The message being communicated, a bill was immediately brought in, to release the members of the court-martial from the obligation of secrecy, and passed through the lower house without opposition; but in the house of lords it appeared to be destitute of a proper foundation. They sent a message to the commons, desiring them to give leave that such of the members of the court-martial as were members of that house might attend their lordships, in order to be examined on the second reading of the bill; accordingly they, and the rest of the court-martial, attended, and answered all questions without hesitation. As they did not insist upon any excuse, nor produce any satisfactory reason for showing that the man they had condemned was a proper object of mercy, their lordships were of opinion that there was no occasion for passing any such bill, which, therefore, they almost unanimously rejected. It is not easy to conceive what stronger reasons could be given for proving Mr. Byng an object of mercy, than those mentioned in the letter sent to the board of admiralty by the members of the court-martial, who were empowered to try the imputed offence, consequently must have been deemed well qualified to judge of his conduct.
The unfortunate admiral being thus abandoned to the stroke of justice, prepared himself for death with resignation and tranquillity. He maintained a surprising cheerfulness to the last; nor did he, from his condemnation to his execution, exhibit the least sign of impatience or apprehension. During that interval he had remained on board of the Monarque, a third-rate ship of war, anchored in the harbour of Portsmouth, under a strong guard, in custody of the marshal of the admiralty. On the fourteenth of March, the day fixed for his execution, the boats belonging to the squadron at Spithead being manned and armed, containing their captains and officers, with a detachment of marines, attended this solemnity in the harbour, which was also crowded with an infinite number of other boats and vessels filled with spectators. About noon, the admiral having taken leave of a clergyman, and two friends who accompanied him, walked out of the great cabin to the quarter-deck, where two files of marines were ready to execute the sentence. He advanced with a firm deliberate step, a composed and resolute countenance, and resolved to suffer with his face uncovered, until his friends, representing that his looks would possibly intimidate the soldiers, and prevent their taking aim properly, he submitted to their request, threw his hat on the deck, kneeled on a cushion, tied one white handkerchief over his eyes, and dropped the other as a signal for his executioners, who fired a volley so decisive, that five balls passed through his body, and he dropped down dead in an instant. The time in which this tragedy was acted, from his walking out of the cabin to his being deposited in the coffin, did not exceed three minutes.
Thus fell, to the astonishment of all Europe, admiral John Byng; who, whatever his errors and indiscretions might have been, seems to have been rashly condemned, meanly given up, and cruelly sacrificed to vile considerations. The sentiments of his own fate he avowed on the verge of eternity, when there was no longer any cause of dissimulation, in the following declaration, which, immediately before his death, he delivered to the marshal of the admiralty: “A few moments will now deliver me from the virulent persecution, and frustrate the further malice of my enemies: nor need I envy them a life subject to the sensations my injuries, and the injustice done me, must create. Persuaded I am, that justice will be done to my reputation hereafter: the manner and cause of raising and keeping up the popular clamour and prejudice against me, will be seen through. I shall be considered (as I now perceive myself) a victim destined to divert the indignation and resentment of an injured and deluded people from the proper objects. My enemies themselves must now think me innocent. Happy for me, at this my last moment, that I know my own innocence, and am conscious that no part of my country’s misfortunes can be owing to me. I heartily wish the shedding my blood may contribute to the happiness and service of my country; but cannot resign my just claim to a faithful discharge of my duty according to the best of my judgment, and the utmost exertion of my ability for his majesty’s honour, and my country’s service. I am sorry that my endeavours were not attended with more success, and that the armament under my command proved too weak to succeed in an expedition of such moment. Truth has prevailed over calumny and falsehood, and justice has wiped off the ignominious stain of my supposed want of personal courage, and the charge of disaffection. My heart acquits me of these crimes; but who can be presumptuously sure of his own judgment? If my crime is an error in judgment, or differing in opinion from my judges, and if yet the error in judgment should be on their side, God forgive them, as I do; and may the distress of their minds, and uneasiness of their consciences, which in justice to me they have represented, be relieved, and subside as my resentment has done. The supreme judge sees all hearts and motives, and to him I must submit the justice of my cause.”
GEORGE II. 1727-1760
Notwithstanding all that has been said in his favour, notwithstanding the infamous arts that were practised to keep up the cry against him, notwithstanding this solemn appeal to heaven in his last moments, and even self-conviction of innocence, the character of admiral Byng, in point of personal courage, will still, with many people, remain problematical. They will still be of opinion, that if the spirit of a British admiral had been properly exerted, the French fleet would have been defeated, and Minorca relieved. A man’s opinion of danger varies at different times, in consequence of an irregular tide of animal spirits, and he is actuated by considerations which he dares not avow. After an officer, thus influenced, has hesitated or kept aloof in the hour of trial, the mind, eager for its own justification, assembles, with surprising industry, every favourable circumstance of excuse, and broods over them with parental partiality, until it becomes not only satisfied, but even enamoured of their beauty and complexion, like a doating mother, blind to the deformity of her own offspring. Whatever Mr. Byng’s internal feelings might have been, whatever consequences might have attended his behaviour on that occasion; as the tribunal before which he was tried acquitted him expressly of cowardice and treachery, he was, without all doubt, a proper object for royal clemency; and so impartial posterity will judge him, after all those dishonourable motives of faction and of fear, by which his fate was influenced, shall be lost in oblivion, or remembered with disdain. The people of Great Britain, naturally fierce, impatient, and clamorous, have been too much indulged, upon every petty miscarriage, with trials, courts-martial, and dismissions, which tend only to render their military commanders rash and precipitate, the populace more licentious and intractable, and to disgrace the national character in the opinion of mankind.
Mr. Pitt and Mr. Legge taken into the Administration..... Obliged to resign..... Restored to their Employments..... Coalition of Parties..... Descent on the Coast of France meditated..... Command of the Fleet given to Sir Edward Hawke, and of the Land-Forces to Sir John. Mordaunt..... Fleet sails September 8..... Admiral Knowles sent to take Aix..... Attack and Surrender of Aix..... A Descent resolved on..... The Fleet returns to Spithead..... His Majesty appoints a Board of Inquiry into the Reasons of the Fleet’s Return..... Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry..... Its Report..... Sir John Mordaunt tried by a Court-Martial, and acquitted..... Fleets sent to the East and West Indies..... Success of the English Privateers..... Riots occasioned by the Price of Corn..... Operations in America..... Lord Loudon’s Conduct in America..... Fort William-Henry taken by the French..... Naval Transactions in America..... Attempt of M. de Kersin on Cape Coast Castle in Africa..... State of Affairs in the East Indies..... Calcutta recovered..... The Suba’s Camp forced, and a new Treaty concluded with him..... Reduction, of Chandernagore..... Colonel Clive defeats the Suba at Plaissey, who is afterwards deposed and put to Death..... King of France assassinated..... Tortures inflicted on the Assassin..... Changes in the French Ministry..... State of the Confederacy against the King of Prussia..... Precautions taken by his Prussian Majesty..... Skirmishes between the Prussians and Austrians..... Neutrality of the Emperor, and Behaviour of the Dutch..... The French take Possession of several Towns in the Low Countries belonging to the King of Prussia..... Declaration of the Czarina against the King of Prussia..... Factions in Poland..... Fruitless Endeavours of the English to restore the Tranquillity of Germany..... King of Prussia enters Bohemia..... Prince of Bevern defeats the Austrians at Richenberg..... King of Prussia obtains a complete Victory over the Austrians near Prague..... Mareschal Schwerin killed..... Prague invested..... and bombarded..... Brave defence of the Besieged..... Count Daun takes the Command of the Austrian Army..... His Character..... King of Prussia defeated at Kolin..... He raises the Siege of Prague, and quits Bohemia..... Preparations for the Defence of Hanover..... The allied Army assembles under the Duke of Cumberland..... Skirmishes with the French..... Duke of Cumberland passes the Weser..... The French follow him, and take Minden and Emden, and lay Hanover under Contribution..... Battle of Hastenbeck..... The French take Hamelen..... Duke de Richelieu supersedes Mareschal d’Etrées in the Command of the French Army..... The French take Possession of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel..... and reduce Verden and Bremen..... Duke of Cumberland signs the Convention of Closter-Seven
1757
Though the parliament of Great Britain unanimously concurred in strengthening the hands of government for a vigorous prosecution of the war, those liberal supplies had like to have proved ineffectual through a want of harmony in her councils. In the course of the last year the clamorous voice of dissatisfaction had been raised by a series of disappointments and miscarriages, which were imputed to want of intelligence, sagacity, and vigour in the administration. The defeat of Braddock, the reduction of Oswego, and other forts in America, the delay of armaments, the neglect of opportunities, ineffectual cruises, absurd dispositions of fleets and squadrons, the disgrace in the Mediterranean, and the loss of Minorca, were numbered among the misfortunes that flowed from the crude designs of a weak dispirited ministry; and the prospect of their acquiescing in a continental war brought them still farther in contempt and detestation with the body of the people. In order to conciliate the good-will of those whom their conduct had disobliged, to acquire a fresh stock of credit with their fellow-subjects, and remove from their own shoulders part of what future censure might ensue, they admitted into a share of the administration a certain set of gentlemen, remarkable for their talents and popularity, headed by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Legge, esteemed the two most illustrious patriots of Great Britain, alike distinguished and admired for their unconquerable spirit and untainted integrity. The former of these was appointed secretary of state, and the other chancellor of the exchequer; and their friends were vested with other honourable though subordinate offices.
So far the people were charmed with the promotion of individuals, upon whose virtues and abilities they had the most perfect reliance; but these new ingredients would never thoroughly mix with the old leaven. The administration became an emblem of the image that Nebuchadnezzar saw in his dream, the leg was of iron, and the foot was of clay. The old junta found their new associates very unfit for their purposes. They could neither persuade, cajole, nor intimidate them into measures which they thought repugnant to the true interest of their country. The new ministers combated in council every such plan, however patronised; they openly opposed in parliament every design which they deemed unworthy of the crown, or prejudicial to the people, even though distinguished by the predilection of the sovereign. Far from bargaining for their places, and surrendering their principles by capitulation, they maintained in office their independency and candour with the most vigilant circumspection, and seemed determined to show, that he is the best minister to the sovereign who acts with the greatest probity towards the subject. Those who immediately surrounded the throne were supposed to have concealed the true characters of these faithful servants from the knowledge of their royal master; to have represented them as obstinate, imperious, ignorant, and even lukewarm in their loyalty; and to have declared, that with such colleagues it would be impossible to move the machine of government according to his majesty’s inclination. These suggestions, artfully inculcated, produced the desired effect: on the ninth day of April, Mr. Pitt, by his majesty’s command, resigned the seals of secretary of state for the southern department. In the room of Mr. Legge, the king was pleased to grant the office of chancellor of the exchequer to the right honourable lord Mansfield, chief-justice of the court of king’s bench, the same personage whom we have mentioned before under the name of Mr. Murray, solicitor-general, now promoted and ennobled for his extraordinary merit and important services. The fate of Mr. Pitt was extended to some of his principal friends: the board of admiralty was changed, and some other removals were made with the same intention.
What was intended as a disgrace to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Legge turned out one of the most shining circumstances of their characters. The whole nation seemed to rise up, as one man, in the vindication of their fame; every mouth was opened in their praise; and a great number of respectable cities and corporations presented them with the freedom of their respective societies, enclosed in gold boxes of curious workmanship, as testimonies of their peculiar veneration. What the people highly esteem, they in a manner idolize. Not contented with making offerings so flattering and grateful to conscious virtue, they conceived the most violent prejudices against those gentlemen who succeeded in the administration; fully convinced, that the same persons who had sunk the nation in the present distressful circumstances, who had brought on her dishonour, and reduced her to the verge of destruction, were by no means the fit instruments of her delivery and redemption. The whole kingdom caught fire at the late changes; nor could the power, the cunning, and the artifice of a faction, long support itself against the united voice of Great Britain, which soon pierced the ears of the sovereign. It was not possible to persuade the people that salutary measures could be suggested or pursued, except by the few, whose zeal for the honour of their country, and steady adherence to an upright disinterested conduct, had secured their confidence, and claimed their veneration. A great number of addresses, dutifully and loyally expressed, solicited the king, ever ready to meet half-way the wishes of his faithful people, to restore Mr. Pitt and Mr. Legge to their former employments. Upon this they rested the security and honour of the nation, as well as the public expectation of the speedy and successful issue of a war, hitherto attended with disgraces and misfortunes. Accordingly, his majesty was graciously pleased to redeliver the seals to Mr. Pitt, appointing him secretary of state for the southern department, on the twenty-ninth day of June; and, five days after, the office of chancellor of the exchequer was restored to Mr. Legge; promotions that afforded universal satisfaction.
It would not, perhaps, be possible to exclude, from a share in the administration, all who were not perfectly agreeable to the people: however unpopular the late ministry might appear, still they possessed sufficient influence in the privy-council, and credit in the house of commons, to thwart every measure in which they did not themselves partake. This consideration, and very recent experience, probably dictated the necessity I of a coalition, salutary in itself, and prudent, because it was the only means of assuaging the rage of faction, and healing those divisions, more pernicious to the public than the most mistaken and blundering councils. Sir Robert Henley was made lord-keeper of the great seal, and sworn of his majesty’s privy-council, on the thirteenth day of June; the custody of the privy-seal was committed to earl Temple; his grace the duke of Newcastle, Mr. Legge, Mr. Nugent, lord viscount Dun-cannon, and Mr. Grenville, were appointed commissioners for executing the office of treasurer to his majesty’s exchequer. Lord Anson, admirals Boscawen and Forbes, Dr. Hay, Mr. West, Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Elliot, to preside at the board of admiralty; Mr. Fox was gratified with the office of receiver and paymaster-general of all his majesty’s guards, garrisons, and land-forces; and the earl of Thomond was made treasurer of the king’s household, and sworn of his majesty’s privy-council. Other promotions likewise took place, with a design to gratify the adherents of either party; and so equally was the royal favour distributed, that the utmost harmony for a long time subsisted. Ingredients, seemingly heterogeneous, consolidated into one uniform mass, so as to produce effects far exceeding the most sanguine expectations; and this prudent arrangement proved displeasing only to those whom violent party attachment had inspired with a narrow and exclusive spirit.
The accumulated losses and disappointments of the preceding year, made it absolutely necessary to retrieve the credit of the British arms and councils by some vigorous and spirited enterprise, which should, at the same time, produce some change in the circumstances of his Prussian majesty, already depressed by the repulse at Kolin, and in danger of being attacked by the whole power of France, now ready to fall upon him, like a torrent, which had so lately swept before it the army of observation, now on the brink of disgrace. A well-planned and vigorous descent on the coast of France, it was thought, would probably give a decisive blow to the marine of that kingdom, and at the same time effect a powerful diversion in favour of the Prussian monarch and the duke of Cumberland, driven from all his posts in the electorate of Hanover, by drawing a part of the French forces to the defence and protection of their own coasts. Both were objects of great concern, upon which the sovereign and ministry were sedulously bent. His royal highness the duke, in a particular manner, urged the necessity of some enterprise of this nature, as the only expedient to obviate the shameful convention now in agitation. The ministry foresaw, that, by destroying the enemy’s shipping, all succours would be cut off from America, whither they were daily transporting troops; the British commerce secured, without those convoys so inconvenient to the board of admiralty, and to the merchants; and those ideal fears of an invasion, that had in some measure affected the public credit, wholly dispelled.
From these considerations, a powerful fleet was ordered to be got in readiness to put to sea on the shortest notice, and ten regiments of foot were marched to the Isle of Wight. The naval armament, consisting of eighteen ships of the line, besides frigates, fireships, bomb-ketches, and transports, was put under the command of sir Edward Hawke, an officer whose faithful services recommended him, above all others, to this command; and rear-admiral Knowles was appointed his subaltern. Sir John Mordaunt was preferred to take the command of the land-forces: and both strictly enjoined to act with the utmost unanimity and harmony. Europe beheld with astonishment these mighty preparations. The destination of the armament was wrapped in the most profound secrecy: it exercised the penetration of politicians, and filled France with very serious alarms. Various were the impediments which obstructed the embarkation of the troops for several weeks, while Mr. Pitt expressed the greatest uneasiness at the delay, and repeatedly urged the commander-in-chief to expedite his departure; but a sufficient number of transports, owing to some blunder in the contractors, had not yet arrived. The troops expressed an eager impatience to signalize themselves against the enemies of the liberties of Europe; but the superstitious drew unfavourable presages from the dilatoriness of the embarkation. At last the transports arrived, the troops were put on board with all expedition, and the fleet got under sail on the eighth day of September, attended with the prayers of every man warmed with the love of his country, and solicitous for her honour. The public, big with expectation, dubious where the stroke would fall, but confident of its success, were impatient for tidings from the fleet; but it was not till the fourteenth, that even the troops on board began to conjecture that a descent was meditated on the coast of France, near Rochefort or Rochelle.
On the twentieth, the fleet made the isle of Oleron, and then sir Edward Hawke sent an order to vice-admiral Knowles, requiring him, if the wind permitted the fleet, to proceed to Basque road, to stand in as near to the isle of Aix as the pilot would carry him, with such ships of his division as he thought necessary for the service, and to batter the fort till the garrison should either abandon or surrender it. But the immediate execution of this order was frustrated by a French ship of war standing in to the very middle of the fleet, and continuing in that station for some time before she discovered her mistake, or any of the captains had a signal thrown out to give chase. Admiral Knowles, when too late, ordered the Magnanime, captain Howe, and Torbay, captain Keppel, on that service, and thereby retarded the attack upon which he was immediately sent. A stroke of policy greatly to be admired, as from hence he gained time to assure himself of the strength of the fortifications of Aix, before he ran his majesty’s ships into danger.
While the above ships, with the addition of the Royal William, were attending the French ship of war safe into the river Garonne, the remainder of the fleet was beating to windward off the isle of Oleron; and the commander-in-chief publishing orders and regulations which did credit to his judgment, and would have been highly useful, had there ever been occasion to put them in execution. On the twenty-third the van of the fleet, led by captain Howe in the Magnanime, stood towards Aix, a small island situated in the mouth of the river Charente, leading up to Rochefort, the fortifications half finished, and mounted with about thirty cannon and mortars, the garrison composed of six hundred men, and the whole island about five miles in circumference. As the Magnanime approached, the enemy fired briskly upon her; but captain Howe, regardless of their faint endeavours, kept on his course without flinching, dropping his anchors close to the walls, and poured in so incessant a fire as soon silenced their artillery. It was, however, near an hour before the fort struck, when some forces were landed to take possession of so important a conquest, with orders to demolish the fortifications, the care of which was intrusted to vice-admiral Knowles.
Inconsiderable as this success might appear, it greatly elated the troops, and was deemed a happy omen of further advantages; but, instead of embarking the troops that night, as was universally expected, several successive days were spent in councils of war, soundings of the coast, and deliberations whether the king’s express orders were practicable, or to be complied with. Eight days were elapsed since the first appearance of the fleet on the coast, and the alarm was given to the enemy. Sir Edward Hawke, indeed, proposed laying a sixty gun ship against Fouras, and battering that fort, which it was thought would help to secure the landing of the troops, and facilitate the enterprise on Rochefort. This a French pilot on board, Thierry, undertook; but after a ship had been lighted for the purpose, vice-admiral Knowles reported, that a bomb-ketch had run a-ground at above the distance of two miles from the fort; upon which the project of battering or bombarding the fort was abandoned. The admiral likewise proposed to bombard Koch elle; but this overture was over-ruled, for reasons which we need not mention. It was at length determined, in a council of war held on the eighth, to make a descent, and attack the forts leading to and upon the mouth of the river Charente. An order, in consequence of this resolution, was immediately issued for the troops to be ready to embark from the transports in the boats precisely at twelve o’clock at night. Accordingly the boats were prepared and filled with the men at the time appointed, and now they remained beating against each other, and the sides of the ships, for the space of four hours, while the council were determining whether, after all the trouble given, they should land; when at length an order was published for the troops to return to their respective transports, and all thoughts of a descent, to appearance, were wholly abandoned. The succeeding days were employed in blowing up and demolishing the fortifications of Aix; after which, the land officers, in a council of war, took the final resolution of returning to England without any further attempts, fully satisfied they had done all in their power to execute the designs of the ministry, and choosing rather to oppose the frowns of an angry sovereign, the murmurs of an incensed nation, and the contempt of mankind, than fight a handful of dastardly militia. Such was the issue of an expedition that raised the expectations of all Europe, threw the coasts of France into the utmost confusion, and cost the people of England little less than a million of money.
The fleet was no sooner returned than the whole nation was in a ferment. The public expectation had been wound up to the highest pitch, and now the disappointment was proportioned to the sanguine hopes conceived, that the pride of France would have been humbled by so formidable an armament. The ministry, and with them the national voice, exclaimed against the commanding officers, and the military men retorted the calumny by laying the blame on the projectors of the enterprise, who had put the nation to great expense before they had obtained the necessary information. Certain it was, that blame must fall somewhere, and the ministry resolved to acquit themselves and fix the accusation, by requesting his majesty to appoint a board of officers of character and ability, to inquire into the causes of the late miscarriage. This alone it was that could appease the public clamours, and afford general satisfaction. The enemies of Mr. Pitt endeavoured to wrest the miscarriage of the expedition to his prejudice, but the whispers of faction were soon drowned in the voice of the whole people of England, who never could persuade themselves that a gentleman raised to the height of power and popularity by mere dint of superior merit, integrity, and disinterestedness, would now sacrifice his reputation by a mock armament, or hazard incurring the derision of Europe, by neglecting to obtain all the necessary previous information, or doing whatever might contribute to the success of the expedition. It was asked, Whether reason or justice dictated, that a late unfortunate admiral should be capitally punished for not trying and exerting his utmost ability to relieve fort St. Philip, invested by a powerful army, and surrounded with a numerous fleet, while no charge of negligence or cowardice was brought against those who occasioned the miscarriage of a well-concerted and well-appointed expedition? The people, they said, were not to be quieted with the resolutions of a council of war, composed of men whose inactivity might frame excuses for declining to expose themselves to danger. It was publicly mentioned, that such backwardness appeared among the general officers before the fleet reached the isle of Oleron, as occasioned the admiral to declare, with warmth, that he would comply with his orders, and go into Basque-road, whatever might be the consequence. It was asked, Why the army did not land on the night of the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, and whether the officers sent out to reconnoitre, had returned with such intelligence as seemed to render a descent impracticable? It was asked, Whether the commander-in-chief had complied with his majesty’s orders, “To attempt, as far as should be found practicable, a descent on the coast of France, at or near Rochefort, in order to attack, and, by a vigorous impression, force that place; and to burn and destroy, to the utmost of his power, all docks, magazines, arsenals, and shipping, as shall be found there?” Such rumours as these, everywhere propagated, rendered an inquiry no less necessary to the reputation of the officers on the expedition, than to the minister who had projected it. Accordingly, a board consisting of three officers of rank, reputation, and ability, was appointed by his majesty, to inquire into the reasons why the fleet returned without having executed his majesty’s orders.
The three general officers, who met on the twenty-first of the same month, were, Charles duke of Marlborough, lieutenant-general, major-generals lord George Sackville and John Waldegrave. To judge of the practicability of executing his majesty’s orders, it was necessary to inquire into the nature of the intelligence upon which the expedition was projected. The first and most important was a letter sent to sir John, afterwards lord Ligonier, by lieutenant-colonel Clark.. This letter had been frequently examined in the privy-council, and contained, in substance, that colonel Clark, in returning from Gibraltar, in the year one thousand-seven hundred and fifty four, had travelled along the western coast of France, to observe the condition of the fortifications, and judge how far a descent would be practicable, in case of a rupture between Great Britain and France. On his coming to Rochefort, where he was attended by an engineer, he was surprised to find the greatest part of a good rampart, with a revetment, flanked only with redans; no outworks, no covered-way, and in many places no ditch, so that the bottom of the wall was seen at a distance. He remembered, that in other places, where the earth had been taken out to form the rampart, there was left around them a considerable height of ground, whence an enemy might draw a great advantage; that for above the length of a front, or two or three hundred yards, there was no rampart, or even intrenchment, but only small ditches, in the low and marshy grounds next the river, which, however, were dry at low water, yet the bottom remained muddy and slimy. Towards the river, no rampart, no batteries, no parapet, on either side appeared, and on the land-side he observed some high ground within the distance of one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards of the town; in which condition, the colonel was told by the engineer, the place had remained for above seventy years. To prevent giving umbrage, he drew no plan of the place, and even burnt the few sketches he had by him: however, as to utility, the colonel declared himself as much satisfied as if he had taken a plan. He could not ascertain the direct height of the rampart, but thought it could not exceed twenty-five feet, including the parapet. The river might be about one hundred and thirty feet broad, and the entrance defended by two or three small redoubts. As to forces, none are ever garrisoned at Eochefort, except marines, which at the time the colonel was on the spot amounted to about one thousand. This was the first intelligence the ministry received of the state of Rochefort, which afforded sufficient room to believe, that an attack by surprise might be attended with happy consequences. It was true that colonel Clark made his observations in time of peace; but it was likewise probable that no great alterations were made on account of the war, as the place had remained in the same condition during the two or three last wars with France, when they had the same reasons as now to expect their coasts would be insulted. The next information was obtained from Joseph Thierry, a French pilot, of the protestant religion, who passed several examinations before the privy-council. This person declared, that he had followed the business of a pilot on the coast of France for the space of twenty years, and served as first pilot in several of the king’s ships; that he had, in particular, piloted the Magnanime, before she was taken by the English, for about twenty-two months, and had often conducted her into the road of the isle of Aix; and that he was perfectly acquainted with the entrance, which indeed is so easy as to render a pilot almost unnecessary. The road, he said, afforded good anchorage in twelve or fourteen fathoms water, as far as Bayonne; the channel between the islands of Oleron and Rhé was three leagues broad, and the banks necessary to be avoided lay near the land, except one called the Board, which is easily discerned by the breakers. He affirmed, that the largest vessels might draw up close to the fort of Aix, which he would undertake the Magnanime alone should destroy; that the largest ships might come up to the Vigerot, two miles distant from the mouth of the river, with all their cannon and stores; that men might be landed to the north of fort Fouras, out of sight of the fort, upon a meadow where the ground is firm and level, under cover of the cannon of the fleet. This landing-place he reckoned at about five miles from Rochefort, the way dry, and no way intercepted by ditches and morasses. He said, great part of the city was encompassed by a wall; but towards the river, on both sides, for about sixty paces, it was enclosed only with pallisadoes, without a fosse. To the intelligence of colonel Clark and Thierry, the minister added a secret account obtained of the strength and distribution of the French forces, whence it appeared highly probable that no more than ten thousand men could be allowed for the defence of the whole coast, from St. Valéry to Bourdeaux. In consequence of the above information the secret expedition was planned; instructions were given to sir John Mordaunt and admiral Hawke to make a vigorous impression on the French coast, and all the other measures projected, which, it was imagined, would make an effectual diversion, by obliging the enemy to employ a great part of their forces at home, disturb and shake the credit of their public loans, impair the strength and resources of their navy, disconcert their extensive and dangerous operations of war, and, finally, give life, strength, and lustre to the common cause and his majesty’s arms. The board of inquiry took next into consideration the several letters and explanatory instructions sent to sir John Mordaunt, in consequence of some difficulties which might possibly occur, stated by that general in letters to the minister, previous to his sailing. Then they examined the report made to sir Edward Hawke by admiral Broderick, and the captains of the men of war sent to sound the French shore from Rochelle to fort Fouras, dated September the twenty-ninth; the result of the councils of war on the twenty-fifth and twenty-eighth; sir Edward Hawke’s letter to sir John Mordaunt on the twenty-seventh, and the general’s answer on the twenty-ninth: after which sir John Mordaunt was called upon to give his reasons for not putting his majesty’s instructions and orders into execution. This he did in substance as follows: the attempt on Rochefort, he understood, was to have been on the footing of a coup de main or surprise, which it would be impossible to execute if the design was discovered, or the alarm taken. He also understood that an attempt could not be made, nay that his majesty did not require it should, unless a proper place for debarking, and a safe retreat for the troops was discovered, particularly where the ships could protect them; and a safe communication with the fleet, and conveyance of supplies from it, were found. His sentiments, he said, were confirmed by a paper to this purpose, delivered to him by sir John Ligonier, on his first being appointed to command the expedition. It was likewise probable, he thought, that although Rochefort should have remained in the situation in which colonel Clark and the pilot Thierry had seen it three years before, yet that a few days’ preparation could make it sufficiently defensible against a coup de main. Judging therefore the dependence on such an operation alone improper, he applied to the ministry for two more old battalions, and artillery for a regular attack to force the place, which, from its construction, appeared as difficult to be made defensible against the latter, as easily secured against the former. But this request being refused, he still thought it his duty to obey his orders on the footing on which the expedition was planned, especially as he understood his instructions were discretionary, regarding the circumstances of the time, the condition of the place, and the nature of the service. He recited the positive and credible intelligence received, as well before the embarkation as during the voyage, of the alarm given to France, and the preparations made along the French coasts from Brest and St. Maloes to Rochefort; the accidents that kept the fleet hovering along the coasts, and prevented the possibility of an attempt by surprise; the reports of all the gentlemen employed in sounding the coasts, so contrary to the intelligence given by Thierry the pilot; the opinion of the council of war, by which he was enjoined to act, and with which his own judgment concurred; the endeavours used, after the twenty-sixth, to find out some expedient for annoying the enemy and executing his majesty’s instructions; the attempt made to land, in consequence of the resolution of the second council of war, which was prevented by boisterous and stormy weather; and lastly, the reasons that determined him, in concert with the other land officers, to return to England.
Having considered all these circumstances, and examined several officers who served in the expedition, the court of inquiry gave in the following report to his majesty:—“It appears to us, that one cause of the expedition having failed is, the not attacking fort Fouras by sea, at the same time that it could have been attacked by land, agreeably to the first design, which certainly must have been of the greatest utility towards carrying your majesty’s instructions into execution. It was at first resolved by admiral Hawke; (Thierry, the pilot, having undertaken the safe conduct of a ship to fort Fouras for that purpose), but afterwards laid aside, upon the representation of vice-admiral Knowles, that the Bar-fleur, the ship designed for that service, was a-ground, at the distance of between four and five miles from the shore; but as neither sir Edward Hawke nor the pilot could attend to give any information upon that head, we cannot presume to offer any certain opinion thereupon. We conceive another cause of the failure of the expedition to have been, that, instead of attempting to land when the report was received, on the twenty-fourth of September, from rear-admiral Broderick, and the captains who had been out to sound and reconnoitre, a council of war was summoned and held on the twenty-fifth, in which it was unanimously resolved not to land, as the attempt on Rochefort was neither advisable nor practicable; but it does not appear to us that there were then or at any time afterwards, either a body of troops or batteries on shore sufficient to have prevented the attempting a descent, in pursuance of the instructions signed by your majesty; neither does it appear to us that there were any reasons sufficient to induce the council of war to believe that Rochefort was so changed in respect to its strength, or posture of defence, since the expedition was first resolved on in England, as to prevent all attempts of an attack upon the place, in order to burn and destroy the docks, magazines, arsenals, and shipping, in obedience to your majesty’s command. And we think ourselves obliged to remark, in the council of war on the twenty-eighth of September, that no reason could have existed sufficient to prevent the attempt of landing the troops, as the council then unanimously resolved to land with all possible despatch. We beg leave also to remark, that after its being unanimously resolved to land, in the council of war of the twenty-eighth of September, the resolution was taken of returning to England, without any regular or general meeting of the said council; but as the whole operation was of so inconsiderable a nature, we do not offer this to your majesty as a cause of the failure of the expedition; since we cannot but look upon the expedition to have failed from the time the great object of it was laid aside in the council of war of the twenty-fifth.”
GEORGE II. 1727-1760
This report, signed by the general officers, Marlborough, Sackville, and Waldegrave, probably laid the foundation for the court-martial which sat soon after upon the conduct of the commander-in-chief of the expedition. The enemies of the minister made a handle of the miscarriage to lessen him in the esteem of the public, by laying the whole blame on his forming a project so expensive to the nation, on intelligence not only slight at the first view, but false upon further examination. But the people were still his advocates; they discerned something mysterious in the whole conduct of the commander-in-chief. They plainly perceived that caution took the place of vigour, and that the hours for action were spent in deliberations and councils of war. Had he debarked the troops, and made such an attack as would have distinguished his courage, the voice of the people would have acquitted him, however unsuccessful, though prudence perhaps might have condemned him. Even Braddock’s rashness they deemed preferable to Mor-daunt’s inactivity: the loss of so many brave lives was thought less injurious and disgraceful to the nation, than the too safe return of the present armament. The one demonstrated that the British spirit still existed; the other seemed to indicate the too powerful influence of wealth, luxury, and those manners which tend to debauch and emasculate the mind. A public trial of the commander-in-chief was expected by the people, and it was graciously granted by his majesty. It is even thought that Sir John Mordaunt himself demanded to have his conduct scrutinized, by which method alone he was sensible his character could be re-established. His majesty’s warrant for holding a court-martial was accordingly signed on the third day of December. The court was composed of nine lieutenant-generals, nine major-generals, and three colonels, who sat on the fourteenth, and continued by several adjournments to the twentieth. Lieutenant-general Sir John Mordaunt came prisoner before the court, and the following charge was exhibited against him; namely, that he being appointed, by the king, commander-in-chief of his majesty’s forces sent on an expedition to the coast of France, and having received orders and instructions relative thereto, from his majesty, under his royal sign-manual, and also by one of his principal secretaries of state, had disobeyed his majesty’s said orders and instructions. The proceedings of this court were nearly similar to those of the court of inquiry. The same evidences were examined, with the addition of sir Edward Hawke’s deposition; and a defence, differing in no essential point from the former, made by the prisoner; but the judgment given was clear and explicit. Sir John Mordaunt was unanimously found Not Guilty, and therefore acquitted, while the public opinion remained unaltered, and many persons inveighed as bitterly against the lenity of the present court-martial, as they had formerly against the severity of the sentence passed upon a late unfortunate admiral. The evidence of one gentleman in particular drew attention: he was accused of tergiversation, and of showing that partial indulgence which his own conduct required. He publicly defended his character: his performance was censured, and himself dismissed the service of his sovereign.
Besides the diversion intended by a descent on the coast of France, several other methods were employed to amuse the enemy, as well as to protect the trade of the kingdom, secure our colonies in the West Indies, and ensure the continuance of the extraordinary success which had lately blessed his majesty’s arms in the East Indies; but these we could not mention before without breaking the thread of our narration. On the ninth of February, admiral West sailed with a squadron of men of war to the westward, as did admiral Coates with the fleet under his convoy to the West Indies, and commodore Stevens with the trade to the East Indies, in the month of March. Admiral Holbourn and commodore Holmes, with eleven ships of the line, a fire-ship, bomb-ketch, and fifty transports, sailed from St. Helen’s for America in April. The admiral had on board six thousand two hundred effective men, exclusive of officers, under the command of general Hopson, assisted by lord Charles Hay. In May, admiral Osborne, who had been forced back to Plymouth with his squadron by stress of weather, set sail for the Mediterranean, as did two ships of war sent to convoy the American trade.
In the meantime, the privateers fitted out by private merchants and societies, greatly annoyed the French commerce. The Antigallican, a private ship of war, equipped by a society of men who assumed that name, took the duke de Penthievre Indiaman, off the part of Corunna, and carried her into Cadiz. The prize was estimated worth two hundred thousand pounds, and immediate application was made by France to the court of Spain for restitution, while the proprietors of the Anti-gallican were squandering in mirth, festivity, and riot, the imaginary wealth so easily and unexpectedly acquired. Such were the remonstrances made to his catholic majesty with respect to the illegality of the prize, which the French East India company asserted was taken within shot of a neutral port, that the Penthievre was first violently wrested out of the hands of the captors, then detained as a deposit, with sealed hatches, and a Spanish guard on board, till the claims of both parties could be examined, and at last adjudged to be an illegal capture, and consequently restored to the French, to the great disappointment of the owners of the privateer. Besides the success which attended a great number of other privateers, the lords of the admiralty published a list of above thirty ships of war and privateers taken from the enemy in the space of four mouths, by the English sloops and ships of war, exclusive of the duke de Aquitaine Indiaman, now fitted out as a ship of war, taken by the Eagle and Medway; the Pondicherry Indiaman, valued at one hundred and sixty thousand pounds, taken by the Doverman of war; and above six privateers brought into port by the diligent and brave captain Lockhart, for which he was honoured with a variety of presents of plate by several corporations, in testimony of their esteem and regard. This run of good fortune was not, however, without some retribution on the side of the enemy, who, out of twenty-one ships homeward bound from Carolina, made prize of nineteen, whence the merchants sustained considerable damage, and a great quantity of valuable commodities, indigo in particular, was lost to this country.