Unpopular government in the United States

Our state legislatures are now for the most part composed of members elected from fairly wieldy districts. Governmental changes then which look toward the application of the principles of commission government to the state, as outlined in the preceding chapter, have to do principally with the union of the executive and legislative powers. Several recent proposals for changes, coming from Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Oregon, indicate that legislators, governors, and political scientists with practical experience have concluded that the executive and legislative powers must be brought nearer together. The interesting fact, however, is that no plans have been suggested by which the legislature is to absorb the control of the executive power by placing it in the hands of the leaders of a majority of the legislature. On the contrary, the proposals for bringing the executive and legislature nearer together have, with one exception, been along the line of conferring upon the executive greater power to control and coerce the legislature.

The Illinois House of Representatives at its 1913 session adopted a rule for which Representative Morton D. Hull was responsible. It provided as follows:

This rule very plainly brings the executive and the legislature nearer together. It does so, however, only by conferring upon the governor an important privilege which enables him to advance his legislative program.

The proposed amendment to the Wisconsin constitution providing for an initiative by the electorate at large for legislation[18] gives to the governor a practical method of coercing or “steam-rollering” the opposition of a hostile legislature. It provides for the submission to the electorate at large of any bill introduced into the legislature any time within the first thirty days of the session. This enables the governor to present all administration bills to the legislature and if they fail of passage he may then present them for enactment into law by the electorate at large. This is giving the governor power to promote and control legislation to a very great degree.

Governor Hodges of Kansas in his message to the legislature of March 10, 1913, in terms advocated the adoption of the commission plan of government for the state. As there outlined, the details of the plan were somewhat vague. It consisted apparently of a unicameral legislature containing one or two members from each of the eight congressional districts of the state, with terms of from four to six years. This legislative commission was to be in session as the exigencies of the public business demanded. The governor was to be ex officio a member and presiding officer of the commission or legislative assembly. We observe here no other union of the executive and legislative powers than occurs in a city government like that of Chicago, where the mayor is elected at large and vested with the executive power and presides over a unicameral council of comparatively few members exercising the municipal legislative power. Governor Hodges’ suggestion would vest more power in the state executive than he now has, by reason of his being the presiding officer of the legislative body. Apart from this, it does not go farther than to propose a reduction in the size of the legislature. But even that part of the plan may be open to the objection that it violates the fundamental principle of the selection of representatives from wieldy geographical districts or by wieldy “quotas.” On the whole, Governor Hodges’ plan would seem to be one which, like the Hull rule in Illinois and the Wisconsin provision for an initiative, increased the power of the executive elected at large and diminished the importance and power of the representatives of the electorate.

The latest plans of the People’s Power League of Oregon are set out in detail in certain constitutional amendments which are to be submitted to the people upon a referendum.[19]

We notice first of all a concentration of executive power in the governor by reason of the fact that he appoints his cabinet consisting of an attorney-general, a secretary of state, a treasurer, a printer, a superintendent of public instruction, a secretary of labor, a state business manager, and such others as may be provided by law. He appoints also all sheriffs and district attorneys throughout the state. These local officers, however, are subject to a recall by the electorate. The powers and duties of all state commissions are consolidated and vested in the governor and become a part of the executive powers and functions, excepting the rail-road commission, the members of which are, however, appointed by the governor. The governor’s power is further increased by giving to him and his cabinet officers seats in a unicameral legislature. It is made the duty of the governor to introduce all bills for appropriating money. While the legislature may reduce the amount of appropriations, it cannot increase them without the consent of the governor. The general veto power of the governor is taken away, but he would still seem to have power by promoting a referendum, to appeal to the electorate to override the legislature.[20]

The single-chamber legislature is to consist of 60 members not less than 2 of whom are elected from each district containing approximately as many sixtieths of the population as there are members to be elected from the district. The voter in no case is permitted to vote for more than one candidate. Hence each party would be expected to put up as many candidates as it estimated its strength to be in sixtieths of the population. The result is bound to be a minority representation, if there be any substantial minority. To obviate the minority having as much power as the majority each member elected casts as many votes in the legislature as there are voters who cast their ballots for him. The unsuccessful candidate for governor who receives the highest number of votes in his party is made a member of the legislature with a voting strength equal to the number of votes cast for the unsuccessful candidates of his party for places in the legislature. One might hazard the guess that a legislature so precisely representing the voting strength of all factions and parties was peculiarly liable to legislative deadlocks which would again vastly increase the opportunity of power in a governor who, with his cabinet, had places in the legislative body and who possessed a vast power over appropriations.

On the whole these new plans from Oregon tend in the direction of magnifying a one-man-executive power at the expense of the legislature rather than the increasing of the power of the legislature by giving to its leaders the control of the executive power.

At the 1913 session of the Illinois legislature there was introduced by Senator Logan Hay a bill to establish what is now known as the Hay plan for a legislative commission. It provided for a joint legislative commission to consist of the governor, who was made ex officio chairman of the committee, the lieutenant-governor, the speaker, the chairmen of the committees on appropriations and judiciary of the Senate and the House, and five other senators and five other representatives, selected as other committees were, viz., in the senate by the resolution of that body, in the House by the speaker. The governor, lieutenant-governor, and speaker were to serve on the committee during their term of office and the other members till the convening of the next General Assembly after their appointment. The commission was to be in session from the commencement of one regular session of the legislature to the commencement of the next. It was given power to prepare and bring forward a complete legislative program, including a budget of appropriations for the coming legislative session, and to establish a legislative reference bureau. It was given power to investigate the administration of any department of the state government and the expenditure of any appropriation made by the General Assembly. Such a plan was admirably designed to increase the power of the legislature by centralizing in its leaders power and authority to present a comprehensive and matured program before the legislature convened. At the same time it conferred no additional power over legislation upon the governor. On the contrary, it, in a mild way, actually attempted to secure additional control over the executive power. The mere existence of a standing legislative commission composed of the leaders of the legislature, with power at any time to investigate the administration of any department of the state government or the expenditure of any money appropriated, was a continuing menace to the present executive isolation and irresponsibility.

The plan evidently met with determined opposition from the executive, for in the House it was amended so as to provide four members from the Senate and House instead of five, and these were to be appointed by the governor. The power of investigation by the commission was restricted to such as it was called upon to make by the governor, the General Assembly, or either house, and the power to investigate the administration of any department of the state government was entirely omitted. In this form the bill became one which would vastly increase the governor’s power by delivering into his hands the authority of the commission and giving him recognized administration members of the legislature. A deadlock ensued between the House and the Senate, and the bill as finally passed contained a provision only for establishing a legislative reference bureau. In the contest over the original plan and the house modifications we have a clear-cut recognition of the necessity of bringing the governor and the legislature nearer together. We also have presented a sharp dispute as to whether the governor shall have added to his power further authority over the promotion of legislation or whether the legislature shall increase its power by organization, and at the same time secure some control, if not an actual domination, over the executive power.

It is rather startling that in all the above proposals which look toward the closer relation of the executive and legislative powers we should find a strong tendency toward the increasing of the power of the single executive by giving him greater control over the legislative power. Historically the effort has constantly been to break down the power of the single executive. True, the executive in such cases was not subject to the electorate at frequent intervals. But frequent elections may not protect the governed from a vast number of errors of judgment and smaller tyrannies, executive oppression and bad appointments, which do not become a matter of general knowledge or make a considerable issue before the electorate. Good executive government in the sense of one which is just and fair, well balanced, seeking improvements, and acting conscientiously in lesser affairs, comes more certainly from a small committee of experienced leaders than from a single man. The exchange of views by such a body and the reaction of one member upon another has a value which cannot be estimated. The single executive on the other hand is likely to have no fixed set of responsible advisers. He is too frequently swayed by the advice of the last man who reaches his ear.

In making constitutions it is quite as easy to unite the executive and legislative powers by giving the control of the executive power to a majority of the legislature as it is to hand the control of the legislative power over to the single executive. From the point of view of expediency there is much to be said of the plan which places the control of the executive power in the hands of the legislature.