CHAPTER XIII.
THE BRITISH DEMAND.
It was well understood in England that Messrs. Mason and Slidell had been commissioned to represent the Confederacy at London and Paris respectively. The difficulties incident to their departure from a blockaded port and the anxiety of the Federal government to prevent the success of their mission were also well known.
An English writer, after giving a brief account of the escape of the commissioners in a blockade-runner, says: “It was correctly assumed that they would embark at Havana on the Trent, a West Indian mail steamer, and travel in her to Europe; it was believed that the government of the United States had issued orders for intercepting the Trent and for capturing the envoys; and it was noticed that a Federal man-of-war had arrived at Falmouth and after coaling had proceeded to Southampton. Lord Russell laid these facts before the law officers, and was advised that a United States man-of-war falling in with a British mail steamer would have the right to board her, open her mail bags, examine their contents, and, if the steamer should prove liable to confiscation for carrying dispatches from the enemy, put a prize crew on board and carry her to a port of the United States for adjudication. In that case the law officers thought she might, and in their opinion she ought to, disembark the passengers on the mail steamer at some convenient port. But they added ‘she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage.’ A few days before the law officers gave this opinion, the San Jacinto, an American war steamer, intercepted the Trent and did the very thing which the law officers had advised she had no right to do.”[1]
As soon as Commander Williams landed in England he was sent to London in hot haste on a special train in order to report the circumstances to the government without any delay. After arriving there he spent the remainder of that day and part of the night at the British foreign office making an official report to Premier Palmerston and the lords commissioners of the admiralty.
The facts as reported by Commander Williams were immediately submitted to the crown law officers, who, after a brief consideration of the matter, reported that the seizure of the commissioners was entirely illegal and not sanctioned by the law of nations.[2]
The case was then considered by the cabinet, and, on November 29, only two days after the news of the boarding of the Trent and seizure of the envoys had reached England, Lord Palmerston prepared a note to the queen in which he formulated a statement of a demand to be made at once upon the American government. He wrote to her majesty as follows: “The general outline and tenor which appeared to meet the opinions of the cabinet would be, that the Washington government should be told that what has been done is a violation of international law and of the rights of Great Britain, and that your majesty’s government trust that the act will be disavowed and the prisoners set free and restored to British protection, and that Lord Lyons should be instructed that, if this demand is refused, he should retire from the United States.”[3]
A copy of the proposed dispatch to Lord Lyons was also forwarded to her majesty, who, with Prince Albert, carefully examined it. Both were profoundly impressed by the fact that the communication indicated a crisis in the affairs of the two countries and that a speedy rupture and war were not improbable. Illness and the serious character of this new political question made it impossible for the prince to sleep during the following night. Upon getting up, although scarcely able to hold a pen while writing, he prepared a memorandum of the changes which her majesty desired to have made in the dispatch to America. The queen preferred that language should be used which was less harsh and offensive in character than that contained in the first draft of the note to the American government. In its uncorrected form the draft of the note not only charged the violation of international law but added an accusation of “wanton insult,” although the belief was asserted that it was not intentional. Prince Albert’s memorandum, corrected with the queen’s own hand, was returned, and the dispatch which was subsequently forwarded to Lord Lyons shows that her majesty’s suggestions were fully observed. This was the prince’s last political writing. His illness grew worse and he died before the communication which he and the queen had aided in preparing was answered by the American government.
The prince’s memorandum, as corrected by the queen and returned by her to the ministry, was as follows: “The queen returns these important drafts which upon the whole she approves, but she can not help feeling that the main draft—that for communication to the American government—is somewhat meagre. She would have liked to have seen the expression of a hope that the American captain did not act under instructions, or, if he did that he misapprehended—that the United States government must be fully aware that the British government could not allow its flag to be insulted and the security of its mail communications to be placed in jeopardy, and her majesty’s government are unwilling to believe that the United States government intended wantonly to put an insult upon this country, and to add to their many distressing complications by forcing a question of dispute upon us; and that we are, therefore, glad to believe that upon a full consideration of the circumstances of the undoubted breach of international law committed, they would spontaneously offer such redress as alone would satisfy this country, viz., the restoration of the unfortunate passengers and a suitable apology.”[4]
Having received this memorandum from the queen, Earl Russell immediately prepared dispatches for Lord Lyons at Washington instructing his lordship to make certain demands of the American government and ordering him what to do in case they were refused. The text of the one containing the demands to be made was as follows:
“Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1861.
“My Lord—Intelligence of a very grave nature has reached her majesty’s government.
“This intelligence was conveyed officially to the knowledge of the admiralty by Commander Williams, agent for mails on board the contract steamer Trent.
“It appears from the letter of Commander Williams, dated ‘Royal Mail Contract Packet Trent, at sea, November 9,’ that the Trent left Havana on the 7th instant, with her majesty’s mails for England, having on board numerous passengers. Commander Williams states that shortly after noon, on the 8th, a steamer having the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colors, was observed ahead. On nearing her, at 1:15 P. M., she fired a round shot from her pivot-gun across the bows of the Trent and showed American colors. While the Trent was approaching her slowly, the American vessel discharged a shell across the bows of the Trent exploding half a cable’s length ahead of her. The Trent then stopped, and an officer with a large armed guard of marines boarded her. The officer demanded a list of the passengers, and, compliance with this demand being refused, the officer said he had orders to arrest Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, and that he had sure information of their being passengers in the Trent. While some parley was going on upon this matter, Mr. Slidell stepped forward and told the American officer that the four persons he had named were then standing before him. The commander of the Trent and Commander Williams protested against the act of taking by force out of the Trent these four passengers, then under the protection of the British flag. But the San Jacinto was at that time only two hundred yards from the Trent, her ship’s company at quarters, her ports open and tompions out. Resistance was therefore out of the question and the four gentlemen before named were forcibly taken out of the ship. A further demand was made that the commander of the Trent should proceed on board the San Jacinto, but he said he would not go unless forcibly compelled likewise, and this demand was not insisted upon.
“It thus appears that certain individuals have been forcibly taken from on board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage—an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of international law.
“Her majesty’s government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his government, or that if he conceived himself to be so authorized he greatly misunderstood the instructions he had received. For the government of the United States must be fully aware that the British government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her majesty’s government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling.
“Her majesty’s government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the government of the United States that government will, of its own accord, offer to the British government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.
“Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him.
“You are at liberty to read this dispatch to the secretary of state, and, if he shall desire it, you will give him a copy of it.
I am, etc., Russell.”
It will be noticed that this communication is in all respects a model of brevity, precision and clearness. The matter to be considered is directly approached and all facts of whatever kind that are not absolutely necessary to his lordship’s view of the case are omitted. The citizenship of the captured persons is not even hinted at, nor is anything said about the nature of their mission. No use is made of the term “confederate” or “rebel.” There is no discussion of the principles of international law bearing upon the case, no reference to texts or precedents, no statement of the rights of belligerents among themselves or their relations to neutral nations. The fact that a great civil war was then raging in the United States, and that the hostile sections of the country were then in belligerent attitudes toward each other is nowhere mentioned in the paper. It is denuded of almost every statement that one would expect to find in such a diplomatic communication. His lordship contents himself with a statement of the main facts in Commander Williams’s official report, after which he presents simply the naked idea of four individuals having been forcibly taken from a British ship which was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage from one neutral port to another, on the high seas and not within the municipal jurisdiction of the United States. The simple act of doing this constitutes a violation of the law of nations, and is “an affront to the British flag.” The only measure of redress which will atone for the act is then dictated by Lord Russell, and that is the complete undoing of Captain Wilkes’s act by liberating “the four gentlemen,” delivering them to Lord Lyons so that they might be placed again under British protection, and apologizing for what had been done.
On the same day that the foregoing dispatch was prepared, Earl Russell also addressed a second communication to Lord Lyons. It was a private letter in which the intentions of the British government could be easily read between the lines. It meant either reparation or an alternative of a very serious character. The following is the body of the letter: “In my previous dispatch of this date I have instructed you by command of her majesty, to make certain demands of the government of the United States.
“Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her majesty’s government, your lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation and repair immediately to London. If, however, you should be of the opinion that the requirements of her majesty’s government are substantially complied with, you may report the facts to her majesty’s government for their consideration and remain at your post until you receive further orders.
“You will communicate with Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne immediately upon receiving the answer of the American government, and you will send him a copy of that answer, together with such observations as you may think fit to make.
“You will also give all the information in your power to the governors of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Jamaica, Bermuda and such other of her majesty’s possessions as may be within your reach.”
The indecent haste and manifest unfairness of the whole proceeding, as well as the bombast and implied threats toward the United States contained in the private note, seem to have slightly impressed even the Earl Russell, for on the same day he addressed a second private note to Lord Lyons as follows: “My wish would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you should not take my dispatch with you, but should prepare him for it and ask him to settle it with the president and cabinet what course they will pursue. The next time you should bring my dispatch and read it to him fully. If he asks what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the president quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain from anything like menace.”
This last diplomatic note clearly reveals the motives and policy of the British government in the whole proceeding. It was publicly to browbeat and menace the United States by a parade of their military power and a threat of war, and, at the same time, privately to pave the way for getting out of the difficulty without a resort to arms.
The messenger of the British government arrived in Washington and delivered Earl Russell’s dispatches to Lord Lyons on December 18. On the afternoon of the 19th, in accordance with his instructions, his lordship waited on Mr. Seward at the department of state and acquainted him in general terms with the nature of Earl Russell’s dispatch demanding reparation, adding at the same time that he hoped the government of the United States would of its own accord offer the desired reparation, and that it was to facilitate such an arrangement that he had come without any sort of written demand.
Mr. Seward received this communication seriously but without manifesting dissatisfaction. He then made some inquiries concerning the exact character of the dispatch and requested that he be given until the next day to consider the matter and to communicate with the president. On the day after, he said that he would be prepared to give an opinion concerning the matters presented to him at that interview. When Lord Lyons made his next call upon Mr. Seward he brought with him, and formally read to the secretary, the dispatch containing Earl Russell’s demand.
Only seven days’ grace were allowed from the time when the matter was first presented. Two of these had now gone, and if the demand were complied with, it must be done with promptness, otherwise the doors of the British legation would be closed and diplomatic relations between the two countries suspended.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. British Annual Register, 1861.
2. Martin, Theodore: Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. V.
3. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion.
4. Nicolay and Hay: Life of Lincoln.
5. Southern Law Review, Vol. VIII.
6. Walpole, Spencer: Life of Lord John Russell.
7. The Union and Confederate Navies, official records of, Series I, Vol. I.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Spencer Walpole’s Life of John Russell, Vol. II, pp. 344-5.
[2] The authority for this statement is a letter from the Rt. Hon. Earl of Kimberly, her majesty’s secretary for foreign affairs, in response to an inquiry addressed to him by the author.
[3] Martin’s Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. V, p. 420.
[4] Martin’s Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. V, p. 422.