The Waterloo Campaign, 1815

On the right of the Third Division, nearest to the extremity of the ridge, and immediately opposite the Farms of Papelotte and La Haye, was posted the Fourth Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Durutte. Its First Brigade, under General Chevalier Pegot, consisted of the 8th and 29th Regiments of the Line; and its Second Brigade, under General Brue, of the 85th and 95th Regiments of the Line; all four Regiments comprising two Battalions each. These two Brigades were also deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.

The Cavalry attached to this Corps, which was the First Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Jaquinot, was posted in a valley on the right of the Infantry: having in its front the Village of Smohain, which it held in observation, as also the Château of Frischermont, on the right of the valley; at the same time throwing out Patrols in the direction of Ohain. It was deployed in three Lines. Its First Brigade, under General Bruno, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Chasseurs; and its Second Brigade, under General Gobrecht, of the 3rd and 4th Lancers.

The Artillery attached to the Infantry Corps, consisting of five Batteries of eight guns each (including a Reserve Battery of eight twelve pounders), was ranged along the front of the different Divisions respectively; and the Battery of Horse Artillery—six guns—attached to the First Division of Cavalry, was posted on the right of the latter.

The Left Wing of the Front Line of the French Army was formed by the Second Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Reille, comprising three Divisions of Infantry and one of Light Cavalry.

Its Right Division, which was the Fifth, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Bachelu, rested its Right upon La Belle Alliance, and was ranged along the descent from thence down into the valley, which, more westward, winds past Hougomont. The First Brigade of this Division, under General Husson, consisted of the 2nd Regiment of Light Infantry and the 61st Regiment of the Line, the former comprising two, and the latter, three, Battalions; and the Second Brigade, under General Baron Campy, of the 72nd and 108th Regiments of the Line, the former comprising two, and the latter, three, Battalions. The Brigades were deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.

On the Left of the Fifth Division, and upon the Height facing the southern boundary of Hougomont, stood the Ninth Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Foy. Its First Brigade, under General Baron Gauthier, consisted of the 92nd and 93rd Regiments of the Line, comprising two Battalions each. Its Second Brigade, under General Baron Jamin, consisted of the 4th Regiment of Light Infantry, and of the 100th Regiment of the Line, each comprising three Battalions. These two Brigades were, in like manner, deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.

On the left of the Ninth Division, and along the ridge of the western boundary of Hougomont, stood the Sixth Division, commanded by Prince Jerome Napoleon. Its First Brigade, under General Baron Bauduin, consisted of the 1st Regiment of Light Infantry and of the 3rd Regiment of the Line, the former comprising three, and the latter two, Battalions. Its Second Brigade, under General Baron Soye, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the Line, comprising three Battalions each. These two Brigades were also deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.

On the left of the Infantry, was posted the Light Cavalry attached to the Corps, namely, the Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Piré. Its First Brigade, under General Baron Hubera, consisted of the 1st and 6th Chasseurs; and its Second Brigade, under General Mathieu, of the 5th and 6th Lancers. It stood across the Nivelles high road, in three deployed Lines, rather under the crest of the ridge, on its reverse slope; and threw out Picquets in the direction of Braine l'Alleud, as also more to its left, thus keeping up a vigilant look out around this Flank of the Army.

The Second general Line of the French Army was formed in the following manner:—

In the Centre, close along the west side of the Charleroi high road, stood the Sixth Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Lobau. Only two of its Divisions, the Nineteenth and Twentieth, were present; the Twenty First was with the Army under Marshal Grouchy. Each of the two Divisions formed a Close Column of Battalions by Grand Divisions; the head of the Column of the Nineteenth Division being distant about a hundred yards in rear of the right of the Second Corps, and an interval of about two hundred yards was preserved between the rear of the Nineteenth Division and the head of the Column of the Twentieth Division.

The former was commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Simmer; and its First Brigade, under General Baron de Bellair, consisted of the 5th and 11th Regiments of the Line, the former comprising two, the latter, three, Battalions. Its Second Brigade, under General Simmer, consisted of the 27th and 84th Regiments of the Line, comprising two Battalions each.

The Twentieth Division was commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Jeannin: its First Brigade, under General Bony, consisted of the 5th Regiment of Light Infantry, and of the 10th Regiment of the Line; and its Second Brigade, under General Tromelin, of the 107th Regiment of the Line; all three Regiments comprising two Battalions each.

There were three Batteries of Foot Artillery, of eight guns each, attached to the Divisions, including one of reserve; as also a Horse Battery of six guns. They were posted on the Left Flank of the Corps.

On the right of these two Divisions of the Sixth Corps, and separated from them by the high road only, were stationed the Third Light Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Domon, and the Fifth Light Cavalry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Subervie (belonging to the First Cavalry Corps, commanded by General Count Pajol). They were formed in Close Column of Regiments by Squadrons. The First Brigade of the former, under General Baron Dommanget, consisted of the 4th and 9th Chasseurs; and the Second Brigade, under General Baron Vinot, of the 12th Chasseurs. The First Brigade of the Fifth Division, under General Count Colbert, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Lancers; and the Second Brigade, under General Merlin, of the 11th Chasseurs.

The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to these two Divisions, comprising six guns each, were posted on the Right Flank of the Column.

The Right Wing of the Second French general Line was composed of the Fourth Cavalry Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Milhaud, which was posted on a parallel ridge, in rear of the two central Divisions of the First Infantry Corps, and distant from them about two hundred yards. It was deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.

The Corps consisted of two Heavy Cavalry Divisions—the Thirteenth, commanded by Lieutenant General Wathier St Alphonse, and the Fourteenth, under Lieutenant General Baron Delort. The First Brigade of the Thirteenth Division, under General Dubois, consisted of the 1st and 4th Cuirassiers; the Second, under General Baron Travers, of the 7th and 12th Cuirassiers. The First Brigade of the Fourteenth Division, under General Baron Farine, consisted of the 5th and 10th Cuirassiers; and the Second, under General Baron Vial, of the 6th and 9th Cuirassiers.

The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to this Corps, comprising six guns each, were stationed, one in the Centre, and the other on the Left Flank.

The Left Wing of the French Second general Line, composed of the Third Cavalry Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Kellermann (Count de Valmy), was posted about two hundred yards in rear of the Centre of the Second Infantry Corps. It was deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first.

The Corps consisted of two Heavy Cavalry Divisions: the Eleventh, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron L'Heritier; and the Twelfth, under Lieutenant General Roussel d'Hurbal. The First Brigade of the Eleventh Division, under General Baron Picquet, consisted of the 2nd and 7th Dragoons; and the Second, under General Gniton, of the 8th and 11th Cuirassiers. The First Brigade of the Twelfth Division, under General Baron Blancard, consisted of the 1st and 2nd Carabiniers; and the Second, of the 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers.

The two Batteries of Horse Artillery attached to this Corps, comprising six guns each, were posted one upon each Flank.

The Third general Line, forming the Grand Reserve of the whole Line of Battle, and comprising the entire force of the Imperial Guards, Cavalry and Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant General Count Drouot, was thus formed.

The Infantry of the Imperial Guard constituted the Centre of the Reserve. It consisted of four Regiments of Grenadiers, four Regiments of Chasseurs, two Regiments of Tirailleurs, and two Regiments of Voltigeurs; each Regiment divided into two Battalions. The 1st and 2nd Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd of Chasseurs, formed the Old Guard, under Lieutenant General Count Friant; the 3rd and 4th Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 3rd and 4th of Chasseurs formed the Moyenne, or Middle, Guard, under Lieutenant General Count Morand; the four Regiments of Tirailleurs and Voltigeurs constituted the Young Guard under Lieutenant General Count Duhesme. This force was posted somewhat in advance of the Farm of Rossomme, in six Lines of four Battalions each, at a distance of twenty yards from one another, and so disposed that the Charleroi high road alone separated the two Right, from the two Left, Battalions of each Line. To each description of the Infantry of the Imperial Guard; the Old, the Middle, and the Young, Guard, two Batteries, of eight guns each, were attached. These were stationed on either Flank; and the Reserve Artillery of the Guard, consisting of twenty four guns, was posted in rear of these Lines.

The Right Wing of the Third Line, or Reserve, consisted of the Light Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Lieutenant General Lefèbvre Desnouettes, namely, the Chasseurs and Lancers of the Guard. It was posted at a distance of about two hundred yards in rear of the Fourth Cavalry Corps and deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first. The two Batteries of Horse Artillery belonging to the Corps, comprising six guns each, were posted in its centre.

The Left Wing of the Third Line, or Reserve, consisted of the Heavy Cavalry of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Lieutenant General Count Guyot, namely, the Grenadiers and Dragoons of the Guard. It was stationed in rear of the Third Cavalry Corps, and deployed in two Lines, the second at a distance of sixty yards in rear of the first. Its two Batteries of Horse Artillery, comprising six guns each, were posted in the centre.

This admirable order of battle, at once grand, simple, and imposing, and presenting to its skilful designer the most ample means of sustaining, by an immediate and efficient support, any attack, from whatever point he might wish to direct it, and of possessing everywhere a respectable force at hand to oppose any attack upon himself, from whatever quarter it might be made, was no less remarkable for the regularity and precision with which the several masses, constituting thirteen distinct Columns, advanced to their destined stations, than for the unusual degree of warlike pomp and high martial bearing with which the Lines drew up in this mighty battle array. The movements throughout were executed under the cheering and spirit stirring sounds of bugles, drums, and trumpets, sending forth the long cherished national military airs of the Republic and of the Empire. The weather had cleared up a little, and to the Anglo-Allied Army, the crowning of the opposite Heights by the French Lines, with all its accompanying circumstances, presented a magnificent spectacle.

Napoleon has frequently been blamed for having thus consumed some very precious time in a mere ostentatious display of his forces. Public opinion, however, should not suffer itself to be too easily influenced by the apparent justness of such censure, and it would be ungenerous to the established renown of the French Leader not to attach due weight to the following circumstances. In the account of the Battle attributed to the Emperor's own dictation, one cause of delay in commencing offensive operations is represented to have been the soft and miry state of the ground after the excessive rain which had fallen during the night; in consequence of which it was found impossible to manœuvre the Artillery and the Cavalry, and it was considered advisable to wait until the ground had, in some degree, resumed its natural consistency. When, therefore, the manœuvring of these two Arms was pronounced to be practicable, though attended with some difficulty, which, however, it was added, would gradually disappear; the employment of the interval in an orderly and a deliberate formation of a well-defined order of battle, was a measure scarcely questionable at the moment, however much the subsequent course of events may have proved that it militated against the chances of success on the part of the French.

The additional impulse which this imposing spectacle was calculated to impart to the moral force of his troops, is also well worthy of consideration. His soldiers, as they contemplated the extended double Front Line of Infantry, disposed as if about to enfold the Enemy in a deadly embrace, and the fluttering of gay lance flags on either extremity, indicating that its Flanks were duly protected; as they glanced at the Second general Line, a double one of Cavalry, superbly mounted, and proudly mailed in glittering helmet and cuirass; and, as they scanned the well disposed Reserves and serried Centre; their reliance on their own strength and in the resources of their Leader was unbounded, their anticipations of success were heightened, and their eager longing for the contest was greatly augmented. And while adverting to the grand spectacle in a moral point of view, it would be well to consider whether it may not have also been designed to exert a powerful influence on that portion of the Anglo-Allied forces with which the Emperor was tampering, in the full expectation of seeing them again range themselves under his victorious Eagles: but which Wellington, with judicious foresight and prompt address, broke up as a united body, and distributed among his British troops; thus securing himself against the possible enactment of a scene similar to that which so powerfully contributed to Napoleon's disaster on the plains of Leipzig.

But supposing it to be admitted upon these grounds that the delay of the attack, having once been determined, was judiciously and advantageously employed, we ought also to consider whether the delay itself may not have been superinduced by motives of far higher import.

Although the miry state of the ground has been put forward as the ostensible cause, can we for a moment imagine that Napoleon was the man to have allowed himself to be deterred by such an obstacle from commencing the attack at an earlier hour; had he, at the moment, been sufficiently acquainted with the actual state of things to foresee that the delay, together with the possibility of a lengthened contest, and of the approach of aid to the British General from the Prussian side, tended to render his situation one of extreme peril?

May we not rather be justified in inferring, that his object was to gain time for the due execution and successful development of Grouchy's operations! The despatch which the Emperor had received from Grouchy, dated Gembloux, 17th June, at 10 P.M. (see page 300), clearly explained that General's intentions, which were, that should the mass of the Prussian forces retire upon Wavre, he would follow them in that direction, so as to prevent them from either reaching Brussels or forming a junction with Wellington; but that if, on the other hand, they should fall back upon Perwès, he would advance towards that town in pursuit of them. In the former case, Napoleon's delay was likely to facilitate the combined operation; because in order to prevent the junction with Wellington, Grouchy required sufficient time to throw himself between the Prussians and the Emperor: and, in the latter case, the delay would be immaterial, because then the Prussian co-operation with Wellington was not to be apprehended; and the battle with the Anglo-Allied Army would have to be fought by the Emperor, unsupported by Grouchy.

It may, perhaps, be argued that Napoleon, by commencing his attack much earlier, would not have been under the necessity of employing a considerable portion of his Reserve against the Prussians in defence of his Right Flank, at a time when he so urgently needed them for following up and strengthening his attacks upon the Duke of Wellington's line. There existed, however, no such striking disparity, in point of numbers, between Wellington's forces, and his own, as to warrant his throwing away a chance amounting, according to the information he had already received, almost to a certainty, of being enabled to bring his greatest mass to bear against each Army separately: and which would doubtless have been the case as regards the Anglo-Allied Army, had Grouchy, by the adoption of more vigorous and energetic measures, manœuvred in such a manner as to sufficiently impede the Prussian co-operation by posting one of his Corps so as to command the Defiles of St Lambert and Lasne, and holding the other in reserve, to be employed by either the Emperor or himself, according to circumstances.

Whether Napoleon was really actuated by any such motives, must remain a doubtful point. These remarks, however, are offered for the consideration of those who censure him for his delay in commencing the Battle of Waterloo.

The strength of the Anglo-Allied Army in the Field was as follows:—

The French Army consisted of:—

The martial sounds already adverted to as having accompanied the march of the French Columns into position, had scarcely been wafted towards the Anglo-Allied Army, when mounted Officers were discerned galloping along the opposite Heights, and taking up the necessary alignments; and, presently, the simultaneous flashing of bayonets over dark masses, on various points, and the roll of drums, now become more distinctly audible, announced the arrival of the heads of the Columns destined to constitute the Front Line. As this gradually developed itself, and was seen extending on either side, from La Belle Alliance, and apparently almost overlapping both Flanks of the Allies, the scene became truly imposing and highly exciting. The two Armies were now fairly in presence of each other; and their mutual observation was governed by the most intense interest, and the most scrutinizing anxiety.

In a still greater degree did these feelings actuate their Commanders, while watching each other's preparatory movements, and minutely scanning the surface of the arena on which tactical skill, habitual prowess, physical strength, and moral courage, were to decide, not alone their own, but in all probability, the fate of Europe. Apart from national interests and considerations, and viewed solely in connection with the opposite characters of the two illustrious Chiefs; the approaching contest was contemplated with anxious solicitude by the whole military world. Need this create surprise when we reflect that the struggle was one for mastery between the far famed Conqueror of Italy, and the victorious Liberator of the Peninsula; between the triumphant Vanquisher of Eastern Europe, and the bold and successful Invader of the South of France! Never was the issue of a single Battle looked forward to as involving consequences of such vast importance—of such universal influence.

CHAPTER X.

WHILE the preparatory dispositions, alluded to in the preceding Chapter, were in progress, Napoleon ordered the following despatch to be forwarded to Grouchy:—

It will thus be seen that Grouchy's report, despatched from Gembloux on the previous night, was well calculated to inspire the Emperor with great confidence as to the result of his present plan of operations, notwithstanding the very little progress that had hitherto been made in that quarter; and which, as already remarked, must be ascribed principally to his own inactivity during the early part of the 17th. He approved of the movement upon Wavre, in pursuit of the great mass of the Prussian Army: but at the same time expressed his desire that it should be executed in such a manner as to draw the Detached Force more within the sphere of the operations of the main French Army; and above all, he enforced the necessity of maintaining a close communication with the latter.

Some time before the Battle commenced, a Prussian Patrol reached the Village of Smohain, in which was posted the Picquet of the 10th British Hussars, under Captain Taylor; whom the Officer accompanying the Patrol desired to report to the Duke of Wellington that General Count Bülow was at St Lambert, and advancing with his Corps d'Armée. Captain Taylor immediately despatched Lieutenant Lindsey, of the 10th, with the intelligence to Head Quarters, as directed. The Prussian Officer was certainly ignorant of the very slow progress made by the main body of Bülow's Corps; and the information which he thus conveyed to the Duke, before the Battle had commenced, naturally led the latter to calculate upon a much earlier arrival of the Prussians than could possibly take place: for, in point of fact, it was only Bülow's Advanced Guard which had then reached St Lambert.

The formation of the French Lines was scarcely completed when the magnificent and animating spectacle which they presented was heightened in an extraordinary degree by the passing of the Emperor along them, attended by a numerous and brilliant Staff. The troops hailed him with loud and fervent acclamations. There was depicted on their brows a deep rooted confidence in his ability, with such an Army, to chain victory to the car in which he had already advanced in triumph to within a few miles of the capital of Belgium. They exulted in the idea that they were now fairly ranged in battle array, under the Chief of their choice, and the idol of their devotion, against the Army of that nation which of all others had proved the most inveterate and the most enduring in its hostility to France; a nation which had not only by its wealth cemented and held together the great European league which had once precipitated that idol from the throne, but had also flung into the scale her own native strength and valour, by which the Fleets of the Empire had been destroyed, its Armies driven out of the Peninsula, and the sceptres of Spain and Portugal wrested from its grasp. They appeared as if excited by the assurance, that the hour had arrived in which the disasters of the Nile and Trafalgar, of Salamanca and Vittoria, were to be cast into the dark shade of oblivion, by the dazzling splendour of the triumph about to be achieved.

The Duke next rode up to the high ground on the Nivelles road, unaccompanied by his Staff, to reconnoitre the Enemy's Left. He then rode along to the Left of his own Line as far as La Haye. When the action began, he was in front of the Left of the First Brigade of Guards.

Napoleon, having completed the inspection of his troops, proceeded to take up his own station upon the Height in rear of La Belle Alliance, which afforded him a commanding view of the whole Field. The Infantry Brigades speedily formed Lines of Battalion Columns respectively. The state of the ground was reported practicable for the movements of Artillery. All was in perfect readiness.

The anxiously looked for moment had now arrived.

The Emperor sent an Order to Reille to begin the Battle by an attack upon Hougomont; and it was about half past eleven o'clock when, from the right of Prince Jerome's Division, a Column, advancing towards the south-western boundary of the Wood, rapidly extended itself into a strong line of Skirmishers. As they approached the Wood, a few straggling shots from behind the outermost trees and hedges gave warning that the defenders were prepared for resistance, and announced to both Armies that the Battle had actually commenced. The French, hastening their advance to obtain a better view of their opponents, began to single them out; and the shots from both sides, quickening in succession, speedily increased into a brisk and well sustained fire of musketry.

Jerome's supporting Columns had not advanced far when the Duke of Wellington, with his Staff, galloped up to the spot on which the Coldstream Guards were formed; and having directed his glass upon the French Columns, the guns of Captain Sandham's Foot Battery, attached to Cooke's Division, were ordered to the front. They instantly unlimbered and opened the cannonade from the Anglo-Allied position. The first discharge was from a howitzer, the shell of which burst over the head of a Column moving towards the Hougomont inclosures. The shots from the remaining guns in succession also took effect; and the Battery was soon in full play. It was immediately followed up by an equally well directed fire from Captain Cleeves's Foot Battery of the German Legion, in front of Alten's Division.

The Batteries of Reille's Corps now opened in their turn, to draw off the fire from their Columns. Napoleon sent an Order to Kellermann to push forward his twelve pieces of Horse Artillery into the Front Line, facing Hougomont. The intervals between the reports from the guns on either side rapidly diminished: in a brief space of time no intervals could be distinguished; and the cannonade, increasing in violence every moment, now thundered forth in one continual roar.

"——deep throated engines belch'd, whose roar
Imbowel'd with outrageous noise the air."

The French Columns, as they moved towards Hougomont, were twice checked by the fire from the British Batteries; which, having been given with remarkable precision, appeared to cause considerable loss and disorder among them. At length they effected their advance. The French Skirmishers, followed by fresh Supports, had, in the mean time, made good their entrance into the Wood; and such was the boldness of their advance that they soon drove the Nassau Battalion and Hanoverian Riflemen before them. They were also pushing forward in considerable force across the inclosures adjoining the left of the Wood.

At this moment, Wellington gave Orders, in person, to Major Bull's British Howitzer Horse Battery, which had just been drawn up on that part of the main ridge which was immediately in rear of the Great Orchard of Hougomont, to dislodge the Enemy's Infantry from those inclosures by means of shells. This service, which, considering the proximity of the Allied troops in the Wood, was of a very delicate nature, was executed with admirable skill, and attended with the desired effect. The Enemy was forced to abandon the fields in front of the Great Orchard; from which the Light Companies of the First Brigade of Guards now moved on, as did also those of the Second Brigade, from the Lane and Kitchen Garden on the right, to relieve the Nassauers and Hanoverians in the Wood. They dashed forward with the most determined resolution, blazing away in the very faces of their opponents, whose further advance they completely checked; and then gallantly pressing on, they gradually succeeded in clearing the Wood of the French Skirmishers.

With the exception of the cannonade maintained between the French Left and the Anglo-Allied Right Wing, and which was gradually extending towards the opposite extremities of the hostile Lines, the action was as yet confined to the Post of Hougomont.

About this time, a body of French Cavalry, issuing from the low ground near Papelotte, approached that part of the Anglo-Allied Left Wing which was occupied by Best's Hanoverian Infantry Brigade, and Captain Rettberg's Hanoverian Foot Battery. It was a strong reconnaissance, made by the French to ascertain whether the summit on which the above Battery was posted had really been intrenched, its appearance, as viewed from the opposite Heights, having induced a supposition that such was the case. Best, expecting to be attacked, immediately formed his Brigade into Battalion Squares; but the French Cavalry speedily retired.

Jerome now moved down fresh Columns to reinforce his Skirmishers. They were directed more against the Allied Right of the Wood, while a part of Foy's Division was ordered to support the attack by a simultaneous advance against the front. The descent of Jerome's troops was observed from the position of the extreme Right of the Allied Second Line, which afforded a partial view up the valley on that side of Hougomont. Two guns were therefore detached, under Captain Napier, from Captain Bolton's Battery, to open a fire upon the advancing Columns; but they were instantly cannonaded by the Batteries on the French Extreme Left, particularly by the Horse Battery of Piré's Light Cavalry, on the Height intersected by the Nivelles road. The remaining guns of the Battery were brought into action, as were also those of Major Sympher's Hanoverian Horse Battery; and a vigorous fire was now maintained against both the attacking troops and the French guns. Lieutenant Colonel Webber Smith, whose British Horse Battery was also with Clinton's Division, but lower down the slope, commenced firing up the valley, across the Nivelles road, at one of Jerome's Columns; but on ascertaining that the latter was somewhat beyond the effectual range of his six pounders, he detached an Officer to the right of the Front Line in rear of Hougomont, to discover whether a more commanding position could be obtained for his Battery on that part of the Field.

In the mean time, Jerome's Skirmishers, having been very strongly reinforced, renewed their attack upon the Wood, in conjunction with Foy's Infantry on their right. The Light Companies of the British Guards presented a stout and desperate resistance, but were forced to yield to an overwhelming superiority of numbers. Retiring from tree to tree, and frequently hazarding a bold and obstinate stand, by which they suffered most severely, they at length withdrew from the unavailing contest: those of the Coldstream and 3rd Regiment seeking shelter partly in the Lane adjoining the right of the Château, and partly behind a Haystack which fronted the Wood near the south-west angle of the buildings; while those of the 1st Regiment fell back into the Great Orchard, on the left.

The French Skirmishers, finding themselves relieved for the moment from any immediate pressure upon their front, now rapidly advanced towards the Buildings and Garden. The hedge which lined the Wood on this side appeared to them, as it gradually presented itself to their view, to form also the boundary of the Great Garden. In the full confidence that this important post was now within their grasp, they rushed forward at the pas de charge to force an entrance. They were instantly and fatally undeceived. A deadly fire bursting forth from the loop holes and platforms along the Garden Wall, which was parallel to, and about thirty yards distant from, the hedge, laid prostrate the leading Files. Those which came up in rapid succession were staggered by the sudden and unexpected appearance of this little fortress. Not venturing upon an escalade, they were forced to take advantage of such cover as was afforded by the hedge and trees; whence they kept up a popping fire, though at fearful odds, with opponents so well concealed by the wall, as also by a row of apple trees which ran along its exterior.

The French Infantry were pushing forward through the Wood in support of this attack, when Major Bull's Horse Battery recommenced its fire; and a shower of howitzer shells fell amongst them, causing the greatest destruction and confusion in their ranks.

Again the defenders dashed forward from the Flanks, and regained a considerable portion of the Wood; whereupon Major Bull ceased firing in that direction, and pointed his guns on strong Columns of French Infantry in support, which he succeeded in causing to retrograde; notwithstanding the very galling fire to which he was himself at that time exposed, not only from the Batteries in his front, but also from Piré's Horse Battery on the French Height adjoining the Nivelles road, by which his own Battery was completely enfiladed.

The French that were in the Wood having rallied, and obtained a vast preponderance of force, now advanced in a most determined manner against the Light Infantry of the British Guards, and compelled the latter to retire to their former posts on the Flanks of the Château and Gardens. At the same time, Jerome's Light Troops were advancing rapidly, and in great force, against the right of the Buildings. That portion of the Light Companies of the Coldstream and 3rd Regiment of Guards which was outside the Farm made a gallant stand, under cover of the Haystack, and from the Lane before mentioned. The Haystack itself was set on fire by the French in one of their attacks, and was now in full blaze. These Guardsmen held their ground with the greatest bravery until they saw themselves completely outflanked, and in danger of being cut off from all retreat.

They then hastily withdrew into the great Court Yard by the Gate which faces the Allied position; and which they instantly closed and endeavoured to block up with ladders, posts, barrows, or whatever was nearest at hand. The French, however, succeeded in forcing the Gate; but the defenders betook themselves to the nearest cover, whence they poured a fire upon the intruders, and then rushing forward, a struggle ensued which was distinguished by the most intrepid courage on both sides. At length, Lieutenant Colonel Macdonell, Captain Wyndham, Ensigns Gooch and Hervey, and Sergeant Graham, of the Coldstream Guards, by dint of great personal strength and exertions, combined with extraordinary bravery and perseverance, succeeded in closing the Gate against their assailants. Those of the latter who had entered the Court Yard fell a sacrifice to their undaunted and conspicuous gallantry.

The remainder of the French Skirmishers, passing on by the Left and to the Rear of Hougomont, and, crossing the Avenue leading to it from the Nivelles road, and the adjacent rivulet, spread themselves over some broken ground partially covered with brushwood. They were now immediately under the position to which Lieutenant Colonel Smith had moved his Battery from its former station on the other side of the Nivelles road, and which was in front of the Extreme Right of the First Line of the Anglo-Allied Army. This Battery had just been hotly engaged with, and had suffered severely from, the Horse Battery posted in front of Piré's Light Cavalry Brigade; which had previously directed its fire upon Bull's guns, and which maintained the cannonade with Lieutenant Colonel Smith's Battery for the purpose of covering the advance of these Light Troops. Smith had succeeded in silencing the fire of his opponent; when the French Skirmishers, taking advantage of both the broken ground and the high corn beyond it, suddenly opened upon his Battery a popping fire so destructive in its effects, that in a few moments several of the Gunners and horses were killed, and so much damage was sustained by the limbers, that it became absolutely necessary to withdraw the guns into a little hollow way that led from the rear of the Battery into the Nivelles road, and in which it remained some time for the purpose of refitting and getting into order.

This daring onset of the French Skirmishers was checked by the advance of four Companies of the Coldstream Regiment of Guards, under Lieutenant Colonel Woodford. They then fell back to the wall of the Farm yard, near which they collected a considerable force, when Colonel Woodford charged them. They gave way immediately, and withdrew from the contest; which afforded Colonel Woodford an opportunity of entering the Farm with a part of the reinforcement by the side door in the Lane. The remainder of the detached force occupied the inclosures between the Château and the Nivelles road.

During this advance of the French Skirmishers against the extreme Right of the Allied Front Line, the troops which formed their Support attempted again to force open the rear Gate of Hougomont. The individuals before mentioned as having closed the Gate, were, at the time, occupied in rendering it more secure by placing against it some pieces of ash timber that lay in the yard. The French failing in their endeavours to push in the Gate, a brave Grenadier volunteered to climb over and open it from the inside. Captain Wyndham, on perceiving the latter at the top of the gate, instantly desired Sergeant Graham, whose musket he was holding whilst the latter was bringing forward another piece of timber, to drop the wood, take his firelock, and shoot the intruder. The Order was instantly obeyed; and the intrepid assailant, who, for any useful result, ought to have been accompanied by a score of his comrades, fell beneath Graham's deadly aim. It was at this moment that the French Skirmishers who had advanced against the main position, were falling back upon their Support; and the whole of these troops were driven off by the advance of the four Companies of the Coldstream Guards, detached from the main position, as previously described.

In the mean time, the French Infantry in the Wood, finding their advance against the Garden so suddenly checked, endeavoured to turn it by its Left. With this view they were debouching through a large gap in the fence, forming an outlet from the Wood into the Orchard; when Lieutenant Colonel Lord Saltoun, seizing the favourable opportunity, made a most gallant charge upon the head of the Column with the Light Companies of the First Brigade of Guards, and succeeded in driving the Enemy back into the Wood.

Shortly afterwards, a large body of the Enemy's Light Troops began to advance stealthily along the eastern hedge of the Hougomont inclosures, communicating at the same time with the Infantry in the Wood on their Left. This was immediately followed by a direct front attack upon the Orchard; which compelled Lord Saltoun gradually to withdraw his greatly reduced force, from tree to tree, until he reached the hollow way in rear of that inclosure.

The Light Troops in front of Alten's Division, having perceived the French creeping along the hedge so as to turn the Left Flank of Hougomont, were on the point of forming to oppose them; but on the latter being pointed out to the Prince of Orange, who had just come to the front to make his observations, he coolly remarked:—"No, don't stir—the Duke is sure to see that movement, and will take some step to counteract it." He had scarcely spoken, when two Companies of the 3rd Regiment of British Guards, detached from the Allied Line, were seen advancing along the same hedge, in an opposite direction, to meet them.

Lord Saltoun being thus reinforced upon his Left, and the French Skirmishers in his front having become exposed to a sharp flanking fire from the Guards lining the eastern Garden Wall, he resumed the offensive; cleared the Orchard of the Enemy, and reoccupied its front hedge: while the Detachment on the Left drove the French along the outer hedge, and down into the hollow whence they had debouched; and then joined the troops in the Great Orchard. The front Hedge of the Orchard, the front Wall of the Garden, with the Lane and Avenue on the right, constituted at this time the Outer Line of the defence of Hougomont.

During the progress of the contest of Hougomont, Ney had been occupied in making his preparatory dispositions for carrying into execution Napoleon's intended grand attack upon the Centre and Left of the Anglo-Allied line. The troops destined for this service consisted of the whole of d'Erlon's Corps d'Armée, and of Roussel's Division of Kellermann's Cavalry Corps. Their advance was to be covered and supported by no less than ten Batteries, which were now brought forward and posted along a ridge that intervened between the French Right and the Allied Left Wing, affording the guns a range of from six hundred to eight hundred yards of the Duke's Line. These Batteries consisted of the three twelve-pounder Batteries of the First, Second, and Sixth Corps, drawn up with their Left close upon the Charleroi road; of the four Divisional Foot Batteries; of the Horse Battery belonging to Jaquinot's Light Cavalry Brigade; and of the two Horse Batteries of Milhaud's Corps of Cuirassiers, which stood in Second Line, in rear of d'Erlon's Corps—altogether seventy four guns.

This imposing force of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, exclusive of the ample Cavalry Reserves at hand, was not more than commensurate with the importance of the object which Napoleon had in view. His aim was not only to turn the Allied Left, but also to force the Centre of the position; and, by gaining possession of the Farms of La Haye Sainte and Mont St Jean, to cut off Wellington's main line of communication by the high road to Brussels, and, at the same time, to prevent any contemplated junction of the Prussian and Anglo-Allied Armies.

This appeared to him preferable to any plan of operation against the Allied Right, where the skilful dispositions made by the Duke would require such a plan to embrace the attack and repulse of the troops occupying Braine l'Alleud, and the Post of Vieux Foriez, as well as the forcing of the position, en potence, held by Lord Hill; a consideration which, combined with a knowledge of the existence of a considerable body of Allied troops near Hal, and the fear of allowing himself to be induced into too great an extension of his own force towards his Left, caused him to resign all idea of attempting any movement of importance in that quarter.

He felt, moreover, that even a successful attack upon the Right would, in all probability, induce the Duke to fall back upon the Prussians; and thus effect that junction which it was his great object to frustrate: whereas, an attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left, which was not so strong, if successful, held out to him the prospect of his being enabled, by aid of the presumed vigorous co-operation on the part of Grouchy, and the momentarily expected arrival of a portion of that Marshal's forces on his own Right, to defeat both Armies in detail.

The Batteries had been regularly posted and fully prepared for action, and the Infantry Columns had advanced to the inner brow of the intervening ridge, when Ney sent word to the Emperor that the preliminary arrangements were completed, and that he only waited His Majesty's Orders to commence the attack. Napoleon immediately took a general view of the Field of Battle, and continuing his observations beyond his Right, in order to discover, if possible, any indication of the approach either of Grouchy or of a hostile force, he perceived in the direction of St Lambert an indistinct mass, having the appearance of a body of troops; and pointing out the object to Soult, who was near him at the time, asked his opinion; whereupon the Marshal observed, that he really conceived it to be a Column on the march, and that there was great reason to believe it was a Detachment from Grouchy. All the Staff directed their telescopes upon the point indicated; and, as the atmosphere was not very clear, different opinions were entertained: some asserting that what had been taken for troops were trees; others that they were Columns in position; whilst several agreed with Soult, that they were troops on the march.

In this state of uncertainty and suspense, the Emperor sent for General Domon, and desired him to proceed instantly with a strong reconnoitring party to the right, and procure correct intelligence; to put himself quickly in communication with the troops approaching from St Lambert; to effect a junction with them, if they belonged to Marshal Grouchy, and to impede their advance if they proved to be Enemies. At the same time, the two Light Cavalry Divisions of Domon and Subervie proceeded some distance in the direction of the Wood of Paris; and were then drawn up en potence to the Right of the French Army.

Not long after Domon's departure, Napoleon's impatience to ascertain the precise character of the distant Column was relieved by the arrival of an Officer of Chasseurs with a Prussian Hussar, who had just been taken prisoner; and who was the bearer of a letter, addressed by the Prussian General Bülow to the Duke of Wellington, to acquaint the latter with his arrival at St Lambert. The prisoner stated that the Column which was perceptible in the vicinity of this Village, was the Advanced Guard of Bülow's Corps, which had not been engaged at Ligny; that he had been in the morning at Wavre; that the three other Prussian Corps were stationed close to that town, and had passed the previous night there, without perceiving any indication of an Enemy in their front; and that a Patrol of his own Regiment had advanced, during the night, as far as two leagues from Wavre without encountering any body of French troops.

Soult who had just at that moment written the following letter to Grouchy, in reply to his Second Report from Gembloux, immediately added a postscript, referring to the above intelligence, and sent off the despatch, accompanied by the intercepted communication and the Hussar's report.

The above letter is of much historical importance. Although conveying Napoleon's approval of Grouchy's movement upon either Corbaix or Wavre, it clearly indicates the commencement of that anxiety and uneasiness of mind which the Emperor experienced through the fear of even the possibility of a want of just conception on the part of the Marshal, of the true spirit in which the combination of his movements with those of the main Army should be carried on. He draws the Marshal's attention to the necessity of his manœuvring so as to prevent the execution of any hostile design against the Right Flank of the main Army, which is then engaged with Wellington's forces, and names Mont St Jean, the Centre of the Duke's position, as a guiding point. This anxiety was naturally augmented very considerably by the discovery of Bülow's troops, and the postscript accordingly enjoins still more urgently the necessity of a close and active co-operation.

Very shortly after the Officer who was the bearer of this despatch had started, a message was sent in by General Domon to the effect that his Scouts had fallen in with Detachments from the Enemy in the direction of St Lambert; and that he had just sent out Patrols towards other points to obtain intelligence of Marshal Grouchy, and to communicate with him, if practicable.

It is to be observed, however, that the troops discovered by the French Cavalry did not belong to Bülow's main body, but merely to his Advanced Guard. The former was the mass first seen from La Belle Alliance, when it was moving across the Heights of St Lambert, on the right or opposite bank of the Lasne; but as explained in a preceding Chapter, it encountered great obstruction and much delay during its march towards the Field: whilst the latter, awaiting its arrival, rested concealed in the Wood of Paris, near Lasne.

Thus it appears that both Commanders were deceived as to the proximity of any considerable body of Prussians at this period of the day. Nevertheless, the conviction of such a proximity, while it imparted increased confidence to Wellington, in regard to the speedy execution of the plan of combined operation which he had preconcerted with Blücher, compelled Napoleon to employ additional vigilance and circumspection upon his Right Flank.

Great, however, as was the necessity for such vigilance; the measures that were adopted were lamentably deficient in energy, vigour, and judgement. Considering that the main body of Bülow's Corps was on the point of entering the Defile of St Lambert, in which it had to overcome the greatest difficulties; it appears unaccountable that the Officer employed in reconnoitring and patroling beyond the extreme Right of the French Army should not have urged the occupation of the Wood of Paris with a detached body of Infantry, with a view to impede Bülow's advance, and compel him to take a more circuitous route. In this manner the Prussian co-operation might have been so far obstructed or delayed as to secure to Napoleon the power of advancing against Wellington with almost the entire of his force; and of thus, perhaps, accomplishing his grand object of defeating both Armies in detail.

No disposition of this kind was made; but, in place of it, Domon's and Subervie's Light Cavalry Divisions were moved to the right, en potence to the Front Line, their Picquets not extending beyond the plateau in front of the Wood of Paris. Whether this culpable neglect arose from the want of due penetration and foresight on the part of General Domon; or from this Officer having been instructed not to act as if in command of a detached Corps, but only to take up a position, within a prescribed distance, en potence to the general Front Line; or, from an over confident expectation on the part of Napoleon of approaching aid from Grouchy; are points not easily determined: but there can be no doubt that the error of not occupying the Wood of Paris with a strong body of Infantry, flanked and supported by the Cavalry, was fatal to the development of Napoleon's original design. One Infantry Division, combined with Domon's and Subervie's Cavalry Divisions, would have sufficed for obstructing the debouching of Bülow's Corps from the almost impassable Defile of St Lambert; and compelling it to move by its right, into the line of march of Zieten's Corps, which did not reach the field before seven o'clock in the evening. To move by its left, along the deep and miry valley of the Lasne, would have been impracticable so long as the Wood of Paris and its vicinity continued to be occupied by the French.

In short, the importance of seizing upon the means that presented themselves for materially retarding, if not of completely frustrating, the co-operation of the principal portion of the Prussian forces, was of so vital a nature, that the French Emperor would have been justified in detaching the whole of Lobau's Corps, along with the Cavalry already mentioned, under an experienced and enterprising General, such as Lobau himself, to operate against the Prussians whilst these were occupied in passing the Defiles which led to his Right Flank. None of those troops were engaged with the Anglo-Allied Army during any part of the day; so that, without diminishing the numbers actually opposed to the latter, they might have been detached in the manner suggested: instead of remaining, as was the case, drawn up en potence on the immediate Field of Action, to be attacked by the Prussians, who were permitted to pass the Defiles without interruption, to collect their forces under cover of the Wood of Paris, to debouch from the latter successively and at their leisure, and to organise their movements of attack in perfect security, and with the most systematic order and regularity.

CHAPTER XI.

NAPOLEON, having taken the precaution of posting a Cavalry Corps of Observation upon his Right Flank, no longer delayed sending the Order to Ney for the commencement of the Grand Attack upon the Centre and Left Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army. About the same time, Wellington, considering that some of the Battalions along the Right Wing of his Front Line were too much exposed to the Enemy's cannonade, which had from the commencement been principally directed against them, and which was now conducted with increased vigour, withdrew them more under shelter of the crest of the ridge. It might then be about half past one, or perhaps a quarter before two o'clock.

The simultaneous advance of d'Erlon's four Divisions of Infantry, amounting to more than 16,000 men, was grand and imposing. As the heads of the Columns cleared their own line of Batteries ranged along the crest of the intervening ridge, and as the points on which they were directed for attack opened out to their view, loud and reiterated shouts arose from their ranks of "Vive l'Empereur!" which, as the masses began to descend the exterior slope of their position, were suddenly drowned in the roar produced by the discharge of seventy four pieces of French cannon over their heads. The effects of the latter upon Picton's Division, and upon Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian Brigade, which, as before stated, was deployed upon the exterior slope of the Anglo-Allied position, were severely felt.

Light Troops now issued forth from each Column, and soon spread out into a line of Skirmishers extending the whole length of the valley. As Donzelot's Division, which was on the left, approached La Haye Sainte, one of its Brigades moved out to attack that Farm, while the other continued its advance on the right of the Charleroi road; and it was not long before a sharp fire of musketry along and around the hedges of the Orchard of La Haye Sainte announced the first resistance to d'Erlon's formidable advance. Shortly afterwards a dropping fire commenced among the hedges and inclosures of Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain; which were occupied by the Nassau Battalions under Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar. The Right Brigade of Durutte's Division was thrown out against the troops defending these inclosures; while the Left Brigade continued to advance across the valley, so as to form a Support to Marcognet's Division on its left, and, at the same time, to connect this attack with the advance of the latter against the main Front Line of the Allied Right Wing.

Durutte's Skirmishers pressed boldly forward against those of Prince Bernhard's Brigade; and it was not long before they succeeded in gaining possession of the Farm House of Papelotte, driving out the Light Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, commanded by Captain Rettberg; but the latter, on being reinforced with four additional Companies, resumed the offensive, and gallantly retook the Farm. The contest in this quarter was now limited to a persistent skirmish; which extended itself along La Haye and Smohain, occupied by the Regiment of Orange Nassau. With this tiraillade on either Flank of d'Erlon's Corps, the central Columns pursued their onward course, and began to ascend the exterior slope of the Allied position.

The three central Columns continued their Advance up the exterior slope of the Allied position. The nature of the ground still admitted of the play of the French Batteries over their heads, and great was the havoc produced by this fire upon Picton's devoted ranks. As the heads of the Columns neared the deployed Line of Bylandt's Brigade, the shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" were renewed. The Skirmishers in advance had scarcely opened their fire upon the Brigade, in order to prepare for, and give increased effect to, the succeeding charge of the Columns; when the Dutch-Belgians, who had already evinced a considerable degree of unsteadiness, began firing in their turn, but with very little effect: immediately after which they commenced a hurried retreat, not partially and promiscuously, but collectively and simultaneously—so much so, that the movement carried with it the appearance of its having resulted from a word of command. The disorder of these troops rapidly augmented; but, on their reaching the straggling hedge along the crest of the position, an endeavour was made to rally them upon the 5th Battalion of Dutch Militia. This attempt, however, notwithstanding the most strenuous and praiseworthy exertions on the part of the Officers, completely failed. The reserve Battalion and the Artillerymen of Captain Byleveld's Battery, though they seemed to stem the torrent for a moment, were quickly swept away by its accumulating force. As they rushed past the British Columns, hissings, hootings, and execrations were indignantly heaped upon them; and one portion, in its eagerness to get away, nearly ran over the Grenadier Company of the 28th British Regiment, the men of which were so enraged, that it was with difficulty they could be prevented from firing upon the fugitives. Some of the men of the 1st, or Royal Scots, were also desirous of shooting them. Nothing seemed to restrain their flight, which ceased only when they found themselves completely across and covered by the main ridge along which the Anglo-Allied Army was drawn up. Here they continued, comparatively under shelter, during the remainder of the battle, as a Reserve; in which capacity alone, considering their losses and their crippled state, they could now be rendered serviceable.