upon that ship and beneath that flag as if they had been on its soil, and a claim on the part of the United States to seize them in the streets of London would have been as well founded as that to apprehend them where they were taken; had they been malefactors, or citizens even, of the United States, they could not have been arrested on board of a British ship or on British soil unless under the express provisions of treaty, and according to the forms therein provided for the extradition of criminals.”

This plaintive wail in behalf of Messrs. Mason and Slidell was intended for European ears. This portion of Mr. Davis’s communication which has just been quoted is more of a message to the English government and people than it is to the Confederate congress. It was hoped that British sympathy would thus be more fully aroused.

Discordant voices were heard, too, about this time from across the Canadian line. The Toronto Leader denounced the act as “the most offensive outrage which Brother Jonathan has dared to perpetrate upon the British flag,” and claimed that immediate reparation should be demanded by requiring an apology and the liberation of the prisoners.

Another well known Canadian newspaper said as soon as the news of the capture had been confirmed:⁠[7] “The seizure of Slidell and Mason was wrong, but it was also one of the most absurd and stupid acts which history records. These diplomatists were going to Europe to stir up feeling against the North and secure the acknowledgment of the Southern Confederacy. In seizing them the American officer did more to accomplish their errand than anything they could possibly have done themselves. We have no expectation that the British government will deal with the matter otherwise than temperately, but the collision will strengthen the hands of the not uninfluential parties in Britain who are striving to induce the government to interfere in the American quarrel. Better have had ten Slidells and Masons in Europe than permit such a cause of quarrel to arise. We do not know what may be the character of the captain of the San Jacinto for loyalty, but if he intended to help the insurgents he could not have gone about the work better. The American vessels have been vainly chasing the Sumter from port to port; they have allowed the Bermuda to enter Savannah and to leave it; they have permitted the Huntsville⁠[8] to reach the Bermudas, and receive the cargo of the Fingal; they have reserved all their courage and activity to stop an unarmed neutral vessel on the seas and take from her two venerable non-combatants. But for the Port Royal bombardment, the whole American naval service would sink beneath contempt.

“The extreme anxiety of the Washington government to prevent the southern diplomatists reaching Europe is a curious proof of weakness in men who profess to be careless as to the action of foreign powers. The United States have nothing to fear from Europe, if they go on with the war vigorously and succeed in the desired object of preserving the Union, and it is altogether a very small business to hunt a couple of men over the ocean to prevent them using their tongues to persuade the shrewd rulers of England and France to do violence to their own interests by entering upon a great war. It was bad enough to send four vessels after them when their departure by the Huntsville was announced, but to run the risk of a war with England for such an object is an act of mid-summer madness. It will add infinitely to the strength and dignity of the American government if, without waiting for remonstrances from Britain, they at once set free the captives and send them on their road to Europe. It will be right, which is infinitely better than being expedient, but it will also show that the North has confidence in the goodness of its cause, and does not fear the tongues of traitors, well-poised though they may be.”

On November 30, six days after the commissioners had been received at Fort Warren, Mr. Seward forwarded a dispatch to Minister Adams at London, in which, after mentioning other matters, the following language was used: “Since that conversation was held Captain Wilkes, of the steamer San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer and taken from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason against their own country. This is a new incident, unknown to, and unforeseen, at least in its circumstances, by Lord Palmerston. It is to be met and disposed of by the two governments, if possible, in the spirit to which I have adverted. Lord Lyons has prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by the British government should be first made known to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. It is proper, however, that you should know one fact in the case, without indicating that we attach much importance to it, namely, that, in the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the government, the subject is therefore free from the embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been specially directed by us.”

“I trust that the British government will consider the subject in a friendly temper, and it may expect the best disposition on the part of this government.”

It will be seen hereafter how important this timely statement of Mr. Seward’s became in the final settlement of the matter between the two countries.

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.

1. Congressional Globe: 2d Session 37th Congress, Part I.

2. Diary of War Events, Moore’s Rebellion Record, Vol. VII.

3. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America.

4. Magazine of American History, May, 1886.

5. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion.

6. Official Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861.

7. Porter, D. D.: Naval History of the Civil War.

8. Principal Northern and Canadian newspapers during the latter half of November, 1861.

9. Paris, Comte de: The Civil War in America.

10. Southern Law Review, Vol. VIII.

11. Welles, Gideon: Lincoln and Seward.