CHAPTER II.
Shewing from the relation between God and man, that human reason cannot be a competent judge of the fitness and reasonableness of God’s proceedings with mankind, either as to the time, or matter, or manner of an external revelation.
AS our author has laid it down for an undeniable rule of God’s actions, that he must, if he be a wise and good being, act according to the relation he stands in towards his creatures; I proceed upon this principle to prove the incapacity of human reason, to judge truly of God’s proceedings in regard to divine revelation.
For if the fitness of actions results from the nature and relations of beings, then the fitness of God’s actions, as he is an omniscient Creator and Governor, to whom every thing is eternally foreknown, over beings endued with our freedom of will, must be to us incomprehensible.
* We are not so much as capable of comprehending by our reason, the possibility of this relation, or how the fore-knowledge of God can consist with the free agency of creatures. We know that God fore-knows all things, with the same certainty as we know there is a God. And if self-consciousness is an infallible proof of our own existence, it proves with the same certainty the freedom of our will. And hence it is, that we have a full assurance of the consistency of God’s fore-knowledge with freedom of will.
* Now this incomprehensible relation between an eternally fore-knowing Creator and Governor, and his free creatures, is the relation from whence arises the fitness of God’s providence over us. But if the relation itself is incomprehensible, then those actions that have their fitness from it, must surely be incomprehensible. Nothing can be fit for God to do, either in creation or providence, but what has its fitness founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would follow, from every kind of creation, and every manner of providence: but if nothing can be fit, but because it is according to this fore-knowledge of every thing that would follow from every kind of creation, and every manner of providence; then we have the utmost certainty, that the fitness of God’s actions as a fore-knowing Creator, and Governor of free agents, must be founded upon reasons that we cannot possibly know any thing of.
* And a child that has but just learned to speak, is as well qualified to state the fitness of the laws of matter and motion by which the whole vegetable world is preserved, as the wisest of men is qualified to comprehend, or state the fitness of the methods, which a fore-knowing Providence observes over free agents. For every reason on which the fitness of such a providence is founded, is not only unknown to us, but by a necessity of nature impossible to be known by us.
For if the fitness of God’s acting in this, or that manner, is founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would happen, from every possible way of acting, then it is impossible for us to know the reasons, on which the fitness of his actions is founded, as it is impossible for us to be omniscient.
Who can tell what different kinds of rational creatures, distinguished by variety of natures, and faculties, it is fit and reasonable for God to create, because he eternally foresaw what would be the effect of such different creations? Who can explain the fitness of that vast variety there is amongst rational creatures of the same species, or shew that all their different faculties ought to be as they are? And yet the fitness of this providence has its certain reason in the divine fore-knowledge, and it could not be fit, but because of it.
Who can tell what degree of reason rational creatures ought to enjoy, or what degrees of new and revealed knowledge it is fit and reasonable for God to give, or not give them, because they seem, or seem not to themselves to want it, are disposed, or not disposed to receive it? For as mankind cannot tell why it was fit and reasonable for God to create them of such a kind, and degree, as they are of; so neither can they tell how God ought, or ought not to add to their natural knowledge, and make them as differently accountable for the use of revealed rules of life, as for the use of their natural faculties.
And as the reason why God created them of such a kind, and with such faculties, was because of his own fore-knowledge of the effects of such a creation; so if ever he does reveal to them any supernatural knowledge, both the doing it, the time, the matter, and manner of it, must have their fitness in his own eternal fore-knowledge of the effects of such a revelation.
The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation depends, why or when, of what matter, in what manner, and to whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be as unsearchable by us, as the reasons of this or that creation of rational beings, at such a time, of such a kind, in such a manner, in such a state.
This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions, which this writer puts in this manner.
“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer the doing it till the time of Tiberius; since the sooner this was done, the greater would his goodness appear?”¹
And again “How is it consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, when all had equal need of it? Was it not as easy for him to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in one?”¹
Now all this is fully answered, by our author’s own great and fundamental principle.
“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹ as he expressly affirms; then the sole rule or reason of God’s revealing any thing to any men, at any time, must have its fitness resulting from the divine fore-knowledge of the effects of such a revelation, at such a time, and to such persons. If God does not act thus, he does not act according to the relation betwixt a fore-knowing Creator, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to a fitness resulting from this relation, and makes, or does not make revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good, can make a revelation at any time, and not make the same at all times, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can reveal that at one time, because it is a proper time for it, and not reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it.
* God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times, and of the state and actions of free agents, deferred a certain revelation to the time of Tiberius, because he fore-saw it would then be an act of the greatest goodness, and have its best effects upon the world: to ask therefore, what reason can be assigned, why so good a revelation was not sooner, or even from the beginning made to the world, is asking, why God should act, according to his own fore-knowledge of the state and actions of free agents, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from such a fore-knowledge?
These questions suppose, that if God shewed his goodness to mankind by a revelation at such time, he must be wanting in goodness before that time, because he did not make it sooner; whereas if his deferring it till such a time, was owing to his fore-knowledge of the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have its best effects, then God is proved to be equally good before he made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before its proper time: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had not deferred it till that time.
Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions of free agents, as the cause of all that is particular in the time and manner of any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence, cannot be said to be begging the question, but is resolving it directly according to the rule, which this writer lays down for God to act by: that “the relations between things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”
But if this is the sole rule, then God in giving any revelation, must act as the relation betwixt a fore-knowing Creator and his free creatures requires; and his actions must have their fitness resulting from his fore-knowledge of the state and actions of free agents. And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask why this or that revelation only at such a time, is to ask why God only does that which is fit for him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it is not fit for him to do?
This writer asks, “How it is consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, who had equal need of it?” But if they had equal need of it, yet if they were not equally fit for it, but prepared only to have their guilt increased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it.
Judas, Pontius Pilate, and the Jews that called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, had equal need of a Saviour with those that believed in him. Chorazin and Bethsaida wanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.
So that this argument, founded on the equal need of all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such a particular time and state of things and persons.
He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they are easy, or forbears things because they are difficult to be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things to all nations or persons, because it was as easy to him, as to do it to any one nation or person; unless it be supposed, that the easiness of a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.
But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this, that his manner of revealing every thing, might be worthy of his own fore-knowledge of the effects of it, and that every thing that is particular in the time or manner of any revelation, might have its fitness resulting from the relation betwixt a good God and his creatures, whose changing state, different conduct, tempers and actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.
Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the effect of justice, or else of mercy and free goodness; but in either of these cases it ought to be universal; for justice must be done to all. But if it is the effect of mercy and free goodness, this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good, who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”¹
It is answered, That there is neither justice in God without mercy, nor mercy without justice; and to ascribe a revelation to either of them separately, in contradistinction to the other, has no more reason in it, than to ascribe the creation separately either to the wisdom or power of God, in contradistinction to the other.
Secondly, A divine revelation is not owing barely to the justice or free goodness of God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of God, governed and directed by his eternal fore-knowledge of all the effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.
* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place; not because it is a justice that he cannot refuse, not because it is a matter of favour or free goodness, and therefore may be given in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the whole duration of human things, the whole race of mankind, the whole order of human changes and events, the whole combination of all causes and effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing that is particular in it, either as to time, matter, manner, or place.
* All complaints therefore about that which is particular, or seemingly partial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings, because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done, and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but according to his own infinite perfections.
* We will not allow a providence to be right, unless we can comprehend the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as much above our comprehension, as our wisdom is below that which is infinite.
For if the relations of things, and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, be the rule of God’s actions; then all the revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to the various states, conditions, tempers, and actions of free agents, and the various effects of every manner of revelation.
But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he must act by a rule that lies out of our sight, and his providence in this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason, because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it ought to have.
CHAPTER III.
Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation.
THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on which a divine revelation is founded, both as to its time, matter, and manner.
But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?”
If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine revelation, either as to its matter or manner, as imperfectly as he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for believing false revelations, as for idolatry; and as full of guilt for rejecting a true revelation, as for denying the only true God.
Secondly, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending the reasons, on which the particular matter or manner of any divine revelation is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons for receiving or not receiving a revelation as divine, as to make our conduct therein justly accountable to God.
For if God can shew a revelation to proceed from him, by the same undeniable evidence, as he shews the creation to be his work; if he can make himself as visible in a particular extraordinary manner, as he is by his general and ordinary providence; then, tho’ we are as unqualified to judge of the mysteries of a revelation, as we are to judge of the mysteries in creation and providence; yet we may be as fully obliged to receive a revelation, as to acknowledge the creation to be the work of God; and as highly criminal for disbelieving it, as for denying a general providence.
Adam, Noah, Abraham, and Moses, were very incompetent judges, of the reasons on which the particular revelations made to them were founded; but this did not hinder their sufficient assurance, that such revelations came from God, because they were proved to come from God in the same manner, as the creation is proved to be the work of God.
And as Adam and Noah must see every thing wonderful, mysterious, and above their comprehensions, in those new worlds into which they were introduced by God; so they could no more expect, that he should require nothing of them, but what they would enjoin themselves, than that their own frame, the nature of the creation, the providence of God, or the state of human life, should be exactly as they would have it.
And if their posterity will let no messages from heaven, no prophesies and miracles persuade them, that God can call them to any duties, but such as they must enjoin themselves; or to the belief of any doctrines, but such as their own minds can suggest; nor to any methods of changing their present state of weakness and disorder for a happy immortality, but such as suit their own taste, temper, and way of reasoning; it is because they are grown senseless of the mysteries of creation and providence with which they are surrounded, and forget the awful prerogative of infinite wisdom, over the weakest, lowest rank of intelligent beings.
* And as we can only know what is worthy of God in creation, by knowing what he has created; so we can no other way know what is worthy of God to be revealed, but by a revelation. And he that pretends independently of any relation, to shew how, and in what manner God ought to make a revelation worthy of himself, is as great a visionary, as he that should pretend independently of the creation, or without learning any thing from it, to shew how God ought to have proceeded in it, to make it worthy of himself. For as God alone, knows how to create worthy of himself, and nothing can possibly be proved to be worthy to be created by him, but because he has already created it; so God alone knows what is worthy of himself in a revelation, and nothing can possibly be proved worthy to be revealed by him, but because he has already revealed it.
Hence we may see how little this writer is governed by the reason and nature of things, who proceeds upon this as an undeniable principle, that we could not know a revelation to be divine, unless we knew, antecedently to revelation, what God could teach or require of us by it. Thus, says he, “Were we not capable by our own reason of knowing what the divine goodness could command, or forbid his creatures, antecedently to any external revelation, we could not distinguish the true instituted religion, from the many false ones.”¹
Just as wild and visionary, as if it was said, Were we not capable by our reason of knowing what kind or orders of beings God ought to create independently of any thing we learn from the creation, we could never prove this or that creation to proceed from him. Did we not, antecedently to facts and experience, know by our own reason what ought to be the method and manner of divine providence, we could never prove that the providence which governs nations and persons is a divine providence.
Again, He proceeds to shew, that a revelation from God cannot contain any thing, but what human reason can prove from the nature of things; because if God could require any thing more of us, than what our own reason could thus prove, he must require without reason, and then there is an end of all religion.
Now this argument proceeds thus; If God does not act according to the measure of human reason, he cannot act according to reason itself. If he requires any more of us, than what we think the nature of things requires of us, then he cannot act according to the nature of things. If his wisdom is in any matters of revelation greater than ours; if it is not in every thing he reveals measurable by ours, it cannot be wisdom at all, much less can it be infinite wisdom.
That is, if he is more powerful than we are, he cannot be omnipotent; if he is more perfect than we are, he cannot be all perfection; if he acts upon greater, or higher, or more reasonable motives than we do, he cannot be a reasonable being.
Now if these absurdities are not plain and manifest to every common understanding, it is in vain to dispute about any thing; but if they are, then it is as plain, this writer’s great argument against Christianity, and first principle of his rational religion, is in the same state of undeniable absurdity.
Thus says he, “Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow from the reason and the nature of things.”¹ That is, natural religion takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says he, “Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure, otherwise it would be the same with natural religion.”²
Here you see all the absurdities just mentioned, are ♦expressly contained in this argument, God is all humour and caprice, if his revelation is not strictly, in every respect, the same with human reason. That is, he is without wisdom, without reason, if his wisdom and reason exceed ours. He has no reason, nor wisdom, if his reason and wisdom are infinite.
Secondly, This argument, if it were allowed, leads directly to atheism. For if a revelation cannot be divine, if it contains any thing mysterious, whose fitness and necessity cannot be explained by human reason, then neither creation nor providence can be proved to be divine, for they are both of them more mysterious than the Christian revelation.
And if every thing is arbitrary, whose fitness and experience human reason cannot prove and explain, then surely an invisible over-ruling providence that orders all things in a manner, and for reasons, known only to itself; that subjects human life, and human affairs, to what changes it pleases; that confounds the best-laid designs, and makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence; that gives not the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous; surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.
And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly to atheism, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in a secret and invisible manner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.
* There is nothing therefore half so mysterious in the Christian revelation, as there is in that invisible providence, which all must hold that believe a God. And tho’ there is enough plain in providence, to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often been a rock of atheism to those, who make their own reason the measure of wisdom.
Again, Tho’ the creation plainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and goodness of God; yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose fitness, expedience, and reasonableness, human reason cannot comprehend, than are to be found in scripture.
If therefore he reasons right, who says, “If there may be some things in a true religion, whose fitness and expedience we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s laws all of a piece? And if the having of these things is no proof of its falshood, how can any things fit and expedient (which no religion is without) be a proof of the truth of any one religion?”¹ If, I say, this is the right reasoning, then it may be said, “If there are things in the creation whose fitness we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s works of a piece? And if the being of such things as these in the creation, is not a proof of its not being divine, how can the fitness and expedience of any creation prove that it is the work of God?”
Thus does this argument tend wholly to atheism, and concludes with the same force against creation and providence, as it does against revelation.
Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation, whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God’s providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.
The credibility of an external divine revelation with regard to human reason, rests wholly upon such external evidence, as is a sufficient proof of the divine interposition. If there be no such external evidence possible; if God has no ways of acting so peculiar to himself, as to be a sufficient proof to human reason of his action; then no revelation can be sufficiently proved to be a divine, external revelation from God.
I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this kind of proof.
1. It is objected, That miracles cannot prove a false, or bad doctrine, to be true and good; therefore miracles, as such, cannot prove the truth of any revelation.
But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good; yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things revealed, but because they are God’s testimony to the truth of that which he reveals.
But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.
“If, says he, evil beings can impress notions in mens minds as strongly as good beings, and cause miracles to be done in confirmation of them; is there any way to know to which of the two, notions thus impressed are owing, but from their internal marks of wisdom and goodness?”
This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that power which evil spirits may have; yet if we know enough of it to affirm, that the creation is not the work of evil spirits; if we can securely appeal to the creation, as a sufficient proof of God’s action and ♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as a sufficient proof of a divine revelation.
For, if the creation must be allowed to be the work of God, notwithstanding any unknown degree of power in evil spirits; if we can as certainly ascribe it to God, as if there were no such spirits; then miracles may be as full a proof of the interposition of God, as if there were no such spirits in being.
I do not ask, Whether the same divine perfection is necessary to foretel such things as are foretold in scripture, and work such miracles as are there related, as is necessary to create? I do not ask, Whether any power less than divine can do such things? I only ask, Whether there is any certainty, that the creation is the work of God? Whether we can be sure of the divine operation, from the existence of that creation? Or, Whether we are in doubt or uncertainty about it, because we do not know the degree of power, that may belong to evil spirits.
For if it can be affirmed, that the creation is the work of God, notwithstanding our uncertainty about the degree of power that may belong to evil spirits; then we have the same certainty, that the prophecies and miracles recorded in scripture, are to be ascribed to God, notwithstanding our uncertainty of the power of evil spirits.
For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God, is the same argument against the certainty of the creation’s being the work of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case than in the other.
For, if evil spirits have so the creation in their hands, that by reason of their power over it, no miracles can prove the operation of God, then the operation of God cannot be proved from the creation itself.
For the creation cannot be proved to be the operation of God, unless it can be proved that God still presides over it.
And if all that which is extraordinary and miraculous may be accounted for, without the interposition of God; then nothing that is ordinary and common according to the course of nature, can be a proof of the action of God. For there can be no reason assigned, why that which is ordinary shall be ascribed to God, if all that is, or has been, or can be miraculous, may be ascribed to evil spirits.
Either therefore it must be said, that there are, or may be miracles, which cannot be the effects of evil spirits; or else nothing that is ordinary and common can be a proof of the operation of God. For if nothing miraculous can be an undeniable proof of God’s action, nothing created can be a proof of it.
The matter therefore stands thus: There are, and may be miracles, that cannot be ascribed to evil spirits, without ascribing the creation to them; and which can no more be doubted to come from God, than we can doubt of his being the Creator of the world. There may be miracles therefore, which, are as full a proof of the truth of that which they attest, as the creation is of the fitness of that which is created.
And though the matter of a revelation is to be attended to, that we may fully understand it, and be rightly affected with it; yet the reason of our receiving it, must rest upon that external authority, which shews it to be of God.
And the authority of miracles, sufficiently plain and apparent, are of themselves a full reason for receiving a revelation, which both as to its matter and manner, would not be approved by us without them.
The history of magical wonders, and extraordinary things done by evil spirits, is no objection against the sufficiency of that proof, that arises from miracles. For the question is not, whether nothing that is extraordinary can be done by evil spirits, but whether nothing that is miraculous can, be a proof of its being done by God. For these two cases are very consistent. It may be very possible for evil spirits, to do things extraordinary in some circumstances, as ♦where people enter into contracts with them, and resign themselves up to their power, and yet that miracle may in other circumstances, be a sufficient proof of their being done by God.
And as miracles are the highest and most undeniable evidence of the truth and divinity of any external revelation; so Christianity stands fully distinguished from all other religions, by the highest and most undeniable evidences; since it has all the proof that the highest state of miracles can give, and every other religion is without any support from them.
And though this writer, with a boldness worthy of himself, often puts all traditional religion upon a level; yet he might have shewn himself as much a friend to truth as sobriety, by asserting, that all arguments are equally conclusive, all tempers equally virtuous, all designs equally honest, and all histories and fables equally supported by evidences of fact.
To give you one instance more of this writer’s extravagant and inconsistent notions.
He makes reason, or natural religion, to be God’s internal revelation, differing only from external revelation in the manner of its being communicated. He rejects external revelation as unworthy of God, because it has not been sufficiently made known at all times, and in all places; yet he sets up an internal revelation, as worthy of God, which has never been made known to any one man of any time or place in the world. For what one man ever knew that reason was God’s internal revelation, to which nothing could be added by any external revelation?
It is a mighty complaint with our author against Christianity, that so much happiness should be deferred till the time of Tiberius, and that it should be communicated to no greater a part of the world, than Christianity hath been. But is not this a judicious complaint in the mouth of a person, that is setting up a religion, that has been communicated to no body but himself.
I know nothing that can be said for our author, in excuse of so much confusion and self-contradiction, unless it be the particular hardships of his sect. The free-thinking few, he says, are forced into an outward compliance; and that which forces a man into a state of hypocrisy, may force him into a great deal of confusion and self-contradiction.
To return: I have from a consideration of the state of man, and the several relations which God stands in towards his creatures, shewn that it is utterly impossible for human reason to be a competent judge of the fitness, or unfitness, of all that God may, or may not require of us. The two following chapters shall state the nature and perfection of reason, as it is a faculty, or principle of action in human nature.