Just as it seemed likely that the English would have to stoop to the Nawab's terms, they received news of the despatch of reinforcements from Madras. About the same time, it became known to both French and English that France and England had declared war against each other in the preceding May.[81] The English naturally said nothing about it, and the French were too eager to see the Nawab well beaten to put any unnecessary obstacles in their way. The negotiations with the friends of the Europeans at Murshidabad were quietly continued until Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive arrived. A rapid advance was then made on Calcutta, which was captured with hardly any resistance.

Siraj-ud-daula was so little disturbed by the recapture of Calcutta that the French thought everything would terminate amicably, but, possibly owing to the reputation of Watson and Clive, who had so long fought against the French,[82] they thought it likely that, if the English demanded compensation for their losses, the Nawab would allow them to recoup themselves by seizing the French Settlements. M. Renault, therefore, wrote to Law to make sure that, in any treaty between the Nawab and the English, an article should be inserted providing for the neutrality of the Ganges; but the French, at present, were needlessly alarmed. The English had no intention of creeping quietly back into the country. Watson and Clive addressed haughty letters to the Nawab, demanding reparation for the wrongs inflicted on the English; and the Admiral and the Council declared war in the name of the King and the Company. This possibly amused the Nawab, who took no notice of their letters; but it was a different matter when a small English force sailed up the Hugli, passed Chandernagore unopposed by the French, captured the fort of Hugli, burnt Hugli[83] and Bandel towns, and ravaged both banks of the river down to Calcutta. The French were in an awkward position. The English had passed Chandernagore without a salute, which was an unfriendly, if not a hostile act; whilst the Nawab thought that, as the French had not fired on them, they must be in alliance with them. Law had to bear the brunt of this suspicion. His common sense told him that the English would never consent to a neutrality, and he wrote to Renault that it was absolutely necessary to join the Moors.

"The neutrality was by no means obligatory, as no treaty
existed. In fact, what confidence could we have in a forced
neutrality, which had been observed so long only out of
fear of the Nawab, who for the general good of the country
was unwilling to allow any act of hostility to be committed
by the Europeans? Much more so when the English were
at war with the Nawab himself. If they managed to get
the better of him, what would become of this fear, the sole
foundation of the neutrality?"

So Law wrote to Renault, begging him, if he could not persuade the English to sign a treaty of neutrality at once, to make up his mind and join the Nawab. We have seen why Renault could do neither, and Law, writing after the event says, generously enough:—

"I am bound to respect the reasons which determined
M. Renault as well as the gentlemen of the Council, who
were all much too good citizens not to have kept constantly
in their minds the welfare of our nation and the Company.
People always do see things differently, and the event does
not always prove the correctness or incorrectness of the
reasons which have decided us to take one or the other course."

As soon as the Nawab heard of the plundering of Hugli he set out for Calcutta, but to blind the English he requested M. Renault to mediate between them. The English refusal to treat through the French had the effect of clearing up matters between the latter and the Nawab; but he could not understand why the French would not actively assist him. Certain, at any rate, that he had only the English to deal with, he foolishly played into their hands by marching to fight them on their own ground, whereas, if he had remained idle at a little distance, merely forbidding supplies to be sent them, he could have starved them out of Calcutta in a few months. As I have said before, Clive attacked his camp on the 5th of February, and so terrified him that he consented to a shameful peace, in which he forgot all mention of the neutrality of the Ganges. Law tells a curious story to the effect that what frightened the Nawab most of all was a letter from Admiral Watson, threatening to make him a prisoner and carry him to England. Watson's letter is extant, and contains no such threat, but it is quite possible that it was so interpreted to the Nawab.

Though the Nawab had assured the English that he would have the same friends and enemies as they, and had omitted to mention the French in the treaty, he now, of his own accord, gave the French all that the English had extorted from him. This act could not be kept secret.

"A great fault at present, and which has always existed,
in the management of affairs in India, especially in Bengal,
is that nothing is secret. Scarcely had the Nawab formed
any project when it was known to the lowest of his slaves.
The English, who were suspicious, and who had for friends
every one who was an enemy of Siraj-ud-daula, whom all
detested, were soon informed of his proposals to M. Renault
and of the letters written on both sides."

Yet Law thinks it was only the European war and the fear that Renault intended an alliance with the Nawab that induced the English to proceed to extremities:—

"The dethronement of the Nawab had become an absolute
necessity. To drive us out of Bengal was only a preliminary
piece of work. A squadron of ours with considerable forces
might arrive. Siraj-ud-daula might join his forces to it.
What, then, would become of the English? They needed
for Nawab a man attached to their interests. Besides, this
revolution was not so difficult to carry out as one might
imagine. With Chandernagore destroyed, nothing could be
more easy; but even if we were left alone the revolution
could have been effected by the junction of the English with
the forces which would have been produced against Siraj-ud-daula
by the crowd of enemies whom he had, and amongst
whom were to be counted the most respectable persons in
the three provinces.[84] This statement demands an explanation.
I have already spoken of the house of Jagat Seth, or
rather of its chiefs, who are named Seth Mahtab Rai and Seth
Sarup Chand, bankers of the Mogul, the richest and most
powerful merchants who have ever lived. They are, I can
say, the movers of the revolution. Without them the English
would never have carried out what they have. I have
already said they were not pleased with Siraj-ud-daula, who
did not show them the same respect as the old Nawab
Aliverdi Khan had done; but the arrival of the English
forces, the capture of the Moorish forts, and the fright of
the Nawab before Calcutta, had made a change which was
apparently in their favour. The Nawab began to perceive
that the bankers were necessary to him. The English
would have no one except them as mediators, and so they
had become, as it were, responsible for the behaviour of
both the Nawab and the English. Accordingly after the
Peace there was nothing but kindness and politeness from
the Nawab towards them, and he consulted them in everything.
At the bottom this behaviour of his was sheer
trickery. The Seths were persuaded that the Nawab who
hated the English must also dislike the persons whom the
English employed. Profiting by the hatred which the
Nawab had drawn on himself by his violence, and distributing
money judiciously, they had long since gained over
those who were nearest to the Nawab, whose imprudence
always enabled them to know what he had in his heart.
From what came to the knowledge of the Seths it was easy
to guess what he intended, and this made them tremble, for
it was nothing less than their destruction, which could be
averted only by his own. The cause of the English had
become that of the Seths; their interests were identical. Can
one be surprised to see them acting in concert? Further,
when one remembers that it was this same house of bankers
that overthrew Sarfaraz Khan[85] to enthrone Aliverdi Khan,
and who, during the reign of the latter, had the management
of all important business, one must confess that it ought not
to be difficult for persons of so much influence to execute a
project in which, the English were taking a share."[86]

Law could not persuade Renault to act, and without his doing so the game was nearly hopeless. Still, he worked at forming a French party in the Court. By means of Coja Wajid, an Armenian merchant of Hugli, whose property had been plundered by the English, he obtained an interview with the Nawab, and persuaded him to send the 2000 soldiers who were with Renault at the beginning of the siege. More would have been despatched but for the apparent certainty that the treaty of neutrality would be signed. In fact, Renault was so worried that, on the complaint of Watson and Clive that Law was exciting the Nawab against the English, he wrote Law a letter which caused the latter to ask to be recalled from Cossimbazar, and it was only at Renault's earnest request that he consented to remain at his post. Law continued forming his party.

"It would appear from the English memoirs that we
corrupted the whole Durbar at Murshidabad to our side by
presents and lies. I might with justice retort this reproach.
As a matter of fact, except Siraj-ud-daula himself, one may
say the English had the whole Durbar always in their
favour. Without insisting on this point, let us honestly
agree, since the English themselves confess it, that we were,
like them, much engaged in opposing corruption to corruption
in order to gain the friendship of scoundrels so as to
place ourselves on equal terms with our enemies. This has
always happened, and ought not to cause surprise in a Court
where right counts for nothing and, every other motive apart,
one can never be successful except by the weight of what
one puts in the balance of iniquity. For the rest, right
or wrong, it is certain that the English were always in a
position to put in more than we could.
"Fear and greed are the two chief motives of Indian
minds. Everything depends on one or the other. Often
they are combined towards the same object, but, when they
are opposed, fear always conquers. A proof of this is easily
to be seen in all the events connected with, the revolution
in Bengal. When, in 1756, Siraj-ud-daula determined to
expel the English, fear and greed combined to make him
act. As soon as he had himself proved the superiority of
the English troops, fear took the upper hand in his mind,
grew stronger day by day, and soon put him in a condition
in which he was unable to follow, and often even to see, his
true interests.
"I mention the Nawab first. His hatred for the English
certainly indicated friendship for us. I think so myself, but
we have seen what was his character and his state of mind
in general. I ask, in all good faith, whether we could expect
any advantage from his friendship? This person, cowed by
fear, irresolute and imprudent, could he alone be of any use
to us? It was necessary for him to be supported by some
one who had his confidence and was capable by his own
firmness of fixing the irresolution of the Prince.
"Mohan Lal, chief Diwan of Siraj-ud-daula, was this
man, the greatest scoundrel the earth has ever borne, worthy
minister of such a master, and yet, in truth, the only person
who was really attached to him. He had firmness and also
sufficient judgment to understand that the ruin of Siraj-ud-daula
must necessarily bring on his own. He was as much,
detested as his master. The sworn enemy of the Seths, and
capable of holding his own against them, I think those
bankers would not have succeeded so easily in their project
if he had been free to act, but, unfortunately for us, he had
been for some time, and was at this most critical moment
dangerously ill. He could not leave his house. I went to
see him twice with Siraj-ud-daula, but it was not possible to
get a word from him. There is strong reason to believe he
had been poisoned. Owing to this, Siraj-ud-daula saw himself
deprived of his only support.
"Coja Wajid, who had introduced me to the Nawab, and
who, it would be natural to suppose, was our patron, was a
great merchant of Hugli. He was consulted by the Nawab
only because, as he had frequented the Europeans and especially
the English, the Nawab imagined he knew them perfectly.
He was one of the most timid of men, who wanted
to be polite to everybody, and who, had he seen the dagger
raised, would have thought he might offend Siraj-ud-daula
by warning him that some one intended to assassinate him.[87]
Possibly he did not love the Seths, but he feared them,
which was sufficient to make him useless to us.
"Rai Durlabh Ram, the other Diwan of the Nawab, was
the man to whom I was bound to trust most. Before the
arrival of Clive he might have been thought the enemy of
the English. It was he who pretended to have beaten them
and to have taken Calcutta. He wished, he said, to maintain
his reputation; but after the affair of the 5th of February,
in which the only part he took was to share in the flight, he
was not the same man; he feared nothing so much as to
have to fight the English. This fear disposed him to gradually
come to terms with the Seths, of whose greatness he
was very jealous. He also hated the Nawab, by whom he
had been ill-used on many occasions. In short, I could never
get him to say a single word in our favour in the Durbar.
The fear of compromising himself made him decide to remain
neutral for the present, though firmly resolved to join finally
the side which appeared to him to be the strongest."

This, then, was the French party, whose sole bond was dislike to the Seths, and the members of which, by timidity or ill-health, were unable to act. It was different with their enemies.

"The English had on their side in the Durbar the terror
of their arms, the faults of Siraj-ud-daula, the ruling influence
and the refined policy of the Seths, who, to conceal their game
more completely, and knowing that it pleased the Nawab,
often spoke all the ill they could think of about the English,
so as to excite him against them and at the same time gain
his confidence. The Nawab fell readily into the snare, and
said everything that came into his mind, thus enabling his
enemies to guard against all the evil which otherwise he
might have managed to do them. The English had also on
their side all the chief officers in the Nawab's army—Jafar
All Khan, Khodadad Khan Latty, and a number of others
who were attached to them by their presents or the influence
of the Seths, all the ministers of the old Court whom
Siraj-ud-daula had disgraced, nearly all the secretaries,[88] the
writers[89] of the Durbar, and even the eunuchs of the harem.
What might they not expect to achieve by the union of all
these forces when guided by so skilful a man as Mr. Watts?"

With such enemies to combat in the Court itself, Law heard that the English were marching on Chandernagore. By the most painful efforts he obtained orders for reinforcements to be sent to the French. They—

"were ready to start, the soldiers had been paid, the Commandant[90]
waited only for final orders. I went to see him
and promised him a large sum if he succeeded in raising the
siege of Chandernagore. I also visited several of the chief
officers, to whom I promised rewards proportionate to their
rank. I represented to the Nawab that Chandernagore must
be certainly captured if the reinforcements did not set out
at once, and I tried to persuade him to give his orders to
the Commandant in my presence. 'All is ready,' replied the
Nawab, 'but before resorting to arms it is proper to try all
possible means to avoid a rupture, and all the more so as the
English have just promised to obey the orders I shall send
them.'[91] I recognized the hand of the Seths in these details.
They encouraged the Nawab in a false impression about this
affair. On the one hand, they assured him that the march
of the English, was only to frighten us into subscribing to
a treaty of neutrality, and on the other hand they increased
his natural timidity by exaggerating the force of the English
and by representing the risk he ran in assisting us with
reinforcements which would probably not prevent the capture
of Chandernagore if the English were determined to take it,
but would serve as a reason for the English to attack the
Nawab himself. They managed so well that they destroyed
in the evening all the effect I had produced in the morning.
"I resolved to visit the bankers. They immediately
commenced talking about our debts, and called my attention
to the want of punctuality in our payments. I said that
this was not the question just now, and that I came to them
upon a much more interesting matter, which, however, concerned
them as well as us with respect to those very debts
for which they were asking payment and security. I asked
why they supported the English against us. They denied it,
and, after much explanation, they promised to make any
suggestions I wished to the Nawab. They added that they
were quite sure the English would not attack us, and that
I might remain tranquil. Knowing that they were well
acquainted with the designs of the English, I told them I
knew as well as they did what these were, and that I saw
no way of preventing them from attacking Chandernagore
except by hastening the despatch of the reinforcements which
the Nawab had promised, and that as they were disposed to
serve me, I begged them to make the Nawab understand the
same. They replied that the Nawab wished to avoid any
rupture with the English, and they said many other things
which only showed me that, in spite of their good will, they
would do nothing for us. Ranjit Rai, who was their man
of business as well as the agent of the English, said to me
in a mocking tone, 'You are a Frenchman; are you afraid of
the English? If they attack you, defend yourselves! No
one is ignorant of what your nation has done on the Madras
Coast, and we are curious to see how you will come off in
this business here.' I told him I did not expect to find such
a warlike person in a Bengali merchant, and that sometimes
people repented of their curiosity. That was enough for such
a fellow, but I saw clearly that the laugh would not be on
my side. However, every one was very polite, and I left
the house."

Law thinks the Seths honestly believed that the English march on Chandernagore was merely intended to frighten the French, and, as a proof of their friendliness, narrates a further incident of this visit:—

"The conversation having turned on Siraj-ud-daula, on
the reasons he had given the Seths to fear him, and on his
violent character, I said I understood clearly enough what
they meant, and that they certainly wanted to set up another
Nawab. The Seths, instead of denying this, contented themselves
with saying in a low voice that this was a subject
which should not be talked about. Omichand, the English
agent[92] (who, by the way, cried 'Away with them!' wherever
he went), was present. If the fact had been false, the Seths
would certainly have denied it, and would have reproached
me for talking in such a way. If they had even thought
I intended to thwart them, they would also have denied
it, but considering all that had happened, the vexations
caused us by the Nawab and our obstinate refusals to help
him, they imagined that we should be just as content as they
were to see him deposed, provided only the English would
leave us in peace. In fact, they did not as yet regard us as
enemies."

Law was, however, ignorant that Clive had already promised, or did so soon after, to give the property of the French Company to the Seths in payment of the money the French owed them; but he now for the first time fully realized the gravity of the situation. The indiscretion of the Seths showed him the whole extent of the plot, and the same evening he told the Nawab, but—

"the poor young man began to laugh, not being able to
imagine I could be so foolish as to indulge in such ideas."

And yet, whilst he refused to believe in the treason of his officers, the Nawab indulged at times in the most violent outbreaks of temper against them.

"Siraj-ud-daula was not master of himself.[93] It would
have needed as much firmness in his character as there was
deceitfulness to make the latter quality of use to him. At
certain times his natural disposition overmastered him,
especially when in his harem surrounded by his wives and
servants, when he was accustomed to say openly all that
was in his heart. Sometimes this happened to him in full
Durbar."

The same evening, also, Mr. Watts came to the Durbar, and the matter of the neutrality was talked over. The Nawab wished the two gentlemen to pledge their respective nations to keep the peace, but Mr. Watts skilfully avoided giving any promise, and suggested the Nawab should write to the Admiral. Law, seeing that further delay was aimed at, exclaimed that the Admiral would pay as little respect to this letter as to the Nawab's previous ones.

"'How?' said the Nawab, looking angrily at me instead
of at Mr. Watts: 'who am I then?' All the members of his
Court cried out together that his orders would certainly be
attended to."

As Law expected, Chandernagore was attacked before the Admiral's reply was received. Law received the news on the 15th, and hurried to the Nawab. Reinforcements were ordered and counter-ordered. At midnight the Nawab's eunuch came to inform Law that the English had been repulsed with loss, and on the morning of the 16th the Nawab's troops were ordered to advance, but when the same day news came that the French had withdrawn into the Fort, every one cried out that the Fort must fall, and that it was mere folly to incense the English by sending down troops. They were immediately recalled. Then news arrived that the Fort was holding out, and Rai Durlabh Ram was ordered to advance. Again there came a false report that the Fort had fallen. Law knew Rai Durlabh was a coward, and his whole reliance was on the second in command, Mir Madan:—

"a capable officer, and one who would have attacked the
enemy with pleasure."

This Mir Madan is said to have been a Hindu convert to Muhammadanism. Native poems still tell of the gallantry with which he commanded the Hindu soldiers of the Nawab. He was one of the first to fall at Plassey, and though it cannot be said that his death caused the loss of the battle, it is certain that it put an end to all chance of the victory being contested.

Law was at his wits' end. It was no time to stick at trifles, and, that he might know the worst at once, he intercepted Mr. Watts's letters. From them he gathered that the English intended to march straight upon Murshidabad. He set about fortifying the enclosure round the French Factory, and, as he had only 10 or 12 men, he induced the Nawab to send him a native officer with 100 musketeers. He soon learned that the reported English advance was merely the pursuit of the fugitives from Chandernagore, who were mentioned in the last chapter. By the end of March he had 60 Europeans:—

"of whom the half, in truth, were not fit to serve; but what
did that matter? The number was worth 120 to me outside
the fort, since rumour always delights in exaggeration."

Of the sepoys also, whom the English set free, some 30 found their way to Law, and so far was he now from being afraid of Mr. Watts, that it was the latter who had to ask the Nawab's protection.

The vacillation which had marked the Nawab's conduct previous to the fall of Chandernagore still continued. He protected Law, but would not help him with money.

"Further, at the solicitation of my enemies, the Nawab
sent people to pull down the earthworks I had erected. He
even wished the native agent of the English to be present.
In my life I have never suffered what I did that day. To
the orders of the Nawab I replied that so long as I was in
the Factory no foreigner should touch my fortifications, but
that to keep my agreement with him I was ready to withdraw
and to make over the Factory to him, with which he
could afterwards do as he liked, and for which I should hold
him responsible. At the same time, I made my whole troop
arm themselves, and, having had my munitions loaded on
carts for several days previous, I prepared to depart with
the small amount of money which belonged to me and to
a few other individuals. The Nawab's officer, seeing my
resolution, and fearing to do anything which, might not be
approved, postponed the execution of his orders, and informed
the Nawab of what was happening. He replied that he
absolutely forbade my leaving the Factory, and ordered the
pioneers to be sent away; but at the same time he informed
me that it was absolutely necessary for me to pull down the
earthworks, that under the present circumstances he had
himself to do many things contrary to his own wishes, that
by refusing to obey I should draw the English upon him
and upon us, that we could not defend ourselves and must
therefore submit, that I should not be troubled any more,
and that, finally, he would give me money enough to build
in brick what I had wished to make in earth. I knew well
the value of his promises, but I was forced to humour him.
It did not suit me to abandon the Factory altogether, so I set
my workmen to pull down what I had built, and the same
night the work was finished."

The English now tried to win over the French soldiers, and had some success, for many of them were deserters from the British forces, and they quickly saw how precarious was the shelter which Law could afford them; but the Nawab could not be persuaded to force Law to surrender, and, though he agreed to leave the country, Law declared he would not do even that unless he received passports and money. On the 8th of April he received passports, and was promised that if he would go to Phulbari, near Patna, he should there receive all he wanted. He was allowed four or five days to make his preparations.

"I profited by this interval to persuade the only man
who dared speak for us to got to action. This was the Nazir
Dalal, a man of no importance, but at the same time a man
in whom the Nawab appeared to have some confidence. As
he was constantly at the Factory, I had opportunities of telling
him many things of particular interest to the Nawab, and I
believed that by politeness and presents I had brought him
over to our interests. A little later, however, I learned that
he received quite as much from the English as from us. He
told the Nawab all that he learned from me, viz. the views
of the English and of the Seths, and the risk he himself was
running, and he brought to his notice that the English were
steadily increasing their garrison at Cossimbazar by bringing
up soldiers who pretended they were deserters and wished to
pass over to the Trench. By this trick, indeed, many soldiers
had passed through the Moorish camp without being stopped.
There was also talk of an English fleet preparing to come up
and waiting only for the Nawab's permission. The Nazir
Dalal represented to him that the trading boats might be
loaded with ammunition, and that they ought to be strictly
searched, and the casks and barrels opened, as guns and
mortars might be found in them. The Nawab opened his
eyes at information of this kind, and promptly sent the Nazir
Dalal to tell me not to leave. This order came on the 10th
of April. I accordingly passed my garrison in review before
the Nawab's agent, and a statement showing the monthly
pay of each officer and soldier was sent to the Nawab, who
promised to pay them accordingly."

On the 12th of April Law received a sudden summons to attend the Durbar the next day.