It is now seen what the SUBJECT of this bold proposition is: namely, tropical or figured language, in general. This figured language, as it is a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, is frequently vicious; i. e. is an acknowledged vice or fault in composition, as such. We now then see the force of the Predicate.
Well; but if this figured language “be vicious as it is, i. e. because, quatenus, it is such a deviation, it must not only be frequently, but always vicious.” The premises are general and unlimited: so must, likewise, be the conclusion. What sense, then, is there in the word, frequently? or what room, for that qualification?
See, what it is to be a great proficient in logic, before one has well learnt one’s Grammar! As, i. e. because, quatenus, say you. How exactly and critically the English language may be studied in Dublin, I pretend not to say: But we in England understand the particle as, not only in the sense of because, quatenus, but also, and, I think, more frequently, in the sense of in proportion as, according as, or, if you will needs have a Latin term to explain an English term, prout, perinde ac. So that the proposition stands thus: These tropes and figures, ACCORDING AS they are a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, are frequently vicious. The premises, you now see, are qualified, as well as the conclusion. Figured language, WHEN it deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, is—what? always vicious? But the Bishop did not say, that figured language is always a deviation from those principles. He only says, when it so deviates, it is vicious. It is implied in the expression that figured language at least sometimes deviates from those principles, and the Bishop, as appears, is of opinion that it frequently deviates: He therefore says, consistently with his premises, and with his usual accuracy, It is frequently vicious.
In short, the Bishop’s argument, about which you make so much noise, if drawn out in mood and figure, would, I suppose, stand thus—“Tropical and figured language, WHEN it deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, is vicious—Tropical and figured language FREQUENTLY deviates from those principles—Therefore tropical and figured language is FREQUENTLY vicious.” And where is the defect of sense or logic, I want to know, in this argumentation? But you impatiently ask, Are metaphors, allegories, and comparisons then included in this figured language, which is pronounced vicious? To this question I can only reply, That I know not whether metaphors, allegories, and comparisons, are, in the Bishop’s opinion, deviations from the principles of metaphysics and logic; for I cannot find that he says any thing, in particular, of this kind of tropes and figures. But if you, or any one for you, will shew clearly, that metaphors, allegories, and comparisons are such deviations, the Bishop, for any thing I know, might affirm, and might be justified in affirming, that they were in themselves vicious. But be not too much alarmed for your favourites, if he should: They would certainly keep their ground, though convicted of such vice; at least unless the Rhetoricians of our time should be so dull as not to be able to find out what Quinctilian calls probabile aliquid, some probable pretext to justify or excuse them.
But, instead of troubling ourselves to guess what the Bishop might say on a subject on which he has said nothing, it is to better purpose to attend to what he has said, on the subject in question. The Bishop has said, That tropical and figured language is frequently vicious. You ask when? He replies, When it deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic. But in what particular instances does this appear? He tells you this too. He gives you instances enough, to justify his affirmation, that tropical and figured language is frequently vicious; for he exemplifies his affirmation in ONE WHOLE class of such figured speech, as deviates from the principles of metaphysics and logic, and is therefore vicious, namely, in the class of verbal figures. ‘This, [i. e. the truth of the affirmation, That figured language, according as it is found to be a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, is frequently vicious] the great master, Quinctilian, freely confesseth, where, speaking of that ornamented speech, which he calls σχήματα λέξεως, he makes the following confession and apology—esset enim omne schema VITIUM, si non peteretur, sed accideret. Verum auctoritate, vetustate, consuetudine, plerumque defenditur, sæpe etiam RATIONE QUADAM. Ideoque cum sit à simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa, virtus est, si habet PROBABILE ALIQUID quod sequatur[159].’
The difficulty, I trust, now begins to clear up. Figured language, is frequently vicious. Of this we have an instance given in one entire species of figured or ornamented speech, namely σχήματα λέξεως, or verbal figures. Can any thing be clearer and plainer? Yet, because you had taken it into your head that by tropes and figures of composition the Bishop understood, nay could only understand, metaphors, allegories, and comparisons, you dreamt of nothing, here, but the same fine things. And though Quinctilian lay before the Bishop, when he quoted these words, though the Bishop’s own express words shew the contrary, for he speaks not of tropes and figures in general, much less of such tropes and figures as you speak of, but solely of that ornamented speech, called σχήματα λέξεως, you will needs have him quote Quinctilian in this place as speaking of Rhetorical figures. But let us attend to Quinctilian’s words. Esset omne schema vitium, si non peterentur, sed acciderent. What! Shall we think the Bishop could mean to affirm of rhetorical figures, that they would always be vicious, if they were not sought for, but occurred of themselves? For that, I think, is the translation of—si non peterentur, sed acciderent. Surely one way, and that the chief, in which rhetorical figures, metaphors, allegories, and comparisons, become vicious, is, when they ARE sought for, sollicitously hunted after, and affectedly brought in. The very contrary happens with regard to these verbal figures: they are vicious, when they are NOT sought for and purposely affected. I conclude then, that his Lordship, who surely does not want common sense, and, I think, understands Latin, did not, and could not intend to exemplify his observation in the case of rhetorical figures.
Still you are something puzzled and perplexed by the Bishop’s observation. Admitting him to mean, as his author does, verbal figures, how can these be considered as a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic? How? Why, has not the Bishop told us, or, if he had not, is it not certain in itself, that to give a language clearness is the office of philosophy; and that Definition, a part of Logic, performs that service by a resolution of the ideas, which make up the terms? But these verbal figures are often a deviation from, nay a willful defiance of, all logical definition. Witness the very instance you and Quinctilian give us, in Virgil’s timidi damæ. Logic defines Damæ to be the females of that species of animals called Deer. The figurative Virgil confounds this distinction by using this term for the males, as well as females. But, universally, Grammar itself, whose peculiar office is to give precision to language, is a part of logic: the Bishop says, its rules are conducted on the principles of Logic. But verbal figures, even when they do not offend against the strictness of definition, are universally violations, in some degree or other, of Grammar, i. e. of Logic. Yet these violations of Logical Grammar, Quinctilian tells us, may be allowed, si habent probabile aliquid quod sequantur; that is, for some fantastical reason or other, by which the masters of Rhetoric are pleased to recommend them to us.
And now, Sir, let me ask, what becomes of your fine comment on Quinctilian’s chapter concerning verbal figures, and, particularly, of your nice distinction between these, and rhetorical figures, which the Bishop, no doubt, wanted to be informed of? The issue of your exploits in Logic and Criticism is now seen to be this, That you have grossly misrepresented the Bishop; and needlessly, at least, explained Quinctilian. First, you make the Bishop talk of rhetorical figures ONLY, in the specific sense of these terms, when his Lordship was all the while speaking of figured language, in general. Next, you make him deliver a bold position concerning rhetorical figures, as being frequently vicious, because always deviations from the principles of metaphysics and logic; when all he maintains, is, That figured language is FREQUENTLY vicious, according as it deviates from those principles; and, in particular, that that part of figured speech, called grammatical or verbal figures, is ALWAYS vicious.
To conclude, if you had shewn any compunction, or even common respect in exposing what you took to be the Bishop’s absurdities on this subject, I should have made a conscience of laying you open on this head of Rhetorical and Grammatical figures. As it is, your unmerciful triumph over the poor Bishop makes it allowable for me to lay your dealing with him before the reader in all its nakedness; and, after what has been said, I cannot do it better than by letting him see how the Bishop’s argumentation is represented by you, as drawn out in your own words, and that in full mood and figure.
“I should by no means,” say you, “willingly misrepresent the argument of my Lord Bishop; but upon repeated examination of the passage here quoted, I must state it thus:
“Quinctilian declares, that what are called grammatical figures are really no more than faulty violations of grammatical rules, unless when purposely introduced upon some reasonable or plausible grounds.”
Therefore,
“He confesses that tropes and figures of composition, as they are a deviation from the principles of metaphysics and logic, are frequently vicious.”
You add, “If this be a fair representation, it were to be wished that the learned author had so far condescended to men of confined abilities, as to explain the connexion between these two propositions[160].”
As the learned author, I guess, may be better employed than in this unnecessary task, which you wish to impose upon him, I have taken upon me to discharge that office, with less able hands; and, yet, have explained the connexion between these two propositions in such sort, that, if I mistake not, we shall never hear more from you, of any inconsistency between them.
I have NOW, Sir, gone through the several particulars of your Dissertation, and have shewn, I think, clearly and invincibly, that all your objections to the Bishop’s paradoxical sentiments on the subject of Eloquence are mistaken and wholly groundless.
The TWO propositions his Lordship took upon him to confute, 1. That an inspired language must needs be a language of perfect eloquence; and, 2. That eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech, and inherent in the constitution of things: These two propositions, I say, are so thoroughly confuted by the Bishop, that not one word of all you say in any degree affects his reasoning, or supports those two propositions against the force of it. I am even candid enough to believe that, on further thoughts, you will not yourself be displeased with this ill success of your attack on the learned Prelate’s principles; which are manifestly calculated for the service of religion and the honour of inspired scripture. For, though you attempt to shew us in your two last chapters, how the honour of inspired scripture may be saved on other principles, yet allow me to say that, for certain reasons, I much question the validity of those principles; at least, that the persons, most concerned in this controversy, will by no means subscribe to them. If there be an Archetype of eloquence in nature, ‘one should be apt enough, as the Bishop says, to conclude, that when the Author of nature condescended to inspire one of these plastic performances of human art, he would make it by the exactest pattern of the Archetype[161].’ Or, whatever you and I and the Bishop might conclude, assure yourself that the objectors to inspired scripture will infallibly draw that conclusion. And, when they do so, and fortify themselves, besides, with the authority of so great a master of eloquence, as yourself, it will be in vain, I doubt, to oppose to them your ingenious harangues and encomiums on the eloquent composition of the sacred scriptures. Nay, it would give you, no doubt, some pain to find that, though they should accept your authority for the truth of their favourite principle of there being an Archetype in nature of perfect eloquence, they would yet reject your harangues and encomiums with that disdain which is so natural to them. The honour of sacred scripture will then hang on a question of Taste: and unluckily the objectors are of such authority in that respect, that there is no appeal from their decisions of it.
The contemplation of these inconveniencies, together with the love of truth, determined me to hazard this address to you. I will not deny, besides, that the mere justice due to a great character, whom I found somewhat freely, not to say injuriously treated by you, was also, one motive with me. If I add still another, it is such as I need not disown, and which you, of all men, will be the last to object to, I mean a motive of Charity towards yourself.
I am much a stranger to your person, and, what it may perhaps be scarce decent for me to profess to you, even to your writings. All I know of YOURSELF, is, what your book tells me, that you are distinguished by an honourable place and office in the University of Dublin: and what I have heared of your WRITINGS, makes me think favourably of a private scholar, who, they say, employs himself in such works of learning and taste, as are proper to instill a reverence into young minds for the best models of ancient eloquence. While you are thus creditably stationed, and thus usefully employed, I could not but feel some concern for the hurt you were likely to do yourself by engaging in so warm and so unnecessary an opposition to a writer, as you characterize him, of distinguished eminence[162]. Time was, when even with us on this side the water, the novelty of this writer’s positions, and the envy, which ever attends superior merit, disposed some warm persons to open, and prosecute with many hard words, the unpopular cry against him, of his being a bold and PARADOXICAL writer. But reflexion and experience have quieted this alarm. Men of sense and judgment now consider his Paradoxes as very harmless, nay as very sober and certain truths; and even vye with each other in their zeal of building upon them, as the surest basis, on which a just and rational vindication of our common religion can be raised. This is the present state of things with us, and especially, they say, in the Universities of this kingdom.
It was, therefore, not without some surprize, and, as I said, with much real concern, that I found a gentleman of learning and education revive, at such a juncture, that stale and worn-out topic, and disgrace himself by propagating this clamour, of I know not what paradoxical boldness, now long out of date, in the much-approved writings of this great Prelate. Nor was the dishonour to yourself, the only circumstance to be lamented. You were striving, with all your might, to infuse prejudices into the minds of many ingenious and virtuous young men; whom you would surely be sorry to mislead; and who would owe you little thanks for prepossessing them with unfavourable sentiments of such a man and writer, as the Bishop of Gloucester, they will find, is generally esteemed to be.
These, then, were the considerations, which induced me to employ an hour or two of leisure in giving your book a free examination. I have done it in as few words as possible, and in a manner which no reasonable and candid man, I persuade myself, will disapprove. I know what apologies may be requisite to the learned Bishop for a stranger’s engaging in this officious task. But to you, Sir, I make none: It is enough if any benefits to yourself or others may be derived from it.
I am, with respect, &c.
FINIS.
Printed by J. Nichols and Son,
Red Lion Passage, Fleet Street, London.
FOOTNOTES:
1 Prov. xvi. 7.
2 Isaiah, xxvi. 9.
3 Rev. ii. 4, 5.
4 Eph. i. 7.
5 John i. 1.
6 Col. i. 17.
7 Rev. i. 17. xxii. 13.
8 Heb. i. 8.
9 Micah v. 2.
10 Rev. i. 8.
11 John xvii. 5.
12 Ps. iii. 2.
13 Eph. iii. 9, 10, 11.
14 Eph. iii. 18, 19.
15 Acts x. 18.
16 Eph. iii. 21.
17 1. Pet. i. 12.
18 Eph. i. 10.
19 Rev. xiv. 6.
20 Gal. i. 6.
21 Rom. x. 18.
22 Col. xi. 10.
23 Matth. xxviii. 19.
24 2 Cor. i. 12.
25 2 Cor. xii. 9.
26 1 Cor. vii. 21-24.
27 John xv. 16.
28 1 Tim. iv. 16.
29 Phil. i. 10, 11.
30 Archbishop’s Injunctions, S. xi.
31 Canon LXXV.
32 Phil. i. 9-11.
33 Rom. xii. 16.
34 Erasmi in Evang. Joannis Paraphrasis, cap. i.
35 1 Cor. ii. 14.
36 1 Cor. ii. 14.
37 2 Tim. iv. 2.
38 Lord Bacon, A. L. B. i. p. 417.
39 Fiduciam orator præ se ferat, semperque ità dicat tanquàm de causâ optimè sentiat. Quint. l. v. c. 13, p. 422.
40 Matth. vii. 29.
41 Matth. xv. 6.
42 “In omnibus quæ dicit tanta auctoritas inest, ut dissentire pudeat; nec advocati studium, sed testis aut judicis afferat fidem.” Said of Cicero by Quintilian. The Roman orator acquired this praise by consummate art and genius. The plainest Christian homilist, who does his duty in speaking as the oracles of God, attains it with ease, and deserves it much better. Such is the pre-eminence of what the Apostle calls the foolishness of preaching!
43 Tanta in oratione auctoritas, ut probationis locum obtineat. Quintil. p. 422.
44 Bishop Stillingfleet, Sermon IV.
45 Afficiamur, antequam afficere conemur. Quint. p. 461. moveamur ipsi. Ib.
46 If I mention the names of the Bishops Beveridge and Blackall, it is not in exclusion of many others, but because I suspect they are less known to the younger clergy than they deserve to be.
47 Matth. xxviii. 20.
48 “Parentes et Pædagogi pueros olim cum primum per ætatem sapere, et intelligere cœpissent, primis Christianæ religionis rudimentis diligenter instituebant, ut pietatem unà penè cum lacte nutricis imbiberent, et à primis statim cunis, virtutis incunabilis ad vitam illam beatam alerentur. Quem etiam ad usum breves libri, quos Catechismos nostri appellant, conscribebantur.”
49 2 Cor. xiii. 14.
50 W. Weston, B. D. Fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge; and vicar of Campden, Gloucestershire. Camb. 1746.
51 Pref. p. ii.
52 Pref. p. ii.
53 Ded. p. iv.—“The best compliment I can make your Lordship on the occasion is the true one, that I have a good opinion of the present performance myself,” &c.
54 Pref. p. iii.
55 Pref. p. iii.
56 Pref. p. ii.
57 The following passages brought to confirm this fact are so well known, that, if there was not something uncommonly strong, and subversive of the writer’s objection in the very turn of expression, I should scarce think myself at liberty to transcribe them.—Visa est mihi res digna consultatione, maximè propter perielitantium numerum. Multi enim omnis ætatis, omnis ordinis, utriusque sexûs etiam vocantur in periculum et vocabuntur. Neque enim civitates tantum, sed vicos etiam atque agros superstitionis istius contagio pervagata——propè jam desolata templa,——sacra solemnia diu intermissa.—Plin.
58 Hesterni sumus, et vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum; sola vobis relinquimus templa. Tertull. Apol. c. 37. And before speaking of the heathens, Obessam vociferantur civitatem, in agris, in castellis, in insulis Christianos, omnem sexum, ætatem, conditionem & dignitatem transgredi ad hoc nomen quasi detrimento mærent. c. i. See also Arnobius, contr. Gentes, insisting on the same fact.—Vel hæc saltem fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi tempore et parvo immensi nominis hujus sacramenta diffusa sunt? &c. L. ii. sub fin.
59 Pref. p. iii.
60 Chap. iii. p. 38.
61 Speaking of I know not what sour and dogmatical divines, “I am not sure (says he) that I shall escape their anathema; since it is their custom generally to be displeased with every thing that does not fall in with their fixed and settled sentiments; and every defence of religion that is out of their way wants another to support it.” Pref. p. viii. And again: “With some, I suppose, the novelty of this matter will be for ever a bar to its reception.” P. 370.
62 The reader sees I complaisantly allow the writer’s representation of the cases both of Pilate and Gallio; though much might, with good reason, be objected to each of them. For, 1. If I should lay any stress on the acts of Pilate, which, he owns, if admitted, would overturn the whole use of his evidence, I should but follow in this the best authorities, and those too supported by such reasonings as the Inquirer would find it difficult to confute. And, 2. As to Gallio’s case, however inattentive he might be to the fame of Paul’s miracles, the passage alledged is certainly insufficient to prove it. Acts, chap. xviii. 17. For, indeed, the Inquirer did not so much as apprehend the purpose of the sacred writer in that whole narration; which manifestly was not to signify to us Gallio’s inattention to the Apostle’s miracles, but his candour, and prudent conduct in refusing to interfere in religious matters, and in chusing rather to overlook an act of violence done in his presence (which, though strictly speaking illegal, he might probably think not altogether undeserved of the malicious intolerating Jew), than gratify the complainant’s passion in punishing either Paul or his heathen advocates. For this is the sense of those words, He cared for none of these things; which the writer ought to have seen is so far from proving Gallio’s disregard of miracles, that, had he been Paul’s convert, the very same thing had been observed of him.
63 Aristeas.—The writers referred to in the margin are Strabo, Maximus Tyrius, Pliny, and Herodotus. Of these, the three first mention Aristeas occasionally only; and yet Strabo calls him ανηρ γοης ει τις αλλος; and Max. Tyrius and Pliny, though they explode miracles, yet plainly enough declare the common creed to run in his favour. Max. Tyrius in particular, after having given us his opinion of his miracles, together with his reasons for pretending to them, adds, And Aristeas gained more credit by this pretension to wonders and supernatural communications, than Xenagoras, Xenophanes, or any other philosopher could have acquired by relating the plain truth. Και ην πιθανωτερος ταυτα λεγων ὁ Αριστεας η ὁ Ξεναγορας η Ξενοφανης, η τις αλλος των εξηγησαμενων τα οντα ὡς εχει. Lastly, the account Herodotus gives us is so much to the credit of his miracles, that one cannot imagine how the writer should think it to his purpose to refer to him. For he was, indeed, delivering the popular history of Aristeas; and therefore did, as might be expected, represent him, not only as a worker of miracles, but as much reverenced and esteemed for them. This he attests upon his own knowledge of several cities, all concurring in the firm belief of his miracles; and one of them in particular transported by so religious a veneration of him, as to erect a statue to his memory; which they also caused to be set up in the most public part of their city, and even close to one they had at the same time decreed to Apollo. And for the historian himself, though in truth the story be even foolish enough, yet so far is he from speaking of it with disregard, that I am not certain if he did not believe it, at least that part which relates to the Metapontini; which, after the mention of some other things from hearsay only, he introduces in the following assured manner: “Thus far the report of these cities: But what I am now going to relate, I certainly know to have happened to the Metapontini in Italy, &c.” Ταυτα μεν αἱ πολεις αὑται λεγουσι, τα δε οιδα Μεταποντινοισι εν Ιταλιη συγκυρησαντα, &c. L iv. 15; and then mentions the affair which gave occasion to the statue; which, he tells us, he saw himself, placed, as I have said, and inscribed to the memory of Aristeas.
64 The other impostors mentioned as not much esteemed for their miracles are Pythagoras, Jamblichus, and Adrian; though it is certain the writers of their lives lay great stress upon them. Jamblichus and Porphyry, after enlarging on several of Pythagoras’s miracles, which drew the applause and admiration of his followers, appeal to current fame for the credit of these, and of other still diviner miracles, which, say they, are related of him with an uniform and constant belief, μυρια δ’ ἑτερα θαυμαστοτερα και θειοτερα περι τ’ ανδρος ὁμαλως και συμφονως ειρηται. (Porph. S. 28 and to the same purpose, and nearly in the same words, Jambl. S. 135). Jamblichus even goes so far, in speaking of the Pythagorean fondness for miracles, as to assure us, that they were conceived to prove the divinity of their authors, and by that means to give a sanction to their opinions and doctrines. την πιστιν των παρ’ αυτοις ὑποληψεων ἡγουνται ειναι ταυτην, &c. S. 140. They conceive it, says he, to add a CREDIT and authority to their doctrines, that the author of them was a GOD; and therefore to the question, Who was Pythagoras? their answer was, The hyperborean Apollo; and in proof of this they alledge the miracle of his golden thigh. And yet, says the Inquirer, Pythagoras was not much more esteemed for his thigh of gold than one of flesh. What pity is it, the wit of this antithesis should be no better supported!
As for Eunapius, though he plainly disbelieved the silly tale of the two boys of Gadara, yet, in relating it circumstantially as he does, he clearly enough expresses his own opinion of miracles, and acknowledges thereby the credit they would bring his master, were they better attested, or but fairly received.
The miracles of the emperors are well known. And as their manifest intent was, of the one of them, to add a credit, or, as Suetonius more strongly expresses it, an authority, and certain awfulness, befitting majesty, to the person of Trajan, and of the other, to inspire the hopes of recovery into Adrian, so the relation of them by their historians, as useful and subservient to those ends, is a thorough confutation of what the author pretends about the little regard paid to them. And here it may be proper to observe, once for all, that the frequent narrations of prodigies and miracles, of which all Pagan story and antiquity is full, is infinitely a stronger argument for the high credit of miracles amongst the heathens in general, than any pretended coolness, tranquillity, and indifference, which the writer’s warmth, in the prosecution of his favourite novelty, leads him to imagine in the narrations themselves, is, or can be, for the contrary opinion. Since this could only shew the incredulity of the relaters; whilst the relating them at all demonstrates the general good reception they met with from the people.
65 This miracle was that of the fiery eruptions which hindered the building of the temple at Jerusalem by Julian; and which, falling into the hands of Marcellinus, might be expected to be spoken of as a natural event. But this is all: for, as to that wonderful coolness and tranquillity, which the writer pretends to have discovered in the narration, it is so far from appearing to me, that, on the contrary, I see not how the historian could have expressed himself with more emotion, without directly owning the miracle. His words are these: Quum itaque rei fortiter instaret Alypius, juvaretque provinciæ rector, metuendi globi flammarum prope fundamenta crebris assultibus erumpentes, fecere locum, exustis aliquoties operantibus, inaccessum: hoc modo elemento destinatius repellente cessavit Inceptum.
66 Pp. 40, 54, 57.
67 Epicurus, Democritus, &c. p. 58.
68 For the passage referred to (Orig. contr. Cels. l. 8) is in answer to an harangue of Celsus, wherein he had expatiated largely on the heathen miracles, and opposed them with great confidence to the Christian. Upon which the excellent Father observes with much force, “I know not how it is that Celsus thinks proper to alledge the heathen miracles as incontestably evident, and undoubted facts; and yet affects to treat the Jewish and Christian miracles recorded in our books as mere fables. For why should not ours rather be thought true, and those which Celsus preaches up fabulous? Especially, since those were never credited by their own philosophers, such as Democritus, Epicurus, and Aristotle; who yet, had they lived with Moses or Jesus, on account of the exceeding great clearness and evidence of the facts, δια την εναργειαν, would in all probability have believed ours.” Having thus fairly laid the passage before the reader, it is submitted to his judgment with what colour of reason the learned writer could think of deducing a proof of the low opinion of miracles in general amongst the philosophers from it.
69 P. 62.
70 P. 63. Philost. L., v. c. 15.
71 P. 64.
72 This was remarkably the case of Mahomet and Numa; the former of whose converse with the angel Gabriel, his journey to heaven, and the armies of angels attending on his battles—as well as the other’s pretended intercourse with the goddess Egeria, is well known.
73 It may seem odd that any of the Fathers of the Church should retain such a strong tincture of this evil principle; yet this, &c. p. 66.
74 Matthew, xxiv. 24. For there shall arise false Christs and false Prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders, insomuch that (if it were possible) they shall deceive the very Elect.
75 Our evidence is still increasing, and is in the next place confirmed even by Divine authority. P. 70.
76 But I could not lay too great a stress on the authority of the Jews, because it neither properly belongs to the present case, nor, &c. P. 74.
77 For this would shew that the heathen rejection of miracles might not be owing to any contempt of them as such, since the Jewish was plainly owing to a very different reason.
78 1 Cor. i. 22. The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom, &c.
79 V. 17.
80 V. 19.
81 V. 20, 21, 22.
82 It is remarkable that Maimonides pushes this prejudice so far as to deny that the true Messiah was to work any miracles at all, except that of restoring the temporal dominion of Israel. If he (the person pretending to be the Messiah) PROSPERS in what he undertakes, and subdues all the neighbouring nations round him, and rebuilds the Sanctuary in its former place, and gathers together the dispersed of Israel, then he is for certain the Messiah. Maimon. in Yad Hachazekah Tract. de Reg. et Bell. eorum. c. 11. s. 4.
83 The right understanding of what is meant by the Jews requiring a sign is of such importance to the perfectly comprehending several parts of the Gospel history, that I shall be allowed to justify and illustrate the interpretation here given by some further considerations. And,
1. If by σημειον is to be understood simply a miracle, then it is not true that Jesus, whom Paul preached, was or could be on that account a stumbling block to the Jews, it being allowed on all hands that many and great miracles did shew forth themselves through him. See John vii. 31. xi. 47. But,
2. Notwithstanding this, and though it was owned in the fullest manner by the chief priests and Pharisees themselves, yet we find them very pressing for a sign, σημειον [Matth. xii. 38. xvi. 1. Luke xi. 29.] and that too (which is very remarkable) at the instant our Saviour had been working a miracle before them; a degree of perversity not rashly to be credited of the Jews themselves.
It is true this sign is sometimes called σημειον απο του ουρανου, a sign from Heaven; which, if meaning any thing more than σημειον, as explained above, i. e. a test or credential of his heavenly or divine mission (and what can be more natural than that the Jews should express by this name the only mark they would admit of the Messiah’s coming from Heaven?) I say, if any thing further be intended in it, it must be either, 1. An outward, sensible display of the Divine power, indicating, by some prodigious and splendid appearance in the heavens, or actually interposing, in some signal way, to accomplish the deliverance of Israel; and then either way it falls in with and includes the interpretation here given. Or else, 2. It must mean a mere prodigy, asked out of wantonness, and for no other end than to gratify a silly curiosity in beholding a wondrous sight from Heaven: an interpretation, which, though maintained by some good writers, is utterly unsupported by the sacred accounts, calling it σημειον indiscriminately, without as with the addition of του ουρανου; and shocking to common sense, which makes it incredible that so frivolous a reason as the being denied a sign, thus understood, could be, as St. Paul asserts it was, the stumbling-block of infidelity to the Jewish nation.
3. But what above all confirms and fixes this interpretation is the tenor of our Saviour’s answer to the question itself. For, upon the inquiry, Master, shew us a sign, &c. his constant reply was, A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, and there shall no sign be given them but that of the prophet Jonas: For, &c. As though he had said, “A perverse and degenerate people, disregarding the wisdom of my doctrines, and the power of my miracles—the genuine marks and characteristics of the Messiah—are yet crying out for the test, σημειον, of my coming. I know the proud and ambitious sentiment of your heart: but assure yourselves, God will not accommodate his proceedings to your fond views and prejudices. No such test shall be given you. One sure and certain TEST indeed there shall be, over and above what has yet been afforded; but to shew you how widely different the Divine conduct is from your prescriptions, it is such a one as ye shall least expect; the very reverse of your hopes and expectations. It shall be that of the prophet Jonas. For, as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale’s belly, so shall Christ (sad contradiction to your conceit of temporal dominion!) be put to death by the Jews, and lie three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. And this event, so degrading of my character with you, and so repugnant to your wishes, shall, I readily foresee, so scandalize you, that, though my return from the grave, like that of Jonas from the whale, shall be in the demonstration of power, yet shall ye, through the inveteracy of that prejudice, be so hardened, as not to be convinced by it.”
The answer of our Saviour is related by Matthew and Luke with some addition, but such as is further favourable to this interpretation. For, upon their asking a sign, it is plain he understood them to mean not a miracle, but a TEST, by the question immediately put to them: When it is evening, ye say it will be fair weather; for the sky is red. And in the morning, it will be foul to-day; for the sky is red and lowering. O! ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky, but can ye not discern the face of the times? “Are the appearances which, in the order and constitution of nature, precede the changes of weather, a sign or test to you of those changes? And are ye stupid and perverse enough to neglect those which, by the Divine appointment, are made the sign or test of the TIMES, of the change of the Mosaic for the Christian dispensation? How is it that ye do not collect this from my miracles and doctrine, the ordinary and stated marks of this change, but ye must perversely demand a test of it, which the Scriptures nowhere promise, and the order and course of God’s Providence disclaim?”
If, after all this, there can yet remain any doubt of the truth of this comment, it will be effectually removed by an authority or two from the other Evangelist, which the reader will indulge me in just mentioning. In our Saviour’s exerting an act of civil power, in scourging and driving the money-changers out of the temple, the Jews require him to shew the credentials of his authority, What sign shewest thou that thou doest these things? The asking a miracle in this case were impertinent; for that, how extraordinary soever, could never prove to the Jews that he came invested with the powers of the civil magistrate. The sign they expected, then was evidently of another kind: an express declaration, or open display, of the regal character and office, evidencing his commission to do such things. Accordingly, the reply of our Saviour was to the same effect as before. Jesus said unto them, destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up; for he spake, we know, of the temple of his body. c. ii.
The next authority is in the sixth chapter, where we have an account of the miracle of feeding the five thousand. Upon the multitude’s following him after this, our Saviour objects to them their neglect of miracles, which he presses upon them as motives to their belief. Ye seek me not, because ye saw the miracles, &c. Now what do the Jews return to this charge? Why, they fairly own it to be just, and, what is more, give a reason for their conduct. Their answer is to this effect: “Wherefore do you urge your miracles thus constantly to us, as motives for our belief? If you would have us trust and confide in you as the Messiah, Where is the sign? For, as to your miracles so often insisted on by you, we cannot admit them as proper evidences of your commission. And indeed how should we? for Moses wrought as great, if not greater wonders than you. To confront your late boasted miracle of feeding the five thousand with five loaves, did not he, as it is written, give our fathers bread from heaven? What miracle of yours can be more extraordinary? Yet Moses could do this. The Messiah, therefore, of whom greater things are promised, we expect to be characterized by other signs. What work takest thou in hand, τι εργαζη?” Here, at last, we see (and the reader will forgive the length of the note for the sake of so clear conviction) that the sign asked for, of what kind soever it might be, neither was nor could be a miracle, since all such signs were rejected by these inquirers upon principle.
84 I have now done with this head [the low opinion of miracles in the heathen world] and am not aware that any reasonable exceptions can be made to the testimonies which have been brought to confirm it; but if any one should think otherwise, and maintain that something else is necessary for the establishment of so singular an opinion, he will be gratify’d in his expectations, as we go along; and will find the principles and practices of much the greater part of the heathens on this point strengthening and confirming each other. P. 77.
85 For this he must say, and not that the credit of miracles would hereby be something weakened: a point, that, as we shall see hereafter, may be allowed, and yet be of no manner of service to his conclusion.
86 I have said bad Dæmons; for miracles wrought by the assistance of good Dæmons were, as the Inquirer observes, p. 247, in great repute.
87 For that this was the obvious and essential difference betwixt the genuine miracles of the gospel, and the tricks of magic, is apparent from many strong expostulations of the Christian apologists, who, when encountered with this frivolous, but malicious objection, used to exclaim: Potestis aliquem nobis designare, monstrare ex omnibus illis magis, Qui unquam fuere per sæcula, consimile aliquid Christo millesimâ ex parte qui fecerit? Qui SINE ULLA VI CARMINUM SINE HERBARUM AUT GRAMINUM SUCCIS, SINE ULLA ALIQUA OBSERVATIONE SOLLICITA SACRORUM, LIBAMINUM, TEMPORUM? &c. Arnob. contr. Gen. L. i. And again, ibid. Atqui constitit Christum SINE ULLIS ADMINICULIS RERUM, SINE ULLIUS RITUS ORSERVATIONE TEL LEGE, omnia illa, quæ fecit, nominis sui possibilitate fecisse; et quod proprium, consentaneum, Deo dignum fuerat vero, nihil nocens, aut noxium, sed OPIFERUM, SED SALUTARE, SED AUXILIARIBUS PLENUM BONIS potestatis munificæ liberalitate donâsse.
88 Acts, C. viii. and xix.
89 For as to the remaining chapters on the idolatry of the Heathens, the parallel betwixt the Heathen and Protestant rejection of miracles, and his Conclusion, they seem very little to concern either him, or me. For, 1. The influence of idolatry is urged to prove, that the religion, not miracles, of Jesus, was hard to be admitted (p. 352); which, though true, has nothing new in it, and is, besides, intirely foreign, if not contradictory, to his purpose. 2. The parallel betwixt the Heathen and Protestant rejection of miracles derives all its little illustrative force from this poor presumption, already confuted, that the Heathens had universally a contempt of miracles. I said the parallel drew its whole force from this fact, for unless it be true that the Heathens universally disbelieved all miracles said to be wrought amongst them, the case of their rejection of Christian miracles, the reader sees, is widely different from that of the Protestant rejection of the Popish. This one circumstance then, to mention no others, overturns the whole use of his parallel. But, 3. As to his conclusion, the design and business of that is, I allow, something extraordinary. It is to shew us, that his whole force was not spent in this wearisome Inquiry, but that, was he disposed for it, he could go on to answer other objections against miracles (p. 408-9) and our common Christianity, which had been already confuted to his hands. For, having shewn us what he could not do with an argument of his own, he was willing, it seems, to shew us what he could do with those of other writers. For which meritorious service he has my compliments and congratulations:
Verbis sæpè in se transfert, qua sal habet,
Quod in TE est.
90 Page 348, and in another place he says, it has been fairly shewn from their own accounts, and from THE NATURE OF THEIR PRINCIPLES, that the Heathens neither had, nor could have an high opinion of miracles. P. 383.
91 Matth. xi. 20. Luke x. 13.
92 Page 172.
93 1 Cor. i. Col. ii. 8.
94 Rom. i. Eph. v. and elsewhere passim.
95 Mr. Addison of the Christian Religion, S. 1.
96 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke.
97 Page 70.
98 Page 12.
99 Or, by judicio suo may be understood that the Chancellor is impowered to inflict which of the several censures mentioned in the Statute he shall think fit, on offenders. The words are ignavos, &c. suspensione graduum, carcere, aut alio leviore supplicio, JUDICIO SUO castigandos. And the same is the meaning of PRO ARBITRIO SUO in the Statute de Officio Procuratorum; on which the Inquirer affects to lay some stress (p. 32). “Eum, qui deliquerit, primò pecuniâ præfinitâ mulctabit; iterum delinquenti duplicabit mulctam; tertiò verò si deliquerit, gravius, pro ARBITRIO SUO, coercebit.” But take it in which sense you will, either of passing sentence by his single authority or determining the kind of punishment at his discretion, neither way can this expression be made to serve the cause in hand. No art of construction can pick, out of the words judicio suo, the sense of final determination.
100 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke.
101 The ignorance of the Inquirer, who asserts that the University has nothing to do with ecclesiastical censures, and that suspension from degrees, in particular, is a punishment merely academical (p. 26), is amazing. Had he been in the least qualified to treat the matter he has undertaken, he would have known that suspension is not merely an usage of the University Court, as such, but was practised by the Ecclesiastical Court of the Bishops or Archbishops, as long as they had jurisdiction in the University. To let in one ray or two of light, in mere compassion, on that utter darkness which environs him, and shuts out all law, canon as well as civil, I will just refer him to Arundel’s Constitutions in a provincial Council; where Members of the University offending in the premisses are declared suspended, ab omni actu scholastico, and deprived, ab omni privilegio scholastico. [Lyndwood, de Hæret. cap. Finaliter.] And the same appears in a Constitution of Archbishop Stratford. [Ib. De Vit. & Honest. Clericorum, cap. Exterior.]
102 So Mr. Attorney General Yorke, in his Argument for the University in Dr. Bentley’s Case,—“The congregation are to be considered as the judges of the Court, and the Vice-chancellor as their official.” The Inquirer hath himself desired the reader to observe (p. 10) that the V. C. in the absence of the Chancellor, hath all the power which the University delegates to this great officer.
103 That his Court was directed by this law, appears from a determination of Delegates, concerning second Appeals in the same cause, which I will take the liberty to transcribe.
De Appellationibus à Delegatis.
In Dei nomine, Amen. Nos D. Buckmaister, Inceptor Dakyns, M’ri Myddylton, Longforth, et Pomell, authoritate nobis ab Universitate commissâ, decernimus ac pro firmâ sententiâ determinamus, quòd liceat unicuique in suâ causâ appellare à judicibus delegatis per Universitatem ad eandem Universitatem, modò id fiat juxta juris exigentiam, hoc est, si antea ab eodem secundâ vice in eâdem causâ appellatum non fuerit. Quod si anteà bis appellaverit, neutiqùam tertiò appellare licebit, quum id prorsus sit vetitum tam per jus civile quàm canonicum: Cæterum unicuique tam actori quàm reo maneat sua libertas appellandi in suâ causâ à judicibus delegatis per Universitatem modo supradicto et à jure præscripto. [Lib. Proc. Jun. fol. 132.]
104 See old Statutes De Judiciis et Foro scholarium; De pœnis Appellantium; De tempore prosequendi Appellationes.
105 See Determination of Delegates, before cited, p. 25.
106 P. 26.
107 P. 1.
108 P. 62.
109 Delegates are nominated by the Caput; and the Caput is, in effect, appointed by the Vice-chancellor and Heads of Colleges, who are commonly parties in all appellations. [See Stat. De capite Eligendo.] So (as the University complained, in their remonstrance against this very Statute of Q. Elizabeth) “when they [the V. C. and Masters of Houses] offer wrong, and themselves appoint judges to redress that wrong; it is too true, which Livy writeth in the state of Decemvira, siquis Collegam appellaverit, (meaning Appius’s judgment), ab eo, ad quem venerit, ità discessurum, tanquam pæniteret prioris decreto non stetisse.” [C. C. C. MSS.] So little reason is there on the part of the Vice-chancellor, to fear any thing from partial Delegates!
110 The Inquirer hath even had the hardiness to advance this in the plainest terms. He harangues at large from p. 9. to 13. on the impropriety of appealing from the determination of a superior to an inferior; and, in another place, p. 39. derides the notion of citing the supreme Magistrate before more supreme Delegates. But how different were the sentiments of a late learned Civilian on this head, from those of this little academical Lawyer! Speaking of Mr. Campbell’s case, in 1725. “There is, says he, a subordination of jurisdiction in the University. The Vice-chancellor’s jurisdiction is inferior to that of the Senate; and upon Mr. C—’s saying, that he appealed to the University, the inferior jurisdiction ceased and devolved to the Senate, even before the inhibition. And, afterwards in considering the proctor’s inhibition; upon the Appeal, the Proctors represent the University, and are in that case superior to the Vice-chancellor.—And I am of opinion, that the Delegates in Mr. C—’s cause may, upon the Proctor’s applying to them, primo et ante omnia reverse the whole proceedings against him, in the V. C’s court, as an attentat upon the University’s jurisdiction; and may likewise inflict such censures, as the Statutes impower them to make use of, for the breach of the inhibition; all inhibitions being by Law, sub pænâ juris et contemptûs.” Dr. Andrews.
111 P. 70.
112 We have this confession from the candid writer of Considerations on the late Regulations, &c. “I must enter, says he, upon this subject with acknowledging, as I do with equal truth and pleasure, that there never was, within my remembrance, nor, I believe, within any one’s memory, a set of more able and industrious tutors than we have at present; more capable of discharging that useful office, or more diligent and careful in the discharge of it,” p. 12. And, again, “I think there prevails in general and through all degrees among us, a great disposition to sobriety and temperance,” p. 14.
113 P. 64.
114 P. 13.
115 P. 65.
116 “You will urge—that, as a previous oath must be taken by the tutor, that he believes in his conscience that his pupil has a just cause of appeal, all Appeals would by this means be prevented, but such as were founded upon good reasons. But the force of this argument will not be thought very great, if, &c.”
Reader, I can easily guess the sentiments which must arise in thee, at the sight of this shocking paragraph. But think not I have abused thee in this citation. They are the author’s own words, as they lie in p. 65 of the Inquiry. Well, but his reason? Why, “if it be remembered, that, though oaths of this kind were exacted in order to prevent the frequency of Appeals, they by no means had their proper effect, the same number having been commenced for the three years next after this regulation, as in that towards the close of which it was first made.” This provision of oaths had not, he says, its proper effect. And how does this appear? Why, because Appeals were as frequent afterwards as before. Now, any other man would, surely, have inferred from hence, that “therefore the Appeals made were not without good reason.” Not so the Inquirer. He is of another spirit. Rather than give any quarter to Appeals, let every tutor in the University be an abandoned perjured villain. In very tenderness to this unhappy writer, whoever he be, I forbear to press him farther on such a subject.
117 P. 66.
118 Diss. VI. p. 259.
119 Diss. VI. p. 251.
120 Hodges, Garnet, Chappelow.
121 P. 296.
122 P. 255.
123 P. 296.
124 Dr. Lowth.
125 Page 261.
126 Page 253.
127 Page 269.
128 Page 293.
129 Julian, p. 316.
130 Essay on the Gift of Tongues, Works, vol. ii. p. 91.
131 Doctrine of Grace, b. i. c. viii. p. 41. 2ᵈ Ed. 8ᵛᵒ.
132 Ib.
133 D. G. p. 51.
134 P. 41, 42.
135 From p. 42 to p. 45.
136 Dissertation, p. 82.
137 Dissert. p. 82.
138 Dissert. p. 86.
139 Doctrine of Grace, p. 41.
140 Doctrine of Grace, p. 45.
141 Doctrine of Grace, p. 43.
142 Dissert. p. 88.
143 Doctrine of Grace, p. 52, 53.
144 Doctrine of Grace, p. 55, 56.
145 Dissert. p. 19.
146 Dissert. p. 4.
147 Doctrine of Grace, p. 52.
148 Dissert. p. 41.
149 Dissert. p. 45.
150 Doctrine of Grace, p. 53.
151 Dissert. p. 58.
152 Dissert. p. 80, n.
153 Doctrine of Grace, pp. 56, 57.
154 Dissert. p. 20.
155 Dissert. p. 80. n.
156 Doctrine of Grace, p. 58.
157 Dissert. p. 24.
158 Dissert. p. 25.
159 Quinct. l. ix. c. 3.
160 Dissert. p. 34.
161 Doctrine of Grace, p. 52.
162 Adv. to the Dissert.