The report was read, and the amendments to the clauses in debate, which then ran thus:—
That the officers and soldiers to be quartered and billeted as aforesaid, shall be received, and furnished with diet and small beer by the owners of the inns, livery stables, alehouses, victualling-houses, etc. paying and allowing for the same the several rates mentioned.
Provided, that in case the innholder on whom any non-commission officers or soldiers shall be quartered, by virtue of this act, (except on a march,) shall be desirous to furnish such officers or soldiers with candles, vinegar, and salt, and with either small beer or cider, not ex-ceeding three quarts for each man a-day gratis, and to allow them the use of fire, and the necessary utensils for dressing and eating their meat, and shall give notice of such his desire to the commanding officers, and shall furnish and allow them the same accordingly; then, and in such case, the non-commission officers and soldiers so quartered shall provide their own victuals; and the officer to whom it belongs to receive, or that does actually receive the pay and subsistence of such non-commission officers and soldiers, shall pay the several sums, payable out of the subsistence-money for diet and small beer, to the non-commission officers and soldiers aforesaid, and not to the innholder or other person on whom such non-commission officers or soldiers are quartered.
The question being put whether this clause should stand thus,
Mr. CAREW spoke to this effect:—Sir, though it may, perhaps, be allowed, that the circumstances of our present situation oblige us to support a more numerous army than in former years, surely no argument can be drawn from them that can show the necessity of a profuse allowance to our soldiers, or of gratifying their desires by the oppression of the innholders.
If, sir, the designs of our enemies are so malicious, and their power so formidable, as to demand augmentations of our troops, and additions to our natural securities, they ought, surely, to impress upon us the necessity of frugal measures, that no useless burdens may be imposed upon the people.
To furnish two quarts of beer, sir, every day for nothing, is, undoubtedly, an imposition sufficiently grievous; and I can, therefore, discover no reason for which an allowance of three should be established; a proposal injurious to the victualler, because it exacts more than he can afford to allow, and of no benefit to the soldier, because it offers him more than he can want.
Sir William YONGE spoke next, to this purpose:—Sir, if it is an instance of misconduct to spend upon any affair more time than the importance of it deserves, I am afraid that the clause, to which our attention is now recalled, may expose us to censure, and that we may be charged with neglecting weighty controversies, and national questions, to debate upon trifles; of wasting our spirits upon subjects unworthy of contention; of defeating the expectations of the publick, and diverting our enemies rather than opposing them.
But, sir, as nothing has a more immediate tendency to the security of the nation than a proper establishment of our forces, and the regulation of their quarters is one of the most necessary and difficult parts of the establishment; it is requisite that we think no question of this kind too trivial for our consideration, since very dangerous disturbances have often been produced by petty disputes.
The quantity, sir, of small beer to be allowed by the victualler to those soldiers who shall provide their own victuals, was disputed yesterday, and, as I thought, agreed upon; but since this question is revived, I must take the opportunity to declare, that we ought not to assign less than three quarts a-day to each man; for it is to be remembered by those who estimate the demands by their own, how much their way of life is different from that of a common soldier, and how little he can be charged with wantonness and superfluity, for drinking more small liquor than themselves.
There are few members of this house, who do not, more than once a-day, drink tea, coffee, chocolate, or some other cooling and diluting infusion; delicacies which the soldier cannot purchase; to which he is entirely a stranger, and of which the place must be supplied by some other cheap and wholesome liquors.
If, sir, those gentlemen whose close attention to the interest of the innholder has, perhaps, abstracted them, in some degree, from any regard to the necessities of a soldier, will consent to allow him five pints a-day, I shall contend no longer; for though I cannot agree that it is a sufficient provision, yet, as other gentlemen, equally able to judge in this subject with myself, are of a different opinion, I shall show my regard for their sentiments by desisting from opposition.
Lord BALTIMORE spoke in substance as follows:—Sir, I am not able to discover any necessity of compromising this debate, by taking the mean between the two different opinions, or for denying to the soldiers what every labourer or serving-man would murmur to be refused for a single day.
I believe, sir, every gentleman, who examines the expense of his family, will find that each of his servants consumes daily at least three quarts of small beer, and surely it is not to be required that a soldier should live in a perpetual state of war with his constitution, and a constant inability to comply with the calls of nature.
General HANDASYD spoke to the following purpose:—Sir, the inclination shown by several gentlemen for a penurious and scanty provision for the soldiers, must, in my opinion, proceed from an inattentive consideration of their pay, and will, therefore, be removed, by laying before them an account of his condition, and comparing his daily pay with his daily expenses.
The whole pay of a foot soldier, sir, is sixpence a-day, of which he is to pay fourpence to his landlord for his diet, or, what is very nearly the same, to carry fourpence daily to the market, for which how small a supply of provisions he can bring to his quarters, especially in time of scarcity, I need not mention.
There remain then only twopence, sir, to be disbursed for things not immediately necessary for the preservation of life, but which no man can want without being despicable to others and burdensome to himself. Twopence a-day is all that a soldier has to lay out upon cleanliness and decency, and with which he is likewise to keep his arms in order, and to supply himself with some part of his clothing. If, sir, after these deductions, he can, from twopence a-day, procure himself the means of enjoying a few happy moments in the year with his companions over a cup of ale, is not his economy much more to be envied than his luxury? Or can it be charged upon him that he enjoys more than his share of the felicities of life? Is he to be burdened with new expenses lest he should hoard up the publick money, stop the circulation of coin, and turn broker or usurer with twopence a-day?
I have been so long acquainted, sir, with the soldier's character, that I will adventure to secure him from the charge of avarice, and to promise that whatever he shall possess not necessary to life, he will enjoy to the advantage of his landlord.
Then the advocate CAMPBELL spoke in substance as follows:—Sir, I am far from intending to oppose this proposal of five pints, though, upon a rigorous examination, it might appear more than the mere wants of nature require; for I cannot but declare that this question has too long engaged the attention of the house, and that the representatives of a mighty nation beset with enemies, and encumbered with difficulties, seem to forget their importance and their dignity, by wrangling from day to day upon a pint of small beer.
I conceive the bill, which we are now considering, sir, not as a perpetual and standing law, to be interwoven with our constitution, or added to the principles of our government, but as a temporary establishment for the present year; an expedient to be laid aside when our affairs cease to require it; an experimental essay of a new practice, which may be changed or continued according to its success.
To allow, sir, five pints of small beer a-day to our soldiers, for a single year, can produce no formidable inconveniency, and may, though it should not be entirely approved, be of less disadvantage to the publick, than the waste of another day.
[An alteration was made to five pints, instead of three quarts; and the bill, thus amended, was ordered to be engrossed, and a few days afterwards, being read a third time, was passed, and ordered to the lords, where it occasioned no debate.]
A copy of his majesty's speech being read, Mr. CLUTTERBUCK-BUCK rose, and spoke as follows:—
Sir, the present confusion in Europe, the known designs of the French, the numerous claims to the Austrian dominions, the armies which are levied to support them, and the present inability of the queen of Hungary to maintain those rights which descend to her from her ancestors, and have been confirmed by all the solemnities of treaties, evidently require an uncommon degree of attention in our consultations, and of vigour in our proceedings.
Whatever may be the professions of the French, their real designs are easily discovered, designs which they have carried on, either openly, or in private, for near a century, and which it cannot be expected that they will lay aside, when they are so near to success. Their view, sir, in all their wars and treaties, alliances and intrigues, has been the attainment of universal dominion, the destruction of the rights of nature, and the subjection of all the rest of mankind; nor have we any reason to imagine that they are not equally zealous for the promotion of this pernicious scheme, while they pour troops into Germany, for the assistance of their ally, as when they wasted kingdoms, laid cities in ashes, and plunged millions into misery and want, without any other motive than the glory of their king.
But the French are not the only nation at this time labouring for the subversion of our common liberties. Our liberties, sir, are endangered by those equally interested with ourselves in their preservation; for in what degree soever any of the princes who are now endeavouring to divide among themselves the dominions of Austria, may be pleased with the acquisition of new territories, and an imaginary increase of influence and power, it must be evident to all who are not dazzled by immediate interest, that they are only fighting for France, and that by the destruction of the Austrian family, they must in a short time fall themselves.
It is well known, sir, though it is not always remembered, that political as well as natural greatness is merely comparative, and that he only is a powerful prince, who is more powerful than those with whom he can have any cause of contention. That prince, therefore, who imagines his power enlarged by a partition of territories, which gives him some additional provinces, may be at last disappointed in his expectations: for, if this partition gives to another prince already greater than himself, an opportunity of increasing his strength in a degree proportionate to his present superiority, the former will soon find, that he has been labouring for nothing, and that his danger is still the same.
Such, sir, is the case of the king of Prussia, who, when he has overrun that part of Germany, to which he now lays claim, will only have weakened the house of Austria, without strengthening himself.
He is at present secure in the possession of his dominions, because neither the Austrians would suffer the French, nor the French permit the Austrians to increase-their power by subduing him. Thus, while the present equipoise of power is maintained, jealousy and caution would always procure him an ally whenever he should be attacked; but when, by his assistance, the Austrian family shall be ruined, who shall defend him against the ambition of France?
While the liberties of mankind are thus equally endangered by folly and ambition, attacked on one side, and neglected on the other, it is necessary for those who foresee the calamity that threatens them, to exert themselves in endeavours to avert it, and to retard the fatal blow, till those who are now lulled by the contemplation of private advantage, can be awakened into a just concern for the general happiness of Europe, and be convinced that they themselves can only be secure by uniting in the cause of liberty and justice.
For this reason, sir, our sovereign has asserted the Pragmatick sanction, and promised to assist the queen of Hungary with the forces which former treaties have entitled her to demand from him; for this reason he has endeavoured to rouse the Dutch from their supineness, and excite them to arm once more for the common safety, to intimidate, by new augmentations, those powers whose ardour, perhaps, only subsists upon the confidence that they shall not be resisted, and to animate, by open declarations in favour of the house of Austria, those who probably are only hindered from offering their assistance, by the fear of standing alone against the armies of France.
That by this conduct he may expose his dominions on the continent to invasions, ravages, and the other miseries of war, every one who knows their situation must readily allow; nor can it be doubted by any man who has heard of the power of the Prussians and French, that they may commit great devastations with very little opposition, the forces of the electorate not being sufficient to give them battle; for though the fortified towns might hold out against them, that consideration will very little alleviate the concern of those who consider the miseries of a nation, whose enemies are in possession of all the open country, and who from their ramparts see their harvest laid waste, and their villages in flames. The fortifications contain the strength, but the field and the trading towns comprise the riches of a people, and the country may be ruined which is not subdued.
As, therefore, sir, the electoral dominions of his majesty are now endangered, not by any private dispute with the neighbouring princes, but by his firmness in asserting the general rights of Europe; as the consequences of his conduct, on this occasion, will be chiefly beneficial to Britain, we ought surely to support him in the prosecution of this design; a design which we cannot but approve, since our ancestors have always carried it on without regard either to the danger or the expense.
In conformity to this maxim of politicks, so clearly founded in equity, and so often justified by the votes of the senate, has his majesty been pleased to declare to us his resolution to adhere to his engagements, and oppose all attempts that may be forming in favour of any unjust pretensions to the prejudice of the house of Austria. 'Tis for this end he desires the concurrence of his senate. I hope every gentleman in this house will agree with me that we ought to declare our approbation of these measures, in such terms as may show the world, that those who shall dare to obstruct them, must resolve to incur the resentment of this nation, and expose themselves to all the opposition which the senate of Britain can send forth against them. We ought to pronounce that the territories of Hanover will be considered, on this occasion, as the dominions of Britain, and that any attack on one or the other will be equally resented. I, therefore, move, that an humble address be presented by this house to his majesty,
To return our thanks for his speech; to express our dutiful sense of his majesty's just regard for the rights of the queen of Hungary, and for maintaining the Pragmatick sanction; to declare our concurrence in the prudent measures which his majesty is pursuing for the preservation of the liberties and balance of power in Europe; to acknowledge his majesty's wisdom and resolution, in not suffering himself to be diverted from steadily persevering in his just purposes of fulfilling his engagements with the house of Austria; also, further to assure his majesty, that, in justice to and vindication of the honour and dignity of the British crown, we will effectually stand by and support his majesty against all insults and attacks, which any prince or power, in resentment of the just measures which he has so wisely taken, shall make upon any of his majesty's dominions, though not belonging to the crown of Great Britain. And that in any future events, which might make it necessary for him to enter into still larger expenses, this house will enable him to contribute, in the most effectual manner, to the support of the queen of Hungary, to the preventing, by all reasonable means, the subversion of the house of Austria, and to the maintaining the Pragmatick sanction and the liberties and balance of Europe.
Mr. FOX seconded the motion in this manner:—Sir, the expediency, if not the necessity of the address now moved for, will, I believe, be readily allowed by those who consider the just measures which are pursued by his majesty, the end which is intended by them, and the powers by which they are opposed.
How much it is our duty to support the house of Austria it is not necessary to explain to any man who has heard the debates of this assembly, or read the history of the last war. How much it is our duty to support it, is evident, as soon as it is known by whom it is attacked; by the ancient enemy of these nations, by the general disturber of the universe, by the formidable oppressors of liberty, exulting in new acquisitions, inflamed with the madness of universal monarchy, and elated with an opportunity of subjecting Germany, by exalting to the supreme power a prince who shall hold his authority only by their permission.
The house of Austria, which has so often stood forth in defence of our common rights, which has poured armies into the field, in confederacy with Britain, to suppress the insolence of that family which nothing could satisfy but boundless power, now demands the assistance which it has so often afforded; that assistance is demanded from us by every claim which the laws of society can enact, or the dictates of nature can suggest, by treaties maturely considered, and solemnly confirmed, by the ties of ancient friendship, and the obligations of common interest.
To violate the publick faith, and to neglect the observation of treaties, is to sink ourselves below barbarity, to destroy that confidence which unites mankind in society. To deny or evade our stipulations, sir, is to commit a crime which every honest mind must consider with abhorrence, and to establish a precedent which may be used hereafter to our own destruction.
To forsake an ancient ally only because we can receive no immediate advantage from his friendship, or because it may be in some degree dangerous to adhere to him; to forsake him when he most wants our good offices, when he is distressed by his enemies, and deserted by others from whom he had reason to hope for kinder treatment, is the most despicable, the most hateful degree of cowardice and treachery.
The obligations of interest, sir, it is not often needful to enforce, but it may be observed on this occasion, that a single year of neglect may never be retrieved. We may, sir, now be able to support those whom, when once dispossessed, it will not be in our power to restore; and that if we suffer the house of Austria to be overborne, our posterity, through every generation, may have reason to curse our injudicious parsimony, our fatal inactivity, and our perfidious cowardice.
With what views the king of Prussia concurs in the French measures, or upon what principles of policy he promises to himself any security in the enjoyment of his new dominions, it is not easy to conjecture; but as it is easy to discover, that whatever he may propose to himself, his conduct evidently tends to the ruin of Europe, so he may, in my opinion, justly be opposed, if he cannot be diverted or made easy.
Nor can we, sir, if this opposition should incite him, or any other power, to an invasion of his majesty's foreign dominions, refuse them our protection and assistance: for as they suffer for the cause which we are engaged to support, and suffer only by our measures, we are at least, as allies, obliged by the laws of equity and the general compacts of mankind, to arm in their defence; and what may be claimed by the common right of allies, we shall surely not deny them, only because they are more closely united to us, because they own the same monarch with ourselves.
Mr. PULTENEY spoke to the following purpose:—Sir, with what eagerness the French snatch every opportunity of increasing their influence, extending their dominions, and oppressing their neighbours, the experience of many years has convinced all Europe; and it is evident that unless some power be preserved in a degree of strength nearly equal to theirs, their schemes, pernicious as they are, cannot be defeated.
That the only power from which this opposition can be hoped, is the house of Austria, a very superficial view of this part of the globe, will sufficiently demonstrate; of this we were long since so strongly convinced, that we employed all our forces and all our politicks to aggrandize this house. We endeavoured not only to support it in all its hereditary rights, but to invest it with new sovereignties, and extend its authority over new dominions.
Why we afterwards varied in our councils and our measures, I have long inquired without any satisfaction, having never, sir, with the utmost application, been able to discover the motives to the memorable treaty of Hanover, by which we stipulated to destroy the fabrick that we had been so long and so laboriously endeavouring to erect; by which we abandoned that alliance which we had so diligently cultivated, which we had preferred to peace, plenty, and riches, and for which we had cheerfully supported a tedious, a bloody, and an expensive war.
This conduct, sir, raises a greater degree of admiration, as the authors of it had exhausted all their eloquence in censuring the treaty of Utrecht, and had endeavoured to expose those who transacted it to the general hatred of the nation; as they always expressed in the strongest terms their dread and detestation of the French; as they animated all their harangues, and stunned their opponents with declarations of their zeal for the liberties of Europe.
By what impulse or what infatuation, these asserters of liberty, these enemies of France, these guardians of the balance of power, were on the sudden prevailed on to declare in favour of the power whom they had so long thought it their chief interest and highest honour to oppose, must be discovered by sagacity superiour to mine. But after such perplexity of councils and such fluctuation of conduct, it is necessary to inquire more particularly what are the present intentions of the ministry, what alliances have been formed, and what conditions are required to be fulfilled.
If we are obliged only to supply the queen of Hungary with twelve thousand men, we have already performed our engagements; if we have promised any pecuniary assistance, the sum which we have stipulated to furnish ought to be declared; for I suppose, at least, our engagements have some limits, and that we are not to exert all the force of the nation, to fight as if fire and sword were at our gates, or an invader were landing armies upon our coasts.
I have, sir, from my earliest years been zealous for the defence and exaltation of the house of Austria, and shall be very far from proposing that any danger or distress should influence us to desert it; but I do not easily discover by what means we shall be able to afford any efficacious assistance: for the power of Britain consists chiefly in naval armaments, which can be of very little use to the queen of Hungary, and I know not any state that will easily consent to unite with us on this occasion.
If there be, sir, any states remaining in Europe which the French can neither intimidate nor bribe, we ought studiously to solicit and diligently to cultivate their friendship; but whether any, except the Moscovites, are now independent, or sufficiently confident of their own strength to engage in such a hazardous alliance, may be justly doubted.
The late grand alliance, sir, was supported at the expense of this nation alone; nor was it required from the other confederates to exhaust the treasure of their country in the common cause. I hope the debt which that war has entailed upon us will instruct us to be more frugal in our future engagements, and to stipulate only what we may perform without involving the nation in misery, which victories and triumphs cannot compensate.
The necessity, sir, of publick economy obliges me to insist, that before any money shall be granted, an account be laid before the senate, in particular terms, of the uses to which it is to be applied. To ask for supplies in general terms, is to demand the power of squandering the publick money at pleasure, and to claim, in softer language, nothing less than despotick authority.
It has not been uncommon for money, granted by the senate, to be spent without producing any of those effects which were expected from it, without assisting our allies, or humbling our enemies; and, therefore, there is reason for suspecting that money has sometimes been asked for one use and applied to another.
If our concurrence, sir, is necessary to increase his majesty's influence on the continent, to animate the friends of the house of Austria, or to repress the disturbers of the publick tranquillity, I shall willingly unite with the most zealous advocates for the administration in any vote of approbation or assistance, not contrary to the act of settlement, that important and well-concerted act, by which the present family was advanced to the throne, and by which it is provided, that Britain shall never be involved in war for the enlargement or protection of the dominions of Hanover, dominions from which we never expected nor received any benefit, and for which, therefore, nothing ought to be either suffered or hazarded.
If it should be again necessary to form a confederacy, and to unite the powers of Europe against the house of Bourbon, that ambitious, that restless family, by which the repose of the world is almost every day interrupted, which is incessantly labouring against the happiness of human nature, and seeking every hour an opportunity of new encroachments, I declare, sir, that I shall not only, with the greatest cheerfulness, bear my share of the publick expense, but endeavour to reconcile others to their part of the calamities of war. This, sir, I have advanced in confidence, that sufficient care shall be taken, that in any new alliance we shall be parties, not principals; that the expense of war, as the advantage of victory, shall be common; and that those who shall unite with us will be our allies, not our mercenaries.
Mr. WALPOLE then spoke, to the following purpose:—Sir, it is not without reason that the honourable gentleman desires to be informed of the stipulations contained in the treaty by which we have engaged to support the Pragmatick sanction; for I find that he either never knew them or has forgotten them; and, therefore, those reasonings which he has formed upon them fall to the ground.
We are obliged, sir, by this treaty, to supply the house of Austria with twelve thousand men, and the Dutch, who were engaged in it by our example, have promised a supply of five thousand. This force, joined to those armies which the large dominions of that family enable them to raise, were conceived sufficient to repel any enemy by whom their rights should be invaded.
But because in affairs of such importance nothing is to be left to hazard, because the preservation of the equipoise of power, on which the liberties of almost all mankind, who can call themselves free, must be acknowledged to depend, ought to be rather certain, than barely probable; it is stipulated farther, both by the French and ourselves, that if the supplies, specified in the first article, shall appear insufficient, we shall unite our whole force in the defence of our ally, and struggle, once more, for independence, with ardour proportioned to the importance of our cause.
By these stipulations, sir, no engagements have been formed that can be imagined to have been prohibited by the act of settlement, by which it is provided, that the house of Hanover shall not plunge this nation into a war, for the sake of their foreign dominions, without the consent of the senate; for this war is by no means entered upon for the particular security of Hanover, but for the general advantage of Europe, to repress the ambition of the French, and to preserve ourselves and our posterity from the most abject dependence upon a nation exasperated against us by long opposition, and hereditary hatred.
Nor is the act of settlement only preserved unviolated by the reasons of the present alliance, but by the regular concurrence of the senate which his majesty has desired, notwithstanding his indubitable right of making peace and war by his own authority. I cannot, therefore, imagine upon what pretence it can be urged, that the law, which requires that no war shall be made on account of the Hanoverian dominions without the consent of the senate, is violated, when it is evident that the war is made upon other motives, and the concurrence of the senate is solemnly desired.
But such is the malevolence with which the conduct of the administration is examined, that no degree of integrity or vigilance can secure it from censure. When, in the present question, truth and reason are evidently on their side, past transactions are recalled to memory, and those measures are treated with the utmost degree of contempt and ridicule, of which the greatest part of the audience have probably forgotten the reasons, and of which the authors of them do not always stand up in the defence, because they are weary of repeating arguments to those who listen with a resolution never to be convinced.
How well, sir, those by whom the ministry is opposed, have succeeded in hardening their minds against the force of reason, is evident from their constant custom of appealing from the senate to the people, and publishing, in pamphlets, those arguments which they have found themselves, in this assembly, unable to support; a practice which discovers rather an obstinate resolution to obstruct the government, than zeal for the prosperity of their country, and which, to speak of it in the softest terms, seems to be suggested more by the desire of popularity than the love of truth.
Mr. SANDYS spoke to the effect following:—Sir, notwithstanding the confidence with which this motion has been offered and defended, notwithstanding the specious appearance of respect to his majesty, by which it is recommended, I am not ashamed to declare, that it appears to me inconsistent with the trust reposed in us by our constituents, who owe their allegiance to the king of Britain, and not to the elector of Hanover.
It will be urged, sir, by the people, whom we sit here to represent, that they are already embarrassed with debts, contracted in a late war, from which, after the expense of many millions, and the destruction of prodigious multitudes, they receive no advantage; and that they are now loaded with taxes for the support of another, of which they perceive no prospect of a very happy or honourable conclusion, of either security or profit, either conquests or reprisals; and that they are, therefore, by no means willing to see themselves involved in any new confederacy, by which they may entail on their posterity the same calamities, and oblige themselves to hazard their fortunes and their happiness in defence of distant countries, of which many of them have scarcely heard, and from which no return of assistance is expected.
Mr. WALPOLE spoke again, to this purpose:—Sir, though it is not necessary to refute every calumny that malice may invent, or credulity admit, or to answer those of whom it may reasonably be conceived that they do not credit their own accusations, I will yet rise, once more, in vindication of the treaty of Hanover, to show with how little reason it is censured, to repress the levity of insult, and the pride of unreasonable triumph.
The treaty of Hanover, sir, how long soever it has been ridiculed, and with whatever contempt those by whom it was negotiated have been treated, was wise and just. It was just, because no injury was intended to any power, no invasion was planned, no partition of dominions stipulated, nothing but our own security desired. It was wise, because it produced the end proposed by it, and established that security which the Austrians and Spaniards were endeavouring to destroy.
The emperour of Germany, sir, had then entered into a secret treaty of alliance with Spain, by which nothing less was designed than the total destruction of our liberties, the diminution of our commerce, the alienation of our dominions, and the subversion of our constitution. We were to have been expelled from Gibraltar, and totally excluded from the Mediterranean, the pretender was to have been exalted to the throne, and a new religion, with the slavery that always accompanies it, to have been introduced amongst us, and Ostend was to have been made a port, and to have shared the poor remains of our commerce to foreign nations.
This unjust, this malicious confederacy, was then opposed with the utmost vehemence by the imperial general, whose courage and military capacity are celebrated throughout the world, and whose political abilities and knowledge of the affairs of Europe, were equal to his knowledge of war. He urged, with great force, that such a confederacy would disunite the empire for ever from the maritime powers, by which it had been supported, and which were engaged by one common interest in the promotion of its prosperity: but his remonstrances availed nothing, and the alliance was concluded.
When our ancient allies, who had been so often succoured with our treasure, and defended by our arms, had entered into such engagements; when it was stipulated not only to impoverish but enslave us; not only to weaken us abroad, but to deprive us of every domestick comfort; when a scheme was formed that would have spread misery over the whole nation, and have extended its consequences to the lowest orders of the community, it was surely necessary to frustrate it by some alliance, and with whom could we then unite, but with France?
This is not the only fact on which gentlemen have ventured to speak with great freedom without sufficient information; the conduct of our allies in the late war has been no less misrepresented than that of our ministers in their negotiations. They have been charged with imposing upon us the whole expense of the confederacy, when it may be proved, beyond controversy, that the annual charge of the Dutch was five millions.
Nor did they, sir, only contribute annually thus largely to the common cause, but when we forsook the alliance, and shamefully abandoned the advantages we had gained, they received our mercenaries into their own pay, and expended nine millions in a single year.
Of the truth of these assertions it is easy to produce incontestable evidence, which, however, cannot be necessary to any man who reflects, that from one of the most wealthy nations in the world, the Dutch, with all their commerce, and all their parsimony, are reduced to penury and distress; for who can tell by what means they have sunk into their present low condition, if they suffered nothing by the late war?
How this gentleman, sir, has been deceived, and to whose insinuations his errours are to be imputed, I am at no loss to discover. I hope he will, by this confutation, be warned against implicit credulity, and remember with what caution that man is to be trusted, whose pernicious counsels have endangered his country.
Mr. VYNER spoke thus:—Sir, it is, in my opinion, an incontestable maxim, that no measures are eligible, which are unjust; and that, therefore, before any resolutions are formed, we ought to examine not what motives may be suggested by expedience, but what arguments may be advanced by equity on one part or the other.
If I do not mistake the true intent of the address now proposed, we are invited to declare that we will oppose the king of Prussia in his attempts upon Silesia, a declaration in which I know not how any man can concur, who knows not the nature of his claim, and the laws of the empire. It ought, therefore, sir, to have been the first endeavour of those by whom this address has been so zealously promoted, to show that his claim, so publickly explained, so firmly urged, and so strongly supported, is without foundation in justice or in reason, and is only one of those imaginary titles, which ambition may always find to the dominions of another.
But no attempt has been yet made towards the discussion of this important question, and, therefore, I know not how any man can call upon us to oppose the king of Prussia, when his claim may probably be just, and, by consequence, such as, if it were necessary for us to engage in the affairs of those distant countries, we ought to join with him in asserting.
Lord GAGE spoke next, in substance as follows:—Sir, as no member of this assembly can feel a greater degree of zeal for his majesty's honour than myself; none shall more readily concur in any expression of duty or adherence to him.
But I have been always taught that allegiance to my prince is consistent with fidelity to my country, that the interest of the king and the people of great Britain is the same; and that he only is a true subject of the crown, who is a steady promoter of the happiness of the nation:
For this reason I think it necessary to declare, that Hanover is always to be considered as a sovereignty separate from that of Britain, and as a country with laws and interests distinct from ours; and that it is the duty of the representatives of this nation, to take care that interests so different may never be confounded, and that Britain may incur no expense of which Hanover alone can enjoy the advantage.
If the elector of Hanover should be engaged in war with any of the neighbouring sovereigns, who should be enabled, by a victory, to enter into the country, and carry the terrours of war through all his territories, it would by no means be necessary for this nation to interpose; for the elector of Hanover might lose his dominions without any disadvantage or dishonour to the king or people of Britain.
His majesty went this day to the house of lords, and after his assent to several bills, he, in a speech from the throne to both houses of the senate, acquainted them, that the war raised against the queen of Hungary, and the various claims on the late German emperour's succession, might expose the dominions of such princes as should incline to support the Pragmatick sanction to imminent danger. That the queen of Hungary required the twelve thousand men stipulated by treaty, and thereupon he had demanded of the king of Denmark, and of the king of Sweden, as sovereign of Hesse Cassel, their respective bodies of troops, of six thousand men each, to be in readiness to march to her assistance. That he was concerting such farther measures as may disappoint all dangerous designs forming to the prejudice of the house of Austria, which might make it necessary for him to enter into still larger expenses for maintaining the Pragmatick sanction. He, therefore, in a conjuncture so critical, desired the concurrence of his senate, in enabling him to contribute, in the most effectual manner, to the support of the queen of Hungary, the preventing, by all reasonable means, the subversion of the house of Austria, and to the maintaining the liberties and balance of power in Europe.
The house of commons, in their address upon this occasion, expressed a dutiful sense of his majesty's just regard for the rights of the queen of Hungary, and for the maintaining the Pragmatick sanction; they declared their concurrence in the prudent measures which his majesty was pursuing for the preservation of the liberties and balance of power in Europe; they assured his majesty, that, in justice to, and vindication of the honour and dignity of the British crown, they would effectually stand by and support his majesty against all insults and attacks, which any power, in resentment of the just measures which he had so wisely taken, should make upon any of his majesty's dominions, though not belonging to the crown of Great Britain. They farther assured his majesty, that in any future events which might make it necessary for him to enter into still larger expenses, they would enable him to contribute, in the most effectual manner, to the support of the designs he proposed.
His majesty, in his answer to this address, observed their readiness in enabling him to make good his engagements with the queen of Hungary, and the assurances given him not to suffer his foreign dominions to be insulted on account of the measures he was pursuing for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, etc.
In consequence of this procedure, the house, pursuant to order, resolved itself into a committee, to consider of the supplies granted to his majesty.
Upon this occasion, a motion was made by sir Robert WALPOLE for a grant of three hundred thousand pounds, for the support of the queen of Hungary, on which arose the following debate:
Sir Robert WALPOLE supported his motion by a speech, in substance as follows:—Sir, the necessity of this grant appears so plainly from the bare mention of the purposes for which it is asked, that I can scarcely conceive that its reasonableness will be disputed. I can discover no principles upon which an objection to this motion can be founded, nor the least arguments by which such objection can be supported.
The indispensable obligations of publick faith, the great ties by which nations are united, and confederacies formed, I cannot suppose any man inclined to invalidate. An exact performance of national promises, and inviolable adherence to treaties, is enforced at once by policy and justice, and all laws both of heaven and earth.
Publick perfidy, sir, like private dishonesty, whatever temporary advantages it may promise or produce, is always, upon the whole, the parent of misery. Every man, however prosperous, must sometimes wish for a friend; and every nation, however potent, stand in need of an ally; but all alliances subsist upon mutual confidence, and confidence can be produced only by unlimited integrity, by known firmness, and approved veracity.
The use of alliances, sir, has, in the last age, been too much experienced to be contested; it is by leagues well concerted, and strictly observed, that the weak are defended against the strong, that bounds are set to the turbulence of ambition, that the torrent of power is restrained, and empires preserved from those inundations of war, that, in former times, laid the world in ruins. By alliances, sir, the equipoise of power is maintained, and those alarms and apprehensions avoided, which must arise from daily vicissitudes of empire, and the fluctuations of perpetual contest.
That it is the interest of this nation to cultivate the friendship of the house of Austria, to protect its rights, and secure its succession, to inform it when mistaken, and to assist it when attacked, is allowed by every party. Every man, sir, knows that the only power that can sensibly injure us, by obstructing our commerce, or invading our dominions, is France, against which no confederacy can be formed, except with the house of Austria, that can afford us any efficacious support.
The firmest bond of alliances is mutual interest. Men easily unite against him whom they have all equal reason to fear and to hate; by whom they have been equally injured, and by whom they suspect that no opportunity will be lost of renewing his encroachments. Such is the state of this nation, and of the Austrians. We are equally endangered by the French greatness, and equally animated against it by hereditary animosities, and contests continued from one age to another; we are convinced that, however either may be flattered or caressed, while the other is invaded, every blow is aimed at both, and that we are divided only that we may be more easily destroyed.
For this reason we engaged in the support of the Pragmatick sanction, and stipulated to secure the imperial crown to the daughters of Austria; which was nothing more than to promise, that we would endeavour to prevent our own destruction, by opposing the exaltation of a prince who should owe his dignity to the French, and, in consequence of so close an alliance, second all their schemes, admit all their claims, and sacrifice to their ambition the happiness of a great part of mankind.
Such would probably be the consequence, if the French should gain the power of conferring the imperial crown. They would hold the emperour in perpetual dependence, would, perhaps, take possession of his hereditary dominions, as a mortgage for their expenses; would awe him with the troops which they sent under a pretence of assisting him, and leave him only the titles of dominion, and the shadows of empire.
In this state would he remain, whilst his formidable allies were extending their dominions on every side. He would see one power subdued after another, and himself weakened by degrees, and only not deprived of his throne, because it would be unnecessary to dethrone him; or he would be obliged to solicit our assistance to break from his slavery, and we should be obliged, at the utmost hazard, and at an expense not to be calculated, to remedy what it is, perhaps, now in our power to prevent with very little difficulty.
That this danger is too near to be merely chimerical, that the queen of Hungary is invaded, and her right to the imperial dignity contested, is well known; it is, therefore, the time for fulfilling our engagements; engagements of the utmost importance to ourselves and our posterity; and I hope the government will not be accused of profusion, if, for three hundred thousand pounds, the liberties of Europe shall be preserved.
We cannot deny this grant without acting in opposition to our late professions of supporting his majesty in his endeavours to maintain the Pragmatick sanction, and of assisting him to defend his foreign dominions from any injuries to which those endeavours should expose them; for how can he without forces defend his dominions, or assist his ally? or how can he maintain forces without supplies?
Mr. SHIPPEN next rose, and spoke thus:—Sir, as I have always endeavoured to act upon conviction of my duty, to examine opinions before I admit them, and to speak what I have thought the truth, I do not easily change my conduct, or retract my assertions; nor am I deterred from repeating my arguments when I have a right to speak, by the remembrance that they have formerly been unsuccessful.
Every man, when he is confident himself, conceives himself able to persuade others, and imagines that their obstinacy proceeds from other motives than reason; and that, if he fails at one time to gain over his audience, he may yet succeed in some happier moment, when their prejudices shall be dissipated, or their interest varied.
For this reason, though it cannot be suspected that I have forgotten the resentment which I have formerly drawn upon myself, by an open declaration of my sentiments with regard to Hanover, I stand up again, with equal confidence, to make my protestations against any interposition in the affairs of that country, and to avow my dislike of the promise lately made to defend it: a promise, inconsistent, in my opinion, with that important and inviolable law, the act of settlement!—a promise, which, if it could have been foreknown, would, perhaps, have for ever precluded from the succession that illustrious family, to which we owe such numberless blessings, such continued felicity!
Far be it from me to insinuate that we can be too grateful to his majesty, or too zealous in our adherence to him; only let us remember, that true gratitude consists in real benefits, in promoting the true interest of him to whom we are indebted; and surely, by hazarding the welfare of Britain in defence of Hanover, we shall very little consult the advantage, or promote the greatness of our sovereign.
It is well known how inconsiderable, in the sight of those by whom the succession was established, Hanover appeared, in comparison with Britain. Those men, to whom even their enemies have seldom denied praise for knowledge and capacity, and who have been so loudly celebrated by many, who have joined in the last address, for their honest zeal, and the love of their country, enacted, that the king of Britain should never visit those important territories, which we have so solemnly promised to defend, at the hazard of our happiness. It was evidently their design that our sovereign, engrossed by the care of his new subjects, a care which, as they reasonably imagined, would arise from gratitude for dignity and power so liberally conferred, should in time forget that corner of the earth on which his ancestors had resided, and act, not as elector of Hanover, but as king of Britain, as the governour of a mighty nation, and the lord of large dominions.
It was expressly determined, that, this nation should never be involved in war for the defence of the dominions on the continent, and, doubtless, the same policy that has restrained us from extending our conquests in countries from which some advantages might be received, ought to forbid all expensive and hazardous measures, for the sake of territories from whence no benefit can be reaped.
Nor are the purposes, sir, for which this supply is demanded, the only objections that may be urged against it, for the manner in which it is asked, makes it necessary at least to delay it. The ministers have been so little accustomed to refusals that they have forgot when to ask with decency, and expect the treasure of the nation to be poured upon them, whenever they shall think it proper to hint that they have discovered some new opportunity of expense.
It is necessary, that when a supply is desired, the house should be informed, some time before, of the sum that is required, and of the ends to which it is to be applied, that every member may consider, at leisure, the expediency of the measures proposed, and the proportion of the sum to the occasion on which it is demanded; that he may examine what are the most proper methods of raising it, and, perhaps, inquire with what willingness his constituents will advance it.
Whether any man is enabled by his acuteness and experience, to determine all these questions upon momentaneous reflection, I cannot decide. For my part, I confess myself one of those on whom nature has bestowed no such faculties, and therefore move that the consideration of this supply may be deferred for a few days; for if it be now pressed upon us, I shall vote against it, because I do not yet fully discover all the reasons for it, nor all the consequences which it may produce, and I think myself obliged to know for what purpose I give away the money which is not my own.
Mr. VYNER spoke as follows:—Sir, whatever may be the necessity of maintaining the Pragmatick sanction, or whatever the obligations of national pacts, of which I hope no man is desirous of countenancing the neglect, yet they cannot oblige us to arm without an enemy, to embarrass ourselves with watching every possibility of danger, to garrison dominions which are not threatened, or assert rights which are not invaded.
The expediency of maintaining the house of Austria on the imperial throne, it is not at present necessary to assert, because it does not appear that any other family is aspiring to it. There may, indeed, be whispers of secret designs and artful machinations, whispers, perhaps, spread only to affright the court into treaties, or the senate into grants; or designs, which, like a thousand others that every day produces, innumerable accidents may defeat; which may be discovered, not only before they are executed, but before they are fully formed, and which, therefore, are not worthy to engross much of our attention, or to exhaust the wealth of the people.
The Pragmatick sanction is nothing more than a settlement of the imperial dignity upon the eldest daughter of the late German emperour and her son; and if she has no son, upon the son of the second daughter; nor has the crown of Britain, by engaging to support that sanction, promised any thing more than to preserve this order of succession, which no power, at present, is endeavouring to interrupt; and which, therefore, at present, requires no defence.
The dispute, sir, between the king of Prussia and the queen of Hungary, is of a different kind; nor is it our duty to engage in it, either as parties or judges. He lays claim to certain territories usurped, as he alleges, from his ancestors by the Austrian family, and asserts, by force, this claim, which is equally valid, whether the queen be emperess or not. We have no right to limit his dominions, or obligation to examine the justice of his demands. If he is only endeavouring to gain what has been forcibly withheld from him, what right have we to obstruct his undertaking? And if the queen can show a better title, she is, like all other sovereigns, at liberty to maintain it; nor are we necessarily to erect ourselves into judges between sovereigns, or distributors of dominions.
The contest seems to have very little relation to the Pragmatick sanction: if the king of Prussia succeeds, he will contribute to support it; and if the queen is able to frustrate his designs, she will be too powerful to need our assistance.
But though, sir, the Pragmatick sanction were in danger of violation, are we to stand up alone in defence of it, while other nations, equally engaged with ourselves by interest and by treaties, sit still to look upon the contest, and gather those advantages of peace which we indiscreetly throw away? Are we able to maintain it without assistance, or are we to exhaust our country, and ruin our posterity in prosecution of a hopeless project, to spend what can never be repaid, and to fight with certainty of a defeat?
The Dutch, whose engagements and whose interests are the same as our own, have not yet made any addition to their expenses, nor augmentation of their troops; nor does a single potentate of Europe, however united by long alliances to the house of Austria, or however endangered by revolutions in the empire, appear to rouse at the approach of alarm, or think himself obliged to provoke enemies by whom he is not yet injured.
I cannot, therefore, persuade myself that we are to stand up single in the defence of the Pragmatick sanction, to fight the quarrel of others, or live in perpetual war, that our neighbours may be at peace.
I shall always think it my duty to disburse the publick money with the utmost parsimony, nor ever intend, but on the most pressing necessity, to load with new exactions a nation already overwhelmed with debts, harassed with taxes, and plundered by a standing army.
For what purpose these numerous forces are maintained, who are now preying on the publick; why we increase our armies by land when we only fight by sea; why we aggravate the burden of the war, and add domestick oppressions to foreign injuries, I am at a loss to determine. Surely some regard should be had to the satisfaction of the people, who ought not, during the present scarcity of provisions, to be starved by the increase of an army, which seems supported only to consume them.
As, therefore, part of our present expense is, in my opinion, unnecessary, I shall not contribute to aggravate it by a new grant, for purposes of which I cannot discover that they will promote the advantage of the publick.
Sir Robert WALPOLE replied to the following effect:—Sir, the Pragmatick sanction, which we are engaged to support, is not confined to the preservation of the order of succession, but extends to all the rights of the house of Austria, which is now attacked, and by a very formidable enemy, at a time of weakness and distraction, and therefore requires our assistance.
That others, equally obliged by treaty and by interest to lend their help on this occasion, sit reluctive, either through cowardice or negligence, or some prospect of temporary advantage, may, perhaps, be true; but is it any excuse of a crime, that he who commits it is not the only criminal? Will the breach of faith in others excuse it in us? Ought we not rather to animate them by our activity, instruct them by our example, and awaken them by our representations?
Perhaps the other powers say to themselves, and to one another, Why should we keep that treaty which Britain is violating? Why should we expose ourselves to danger, of which that mighty nation, so celebrated for courage, is afraid? Why should we rush into war, in which our most powerful ally seems unwilling to support us?
Thus the same argument, an argument evidently false, and made specious only by interest, may be used by all, till some one, more bold and honest than the rest, shall dare to rise in vindication of those rights which all have promised to maintain; and why should not the greatest nation be the first that shall avow her solemn engagements? Why should not they be most diligent in the prosecution of an affair who have most to lose by its miscarriage?
I am always willing to believe, that no member of this assembly makes use, in any solemn debate, of arguments which do not appear rational to himself, and yet it is difficult to conceive that any man can imagine himself released from a promise, because the same promise is broken by another, or that he is at liberty to desert his friend in distress, because others desert him, whose good offices he has equal reason to expect, and that the more his assistance is needed, the more right he has to deny it.
Surely such arguments as these deserve not, need not a confutation. Before we regulate our conduct by that of others, we must either prove that they have done right, which proof will be a sufficient defence without the precedent, or own that they are more capable of judging than we, and that, therefore, we pay an implicit submission to their dictates and example; a sacrifice which we shall not willingly make to the vanity of our neighbours.
In the present case it is evident that if other nations neglect the performance of their contracts, they are guilty of the breach of publick faith; of a crime, that, if it should generally be imitated, would dissolve society, and throw human nature into confusion, that would change the most happy region into deserts, in which one savage would be preying on another.
Nor are they only propagating an example, which in some distant times may be pleaded against themselves, but they are exposing themselves to more immediate dangers; they are forwarding designs that have no tendency but to their ruin, they are adding strength to their inveterate enemies, and beckoning invasion to their own frontiers.
Let us, therefore, instead of hardening ourselves in perfidy, or lulling ourselves in security by their example, exert all our influence to unite them, and all our power to assist them. Let us show them what they ought to determine by our resolutions, and teach them to act by our vigour; that, if the house of Austria be preserved, our alliance may be strengthened by new motives of gratitude; and that, if it must be that the liberties of this part of the world be lost, we may not reproach ourselves with having neglected to defend them.
Mr. PELHAM spoke next to this purpose:—Sir, it is not to be supposed that such members of this assembly as are not engaged in publick affairs, should receive very exact intelligence of the dispositions of foreign powers, and, therefore, I do not wonder that the conduct of the Dutch has been misrepresented, and that they are suspected of neglecting their engagements at a time when they are endeavouring to perform them.
The Dutch have now under consideration the most proper methods of assisting the queen of Hungary, and maintaining the Pragmatick sanction; it may be, indeed, justly suspected, from the nature of their constitution, that their motions will be slow, but it cannot be asserted, that they break their engagements, or desert their confederates.
Nor is there any reason for imagining that the other princes, who have incurred the same obligations, will not endeavour to perform their promises; it may be easily conceived that some of them are not able at a sudden summons to afford great assistance, and that others may wait the result of our deliberations, and regulate their conduct by our example.
Not that we ought to neglect our engagements, or endanger our country, because other powers are either perfidious, or insensible; for I am not afraid to declare, that if that should happen, which there is no reason to suspect, if all the other powers should desert the defence of the Austrian line, should consent to annul the Pragmatick sanction, and leave the queen of Hungary to the mercy of her enemies, I would advise that Britain alone should pour her armies into the continent, that she should defend her ally against the most formidable confederacy, and show mankind an example of constancy not to be shaken, and of faith not to be violated.
If it be, therefore, our duty to support the Pragmatick sanction, it is now the time for declaring our resolutions, when the imperial crown is claimed by a multitude of competitors, among whom the elector of Bavaria, a very powerful prince, has, by his minister, notified his pretensions to the court of Britain.
The ancient alliance between this prince and the French is well known, nor can we doubt that he will now implore their assistance for the attainment of the throne to which he aspires; and I need not say what may be expected from an emperour, whose elevation was procured by the forces of France.
Nor is this the only prince that claims the imperial crown upon plausible pretences, or whose claims other powers may combine to support; it is well known, that even the Spanish monarch believes himself entitled to it, nor can we, who have no communication with him, know whether he has not declared to all the other princes of Europe, his resolution to assert his claim.
It is far from being impossible that the pretensions of the house of Bourbon may be revived, and that though no single prince of that family should attempt to mount the imperial throne, they may all conspire to dismember the empire into petty kingdoms, and free themselves from the dread of a formidable neighbour, by erecting a number of diminutive sovereigns, who may be always courting the assistance of their protectors, for the sake of harassing each other.
Thus will the house by which Europe has been hitherto protected, sink into an empty name, and we shall be left to stand alone against all the powers that profess a different religion, and whose interest is opposite to that of Britain.
We ought, indeed, to act with the utmost vigour, when we see one of the most powerful of the reformed princes so far forgetful of the interest of our religion, as to cooperate with the designs of France, and so intent upon improving the opportunity of distressing the house of Austria, as to neglect the common cause, and expose himself or his posterity to the danger of becoming a dependant on the house of Bourbon.
For this reason, I cannot agree that our army, though numerous and burdensome, is greater than the necessity of affairs requires: if we cast our eyes on the continent, nothing is to be seen but general confusion, powerful armies in motion, the dominions of one prince invaded, of another threatened; the tumults of ambition in one place, and a panick stillness in another.
What will be the event of these commotions who can discover? And how can we know what may determine the course of that flood of power, which is now in a state of uncertain fluctuation, or seems driven to different points by different impulses? How soon may the Dutch see their barrier attacked, and call upon us for the ten thousand men which we are obliged to send them? How soon may the house of Austria be so distressed, as to require all our power for its preservation?
That we are to leave nothing unattempted for the security of our own religion and liberty, will easily be granted, and, therefore, unless it can be proved that we may be equally secure, though the house of Austria be ruined, it will necessarily follow that we are, with all our power, to enforce the observation of the Pragmatick sanction.
This is not an act of romantick generosity, but such as the closest attention to our own interest shows to be necessary; in defending the queen of Hungary we defend ourselves, and only extinguish that flame, by which, if it be suffered to spread, we shall ourselves be consumed. The empire may be considered as the bulwark of Britain, which, if it be thrown down, leaves us naked and defenceless.
Let us, therefore, consider our own danger, and remember, that while we are considering this supply, we are deliberating upon nothing less than the fate of our country.
Mr. PULTENEY spoke next, to the effect following:—Sir, I am on this occasion of an opinion different from that of the honourable member who spoke the second in this debate, though on most questions our judgment has been the same. I am so far from seconding his proposal for delaying the consideration of this supply, that I think it may justly be inquired, why it was not sooner proposed.
For the support of the house of Austria, and the assertion of the Pragmatick sanction, no man can be more zealous than myself; I am convinced how closely the interest of this nation and that of the Austrian family are united, and how much either must be endangered by the ruin of the other, and, therefore, I shall not delay, for a single moment, my consent to any measures that may reestablish our interest on the continent, and rescue Germany once more from the jaws of France.
I am afraid that we have lost part of our influence in the neighbouring countries, and that the name of Britain is less formidable than heretofore; but if reputation is lost, it is time to recover it, and I doubt not but it may be recovered by the same means that it was at first obtained. Our armies may be yet equally destructive, and our money equally persuasive.
We have not yet suffered, amidst all our misconduct, our naval force to be diminished; our sailors yet retain their ancient courage, and our fleets are sufficient to keep the dominion of the ocean, and prescribe limits to the commerce of every nation. While this power remains unimpaired, while Britain retains her natural superiority, and asserts the honour of her flag in every climate, we cannot become despicable, nor can any nation ridicule our menaces or scorn our alliance. We may still extend our influence to the inland countries, and awe those nations which we cannot invade.
To preserve this power let us watch over the disposal of our money; money is the source of dominion; those nations may be formidable for their affluence which are not considerable for their numbers; and by a negligent profusion of their wealth, the most powerful people may languish into imbecility, and sink into contempt.
If the grant which is now demanded will be sufficient to produce the ends to which it is proposed to be applied, if we are assured of the proper application of it, I shall agree to it without hesitation. But though it cannot be affirmed that the sum now demanded is too high a price for the liberties of Europe, it is at least more than ought to be squandered without effect, and we ought at least to know before we grant it, what advantages may be expected from it.
May not the sum demanded for the support of the queen of Hungary be employed to promote very different interests? May it not be lavished to support that power, to which our grants have too long contributed? that power by which ourselves have been awed, and the administration has tyrannised without control?
If this sum is really intended to support the queen of Hungary, may we not inquire how it is to be employed for her service? Is it to be sent her for the payment of her armies, and the support of her court? Should we not more effectually secure her dominions by purchasing with it the friendship and assistance of the king of Prussia, a prince, whose extent of dominions and numerous forces, make him not more formidable than his personal qualities.
What may be hoped, sir, from a prince of wisdom and courage, at the head of a hundred and ten thousand regular troops, with eight millions in his treasury? How much he must necessarily add to the strength of any party in which he shall engage, is unnecessary to mention; it is evident, without proof, that nothing could so much contribute to the reestablishment of the house of Austria, as a reconciliation with this mighty prince, and that, to bring it to pass, would be the most effectual method of serving the unfortunate queen that requires our assistance.