They had been informed that they should find refreshments at Damanhour, but they met with nothing there but miserable huts, and could procure neither bread nor wine; only lentils in great abundance, and a little water. They were obliged to proceed again into the desert. Bonaparte saw the brave Lannes and Murat take off their hats, dash them on the sand, and trample them under foot. He, however, overawed all: his presence imposed silence, and sometimes restored cheerfulness. The soldiers would not impute their sufferings to him, but grew angry with those who took pleasure in observing the country. On seeing the men of science stop to examine the slightest ruins, they said they should not have been there but for them, and revenged themselves with witticisms after their fashion. Caffarelli, in particular, brave as a grenadier, and inquisitive as a scholar, was considered by them as the man who had deceived the general and drawn him into this distant country. As he had lost a leg on the Rhine, they said, “He, for his part, laughs at this: he has one foot in France.” At last, after severe hardships, endured at first with impatience, and afterwards with gaiety and fortitude, they reached the Nile on the 10th of July, after a march of four days. At the sight of the Nile and of the water so much longed for, the soldiers flung themselves into it, and, bathing in its waves, forgot their fatigues. Desaix’ division, which from the advance-guard had become the rear-guard, saw two or three hundred Mamluks galloping before it, whom they dispersed by a few volleys of grape. These were the first that had been seen, which warned the French that they would speedily fall in with the hostile army. The brave Murad Bey, having received the intelligence of the arrival of Bonaparte, was actually collecting his forces around Cairo. Until they should have assembled, he was hovering with a thousand horse about the army, in order to watch its march.

The army waited at Ramanieh for the arrival of the flotilla. It rested till July 13th, and set out on the same day for Chebreiss. Murad Bey was waiting there with his Mamluks. The flotilla, which had set out first and preceded the army, found itself engaged before it could be supported. Murad Bey had a flotilla also, and from the shore he joined his fire to that of his light Egyptian vessels. The French flotilla had to sustain a very severe combat. Perrée, a naval officer who commanded it, displayed extraordinary courage; he was supported by the cavalry, who had come dismounted to Egypt, and who, until they could equip themselves at the expense of the Mamluks, had taken their passage by water. Two gunboats were retaken from the enemy, and Perrée was repulsed.

At that moment the army came up; it was composed of five divisions, and had not yet been in action with its singular enemies. To swiftness and the charge of horse, and to sabre-cuts, it would be necessary to oppose the immobility of the foot-soldier, his long bayonet, and masses presenting a front on every side. Bonaparte formed his five divisions into five squares, in the centre of which were placed the baggage and the staff. The artillery was at the angles. The five divisions flanked one another. Murad Bey flung upon these living citadels a thousand or twelve hundred intrepid horse; who, bearing down with loud shouts and at full gallop, discharging their pistols, and then drawing their formidable sabres, threw themselves upon the front of the squares. Encountering everywhere a hedge of bayonets and a tremendous fire, they hovered about the French ranks, Fell before them, or scampered off in the plain at the utmost speed of their horses. Murad Bey, after losing a few of his bravest men, retired for the purpose of proceeding to the point of the Delta, and awaiting them near Cairo at the head of all his forces.

This action was sufficient to familiarise the army with this new kind of enemy, and to suggest to Bonaparte the kind of tactics which he ought to employ with them. He pursued his march towards Cairo, and the flotilla ascended the Nile abreast of the army. It marched without intermission during the following days, and, although the soldiers had fresh hardships to endure, they kept close to the Nile, and could bathe every night in its waters.

The army now approached Cairo, where the decisive battle was to be fought. Murad Bey had collected here the greater part of his Mamluks, nearly ten thousand in number, and they were attended by double the number of fellahs, to whom arms were given, and who were obliged to fight behind the intrenchments. He had also assembled some thousands of janizaries, or spahis, dependent on the pasha, who, notwithstanding Bonaparte’s letter of conciliation, had suffered himself to be persuaded to join his oppressors. Murad Bey had made preparations for defence on the banks of the Nile. The great capital, Cairo, is situated on the right bank of the river, and on the opposite bank Murad Bey had pitched his tent, in a long plain extending from the river to the pyramids of Gizeh.

On the 21st of July, the French army set itself in motion before daybreak. As they approached, they saw the minarets of Cairo shooting up; they saw the pyramids increase in height; they saw the swarming multitude which guarded Embabeh; they saw the glistening arms of ten thousand horsemen resplendent with gold and steel, and forming an immense line.

The face of Bonaparte beamed with enthusiasm. He began to gallop before the ranks of the soldiers, and, pointing to the pyramids, he exclaimed, “Consider, that from the summit of those pyramids forty centuries have their eyes fixed upon you.”

In the battle of the Pyramids, as it was called, the enemy’s force of sixty thousand men was almost completely annihilated. The Mamluks, bewildered by European tactics, impaled themselves upon the bayonets of the French squares. Fifteen thousand men of all arms fell upon the field. The battle had cost the French scarcely a hundred killed and wounded; for, if defeat is terrible for broken squares, the loss is insignificant for victorious squares. The Mamluks had lost their best horsemen by fire or water: their forces were dispersed, and the possession of Cairo secured. The capital was in extraordinary agitation. It contained more than three hundred thousand inhabitants, many of whom were indulging in all sorts of excesses, and intending to profit by the tumult to pillage the rich palaces of the beys.

The French flotilla, however, had not yet ascended the Nile, and there was no means of crossing to take possession of Cairo. Some French traders who happened to be there were sent to Bonaparte by the sheikhs to arrange concerning the occupation of the city. He procured a few light boats, or djerms, and sent across the river a detachment of troops, which at once restored tranquillity, and secured persons and property from the fury of the populace.

Bonaparte established his headquarters at Gizeh, on the banks of the Nile, where Murad Bey had an imposing residence. A considerable store of provisions was found both at Gizeh and at Embabeh, and the soldiers could make amends for their long privations. No sooner had he settled in Cairo than he hastened to pursue the same policy which he had already adopted at Alexandria, and by which he hoped to gain the country. The essential point was to obtain from the sheikhs of the mosque of Jemil-Azar a declaration in favour of the French. It corresponded to a papal bull among Christians. On this occasion Bonaparte exerted his utmost address, and was completely successful. The great sheikhs issued the desired declaration, and exhorted the Egyptians to submit to the envoy of God, who reverenced the Prophet, and who had come to deliver his children from the tyranny of the Mamluks. Bonaparte established a divan at Cairo, as he had done at Alexandria, composed of the principal sheikhs, and the most distinguished inhabitants. This divan, or municipal council, was intended to serve him in gaining the minds of the Egyptians, by consulting it, and learning from it all the details of the internal administration. It was agreed that similar assemblies should be established in all the provinces, and that these subordinate divans should send deputies to the divan of Cairo, which would thus be the great national divan.

Bonaparte resolved to leave the administration of justice to the cadis. In execution of his scheme of succeeding to the rights of the Mamluks, he seized their property, and caused the taxes previously imposed to continue to be levied for the benefit of the French army. For this purpose it was requisite that he should have the Kopts at his disposal. He omitted nothing to attach them to him, holding out hopes to them of an amelioration of their condition. He sent generals with detachments down the Nile to complete the occupation of the Delta, which the army had merely traversed, and sent others towards the Upper Nile, to take possession of Middle Egypt. Desaix was placed with a division at the entrance of Upper Egypt, which he was to conquer from Murad Bey, as soon as the waters of the Nile should subside in the autumn. Each of the generals, furnished with detailed instructions, was to repeat in the country what had been done at Alexandria and at Cairo. They were to court the sheikhs, to win the Kopts, and to establish the levy of the taxes in order to supply the wants of the army. Bonaparte was also attentive to keep up the relations with the neighbouring countries, in order to uphold and to appropriate to himself the rich commerce of Egypt. He appointed the Emir Hadgi, an officer annually chosen at Cairo, to protect the great caravan from Mecca. He wrote to all the French consuls on the coast of Barbary to inform the beys that the Emir Hadgi was appointed, and that the caravans might set out. At his desire the sheikhs wrote to the sherif of Mecca, to acquaint him that the pilgrims would be protected, and that the caravans would find safety and protection. The pasha of Cairo had followed Ibraham Bey to Belbeys. Bonaparte wrote to him, as well as to the several pashas of St. Jean d’Acre and Damascus, to assure them of the good disposition of the French towards the Sublime Porte. The Arabs were struck by the character of the young conqueror. They could not comprehend how it was that the mortal who wielded the thunderbolt should be so merciful. They called him the worthy son of the Prophet, the favourite of the great Allah, and sang in the great mosque a litany in his praise.

Napoleon, in carrying out his policy of conciliating the natives, was present at the Nile festival, which is one of the greatest in Egypt. It was on the 18th of August that this festival was held. Bonaparte had ordered the whole army to be under arms, and had drawn it up on the banks of the canal. An immense concourse of people had assembled, who beheld with joy the brave man of the West attending their festivals.

It was by such means that the young general, as profound a politician as he was a great captain, contrived to ingratiate himself with the people. While he flattered their prejudices for the moment, he laboured to diffuse among them the light of science by the creation of the celebrated Institute of Egypt. He collected the men of science and the artists whom he had brought with him, and, associating with them some of the best educated of his officers, established the institute, to which he appropriated a revenue and one of the most spacious palaces in Cairo.

The conquest of the provinces of Lower and Middle Egypt had been effected without difficulty, and had cost only a few skirmishes with the Arabs. A forced march upon Belbeys had been sufficient to drive Ibrahim Bey into Syria, where Desaix awaited the autumn for wresting Upper Egypt from Murad Bey, who had retired thither with the wrecks of his army.

Fortune was, meanwhile, preparing for Bonaparte the most terrible of all reverses. On leaving Alexandria, he had earnestly recommended to Admiral Brueys to secure his squadron from the English, either by taking it into the harbour of Alexandria, or by proceeding with it to Corfu; and he had particularly enjoined him not to leave it in the road of Abukir, for it was much better to fall in with an enemy when under sail than to receive him at anchor. A warm discussion had arisen on the question whether the ships of 80 and 120 guns could be carried into the harbour of Alexandria. As to the smaller ships, there was no doubt; but the larger would require lightening so much as to enable them to draw three feet less water. For this purpose it would be necessary to take out their guns, or to construct floats. On such conditions, Admiral Brueys resolved not to take his squadron into the harbour. The time which he spent, either in sounding the channels to the harbour, or in waiting for news from Cairo, caused his own destruction.

Admiral Brueys was moored in the road of Abukir. This road is a very regular semicircle, and his thirteen ships formed a line parallel to the shore, and so disposed that he believed no British ship could pass between him and the shore, if an attack were made.

Nelson, after visiting the Archipelago, and returning to the Adriatic, Naples, and Sicily, had at length obtained the certain knowledge of the landing of the French at Alexandria. He immediately steered in that direction in order to seek and put to flight their squadron. He sent a frigate to look out for it, and to reconnoitre its position. The English frigate, having made her observations, rejoined Nelson, who, being informed of all the particulars, immediately stood in for Abukir, and arrived there August 1, 1798, at about six o’clock in the evening. Admiral Brueys was at dinner. He immediately ordered the signal for battle to be given; but so unprepared was the squadron to receive the enemy, that the hammocks were not stowed away on board any of the ships, and part of the crews were on shore. The admiral despatched officers to send the seamen on board, and to demand part of those who were in the transports. He had no conception that Nelson would dare to attack him the same evening, and conceived that he should have time to receive the reinforcements for which he had applied.

Nelson resolved to attack immediately, and to push in between the French ships and the shore at all hazards. “Before this time to-morrow” said he, “I shall have gained a peerage or Westminster Abbey.”

The number of vessels was equal on both sides, namely, thirteen ships of war. The engagement lasted upwards of fifteen hours. All the crews performed prodigies of valour. The brave Captain Du Petit-Thouars had two of his limbs shot off. He ordered snuff to be brought him, and remained on his quarter-deck, and, like Brueys, waited till a cannon-ball despatched him. The entire French squadron, excepting the two ships and two frigates carried off by Villeneuve, was destroyed. Nelson had suffered so severely that he could not pursue the fugitives. Such was the famous battle of Abukir, the most disastrous that the French had ever sustained, and involved the most far-reaching consequences. The fleet which had carried the French to Egypt, which might have served to succour or to recruit them, which was to second their movements on the coast of Syria,—had there been any to execute,—which was to overawe the Porte, to force it to put up with false reasoning, and to oblige it to wink at the invasion of Egypt, which finally, in case of reverses, was to convey the French back to their country,—that fleet was destroyed. The French ships were burned. The news of this disaster spread rapidly in Egypt, and for a moment filled the army with despair. Bonaparte received the tidings with imperturbable composure. “Well,” he said, “we must die in this country, or get out of it as great as the ancients.” He wrote to Kléber: “This will oblige us to do greater things than we intended. We must hold ourselves in readiness.” The great soul of Kléber was worthy of this language: “Yes,” replied Kléber, “we must do great things. I am preparing my faculties.” The courage of these men supported the army, and restored its confidence.

Bonaparte strove to divert the thoughts of the soldiers by various expeditions, and soon made them forget this disaster. On the festival of the foundation of the republic, he endeavoured to give a new stimulus to their imagination; he engraved on Pompey’s Pillar the names of the first forty soldiers slain in Egypt. They were the forty who had fallen in the attack on Alexandria; and the names of these men, sprung from the villages of France, were thus associated with the immortality of Pompey and Alexander.

Bonaparte, after the battle of the Pyramids, found himself master of Egypt. He began to establish himself there, and sent his generals into the provinces to complete their conquest. Desaix, placed at the entrance of Upper Egypt with a division of about three thousand men, was directed to reduce the remnants of Murad Bey’s force in that province. It was in the preceding year (October, 1798), at the moment when the inundation was over, that Desaix had commenced his expedition. The enemy had retired before him, and did not wait for him till he reached Sediman; there, on October 7th, Desaix fought a sanguinary battle with the desperate remainder of Murad Bey’s forces. Two thousand French had to combat with four thousand Mamluks and eight thousand fellahs, intrenched in the village of Sediman. The battle was conducted in the same manner as that of the Pyramids, and like all those fought in Egypt. The fellahs were behind the walls of the village, and the horse in the plain. The field of battle was thickly strewn with slain. The French lost three hundred men. Desaix continued his march during the whole winter, and, after a series of actions, reduced Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts. He made himself equally feared for his bravery and beloved for his clemency. In Cairo, Bonaparte had been named Sultan Kebir, the Fire Sultan. In Upper Egypt, Desaix was called the “Just Sultan.”

Bonaparte had meanwhile marched to Belbeys, to drive Ibrahim Bey into Syria, and he had collected by the way the wrecks of the caravan of Mecca, plundered by the Arabs. Returning to Cairo, he continued to establish there an entirely French administration. Thus passed the winter between 1798 and 1799 in the expectation of important events. During this interval, Bonaparte received intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte, and of the preparations which it was making against him with the aid of the English. Two armies were being formed, one at Rhodes, the other in Syria. These two armies were to act simultaneously in the spring of 1799, the one by landing at Abukir near Alexandria, the other by crossing the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. Bonaparte was instantly aware of his position, and determined, as was his custom, to disconcert the enemy and to forestall any offensive movement by a sudden attack. He could not cross the desert which parts Egypt from Syria in summer, and he resolved to avail himself of the winter for destroying the assemblages of troops forming at Acre, at Damascus, and in the principal towns. Djezzar, the celebrated pasha of Acre, was appointed seraskier of the army collected in Syria. Abd Allah Pasha of Damascus commanded its advanced-guard, and had proceeded as far as the fort of El Arish, which is the key to Egypt on the side next to Syria. Bonaparte resolved to act immediately. He was in communication with the tribes of the Lebanon. The Druses, Christian tribes, the Mutualis, and schismatic Muhammedans offered him assistance, and ardently wished for his coming. By a sudden assault on Jaffa, Acre, and some other badly fortified places, he might in a short time gain possession of Syria, add this fine conquest to that of Egypt, make himself master of the Euphrates, as he was of the Nile, and thus command all the communications with India.

Bonaparte commenced his march very early in February at the head of Kléber’s, Régnier’s, Lannes’s, Bon’s, and Murat’s divisions, about thirteen thousand strong. He arrived before the fort El Arish on February 15th, and, after a slight resistance, the garrison surrendered themselves prisoners, to the number of thirteen hundred men. Ibrahim Bey, having attempted to relieve it, was put to flight, and, after a severe march across the desert, they reached Gaza. They took that place in the sight of Djezzar Pasha, and found there, as in the fort of El Arish, a great quantity of ammunition and provisions. From Gaza the army proceeded to Jaffa (the ancient Joppa), where it arrived on March 3rd. This place was surrounded by a massive wall, flanked by towers, and it contained a garrison of four thousand men. Bonaparte caused a breach to be battered in the wall, and then summoned the commandant, who only answered by cutting off the head of the messenger. The assault was made, and the place stormed with extraordinary intrepidity, and given up for thirty hours to pillage and massacre. Here, too, was found a considerable quantity of artillery and supplies of all kinds. There were some thousands of prisoners, whom the general could not despatch to Egypt, because he had not the ordinary means for escorting them, and he would not send them back to the enemy to swell their ranks. Bonaparte decided on a terrible measure, the most cruel act of his life. Transported into a barbarous country, he had adopted its manners, and he ordered all the prisoners to be put to death. The army consummated with obedience, but with a sort of horror, the execution that was commanded.

Bonaparte then advanced upon St. Jean d’Acre, the ancient Ptolemais, situated at the foot of Mount Carmel. It was the only place that could now stop him. If he could make himself master of this fortress, Syria would be his. But the ferocious Djezzar had shut himself up there, with all his wealth and a strong garrison, and he also reckoned upon support from Sir Sidney Smith, then cruising off that coast, who supplied him with engineers, artillerymen, and ammunition. It was probable, moreover, that he would be soon relieved by the Turkish army collected in Syria, which was advancing from Damascus to cross the Jordan. Bonaparte hastened to attack the place, in hopes of taking it, as he had done Jaffa, before it was reinforced with fresh troops, and before the English had time to improve its defences. The trenches were immediately opened. The siege artillery sent by sea from Alexandria had been intercepted by Sir Sidney Smith, who captured seven vessels out of the nine. A breach was effected, and dispositions were made for the assault, but the men were stopped by a counterscarp and a ditch. They immediately set about mining. The operation was carried on under the fire of all the ramparts, and of the fine artillery which Sir Sidney Smith had taken from the French. The mine was exploded on April 17th, and blew up only a portion of the counterscarp. Unluckily for the French, the place had received a reinforcement of several thousand men, a great number of gunners trained after the European fashion, and immense supplies. It was a siege on a large scale to be carried on with thirteen thousand men, almost entirely destitute of artillery. It was necessary to open a new mine to blow up the entire counterscarp, and to commence another covered way.

Bonaparte now ordered Kléber’s division to oppose the passage of the Jordan by the army coming from Damascus. The enemy was commanded by Abd Allah Pasha of Damascus, and numbered about twenty-five thousand men and twelve thousand horse. A desperate battle was fought in the plain of Fouli, and for six hours Kléber, with scarcely three thousand infantry in square, resisted the utmost fury of the Turkish cavalry. Bonaparte, who had been making a rapid march to join Kléber, suddenly made his appearance on the field of battle. A tremendous fire, discharged instantaneously from the three points of this triangle, assailed the Mamluks who were in the midst, drove them in confusion upon one another, and made them flee in disorder in all directions. Kléber’s division, fired with fresh ardour at this sight, rushed upon the village of Eouli, stormed it at the point of the bayonet, and made a great carnage among the enemy. In a moment the whole multitude was gone, and the plain was left covered with dead. During this interval the besiegers had never ceased mining and countermining about the walls of St. Jean d’Acre. The siege of Acre lasted for sixty-five days. Bonaparte made eight desperate but ineffectual assaults upon the city, which were repulsed by eleven furious sallies on the part of the besieged garrison. It was absolutely necessary to relinquish the enterprise. The strategic point in the East was lost.

For two months the army had been before Acre; it had sustained considerable losses, and it would have been imprudent to expose it to more. The plague was in Acre, and the army had caught the contagion at Jaffa. The season for landing troops approached, and the arrival of a Turkish army near the mouths of the Nile was expected. By persisting longer, Bonaparte was liable to weaken himself to such a degree as not to be able to repulse new enemies. The main point of his plan was effected, since he had rendered the enemy in that quarter incapable of acting. He now commenced his march to recross the desert.

Bonaparte at length reached Egypt after an expedition of nearly three months. It was high time for him to return; for the spirit of insurrection had spread throughout the whole Delta. His presence produced everywhere submission and tranquillity. He gave orders for magnificent festivities at Cairo to celebrate his triumphs in Syria. He had to curb not only the inhabitants, but his own generals and the army itself. A deep discontent pervaded it. They had been for a whole year in Egypt. It was now the month of June, and they were still ignorant of what was passing in Europe, and of the disasters of France. They merely knew that the Continent was in confusion, and that a new war was inevitable. Bonaparte impatiently waited for further particulars, that he might decide what course to pursue, and return, in case of need, to the first theatre of his exploits. But he hoped first to destroy the second Turkish army assembled at Rhodes, the very speedy landing of which was announced.

This army, put on board numerous transports and escorted by Sir Sidney Smith’s squadron, appeared on July 11th in sight of Alexandria, and came to anchor in the road of Abukir, where the French squadron had been destroyed. The point chosen by the English for landing was the peninsula which commands the entrance to the road, and bears the same name. The Turks landed with great boldness, attacked the intrenchments sword in hand, carried them, and made themselves masters of the village of Abukir, putting to death the garrison. The village being taken, it was impossible for the fort to hold out, and it was obliged to surrender. Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, left the city at the head of twelve hundred men to hasten to the assistance of the troops at Abukir. But, learning that the Turks had landed in considerable numbers, he did not dare to attempt to throw them into the sea by a bold attack, and returned to Alexandria, leaving them to establish themselves quietly in the peninsula of Abukir.

The Turks amounted to nearly eighteen thousand infantry. They had no cavalry, for they had not brought more than three hundred horses, but they expected the arrival of Murad Bey, who was to leave Upper Egypt, skirt the desert, cross the oases, and throw himself into Abukir with two or three thousand Mamluks.

When Bonaparte was informed of the particulars of the landing, he immediately left Cairo, and made from that city to Alexandria one of those extraordinary marches of which he had given so many examples in Italy. He took with him the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat. He had ordered Desaix to evacuate Upper Egypt, and Kleber and Régnier, who were in the Delta, to approach Abukir. He had chosen the point of Birket, midway between Alexandria and Abukir, at which to concentrate his forces, and to manouvre according to circumstances. He was afraid that an English army had landed with the Turks. The next day, the 7th, he was at the entrance of the peninsula.

Bonaparte made his dispositions with his usual promptitude and decision. He ordered General D ‘Estaing, with some battalions, to march to the hill on the left, where the one thousand Turks were posted; Lannes to march to that on the right, where the two thousand others were; and Murat, who was at the centre, to make the cavalry file on the rear of the two hills. D’Estaing marched to the hill on the left and boldly ascended it: Murat caused it to be turned by a squadron. The Turks, at sight of this, quitted their post, and fell in with the cavalry, which cut them to pieces, and drove them into the sea, into which they chose rather to throw themselves than to surrender. Precisely the same thing was done on the right. Lannes attacked the two thousand janizaries; Murat turned them, cut them in pieces, and drove them into the sea. D’Estaing and Lannes then moved towards the centre, formed by a village, and attacked it in front. The Turks there defended themselves bravely, reckoning upon assistance from the second line. A column did in fact advance from the camp of Abukir; but Murat, who had already filed upon the rear of the village, fell sword in hand upon this column, and drove it back into Abukir. D’Estaing’s infantry and that of Lannes entered the village at the charge step, driving the Turks out of it, who were pushed in all directions, and who, obstinately refusing to surrender, had no retreat but the sea, in which they were drowned.

From four to five thousand had already perished in this manner. The first line was carried: Bonaparte’s object was accomplished. He immediately followed up his success with desperate fighting to complete his victory on the moment. The Turks, affrighted, fled on all sides, and a horrible carnage was made among them. They were pursued at the point of the bayonet and thrust into the sea. More than twelve thousand corpses were floating in the bay of Abukir, and two or three thousand more had perished by the fire or by the sword. The rest, shut up in the fort, had no rescue but the clemency of the conqueror. Such was that extraordinary battle in which a hostile army was entirely destroyed. Thus, either by the expedition to Syria, or by the battle of Abukir, Egypt was delivered, at least for a time, from the forces of the Porte.

Having arrived in the summer before the inundation, Bonaparte had employed the first moments in gaining possession of Alexandria and the capital, which he had secured by the battle of the Pyramids. In the autumn, after the inundation, he had completed the conquest of the Delta, and consigned that of Upper Egypt to Desaix. In the winter he had undertaken the expedition to Syria, and destroyed Djezzar’s Turkish army at Mount Tabor. He had now, in the second summer, just destroyed the second army of the Porte at Abukir. The time had thus been well spent; and, while Victory was forsaking in Europe the banners of France, she adhered to them in Africa and Asia. The tricolour waved triumphant over the Nile and the Jordan, and over the places which were the cradle of the Christian religion.

Bonaparte was as yet ignorant of what was passing in France. None of the despatches from the Directory or from his brothers had reached him, and he was a prey to the keenest anxiety. With a view to obtaining some intelligence, he ordered brigs to cruise about, to stop all merchantmen, and to gain from them information of the occurrences in Europe. He sent to the Turkish fleet a flag of truce, which, under the pretext of negotiating an exchange of prisoners, was for the purpose of obtaining news. Sir Sidney Smith stopped this messenger, treated him exceedingly well, and, perceiving that Bonaparte was ignorant of the disasters of France, took a spiteful pleasure in sending him a packet of newspapers. The messenger returned and delivered the packet to Bonaparte. The latter spent the whole night in devouring the contents of those papers, and informing himself of what was passing in his own country. His determination was immediately taken, and he resolved to embark secretly for Europe, and on August 22nd, taking with him Berthier, Lannes, Murât, Andréossy, Marmont, Berthollet, and Monge, and escorted by some of his guides, he proceeded to a retired spot on the beach, where boats were awaiting them. They got into them and went on board the frigates, La Muiron and La Carrère. They set sail immediately, that by daylight they might be out of sight of the English cruisers. Unfortunately it fell calm; fearful of being surprised, some were for returning to Alexandria, but Bonaparte resolved to proceed. “Be quiet,” said he, “we shall pass in safety.” Like Cæsar, he reckoned upon his fortune. Menou, who alone had been initiated into the secret, made known in Alexandria the departure of General Bonaparte, and the appointment which he had made of General Kléber to succeed him. This intelligence caused a painful surprise throughout the army. The most opprobrious epithets were applied to this departure. They did not consider that irresistible impulse of patriotism and ambition, which, on the news of the disasters of the republic, had urged him to return to France. They perceived only the forlorn state in which he had left the unfortunate army, which had felt sufficient confidence in his genius to follow him.

Kléber was not fond of General Bonaparte, and endured his ascendency with a sort of impatience, and now he was sorry that he had quitted the banks of the Rhine for the banks of the Nile. The chief command did not counterbalance the necessity of remaining in Egypt, for he took no pleasure in commanding.

Kléber, however, was the most popular of the generals among the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confidence, and somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious commander who had just left them. He returned to Cairo, assumed the command with a sort of ostentation, and took possession of the fine Arabian mansion which his predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekieh Place. But it was not long before the solicitudes of the chief command, which were insupportable to him, the new dangers with which the Turks and the English threatened Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his soul with the most gloomy discouragement.

Kléber, together with Poussielgue, the administrator of the army, at once prepared and addressed despatches to the Directory, placing the condition of the troops, the finances, and the number of the enemy in the most melancholy light. These despatches fell into the hands of the English, and the duplicate reports found their way into the hands of Bonaparte himself. Bonaparte had left instructions with Kléber to meet every possible contingency during his absence, even to the necessity of an evacuation of Egypt. “I am going to France,” said he, “either as a private man or as a public man; I will get reinforcement sent to you. But if by next spring (he was writing in August, 1799) you have received no supplies, no instructions; if the plague has carried off more than fifteen hundred men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable force, which you should be incapable of resisting, presses you hard, negotiate with the vizier: consent even, if it must be so, to an evacuation; subject to one condition, that of referring to the French government; and meanwhile continue to occupy. You will thus have gained time, and it is impossible that, during the interval, you should not have received succour.”

The instructions were very sound; but the case foreseen was far from being realised at the time when Kléber determined to negotiate for the evacuation of Egypt. Murad Bey, disheartened, was a fugitive in Upper Egypt with a few Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who, under the government of the Mamluks, shared the sovereignty with him, was then in Lower Egypt towards the frontier of Syria.. He had four hundred horse. Djezzar Pasha was shut up in St. Jean d’Acre, and, so far from preparing a reinforcement of men for the army of the grand vizier, he viewed, on the contrary, with high displeasure, the approach of a fresh Turkish army, now that his pashalik was delivered from the French. As for the grand vizier, he was not yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon, and were not at this moment aggressive. At Kléber’s side was General Menou, who viewed everything under the most favourable colours, and believed the French to be invincible in Egypt, and regarded the expedition as the commencement of a near and momentous revolution in the commerce of the world. Kléber and Menou were both honest, upright men; but one wanted to leave Egypt, the other to stay in it; the clearest and most authentic returns conveyed to them totally contrary significations; misery and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.

In September, 1799, Desaix, having completed the conquest and subjugation of Upper Egypt, had left two movable columns for the pursuit of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming a vassal of France. He then returned to Cairo by the order of Kléber, who wished to make use of his name in those negotiations into which he was about to enter. During these proceedings, the army of the grand vizier, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who convoyed with his squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported by sea, had just arrived off Dami-etta with eight thousand janizaries, and on the first of November, 1799, the landing of the first division of four thousand janizaries was effected. At the first tidings of this disembarkation, Kléber had despatched Desaix with a column of three thousand men; but the latter, uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the victory won,—the Turkish division having been completely destroyed by General Verdier,—and the French filled with unbounded confidence. This brilliant achievement ought to have served to encourage Kléber; unfortunately, he was swayed at once by his own lack of confidence and that of the army. In this disposition of mind, Kléber had sent one of his officers to the vizier (who had entered Syria), to make new overtures of peace. General Bonaparte, with a view to embroiling the vizier with the English, had previously entertained the idea of setting on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were nothing more than a feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and pride. Kléber ‘s advances met with a favourable reception, through the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a prominent part in the affairs of Egypt. This officer had largely contributed to prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d’Acre; he was proud of it, and had devised a ruse de guerre by taking advantage of a momentary weakness to wrest from the French their valuable conquest. With this view, he had disposed the grand vizier to listen to the overtures of Kléber. Kléber, on his part, despatched Desaix and Poussielgue as negotiators to Sir Sidney Smith; for, since the English were masters of the sea, he wished to induce them to take part in the negotiation, so that the return to France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney manifested a disposition to enter into arrangements, acting as “Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty,” and attributing to himself a power which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of Lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople. Poussielgue was an advocate for evacuation; Desaix just the reverse. The conditions proposed by Kléber were unreasonable: not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what was given up in giving up Egypt, but because they were not feasible. Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this. Officers treating for a mere suspension of arms could not include topics of vast extent in their negotiation, such as the demand for the possession of the Venetian Islands, and the annulment of the Triple Alliance. But it was urgently necessary to settle two points immediately: the departure of the wounded and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix solicited safe-conduct; and secondly, a suspension of arms, for the army of the grand vizier, though marching slowly, would soon be in presence of the French. It had actually arrived before the fort of El Arish, the first French post on the frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to surrender. The negotiations, in fact, had been going on for a fortnight on board Le Tigre, while floating at the pleasure of the winds off the coasts of Syria and Egypt: the parties had said all they had to say, and the negotiations could not be continued to any useful purpose without the concurrence of the grand vizier. Sir Sidney, availing himself of a favourable moment, pushed off in a boat which landed him on the coast, after incurring some danger, and ordered the captain of Le Tigre to meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were to be put ashore, if the conferences were to be transferred to the camp of the grand vizier.

At the moment when the English commodore reached the camp, a horrible event had occurred at El Arish. The grand vizier had collected around him an army of seventy or eighty thousand fanatic Mussulmans. The Turks were joined by the Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who had some time before retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by a long circuit from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had become the auxiliaries of their former adversaries. The English had made for this army a sort of field-artillery, drawn by mules. The fort of El Arish, before which the Turks were at this moment, was, according to the declaration of General Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt; Alexandria was the other.

The Turkish advanced-guard having reached El Arish, Colonel Douglas, an English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the commandant, to surrender. The culpable sentiments which the officers had too much encouraged in the army then burst forth. The soldiers in the garrison at El Arish, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave Egypt, declared to the commandant that they would not fight, and that he must make up his mind to surrender the fort.

The gallant Cazals indignantly refused, and a struggle with the Turks ensued. During this contest, the recreants, who insisted on surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks; these ferocious enemies, once hoisted up into the fort, rushed, sword in hand, upon those who had given them admission into the fort, and slaughtered a great number of them. The others, brought back to reason, joined the rest of the garrison, and, defending themselves with desperate courage, were most of them killed. A small number obtained quarter, thanks to that humane and distinguished officer, Colonel Douglas.

It was now the 30th of December: the letter written by Sir Sidney Smith to the grand vizier, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arish. Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings: this barbarous massacre of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made him fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time in sending explanations to Kléber, both in his own name and that of the grand vizier, and he added the formal assurance that all hostility should cease during the negotiations.

Kléber, when informed of the massacre of El Arish, did not manifest as much indignation as he ought to have done; he was aware that, if he was too warm upon that subject, all the negotiations might be broken off. He was more urgent than ever for a suspension of arms; and, at the same time, by way of precaution, and to be nearer to the theatre of the conferences, he left Cairo, and transferred his headquarters to Salahieh, on the very border of the desert, two days’ march from El Arish.

In the meantime, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by contrary winds, had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th, and to reach El Arish before the 13th.

The evacuation and its conditions soon became the sole subject of negotiation. After long discussions it was agreed that all hostility should cease for three months; that those three months should be employed by the vizier in collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Abukir, and Alexandria, the vessels requisite for the conveyance of the French army; by General Kléber, in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the contiguous provinces, and in concentrating his troops about the point of embarkation; that the French should depart with the honours of war; that they should cease to impose contributions; but that, in return, the French army should receive three thousand purses, equivalent at that time to three million francs, and representing the sum necessary for its subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh, Salahieh, and the Belbeys, forming the frontier of Egypt towards the desert of Syria, were to be given up ten days after the ratification; Cairo forty days after.

The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing more to be done but sign it. Kléber, who had a vague feeling of his fault, determined, in order to cover it, to assemble a council of war, to which all the generals of the army were summoned. The council met on the 21st of January, 1800. The minutes of it still exist. Desaix, although deeply grieved, was swept along by the torrent of popular opinion, gave way to it himself, and affixed his signature on the 28th of January to the convention of El Arish.

Meanwhile preparations were being made for departure; Sir Sidney Smith had returned to his ship. The vizier advanced and took possession, consecutively, of the entrenched positions of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeys, which Kléber, in haste to execute the convention, faithfully delivered up to him. Kléber returned to Cairo to make his preparations for departure, to call in the troops that were guarding Upper Egypt, to concentrate his army, and then to direct it upon Alexandria and Rosetta at the time stipulated for embarkation.

While these events were occurring in Egypt, the English cabinet had received advice of the overtures made by General Kléber to the grand vizier and to Sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French army was reduced to the last extremity, it lost no time in sending off an express order not to grant any capitulation unless they surrendered themselves prisoners of war. These orders, despatched from London on the 17th of December, reached Admiral Keith in the island of Minorca in the first days of January, 1800; and, on the 8th of the same month, the admiral hastened to forward to Sir Sidney Smith the instructions which he had just received from the government. He lost no time in writing to Kléber, to express his mortification, to apprise him honestly of what was passing, to advise him to suspend immediately the delivery of the Egyptian fortresses to the grand vizier, and to conjure him to wait for fresh orders from England before he took any definite resolutions. Unfortunately, when these advices from Sir Sidney arrived at Cairo, the French army had already executed in part the treaty of El Arish.

Kléber instantly countermanded all the orders previously given to the army. He brought back from Lower Egypt to Cairo part of the troops that had already descended the Nile; he ordered his stores to be sent up again; he urged the division of Upper Egypt to make haste to rejoin him, and gave notice to the grand vizier to suspend his march towards Cairo, otherwise he should immediately commence hostilities. The grand vizier replied that the convention of El Arish was signed; that it must be executed; that, in consequence, he should advance towards the capital. At the same instant, an officer sent from Minorca with a letter from Lord Keith to Kléber, arrived at the headquarters. Kléber, fired with indignation at the demand for surrender, caused Lord Keith’s letter to be inserted in the order of the day, adding to it these few words: “Soldiers, to such insults there is no other answer than victory. Prepare for action.”

Agents from Sir Sidney had hastened up to interpose between the French and the Turks, and to make fresh proposals of accommodation. Letters, they said, had just been written to London, and, when the convention of El Arish was known there, it would be ratified to a certainty; in this situation, it would not be right to suspend hostilities, and wait. To this the grand vizier and Kléber consented, but on conditions that were irreconcilable. The grand vizier insisted that Cairo should be given up to him; Kléber, on the contrary, that the vizier should fall back to the frontier. Under these conditions, fighting was the only resource.

On the 20th of March, 1800, in the plain of Heliopolis, ten thousand soldiers, by superiority in discipline and courage, dispersed seventy or eighty thousand foes. Kléber gave orders for the pursuit on the following day. When he had ascertained with his own eyes that the Turkish army had disappeared, he resolved to return and reduce the towns of Lower Egypt, and Cairo in particular, to their duty.

He arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Important events had occurred there since his departure. The population of that great city, which numbered nearly three hundred thousand inhabitants, fickle, inflammable, inclined to change, had followed the suggestions of Turkish emissaries, and fallen upon the French the moment they heard the cannon at Heliopolis. Pouring forth outside the walls during the battle, and seeing Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey, with some thousand horse and janizaries, they supposed them to be the conquerors. Taking good care not to undeceive the inhabitants, the Turks affirmed that the grand vizier had gained a complete victory, and that the French were exterminated. At these tidings, fifty thousand men had risen in Cairo, at Bulak, and at Gizeh, and Cairo became a scene of plunder, rapine, and murder.