The war in Nicaragua

On the 20th of December, 1856, nearly the whole body of Americans in Nicaragua was concentrated at Rivas, and the health and moral condition of the troops were favorably affected by the movement thither. The hospital was established in a large building, situated on a slight elevation near the edge of the town, known as the house of Maleaño. Under the efficient administration of Dr. Coleman, acting surgeon-general, the wards were kept clean, and the surgical attendance was good. The diet of the patients was of the best sort, and although the number of wounded was large, no disagreeable results followed from placing them all in the same building. The supplies of medicine and surgical instruments were ample, and the strength of the surgical staff was far greater than usual in any armies either of the eastern or western continent. The fictions which have been published concerning the want of medical and surgical attention to the inmates of the hospital were created for the purpose of pandering to a morbid public opinion, and of excusing the faults and crimes of those who deserted their countrymen in Central America. The quarters of the troops were comfortable, the subsistence varied and abundant, and the spirits of the force were cheerful and buoyant.

The reports from the enemy also tended to increase the confidence of the Americans. After the retreat of Henningsen from Granada was so triumphantly achieved, Belloso sullenly retired to Masaya, and there attempted to gather the remains of the shattered force which had attempted to cut off the troops charged with the destruction of the Legitimist stronghold. But the other Allied generals were no longer willing to act under Belloso. Defeated in their efforts to destroy Henningsen, the chiefs of the Allied army were naturally inclined to throw the responsibility of their discomfiture on the Salvadorian general. They accused Belloso not only of want of skill, but also of want of courage; and they intimated that his hasty withdrawal toward Masaya, soon after Waters reached the Guadalupe, was due to an over-anxiety for his own personal safety. The dissensions which thus arose in the Allied camp promised in a short time to dissolve the whole force, and the charges then made against Belloso were afterward examined by a military commission in his own State of San Salvador.

These dissensions were also increased by the disheartening effects on the Allied officers of the great losses they had sustained in the campaign against the Americans. It is difficult to estimate the numbers the Allies had actually brought into the field before the retreat from Granada was accomplished, but it is certainly no exaggeration to place the troops they had employed from the beginning of October to the middle of December at seven thousand. In addition to the losses at Granada on the 12th and 13th of October, on the Transit road, by the affairs of the 11th and 12th of November, and at Masaya, during the three days fighting there, the Allies must have lost near two thousand men by the attack they made on Henningsen. Reports concur in the fact that Belloso had not more than two thousand under his command after he retired to Masaya. Thus, even placing the deserters at fifteen hundred—and you must place these at a high figure, considering the forced character of the service in Central America—the enemy must have lost thirty-five hundred in killed and wounded during the ten weeks immediately succeeding their march from Leon.

Nor did Belloso entirely escape the cholera after he reached Masaya. Hence fear of the pestilence as well as of the deadly rifles of the Americans, stimulated desertion among the Allies. So disorganized did Belloso’s force become, that the propriety of a retreat on Leon was discussed among the chiefs of the several contingents; and the Salvadorian troops, particularly, were disposed to withdraw from the contest. The Salvadorian cabinet were, it seems, not well pleased with the censures some of the generals of the other States had passed on the commander-in-chief; and a large portion of the Liberal party of that State, unmoved by the passions which prompted Cabañas’ friends to revenge themselves on the Americans for the refusal to re-establish his power in Honduras, consistently refused to support the war waged against the naturalized Nicaraguans.

Such was the general condition of the respective parties on the 2d of January, 1857, when the steamer San Carlos, as heretofore narrated, crossed the lake with the passengers from California to the Atlantic States. The morning report of the troops at Rivas on the 3d will give an accurate idea of the American force at that time. The total, including those employed in the several departments, is reported at 919. Of these, 25 were employed in the ordnance department; 15 in the quartermaster’s department; 20 in the commissary’s and 12 in the band; thus leaving an aggregate in the line of 847. Of the aggregate 8 were of the post and division field and staff, while 1 captain and 29 privates were on detached duty; 3 captains, 3 lieutenants, and 2 privates, on furlough; and 2 privates absent without leave. Thus the aggregate present was reduced to 788; and of these 60 were on extra duty, and 197 sick. The number for duty, officers and men, was 518; but many of those reported sick had only chigoës in their feet, and were fully able to aid in the defence of the town. Laziness and a disposition to shirk duty placed many on the sick list, who in an emergency might have proved among the best fighting men in the garrison.

Henningsen had been promoted to the rank of major-general, and Sanders to that of brigadier; so that O’Neal had command of the First Rifles, with Leonard as lieut.-colonel, and Dolan as major, while Jaquess was in command of the Infantry, and Lewis of the Second Rifles. The Artillery, as well as the Rangers were very much thinned by the hard service through which they had passed; and Col. Schwartz, being in bad health, soon after reaching Rivas, obtained leave of absence to visit California. Col. Waters kept the small companies of Rangers under his command, riding constantly in search of supplies and information.

In a few days after the San Carlos left Virgin Bay with the passengers, uneasiness was felt on account of the non-arrival of the steamers from the river. There were several causes which might be assigned for their detention, one being the misunderstanding between the two agents of the company, Scott and Macdonald. The improbabilities, too, of all the steamers falling into the hands of the Costa Ricans were so many, that in the event of the enemy’s appearance on the river, it was supposed some news of the fact would soon reach Rivas. It was many days before the steamers finally appeared on the lake, and then their movements indicated that they were in the hands of the Allies. In the meantime, the steamer Sierra Nevada, which had been waiting at San Juan del Sur for the passengers, sailed for Panama; and it was not until her return on the 24th of January, that Walker heard definitely the events which had transpired on the river, and of Lockridge’s presence at Punta Arenas, with a body of immigrants for Nicaragua.

Previous to the return of the Sierra Nevada from Panama, Capt. Finney had been sent with about fifty Rangers as far as Nandaime, in order to ascertain what news the people near Masaya had in reference to the steamers; and also to learn whether or not the enemy were making any movements of importance. Finney returned, reporting that he had gone as far as Nandaime without seeing the enemy or hearing any news indicating either an advance of Allies or a knowledge on their part of the capture of the steamers. The country between Nandaime and Rivas was quiet; the people were engaged in their usual domestic pursuits, and had not been troubled by detachments of the Allies.

In the meantime Rivas was prepared for defence. Soon after occupying the place, in December, Walker had given orders to Henningsen to strengthen the natural advantages of the position, so that a small garrison might be left there without risk to the military and other stores gathered in the town. In fulfilment of these orders, Henningsen had burnt most of the small huts on the edges of the town, and had cut away the thick tropical undergrowth which might conceal and protect an attacking foe. The nature of the ground in and about the place was well ascertained, and the numerous trails and by-paths of the neighborhood were examined. Strobel was, at the same time, engaged in surveying a more direct road than the one usually travelled from Rivas to Virgin Bay; and for this service he principally employed natives, who, with their machetes, are able to clear away rapidly the dense brushwood of that luxuriant soil and climate.

A small schooner, which had once belonged to the chief of the Mosquitos, was brought up the river and across the lake during the month of December; and having been purchased by the government, this vessel was undergoing repairs at the time the steamers made their appearance at Omotepe. On the 16th of January, Walker sent for Fayssoux to come to Rivas, in order to have his opinion as to the feasibility of using the schooner for re-taking the steamers. Fayssoux, although suffering at the time from fever, reached Rivas a few hours after he received the message; and on his arrival he said he thought the schooner would be of very little use for such a purpose. Afterward the vessel was burned, to prevent her from falling into the hands of the enemy; to hold the vessel securely it would have been necessary to keep a strong garrison at Virgin Bay.

Of course, the knowledge that the enemy held the river and the lake, diminished greatly the spirits and confidence of the troops at Rivas. But, although difficulties appeared to gather about the Americans in Nicaragua, they never for a moment relaxed their resolution to maintain strict order and discipline wherever they held sway. An extract from the log of the Granada for the 19th of January, shows the assistance her commander gave to a vessel of the very power which in a few short weeks manifested its gratitude for such services by capturing the Nicaraguan schooner. The log reads: “Crew employed on ship’s duty. Sent five men and an officer to assist the civil authorities to place the mutinous crew of the Narraganset (an American ship) on board of her. Lent her four hand-cuffs to iron them.” The fact may appear trifling, but, when read by the light of after events, it becomes instructive and characteristic.

After Mora had secured the San Juan river and the lake steamers, he established his headquarters at Fort San Carlos. Some days elapsed before he communicated with the Allies across the lake. His object, probably, was to get all the force he could command to the river, and so secure his communications between San Carlos and San José, previous to taking any step which might give Walker an opportunity of ascertaining the occurrences on the San Juan. When, however, he had, as he supposed, put the river in a proper state of defence, he crossed to Granada, and there met the chiefs of the allied forces. By the success of Costa Rica on the San Juan, she had obtained a preponderating influence in the counsels of the confederates, and hence there was little difficulty in having Cañas placed in command of the army at Masaya. The possession of the lake and river, and the closing of the Transit, gave new life to the leaders of the allied troops, and they determined to advance into the Meridional Department.

On the 26th of January Walker received news of the advance of the Allies toward Obraje, a small village on the south side of the Gil Gonzales, and about three leagues distant from Rivas. The same afternoon O’Neal with his Rifles, about 160 strong, and with a twelve-pound howitzer and a small four-pound brass piece, went to meet the enemy, reported as numbering 800 or 1,000 men. A company of Rangers also accompanied O’Neal; and Finney riding to the edge of Obraje came suddenly on a strong picket of the Allies and received their fire, himself mortally wounded, almost before he was aware of their presence. When O’Neal ascertained that the enemy held Obraje he halted for the night about a mile from the village. The next morning he sent forward a skirmishing party to feel the strength of the Allies, and the latter came out to meet the skirmishers in such force that O’Neal judged it prudent to recall his riflemen. In the skirmishing with the enemy O’Neal lost several men; and when his report of the apparent strength and confidence of the Allies reached Rivas, Henningsen was sent to Obraje to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. After a short time Henningsen reported the Allies occupying the principal square of the village, strongly barricaded and also protected by earthworks; and that the place could not be carried without a loss entirely disproportionate to its value and importance. On the receipt of Henningsen’s report Walker ordered the Rifles to fall back to Rivas.

The enemy remained in Obraje during the morning of the 28th; but about nightfall of that day some Americans from San Jorge brought the news of small bodies of the Allies being seen in the outskirts of this village, situated near the lake shore and about two miles to the east of Rivas. By eight o’clock in the evening Cañas was in San Jorge, and his force was busily engaged in building barricades and other defences. The rapidity with which Central American troops throw up barricades is almost incredible, and long practice has made them more expert at such work than even a Parisian mob. Hence, in a few hours, all the streets leading into the square of San Jorge, as well as the houses around the Plaza, were strongly barricaded. The secrecy, however, of the march from Obraje, no less than the rapidity with which the barricades at San Jorge had been built, showed that the Allies were not disposed to meet the Americans in the open field or to come to a decisive action. It was clear that they desired to hold San Jorge in order to communicate with Mora on the lake, and thus to secure more strength for future offensive operations. Therefore, Walker determined to attack them at once.

On the morning of the 29th, Henningsen marched to San Jorge with the 1st and 2d Rifles, Jaquess’ Infantry, some Rangers, a twelve-pound howitzer, and a six-pounder. Next in command to Henningsen was Sanders. They soon succeeded in driving the enemy behind the barricades of the Plaza; but by some misunderstanding of Henningsen’s orders, Sanders, with a part of Lewis’ Rifles, became separated from the rest of the command, and reached a position to the north of the main square and near the road leading to the lake. Confusion ensued; and as the Americans had suffered rather severely from the enemy’s fire, they were drawn off to gain time for new dispositions. It appears that several of the officers had taken too much liquor during the morning, and did not apprehend clearly the purport of the orders they received. Besides this, there was a jealousy on the part of Sanders toward Henningsen, and the latter averred that the former afterward admitted he had done all in his power to frustrate the attack on San Jorge. It is certain Sanders was of a jealous disposition; and though he denied having made the admission above referred to, there can be little doubt that he was not altogether displeased at any incidents which tended to diminish the confidence of the general-in-chief and of the army in the skill and capacity of Henningsen.

After getting his force as far as possible out of the enemy’s fire, Henningsen reconnoitred more exactly the position of the Allies with a view of another attempt to carry their defences. Early in the afternoon, and before Henningsen had prepared for a second attack, the enemy sallied in strength from the barricades and made a vigorous effort to drive the Americans out of some plantain patches they were occupying. The number of riflemen among the plantains was not large at the time the Allies came suddenly and rather unexpectedly upon them; but the 12-pound howitzer was on the spot, and its discharges of cannister were very destructive to the enemy. Nothing can be more effective than this arm for brushing away a harassing foe from the plantain fields scattered around the edges of the towns and villages of Central America. On the occasion of the sortie the enemy made at San Jorge, the howitzer did the service—to make a moderate estimate—of at least fifty riflemen.

The repulse of the enemy among the plantains raised the spirits of the men; and late in the afternoon Henningsen again attacked the barricades. Lewis was to attempt to get a foothold on the north and east side of the Plaza, near the church, where the enemy kept its ordnance and other stores, while Jaquess with the Infantry was to try to effect a lodgment on the south side near the road leading toward Virgin Bay. Lewis’ men could not be brought to advance nearer than within eighty or a hundred yards of the barricades; but the Infantry made a gallant effort, though an unsuccessful one, to perform the part assigned it in the general assault. The Infantry had hitherto lacked opportunities for meeting the enemy; and some jests had been passed at their expense among the other corps of the army. Therefore Jaquess was now put on his mettle. He, followed by Major Dusenberry, led the men up toward the barricade with more courage than conduct; and for several seconds the Infantry received, without wincing, a most galling fire from the Allies. Jaquess was struck down by a ball in the loins, while Dusenberry fell at about the same moment mortally wounded. Thus losing their chief officers, the Infantry were checked at a critical moment and were obliged to retire, leaving several killed near the barricades and bringing off a number of wounded.

From the reports Walker received he was led to suppose that the ill success of the attack on San Jorge might be due in some degree to the want of cordial co-operation on the part of Sanders and other officers with Henningsen. There was always some little prejudice against the latter because of his European birth and education; and it is impossible even with the aid of long military habits to conquer or destroy such prejudices. Therefore Henningsen was recalled; but as Walker had little confidence in the capacity of Sanders for independent command, Waters was sent to San Jorge with orders which gave him the real control of the troops there. Soon, however, Waters reported that he thought it impossible to carry the place with the force then before it; and Sanders was accordingly ordered to return to Rivas.

The loss of the Americans on the 29th January was about eighty killed and wounded. Captains Russell and Wilkinson, both valuable officers, were killed; while Major Dusenberry died in a short time after he was brought to Rivas. Jaquess’ wound made him unfit for duty for many weeks; and Lieut. Col. Leonard was confined to his bed for months from the effects of that day at San Jorge. The loss of the enemy was also large, especially in the plantain patches where they met the howitzer. But it was difficult to get even an approximative report of the losses of the enemy. They kept their wounded carefully out of sight, sending them to Omotope and other points, and scattering them so as to make the numbers seem less than they were. So, too, when inquiries were made for men who disappeared, instead of letting it be known they were killed, the officers would represent that they had been ordered to some distant point. Thus the lake steamers were very serviceable to the Allies by enabling them to keep their wounded out of sight, and to prevent their large losses from affecting the spirits of those who escaped the American rifles.

On the afternoon of the 30th, Walker marched with the 1st and 2d Rifles (about 250 men in all) and a 12-pound howitzer to San Juan del Sur, with the double view of inspiring the troops with confidence by showing them that the Allies feared to meet them in the open field and of communicating with the steamer Orizaba, expected in port about the first of February. The march to San Juan was made in good time and with cheerful spirits, and no signs of the enemy appeared on the road. On the evening of the 1st of February the Orizaba arrived from San Francisco, bringing Captain Buchanan and some forty others for Nicaragua. The vessel was coaled, as usual, by men in the service of the State; and without aid from the government it might have been difficult for the steamers to get labor at reasonable rates. A marginal note in the log of the schooner Granada, written by Captain Fayssoux, shows whether or not American commerce had reason to be thankful to the authorities then at San Juan. In the body of the schooner’s log for the 2d of February we read, “Eleven of the crew employed coaling the Orizaba;” while in the margin we find the note: “M. Mars being drunk on board the Orizaba, and urging our crew to strike for higher wages, which they did, the captain and he got into a fight; I separated them, and sent Mars on shore, and persuaded the men to go on coaling.”

About 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the 2d, Walker marched from San Juan to Virgin Bay. At the latter place he ascertained that Cañas had been there with some four or five hundred men, and had retired as soon as he heard of the approach of the Americans. Early on the morning of the 3d the steamer La Virgen appeared off Virgin Bay, and the troops then in the village were carefully concealed, with the hope that the steamer might come up to the wharf. When, however, she got within a few hundred yards of the wharf, she stopped her engines, yet did not drop anchor, as if regarding the aspect of affairs on shore. After a while several tried to strike her pilot-house with the Minié musket; but their efforts were not very successful; and in a short time the steamer turned away from the wharf and proceeded toward San Jorge. Then the Americans resumed their march and reached Rivas about midday of the 3d.

On their return to Rivas the Rifles were ordered to get as much rest as possible during the afternoon and the early part of the night, since their services might be required before daybreak of the 4th. Not long after midnight of the 3d, Walker marched with about 200 of the Rifles toward San Jorge; and near a mile from Rivas, taking a road to the left, he entered the village, where the enemy lay, at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 4th of February. The Allies were taken entirely by surprise, and a select corps of volunteers, led on by Dr. McAllenny, penetrated to one of the main barricades of the Plaza and fired over its top at the enemy, running hither and thither across the square. But the main body could not be brought to sustain the advancing party before the enemy recovered from their surprise. Then it was too late to carry the barricades without great loss, and the Americans were drawn off to the edge of the village beyond the reach of the enemy’s small-arms. During the assault on the barricade Lieutenants Blackman and Gray were mortally wounded; and while the Americans were on the edge of the village O’Neal received his death-wound. By eight o’clock A.M. on the 4th, the Americans had returned to Rivas.

During this attack on San Jorge, Jerez was wounded in the face, and for some days there were reports of his death; but the hurt was less dangerous than represented, and he soon recovered from its effects. The loss of O’Neil was a more severe blow to the Americans than any they inflicted on the Allies. Young and enthusiastic, he was not without the quick perception and rapid decision which fit a man for command in moments of danger. He was almost a boy in age, not twenty-one, at the time of his death; but the mind matures rapidly on the battle field, and he had by nature the true sentiment of the soldier which tells him that it matters little whether death comes soon or late, so it finds him in the performance of duty. He lingered for several days after he was carried back to Rivas, and probably his gallant spirit would have preferred to go forth from the world amid the storm of battle. But anxious eyes watched over his last agonies, and there was none in camp who was not saddened when the news of his death spread through the town.

It was while Walker was at San Juan del Sur that printed proclamations from Rafael Mora—promising deserters protection and free passage to the United States—were first scattered in the suburbs of Rivas. At the same time letters were addressed to Americans, signed by those who had deserted from Granada and elsewhere, urging officers and men to desert Walker and go over to the enemy. This was an entire change in the policy of Costa Rica. Not a year before, Mora had declared a war of extermination against the “filibusters;” now he attempted to make the war one against a single person, and besought the Americans to desert their leader. This change of policy, while it tacitly admitted that the war had failed in its objects, was also indicative of new counsellors in the cabinet of Costa Rica; it proved that other than Central American heads were busy in plotting the removal of the naturalized Nicaraguans from their adopted country. All Americans, however, are interested in having the names of these counsellors remain in the obscurity their deeds deserve.

While barricades were being built at Rivas and the town was more thoroughly prepared for defence, Col. Swingle was engaged in labors which added much to the efficiency of the artillery. The mechanical genius of Swingle was extraordinary. Besides the well-organized work-shops he established at Rivas, he got a small engine from San Juan del Sur and succeeded in producing a blast of air which enabled him to smelt iron, and thus he cast the first cannon-balls ever made in Central America. The scanty supply of balls had been a serious obstacle to the employment of the artillery, and for some time it was necessary to use such as could be moulded with lead. As the supply of lead was limited, it would not do to put a great deal of it into the shape of cannon balls. A number of bells had been gathered from the towns and villages of the Meridional Department, and from these Swingle cast round shot, more effective, though also dearer, than those made of iron.

On the morning of the 7th of February, a supply of round shot having been procured, Henningsen, supported by the Rifles, proceeded to San Jorge to give the enemy a cannonade. He prepared some empty musket-boxes in order to construct a breastwork rapidly and without annoyance from the enemy. While it was yet dark he reached a point about six hundred yards from the lines of the Allies, and before daybreak his work was so far complete as to enable the men to proceed without interruption by the fire from the Plaza. The breastwork being finished, the six-pounders were fired rapidly and with much accuracy. The impression made on the Allies was apparent, though they affected to say that the balls did small damage. None of the Americans was hurt, and they returned to Rivas in good spirits at the work which had been done with so little expense. The object of these frequent attacks on the enemy was to keep them in a state of constant alarm, and besides the actual loss of the Allies in killed and wounded, the confusion into which they were thrown by the appearance of the Americans always enabled a few of the soldiers to desert. It was important, also, for Walker—while waiting the result of Lockridge’s effort to open the Transit—to let his troops see that they were not thrown entirely on the defensive.

It was necessary to inspire the Americans with confidence in their own strength, and to show them the weakness of the enemy in order to cure, if possible, the fearful epidemic—for it is a disease—of desertion which had begun to demoralize the force at Rivas. Early in February a number of Rangers, with a commissioned officer, deserted and took the road to Costa Rica, carrying off their horses, saddles, and arms. The morning report of the 6th of February shows twenty desertions in twenty-four hours; that of the 8th of the same month shows six. Desertions at that time were the result of pure fright and restlessness; for the subsistence was unexceptionable, a large supply of flour and other provisions having been received from California during the month of January. Besides, the Rangers were then passing in bodies of ten and twelve through most parts of the Meridional Department and were able to bring in supplies of corn, tobacco, and sugar, for the troops. The spirit of desertion was rifest among those who had been in California; and the wandering habits there engendered made them restive under the restraints of military life. Americans, too, are accustomed to discuss public affairs with entire freedom; and it is difficult to cure them of the habit—most dangerous in camp—of expressing their opinions about public acts and events. Such discussions may often be fatal to the safety of an army; and thus, the habits of freedom, while they add to the courage of the citizen, may also diminish the fortitude unlicensed speech too often shakes. Foolish speech and the spread of absurd reports did more to foster desertion among the troops at Rivas than all the promises of the enemy or any privations to which they may have been subjected. Unfortunately, many officers were not much wiser than the men in this respect, and their discouraging remarks produced most pernicious effects. Such military faults, too, on the part of officers are hard to deal with; for the punishment of them may increase the evils they produce.

On the 6th of February, the United States sloop-of-war St. Mary’s, Commander Charles Henry Davis commanding, cast anchor in the port of San Juan del Sur; and a few days thereafter, on the 10th, Her Britannic Majesty’s steamer Esk, Commander Sir Robert McClure commanding, also anchored in the same harbor. On the 11th the log of the Granada reads: “At 9 A.M. the commander of the English ship sent on board to know my authority for flying a flag. He was answered by the authority of our government. At 6 P.M. he again sent on board using threats that he would take me prize or sink me if I did not proceed on board of him with my commission, which I refused to do. After making me three visits and threatening everything, the lieutenant insisted on my making a friendly visit to the commander, which I did.” As soon as the conduct of Sir Robert McClure was known at Rivas, orders were sent to Fayssoux not to hold or allow any of his officers or men to hold communication with the English commander, his officers or crew, and not in any manner to notice the presence of the Esk in port. In a few hours Sir Robert was in Rivas; and when informed that his conduct should be properly reported and brought to the attention of Her Majesty’s government, he was profuse in his apologies, saying he had not intended any insult to Fayssoux or his flag. After his apology, the order to Fayssoux was revoked. In the schooner’s log for the 13th we find: “At 11 A.M. Capt. Davis of the American sloop-of-war paid us an official visit. At 12 M. Capt. McClure returned my friendly visit.” The course of Sir Robert McClure illustrates the conduct of the British naval officers toward Nicaragua. Whenever they were properly met and resisted in the first instance they would draw back from their arrogant demands; but if they found only hesitation and concessions they pressed their interference with more determination after each successful act. On the 19th the Esk left for Punta Arenas.

Commander Davis, having sent word that he desired to visit Rivas on business, an escort was ordered to conduct him to the town, and on the 18th he arrived at headquarters. He spent the afternoon and night in Rivas, and in his conversations with Walker studiously addressed him as President. During his stay the officers who accompanied him passed freely through the camp, and seemed surprised at the cheerful aspect of the place. The commander stated to Walker that the captain of the Narraganset, a coal-ship at San Juan, would require her small boats, then in Rivas, before going to sea. These boats had been brought from the Transit some weeks previously, with a view of using them on the lake, but as they were now useless for this service, Walker told Davis he did not object to return them to the Narraganset. At the same time Walker mentioned to Davis that the lake and river steamers, belonging to the American owners of the ocean steamships between Nicaragua and the United States, were precisely analogous to the boats of the Narraganset, and if he asked for the latter he should also demand the former from the Allies. Morgan and Garrison could no more carry on their business of transporting passengers between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States without the property then in the hands of the Allies, than the Narraganset could go to sea without her small boats. Davis appeared to see the analogy of the cases, and said he would visit San Jorge after leaving Rivas, and speak with the Allied general on the subject.

From Rivas Davis went to San Jorge; but if he mentioned the lake and river steamers it must have been casually, and it was certainly without any result. He demanded to know from the Allied general whether the Americans on the small steamers were held against their will, for such was the current report through the country at the time. But he was satisfied with the simple assurance that these men served the Allies voluntarily. Of course any one familiar with the character and morals of Spanish-American officers, know that such assurances are readily given and really mean nothing. Davis, however, took no farther steps to ascertain the facts in relation to the Americans on the steamer, and this, with other facts, led Walker to see that the United States commander was more desirous of pressing demands against him than against the Allies. Hence, when the lieutenant of the St. Mary’s came up for the Narraganset’s boats, Walker told him he could not give them up unless Davis treated both parties to the war alike, and pressed his demands against the Allies with as much vigor as those he might make on the Nicaraguans.

During the latter part of February there were several encounters between the Rangers and small parties of the enemy. A few riflemen, too, would go out at night and alarm the camp of the Allies by firing on their pickets, and the enemy would, in the same manner, scatter small parties through the plantain patches and fire up the streets of Rivas. The Rangers in the employ of the commissary (of whom at one time there were about thirty) had some skirmishes with the Allies while the former were collecting subsistence for the Americans, and on the afternoon of the 4th of March the enemy took two wagons, several carts, and a number of oxen which had been sent out, in charge of the Rangers, for corn. This capture was made not more than a mile from Rivas, and on an estate belonging to the family of an officer in the Allied army.

On the evening of the 4th of March, Caycee, with some forty Rangers, was sent to San Juan del Sur as an escort to Col. Jaquess, Mrs. Dusenberry, the widow of the major mortally wounded at San Jorge, and others going to the United States. They arrived at San Juan without seeing the enemy; but on the 5th, as Caycee was returning to Rivas, he found himself unexpectedly in the presence of 200 of the Allies, just after he passed the Half-way House, and was about to leave the Transit road. The enemy took Caycee by surprise, and he lost six of his men, four killed and two wounded, before he was able to extricate himself from the fire of the Allies. He fell back to San Juan, and remained there until the 7th. In the meantime, Walker having learned, through a native boy, that a Costa Rican force had left San Jorge, and was on the way to the Transit, ordered Sanders to get the Rifles ready for marching. The boy who brought the information to Walker had seen the Costa Ricans pass along the hill-side while he lay hid in the bushes, and he had thus been able to count almost every man. He reported them about 200 strong, and Sanders was sent out to join Caycee with 160 of the Rifles. In the afternoon of the 5th, Sanders, while on the march toward the Transit, met the enemy near a league from the Jocote farm. The Rifles were much scattered when the Costa Ricans first appeared, and Captains Conway and Higley were engaged in deploying their companies on either side of the road when they received the enemy’s attack. The Costa Ricans came on briskly and with confidence; the Rifles, on the contrary, hesitated, and in spite of the efforts of their officers began to give way. Waters, who was with Sanders, made several ineffectual attempts to check the disorder into which the Americans fell, but he could not get the Rifles to make head against the Costa Ricans, and the latter continued to press the rear of the Americans until they reached the point where the road forked—one fork leading to Rivas, the other to San Jorge. The enemy took the road leading to San Jorge; and no doubt the idea that they were cut off from their main body, and the necessity of forcing their way back to Cañas, increased the vigor of their attack, and made them fight with more appearance of courage than was usual to them. Sanders’ loss was 28, of which there were 20 killed and 8 wounded. The large proportion of killed is explained by the fact that a number of the wounded were left on the field, and the enemy killed these when they came up. Higley and Conway, both excellent officers, were among the killed. For many hours there were numbers both of men and officers missing, but the most of these came into Rivas during the next day.

The Allies, elated by the result of the conflict with Sanders, marched a strong body into the plantain patches, to the east of Rivas and near the Plaza, about ten o’clock P.M. of the 5th. A deserter, who was with them, called out to the sentry not to fire as “they were Rangers;” but the fellow’s over-anxious tone betrayed his plans and the alarm was given. Some rounds of canister fired among the plantains soon scattered the allied force stationed there; and though the bugles continued to sound the charge, the spirit of the enemy did not seem equal to the attempt. The fire into the town had been short and rambling; but a musket-ball struck Dulaney, of the Artillery, in the throat, inflicting a painful though not dangerous wound.

On the afternoon of the 7th Caycee returned to Rivas with his Rangers and 70 footmen from California, in charge of Capt. Stewart. Arms had been furnished to the new men from the supply aboard of the Granada; and the steamer which brought these immigrants from California, also bore a quantity of arms and ammunition for the service of Nicaragua. Stewart’s men were formed into a corps called the Red Star Guard, and they were put under the command of Major Stephen S. Tucker, formerly of the U. S. Mounted Rifles. Tucker was an excellent officer, punctual in the discharge of his duties, and rigid in exacting from others the performance of theirs. The captain of the Guard, Stewart, was a noisy, talkative man, whose ideas about public affairs had been derived principally from grogshop assemblies in the mining villages of California; and Tucker’s ideas of discipline and duty were quite distasteful to a man whose habit it was to fawn on people in order to secure their good-will and favor. From the beginning, Tucker was strict with his men, and aspired to make them the best soldiers in Rivas. For a time he succeeded admirably; and it is probable he might have done more with the Guard in the end, had it not been for the foolish talkativeness of its captain.

The day after Stewart and his men arrived, the whole force in Rivas was paraded on the Plaza, and Walker addressed them with a view of raising their spirits after the depression of Jocote, and Caycee’s mishap on the Transit. He reviewed the course the Costa Ricans took in the opening of the war, and contrasted it with the policy the Allies had since adopted, thereby showing that they had been humbled in their conflict with the Americans. He also alluded to the efforts made to seduce the troops from their allegiance to the flag, by representing their chief as selfish and ungrateful. It was, he said, an insult to Americans to suppose, that they served a chief; they served a cause and not a man; and when the Allies asked, what reward they had received or what thanks had been bestowed for the sufferings at Rivas, at Masaya, and at Granada, they recalled names that should fill the souls of soldiers with devotion and enthusiasm to the cause in which they were engaged. The address was brief; but it had an effect on those who heard it, and for several days the spirit of the garrison was better than it had been.

On the 13th, Caycee, with his Rangers, went to San Juan for the purpose of bringing to Rivas the letters and papers brought by the Sierra Nevada from Panama. Titus was a passenger on the steamer, and had been intrusted, so Lockridge afterward said, with the official report of events on the river; but Walker did not get this report until many days after Titus’ arrival at Rivas, and then in the shape of duplicates by the next vessel with mails from San Juan del Norte. Hence, for some time, the chief information as to affairs on the San Juan was derived from Titus, and this, as may be readily imagined, was of very inaccurate character. This person, Titus, had not been at Rivas long, before his reports were regarded as wholly worthless; for, during the sickness of one of Walker’s aides, Titus was requested to act, for the time, on the staff of the general-in-chief. The first duty on which he was sent, required him to approach a point where the Allies and Americans were in presence of each other; and Titus, not venturing within range of the enemy’s fire, received a statement from a soldier and brought it to headquarters as a report of facts. A moment after Titus’ return, Henningsen rode up, and reported to Walker a state of facts entirely the reverse of Titus’ report. Of course, the services of Titus were immediately dispensed with.

From the first, Walker placed no confidence in the statements of Titus about affairs on the river. No commission was given to Titus; on the contrary, when he requested to be sent to the United States with authority to act for Nicaragua, his application was refused. Although possessed of some plausibility, he could lead only superficial observers astray as to his real character. He had too much the air of the bully, to gain credit for either honesty or firmness of purpose. His future conduct will hereafter be related; and from it may be learned something of the man who, when he left New-Orleans, boasted that in not many days the San Juan river would be open to the Americans.

At two o’clock on the morning of the 16th, Walker marched for San Jorge, with about 400 effective men, two iron six-pounders, one twelve-pound howitzer, and four small mortars. Henningsen accompanied the force with the view of directing the operations of the artillery. The force of the enemy had been swelled to upward of 2,000 men, by fresh troops from Guatemala and Costa Rica; and only the day before a body of 400 or 500 had been carried on the lake steamer from Tortugas, about ten leagues south of Virgin Bay, to the camp at San Jorge. By daybreak, however, the Americans had possession of a small church, about six hundred yards from the Plaza, where the enemy lay. Soon after the position was secured, the six-pounders opened on the Allies, men being stationed in the trees so as to watch where the balls struck; for the dense vegetation about the town made it impossible to get an open view of the square, and thus the pointing of the guns was to some extent conjectural. Twelve-pound shells were also thrown from the mortars; and had there been a larger supply of shells, the fire of the mortars would have accomplished much. Even the small number of shells thrown were not without effect on the enemy. As one of the characteristic incidents of the day, it may be mentioned, that while the artillery firing was going on, Col. Henry, who had been left in bed at Rivas, rode up on his mule, and received another bullet from the enemy before the day was over.

While the artillery was engaged in pouring round shot and shell into the Plaza, Tucker, with the Red Star Guard, was throwing up a breastwork some seventy or eighty yards to the left, and in advance of the church Walker occupied. The ground where Tucker was at work touched the road leading straight into the Plaza; and he was preparing it for the reception of a gun which might thence have told with much effect on the Allies. The enemy, however, observed Tucker’s men, and before the breastwork was complete, several hundred of the newly-arrived Costa Ricans sallied from the Plaza, and advancing through the plantain walks, fell with fury on the Red Star Guard. Tucker fought fiercely for several minutes, his men showing fine spirit, and doing good work with their Minié muskets. But the strength of the enemy was such, as to force him to retire to the church, after the loss of several killed and wounded.

The several roads and bye-paths in the rear, and on the flanks of the American main position at the church, were well watched and guarded by the Rangers, as well as by some companies of Infantry and Rifles. Captain Northedge’s company on the left, was assailed about the same time with Tucker; but he held his position, and the enemy retired. There was more or less skirmishing on the flanks and rear, while the Artillery was exhausting its supplies of shot; after some three hundred and fifty rounds had been fired, it was clear that few of the enemy remained in the Plaza, and that they were taking positions on the road between San Jorge and Rivas, with a view of harassing, if not of preventing the return of the Americans to the latter place. The delay in the re-appearance of some Rangers sent to Rivas to ascertain whether the road to that place was open, showed that the Allies were attempting to occupy it. The enemy thus having almost entirely deserted San Jorge, and offering action along the road to Rivas, Walker decided to accept the offer.

Placing, then, Waters with the Rangers in front, and Henningsen with the twelve-pound howitzer in the rear, while the wounded and the six-pounders occupied the centre of the column, Walker took the main road from San Jorge to Rivas. As he approached a small rise in the road, near a mile from San Jorge, the general-in-chief found Waters engaged with the enemy, posted some hundred and fifty or two hundred yards in advance, on each side of a deep cut in the road. The Rangers had been engaged for several minutes when the general-in-chief came up; and when Walker saw how the Allies were posted, taking the nearest company, which happened to be that of Captain Clark of the Infantry, he made a detour to the right, and coming suddenly on the enemy’s left flank, drove them across the road, and then from their whole position. Thus sweeping the road as they passed over it, the Americans reached the point known as Cuatro Esquinas, near half a mile from Rivas, without further serious interruption from the Allies. Several times they tried to close on the rear but the resolute and defiant air of Henningsen, kept them at a safe distance.

While Walker was at San Jorge, Swingle remained in command at Rivas; and the enemy had once during the day approached the barricades, thinking they might enter the town with small risk. But Swingle was not a man to be trifled with; and the Allies soon gave up their efforts to get a foothold in the place. Then they occupied a house some six hundred yards from the Plaza of Rivas, and near the road between the town and the Cuatro Esquinas. The enemy had, during the afternoon, strongly barricaded this house, and as the head of the American column approached it, the Allies opened a sharp fire of musketry from the loop-holes they had cut through the walls of the building. The Americans were, to some extent, protected by the shelving ground between the house and the road, and many of them thus passed without much danger from the enemy’s fire; but several were hurt before they got under a steep bank which entirely screened them from the balls of the Allies. Walker himself pushed on to Rivas, and ascertaining that the road to the left from Cuatro Esquinas was clear of the enemy, sent orders to Henningsen to have the wounded brought in by that road. He also sent orders to have the guns brought in the same way; but before these orders reached Henningsen, the guns were already on the narrow road the main body had taken, and could not be withdrawn. After the general-in-chief passed the house the Allies occupied, Dolan, coming up with his Rifles, rode almost on to the muskets of the enemy, calling to his men to follow. His characteristic impetuosity carried him too far; he fell bleeding and apparently nigh dead, from several severe wounds; and he is indebted to a remarkably tough body for his recovery from the effects of that day’s rashness. Soon after dark nearly all the American force had reached the Plaza of Rivas; but it was not before morning of the 17th that the guns and mortars were safely within the barricades.

The loss of the Americans on the 16th of March was thirteen killed and sixty-three wounded, four of the latter mortally. Among the mortally wounded was Lewis, of the Second Rifles. He received a musket-ball through the chest as he rode into the midst of the enemy near San Jorge; and among his last words were, “Tell my mother that I died as I have always wished to die.” Tucker was wounded in the sword hand; but not so seriously as to prevent him from reporting for duty a few days afterward. The Red Star Guard suffered severely, they reporting on the 17th two killed, four mortally wounded, and nearly half their number more or less hurt. The loss of the Allies was, according to the reports of their own officers, five hundred killed and wounded. An Italian, acting as an officer with the Allies, and afterward taken prisoner, put their loss at this figure; and a Costa Rican officer, who arrived at San Jorge on the 17th, and was made prisoner by the Americans on the 11th of April, stated that the sight of the numerous wounded being carried to the lake steamer, as the new men from Tortugas landed, made a deep and gloomy impression on the minds of the latter.

On the 19th, Colonel Waters, with fifty Rangers, marched to San Juan del Sur to communicate with the steamer Orizaba, which arrived that day from San Francisco. The steamer brought Captain Chatfield, with twenty others, for Nicaragua, and also some arms and five hundred 6lb. shot. Waters had three hundred of the shot carried to Rivas; and Chatfield, with his men, accompanied the Rangers on their return. By the Orizaba, Walker also received letters from his California correspondents, more than intimating doubts of Garrison’s fidelity to his contracts and compromises. The regular day for the sailing of the Orizaba was the 20th of March; and the friends of Nicaragua in San Francisco had made their arrangements expecting she would sail at that time. Two or three days, however, before the 5th of March, letters were received from Morgan and Garrison by their agents at San Francisco, ordering the Orizaba to be despatched two weeks in advance of her regular day. The change was damaging to the plans of Walker’s friends in California; and the inference was that the Transit contractors were about to play false with the men who had risked much to advance their interests.

The day after the action at San Jorge and along the road between that town and Rivas, the Allies received fresh troops, and also brought across the lake one of the old 24-pound pieces the Spaniards left in the country. They took a position on a slight eminence, about 1,200 yards from Rivas, just beyond the Cuatro Esquinas; and, on the 22d of March, planting the twenty-four pounder there, they opened a scattering and irregular fire on the town. The 24-pound balls were, at long intervals, sent into the place, doing, however, little or no damage. They were picked up by the men and carried to the arsenal; and Swingle afterward melted them into 6-pound balls and sent them back to the enemy. But the cannonade—if such it might be called—of the 22d, was preliminary to an attack the Allies made early on the morning of the 23d.

On Monday, the 23d, just before daybreak, a body of some four or five hundred of the enemy crept under the thick shades of the cacao walks, behind the Maleaño house, and getting almost to the back gate of the hospital before they were discovered, made a vigorous attempt to get within the building. But Dr. Dolman, with a few half-sick men, resisted the enemy with such firmness and composure, that time was afforded Dr. Callaghan, who had charge of the point, to get the hospital ready for defence. The Allies thus foiled in their efforts to surprise the Maleaño house, were driven back with much loss and more disgrace: for they had unsuccessfully, no less than cruelly, attacked a building occupied almost exclusively by the sick and wounded.

The attack on the hospital was, however, part of a general assault on the positions held by the Americans. On the north side of the town, Cañas, with some six or seven hundred men, tried to get up to the houses near the barricades, but his men were driven back by the deadly fire of the riflemen stationed behind the adobe defences. Finding the efforts of the infantry to approach the barricades ineffectual, Cañas had a four-pounder, in charge of an Italian, pushed within less than two hundred yards of the American lines. This was a bolder movement than the enemy were in the habit of making with their artillery, and it was the result of a mistake rather than of design. The gun was fired two or three times; but when it got within range of the Mississippi Rifles the men at the piece began to fall rapidly, and finally abandoned it. The Italian commanding the piece was dangerously wounded and made prisoner; and Rogers, with a few of the native Nicaraguans, took the gun and dragged it into the town. Cañas was forced to retire, leaving many of his wounded, as well as a large number of his dead, on the field.

The south side of the town was attacked by Fernando Chamorro with some six hundred men. He succeeded in getting possession of some empty houses not more than a square from the Plaza, and commenced with the usual rapidity to raise barricades at the points he occupied. The Red Star Guard was defending the portion of the town attacked by Chamorro, and Tucker was kept busy in repelling the advances of the enemy. At one time a company of the Allies actually got possession of a house which had been occupied by the Guard; but though a bold, it was a mistaken movement on their part, for the Guard cut them off from their main body, and killing several, and wounding others, as they attempted to leave the house, Tucker’s men took the rest of the company prisoners. With some difficulty Henningsen succeeded with the six-pounders in driving Chamorro from the houses he had occupied early in the day, and after this was accomplished the fire of the enemy almost entirely ceased.

The loss of the Americans on the 23d was slight; three killed and six wounded was the report made immediately after the action. The loss of the enemy must have been near 600. They left between 40 and 50 dead on the field; and the wells about the houses Chamorro occupied were filled with freshly-slain bodies. The wounded taken by the Americans were sent to the hospital, and received the same attentions as the other patients. The other prisoners were set to work burying the dead of the enemy, building barricades, and doing the police duty of the town.

After the action of the 23d, the Allies took possession of the house of D. José Maria Hurtado, a fine large building, less than half a mile from Rivas, on the road to Granada; and on the morning of the 24th, a body of the enemy, probably belonging to the troops stationed at Hurtado’s house, attempted to set fire to the building of Santa Ursula, occupied by some of the Infantry. They used for this purpose some combustibles covered with resinous matter, and stuck on a bayonet fixed to the end of a long pole. Approaching the rear of the building, the enemy thrust the bayonet between the tiles of the roof into the cane on which they are placed, and thus the fire partially caught. But the Infantry drove off the troops which applied the fire, killing several and wounding others, and the flames were soon extinguished.

During the afternoon of the 25th Henningsen used a safer and more effectual method for setting fire to the enemy’s barricades, made partly of wood and plantain stalks. He threw a number of hot shot from one of the six-pounders into the wood-work of the barricades, and the smoke which arose showed that the shot had been effectual. As a supply of round shot had been received from California, and Swingle was engaged in casting others, the Americans could afford to reply with their six-pounders to the fire of the enemy’s guns, and yet retain a reserve of balls for any pressing emergency. This, of course, much increased the effectiveness of the artillery, and enabled it to keep the Allies at a safe distance from the lines of Rivas. After the repulse of the 23d, the enemy evidently aimed to invest the town and cut off its supplies; and, in addition to the occupation of Hurtado’s house, they took a position on the San Juan road. This last position was taken on the morning of the 26th, and in an unsuccessful effort made by some Infantry and Rifles, Capt. E. H. Clark was unfortunately lost. With their ranks already thinned by desertion, the Americans could ill afford to spare the lives necessarily lost in driving the Allies from their barricaded positions with small arms; and the artillery, forcing the enemy to extend their lines, thereby prevented the investment from becoming complete. Hence Walker had no difficulty in constantly sending native couriers through the allied lines, in order to get the news circulating in the country.

The Allies were, however, strong enough to prevent detachments from bringing cattle and other supplies from a distance into the American camp. Col. Natzmer, who acted as commissary-general after Walker occupied Rivas in December, had been actively employed during January and February, and had brought in a supply of subsistence which, considering the means at his disposal, was creditable to his skill and efficiency. The post commissary, also, Capt. J. S. West, had much aided his chief in the duties of the commissariat; and even after the enemy had cut off supplies from a distance, West, by his cool, deliberate courage, did much to gather rations of plantains from the debateable and dangerous ground between the American and Allied lines. But on the 27th of March, it became necessary for the commissary to have two quartermaster’s oxen killed; and these, with a slight mixture of mule meat, furnished the rations for the next morning. The mule meat was eaten by the troops as beef; and in two or three days none but horse or mule flesh was issued as the meat ration. The large number of horses and mules belonging to the Rangers and to the quartermaster, furnished full rations to the whole camp for more than a month, and the leaves of the mango trees, many of which grew around Rivas, furnished excellent forage for the animals. In order not to place Lockridge in a false position, should he succeed in reaching Rivas from the river, Walker was determined to hold the town as long as his provisions lasted. Besides this, although Cañas, in return for the care taken of his sick and wounded, after his retreat in April, 1856, had been placed under obligations to see that the Americans were treated in the same manner, Walker was averse, unless in the last extremity, to leaving his hospital to the tender mercies of the Allied generals.

During the last days of March and the first ten days of April, the enemy, having brought up another twenty-four-pound gun and placed it on the south side of the town, kept up an irregular fire with their large pieces, and from time to time they would fire volleys of musketry at random, the balls dropping on the houses and in the streets of the place. Few men were hurt by this irregular fire. Two officers, Capt. Mann and Lieut. Moore, were killed by twenty-four pound balls, and the officer of the day, on the 29th of March, Lieut. Graves, had his arm broken by a Minié ball, while he was visiting on horseback the several points on the edge of the town. The aides of the general-in-chief, Hooff and Brady, who were constantly, day and night, passing through different exposed quarters of the place—Brady, too, on a fine spirited white horse, which necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy—escaped untouched. Every now and then, small parties of Americans were sent beyond the lines, and getting close to the enemy’s pickets would drive them in, nearly always killing or wounding some of the sentries of the Allies. So, too, the enemy would sometimes meet the Americans when they ventured outside to gather plantains, and skirmishes, with more or less loss to each side, would ensue.

But it was not the scanty rations or the fire of the Allies which did most injury to the American force; it was the shameful desertion which most affected the spirits and the strength of the defenders of Rivas. As long as the desertion was confined principally to those of European birth, it did not so seriously sap the confidence men had in each other; but when the fatal infection spread among the Americans, it wrung bitter tears of agony from every true-hearted man who witnessed the shame and dishonor of his countrymen. Sometimes the deserters left in bodies of ten or twelve, and the sentries and pickets would leave with the countersign for the night. Let us pass the names of these with sorrow for the weakness of human nature, nor taint the air with the narration of their crimes and degradation. There is shame and infamy enough in the world without seeking for them on fields where glory should be won and honor achieved.

A day or two before the 10th of April the Allies received a body of fresh troops from Guatemala, and the quiet of the enemy on the 10th led to the surmise that they might select the anniversary of the action at Rivas, in April, 1856, for another general attack on the American lines. They supposed that the force in Rivas, weakened by its unusual food and disheartened by desertions might yield readily to a vigorous assault made on all sides at the same moment. But they underrated the spirit of their adversaries. The Nicaraguans really hoped that the Allies would find courage to attack them, and they were vigilant and well prepared during the night of the 10th and on the morning of the 11th.

As expected, the enemy came up a little before daybreak of the 11th, and made their first dash at a house on the south side of the Plaza, occupied by a couple of American ladies. The latter had been frequently warned of the danger of their position, but they persisted in remaining where they were against the remonstrances of several officers. This attempt of the enemy to gain a foothold on the Plaza was made by a body of Costa Ricans, and guided by a Legitimist, Bonilla, familiar with the ground, they got close to the house and were within it before the alarm was given. But as they opened the door fronting on the Plaza, with a view of getting to the house next on their right, and held by some of the quartermaster’s men, Sevier, of the Artillery, ran out a twelve-pound howitzer, not thirty yards from the Costa Ricans, and one round of canister drove the enemy behind the adobes. Thus the advance of the Allies was checked on the south side, and the company in the house, fronting the Plaza, was completely cut off by the quartermaster’s men on one flank, Williamson with his company on the other, and by Pineda with Buchanan’s Rangers in the rear. In a few moments Henningsen began to riddle the house with six-pound shot, and the Costa Ricans, crouching on the ground, knew not how to escape the danger which surrounded them. Finally Pineda, addressing them in Spanish, called on them to surrender, and those who escaped death were taken prisoners.

But while the round shot were riddling the house held by the Costa Ricans, the fresh Guatemalan troops, half drunk with aguardiente, were driven up by their officers close to the American lines. These soldiers, probably never before in action, and not aware of the danger from rifles, exposed themselves without reason, at a distance of sixty or seventy-five yards from the positions held by McEachin and McMichael. The men under these two officers poured a deadly fire into the foolish and ignorant Indians Carrera had sent to Nicaragua; and it was with a feeling almost of pity for these forced levies that the Americans were obliged to shoot them down like so many cattle. The Guatemalan officers cared no more for their men than if they were sheep; and when they finally drew off their troops the ground was thickly strewn with the dead and the wounded.

The third point of attack on the 11th was the house of Santa Ursula. Martinez directed the Allies on that side; but he was not more fortunate than Mora—for José Joaquin Mora was now commander-in-chief of the Allies—on the south or than Zavala on the north. The men Martinez sent against Santa Ursula did not make as bold a dash as did the Costa Ricans at the house on the south side of the Plaza, nor did they expose themselves as unnecessarily as the Guatemalans in front of McMichael and McEachin; but the number of dead they left on the field when they retired showed that Chatfield and the men at Santa Ursula had not missed opportunities for weakening the enemy. The repulse of the Allies was complete on all sides; and when they fell back, it was clear that they were much exhausted and demoralized.

The loss of the Americans on the 11th of April was small, being the same as on the 23d of March three killed and six wounded. The loss of the Allies was even greater than at the previous attack. After the enemy retired 110 of their dead were buried by the Americans; the wounded prisoners were sent to the Allied camp under a flag of truce, and upward of 70 unhurt prisoners retained. In addition to the dead found by the Nicaraguans, nearly one hundred bodies were seen the day after in the Allied camp, so that the killed exceeded 200. The whole loss must have amounted to 700 or 800; and the weakness of the enemy for several days was very apparent to the troops in Rivas. In addition to the prisoners taken by the Americans, 250 small arms, many of them Minié muskets, and some ammunition, were picked up on the field. The Minié muskets were those which had been taken from the steamer La Virgen at the time of her capture by Spencer; and the ammunition also was of that the Costa Ricans had got with the Minié muskets.

The night of the 11th, Capt. Hankins, with two native boys, was sent to San Juan del Sur to get the correspondence brought from Panama by the Orizaba. On the night of the 14th he returned to Rivas, and added to the commissary stores by riding in on horseback. The letters from the San Juan river gave the news of the arrival of Capers and Marcellus French with their respective commands; while those from New-York too well confirmed the surmises of Walker’s friends in California, for they gave notice of the intention of Garrison and Morgan to cease running their steamers. It is unnecessary to go into the reasons which induced these men to the course they took; for it would involve an investigation into transactions uninteresting if not positively distasteful. Suffice it to say that their conduct was the result of weakness and timidity. As to their treachery, Walker had expected them to remain faithful to the Americans in Nicaragua only as long as their interests required fidelity; he expected them, however, to show more commercial nerve and sagacity than they displayed. Their course evinced as much folly as timidity, and jeoparded their reputation of skilful merchants fully as much as it damaged their character for honesty and integrity.

From the 14th to the 23d, a number of skirmishes took place between parties of the enemy and small bodies of the Americans who went out to gather plantains; but none of these was serious or deserving of special notice. One of these skirmishes occurred on the morning of the 23d; and in the afternoon of the same day, a flag of truce brought letters to Walker announcing that Lieut. Huston, of the St. Mary’s, was at the headquarters of the Allies, and was ready, under the United States flag, to conduct the women and children in Rivas to San Juan del Sur. A letter from Mora to Walker proposed to send two of his aides with Lieut. Huston to a convenient-point between the camps, where the United States officer might be met by two of Walker’s aids, and be thus conducted into Rivas. In accordance with this proposition, Hooff and Brady accompanied the native boy who bore the letters from Mora to a point about half way between the camps, and there halted, waiting the approach of Lieut. Huston. While these two officers waited, a couple of deserters approached and attempted to address them; but Hooff, drawing his pistol, warned the fellows off under peril of their lives. Then, indignant at the Allies for permitting such an insult as the approach of deserters to officers bearing a flag of truce, Hooff and Brady returned to Rivas without waiting longer the arrival of Lieut. Huston. Soon after, however, Lieut. Huston entered the town, accompanied by a corporal of marines.

Immediately after Lieut. Huston entered the Nicaraguan camp, he was told to forbid his corporal to speak with the soldiers about facts or events at San Juan del Sur. In spite of this injunction the marine told the most exaggerated stories about the number of men the Allies had at San Juan, and about their strength generally. Lieut. Huston remained in Rivas during the night of the 23d, and he frequently expressed his surprise at the cheerful and confident aspect of affairs in the place. Before leaving with the women, he informed Walker that Commander Davis had ordered him to say any communications he had to make to Macdonald, the agent of the Transit contractors at San Juan, should be faithfully delivered. Walker replied, “he did not desire to write to Macdonald”; but added that Lieut. Huston might say to Commander Davis—and as a communication for Macdonald—“he considered his position at Rivas impregnable to the force at the disposal of the enemy so long as his provisions lasted; if Lockridge did not join him in Rivas by the time his commissary stores were exhausted, he would abandon the place and join the force on the San Juan; and he considered himself wholly able to carry out such a movement.” Macdonald afterward told Walker that he never received this message. From this fact, it would appear that Davis’ offer was a mere effort to entrap Walker into writing something which might seem to justify the former in the course he afterward took.

On the morning of the 24th the women and children left Rivas in charge of Lieut. Huston and under the protection of the United States flag. Among them were several ladies who had encountered the dangers and privations of the camp with a courage and fortitude which might have made many of the men blush. Their departure was a great relief to Walker, as it removed one of the most serious obstacles to a movement from Rivas; and it was reasonable to suppose that their absence would inspire new spirit and resolution into the troops thus relieved of an anxious burden. Far from this, however, desertions, which had almost ceased since the 11th, re-commenced after the 24th; and by the 26th Johnson and Titus and Bostwick had disappeared from Rivas. Late in the afternoon of that day it was reported to Walker that Bell, commanding at Santa Ursula, had not been seen for several hours; and when he did re-appear, his orders in regard to the change of the sentries’ post, were suspicious. He was ordered to headquarters; but soon after the aid communicated the order, Bell mounted his mule, and riding hastily past the sentries, fled to the Allied camp.

But while Americans were thus proving false to themselves and false to their countrymen, the native Nicaraguans in Rivas were giving an example of fidelity and fortitude worthy the race which had been naturalized in their midst. The natives in Rivas were mostly Democrats from San Jorge, and they were there by families—fathers and sons fighting together against the Allied foes who had violated their fields and their homes. They bore the scanty fare of the camp with patience and cheerfulness, saying they had not as much need of meat rations as the Americans, who were accustomed to have beef every day. During the frequent conversations, too, which occurred between the men at the barricades of the respective forces, Pineda reminded the native Nicaraguans who were with the Allies that he saw the flag of his country flying on the walls of Rivas, while only the Costa Rican colors floated over the camp without. Some of the soldiers would reply to Pineda that they were “agarrados”—caught up—and were tied to their barricades; and it was noticed that the Americans were never annoyed by the fire from the points at which the Leoneses were stationed. On the 27th, Pineda threw among the Leoneses an address which, while it indicates the loftiness of his character, also shows his opinion as to the conduct of the Americans in Nicaragua. “Born,” so the address read, “a citizen of Nicaragua like yourselves, fond of liberty, and desirous of seeing its flag waving over our country, I early enlisted under that standard. All the hardships tyranny can heap upon a man, all the horrors of the civil war, which for so many years has been our plague, I have suffered without complaint. The scars I bear with pride are the best proof of what I say. I feel my enthusiasm yet more strengthened by the testimony I find in my heart that none of the heavy sacrifices I have made were made for low or selfish interest. Never, I believe, never have I been found guilty, at your hands, of any misconduct; and I call upon you to bear witness to the correctness of my words. You were my fellow-soldiers, and bestowed upon me your confidence. Under these circumstances, what other object than your happiness and welfare could nerve me? My own happiness, my reputation, my private feelings, and all that is mine, are involved in this struggle for liberty. Yes, and I call upon those leaders who drag you into this murderous war of extermination, to say if they have not been indemnified, if they have not accumulated profits by it, while you and I have received nothing. The flag of Nicaragua waves over this city, and it is a painful disgrace to see it besieged by the armies of Costa Rica and Guatemala, and you, my fellow-countrymen, assault it with them.” Then, reminding them of the services they had received at the hands of Walker, the address adds: “How is it that you, my friends, should fight against him, thus giving a most striking instance of perfidy and ingratitude? No: it cannot be. My heart is filled with gloom, and, fellow-soldiers, believe me when I say that tears fell from my eyes on hearing the voices of those who used to take my hand with heartfelt demonstrations of friendship. When I see you where you are, I dare tell you to awake from your slumber, and fly from the enemy’s ranks to the only man who will bring us in safety to the bosom of peace and happiness, by putting an end to this desolating war. But if you continue in your present course, and remain the tools of barbarism, you will meet reproof, though war may last some time and your own acts obstruct its termination.”