Tics and Their Treatment

The opinion of Brissaud on the subject coincides with our own.

If we suppose now that the cortex ceases to act as a surface of peripheral excitation, and becomes itself a reflex centre, we note at once a complete change. The modification effected by the cortex on afferent impressions is obvious in altered motor reactions, which appear with the stamp of cortical intervention, herein differing from bulbo-spinal phenomena. To this category belong the tics; we shall soon see why and how.

Conformably, then, to convention sanctioned by usage, and especially by the teaching of Charcot and Brissaud, we have given a precise definition to the word spasm, and we can only solicit its general adoption.

To resume briefly the argument we have advanced in the foregoing paragraphs, we maintain:

If in a given motor phenomenon there is no evidence of actual or previous cortical intervention, it is not a tic.

If the motor reaction is consecutive to pathological irritation at any point on a bulbo-spinal reflex arc, it is a spasm.

If the cortex is or has been involved in its production, it is not a spasm.

Should it present, in addition to the fact of cortical participation, certain distinctive pathological features, it is a tic.

TIC AND MOTOR REACTIONS; REFLEX, CO-ORDINATED, FUNCTIONAL, AUTOMATIC, AND VOLUNTARY ACTS

The instantaneous muscular contraction that follows the application of a drop of sulphuric acid to the limb of a decerebrate frog is an example of a pure spinal reflex. With the persistence of the irritation contraction of the other limb and of the whole body ensues; the simple spinal reflex has become generalised. Observe the frog a little longer. Soon the sound foot approaches the affected limb and attempts by rubbing to remove the point of irritation. A movement of attack has succeeded the simple movement of defence, and indicates a complete change in the nature of the motor reaction. In the first case the limb is withdrawn briskly from the painful stimulus; in the second the animal performs a series of co-ordinated purposive movements. The first reflex is automatic, and so no doubt is the second, since the frog is decerebrate. But a co-ordinated movement is not of necessity automatic from the outset; its automatism may be the sequel to voluntary education. Co-ordination is often a manifestation of cortical activity.

Take, next, the case of the infant. His earliest muscular movements are pure spinal reflexes. Pinch his leg, and he withdraws it; continue the stimulus, and he moves the other leg, his arms, his whole body; he starts to cry. The original reflex is becoming generalised, yet he makes no attempt to remove the source of irritation. Should a particle get into his eye, his lids will blink so long as the pain persists, but he never rubs them to expel the foreign body. In Virchow's phrase, the newborn infant is a spinal animal, endowed with spinal reflexes only; his responses to stimuli are beyond voluntary control.

Similarly with the functions of respiration and nictitation—their establishment follows the stimulation by air of the respiratory or conjunctival mucosa. The appropriate movements constitute the spontaneous reaction to afferent impulses; they are simple bulbar reflexes. Co-ordinated and purposive though they be, they do not come within the sphere of the will. The newborn child cannot voluntarily accelerate or retard his respiratory rhythm.

But a day comes when the formation of cortico-bulbar or cortico-spinal anastomoses renders possible the interaction of higher and lower centres; respiration may be made quicker or slower; the eyelid may be closed less rapidly, more often. In a word, cortical modification of function becomes a reality.

A further step in advance is soon taken.

Under the "law of least effort" the inhibitory power of the will reduces motor reaction for the attainment of a given object to a minimum. The infant begins to make more complicated movements, attempting the removal of a source of annoyance by direct attack, learning to scratch itself, to spit instead of swallow, etc.

It is true these co-ordinated acts are eventually performed with all the spontaneity of the simplest reflexes; voluntary co-operation is no longer indispensable; scratching, spitting, walking, can be effected without any actual intervention of the will. But we must not forget such muscular automatism entails a preliminary training in the shape of frequent repetition of purposive movements—a training which varies in duration with the individual and the nature of the particular movement. It is only after several years of volitional effort that such acts as locomotion or the expulsion from the throat of an irritant particle become really automatic.

The fact that the newly hatched chick is capable of walking has been advanced as an argument for the existence of congenital automatism. It is true that the chick's movements are very imperfect—it stumbles and falls, as does the infant, on the slightest provocation, and even without any apparent cause; but the rapidity with which certain animals acquire the faculty is so surprising that the latter almost appears to have been innate.

Another advance is still to be made.

With increasing cortical development the individual is able, on stimulation no longer peripheral but central in origin, spontaneously to execute movements which frequent repetition has endowed with all the features of functional acts. Of these ideomotor phenomena physical exercises, games, manual trades, readily furnish instances. Swimming, for an instance, requires the rhythmical co-ordination of arm and leg, to attain which perseverance, retentiveness, and above all repetition are essential. At length the time arrives when the swimmer is surprised at the absence of any necessity for voluntary co-ordinating effort on his part. In fact, to reintroduce volition into this acquired automatism would be to court disaster. "What I do naturally," said Montaigne, "I can no longer perform if I attempt it expressly."

From these physiological considerations we are led to make the following classification of motor reactions:

1. Simple spinal reflexes, innocent of co-ordination or functional systematisation, on whose production or inhibition the will has no influence. To this division belong the movements known as spasms.

2. Functional motor acts. Among these we may distinguish:

    a. Essential movements, e.g. respiration, suction, etc., appearing at birth, and co-ordinated in view of some definite function.

    b. Acts such as locomotion, mastication, etc., whose acquisition is subsequent to a more or less prolonged period of education.

The movements belonging to the first group in this latter category may manifest themselves without any exertion on the part of the will, but its activity is essential to the perfecting of the second, and the originating of the third.

In this last division are placed the motor phenomena known as tics.

TIC AND CO-ORDINATION

We have thus come to see that a tic is a co-ordinated, systematised, purposive act. The majority of observers are satisfied on this point, although there exist various differences of opinion, more apparent than real, the inevitable result of disagreement as to the interpretation of certain expressions. It is imperative to obviate misunderstanding once and for all.

In his first contribution to the study of the disease which bears his name, Gilles de la Tourette gave the general description of motor inco-ordination to the convulsive movements of his patients. It has been argued by Guinon, on the contrary, that they are really systematised, and that they reproduce, in an involuntary manner, the co-ordinated movements of everyday life. That this is sometimes the case Tourette subsequently admitted, but he still professed their frequent actual inco-ordination.

It is precisely in the type of inco-ordination that the difference lies. As rigorous a distinction must be drawn between the gestures of chorea and the gesticulations of the sufferer from tic as between the tremor of insular sclerosis and of Parkinson's disease.

In assigning an exact meaning to the term muscular inco-ordination, we cannot do better than quote the remarks of Guinon:

In his article in the Dictionnaire Jaccoud, Letulle distinguishes two kinds of tics:

According to Guinon, a further distinguishing feature of the convulsive tic is its frequent though inopportune reproduction of some reflex or automatic purposive movement of everyday life, whereas we have just seen that one of the elements in Letulle's co-ordinated tic is its purposiveness. In a word, these observers apply the same epithet to two varieties of tic which they are endeavouring to separate.

The explanation of the apparent contradiction is simple. A gesture which seems meaningless and useless to-day becomes intelligible and logical to-morrow, when we learn the reason for it. In the course of an attack of conjunctivitis a patient acquires the habit of winking his eye, and though the inflammation subsides, the habit persists. If we are ignorant of its cause, are we to call the tic convulsive since it appears to us needless? And if we do know its origin; can we say it is co-ordinated when one muscle only is involved in the contraction?

THE GENESIS OF TIC

We have seen how various purposive, co-ordinated movements may, by dint of education and voluntary repetition, become automatic and be automatically repeated should occasion arise. Imagine some such act recurring involuntarily without any apparent reason and for no apparent object; what does such an anomaly signify?

Take, for instance, the case of a young girl who inclines her head on her shoulder to relieve the pain of a dental abscess. The act is called forth by a real exciting cause; the muscular response is voluntary, deliberate, undeniably cortical in origin: the patient wills to appease the pain by pressing and warming her cheek. Should the abscess persist, the movement will be repeated less and less voluntarily, more and more automatically; but as the why and the wherefore still remain, there is nothing pathological about it.

With the healing of the abscess, however, and the consequent relief of the pain, the girl still inclines her head on her shoulder from time to time, albeit cause and purpose have ceased to operate. Her primarily volitional, co-ordinate, systematic, motor reaction is now automatic, inopportune, and meaningless: it is a tic.

Mere repetition does not, cannot, evolve a tic in every case. Not all who would may tic; psychical predisposition in the shape of volitional enfeeblement is a sine qua non.

Of the rôle played by mental insufficiency in the genesis of tic we shall have much to say later. The point we are desirous of emphasising now is that the first manifestations of tic have their origin in, and are dependent on, cortical activity, at least in a majority of cases.

Notwithstanding painstaking investigation, determination of the initial cause may no doubt be difficult in some instances, owing to the patient's ignorance or forgetfulness; for that matter, the observer may not know how to set about his task. Prolonged interrogation, however, and due consideration of the patient's environment, will generally enable him to reconstruct the pathogeny of the condition.

A few concrete instances will help us better to understand the nature of this psycho-physiological mechanism.

An individual is wearing a collar too small for him, and its frayed edge chafes his skin; the neck is at once abruptly inclined away from the irritating point—a simple spinal reflex movement of defence. Now that he is warned by the sensation of pain, he wishes to avoid it, which he does by bending his head to the opposite side. The act is similar to the preceding, but of a totally different nature; it is voluntary, not involuntary; cortical, not bulbo-spinal.

Next day the collar is replaced by another of ampler proportions. There is no further irritation of the skin, and accordingly no occasion for deviation of the head. Memory of the disagreeable sensation may perhaps incite him to verify the disappearance of the irritation by a few movements of the head, and in the normal individual the matter ends there. Even should the idea of repeating the gesture, now become meaningless, occur to him, he banishes it by an effort of the will.

Or again: a speck gets under my eyelid, and I wink—a spasmodic act independent of the cortex. The speck is removed, but the conjunctiva remains a little tender, and I wink again—still only a spasm. All trace of irritation vanishes, yet the blinking persists: it is degenerating into a tic.

Wherein consists the rôle played by the cortex in the production of such phenomena? It intervenes to order the repetition of the gesture provoked involuntarily, in the first instance, by peripheral excitation; and though one may not always be able later to discover evidence of this, one must at the least recognise the fact that the mere inopportune persistence of the movement bears witness to psychical imperfection.

It has been remarked by Guinon that patients suffering from tics of blinking attribute them to the presence of foreign bodies; he declares, however, that "if they bear a superficial resemblance to simple tic, they differ widely in essential characters and from the point of view of prognosis. They are really involuntary movements of reflex origin, occasioned by abnormal sensations, usually of pain." He cites as a typical instance the "tic douloureux" of the face.

The candidate for tic is mentally unstable. Indifferent perhaps to acute suffering, he may become entirely preoccupied by some trifling sensation of pain or by some source of petty annoyance, to rid himself of which he will resort to all sorts of tricks and assume all sorts of odd attitudes—tic germs quick to develop in suitable soil.

In many motor reactions of the class we are now considering the main object is the avoidance of some abnormal sensation, suppression of which, however, brings no relief to the patient's mind. He dreads its reappearance; he must assure himself of its absence. He taxes his ingenuity in the attempt to rediscover the sensation, and multiplies his gestures and attitudes until once again he experiences it. The satisfaction he felt originally in shunning the pain or the discomfort is paralleled by the satisfaction he now knows in its rediscovery. In each instance the motor phenomena are voluntary and co-ordinated, but their excessive repetition betrays unstable mental equilibrium.

Instructive examples of this pathogenic process are furnished by the history of O., and by the case of a young patient J., from which we extract the following:

Noir has directed attention to a tic of frequent occurrence among amaurotic idiots, consisting in rapid to-and-fro movements of the finger before the eyes. The explanation seems to be that their blindness is not absolute enough to prevent some faint appreciation of light by retinal stimulation, and the effect of the luminous impression is enhanced by the alternation of light and shade sensations produced by the waving of the fingers in front of the eyes. The tic is neither more nor less than a search after this effect.

The imperiousness of these impulses, and the peculiar relief attendant on submission to them, accentuate the closeness of the resemblance between tic and obsession, to which reference will be made later; but it is necessary at this early stage to indicate the bearing of these psychical phenomena on the pathogeny and diagnosis of tic.

TIC AND WILL.

It might be imagined that a tic would cease to exist as such were a voluntary element to enter into its constitution. The fact, however, that tic is the sequel to frequent repetition of a primarily voluntary act, and that it may be arrested, transformed, or aborted, is proof to the contrary of which there is no gainsaying.

The truth is, once a tic is established, it has all the appearance of an involuntary movement, but that nevertheless its manifestations may be either modified or inhibited by an effort of the will is patent from clinical observation. This is a fact of great importance.

Consensus of opinion admits diminution of will power to be the cardinal mental symptom of the tic patient. Inhibitory insufficiency, as Blocq and Onanoff say, allows the persistence of fixed ideas of movement which reveal themselves by involuntary acts. Noir has admirably supplemented the researches of Ribot in this direction:

TIC AND HABIT

The view which regards tic as a "pathological muscular habit" provides emphatic illustration of the sinister influence of volitional infirmity.

This aspect of the question is of deep significance. If we define a habit, in the words of Littré, as a "disposition acquired by the repetition of the same acts," we can easily conceive how intimate is the relation between habit and automatism, and how constant rehearsal of the same movement in the same manner will create a mode of motor reaction independent of the function of the will. It has been made clear already that the phenomena of tic, regarded from the motor standpoint, reveal an identical process at work; but the fundamental difference between the habits of normal individuals and those of tic subjects is that the former can be checked or modified by voluntary effort, whereas the latter gradually acquire the pathological features of tenacity and irresistibility.

We are not prepared to maintain, of course, that all motor "bad habits" are tics, for a whole host of familiar gestures, tricks, and mannerisms do not merit the name, superfluous and even detestable though they may be. It is true they are the product of education, and become, since the will has less and less to do with their appearing, at the last purely automatic; they may thus developmentally bear a close resemblance to tics. As Letulle says:

But such automatic habits and mannerisms are not genuine tics so long as the movement executed conserves in form the characters of a normal gesture. Be it never so inopportune or absurd, it is not a tic. It comes rather under the heading of stereotyped acts, whose kinship with, and difference from, the tics, have been well demonstrated by Séglas.

On the other hand, the thousand illogical and absurd mannerisms of which we have been speaking betray no irresistible imperiousness in their execution, and require no agonising struggle for their repression. They are not tics. The crucial point in the differential diagnosis is the presence or absence of mental suffering.

The distinction may be further elaborated. Concentration of the attention may diminish the intensity or even inhibit the occurrence of a tic; inversely, a simple bad habit is manifested preferably during this very concentration. In the heat of physical or intellectual labour, we have all our favourite and characteristic tricks: we curl our moustache, we twist our beard, we scratch our forehead, we rub our chin, we nod our head, we fidget with our fingers in reading, speaking, reciting—in any mental or physical exercise requiring our attention we reveal innumerable little oddities of movement; but let our thoughts be directed for an instant to these gestures of distraction, and they disappear forthwith, to reappear afresh when we are absorbed in our work again. Charcot used to twist his hair round his index finger so intricately that to disentangle the finger one day a lock of hair had actually to be cut off. It was a trick of his, not a tic.

In the case of the latter, leisure of mind and body is the signal for the apparition of the inopportune movements. Any form of effort demanding the attention will, as a general rule, lessen their frequency or abolish them altogether.

We all have met the young man who cannot strike a ball at tennis without protruding his tongue at the same moment; his partner bites his lips at any difficult stroke. At other times neither betrays the slightest grimace; neither is conscious of any effort in maintaining repose. The occurrence of these movements during active concentration of the attention, and the absence of either difficulty or distress in checking them, justify their classification as stereotyped acts, in subjects psychically normal.

Tic is a pathological habit, to use Brissaud's phrase, and its description as a habit disease is in harmony with the facts. We must expect, of course, to meet every intermediate variety between the bad habit and the true tic, but this need not deter us from drawing the above-noted distinction, the application of which will be found not without value in the great majority of instances.

TIC AND IDEA

Tics of this sort are numerous enough. "To think an act," as Charcot used to say, following Herbert Spencer and Bain, "is already to accomplish it. When we think of the movement, say of extension of the hand, we have already sketched it in our minds; and, should the idea be too strong, we execute it."

In this connection Grasset most appropriately cites the fact that the peoples of mid-France evince a peculiar aptitude for mimicking by suitable gesture the various ideas which occur in the course of conversation. "You will always succeed," he says, "with the following little experiment. In a drawing-room ask ten individuals consecutively to tell you what a rattle (crécelle) is. The answer will in every case be accompanied by a gesture expressive of an object that turns. To think an act is already to perform it; the thought and the gesture are wellnigh inseparable."

The truth of this observation is not a question of geography. Examples are met with on every hand. It is a law, abundant evidence for which is furnished by all who tic. But however exuberant be accompanying movements of explanation, they must present the additional features of inappositeness and irresistibility to be denominated tics.

For instance, during the enunciation of the following sentence, "We were on a paddle steamer, with captain, commissaire, and doctor," he first of all imitated the movement of paddles; he then put his hand, with three fingers apart, to his forehead (the captain's cap has three lace bands); to mimic the word commissaire he shook hands with himself (commissaire—comme il serre); to express the word doctor he pretended to touch imaginary breasts on his body (médecin—mes deux seins); and so on throughout all his conversation.

Voluntary execution of these puns had been succeeded by complete automatism, yet they were not tics, because, however singular the mimicry, it was appropriate; whereas his facial grimaces, the shrugging of his shoulders, the tapping of his heels, repeated every minute for no reason or purpose, were real tics.

If, when asked what a rattle is, we make a turning movement with our hand, or if when asked to explain the word brandebourg we indicate an imaginary arrangement of braid on our coat—these two experiments always succeed—we are attempting to express an idea by mimicry at the actual moment of its arising in the mind; but the subject of a tic—which may primarily have been the representation by mimicry of an idea—continues the gesture long after the idea which provoked it has vanished.

Should the cortex be functioning harmoniously, afferent impulse and efferent reaction stand in due proportion one to the other; but any disturbance of psychical equilibrium—e.g. the fixity of some idea combined with inhibitory weakness—will effect a corresponding disturbance on the motor side. Charcot used to speak of tics of the mind revealing themselves by tics of the body. Fear may elicit a movement of defence, to persist as a tic after the exciting cause has vanished.

It is of course quite incorrect to say that each and every motor reaction to a pathological idea is a tic. The psychasthenic who in his fear of draughts shakes the door-knob a hundred times a day to make sure the door is shut, is not a martyr to tic; in spite of the absurdity of his action, it is logically connected with the idea that originated it, and it is the idea which is absurd. To make an involuntary movement of defence against some purely imaginary ill, on the other hand, and to continue when all fear is past, is to tic.

In practice it may not always be a simple matter to uphold the distinction, but some such demarcation of the tic's limits is called for if we are to avoid its being applied to any act performed under the compulsion of a pathological mental state.

The exteriorisation of the hallucinatory phenomenon suffices at once to bring it within the scope of our definition. Innumerable tics arise in this way, provoked, mayhap, by some or other insignificant psychomotor hallucination. The attitude adopted by certain patients, as remarked by Séglas, is an index to the nature and seat of their hallucinations. Some keep their tongue firmly bitten between the teeth; others cram their mouth with pebbles, or compress their epigastrium tightly, under the impression that it is the source of their voice. Should such gestures persist while the hallucination does not, they may give rise to what we are in the habit of calling "tonic tics," or "tics of attitude," but we must repeat that the presence of a convulsive element is essential; however out of place or absurd the contractions are, if otherwise they are normal we are dealing with what Séglas designates stereotyped acts. To this question we shall return later.

TIC AND CONSCIOUSNESS

According to Guinon, proof that "convulsive" tic is conscious is furnished by the accurate description and rational explanation patients supply of their affliction. Similarly Letulle's "co-ordinated" tic is a conscious act, at least in its commencement; it is a "bad habit" which finally passes beyond the limit of consciousness.

According to Cruchet, certain so-called psychical tics are always subliminal—for instance, the imitation tics common in children and in idiots.

But if the consciousness of the normal adult be, as it admittedly is, a most elusive conception to define, how infinitely more precarious is the task in the case of idiots or infants! Cruchet says it is impossible to be sure whether at any given moment a tic has been above the threshold of consciousness or not; and we do not think the question will be elucidated by the introduction of data so difficult to comprehend as the consciousness, unconsciousness, or subconsciousness of the tic patient. In any case, these conceptions are quite inadequate for the establishment of useful distinctions. All that we can say is that the participation of consciousness in the phenomena of tic varies in time and degree. To hazard farther would be to invite disaster.

TIC AND POLYGON