ARTICLE SIGNED "COTTON MATHER."1
[Boston Gazette, November 25, 1771.]
MESSIEURS EDES & GILL,
Mucius SCAEVOLA, a writer whom I very much admire, tells us, "A Massachusetts Governor the King by Compact may nominate and appoint, but not pay: For his support he must stipulate with the people, & until he does, he is no legal Governor; without this, if he undertakes to rule he is a USURPER." - These sentiments have given great disgust to the Governor & Council, and the publisher, it is said, is to be prosecuted: But if he has spoken the words of truth and soberness, why should he be punished? Is there any man in the community that can procure harm in a process of law, to him who speaks necessary and important truths? If there be such a man, mark him for a Tyrant. Is there any man whose publick conduct will not bear the scrutiny of truth? he is a Traitor, and it is high time he was pointed out.
I have upon this occasion looked into the Charter of the province in which the COMPACT between the King and the people is contain'd, and I find not a single word about the King's paying his Governor. If therefore the Charter is altogether silent about it, Mucius is certainly to be justified in saying that by the compact the King may not pay him; that is, there is nothing in the Charter to warrant it. But it is asked, whether the King may not pay his Governor notwithstanding? And ought it not to be looked upon as a mark of royal bounty and goodness, thus to save the people from being "burdened by a tax upon their polls and estates for a Governor's support?" This is the Court language; and great pains have been taken by some gentlemen, whose particular business it is to ride through the several counties, to spread it in every part of the province. But it has a tendency to mislead and ensnare. It no doubt sounds very agreeably in the ears of an unwary man, that by this ministerial manoeuvre, the province have a saving of a thousand pounds sterling every year, for the support of a Governor. Let us consider the matter a little. Did not our ancestors, when they accepted this Charter, understand that they had contracted for a free government? And did not the King on his part intend that it should be so? Was it not understood, that by this contract every power of government was to be under a check adequate to the importance of it, without which, according to the best reasoners on government, and the experience of mankind in all ages of the world, that power must be a tyranny? Undoubtedly it was the sense of both parties in the contract, that the government to be erected by the Charter, should be a free government, and that every power of it should be properly controuled in order to constitute it so. I would then ask, what weight remains in the scale of the democratick part of the constitution to check the monarchick in the hands of the governor, if the king has not only an uncontroulable power to nominate and appoint a governor, but may pay him too? If any one will point out to me a sufficient weight to balance the scale, I will differ from Mucius: But until that is done, I must be of his mind, that the king has no right to pay his governor: "For that, he must stipulate with the people;" otherwise our civil constitution is rendered materially different from what the contracting parties intended it should be, viz, a free constitution. It places the governor in such a state of independency as must make any man formidable. - It puts it in his power in many instances to act the tyrant, even under the appearance of all the forms of the constitution. The man who is possessed of a power to act the tyrant when he thinks proper, let him become possessed of it as he may, is at least an USURPER of power that cannot belong to him in any free state - Power is intoxicating: There have been few men, if any, who when possessed of an unrestrained power, have not made a very bad use of it - They have generally exercised such a power to the terror both of the good and the evil, and of the good more than the evil - While a governor is possessed of a power without any other check than that which the constitution has provided, upon a supposition that the king by charter may pay him as well as appoint him, for aught I can see, under such an administration as the present, I mean in England, he may make the people slaves as soon as he pleases and keep them so as long as he pleases. I have heard it asked, What! may not the king make a present to his governor of fifteen hundred sterling every year, if he sees fit? Is not his MAJESTY allowed to be upon a footing with even a private subject? This reasoning is very plausible, but I think not just. In some respects the king is more restrained than the lowest of his subjects. He may not for instance, turn a Roman Catholic, or marry one of that religion and hold his crown: He forfeits it by law if he does. And why? Because it has been found that the Roman Catholic principles are inconsistent with the principles of the British constitution, which is the rule of his government. And there is the same reason why the governor who is appointed by the crown, should stipulate with the people for his support, if that mutual check among the several powers of government, which is essential to every free constitution, is otherwise destroyed. - If the king's paying or making yearly presents to his governor, renders him a different being in the state from that which the Charter intends he shall be, and that to the prejudice of the people, the king by the compact may not pay him, for in such a case, it would be inconsistent with the principles of our constitution - No king can have a right to put it in the power of his governor to become a tyrant, or govern arbitrarily; for he cannot be a tyrant or govern arbitrarily himself.
I beg leave to make a supposition; If his Holiness the Pope, for the sake of once more having a Catholic King seated on the British throne, should make him a present yearly of eight hundred thousand pounds sterling, for the support of himself and his household, it would be a great saving indeed to the nation; but would the people, think you, consent to it because of that saving? Should we not hear the faithful Commons objecting to it as an innovation big with danger to the rights and liberties of the nation? I believe it would be in vain to flatter them that their constituents would be eas'd of a burden of a tax upon their polls and estates, by means which would render their king thus independent of them, and place him in a state of absolute dependance, for his support, upon another, who had especially for a long course of years, tried every art and machination to overthrow their constitution in church and state - Would not the people justly think there would be danger that such a king thus dependent on the pope, and oblig'd by him, would be as subservient to the admonitions of his Holiness, or his Legate in his name, as a certain provincial governor, we know, has been to the instructions of a minister of state, upon the bare prospect of his being made independent of the people for his support.
COTTON MATHER.
1 Attributed to Adams in the Dorr file of the Gazette.
ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."
[Boston Gazette, December 2, 1771.]
Messieurs EDES & GILL,
No methods are yet left untried by the writers on the side of the ministry, to perswade this People that the best way to get rid of our Grievances is to submit to them. This was the artifice of Governor Bernard, and it is urg'd with as much zeal as ever, under the administration of Governor Hutchinson. They would fain have us endure the loss of as many of our Rights and Liberties as an abandon'd ministry shall see fit to wrest from us, without the least murmur: But when they find, that they cannot silence our complaints, & sooth us into security they then tell us, that "much may be done for the publick interest by way of humble & dutiful representation, pointing out the hardships of certain measures" - This is the language of Chronus in the last Massachusetts Gazette. But have we not already petition'd the King for the Redress of our Grievances and the Restoration of our Liberties? - have not the House of Representatives done it in the most dutiful terms imaginable? - Was it not many months before that Petition was suffer'd to reach the royal hand? - And after it was laid before his Majesty, was he not advis'd by his ministers to measures still more grevious and severe? Have any lenient measures been the consequence of our humble representations of "the hardship of certain measures," which were set forth by the house of assembly in the most decent and respectful letters to persons of high rank in the administration of government at home? Did not the deputies of most of the towns and districts in this province met in Convention in the year 1768, when Bernard had in a very extraordinary manner dissolv'd the General Assembly? - Did they not, I say, in the most humble terms, petition the Throne for the Redress of the intolerable grievances we then labor'd under? - Has not the Town of Boston most submissively represented "the hardship of certain measures" to their most gracious Sovereign, and petition'd for Right and Relief? - Was not petitioning and humbly supplicating, the method constantly propos'd by those very persons whom Chronus after the manner of his brethren, stiles "pretended patriots ", and constantly adopted till it was apparent that our petitions and representations were treated with neglect and contempt? - Till we found that even our petitioning was looked upon as factious, and the effects of it were the heaping Grievance upon Grievance? - Have not the people of this province, after all their humble supplications, been falsly charg'd with being "in a state of disobedience to all law and government?" And in consequence of petitioning, has not the capital been filled with soldiers to quiet their murmurs with the bayonet; & to murder, assassinate & plunder with impunity? -Have we not borne for these seven years past such indignity as no free people ever suffer'd before, and with no other tokens of resentment on our part, than pointing out our hardships, and appealing to the common sense of mankind, after we had in vain petition'd our most gracious Sovereign? - And now we are even insulted by those who have bro't on us all these difficulties, for uttering our just complaints in a publick Newspaper! Pointing out the hardships of our sufferings, and calling upon the impartial world to judge between us and our oppressors, and protesting before God and man against innovations big with ruin to the public Liberty, is call'd by this writer, "a stubborn opposition to public authority," and "a high hand opposition and repugnancy to government" For God's sake, what are we to expect from petitioning? Have we any prospect in the way of humble and dutiful representation? Let us advert to the nation of which this writer says we are a part. Are not they suffering the same grievances, under the same administration? Have not they repeatedly petitioned and remonstrated to the throne, and "pointed out the hardships of certain measures," to the King himself? And has not his Majesty been advised by his ministers, to treat them as imaginary grievances only? And yet after all, against repeated facts, and common experience to the contrary, we are told, that "much might be done for the public interest, by way of hunible and dutiful representation!" If there were even now, any hopes that the King would hear us, while his present counsellors are near him, I should be by all means for petitioning again; but every man of common observation will judge for himself of the prospect.
I am not of this writers opinion that the claims of our sister colonies, New-Hampshire and Rhode-Island, were so very reasonable, when disputes arose about the dividing lines; nor do I believe any of his disinterested readers will think his bare ipse dixit, however peremptory, a sufficient evidence of it. - It seems in the estimation of Chronus and his few confederates, all are "intemperate patriots ", who will not yield the public rights to every demand, however unjust it may appear. - Thus a whole General Assembly is branded by this writer, with the character of "wrong-headed politicians ", for not surrendering a part of the territory of this province to New-Hampshire and Rhode-Island, because they demanded it. It is no uncommon thing for those who are resolved to carry a favorite point, when they cannot reason with their opponents, to rail at them. -I shall not take upon me at present to say, whether the claims of those governments were right or wrong; but if the governor of the province, & a majority of the two houses, whom Chronus does not scruple to call "pretended patriots ", then judged them to be wrong, their conduct in contending for the interest of the province, affords sufficient evidence, that they were real patriots. These instances are bro't by Chronus to show the wisdom "of scorning the influence, and rejecting the rash and injudicious clamour of pretended patriots, and wrong-headed politicians," in the present assembly; who by their "indecent treatment of his Majesty's governor, are pressing him to comply with measures contrary to his instructions": But if his Majesty's governor's instructions are repugnant to the Rights and Liberties of his Majesty's subjects of this province, and those who are elected by the people to be the guardians of their rights and liberties, are really of that mind; especially if they also think that such instructions are design'd to have the force of laws; is it reasonable or decent for Chronus, tho' he may think differently, to call them mere pretended patriots, which conveys the idea of false-hearted men, for protesting against such instructions, as dangerous innovations, threatning the "very being of government", as constituted by the Charter? Chronus and his brethren would do well to consider, that "a high handed opposition and repugnance, ('tis a wonder he did not in the style of his friend Bernard, call it 'oppugnation') to government ", is as dangerous when level'd at the representative body of the people, as at "his Majesty's Governor": An attack upon the constitution especially in that silent manner in which it has of late been attacked, is more dangerous than either. - He says that those "wretched politicians ", "have made the Governor's subsistence to depend upon his compliance with measures contrary to his instructions." If this had been true, it would have been treating the Governor in a manner in which the British parliaments, when free, have treated their sovereign: No supplies till grievances are redressed, has been the language of those "wrong headed politicians ", the British house of commons in former, and better times, than these - If the commons of this province have at any time withheld their grant for the support of a governor, till he should comply with measures contrary to his instructions, they looking upon those instructions, as they have been, in fact, repugnant to the very spirit of the charter, and subversive of the liberty of their constituents, who can blame them? They are in my opinion highly to be commended, for making use of a power vested in them, or rather reserv'd by the constitution, & originally intended to check the wanton career of imperious governors - A power, in the due exercise of which, even KINGS, their masters, have sometimes been brought to their senses, when they had any. But Chronus cannot show an instance of this conduct in the house of representatives for many years past, I dare say. It must therefore be a mistake in him to suppose that this conduct of "our intemperate patriots", has "occasion'd his Majesty to render him more independent, by taking the payment of his governor upon himself." I make no doubt but some other motive occasion'd the minister to advise an independent governor in this province, which will in all probability take place in every colony throughout America. - The motive is too obvious to need mentioning - If Chronus will make it appear that a governor's being made independent of the people, is not repugnant to the principles of the charter of this province, or any free government, he will do more than I at present think he or any other can - Till this is done, it is in vain to flatter a sensible people with the prospect of enjoying "peace, happiness or any other blessing they have reason to desire," and right to expect from good government, while the measure is persisted in.
CANDIDUS.
ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."
[Boston Gazette, December 9, 1771.]
MESSIEURS EDES & GILL,
"Whene'er from putrid Courts foul Vapours rose,
with vigorous wholesome Gales
The Winds of OPPOSITION fiercely blew,
Which purg'd and clear'd the agitated State"
If the liberties of America are ever compleatly ruined, of which in my opinion there is now the utmost danger, it will in all probability be the consequence of a mistaken notion of prudence, which leads men to acquiesce in measures of the most destructive tendency for the sake of present ease. When designs are form'd to rase the very foundation of a free government, those few who are to erect their grandeur and fortunes upon the general ruin, will employ every art to sooth the devoted people into a state of indolence, inattention and security, which is forever the fore-runner of slavery - They are alarmed at nothing so much, as attempts to awaken the people to jealousy and watchfulness; and it has been an old game played over and over again, to hold up the men who would rouse their fellow citizens and countrymen to a sense of their real danger, and spirit them to the most zealous activity in the use of all proper means for the preservation of the public liberty, as "pretended patriots," "intemperate politicians," rash, hot-headed men, Incendiaries, wretched desperadoes, who, as was said of the best of men, would turn the world upside down, or have done it already. - But he must have a small share of fortitude indeed, who is put out of countenance by hard speeches without sense and meaning, or affrighted from the path of duty by the rude language of Billingsgate - For my own part, I smile contemptuously at such unmanly efforts: I would be glad to hear the reasoning of Chronus, if he has a capacity for it; but I disregard his railing as I would the barking of a "Cur dog".
The dispassionate and rational Pennsylvania Farmer has told us, that "a perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, is absolutely requisite in all free states." The unhappy experience of the world has frequently manifested the truth of his observation. For want of this jealousy, the liberties of Stain were destroyed by what is called a vote of credit; that is, a confidence placed in the King to raise money upon extraordinary emergencies, in the intervals of parliament. France afterwards fell into the same snare; and England itself was in great danger of it, in the reign of Charles the second; when a bill was brought into the house of commons to enable the King to raise what money he pleased upon extraordinary occasions, as the dutch war was pretended to be - And the scheme would doubtless have succeeded to the ruin of the national liberty, had it not been for the watchfulness of the "intemperate patriots ", and "wrong-headed politicians" even of that day.
How much better is the state of the American colonies soon likely to be, than that of France and Spain or than Britain would have been in, if the Bill before mention'd had pass'd into an act? Does it make any real difference whether one man has the sovereign disposal of the peoples purses, or five hundred? Is it not as certain that the British parliament have assumed to themselves the power of raising what money they please in the colonies upon all occasions, as it is, that the Kings of France and Spain exercise the same power over their subjects upon emergencies? Those Kings by the way, being the sole judges when emergencies happen, they generally create them as often as they want money. And what security have the colonies that the British parliament will not do the same? It is dangerous to be silent, as the ministerial writers would have us to be, while such a claim is held up; but much more to submit to it. Your very silence, my countrymen, may be construed a submission, and those who would perswade you to be quiet, intend to give it that turn. Will it be likely then that your enemies, who have exerted every nerve to establish a revenue, rais'd by virtue of a suppos'd inherent right in the British parliament without your consent, will recede from the favorite plan, when they imagine it to be compleated by your submission? Or if they should repeal the obnoxious act, upon the terms of your submitting to the right, is it not to be apprehended that your own submission will be brought forth as a precedent in a future time, when your watchful adversary shall have succeeded, and laid the most of you fast asleep in the bed of security and insensibility. Believe me, should the British parliament, which claims a right to tax you at discretion, ever be guided by a wicked and corrupt administration, and how near they are approaching to it, I will leave you to judge, you will then find one revenue act succeeding another, till the fatal influence shall extend to your own parliaments. Bribes and tensions will be as frequent here, as they are in the unhappy kingdom of Ireland, and you and your posterity will be made, by means of your own money, as subservient to the will of a British ministry, or an obsequious Governor, as the vassals of France are to that of their grand monarch. What will prevent this misery and infamy, but your being finally oblig'd to have recourse to the ultima ratio! But is it probable that you will ever make any manly efforts to recover your liberty, after you have been inur'd, without any remorse, to contemplate yourselves as slaves? Custom, says the Farmer, gradually reconciles us to objects even of dread and detestation. It reigns in nothing more arbitrarily than in publick Affairs. When an act injurious to freedom has once been done, and the people bear it, the repetition of it is more likely to meet with submission. For as the mischief of the one was found to be tolerable, they will hope that the second will prove so too; and they will not regard the infamy of the last, because they are stain'd with that of the first.
The beloved Patriot further observes, "In mixed governments, the very texture of their constitution demands a perpetual jealousy; for the cautions with which power is distributed among the several orders, imply, that each has that share which is proper for the general welfare, and therefore that any further imposition must be pernicious". The government of this province, like that of Great Britain, of which it is said to be an epitome, is a mixed government. It's constitution is delicately framed; and I believe all must acknowledge, that the power vested in the crown is full as great as is consistent with the general welfare. The King, by the charter, has the nomination and appointment of the governor: But no mention being therein made of his right to take the payment of his governor upon himself, it is fairly concluded that the people have reserv'd that right to themselves, and the governor must stipulate with them for his support. That this was the sense of the contracting parties, appears from practice contemporary with the date of the charter itself, which is the best exposition of it; and the same practice has been continued uninterruptedly to the present time - But the King now orders his support out of the American revenue: Chronus himself, acknowledges that he is thereby "render'd more independent of the people." - Consequently the balance of power if it was before even is by this means disadjusted. Here then is another great occasion of jealousy in the people. No reasonable man will deny that an undue proportion of power added to the monarchical part of the constitution, is as dangerous, as the same undue proportion would be, if added to the democratical. Should the people refuse to allow the governor the due exercise of the powers that are vested in him by the Charter, I dare say they would soon be told, and very justly, of "the mischief that would be the consequence of it." And is there not the same reason why the people may and ought to speak freely & LOUDLY of the mischief which would be the consequence of his being rendered more independent of them; or which is in reality the same thing, his becoming possessed of more power than the charter vests him with? For the annihilating a constitutional check, in the people, which is necessary to prevent the Governor's exercise of exorbitant power, is in effect to enable him to exercise that exorbitant power, when he pleases, without controul. A Governor legally appointed may usurp powers which do not belong to him: And it is ten to one but he will, if the people are not jealous and vigilant. Charles the first was legally appointed king: The doctrines advanced by the clergy in his father's infamous reign, led them both to believe that they were the LORD'S anointed and were not accountable for their conduct to the people. - It is strange that kings seated on the English throne, should imbibe such opinions: But it is possible they were totally unacquainted with the history of their English predecessors. - Charles, by hearkening to the council of his evil ministers, which coincided with the principles of his education, and his natural temper, and confiding in his corrupt judges, became an usurper of powers which he had no right to; and exercising those powers, he became a Tyrant: But the end proved fatal to him, and afforded a solemn lesson for all succeeding usurpers and tyrants: His subjects who made him king, called him to account, dismiss'd and PUNISH'D him in a most exemplary manner! Charles was obstinate in his temper, and thought of nothing so little as concessions of any kind: If he had been well advis'd, he would have renounced his usurped powers: Every wise governor will relinquish a power which is not clearly constitutional, however inconsiderable those about him may perswade him to think it; especially, if the people regard it as a PART OF A SYSTEM OF OPPRESSION, and AN EVIDENCE OF TYRANNICAL DESIGNS. And the more tenacious he is of it, the stronger is the reason why "the SPIRIT OF APPREHENSION" should be kept up among them in its utmost VIGILANCE.
CANDIDUS.
ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."
[Boston Gazette, December 16, 1771.]
Messieurs EDES & GILL,
I Profess to be more generous than to make severe remarks upon the apparent absurdities that run through the whole of Chronus's performance in the last Massachusetts-Gazette. He tells us that "he seldom examines political struggles that make their weekly appearance in the papers ". If by this mode of expression he means to inform us, that he seldom reads the papers with impartiality and attention, as every one ought, who designs to make his own observations on them, I can easily believe him; for it is evident in the piece now before me, that thro' a want of such impartiality or due attention, to the political struggles which he examines, he mistakes one writer for another, and finds fault with Candidus for not vindicating what had been advanc'd by Mutius Scaevola. I am no party man, unless a firm attachment to the cause of Liberty and Truth will denominate one such: And if this be the judgment of those who have taken upon themselves the character of Friends to the Government, I am content to be in their sense of the word a party man, and will glory in it as long as I shall retain that small portion of understanding which GOD has been pleas'd to bless me with. If at any time I venture to lay my own opinions before the public, which is the undoubted right of every one, I expect they will be treated, if worth any notice, with freedom and candor: But I do not think myself liable to be called to account by Chronus, or any one else, for not answering the objections they are pleased to make to what is offered by another man, and not by me. Whatever may be the opinion of Mr. Hutchinson, as a Usurper or a Tyrant or not, or as Governor or no Governor, if Chronus had fairly "examined the political struggles" which have appeared in the papers, he must have known that I had not published my sentiments about the matter; I shall do it however, as soon as I think proper. - I would not willingly suppose that Chronus artfully intended to amuse his readers, and "mislead them to believe ", that his address to the publick of the 28th of November, was particularly applicable to me, as having advanced the doctrine which has given so much disgust to some gentlemen, and from whence he draws such a long string of terrible consequences. Whether the denying the governor's authority be right or wrong, or whether upon Mutius's hypothesis it be vindicable or not, it is a "maxim," (to use his own word) upon which it no more concerned me to pass my judgment than it did any other man in the community. Had Chronus then a right to press me into this "political struggle," or to demand my opinion of what he had so sagely observed upon a subject which I had never engag'd in? Yes, by all means; says he, "I pointed out some of the mischiefs that would inevitably follow upon denying the Governor's authority, if that maxim should be generally received"; and adds, "what now has Candidus reply'd to all this? Why truly nothing, but - altum silentium" in English, a profound silence; that is in the words of an honest Teague on another occasion "he answered and said nothing" - But notwithstanding the deep silence that I preserv'd when I made my answer, it seems that "I assured him that the way of peaceable, dutiful and legal representations of our grievances had already been tried to no purpose": With the most profound Taciturnity I "was pleas'd most largely to expatiate upon this point", & with all my "altum silentium" my "interrogations follow'd one another with such amazing rapidity, that he (poor man) was almost out of breath in repeating them." - Here, gentle reader, is presented to you a group of ideas in the chaste, the elegant style of CURONUS, which required much more skill in the English language than I am a master of, to reduce to the level of common sense. Thus I have given you a short specimen of the taste of Chronus, who is said to be the top hand on the side of the ministry: For want of leisure I must omit taking notice of his "method of reasoning" till another time.
CANDIDUS.
MEMORANDUM.
[MS., Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.]
Decbr 18 I771.
This day I waited on Mr Harrison Gray junr to acquaint him that I had been informd that he had told John Hancock Esqr that he heard me say in a threatning manner that Mr Hancock might think as he pleasd, Mr Otis had friends & his (Mr Hancocks) treatment of Mr Otis would prejudice his (Mr Hancocks) Election. Mr Gray declard to me that he did not hear me mention a Word of Mr Hancocks Election - that a conversation happend between Mr John Cotton & my self (Mr Gray being present) relative to Mr Otis - that Mr Cotton said Mr Otis' Conduct must be the Effect of Distraction or Drunkeness - that I said I did not think so - but that it rather proceeded from Irritation - that he (Mr Gray) said if Mr Otis is distracted why should Mr Hancock pursue him - & that I answerd that Mr Hancock might be stirred up by others to do it, but I thought he had better not or it was a pity he should. This Mr Gray declared was all that I said relative to Mr Hancock, in answer to his Question as is before mentiond & that it did not appear to him that I discoverd the least Unfriendliness towards Mr Hancock. He further said he was willing to give his oath to the truth of this his declaration. Upon which I told Mr Gray that it was far from my Intention to make Mr Hancock displeasd with him, that I was satisfied that Mr Hancock understood him differently & I should let Mr Hancock know what he now said, & asked him to repeat it which he did precisely as before - & told me he was freely willing that I should repeat it to Mr Hancock that if Mr Hancock & myself desired it he would thus explain it in presense of us both.
ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."
[Boston Gazette, December 23, 1771.]
Messieurs EDES & GILL,
The writer in the Massachusetts Gazette, who signs Chronus, in his address to the publick, recommended petitioning and humbly representing the hardship of certain measures; and yet before he finished his first paper, he pointed out to us the unhappy effects in former times of the very method he had prescribed. Those "intemperate patriots" it seems, the majority of both houses of the general assembly, not hearkning to the cool advice of the few wise men within and without doors, must needs make their humble representations to the King and Council upon the claims of New- Hampshire and Rhode-Island: And what was the consequence? Why, he says the province lost ten times the value of the land in dispute. Did Chronus mean by this and such like instances, to enforce the measure which he had recommended? They certainly afford a poor encouragement for us to persevere in the way of petitioning and humble representation. But perhaps he will say, the General Assembly had at that time no reason to complain of the incroachment of these sister colonies their claims were just; and the discerning few who were in that mind were in the right. Just so he says is the case now. For he tells us that "no one has attempted to infringe the peoples rights." Upon what principle then would he have us petition? It is possible, for I would fain understand him, that what Candidus and others call an invasion of our rights, he may choose to denominate a Grievance; for if we suffer no Grievance, he can certainly have no reason to advise us to represent the hardship of certain measures. And I am the rather inclin'd to think, that this is his particular humour, because I find that the stamp-act, which almost every one looked upon as a most violent infraction of our natural and constitutional rights, is called by this writer a Grievance. And he is so singular as to enquire, "What Liberties we are now deprived of," aitho' an act of parliament is still in being, and daily executed, very similar to the stamp-act, and form'd for the very same purpose, viz, the raising and establishing a revenue in the colonies by virtue of a suppos'd inherent right in the British parliament, where the colonies cannot be represented, and therefore without their consent. The exercise of such a power Chronus would have us consider as a Grievance indeed, but not by any means a deprivation of our rights and liberties, or even so much as the least infringement of them. Mr. Locke has often been quoted in the present dispute between Britain and her colonies, and very much to our purpose. His reasoning is so forcible, that no one has even attempted to confute it. He holds that "the preservation of property is the end of government, and that for which men enter into society. It therefore necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property, without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by entering into society, which was the end for which they enter'd into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are theirs, that no body hath the right to take any part of their subsistence from them without their consent: Without this, they could have no property at all. For I truly can have no property in that which another can by right take from me when he pleases, against my consent. Hence, says he, it is a mistake to think that the supreme power of any commonwealth can dispose of the estates of the subjects arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. The prince or senate can never have a power to take to themselves the whole or any part of the subjects property without their own consent; for this would be in effect to have no property at all." - This is the reasoning of that great and good man. And is not our own case exactly described by him? Hath not the British parliament made an act to take a part of our property against our consent? Against our repeated submissive petitions and humble representations of the hardship of it? Is not the act daily executed in every colony? If therefore the preservation of property is the very end of government, we are depriv'd of that for which government itself is instituted. - Tis true, says Mr. Locke, "Government cannot be supported without great charge; and tis fit that every one who enjoys a share in the protection should pay his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with their own consent, given by themselves or their representatives." Chronus will not say that the monies that are every day paid at the custom-houses in America for the express purpose of maintaining all or any of the Governors therein, were rais'd with the consent of those who pay them, given by themselves or their representatives - "If any one, adds Mr. Locke, shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority & without such consent of the people, he thereby subverts the end of government." - Will Chronus tell us that the British parliament doth not claim authority to lay and levy such taxes, and doth not actually lay and levy them on the colonies without their consent? This is the case particularly in this province. If therefore it is a subversion of the end of government, it must be a subversion of our civil liberty, which is supported by civil government only. And this I think a sufficient answer to a strange question which Chronus thinks it "not improper for our zealous Patriots to answer, viz. What those liberties and rights are of which we have been deprived. - If Chronus is really as ignorant as he pretends to be, of the present state of the colonies, their universal and just complaints of the most violent infractions of their liberties, and their repeated petitions to the throne upon that account, I hope I shall be excused in taking up any room in your valuable paper, with a view of answering a question, which to him must be of the utmost importance. - But if he is not, I think his question not only impertinent, but a gross affront to the understanding of the public. We have lost the constitutional right which the Commons of America in their several Assemblies have ever before possessed, of giving and granting their own money, as much of it as they please, and no more; and appropriating it for the support of their own government, for their own defence, and such other purposes as they please. The great Mr. Pitt, in his speech in parliament in favor of the repeal of the stamp-act, declared that "we should have been slaves if we had not enjoy'd this right." This is the sentiment of that patriotic member, and it is obvious to the comnmon sense of every man. -If the parliament have a right to take as much of our money as they please, they may take all. And what liberty can that man have, the produce of whose daily labour another has the right to take from him if he pleases, and which is similar to our case, takes a part of it to convince him that he has the power as well as the pretence of right? - That sage of the law Lord Camden declar'd, in his speech upon the declaratory bill, that "his searches had more and more convinced him that the British parliament have no right to tax the Americans. Nor, said he, "is the doctrine new: It is as old as the constitution: Indeed, it is its support." The taking away this right must then be in the opinion of that great lawyer, the removal of the very support of the constitution, upon which all our civil liberties depend. He speaks in still stronger terms-" Taxation and representation are inseparably united: This position is founded on the laws of nature: It is more: It is itself an eternal law of nature - Whatever is a man's own is absolutely his own; and no man has a right to take it from him without his consent, either express'd by himself or his representative - Whoever attempts to do it, attempts an injury: Whoever does it, commits a ROBBERY: He throws down the distinction between liberty and slavery" - Can Chronus say, that the Americans ever consented either by themselves or their representatives, that the British parliament should tax them? That they have taxed us we all know: We all feel it: I wish we felt it more sensibly: They have therefore, according to the sentiments of the last mention'd Nobleman, which are built on nature and common reason, thrown down the very distinction between liberty and slavery in America - And yet this writer. like one just awoke from a long dream, or, as I cannot help thinking there are good grounds to suspect, with a design to "mislead his unwary readers (and unwary they must needs be, if they are thus misled,) to believe that all our liberties are perfectly secure, he calls upon us to show "which of our liberties we are deprived of;" and in the face of a whole continent, as well as of the best men in Europe, he has the effrontery to assert, without the least shadow of argument, that "no one has attempted to infringe them." One cannot after all this, be at a loss to conceive, what judgment to form of his modesty, his understanding or sincerity.
It might be easy to show that there are other instances in which we are deprived of our liberties. - I should think, a people would hardly be perswaded to believe that they were in the full enjoyment of their liberties, while their capital fortress is garrison'd by troops over which they have no controul, and under the direction of an administration in whom, to say the least, they have no reason to place the smallest confidence that they shall be employ'd for their protection, and not as they have been for their destruction - While they have a governor absolutely independent of them for his support, which support as well as his political being - depends upon that same administration, tho' at the expence of their own money taken from them against their consent - While their governor acts not according to the dictates of his own judgment, assisted by the constitutional advice of his council, if he thinks it necessary to call for it, but according to the edicts of such an administration - Will it mend the matter that this governor, thus dependent upon the crown, is to be the judge of the legality of instructions and their consistency with the Charter, which is the constitution? Or if their present governor should be possess'd of as many angelic properties as we have heard of in the late addresses, can they enjoy that tranquility of mind arising from their sense of safety, which Montesquieu defines to be civil liberty, when they consider how precarious a person a provincial governor is, especially a good one? And how likely a thing it is, if he is a good one, that another may soon be placed in his stead, possessed of the principles of the Devil, who for the sake of holding his commission which is even now pleaded as a weighty motive, will execute to the full the orders of an abandon'd minister, to the ruin of those liberties which we are told are now so secure - Will a people be perswaded that their liberties are safe, while their representatives in general assembly, if they are ever to meet again, will be deprived of the most essential privilege of giving and granting what part of their own money they are yet allowed to give and grant, unless, in conformity to a ministerial instruction to the governor, solemnly read to them for their direction, they exempt the commissioners of the customs, or any other favorites or tools of the ministry, from their equitable share in the tax? All these and many others that might be mention'd, are the natural effects of that capital cause of complaint of all North-America, which, to use the language of those "intemperate patriots ", the majority of the present assembly, is " a subjugation to as arbitrary a TRIBUTE as ever the Romans laid upon the Jews, or their other colonies" - What now is the advice of Chronus? Why, "much may be done, says he, by humble petitions and representations of the hardships of certain measures" - Ask him whether the colonies have not already done it? Whether the assembly of this province, the convention, the town of Boston, have not petitioned and humbly represented the hardship of certain measures, and all to no purpose, and he tells you either that he is "a stranger to those petitions", or "that they were not duly timed, or properly urged," or "that the true reason why ALL our petitions and representations met with no better success was, because they were accompanied with a conduct quite the reverse of that submission and duty which they seem'd to express" - that "to present a petition with one hand, while the other is held up in a threatning posture to enforce it, is not the way to succeed" - Search for his meaning, and enquire when the threatning hand was held up, and you'll find him encountering the Resolves of the Town of Boston to maintain their Rights, (in which they copied after the patriotic Assemblies of the several Colonies) and their Instructions to their Representatives. Here is the sad source of all our difficulties. - Chronus would have us petition, and humbly represent the hardships of certain measures, but we must by no means assert our Liberties. We must acknowledge, at least tacitly, that the Parliament of Great Britain has a constitutional authority, "to throw down the distinction between Liberty and slavery" in America. We may indeed, humbly represent it as a hardship, but if they are resolved to execute the purpose, we must submit to it, without the least intimation to posterity, that we look'd upon it as unconstitutional or unjust. Such advice was sagely given to the Colonists a few years ago, at second hand, by one who had taken a trip to the great city, and grew wonderfully acquainted, as he said, with Lord Hillsborough; but his foibles are now "buried under the mantle of charity." Very different was his advice from that of another of infinitely greater abilities, as well as experience in the public affairs of the nation, and the colonies: I mean Doctor Benjamin Franklin, the present agent of the House of Representatives. His last letter to his constituents, as I am well informed, strongly recommends the holding up our constitutional Rights, by frequent Resolves, &c. This we know will be obnoxious to those who are in the plan to enslave us: But remember my countrymen, it will be better to have your liberties wrested from you by force, than to have it said that you even implicitly surrendered them.
I have something more to say to Chronus when leisure will admit of it.
CANDIDUS.
TO HENRY MARCHANT.1
[MS., Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.]
BOSTON Jan 7 1772
SIR
I wrote you soon after your departure from hence but am lately informd by Mr F. Dana that you have not receivd my Letter; he has put me in the way of a more sure direction under an Inclosure to Mess Trecothick & Apthorp.
By our last Vessells from London we have an Account of the Choice of Mr Nash for the Lord Mayor, & that he was brot in by ministerial Influence. It gives great Concern to the Friends of Liberty here that any Administration much more such as the present appears to be, should have an Ascendency in the important Elections of that City, which has heretofore by her Independency & Incorruption been the great Security of the Freedom of the nation. It is questionable however
1 Attorney-General of Rhode Island. The letter was addressed to Marchant at London, where he was acting as the agent of Rhode Island. He left Rhode Island in July, 1771, and returned in the autumn of 1772. Cf., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island, vol. vii., pp. 27-31, 197.
whether the Ministry would have gaind their point, if they had not according to the Machiavellian plan accomplishd a Division among those who profess to be Patriots. The same Art is now practicd by their Tools & Dependents on this side the Water. They have been endeavoring to excite a Jealousy among the Colonies, each one of the others, & in a great measure brought it about by the unfortunate failure of the Nonimportation Agreement. Perhaps every Colony was faulty in that matter in some degree but neither chose to take any of the Blame of it to its self, & to shift it off each cast the whole upon the others. The Truth is there were so many of the Merchants under the Court Influence in all of them as that they were able to defeat the plan, & for that Reason I was doubtful from the beginning of the Success of it. The Agents of the Ministry have since been trying to perswade the people to believe that they are sick of their measures & would be glad to recede, but cannot consistent with their own honor while the Colonies are clamoring against them - they would therefore have us to be quite silent as tho we enjoyd our Rights & Liberties to the full, & trust that those who have discoverd the greatest perseverance in every Measure to enslave us, will of their own Accord & without the least Necessity give up their Design. This soothing & dangerous Doctrine I fear has had an effect in some of the Colonies, but I am in hopes that those who have been ready to trust to the false promises of Courtiers begin to see through the Delusion. It was impossible that many persons could be catchd in such a Snare in this province, where absolute Despotism appears to be continually making large Strides with barefaced Impudence. It will not be easy to convince this people that the Ministry have in their hearts any favor towards them, while they are taking their money out of their pockets, & appropriating it for the maintenance of a Governor who because of his absolute Dependence upon them will always yield obedience to their Instructions, and a standing Army in their Capital fortress, over which that Governor I presume to say dares not exercise any Authority, tho invested with it by the Charter, without express Leave from his Masters. Administration must be strangely blind indeed, or they must think us the most foolish and ductile people under Heaven (in which they are greatly mistaken) to imagine that in such a Condition we are to be flatterd with hopes of any kind Disposition of theirs towards us. The Governor & other Friends to the Ministry or rather friends to themselves would fain have it thought in England, that the People in general are easy & contented or to use the Words of his Speech at the opening of the last Session, that they are returnd to Good order & Government1 this may tend to establish him in his Seat as one who can carry the most favorite points but Nothing can afford greater Evidence to the Contrary than the general Contempt and Indignation with which his proclamation for an annual Thanksgiving was treated, because we were therein exhorted to return Thanks to Almighty God that "our religious & civil privileges were continued to us" & that "our Trade was enlargd" - It is said & I believe it to be a fact, that full two thirds of the congregational Clergy refusd to read the proclamation, & perhaps not more of them than appeard the last Spring in favor [of] the pompous congratulatory Address, that is not a Sixth part of them took any notice of those Clauses in the religious Services of the day. It is for the Interest of the Crown Officers here who are dependent upon the Ministers to make them believe that they have by their Art & policy reconciled the people to their Measures, & if the Nation is so far misled as to believe so, the Ministry may avail themselves of it, but if the Contrary should happen to be true, as it appears to me to be, such Events may sooner than we are aware of it take place, as may afford the Nation Grounds to repent of her Credulity. It may be thought arrogant for an American thus to express himself, but let Britain consider that her own & her Colonies dependence is at present mutual which may not & probably will not be the Case in some hereafter. Why should either side hasten on the alarming Crisis. I am a friend to both, but I confess my friendship to the latter is the most ardent - they have in time past and if by the severe treatment which the Colonies have receivd, Confidence in the Mother Country is not in too great a Degree lost, they may still for some time to come administer to each others Happiness & Grandeur. This in my humble Opinion greatly depends upon a Change of Ministers & Measures which it is not in my power & I presume not in yours however earnestly we both may desire it, to accomplish.
I wait in daily Expectation of a Letter from you.
1 May 30, 1771. Massachusetts State Papers, p. 300.
TO ARTHUR LEE.
[R. H. Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, vol. ii., pp., 189-192; a draft is in the Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library]
BOSTON, January 14th, 1772.
SIR, -
Your latest letter to me is of the 10th June,1 since which I have several times written to you and have been impatiently waiting for your farther favours. I suppose by this time the parliament is sitting for the despatch of business, and we shall soon discover whether administration have had it in their hearts, as we have been flattered, to recede from their oppressive measures, and repeal the obnoxious revenue acts. Is it not a strange mode of expression of late years made use of, that administration intends that this law shall be enacted, or that repealed? It is language adapted to the infamy of the present times, by a nation which boasts of the freedom and independency of her parliaments. I believe almost any of the American assemblies would highly resent such an imperious tone, even in the honourable board of commissioners of the customs, who I dare say think themselves equal in dignity, at least in proportion to the different countries, to his majesty's ministers of state. A Bostonian, I assure you, would blush with indignation to hear it said that his majesty's commissioners of the customs (though perhaps they are of his excellency's privy council) had held a consultation at Butcher's Hall, upon the affairs of the province, and that they had come to a conclusion that the house of representatives should rescind their late protest against any doctrines which tend to give royal instructions to the governor, the force of laws. This protest it is said, his majesty's wise ministers were so hugely affronted at, as to alter their determination upon a question, in which the fate of the British nation was involved, namely, whether our general assembly should sit at Cambridge or in Boston. I confess this was a question of such astonishing importance to the millions of Britons and their descendants, and decided no doubt with such refined discrimination of judgment, that is not so much to be wondered at, if all national wisdom is to be ascribed to such a bed of counsellors, who seem to have possessed themselves of all national power. But as the circumstances of things may alter, and his majesty may be obliged through necessity to have recourse to men of common understanding, when these are gone to receive their just rewards in another life, would it not be most proper that the parliament should be at least the ostensive legislature, for there is danger in precedents, and in time to come the supreme power of the nation may be the dupes of a ministry, who may have no more understanding than themselves. It has been said that the king's ministers have for years past received momentary hints respecting the fabrication of American revenue laws and other regulations, from some very wise heads on this side of the water, and particularly of this place; and perhaps Great Britain may be more indebted to some Bostonians or residents in Boston than she may imagine, however reproachfully she may have spoken of them. Bernard publicly declared that he did not obtrude his advice on his majesty's ministers unasked; and therefore we may naturally conclude that my lord of Hillsborough, (sublime as his understanding is) the minister in the department, stood in need of and asked his advice, when the baronet journalized the necessary measures of administration for the colonies, which he retailed in weekly and sometimes daily letters to his lordship. On his departure he recommended Mr Hutchinson, though a Bostonian, "born and educated" as one upon whom his lordship might depend as much as upon himself; and in this one thing I believe Bernard wrote the truth, for if they have not equal merit for their faithful services to administration, Mr. Hutchinson, I verily believe, has the greatest share. It is whispered here that the honourable board of commissioners have represented to administration that the present revenue is not sufficient to answer all demands, which are daily increasing, and therefore it will be necessary for their lordships to establish an additional fund. This is an important hint, which may relieve their lordships, unless a new manoeuvre should succeed, of which we have an account in the Boston Gazette enclosed. By a vessel just arrived from London, the friends of government, as they call themselves, pretend that they have certain assurances from administration, that in three months we shall not be troubled with commissioners or standing armies. This, if we could depend upon court promises, would afford an agreeable prospect. But the root of all our grievances is the parliament's taxing us, which they cannot do, but upon principles repugnant to and subversive of our constitution. If their lordships, the ministry, would be pleased to repeal the revenue acts, they would strike a blow at the root.
The grand design of our adversaries is to lull us into security, and make us easy while the acts remain in force, which would prove fatal to us.
I have written in great haste, and am sincerely your friend and humble servant,
1 R. H. Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, vol. i., pp. 215-219.
ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."
[Boston Gazette, January 20, 1772.]
Messieurs EDES & GILL,
IN the Massachusetts-Gazette of the 9th instant, Chronus attempts to prove that "the Parliament's laying duties upon trade, for the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to and subversive of our constitution." In defence of this proposition, he proceeds to consider the nation as commercial, and from thence to show the necessity of laws for the regulation of trade. - In the nation he includes Great-Britain and all the Colonies, and infers that these acts for the regulation of trade, "should extend to all the British dominions, to prevent one part of the national body from injuring another." And, says he, "If laws for the regulation of trade are necessary, who so proper to enact them, &c. as the British parliament, or to dispose of the fines & forfeitures arising from the breach of such acts?" And then he tells us, that as a number of preventive officers will hereupon become necessary, the parliament have thought proper to assign to his Majesty's revenue "the profits arising on the duties of importation for the payment of those officers ". This is Chronus's "method of reasoning ", to prove that because it is necessary that the parliament should enact laws for the regulation of trade, about which there has as yet been no dispute that I know of, and because it is proper that such preventive officers as shall be found needful to carry those laws into execution, should be paid out of the fines and forfeitures arising from the breach of them, Therefore, the parliament hath a right to make laws imposing duties or taxes, for the express purpose of raising a revenue in the colonies without their consent; and that this is not (as is alledg'd by our Patriots ") "repugnant to or subversive of our constitution ". Every one may easily see how Chronus evades the matter in dispute, and aims at amusing his readers according to his usual manner, by endeavouring, and that without a shadow of argument, to prove one point, instead of another which is quite distinct from it, and which he ought to prove, but cannot. He is indeed sensible that his artifice is seen through; that it will be urged that "he has evaded the chief difficulties," and that "the objection doth not lie against the regulation of trade, but against the imposing duties for the express purpose of raising a revenue." And he is full ready to remove this objection. But how? Why, by asking a question, which he often substitutes in the room of argument. Are we not, says he, "fellow-subjects with our brethren at home, and consequently bound to bear a part according to our ability, in supporting the honor & dignity of the crown?" It is allow'd that we are the subjects of the same prince with our brethren at home, and are in duty bound, as far as we are able, to support the honor and dignity of our Sovereign, while he affords us his protection. But does Chronus from thence infer an obligation on us to yield obedience to the acts of the British parliament imposing taxes upon us with the express intention of raising a revenue, to be appropriated for such purposes as that legislative thinks proper, without our consent? 0, says he, "there is good reason for this." What is the good reason? Why "if we will not consent to do anything ourselves ", "our money will be taken from us without our consent." This is conclusive argument indeed. And then he, as it were, imperceptibly glides into that which has ever appeared to be his favorite topick, however impertinent to the present point, viz, an independent support for the governor. He boldly affirms, what is a notorious untruth, that "we are unwilling to pay his Majesty's substitute in such a manner as should leave him that freedom and independency which is necessary to his station, and with which he is vested by the constitution:" And therefore the parliament hath a right to enable his Majesty to pay his substitute, out of a revenue extorted from us against our consent. If his premises were well grounded, his conclusion would not follow: And the question would still remain, to which Chronus has not attempted to give any rational answer, namely, By what authority doth the parliament these things, and who gave them this authority? Thus we still continue to dispute the authority of the parliament to lay duties and taxes upon us, with the express purpose of raising a revenue, as "repugnant to, and subversive of our constitution;" and for a reason which I dare say Chronus will never get over, namely, because as he himself allows," we are not represented in it." -
The English constitution, says Baron Montesquieu, has Liberty for its direct object: And the constitution of this province, as our own historian,1 informs us, is an epitome of the British constitution; and it undoubtedly has the same end for its object: Whatever laws therefore are made for our government, either in a manner, or for purposes subversive of Liberty, must be subversive of the end of the constitution, and consequently of the constitution itself. - No free people, as the Pennsylvania Farmer has observed, ever existed, or ever can exist without, to use a common but strong expression, keeping the purse-strings in their hands: But the parliament's laying taxes on the Colonies for the express purpose of raising a revenue, takes the purse strings out of their hands, and consequently it is "repugnant to, and subversive of (the end of) our constitution "-Liberty. Mr. Locke says, that the security of property is the end for which men enter into society; and I believe Chronus will not deny it: Whatever laws therefore are made in any society, tending to render property insecure, must be subversive of the end for which men prefer society to the state of nature; and consequently must be subversive of society itself:
But the parliament in which the Colonies have no voice, taking as much of their money as it pleases, and appropriating it to such purposes as it pleases, even against their consent, and as they think repugnant to their safety, renders all their property precarious, and therefore it is subversive of the end for which men enter into society and repugnant to every free constitution. - Mr. Hooker in his ecclesiastical polity, as quoted by Mr. Locke, affirms that "Laws they are not, which the public approbation hath not made so." This seems to be the language of nature and common sense; for if the public are bound to yield obedience to the laws, to which they cannot give their approbation, they are slaves to those who make such laws and enforce them: But the acts of parliament imposing duties, with the express purpose of raising a revenue in the colonies, have received every mark of the public disapprobation in every colony; and yet they are enforced in all, and in some with the utmost rigour. The British constitution having liberty for its object, is so framed, as that every man who is to be bound by any law about to be made, may be present by his representative in parliament, who may employ the whole force of his objections against it, if he cannot approve of it: If after fair debate, it is approv'd of by the majority of the whole representative body of the nation, the minority, by a rule essential in society, and without which it could not subsist, is bound to submit to it: But the colonies had no voice in parliament when the revenue acts were made; nay, though they had no representatives there, their petitions were rejected, because they were against duties to be laid on; and they have been called factious, for the objections they made, not only against their being taxed without their consent, which was a sufficient objection, but against the appropriation of the money when rais'd to purposes which as the Farmer has made to appear, will supersede the authority in our respective assemblies, which is most essential to liberty. Representation and Legislation, as well as taxation, are inseparable, according to the spirit of our constitution; and of all others that are free. Human foresight is incapable of providing against every accident. A small part of the nation may be "at sea, as Chronus tells us, when writs are issued out for the election of members of parliament"; and to admit that they, after their return "should be exempt from any acts of parliament, the members of which were chosen in their absence ", would be attended with greater evil to the community, the safety and welfare of which is the end of all legislation, than the misfortune of their voluntary absence, if it should prove one, could be to them. I say, if it should prove a misfortune to them; for those acts being made by the consent of representatives chosen by all the rest of the nation, it is presum'd they are calculated for the good of the whole, of which they, as a part, must necessarily partake: But the supposed case of these persons is far different from that of the colonists; who are, not by a voluntary choice of their own, but through necessity, not by mere accident, but by means of the local distance of their constant residence, excluded from being present by representation in the British legislature. Chronus allows that by means of their distance, "they are become incapable of exercising their original right of choosing representatives for the British parliament." If so, they cannot without subversion of the end of the British constitution, be bound to obedience, against their own consent, to such laws as are there made; especially such laws as tend to render precarious their property, the security of which is the end of men's entering into society. If they are thus bound, they are slaves and not free men: But slavery must certainly be "repugnant to the constitution" which has liberty for its direct object. If the supreme legislative of Great Britain, cannot consistently with the British constitution or the essential liberty of the colonies, make laws binding upon them, and Chronus for ought I can see, has not attempted to make it rationally appear that it can, it is dangerous for the colonies to admit any of its laws. For however upright some may think the present parliament to be, in intention, they may ruin us through mistake arising from an incurable ignorance of our circumstances; and though Chronus may be so singular as to judge the present revenue acts of parliament binding upon the colonies, to be salutary, the time may perhaps come, when even he may be convinced, that future ones may be oppressive and tyrannical, not only in their execution, but in the very intention of those that may make them.
Chronus says, that "he has all along taken it for granted, that the kingdom and the colonies are one dominion." If so he must allow the colonies to take it for granted that they have an equal share with the inhabitants of Britain in the rights belonging to this one dominion, and particularly in the cardinal right of being represented in the supreme legislature. But that right, he says, they are "incapable of exercising," by reason of their distance. We all agree in this, and it is not their fault? Why then should they not have the right of legislating for themselves, as well as that other part of this one dominion? Why truly, we have "a right of choosing an assembly, which with the concurrence of his Majesty's Governor, hath a power of enacting local statutes, establishing taxes, &c. - Yet still in subordination to the general laws of the empire, reserving the full right of supremacy & dominion, which are in themselves unalienable." If I understand his meaning in this dark expression, it is this, we have a right of choosing an assembly, but this assembly is controulable in all its acts, by another assembly which we have no right to choose, and which has this right of controul in itself unalienable. But the question still recurs, How came this right to be in the British parliament? Chronus says that "admitting that we are all one dominion, there is, and must be, a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrouled authority, in which must reside the power of making and establishing laws," "and all others must conform to it, and be govern'd by it". But if we are all one dominion; or if I understand him, the members of one state, tho' so remotely situated, the kingdom from the Colonies, as that we cannot all partake of the rights of the supreme Legislature, why may not this "irresistible, absolute, uncontrouled," and controuling "authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of the government reside", be established in America, or in Ireland, as well as in Britain. Is there any thing in nature, or has Ireland or America consented that the part of this one dominion called Britain shall be thus distinguished? Or are we to infer her authority from her power? But it must be, and Chronus gives us no other reason for it than his bare affirmation, that "the King, Lords and Commons of Great-Britain form the supreme Legislature of the British dominions". And he adds, "to say that each of the Colonies had within itself a supreme independent Legislature, and that nevertheless the kingdom and the Colonies are all one dominion, is a solecism:" Let him then view the Kingdom and the Colonies in another light, and see whether there will be a solecism in considering them as more dominions than one, or separate states. It is certainly more concordant with the great law of nature and reason, which the most powerful nation may not violate and cannot alter, to suppose that the Colonies are separate independent and free, than to suppose that they must be one with Great-Britain and slaves. And slaves they must be, notwithstanding all which Chronus has said to the contrary, if Great Britain may make all laws whatsoever binding upon them, especially laws to take from them what portions of their property she pleases, without and against their consent.
I shall make further remarks upon Chronus, when I shall be at leisure.
CANDIDUS.
1 Mr. Hutchinson.
ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."
[Boston Gazette, January 27, 1772; a complete draft of this article is in the Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.]
Messieurs EDES & GILL,
I have observed from Baron Montesquieu, that the British constitution has liberty for its direct object and that the constitution of this province, according to Mr. Hutchinson, is an epitome of the British constitution: That the right of representation in the body that legislates, is essential to the British constitution, without which there cannot be liberty; and Chronus himself acknowledges, that the Americans are "incapable of exercising this right": Let him draw what conclusion he pleases. All I insist upon is, that the conclusion cannot be just, that "the parliament's laying duties upon trade with the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to or subversive of our constitution." This doctrine, tho' long exploded by the best writers on both sides of the atlantic, he now urges; and he is reduced to this necessity, in order to justify or give coloring to his frequent bold assertions, that "no one has attempted even to infringe our liberties," and to his ungenerous reflections upon those who declare themselves of a different mind, as "pretended patriots," "overzealous," "intemperate politicians," "men of no property," who "expect to find their account" in perpetually keeping up the ball of contention. But after all that Chronus and his associates have said, or can say, the people of America have just "grounds still to complain" that their rights are violated. There seems to be a system of "tyranny and oppression" already begun. It is therefore the duty of every honest man, to alarm his fellow-citizens and countrymen, and awaken in them the utmost vigilance and circumspection. Jealousy, especially at such a time, is a political virtue: Nay, I will say, it is a moral virtue; for we are under all obligations to do what in us lies to save our country." Tyrants alone, says the great Vatel, will treat as seditious, those brave and resolute citizens, who exhort the people to preserve themselves from oppression, in vindication of their rights and privileges: A good prince, says he, will commend such virtuous patriots" and will "mistrust the selfish suggestions of a minister, who represents to him as rebels, all those citizens who do not hold out their hands to chains, who refuse lamely to suffer the strokes of arbitrary power."
I cannot help observing how artfully Chronus expresses his position, that the "parliament's laying duties upon trade with the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to our constitution." It has not been made a question, that I know of, whether the parliament hath a right to make laws for the regulation of the trade of the colonies. Power she undoubtedly has to enforce her acts of trade: And the strongest maritime power caeteris paribus, will always make the most advantageous treaties, and give laws of trade to other nations, for whom there can be no pretence to the right of legislation. The matter however should be considered equitably, if it should ever be considered at all: If the trade of the Colonies is protected by the British navy, there may possibly be from thence inferr'd a just right in the parliament of Great Britain to restrain them from carrying on their trade to the injury of the trade of Great Britain. But this being granted, it is very different from the right to make laws in all cases whatever binding upon the Colonies, and especially for laying duties upon trade for the express purpose of raising a revenue. In the one case it may be the wisdom of the Colonies, under present circumstances to acquiesce in reasonable restrictions, rather than lose their whole trade by means of the depredations of a foreign power: In the other, it is a duty they owe themselves and their posterity, by no means to acquiesce; because it involves them in a state of perfect slavery. I say perfect slavery: For, as political liberty in its perfection consists in the people's consenting by themselves or their representatives, to all laws which they are bound to obey, so perfect political slavery consists in their being bound to obey any laws for taxing them, to which they cannot consent. If a people can be deprived of their property by another person or nation, it is evident that such a people cannot be free. Whether it be by a nation or a monarch, is not material: The masters indeed are different, but the government is equally despotic; and tho' the despotism may be mild, from principles of policy, it is not the less a despotism.
Chronus talks of Magna Charta as though it were of no greater consequence than an act of parliament for the establishment of a corporation of buttonmakers. Whatever low ideas he may entertain of that Great Charter, and such ideas he must entertain of it to support the cause he hath espous'd, it is affirm'd by Lord Coke, to be declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws and liberties of England. "It is called Charta Libertatum Regni, the Charter of the Liberties of the kingdom, upon great reason, says that sage of the law, because liberos facit, it makes and preserves the people free." Those therefore who would make the people slaves, would fain have them look upon this charter, in a light of indifference, which so often affirms sua jura, suas libertates, their own rights, their own liberties: But if it be declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws and liberties of England, it cannot be altered in any of its essential parts, without altering the constitution. Whatever Chronus may have adopted from Mr. Hume, Vatel tells us plainly and without hesitation, that "the supreme legislative cannot change the constitution," "that their authority does not extend so far," & "that they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if the nation has not, in very express terms, given them power to change them." And he gives a reason for it solid and weighty; for, says he, "the constitution of the state ought to be fixed." Mr. Hume, as quoted by Chronus, says, the only rule of government is the established practice of the age, upon maxims universally assented to. If then any deviation is made from the maxims upon which the established practice of the age is founded, it must be by universal assent. "The fundamental laws," says Vatel, "are excepted from their (legislators) commission," "nothing leads us to think that the nation was willing to submit the constitution itself to their pleasure." "They derive their authority from the constitution, how then can they change it without destroying the foundation of their own authority?" If then according to Lord Coke, Magna Charta is declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws and liberties of the people, and Vatel is right in his opinion, that the supreme legislative cannot change the constitution, I think it follows, whether Lord Coke has expressly asserted it or not, that an act of parliament made against Magna Charta in violation of its essential parts, is void. - "By the fundamental laws of England, says Vatel, the two houses of parliament in concert with the King, exercise the legislative power: But if the two houses should resolve to suppress themselves, and to invest the King with the full and absolute government, certainly the nation would not suffer it, "although it was done by a solemn act of parliament. But such doctrine is directly the reverse of that which Chronus holds; which amounts to this, that if the two houses should give up to the King, any, the most essential rights of the people declared in Magna Charta, the nation has not a power either de jura or de facto to prevent it. I may hereafter quote for his serious perusal, the reasoning of the immortal Locke upon this important subject, and am, in the mean time,