Sulla landed at Brundisium in the spring of B.C. 83, in the Consulship of L. Scipio and C. Norbanus. During the preceding year he had written to the Senate, recounting the services he had rendered to the commonwealth, complaining of the ingratitude with which he had been treated, announcing his speedy return to Italy, and threatening to take vengeance upon his enemies and those of the Republic. The Senate, in alarm, sent an embassy to Sulla to endeavor to bring about a reconciliation between him and his enemies, and meantime ordered the Consuls Cinna and Carbo to desist from levying troops and making farther preparations for war. Cinna and Carbo gave no heed to this command; they knew that a reconciliation was impossible, and resolved to carry over an army to Dalmatia, in order to oppose Sulla in Greece; but, after one detachment of their troops had embarked, the rest of the soldiers rose in mutiny, and murdered Cinna. The Marian party had thus lost their chief leader, but continued nevertheless to make every preparation to resist Sulla, for they were well aware that he would never forgive them, and that their only choice lay between victory and destruction. Besides this the Italians were ready to support them, as these new citizens feared that Sulla would deprive them of the rights which they had lately obtained after so much bloodshed. The Marian party had every prospect of victory, for their troops far exceeded those of their opponent. They had 200,000 men in arms, while Sulla landed at Brundusium with only 30,000, or at the most 40,000 men. But, on the other hand, the popular party had no one of sufficient influence and military reputation to take the supreme command in the war; their vast forces were scattered about Italy, in different armies, under different generals; the soldiers had no confidence in their commanders, and no enthusiasm in their cause; and the consequence was, that whole hosts of them deserted to Sulla on the first opportunity. Sulla's soldiers, on the contrary, were veterans, who had frequently fought by each other's sides, and had acquired that confidence in themselves and in their general which frequent victories always give. Still, if the Italians had remained faithful to the cause of the Marian party, Sulla would hardly have conquered, and therefore one of his first cares after landing at Brundusium was to detach them from his enemies. For this purpose he would not allow his troops to do any injury to the towns or fields of the Italians in his march from Brundusium through Calabria and Apulia, and he formed separate treaties with many of the Italian towns, by which he secured to them all the rights and privileges of Roman citizens which they then enjoyed. Among the Italians the Samnites continued to be the most formidable enemies of Sulla. They had joined the Marian party, not simply with the design of securing the supremacy for the latter, but with the hope of conquering Rome by their means, and then destroying forever their hated oppressor. Thus this Civil war became merely another phase of the Social war, and the struggle between Rome and Samnium for the supremacy of the peninsula was renewed after the subjection of the latter for more than two hundred years.
Sulla marched from Apulia into Campania without meeting with any resistance. In Campania he gained his first victory over the Consul Norbanus, who was defeated with great loss, and obliged to take refuge in Capua. His colleague Scipio, who was at no great distance, willingly accepted a truce which Sulla offered him, although Sertorius, the ablest of the Marian generals, warned him against entering into any negotiations. His caution was justified by the event. By means of his emissaries Sulla seduced the troops of Scipio, who at length found himself deserted by all his soldiers, and was taken prisoner in his tent. Sulla, however, dismissed him uninjured. On hearing of this, Carbo is said to have observed "that he had to contend in Sulla both with a lion and a fox, but that the fox gave him more trouble." Many distinguished Romans meantime had taken up arms on behalf of Sulla. Cn. Pompey, the son of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, then only twenty-three years of age, levied three legions in Picenum and the surrounding districts; and Q. Metellus Pius, M. Crassus, M. Lucullus, and several others, offered their services as legates. It was not, however, till the following year (B.C. 82) that the struggle was brought to a decisive issue. The Consuls of this year were Cn. Papirius Carbo and the younger Marius, the former of whom was intrusted with the protection of Etruria and Umbria, while the latter had to guard Rome and Latium. Sulla appears to have passed the winter at Campania. At the commencement of spring he advanced against the younger Marius, who had concentrated all his forces at Sacriportus, and defeated him with great loss. Marius took refuge in Præneste; and Sulla, after leaving Q. Lucretius Ofella with a large force to blockade the town, marched with the main body of his army to Rome. Marius was resolved not to perish unavenged, and accordingly, before Sulla could reach Rome, he sent orders to L. Damasippus, the Prætor, to put to death all his leading opponents. His orders were faithfully obeyed. Q. Mucius Scævola, the Pontifex Maximus and jurist, P. Antistius, L. Domitius, and many other distinguished men, were butchered, and their corpses thrown into the Tiber. Sulla entered the city without opposition, and marched against Carbo, who had been previously opposed by Pompey and Metellus. The history of this part of the war is involved in great obscurity. Carbo made two efforts to relieve Præneste, but failed in each; and, after fighting with various fortune against Pompey, Metellus, and Sulla, he at length embarked for Africa, despairing of farther success in Italy. Meantime Rome had nearly fallen into the hands of the enemy. The Samnites and Lucanians, under Pontius Telesinus and L. Lamponius, after attempting to relieve Præneste, resolved to march straight upon Rome, which had been left without an army for its protection. Sulla arrived barely in time to save the city. The battle was fought before the Colline Gate; it was long and obstinately contested; the combat was not simply for the supremacy of a party; the very existence of Rome was at stake, for Pontius had declared that he would raze the city to the ground. The left wing, where Sulla commanded in person, was driven off the field by the vehemence of the enemy's charge; but the success of the right wing, which was commanded by Crassus, enabled Sulla to restore the battle, and at length gain a complete victory. Fifty thousand men were said to have fallen on each side. All the most distinguished leaders of the Marian party either perished in the engagement, or were taken prisoners and put to death. Among these was the brave Samnite Pontius, whose head was cut off and carried under the walls of Præneste, thereby announcing to the young Marius that his last hope of succour was gone. To the Samnite prisoners Sulla showed no mercy. He was resolved to root out of the peninsula those heroic enemies of Rome. On the third day after the battle he collected all the Samnite and Lucanian prisoners in the Campus Martius, and ordered his soldiers to cut them down. The dying shrieks of so many victims frightened the Senators, who had been assembled at the same time by Sulla in the temple of Bellona; but he bade them attend to what he was saying, and not mind what was taking place outside, as he was only chastising some rebels. Præneste surrendered soon afterward. The Romans in the town were pardoned; but all the Samnites and Prænestines were massacred without mercy. The younger Marius put an end to his own life. The war in Italy was now virtually at an end, for the few towns which still held out had no prospect of offering any effectual opposition, and were reduced soon afterward. In other parts of the Roman world the war continued still longer, and Sulla did not live to see its completion. The armies of the Marian party in Sicily and Africa were subdued by Pompey in the course of the same year; but Sertorius in Spain continued to defy all the attempts of the Senate till B.C. 72.
Sulla was now master of Rome. He had not commenced the Civil war, but had been driven to it by the mad ambition of Marius. His enemies had attempted to deprive him of the command in the Mithridatic war, which had been legally conferred upon him by the Senate; and while he was righting the battles of the Republic they had declared him a public enemy, confiscated his property, and murdered the most distinguished of his friends and adherents. For all these wrongs Sulla had threatened to take the most ample vengeance; and he more than redeemed his word. He resolved to extirpate the popular party root and branch. One of his first acts was to draw up a list of his enemies who were to be put to death, which list was exhibited in the forum to public inspection, and called a Proscriptio. It was the first instance of the kind in Roman history. All persons in this list were outlaws who might be killed by any one with impunity; their property was confiscated to the state; their children and grandchildren lost their votes in the comitia, and were excluded from all public offices. Farther, all who killed a proscribed person, or indicated the place of his concealment, received two talents as a reward, and whoever sheltered such a person was punished with death. Terror now reigned not only at Rome, but throughout Italy. Fresh lists of the proscribed constantly appeared. No one was safe; for Sulla gratified his friends by placing in the fatal lists their personal enemies, or persons whose property was coveted by his adherents. An estate, a house, or even a piece of plate, was to many a man, who belonged to no political party, his death-warrant; for, although the confiscated property belonged to the state, and had to be sold by public auction, the friends and dependents of Sulla purchased it at a nominal price, as no one dared to bid against them. Oftentimes Sulla did not require the purchase-money to be paid at all, and in many cases he gave such property to his favorites without even the formality of a sale. The number of persons who perished by the proscriptions amounted to many thousands. At the commencement of these horrors Sulla had been appointed Dictator. As both the Consuls had perished, he caused the Senate to elect Valerius Flaccus interrex, and the latter brought before the people a rogatio, conferring the Dictatorship upon Sulla, for the purpose of restoring order to the Republic, and for as long a time as he judged to be necessary. Thus the Dictatorship was revived after being in abeyance for more than 120 years, and Sulla obtained absolute power over the lives and fortunes of all the citizens. This was toward the close of B.C. 81. Sulla's great object in being invested with the Dictatorship was to carry into execution in a legal manner the great reforms which he meditated in the constitution and the administration of justice, by which he hoped to place the government of the Republic on a firm and secure basis. He had no intention of abolishing the Republic, and consequently he caused Consuls to be elected for the following year, B.C. 81, and was elected to the office himself in B.C. 80, while he continued to hold the Dictatorship.
At the beginning of B.C. 81 Sulla celebrated a splendid triumph on account of his victory over Mithridates. In a speech which he delivered to the people at the close of the gorgeous ceremony, he claimed for himself the surname of Felix, as he attributed his success in life to the favor of the gods. All ranks in Rome bowed in awe before their master; and among other marks of distinction which were voted to him by the obsequious Senate, a gilt equestrian statue was erected to his honor before the Rostra, bearing the inscription "Cornelio Sullæ Imperatori Felici."
During the years B.C. 80 and 79 Sulla carried into execution his various reforms in the constitution, of which an account is given at the end of this chapter. At the same time he established many military colonies throughout Italy. The inhabitants of the Italian towns which had fought against Sulla were deprived of the full Roman franchise which had been lately conferred upon them; their lands were confiscated and given to the soldiers who had fought under him. A great number of these colonies were settled in Etruria. They had the strongest interest in upholding the institutions of Sulla, since any attempt to invalidate the latter would have endangered their newly-acquired possessions. But, though they were a support to the power of Sulla, they hastened the fall of the commonwealth; an idle and licentious soldiery supplanted an industrious agricultural population; and Catiline found nowhere more adherents than among the military colonies of Sulla. While Sulla thus established throughout Italy a population devoted to his interests, he created at Rome a kind of body-guard for his protection by giving the citizenship to a great number of slaves belonging to those who had been proscribed by him. The slaves thus rewarded are said to have been as many as 10,000, and were called Cornelii after him as their patron.
Sulla had completed his reforms by the beginning of B.C. 79; and as he longed for the undisturbed enjoyment of his pleasures, he resigned his Dictatorship, and declared himself ready to render an account of his conduct while in office. This voluntary abdication by Sulla of the sovereignty of the Roman world has excited the astonishment and admiration of both ancient and modern writers. But it is evident that Sulla never contemplated, like Julius Cæsar, the establishment of a monarchical form of government; and it must be recollected that he could retire into a private station without any fear that attempts would be made against his life or his institutions. The ten thousand Cornelii at Rome and his veterans stationed throughout Italy, as well as the whole strength of the aristocratical party, secured him against all danger. Even in his retirement his will was law, and shortly before his death he ordered his slaves to strangle a magistrate of one of the towns in Italy because he was a public defaulter.
After resigning his Dictatorship, Sulla retired to his estate at Puteoli, and there, surrounded by the beauties of nature and art, he passed the remainder of his life in those literary and sensual enjoyments in which he had always taken so much pleasure. He died in B.C. 78, in the sixtieth year of his age. The immediate cause of his death was the rupture of a blood-vessel, but some time before he had been suffering from the disgusting disease which is known in modern times by the name of Morbus Pediculosus. The Senate, faithful to the last, resolved to give him the honor of a public funeral. This was, however, opposed by the Consul Lepidus, who had resolved to attempt the repeal of Sulla's laws; but the Dictator's power continued unshaken even after his death. The veterans were summoned from their colonies, and Q. Catulus, L. Lucullus, and Cn. Pompey placed themselves at their head. Lepidus was obliged to give way, and allowed the funeral to take place without interruption. It was a gorgeous pageant. The Magistrates, the Senate, the Equites, the Priests, and the Vestal virgins, as well as the veterans, accompanied the funeral procession to the Campus Martius, where the corpse was burnt according to the wish of Sulla himself, who feared that his enemies might insult his remains, as he had done those of Marius, which had been taken out of the grave and thrown into the Anio at his command. It had been previously the custom of the Cornelia gens to bury and not burn their dead. A monument was erected to Sulla in the Campus Martius, the inscription on which he is said to have composed himself. It stated that none of his friends ever did him a kindness, and none of his enemies a wrong, without being fully repaid.
All the reforms of Sulla were effected by means of Leges, which were proposed by him in the Comitia Centuriata, and bore the general name of Leges Corneliæ. They may be divided into four classes: laws relating to the constitution, to the ecclesiastical corporations, to the administration of justice, and to the improvement of public morals. Their general object and design was to restore, as far as possible, the ancient Roman Constitution, and to give again to the Senate and the Nobility that power of which they had been gradually deprived by the leaders of the popular party. His Constitution did not last, because the aristocracy were thoroughly selfish and corrupt, and exercised the power which Sulla had intrusted to them only for their own aggrandizement. Their shameless conduct soon disgusted the provinces as well as the capital; the people again regained their power, but the consequence was an anarchy and not a government; and as neither class was fit to rule, they were obliged to submit to the dominion of a single man. Thus the empire became a necessity to the exhausted Roman world.
I. Laws relating to the Constitution.—Sulla deprived the Comitia Tributa of their legislative and judicial powers; but he allowed them to elect the Tribunes, Ædiles, Quæstors, and other inferior magistrates. This seems to have been the only purpose for which they were called together. The Comitia Centuriata, on the other hand, were allowed to retain their right of legislation unimpaired. He restored, however, the ancient regulation, which had fallen into desuetude, that no matter should be brought before them without the previous sanction of a senatus consultum.
The Senate had been so much reduced in numbers by the proscriptions of Sulla, that he was obliged to fill up the vacancies by the election of three hundred new members. But he made no alteration in their duties and functions, as the whole administration of the state was in their hands; and he gave them the initiative in legislation by requiring a previous senatus consultum respecting all measures that were to be submitted to the Comitia, as already stated.
With respect to the magistrates, Sulla increased the number of Quæstors from eight to twenty, and of Prætors from six to eight. He renewed the old law that no one should hold the Prætorship before he had been Quæstor, nor the Consulship before he had been Prætor. He also renewed the law that no one should be elected to the same magistracy till after the expiration of ten years.
One of the most important of Sulla's reforms related to the Tribunate, which he deprived of all real power. He took away from the Tribunes the right of proposing a rogation of any kind to the Tribes, or of impeaching any person before them; and he appears to have limited the right of intercession to their giving protection to private persons against the unjust decisions of magistrates, as, for instance, in the enlisting of soldiers. To degrade the Tribunate still lower, Sulla enacted that whoever had held this office forfeited thereby all right to become a candidate for any of the higher curule offices, in order that all persons of rank, talent, and wealth might be deterred from holding an office which would be a fatal impediment to rising any higher in the state. He also required persons to be Senators before they could become Tribunes.
II. Laws relating to the Ecclesiastical Corporations.—Sulla repealed the Lex Domitia, which gave to the Comitia Tributa the right of electing the members of the great ecclesiastical corporations, and restored to the latter the right of co-optatio, or self-election. At the same time, he increased the number of Pontiffs and Augurs to fifteen respectively.
III. Laws relating to the Administration of Justice.—Sulla established permanent courts for the trial of particular offenses, in each of which a Prætor presided. A precedent for this had been given by the Lex Calpurnia of the Tribune L. Calpurnius Piso, in B.C. 149, by which it was enacted that a Prætor should preside at all trials for Repetundæ during his year of office. This was called a Quæstio Perpetua, and nine such Quæstiones Perpetuæ were established by Sulla, namely, De Repetundis, Majestatis, De Sicariis et Veneficis, De Parricidio, Peculatus, Ambitus, De Nummis Adulterinis, De Falsis or Testamentaria, and De Vi Publica. Jurisdiction in civil cases was left to the Prætor Peregrinus and the Prætor Urbanus as before, and the other six Prætors presided in the Quæstiones; but as the latter were more in number than the Prætors, some of the Prætors took more than one Quæstio, or a Judex Quæstionis was appointed. The Prætors, after their election, had to draw lots for their several jurisdictions. Sulla enacted that the Judices should be taken exclusively from the Senators, and not from the Equites, the latter of whom had possessed this privilege, with a few interruptions, from the law of C. Gracchus, in B.C. 123. This was a great gain for the aristocracy, since the offenses for which they were usually brought to trial, such as bribery, malversation, and the like, were so commonly practiced by the whole order, that they were, in most cases, nearly certain of acquittal from men who required similar indulgence themselves.
Sulla's reform in the criminal law, the greatest and most enduring part of his legislation, belongs to a history of Roman law, and can not be given here.
IV. Laws relating to the Improvement of Public Morals.—Of these we have very little information. One of them was a Lex Sumtuaria, which enacted that not more than a certain sum of money should be spent upon entertainments, and also restrained extravagance in funerals. There was likewise a law of Sulla respecting marriage, the provisions of which are quite unknown, as it was probably abrogated by the Julian law of Augustus.
Sulla was scarcely dead before an attempt was made to overthrow the aristocratic constitution which he had established. The Consul M. Lepidus had already, as we have seen, endeavored to prevent the burial of Sulla in the Campus Martius. He now proposed to repeal the Dictator's laws; but the other Consul, Q. Catulus, remained firm to the aristocracy, and offered the most strenuous opposition to the measures of his colleague. Shortly afterward the Senate ordered Lepidus to repair to Farther Gaul, which had been assigned to him as his Province; but he availed himself of the opportunity to collect an army in Etruria, and at the beginning of the following year marched straight upon Rome. The Senate assembled an army, which they placed under the command of Q. Catulus, with Pompey as his lieutenant. A battle was fought near the Mulvian bridge, in which Lepidus was defeated, and, finding it impossible to maintain his footing in Italy, he sailed with the remainder of his forces to Sardinia, where he died soon afterward.
Meantime the remainder of the Marian party found refuge in Spain. Q. Sertorius, one of the ablest of their generals, had received the government of this country in the year B.C. 82. He soon acquired an extraordinary ascendency over the minds of the natives, and flattered them with the hope of establishing an independent state which might bid defiance to Rome. His influence was enhanced by the superstition of the people. He was accompanied on all occasions by a tame fawn, which they believed to be a familiar spirit. So attached did they become to his person, that he found no difficulty in collecting a formidable army, which for some years successfully opposed all the power of Rome. After defeating several generals whom Sulla had sent against him, he had to encounter, in B.C. 79, Q. Metellus, who had been Consul the previous year with Sulla. But Metellus did not fare much better than his predecessors; and in B.C. 78 Sertorius was re-enforced by a considerable body of troops which Perperna carried with him into Spain after the defeat of Lepidus. The growing power of Sertorius led the Senate to send Pompey to the assistance of Metellus. Pompey, though only 30 years of age, was already regarded as the ablest general of the Republic; and as he played such a prominent part in the later history, we may here pause to give a brief account of his early career.
POMPEY was born B.C. 106, and was, as we have already seen, the son of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, who fought against the Italians in his Consulship, B.C. 89. The young Pompey served under his father in this war, when he was only 17 years of age, and continued with him till his death two years afterward. He was present at the battle of the Colline Gate in B.C. 87, and shortly afterward he saved the life of his father, and quelled an insurrection of the soldiers by his courage and activity. As soon as Sulla had finished the Mithridatic war, and was on his way to Italy, Pompey, instead of waiting, like the other leaders of the aristocracy, for the arrival of their chief, resolved to share with him the glory of crushing the Marian party. Accordingly, he proceeded to levy troops in Picenum without holding any public office; and such was his personal influence that he was able to raise an army of three legions. Before joining Sulla he gained a brilliant victory over the Marian generals, and was received by Sulla with the greatest distinction. Upon the conclusion of the war in Italy Pompey was sent first into Sicily, and afterward into Africa, where the Marian party still held out. His success was rapid and decisive. In a few months he reduced the whole of Numidia, and, unlike other Roman governors, abstained from plundering the province. His military achievements and his incorruptibility procured him the greatest renown, and he returned to Rome covered with glory (B.C. 80). Numbers flocked out of the city to meet him; and the Dictator himself, who formed one of the crowd, greeted him with the surname of MAGNUS or the GREAT, which he bore ever afterward. Sulla at first refused to let him triumph. Hitherto no one but a Dictator, Consul, or Prætor had enjoyed this distinction; but as Pompey insisted upon the honor, Sulla gave way, and the young general entered Rome in triumph as a simple Eques, and before he had completed his 25th year.
Pompey again exhibited his power in promoting, in B.C. 79, the election of M. Æmilius Lepidus to the Consulship, in opposition to the wishes of Sulla. The latter had now retired from public affairs, and contented himself with warning Pompey, as he met him returning from the comitia in triumph, "Young man, it is time for you not to slumber, for you have strengthened your rival against yourself." Lepidus seems to have reckoned upon the support of Pompey; but in this he was disappointed, for Pompey remained faithful to the aristocracy, and thus saved his party. He fought at the Mulvian bridge against Lepidus, as we have already related, and afterward marched into Cisalpine Gaul against the remains of his party. The Senate, who now began to dread Pompey, ordered him to disband his army; but he found various excuses for evading this command, as he was anxious to obtain the command of the war against Sertorius in Spain. They hesitated, however, to give him this opportunity for gaining fresh distinction and additional power; and it was only in consequence of the increasing power of Sertorius that they at length unwillingly determined to send Pompey to Spain, with the title of Proconsul, and with powers equal to Metellus.
Pompey arrived in Spain in B.C. 76. He soon found that he had a more formidable enemy to deal with than any he had yet encountered. He suffered several defeats, and, though he gained some advantages, yet such were his losses that at the end of two years he was obliged to send to Rome for re-enforcements. The war continued three years longer; but Sertorius, who had lost some of his influence over the Spanish tribes, and who had become an object of jealousy to M. Perperna and his principal Roman officers, was unable to carry on operations with the same vigor as during the two preceding years. Pompey accordingly gained some advantages over him, but the war was still far from a close; and the genius of Sertorius would probably have soon given a very different aspect to affairs had he not been assassinated by Perperna in B.C. 72. Perperna had flattered himself that he should succeed to the power of Sertorius; but he soon found that he had murdered the only man who was able to save him from ruin. In his first battle with Pompey he was completely defeated, his principal officers slain, and himself taken prisoner. Anxious to save his life, he offered to deliver up to Pompey the papers of Sertorius, containing letters from many of the leading men at Rome. But Pompey refused to see him, and commanded the letters to be burnt. The war was now virtually at an end, and the remainder of the year was employed in subduing the towns which still held out against Pompey. Metellus had taken no part in the final struggle with Perperna, and Pompey thus obtained the credit of bringing the war to a conclusion. The people longed for his return, that he might deliver Italy from Spartacus and his horde of gladiators, who had defeated the Consuls, and were in possession of a great part of the peninsula.
A righteous retribution had overtaken the Romans for their love of the cruel sports of the amphitheatre. The gladiators were generally prisoners taken in war, and sold to persons who trained them in schools for the Roman games. There was such a school at Capua, and among the gladiators was a Thracian of the name of Spartacus, originally a chief of banditti, who had been taken prisoner by the Romans, and was now destined to be butchered for their amusement. Having prevailed upon about 70 of his comrades, he burst out of the school with them, succeeded in obtaining arms, and took refuge in the crater of Vesuvius, at that time an extinct volcano (B.C. 73). Here he was soon joined by large numbers of slaves, who flocked to him from all quarters. He was soon at the head of a formidable army. The desolation of the Social and Civil Wars had depopulated Italy, while the employment of slave-labor furnished Spartacus with an endless supply of soldiers. In addition to this, the war with Sertorius was not yet finished, and that with Mithridates, of which we shall speak presently, had already commenced. For upward of two years Spartacus was master of Italy, which he laid waste from the foot of the Alps to the southernmost corner of the peninsula. In B.C. 72 he found himself at the head of 100,000 men, and defeated both Consuls. As the Consuls of the following year had no military reputation, the conduct of the war was intrusted to the Prætor, M. Licinius Crassus, who had greatly distinguished himself in the wars of Sulla. He had been rewarded by the Dictator with donations of confiscated property, and had accumulated an immense fortune. Six legions were now given him in addition to the remains of the Consular armies already in the field. The Roman troops were disheartened and disorganized by defeat, but Crassus restored discipline by decimating the soldiers. Spartacus was driven to the extreme point of Bruttium. Crassus drew strong lines of circumvallation around Rhegium, and by his superior numbers prevented the escape of the slaves. Spartacus now attempted to pass over to Sicily, where he would have been welcomed by thousands of followers. He failed in the attempt to cross the straits, but at length succeeded in forcing his way through the lines of Crassus. The Roman general hastened in pursuit, and in Lucania fell in with the main body of the fugitives. A desperate battle ensued, in which Spartacus perished, with the greater part of his followers. About 6000 were taken prisoners, whom Crassus impaled on each side of the Appian road between Rome and Capua. A body of 5000 made their way northward, whom Pompey met as he was returning from Spain, and cut to pieces. Crassus had, in reality, brought the war to an end, but Pompey took the credit to himself, and wrote to the Senate, saying, "Crassus, indeed, has defeated the enemy, but I have extirpated them by the roots."
Pompey and Crassus now approached the city at the head of their armies, and each laid claim to the Consulship. Neither of them was qualified by the laws of Sulla. Pompey was only in his 35th year, and had not even held the office of Quæstor. Crassus was still Prætor, and two years ought to elapse before he could become Consul. Pompey, however, agreed to support the claims of Crassus, and the Senate dared not offer open opposition to two generals at the head of powerful armies. Pompey, moreover, declared himself the advocate of the popular rights, and promised to restore the Tribunitian power. Accordingly, they were elected Consuls for the following year. Pompey entered the city in triumph on the 31st of December, B.C. 71, and Crassus enjoyed the honor of an ovation.
The Consulship of Pompey and Crassus (B.C. 70) was memorable for the repeal of the most important portions of Sulla's constitutional reforms. One of Pompey's first acts was to redeem the pledge he had given to the people, by bringing forward a law for the restoration of the Tribunitian power. The law was passed with little opposition; for the Senate felt that it was worse than useless to contend against Pompey, supported as he was by the popular enthusiasm and by his troops, which were still in the immediate neighborhood of the city. He also struck another blow at the aristocracy. By one of Sulla's laws, the Judices, during the last ten years, had been chosen from the Senate. The corruption and venality of the latter in the administration of justice had excited such general indignation that some change was clamorously demanded by the people. Accordingly, the Prætor L. Aurelius Cotta, with the approbation of Pompey, proposed a law by which the Judices were to be taken in future from the Senate, Equites, and Tribuni Ærarii, the latter probably representing the wealthier members of the third order in the state. This law was likewise carried; but it did not improve the purity of the administration of justice, since corruption was not confined to the Senators, but pervaded all classes of the community alike. Pompey had thus broken with the aristocracy, and had become the great popular hero. In carrying both these measures he was strongly supported by Cæsar, who, though he was rapidly rising in popular favor, could as yet only hope to weaken the power of the aristocracy through Pompey's means.
When Sulla returned to Italy after the First Mithridatic War, he left L. Murena, with two legions, to hold the command in Asia. Murena, who was eager for some opportunity of earning the honor of a triumph, pretending that Mithridates had not yet evacuated the whole of Cappadocia, not only marched into that country, but even crossed the Halys, and laid waste the plains of Pontus itself (B.C. 83). To this flagrant breach of the treaty so lately concluded the Roman general was in great measure instigated by Archelaus, who, finding himself regarded with suspicion by Mithridates, had consulted his safety by flight, and was received with the utmost honors by the Romans. Mithridates, who was wholly unprepared to renew the contest with Rome, offered no opposition to the progress of Murena; but finding that general disregard his remonstrances, he sent to Rome to complain of his aggression. When, in the following spring (B.C. 82), he saw Murena preparing to renew his hostile incursions, he at once determined to oppose him by force, and assembled a large army, with which he met the Roman general on the banks of the Halys. The action that ensued terminated in the complete victory of the king, and Murena, with difficultly, effected his retreat into Phrygia, leaving Cappadocia at the mercy of Mithridates, who quickly overran the whole province. Shortly afterward A. Gabinius arrived in Asia, bringing peremptory orders from Sulla to Murena to desist from hostilities, whereupon Mithridates once more consented to evacuate Cappadocia. Thus ended what is commonly called the Second Mithridatic War.
Notwithstanding the interposition of Sulla, Mithridates was well aware that the peace between him and Rome was in fact only suspension of hostilities, and that the haughty Republic would never suffer the massacre of her citizens in Asia to remain ultimately unpunished. Hence all his efforts were directed toward the formation of an army capable of contending, not only in numbers, but in discipline, with those of Rome; and with this view he armed his barbarian troops after the Roman fashion, and endeavored to train them up in that discipline of which he had so strongly felt the effect in the preceding contest. In these attempts he was doubtless assisted by the refugees of the Marian party, who had accompanied Fimbria into Asia, and on the defeat of that general by Sulla had taken refuge with the King of Pontus. At their instigation, also, Mithridates sent an embassy to Sertorius, who was still maintaining his ground in Spain, and concluded an alliance with him against their common enemies. But it was the death of Nicomedes III., king of Bithynia, at the beginning of B.C. 74, that brought matters to a crisis, and became the immediate occasion of the war which both parties had long felt to be inevitable. That monarch left his dominions by will to the Roman people, and Bithynia was accordingly declared a Roman province; but Mithridates asserted that the late king had left a legitimate son by his wife Nysa, whose pretensions he immediately prepared to support by his arms.
The forces with which Mithridates was now prepared to take the field were such as might inspire him with no unreasonable confidence of victory. He had assembled an army of 120,000 foot-soldiers, armed and disciplined in the Roman manner, and 16,000 horse, besides a hundred scythed chariots. His fleet, also, was so far superior to any that the Romans could oppose to him as to give him the almost undisputed command of the sea. These preparations, however, appear to have delayed him so long that the season was far advanced before he was able to take the field, and both the Roman Consuls, L. Licinius Lucullus and M. Aurelius Cotta, had arrived in Asia. Neither of them, however, was able to oppose his first irruption. He traversed almost the whole of Bithynia without encountering any resistance; and when at length Cotta ventured to give him battle under the walls of Chalcedon, his army and fleet were totally defeated. Mithridates now proceeded to lay siege to Cyzicus both by sea and land. But Lucullus, who had advanced from Phrygia to the relief of Cotta, and followed Mithridates to Cyzicus, took possession of an advantageous position near the camp of the king, where he almost entirely cut him off from receiving supplies by land, while the storms of the winter prevented him from depending on those by sea. Hence it was not long before famine began to make itself felt in the camp of Mithridates, and all his assaults upon the city having been foiled by the courage and resolution of the besieged, he was at length compelled (early in the year B.C. 73) to abandon the enterprise and raise the siege. In his retreat he was repeatedly attacked by the Roman general, and suffered very heavy loss at the passage of the Æsepus and Granicus. By the close of the year the great army with which he had commenced the war was annihilated, and he was not only compelled to retire within his own dominions, but was without the means of opposing the advance of Lucullus into the heart of Pontus itself. But he now again set to work with indefatigable activity to raise a fresh army; and while he left the whole of the sea-coast of Pontus open to the invaders, he established himself in the interior at Cabira. Here he was again defeated by Lucullus; and despairing of opposing the farther progress of the Romans, he fled into Armenia to claim the protection and assistance of his son-in-law Tigranes.
Tigranes was at this moment the most powerful monarch of Asia, but he appears to have been unwilling to engage openly in war with Rome; and on this account, while he received the fugitive monarch in a friendly manner, he refused to admit him to his presence, and showed no disposition to attempt his restoration. But the arrogance of the Romans brought about a change in his policy; and Tigranes, offended at the haughty conduct of Appius Claudius, whom Lucullus had sent to demand the surrender of Mithridates, not only refused this request, but determined at once to prepare for war.
While Lucullus was waiting for the return of Claudius, he devoted his attention to the settlement of the affairs of Asia, which was suffering severely from the oppressions of the farmers of the public taxes. By various judicious regulations he put a stop to their exactions, and earned the gratitude of the cities of Asia; but at the same time he brought upon himself the enmity of the Equites, who were the farmers of the revenue. They were loud against him in their complaints at Rome, and by their continued clamors undoubtedly prepared the way for his ultimate recall.
Meanwhile community of interests between Mithridates and Tigranes had led to a complete reconciliation between them, and the Pontic king, who had spent a year and eight months in the dominions of his son-in-law without being admitted to a personal interview, was now made to participate in all the councils of Tigranes, and appointed to levy an army to unite in the war. But it was in vain that in the ensuing campaign (B.C. 69) he urged upon his son-in-law the lessons of his own experience, and advised him to shun a regular action with Lucullus: Tigranes, confident in the multitude of his forces, gave battle at Tigranocerta, and was defeated, before Mithridates had been able to join him. But this disaster, so precisely in accordance with the warnings of Mithridates, served to raise the latter so high in the estimation of Tigranes, that from this time forward the whole conduct of the war was intrusted to the direction of the King of Pontus.
In the following summer (B.C. 68) Lucullus crossed the Taurus, penetrated into the heart of Armenia, and again defeated the allied monarchs near the city of Artaxata. But the early severity of the season, and the discontent of his own troops, checked the farther advance of the Roman general, who turned aside into Mesopotamia. Here Mithridates left him to lay siege to the fortress of Nisibis, which was supposed to be impregnable, while he himself took advantage of his absence to invade Pontus at the head of a large army, and endeavor to regain possession of his former dominions. The defense of Pontus was confided to Fabius, one of the lieutenants of Lucullus; but the oppression of the Romans had excited a general spirit of disaffection, and the people crowded around the standard of Mithridates. Fabius was totally defeated, and compelled to shut himself up in the fortress of Cabira. In the following spring (B.C. 67), Triarius, another of the Roman generals, was also defeated with immense loss. The blow was one of the severest which the Roman arms had sustained for a long period: 7000 of their troops fell, among whom were an unprecedented number of officers, and their camp itself was taken.
The advance of Lucullus himself from Mesopotamia prevented Mithridates from following up his advantage, and he withdrew into Lesser Armenia, where he took up a strong position to await the approach of Tigranes. But the farther proceedings of Lucullus were paralyzed by the mutinous and disaffected spirit of his own soldiers. Their discontents were fostered by P. Clodius, whose turbulent and restless spirit already showed itself in its full force, and were encouraged by reports from Rome, where the demagogues who were favorable to Pompey, or had been gained over by the Equestrian party, were loud in their clamors against Lucullus. They accused him of protracting the war for his own personal objects, either of ambition or avarice; and the soldiery, whose appetite for plunder had been often checked by Lucullus, readily joined in the outcry. Accordingly, on the arrival of Tigranes, the two monarchs found themselves able to overrun almost the whole of Pontus and Cappadocia without opposition.
Such was the state of affairs when ten legates arrived in Asia to reduce Pontus to the form of a Roman province, and they had, in consequence, to report to the Senate that the country supposed to be conquered was again in the hands of the enemy. The adversaries of Lucullus naturally availed themselves of so favorable an occasion, and a decree was passed transferring to M. Acilius Glabrio, one of the Consuls for the year, the province of Bithynia, and the command against Mithridates. But Glabrio was wholly incompetent for the task assigned to him. On arriving in Bithynia he made no attempt to assume the command, but remained within the confines of his province, while he still farther embarrassed the position of Lucullus by issuing proclamations to his soldiers, announcing to them that their general was superseded, and releasing them from their obedience. Before the close of the year (B.C. 67) Lucullus had the mortification of seeing Mithridates established once more in the possession of his hereditary dominions. But it was still more galling to his feelings when, in the spring of the following year (B.C. 66), he was called upon to resign the command to Pompey, who had just brought to a successful termination the war against the pirates.
The Mediterranean Sea had long been swarming with pirates. From the earliest times piracy has more or less prevailed in this sea, which, lying between three continents, and abounding with numerous creeks and islands, presents at the same time both the greatest temptations and the greatest facilities for piratical pursuits. Moreover, in consequence of the Social and Civil wars, and the absence of any fleet to preserve order upon the sea, piracy had reached an alarming height. The pirates possessed fleets in all parts of the Mediterranean, were in the habit of plundering the most wealthy cities on the coasts, and had at length carried their audacity so far as to make descents upon the Appian Road, and carry off Roman magistrates, with their lictors. All communication between Rome and the provinces was cut off, or at least rendered extremely dangerous; the fleets of corn-vessels, upon which Rome to a great extent depended for its subsistence, could not reach the city, and the price of provisions in consequence rose enormously. Such a state of things had become intolerable, and all eyes were now directed to Pompey. At the beginning of B.C. 67 the Tribune A. Gabinius brought forward a bill which was intended to give Pompey almost absolute authority over the greater part of the Roman world. It proposed that the people should elect a man with consular rank, who should possess unlimited power for three years over the whole of the Mediterranean, a fleet of 200 ships, with as many soldiers and sailors as he thought necessary, and 6000 Attic talents. The bill did not name Pompey, but it was clear who was meant. The aristocracy were in the utmost alarm, and in the Senate Cæsar was almost the only person who came forward in its support. Party spirit ran to such a height that the most serious riots ensued. Even Pompey himself was threatened by the Consul, "If you emulate Romulus, you will not escape the end of Romulus." Q. Catulus and Q. Hortensius spoke against the bill with great eloquence, but with no effect. On the day that the bill was passed the price of provisions at Rome immediately fell, a fact which showed the immense confidence which all parties placed in the military abilities of Pompey.
Pompey's plans were formed with great skill, and were crowned with complete success. He stationed his lieutenants with different squadrons in various parts of the Mediterranean to prevent the pirates from uniting, and to hunt them out of the various bays and creeks in which they concealed themselves; while, at the same time, he swept the middle of the sea with the main body of his fleet, and chased them eastward. In forty days he drove the pirates out of the western seas, and restored communication between Spain, Africa, and Italy. After then remaining a short time in Italy, he sailed from Brundusium, cleared the seas as he went along, and forced the pirates to the Cilician coast. Here the decisive action was fought; the pirates were defeated, and more than 20,000 prisoners fell into his hands. Those on whom most reliance could be placed were distributed among the small and depopulated cities of Cilicia, and a large number were settled at Soli, which was henceforward called Pompeiopolis. The second part of this campaign occupied only forty-nine days, and the whole war was brought to a conclusion in the course of three months. Pompey remained in Cilicia during the remainder of this year and the beginning of the one following. Meantime the Tribune C. Manilius brought forward a bill (B.C. 66) giving to Pompey the command of the war against Mithridates, with unlimited power over the army and the fleet in the East, and with the rights of a Proconsul in the whole of Asia as far as Armenia. As his Proconsular power already extended over all the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean in virtue of the Gabinian law, this new measure virtually placed almost the whole of the Roman dominions in his hands. But there was no power, however excessive, which the people were not ready to intrust to their favorite hero; and the bill was accordingly passed, notwithstanding the opposition of Hortensius, Catulus, and the aristocratical party. Cicero advocated the measure in an oration which has come down to us (Pro Lege Manilia), and Cæsar likewise supported it with his growing popularity and influence.
On receiving intelligence of this new appointment, Pompey immediately crossed the Taurus, and took the command of the army from Lucullus.
The power of Mithridates had been broken by the previous victories of Lucullus, and the successes which the king had gained lately were only of a temporary nature, mainly owing to the disorganization of the Roman army. In the plan of the campaign Pompey displayed great military skill. One of his first measures was to secure the alliance of the Parthian king, which not only deprived Mithridates of all hopes of succor from that quarter, but likewise cut him off from all assistance from the Armenian king Tigranes, who was now obliged to look to the safety of his own dominions. Pompey next stationed his fleet in different squadrons along the coasts of Asia Minor, in order to deprive Mithridates of all communication from the sea, and he then proceeded in person at the head of his land-forces against the king. Thus thrown back upon his own resources, Mithridates sued for peace, but, as Pompey would hear of nothing but unqualified submission, the negotiation was broken off. The king was still at the head of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse; but he knew too well the strength of a Roman army to venture an engagement with these forces, and accordingly withdrew gradually to the frontiers of Armenia. For a long time he succeeded in avoiding a battle, but he was at length surprised by Pompey in Lesser Armenia, as he was marching through a narrow pass. The battle was soon decided; the king lost the greater number of his troops, and escaped with only a few horsemen to the fortress of Synorium, on the borders of the Greater Armenia. Here he again collected a considerable force; but as Tigranes refused to admit him into his dominions, because he suspected him of fomenting the intrigues of his son against him, Mithridates had no alternative but to take refuge in his own distant dominions in the Cimmerian Bosporus. To reach them he had to march through Colchis, and to fight his way through the wild and barbarous tribes that occupied the country between the Caucasus and the Euxine. He succeeded, however, in this arduous enterprise, and reached the Bosporus in safety in the course of next year. Pompey abandoned at present all thoughts of following the fugitive king, and resolved at once to attack Tigranes, who was now the more formidable of the two monarchs.
On entering Armenia Pompey met with no opposition. He was joined by the young Tigranes, who had revolted against his father, and all the cities submitted to them on their approach. When the Romans drew near to Artaxata, the king, deserted by his army and his court, went out to meet Pompey, and threw himself before him as a suppliant. Pompey received him with kindness, acknowledged him as King of Armenia, and demanded only the payment of 6000 talents. His foreign possessions, however, in Syria, Phœnicia, Cilicia, Galatia, and Cappadocia, which had been conquered by Lucullus, were to belong to the Romans. To his son Tigranes, Sophene and Gordyene were given as an independent kingdom; but as the young prince was discontented with this arrangement, and even ventured to utter threats, Pompey had him arrested, and kept him in chains to grace his triumph.
After thus settling the affairs of Armenia, Pompey proceeded northward in pursuit of Mithridates. But the season was so far advanced that he took up his winter quarters on the banks of the River Cyrus. Early in the spring (B.C. 65) he resumed his march northward, and advanced as far as the River Phasis, but, obtaining here more certain information of the movements of Mithridates, and of the wild and inaccessible nature of the country through which he would have to march in order to reach the king, he retraced his steps, and led his troops into winter quarters at Amisus, on the Euxine. He now reduced Pontus to the form of a Roman province.
In B.C. 64 Pompey marched into Syria, where he deposed Antiochus Asiaticus, and made the country a Roman province. He likewise compelled the neighboring princes, who had established independent kingdoms on the ruins of the Syrian empire, to submit to the Roman dominion. The whole of this year was occupied with the settlement of Syria and the adjacent countries.
Next year (B.C. 63) Pompey advanced farther south, in order to establish the Roman supremacy in Phœnicia, Cœle-Syria, and Palestine. The latter country was at this time distracted by a civil war between Hyrcanus and Aristobulus. Pompey espoused the side of Hyrcanus, and Aristobulus surrendered himself to Pompey when the latter had advanced near to Jerusalem. But the Jews refused to follow the example of their king, and it was not till after a siege of three months that the city was taken. Pompey entered the Holy of Holies, the first time that any human being, except the high-priest, had penetrated into this sacred spot. He reinstated Hyrcanus in the high-priesthood, but compelled him to pay an annual tribute to Rome; Aristobulus accompanied him as a prisoner. It was during this war in Palestine that Pompey received intelligence of the death of Mithridates.
During the last two years Mithridates had been making the most extensive preparations for a renewal of the contest. He had conceived the daring project of marching round the north and west coasts of the Euxine, and penetrating even into Italy. With these views, he was busily engaged in assembling such a fleet and array as would be sufficient for an enterprise of this magnitude; but his proceedings were delayed by a long and painful illness, which incapacitated him for any personal exertion. At length, however, his preparations were completed, and he found himself at the head of an army of 36,000 men and a considerable fleet. But during his illness disaffection had made rapid progress among his followers. The full extent of his schemes was probably communicated to few; but enough had transpired to alarm the multitude, and a formidable conspiracy was organized by Pharnaces, the favorite son of Mithridates. He was quickly joined both by the whole army and the citizens of Panticapæum, who unanimously proclaimed him king, and Mithridates saw that no choice remained to him but death or captivity. Hereupon he took poison, which he constantly carried with him; but his constitution had been so long inured to antidotes that it did not produce the desired effect, and he was compelled to call in the assistance of one of his Gaulish mercenaries to dispatch him with his sword.
Pompey now devoted his attention to the settlement of affairs in Asia. He confirmed Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, in the possession of the kingdom of Bosporus; Deiotarus, tetrarch of Galatia, was rewarded with an extension of territory; and Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, was restored to his kingdom. After an absence of seven years, Pompey arrived in Italy toward the end of B.C. 62. His arrival had been long looked for by all parties with various feelings of hope and fear. It was felt that at the head of his victorious troops he could easily play the part of Sulla, and become the ruler of the state. Important events had taken place at Rome during the absence of Pompey, of which it is necessary to give an account before following him to the city.