History, as made in France by the Negro soldier, falls naturally into two divisions; that which was made by the bodies of troops which had an organization prior to the war, and whether trained or not, could lay claim to an understanding of the first principles of military science; and that made by the raw selectives—the draft soldiers—to whom the art of war was a closed book, something never considered as likely to affect their scheme of life and never given more than a passing thought.

We have followed the first phase of it in the wonderful combat-records of the colored National Guard, its volunteers and recruits. We have seen them like a stone wall bearing the brunt of attack from the finest shock troops of the Kaiser's Army. We have seen them undaunted by shot and shell, advancing through the most terrific artillery fire up to that time ever concentrated; rout those same troops, hold their ground and even advance under the most powerful counter attack which the enemy could deliver. We have followed them from trench to plain, to valley and into the mountains and read the story of their battles under all those varying conditions. We have pitied them in their trials, sympathized with their wounded and ill, been saddened by their lists of dead and finally have seen the survivors come home; have seen them cheered and feted as no men of their race ever were cheered and feted before.

Much of the nation's pride in them was due to the fact that it knew them as fighting men; at least as men who were organized for fighting purposes before the war. When they marched away and sailed we had confidence in them; were proud of their appearance, their spirit, their willingness to serve. The country felt they would not fail to clothe with luster their race and maintain the expectations of them. That they fulfilled every expectation and more; had come back loaded with honors; finer, manlier men than ever, increased the nation's pride in them.

Now we come to a contemplation of the other class; the men who knew nothing of military life or military matters; who, most of them, wished to serve but never dreamed of getting the opportunity. Many of them employed in the cotton fields or residing in the remote corners of the country, hardly knew there was a war in progress. Some of them realized that events out of the ordinary were transpiring through the suddenly increased demand for their labor and the higher wages offered them. But that Uncle Sam would ever call them to serve in his army and even to go far across seas to a shadowy—to them, far off land, among a strange people; speaking a strange language, had never occurred to most of them even in dreams.

Then all of a sudden came the draft summons. The call soon penetrated to the farthest nooks of our great land; surprised, bewildered but happy, the black legions began to form.

It already has been noted that with the exception of the 371st regiment, which went to the 93rd Division, the selectives who saw service in the fighting areas, were all in the 92nd Division. This was a complete American division, brigaded with its own army, commanded through the greater part of its service by Major General Ballou and towards the end by Major General Martin.

While the 92nd Division as a whole, did not get into the heavy fighting until the last two weeks of the war, individual units had a taste of it earlier. Service which the division as a whole did see, was some of the most severe of the war. The Negroes of the country may well be proud of the organization, for its record was good all the way through and in the heavy fighting was characterized by great gallantry and efficiency.

One of the outstanding features of the division was the fact that it had about six hundred Negro commissioned officers. Its rank and file of course, was composed exclusively of Negro soldiers. The fine record of the division must forever set at rest any doubts concerning the ability of Negro officers, and any questions about Negro soldiers following and fighting under them. It was a splendid record all the way through, and Negro officers rendered excellent service at all times and under the most trying circumstances. Many of these officers, be it understood, were entirely new to military life. Some had seen service in the National Guard and some had come up from the ranks of the Regular Army, but the majority of them were men taken from civilian life and trained and graduated from the officer's training camps at Fort Des Moines, Camp Taylor, Camp Hancock and Camp Pike. A few received commissions from the officers' training schools in France.

The 92nd Division was composed of the 183rd Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 365th and 366th Infantry Regiments and the 350th Machine Gun Battalion; the 184th Infantry Brigade, composed of the 367th and 368th Infantry Regiments and the 351st Machine Gun Battalion; the 167th Artillery Brigade consisting of the 349th, 350th and 351st Artillery Regiments; and the 349th Machine Gun Battalion, the 317th Trench Mortar Battalion, the 317th Engineers' Regiment, the 317th Engineers' Train, the 317th Ammunition Train, the 317th Supply Train, the 317th Train Headquarters, the 92nd Military Police Company; and the Sanitary Train, comprising the 365th, 366th 367th and 368th Field Hospital and Ambulance Companies.

Briefly summarized, the operations of the 92nd Division may be stated as follows: Arrived in France the summer of 1918. After the usual period of intensive training in the back areas it was divided into several groups for training alongside the French in front line trenches.

In August they took over a sector in the St. Die region near the Lorraine border. September 2nd they repulsed an enemy raid at LaFontenelle. On September 26th the division was a reserve of the First Army Corps in the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

On October 10th they moved to the Marbache sector in the vicinity of Pont a Mousson. November 10th they advanced, reaching Bois Frehaut and Bois Cheminot, capturing 710 prisoners. These positions were being consolidated on November 11th when the armistice put an end to the fighting. Of course there was fighting by some units of the division from the time early in the summer when they went into the trenches.

When the Marbache sector was taken over by the 92nd Division, "No Man's Land" was owned by the Germans and they were aggressively on the offensive. They held Belie Farm, Bois de Tete D'Or, Bois Frehaut, Voivrotte Farm, Voivrotte Woods, Bois Cheminot and Moulin Brook. Raids and the aggressiveness of the patrols of the 92nd Division changed the complexion of things speedily. They inflicted many casualties on the Germans and took many prisoners.

Each of the places named above was raided by the doughty black men as was also Epley, while their patrols penetrated north nearly to the east and west line through Pagny. The Germans were driven north beyond Frehaut and Voivrotte to Cheminot bridge. In their desperation they tried to check the Americans by an attempt to destroy the bridge over the Seille river. They succeeded in flooding a portion of the adjacent country; these tactics demonstrating that they could not withstand the Negro soldiers. West of the Seille river excellent results followed the energetic offensive, the Germans losing heavily in killed, wounded and prisoners. In nearly every instance the raids were conducted by Negro line officers.

Up to this time the division as a whole, had never been in a major battle. The only regiment in it that had seen a big engagement was the 368th infantry, which took part in the action in the Argonne Forest in September.

The division's chance came in the great drive on Metz, just before the end of the war. They were notified at 4 o'clock Sunday morning, November 10th. The motto "See it through" of the 367th infantry, known as the "Buffaloes," echoed through the whole division.

They began their advance at 7 o'clock from Pont a Mousson. Before them was a valley commanded by the heavy guns of Metz and by innumerable nests of German machine guns. The Negroes seemed to realize that here for the first time was the opportunity to show their mettle—that for the first time they were going to battle as a division. A sense of race pride seemed to stir and actuate every man. Here was a chance to show what this great body, composed of cotton-field Negroes, of stevedores, mechanics, general laborers, trades, professional men and those from all walks of civilian life who but recently had taken up the profession of arms, could do. An opportunity to enact a mighty role was upon them, and they played it well.

Not only were the black infantry and machine gun units up at the front; in the thickest of it, but the artillery—the 167th Brigade—was on the line behaving like veterans. They laid down a barrage for the infantry that was wonderfully effective. They established a reputation which has been made by but few, among French, British or Americans, of laying down a barrage that did not entrap; and fatally so, their own comrades.

It was a glorious day for the division. The casualty roll was heavy for the sector was strongly fortified and the enemy made a most determined resistance. Metz is considered by experts to be the strongest fortified inland city in the world.

Indeed it is almost as strong, if not quite so, as Gibraltar or the Dardanelles. But from the way the Americans hammered at it, military authorities say that only the signing of the armistice prevented the taking of it by assault. As it was, the close of fighting saw Negro troops on German soil.

The fortitude and valor of the Negroes, especially in the action against Metz, won them high praise from their commanding officers. Entire units were decorated by the French with the Croix de Guerre. Fourteen Negro officers and forty-three enlisted men were cited for bravery in action and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by General Pershing. This is a splendid showing considering that up to November 10th, 1918, the greater portion of the division had to content itself with making daily and nightly raids on the German front line trenches to harass the foe and capture prisoners. This, however, required daring and courage and, in some ways, was more trying and dangerous than being in a big engagement. A total of 57 citations by the American military authorities, besides honors bestowed by the French, is a splendid showing for a division which won most of its honors during its first great baptism of fire.

The casualties of the 92nd Division amounted to an aggregate of 1,511 of all kinds. Six officers were killed in action and one died from wounds. Among the non-commissioned officers and privates 103 were killed in action, 50 died from wounds, 47 were missing in action and five were taken prisoner. Forty enlisted men died from disease. Sixteen officers and 543 enlisted men were wounded; thirty-nine officers and 661 enlisted men were gassed. The number of gassed was unusually large, a reason being, perhaps, that the men in the front line trenches were exceptionally daring in making raids into the enemy's territory. One of the main reliances of the Germans against these raids was poison gas, a plentiful supply of which they kept on hand at all times, and which they could utilize quickly and with great facility.

The small number in this division who were taken prisoner by the enemy verifies the assertion made before that the Negro would sacrifice his life or submit to deadly wounds rather than be captured. When only five out of a total of about 30,000 fell into the Germans' hands alive, it gives some idea of the desperate resistance they put up. Perhaps the stories they had heard about the wanton slaughter of prisoners by the Hun or the brutalities practiced on those who were permitted to live, had something to do with the attitude of the Negroes against being captured; but a more likely solution is that their very spirit to advance and win and to accept death in preference to being conquered, caused the small number in the prisoner list, and the large number in the lists of other casualties.

Considering the desperate advance made by the 92nd Division from Pont a Mousson the morning of November 10th, through a valley swept by the tremendous guns of Metz and thousands of machine guns, the casualty list really is slight.

Advancing over such dangerous ground to gain their objective, it appears miraculous that the division was not wiped out, or at least did not suffer more heavily than it did. An explanation of this seeming miracle has been offered in the rapidity of the advance.

No two battles are ever fought alike. Offensives and defensives will be planned along certain lines. Then will suddenly obtrude the element of surprise or something that could not be foreseen or guarded against, which will overturn the most carefully prepared plans.

No soldiers in the world were ever trained to a higher degree of efficiency than the Germans. Mathematical precision ruled everywhere; the ultimate detail had been considered; and all students of military matters were forced to admit that they had reduced warfare seemingly, to an exact science. But it was a mistake. The Germans were the victims of surprise times innumerable. Some of the greatest events of the war, notably the first defeat at the Marne in its strategic features, was a complete surprise to them.

Everything about war, can, it seems, be reduced to a science except strategy. Certain rules can be laid down governing strategy, but they do not always work. Generally speaking, it is psychology; something which exists in the other man's mind. To read the other man's mind or make a good guess at it, defeats the most scientifically conceived strategy. Napoleon outwitted the best military brains and was himself the greatest strategist of his time, because he invariably departed from fixed military customs and kept his opponent entirely at sea regarding what he was doing or intended to do. Very seldom did he do the thing which his enemy thought he would do; which seemed most likely and proper according to military science. He thought and acted quickly in crises, relied constantly on the element of surprise and invented new strategy on the spur of the moment.

It was the big new strategy, the big new surprises, with which the Germans found themselves unable to cope. The strategy of Foch which developed in the offensive shortly after the battle of Chateau Thierry in July and was well under way in the early part of August, was a surprise to the Germans. Pershing surprised them in his St. Mihiel and following operations, especially the battles of Argonne Forest, and had a greater surprise in store for them in the Lorraine campaign had the war continued.

Perhaps the Germans figured at Metz, that owing to the extreme difficulty of the ground to be covered, their strong fortifications and great gun power, any advance, especially of Negro troops, would be slow. They accordingly timed their artillery action and their defensive measures for a slow assault.

But they were surprised again. Officers could not hold back the Negro fighters and German guns and soldiers could not stop them. They plunged on to Preny and Pagny, and they rushed into the Bois Frehaut, and held for thirty-six hours, this place from which picked Moroccan and Senegalese troops were forced to retreat in ten minutes after they had entered it. The Bois Frehaut was an inferno under the murderous fire of the Germans. Holding it for thirty-six hours and remaining there until hostilities ceased, it is surprising that the casualty list of the 92nd Division did not amount to many times 1,511.

It is not intended to convey the impression that the Negroes were entirely responsible for the victory before Metz. Many thousands of white troops participated and fought just as valiantly. But this History concerns itself with the operations of Negro soldiers and with bringing out as many of the details of those operations as the records at this time will supply.