APPENDIX E
FIRST LORD’S MINUTES
In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval reservists of different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres of one marine and two naval brigades. The marine brigade has already been partially formed in four battalions, aggregating 1,880 active service men. To this will be added an approximately equal number of reservists, making the total strength of the brigade 3,900, organised in four battalions of four double companies of approximately 250 men. The two naval brigades will also consist of four battalions, each, if possible, of 880 men, organised in sixteen double companies of 220. The composition of each battalion should be as follows:—
| R.N.V.R. | 375 |
| R.F.R. (picked, under 30 years of age) | 313 |
| R.N.R. | 190 |
The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would therefore be:—
| R.N.V.R. | 3,000 |
| R.F.R. | 2,500 |
| R.N.R. | 1,500 |
The marine brigade will be commanded by a Colonel, and each battalion by a Lieutenant-Colonel; each company by a Major and a Captain. The means of remedying the shortage of junior officers will be dealt with separately. About fifty new subalterns, R.M., must be entered either permanently or on a three years’ or till the war stops engagement.
Each naval brigade will be commanded by a Captain, R.N.; five of the battalions by a Commander or naval officer promoted to that rank, and three by R.N.V.R. Commanders; each company will be commanded by a Lieutenant-Commander, R.N. or R.N.V.R., or, if these are not forthcoming, by a Major, R.M. The question of making good deficiencies in these and in the marine brigade will be dealt with separately. There are, however, available 50 R.N.V.R. Lieutenants, 66 Sub-Lieutenants, and 12 Midshipmen; total, 128. About 50 more officers would be required.
The use of these brigades need not be considered until the organisation has advanced sufficiently to allow of their military value to be judged.
The formation of these brigades should be completed so far as resources allow in the present week. The officers commanding the companies and battalions must be appointed forthwith. The first essential is to get the men drilling together in brigades; and the deficiencies of various ranks in the battalions can be filled up later. It may ultimately be found possible in the course of the war to build up all battalions of the marine and naval brigades to the army strength of 1,070, and the organisation will readily adapt itself to this. All the men, whether sailors or marines, while training in the three brigades will be available if required for service afloat, and it must be distinctly understood that this is the paramount claim upon them; but in the meanwhile they will be left to be organised for land service.
ACTION OF AUGUST 28
1. Let me have an estimate of how long it will take to refit for service in every particular the vessels damaged in the recent action. Careful attention should be paid to the wishes and suggestions of the officers who fought them, in order that everything possible can be done to increase their fighting efficiency.
2. The failure of the 4–inch guns in the Arethusa is most serious, and must be thoroughly investigated. I am informed that it arose both from the breaking of the ejector catches, of which there were no spares, and secondly from the coating of the cartridge cases, which gradually fouled the gun. At one critical moment only one 4–inch gun could fire, and but for her 6–inch guns the Arethusa would have been destroyed. I wish to receive a statement showing that an effective remedy has been provided.
3. Every effort should be made while the ships are refitting to give the officers and men a few days’ leave. The nervous strain of a modern action is considerable, and a change of scene is required to restore poise and resiliency.
(1) Selections might be made from all the reports of this action, beginning with some of the submarine reconnaissance reports which the Prime Minister has repeatedly urged me to publish. All interesting matter which can be made public without detriment to the future should be collected, circulated to the Fleet, and published in the newspapers.
(2) The criticism in the Commander-in-Chief’s report and various references to discrepancies in the arrangements which occur in Commodore S’s and other statements must all be kept absolutely secret. Mistakes are always made in war, but there is no need to weaken confidence by dwelling on them after success has been obtained. The Senior Officers concerned in the manœuvre should, however, all have the opportunity of studying the full reports in order that every effort may be made to improve arrangements in the future. Beyond this profoundly secret circle no whisper must go.
(3) I am awaiting your recommendations for honours, promotions, and rewards to be accorded to the officers and men who distinguished themselves in this fortunate and skilful enterprise.