Map of Africa (1902)
FOOTNOTES:
[544] The Temps of March 30, 1913, estimated that Germany would soon have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000 French, unless France recurred to three years' service. See M. Sembat, Faites un Roi, si non faites la Paix.
[545] G. Alexinsky, La Russie et la guerre, pp. 83-88.
[546] General Botha's speech at Cape Town, July 25, 1915.
[547] Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912), p. 216 (more than 10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year); Reventlow, Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, p. 251.
[548] Revue des questions diplomatiques (1913), pp. 417-18.
[549] Frédéric, Hist. de la guerre de sept Ans, i. p. 37.
[550] Daily Telegraph, July 25, 1914.
[551] J'accuse, pp. 134-5 (German edition). The partial mobilisations of Austria and Russia earlier were intended to threaten and protect Servia. The time of Austria's order for complete mobilisation is shown in French Yellow Book, No. 115. That of Russia in Austrian "Rotbuch," No. 52, and Russian Orange Book, No. 77.
[552] Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 50-56; British White Papers, Miscellaneous (1914), No. 6 (No. 137), and No. 10, p. 3; French Yellow Book, No. 120.
[553] M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to England's attitude, and owing to the Tsar's telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized. All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).
[554] Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.
[555] Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper, Nos. 91-97, 161. J'accuse (III. A) goes too far in accusing Austria of consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready; Germany was.
[556] German White Book, No. 23a; J'accuse, Section III. B, pp. 153, 164 (German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser, inviting him to refer the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J.W. Headlam, History of Twelve Days, p. 183.)
[557] German White Book, Nos. 26, 27; French Yellow Book, No. 147.
[558] British White Paper, No. 105 and Enclosures, also No. 116.
[559] British White Paper, Nos. 123, 151, 153; Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 20-25. For a full and convincing refutation of the German charges that our military attachés at Brussels in 1906 and 1912 had bound us by conventions(!) to land an army in Belgium, see second Belgian Grey Book, pp. 103-6; Headlam, op. cit., ch. xvi., also p. 377, on the charge that France was about to invade Belgium.
[560] British White Paper, Nos. 6, 24, 99; Russian Orange Book, No. 17.
[561] British White Paper, Nos. 101, 102, 111, 114, 119. I dissent from Mr. F.S. Oliver (Ordeal by Battle, pp. 30-34) on the question discussed above. For other arguments, see my Origins of the War, pp. 167-9. The ties binding Roumania to Germany and Austria were looser; but anything of the nature of a general threat to the Central Powers would probably have ranged her too on their side.
[562] British White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, 125; Belgian Grey Book, No. 19.
[563] See the damning indictment by a German in J'accuse, Section III., also the thorough and judicial examination by J.W. Headlam, The History of Twelve Days.