CHAPTER XIX
At 9.30 A.M., 27th April, a copy of the French Operation Orders was received from Second Army. From these it became apparent that the French were to continue the offensive both from the west and the south. From this latter direction the Moroccan Brigade of Colonel Savy was to attack, as before, along the west of the Langemarck road. Arrangements for co-operating with this Brigade were therefore put in hand. The Artillery bombardment was timed by the French to begin at 12.30 P.M. and the assault at 1.15 P.M.
At 11.20 a message was received from the Second Army, giving the intentions of the Army commander as regards the action to be taken by the Lahore Division. In this it was made clear that the Division was to be prepared to take advantage at once of any advance made by the French to gain ground; but that it was not to be committed to the attack until the advance of the French had assured the safety of its left flank. The Artillery of the Fifth Corps and Lahore Division, which bore on the line of advance, were to co-operate. The Headquarters of the 27th and Canadian Divisional Artillery were in dug-outs close beside that occupied by Lahore Division Headquarters at Potijze. The following were the dispositions: Sirhind Brigade to attack with their right on an oblong farm, and the left along the Langemarck road. 1/4th Gurkhas on the right, 1/1st Gurkhas on the left. In support were a part of the Highland Light Infantry and the 15th Sikhs and 4th King’s Liverpools. The Ferozepore Brigade was to prolong the Sirhind Brigade’s right and to move forward under cover of the bombardment, so as to be up in line with Sirhind Brigade at 1.15 P.M. 9th Bhopals on the right, 4th Londons on the left, in touch with Sirhind’s right. The Connaught Rangers in support, with the 57th Rifles and 129th Baluchis in reserve.
As has already been stated, not only were many of these units very weak before the battle, but had after the previous day’s losses dwindled to shadows of battalions.
At 12.20 P.M., 27th April, the Ferozepore Brigade started and their advance was systematically reported. The Sirhind Brigade advanced before the time fixed and by 1.15 P.M., when the bombardment ceased, the leading battalions of this Brigade had reached the edge of some enclosed ground on the slope towards the valley. The heavy enfilade fire caused the 1/1st Gurkhas to swing north-north-west to face it. The 4th Gurkhas maintained their direction but were held up. At 1.30 P.M. it was reported to the Divisional commander that the French were attacking to the north-west of an adjoining farm, and though losing heavily were continuing to form a firing-line. Our own front line was also reported as being checked and suffering heavy loss.
In its advance the Sirhind Brigade had to pass through heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and casualties came fast. Before a party of the 4th Gurkhas had reached an old farmhouse, which they tenaciously held, the C.O., Major Brodhurst, had been killed, and his Adjutant, Captain Hartwell, wounded. Two other officers, Captain E. C. Lentaigne and Lieut. C. F. Moore, were also hit. The Gurkhas, however, held on to the farm. A Gurkha officer, Jemadar Nain Singh Rana, was amongst the killed.
Meantime, the 1st Gurkhas rushed another farm 250 yards from the enemy trench, which was held by a company till dark. The greater part of the battalion, however, was held up at some hundred yards farther back. The Adjutant, Lieutenant St. George, was mortally wounded, and nearly all the other British officers present were wounded. Rifleman Ramkishan Thapa won the I.O.M. for a particularly plucky act.
A fire fight now ensued, which continued till 4 P.M., at which time the O.C. 4th King’s, seeing that the 4th Gurkhas could make no progress, decided to reinforce them with part of his battalion. The King’s advanced with great gallantry, and, although suffering severe losses, carried the line forward for some distance. A party under Major Beall got to within 200 yards of the German trenches.
The advance of the 4th King’s was a very fine feat of arms. Straight from home they had joined in the tumult of Neuve Chapelle, and this day by their valour, which would take no denial, had already established themselves as a veteran battalion. Lieut.-Colonel Allen, the C.O., was awarded the C.M.G., and Major Beall the D.S.O. A few N.C.O.’s and men won the D.C.M. The casualties, as was to be expected, were very heavy, 380 of all ranks, including 2nd Lieut. Lloyd (killed), besides eight other officers wounded.
The Ferozepore Brigade as it advanced lost heavily from Artillery, and later from rifle fire. The attack of this Brigade was also eventually checked.
It was at this time that Major Jamieson, 9th Bhopals, of whom I had much to say in describing the fight before Neuve Chapelle in the autumn of 1914, was wounded. He was later killed in Mesopotamia. This battalion suffered 120 casualties, including Captain Etlinger, the Adjutant, killed. The 9th Bhopals had in India paid me a very special compliment by making me a life honorary member of their mess, and I hope I may one day again avail myself of the privilege.
The 4th Londons on the left of the Bhopals, keeping touch with the advance on both flanks, moved on until the general line of both Brigades was assimilated, when like the others they were brought to a halt. Captain Saunders was mortally wounded whilst engaged in reinforcing with his company. Lieut. Coates was also killed in the extreme front of the advance. Two N.C.O.’s who behaved most gallantly were awarded the D.C.M., and the M.C. was the reward of 2nd Lieut. Pyper.
The 1st Gurkhas of the Sirhind Brigade established their line beyond four heavy French guns, which had been abandoned, and which were thus enabled to be withdrawn at night.
An order from the Second Army directing the attack to be pressed vigorously was received by the G.O.C. Lahore Division at 2.40 P.M., and in order to give weight to this, the Composite Brigade, consisting of battalions of the Cornwall Light Infantry, York and Lancasters, West Ridings, and Royal Lancasters, but numbering less than 1300 all told, was placed at General Keary’s disposal. This Brigade was commanded by Colonel Tuson, and left Potijze with orders to push forward and establish connection with the Sirhind Brigade. If the position permitted, a heavy bombardment was then to be carried out, prior to a fresh assault.
At 4.25 P.M., 27th April, a report was received from the Sirhind Brigade that their front lines were far enough from the enemy to permit of a fresh bombardment. This was accordingly arranged as soon as possible, and all guns opened fire. It began at 5.30 P.M., and under its cover the Highland Light Infantry (except a detachment who were facing north-north-west, 100 yards from the German trenches) and the 15th Sikhs pushed forward, but were temporarily checked, as there was nothing behind them to give the necessary support.
The Highland Light Infantry, however, moved on, and eventually in order to hold its ground, when the French Colonials on the left were once more forced back by renewed gas attacks, the battalion entrenched itself as best it could and held on to its position. Captain Tarrant, of whom I have already written, and his immortal detachment were found still occupying their isolated trench only 100 yards from the German line. Allied, British, and Indian soldiers had been driven before the terrible gas; shells and bullets had swept in tornadoes over them, but nothing could discourage that noble band. The brave commander paid for his valour with his life, but the Highlands will long re-echo his name and treasure the memory of those true sons of Scotland. If posthumous rewards cannot be given under present rules, the sooner such rules are changed to meet the exigencies of this great war the better. Is it too late?
With Tarrant was his Company Sergeant-Major, R. Bell, who, when a party of carriers coming up with ammunition were literally swept away by fire, went out with a few brave men and returned, to wear the Distinguished Conduct Medal he so well merited.
The 15th Sikhs, the other battalion in the front line of the Brigade, was met by severe shrapnel fire, whilst the incessant rain of bullets of course never varied. Lieut.-Colonel C. A. Vivian was killed. In the pages of The Indian Corps in France will be found a story of this officer’s gallantry during the very early days of the war, which I can supplement by another instance of his keen courage. One night in December 1914 he asked to see me and did not wish any one else to be present. He then unfolded a plan to disguise himself and wander into the German lines. His intention was to gain certain information which he knew was badly needed. He felt sure of success and said it was well worth risking, and it was only because of the shortage of British officers with Indian battalions that he had come to ask permission instead of going off on his own. He begged me not to mention the matter to any one, which, of course, I only do now that he is no more. I had to refuse his unselfish offer, but a few days later his restless spirit prompted him to go through the adventure related in the book above mentioned.
Sepoy Bakshi Singh during the advance repeatedly performed acts of signal bravery and was awarded the I.O.M. Major Carden, the next senior officer to Vivian, was killed while endeavouring to save a brother officer, Captain A. H. Muir, who had been wounded. The 15th Sikhs during the second battle of Ypres suffered a total of 100 casualties.
The commander of the Moroccan Brigade, who was in close touch with the G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade, now informed him that he would assault again at 7 P.M., 28th April. The arrival of the Composite Brigade was expected before that time, and arrangements for a combined assault were carried out.
The French assault commenced punctually under cover of heavy Artillery fire and the Sirhind Brigade moved forward once more. Shortly after, the Moroccans were observed streaming to the rear, but observation was difficult, owing to the clouds of smoke and asphyxiating gas. Suspecting a counter-attack on the left of the Brigade, the 15th Sikhs wheeled round to cover the left flank. Two battalions of the Composite Brigade were also deployed in the same direction, and the Brigade was then ordered to consolidate its position. The Highland Light Infantry and 15th Sikhs took over the front line, and the two Gurkha battalions and the 4th King’s Liverpools were withdrawn to reorganise. The 34th Pioneers and Sappers and Miners were sent up to assist and the Composite Brigade was withdrawn into reserve. By 9 P.M. our Allies had gone forward again and touch had been re-established with the Moroccans. The deployment and advance of the Brigade had been carried out in full view of the enemy, and during the whole day the troops were subjected to a heavy enfilade and Artillery fire. They had behaved with the greatest firmness and done all that was possible to attain their object.
The Brigadier brought to special notice the dashing advance of the 4th King’s, and the gallantry of the company 1st Highland Light Infantry under Captain Tarrant. At noon on 28th April the Division was placed under the orders of Plumer’s Force, which had just been formed.
During the 28th and 29th April, various plans for an attack by the French were arranged and the rôle of our troops was laid down and communicated to Brigadiers, but the attacks did not take place. By this time it was known that the German position was a continuous line of trenches of great strength with strong points here and there at farms and other houses. During the night of 29th April, the Ferozepore and Jalandar Brigades were withdrawn to Ouderdom huts under orders from Plumer’s Force. No attack took place on the 30th April, but a continuous bombardment was carried on, in which the co-operation of the Canadian Artillery was specially acknowledged by General Keary.
At 6 P.M. on 30th April Colonel Savy, commanding the Moroccan Brigade, was asked to state his intention, and informed the G.O.C. Division that his losses had been very heavy and that he could not attack without reinforcements. During the early hours of the morning of 1st May a message was received from Plumer’s Force giving the substance of a communication sent to General Plutz, commanding the French Army of Belgium, in which it was explained to him that the Sirhind Brigade, the only one available, could be utilised to support the French right in an attack on the German trench line on Hill 29, and orders for the Artillery were issued to suit the particular form the attack was to take, and instructions allotting their objectives were sent to the Artillery of the Canadian and Twenty-seventh Divisions, which were to co-operate.
A message from Plumer’s Force made it clear that General Plutz understood that the Sirhind Brigade would only advance to the attack in conjunction with the French, and that their attack would not be converging. The Brigadier reported that he would move off twenty minutes before the French, so as to bring him level with the latter when the assault began. The Artillery was ordered to support this movement with a heavy fire, and at 2.50 P.M. the Brigade advanced in the following formation:
Right battalion—1/4th Gurkhas. In support 1st Highland Light Infantry.
Left battalion—1/1st Gurkhas; with King’s Liverpools in support. The 15th Sikhs to hold the advanced trenches.
It is on record that the Gurkhas were so overjoyed at finding themselves for once out of a bog that they literally tore over the rolling country until within 300 yards of the German lines. An officer who was present, and who afterwards went to Gallipoli, wrote to say that when his men saw the barren hills there, they shouted, “Hurrah! at last we shall be able to shoot on a hillside—no more snipe jheels for us.” Oh! if some one who knew what many of our Indian battalions could do (outside of eternal mire) had given us a chance in France, even for a short spell, what an opportunity it would have been of proving once for all that the hillmen of India with British officers cannot be beaten in hilly country no matter who the foe. But the depression caused by existence in the same fetid morass for fourteen long and blood-stained months, without any change, was enough to turn sour the cheeriest mortal that ever shouldered a rifle. I make bold to say that no other Corps, Division, Brigade, or unit in France was ever kept as long on such a narrow, cheerless front as was the Indian Corps, nor, had they been, would they have stuck it out any better.
The right battalion, 1/4th Gurkhas, in its rush arrived near the farm, the vicinity of which had been the scene of Captain Tarrant’s exploit. Here they were joined by their supporting battalion, the Highland Light Infantry. In this operation the rapidity of the Gurkha advance served them well, as only some fifty casualties were recorded. The Highlanders had eighty casualties, including 2nd Lieut. McIntosh of the Indian Army attached to the battalion, killed.
The 1st Gurkhas only finished their rush when but 200 yards severed them from the German trenches—that fateful “No Man’s Land,” so familiar to every soldier, so dreaded by every mother and wife, the Lethean zone which alone separated civilisation from modern barbarism; that 200 yards which was more difficult to cross than the 600 leagues over which Xenophon retreated, or the vast expanses Marco Polo explored. But in the ranks of the army of Great Britain’s King the occasion always finds the man.
Close by the German front was a trench: Who was in it—friend or foe? Havildar Bhakat Sing Rana of the 2/4th Gurkhas, attached to the 1st battalion, offered to solve the riddle. With a small chosen band he crept out and, cheating death, discovered it was held by our Allies. The Indian Order of Merit could not have been better won.
The 1st Gurkhas had about seventy casualties in this attack, and the supporting battalion, the 4th King’s Liverpools, added forty-five, including Captain Lumsden killed, and Major Beall, who had led so well a few days previously, wounded.
I will quote from General Keary’s report, which concisely explains the movements of the Brigade:
The leading battalions, moving rapidly forward, advanced without serious loss, and had passed before the enemy had formed a belt of Artillery fire on the crest of the ridge on our side of the valley, through which it subsequently became impossible to advance. Owing to the German line being better known by this time, and owing to the more detailed instructions as to Artillery support, the hostile rifle fire was more effectively kept down on this day.
The troops advanced into the front French and British trenches. The ground between them and the German trenches was a glacis slope, and by 5 P.M. it became apparent that the wire entanglement in front, some four yards deep, had not been cut.
At 7 P.M. the officer commanding 4th Moroccan Brigade sent a message to say that he had decided not to attack.
Accordingly orders were issued to the Sirhind Brigade to withdraw to the huts at Ouderdom. Ends.
During the last four days of the operations the Lahore Divisional Artillery was chiefly employed in assisting the French. It earned the thanks of the French Commander for the accuracy and effectiveness of its fire. General Keary specially brought to notice the great assistance he had received from Brigadier-General Burstall and the Staff of the Canadian Divisional Artillery; throughout the operations they had co-operated with the utmost zeal and cordiality. He also acknowledged the great help Brigadier-General Stokes and the Artillery of the Twenty-seventh Division had rendered.
Of 16,000 combatants of all arms detached from the Indian Army Corps to take part in the second battle of Ypres, over 24 per cent were returned as casualties. General Keary, in forwarding his report on the battle, wrote:
In conclusion, I consider that the troops did all that it was humanly possible to do under most trying circumstances. They had to pass along some miles of road and narrow streets under a hail of shell-fire, advance to a position of assembly over open ground and from thence to a position of deployment under the same conditions.
The Germans had prepared a position which required the most accurate and intense gun fire to reduce it. Owing to the hurried nature of the attack it was impossible to reconnoitre sufficiently to ensure such a fire; nor were the guns registered. During the first two days the Infantry advanced against a position on an open glacis which was virtually unshaken. After the first two days only one Brigade was in action, and its action depended on that of the French, whose right was unable to advance to the attack.
In spite of all these disabilities the carrying of the position by the French and British was only prevented by the use of asphyxiating gases.
I think the following regiments deserve special mention for the gallantry shown by them:
The following letter was received from the Second Army:
G.O.C. Lahore Division—Having read the very complete and excellent report on the work of the Lahore Division in the heavy fighting near Ypres on the 26th and 27th April 1915, the Commander of the Second Army is confirmed in the views he formed at the time, that the Division had been handled with great skill and determination by Major-General Keary.
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien fully realises the disadvantages under which the attack was made, insufficient Artillery preparation on our side and an open glacis-like slope to advance over in the face of overwhelming shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and the employment of poisonous gases on the enemy’s side; and that, in spite of these disadvantages, the troops, although only partially successful in wrenching ground from the enemy, effectually prevented his further advance and thus ensured the safety of the town of Ypres.
Sir Horace, whilst deploring the heavy casualties, wishes to thank the Divisional General, Brigadiers, and Commanding Officers and all ranks of the several Arms employed, for the great service they performed for the Second Army on those eventful two days.
In this respect he would specially mention the following regiments:
[The corps named by General Keary are then enumerated.]
General Sir Herbert Plumer also wrote us follows:
G.O.C. Lahore Division—Will you please convey to the Brigadiers, Commanding Officers, and all Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of your Division my thanks for the assistance they have rendered in the recent severe fighting, and my appreciation of the way in which they have carried out the very arduous duties entrusted to them while under my command.
I deeply regret the very heavy casualties they have suffered.
By 5th May the Lahore Division had rejoined the Corps, and immediately proceeded to take its share in the severe fighting round Festubert.
I took the opportunity to see as many units as possible during the short interval, and it was a great pleasure to talk with Keary, and many others of all ranks, British and Indian. The universal note was satisfaction that they had tried to do their duty. General Keary again commanded his Division at the battles near Festubert and Mauquissart, in May and September 1915, but it was not till he had been in command of a Division in Mesopotamia, much later on, that he was given any reward for his distinguished services.