The Mormon plan of campaign was already mapped out, and it was thus stated in an order of their commanding general, D. H. Wells, a copy of which was found on a Mormon major, Joseph Taylor, to whom it was addressed:—
"You will proceed, with all possible despatch, without injuring your animals, to the Oregon road, near the bend of Bear River, north by east of this place. Take close and correct observations of the country on your route. When you approach the road, send scouts ahead to ascertain if the invading troops have passed that way. Should they have passed, take a concealed route and get ahead of them, express to Colonel Benton, who is now on that road and in the vicinity of the troops, and effect a junction with him, so as to operate in concert. On ascertaining the locality or route of the troops, proceed at once to annoy them in every possible way. Use every exertion to stampede their animals and set fire to their trains. Burn the whole country before them and on their flanks. Keep them from sleeping by night surprises; blockade the road by felling trees or destroying river fords, where you can. Watch for opportunities to set fire to the grass on their windward, so as if possible to envelop their trains. Leave no grass before them that can be burned. Keep your men concealed as much as possible, and guard against surprise. Keep scouts out at all times, and communications open with Colonel Benton, Major McAllster and O. P. Rockwell, who are operating in the same way. Keep me advised daily of your movements, and every step the troops take, and in which direction.
"God bless you and give you success. Your brother in Christ."
The first man selected to carry out this order was Major Lot Smith. Setting out at 4 P.M., on October 3, with forty-four men, after an all night's ride, he came up with a federal supply train drawn by oxen. The captain of this train was ordered to "go the other way till he reached the States." As he persistently retraced his steps as often as the Mormons moved away, the latter relieved his wagons of their load and left him. Sending one of his captains with twenty men to capture or stampede the mules of the Tenth Regiment, Smith, with the remainder of his force, started for Sandy Fork to intercept army trains.
Scouts sent ahead to investigate a distant cloud of dust reported that it was made by a freight train of twenty-six wagons. Smith allowed this train to proceed until dark, and then approached it undiscovered. Finding the drivers drunk, as he afterward explained, and fearing that they would be belligerent and thus compel him to disobey his instruction "not to hurt any one except in self-defence," he lay concealed until after midnight. His scouts meanwhile had reported to him that the train was drawn up for the night in two lines.
Allowing the usual number of men to each wagon, Smith decided that his force of twenty-four was sufficient to capture the outfit, and, mounting his command, he ordered an advance on the camp. But a surprise was in store for him. His scouts had failed to discover that a second train had joined the first, and that twice the force anticipated confronted them. When this discovery was made, the Mormons were too close to escape observation. Members of Smith's party expected that their leader would now make some casual inquiry and then ride on, as if his destination were elsewhere. Smith, however, decided differently. As his force approached the camp-fire that was burning close to the wagons, he noticed that the rear of his column was not distinguishable in the darkness, and that thus the smallness of their number could not be immediately discovered. He, therefore, asked at once for the captain of the train, and one Dawson stepped forward. Smith directed him to have his men collect their private property at once, as he intended to "put a little fire" into the wagons. "For God's sake, don't burn the trains," was the reply. Dawson was curtly told where his men were to stack their arms, and where they were themselves to stand under guard. Then, making a torch, Smith ordered one of the government drivers to apply it, in order that "the Gentiles might spoil the Gentiles," as he afterward expressed it. The destruction of the supplies was complete. Smith allowed an Indian to take two wagon covers for a lodge, and some flour and soap, and compelled Dawson to get out some provisions for his own men. Nothing else was spared.
The official list of rations thus destroyed included 2720 pounds of ham, 92,700 of bacon, 167,900 of flour, 8910 of coffee, 1400 of sugar, 1333 of soap, 800 of sperm candles, 765 of tea, 7781 of hard bread, and 68,832 rations of desiccated vegetables. Another train was destroyed by the same party the next day on the Big Sandy, besides a few sutlers' wagons that were straggling behind.
On October 5 Colonel Alexander assumed command of all the troops in the camp. He found his position a trying one. In a report dated October 8, he said that his forage would last only fourteen days, that no information of the position or intentions of the commanding officer had reached him, and that, strange as it may appear, he was "in utter ignorance of the objects of the government in sending troops here, or the instructions given for their conduct after reaching here." In these circumstances, he called a council of his officers and decided to advance without waiting for Colonel Johnston and the other companies, as he believed that delay would endanger the entire force. He selected as his route to a wintering place, not the most direct one to Salt Lake City, inasmuch as the canyons could be easily defended, but one twice as long (three hundred miles), by way of Soda Springs, and thence either down Bear River Valley or northeast toward the Wind River Mountains, according to the resistance he might encounter.
The march, in accordance with this decision, began on October 11, and a weary and profitless one it proved to be. Snow was falling as the column moved, and the ground was covered with it during their advance. There was no trail, and a road had to be cut through the greasewood and sage brush. The progress was so slow—often only three miles a day—and the supply train so long, that camp would sometimes be pitched for the night before the rear wagons would be under way. Wells's men continued to carry out his orders, and, in the absence of federal cavalry, with little opposition. One day eight hundred oxen were "cut out" and driven toward Salt Lake City.
Conditions like these destroyed the morale of both officers and men, and there were divided counsels among the former, and complaints among the latter. Finally, after having made only thirty-five miles in nine days, Colonel Alexander himself became discouraged, called another council, and, in obedience to its decision, on October 19 directed his force to retrace their steps. They moved back in three columns, and on November 2 all of them had reached a camp on Black's Fork, two miles above Fort Bridger.
Colonel Johnston had arrived at Fort Laramie on October 5, and, after a talk with Captain Van Vliet, had retained two additional companies of infantry that were on the way to Fort Leavenworth. As he proceeded, rumors of the burning of trains, exaggerated as is usual in such times, reached him. Having only about three hundred men to guard a wagon train six miles in length, some of the drivers showed signs of panic, and the colonel deemed the situation so serious that he accepted an offer of fifty or sixty volunteers from the force of the superintendent of the South Pass wagon road. He was fortunate in having as his guide the well known James Bridger, to whose knowledge of Rocky Mountain weather signs they owed escapes from much discomfort, by making camps in time to avoid coming storms.
But even in camp a winter snowstorm is serious to a moving column, especially when it deprives the animals of their forage, as it did now. The forage supply was almost exhausted when South Pass was reached, and the draught and beef cattle were in a sad plight. Then came another big snowstorm and a temperature of l6 deg., during which eleven mules and a number of oxen were frozen to death. In this condition of affairs, Colonel Johnston decided that a winter advance into Salt Lake Valley was impracticable. Learning of Colonel Alexander's move, which he did not approve, he sent word for him to join forces with his own command on Black's Fork, and there the commanding officer arrived on November 3.
Lieutenant Colonel Cooke, of the Second Dragoons, with whom Governor Cumming was making the trip, had a harrowing experience. There was much confusion in organizing his regiment of six companies at Fort Leavenworth, and he did not begin his march until September 17, with a miserable lot of mules and insufficient supplies. He found little grass for the animals, and after crossing the South Platte on October 15, they began to die or to drop out. From that point snow and sleet storms were encountered, and, when Fort Laramie was reached, so many of the animals had been left behind or were unable to travel, that some of his men were dismounted, the baggage supply was reduced, and even the ambulances were used to carry grain. After passing Devil's Gate, they encountered a snowstorm on November 5. The best shelter their guide could find was a lofty natural wall at a point known as Three Crossings. Describing their night there he says: "Only a part of the regiment could huddle behind the rock in the deep snow; whilst, the long night through, the storm continued, and in fearful eddies from above, before, behind, drove the falling and drifting snow. Thus exposed, for the hope of grass the poor animals were driven, with great devotion, by the men once more across the stream and three-quarters of a mile beyond, to the base of a granite ridge, which almost faced the storm. There the famished mules, crying piteously, did not seek to eat, but desperately gathered in a mass, and some horses, escaping guard, went back to the ford, where the lofty precipice first gave us so pleasant relief and shelter."
The march westward was continued through deep snow and against a cold wind. On November 8 twenty-three mules had given out, and five wagons had to be abandoned. On the night of the 9th, when the mules were tied to the wagons, "they gnawed and destroyed four wagon tongues, a number of wagon covers, ate their ropes, and getting loose, ate the sage fuel collected at the tents." On November 10 nine horses were left dying on the road, and the thermometer was estimated to have marked twenty-five degrees below zero. Their thermometers were all broken, but the freezing of a bottle of sherry in a trunk gave them a basis of calculation.
The command reached a camp three miles below Fort Bridger on November 19. Of one hundred and forty-four horses with which they started, only ten reached that camp.
When Colonel Johnston arrived at the Black's Fork camp the information he received from Colonel Alexander, and certain correspondence with the Mormon authorities, gave him a comprehensive view of the situation; and on November 5 he forwarded a report to army headquarters in the East, declaring that it was the matured design of the Mormons "to hold and occupy this territory independent of and irrespective of the authority of the United States," entertaining "the insane design of establishing a form of government thoroughly despotic, and utterly repugnant to our institutions."
The correspondence referred to began with a letter from Brigham Young to Colonel Alexander, dated October 14. Opening with a declaration of Young's patriotism, and the brazen assertion that the people of Utah "had never resisted even the wish of the President of the United States, nor treated with indignity a single individual coming to the territory under his authority," he went on to say:—
"But when the President of the United States so far degrades his high position, and prostitutes the highest gift of the people, as to make use of the military power (only intended for the protection of the people's rights) to crush the people's liberties, and compel them to receive officials so lost to self-respect as to accept appointments against the known and expressed wish of the people, and so craven and degraded as to need an army to protect them in their position, we feel that we should be recreant to every principle of self-respect, honor, integrity, and patriotism to bow tamely to such high-handed tyranny, a parallel for which is only found in the attempts of the British government, in its most corrupt stages, against the rights, liberties, and lives of our forefathers."
He then appealed to Colonel Alexander, as probably "the unwilling agent" of the administration, to return East with his force, saying, "I have yet to learn that United States officers are implicitly bound to obey the dictum of a despotic President, in violating the most sacred constitutional rights of American citizens."
On October 18 Colonel Alexander, acknowledging the receipt of Young's letter, said in his reply that no one connected with his force had any wish to interfere in any way with the religion of the people of Utah, adding: "I repeat my earnest desire to avoid violence and bloodshed, and it will require positive resistance to force me to it. But my troops have the same right of self-defence that you claim, and it rests entirely with you whether they are driven to the exercise of it."
Finding that he could not cajole the federal officer, Young threw off all disguise, and in reply to an earlier letter of Colonel Alexander, he gave free play to his vituperative powers. After going over the old Mormon complaints, and declaring that "both we and the Kingdom of God will be free from all hellish oppressors, the Lord being our helper," he wrote at great length in the following tone:—
"If you persist in your attempt to permanently locate an army in this Territory, contrary to the wishes and constitutional rights of the people therein, and with a view to aid the administration in their unhallowed efforts to palm their corrupt officials upon us, and to protect them and blacklegs, black-hearted scoundrels, whoremasters, and murderers, as was the sole intention in sending you and your troops here, you will have to meet a mode of warfare against which your tactics furnish you no information....
"If George Washington was now living, and at the helm of our government, he would hang the administration as high as he did Andre, and that, too, with a far better grace and to a much greater subserving the best interests of our country....
"By virtue of my office as Governor of the Territory of Utah, I command you to marshal your troops and leave this territory, for it can be of no possible benefit to you to wickedly waste treasures and blood in prosecuting your course upon the side of a rebellion against the general government by its administrators.... Were you and your fellow officers as well acquainted with your soldiers as I am with mine, and did they understand the work they were now engaged in as well as you may understand it, you must know that many of them would immediately revolt from all connection with so ungodly, illegal, unconstitutional and hellish a crusade against an innocent people, and if their blood is shed it shall rest upon the heads of their commanders. With us it is the Kingdom of God or nothing."
To this Colonel Alexander replied, on the 19th, that no citizen of Utah would be harmed through the instrumentality of the army in the performance of its duties without molestation, and that, as Young's order to leave the territory was illegal and beyond his authority, it would not be obeyed.
John Taylor, on October 21, added to this correspondence a letter to Captain Marcy, in which he ascribed to party necessity the necessity of something with which to meet the declaration of the Republicans against polygamy—the order of the President that troops should accompany the new governor to Utah; declared that the religion of the Mormons was "a right guaranteed to us by the constitution"; and reiterated their purpose, if driven to it, "to burn every house, tree, shrub, rail, every patch of grass and stack of straw and hay, and flee to the mountains." "How a large army would fare without resources," he added, "you can picture to yourself."*
The Mormon authorities meant just what they said from the start. Young was as determined to be the head of the civil government of the territory as he was to be the head of the church. He had founded a practical dictatorship, with power over life and property, and had discovered that such a dictatorship was necessary to the regulation of the flock that he had gathered around him and to the schemes that he had in mind. To permit a federal governor to take charge of the territory, backed up by troops who would sustain him in his authority, meant an end to Young's absolute rule. Rather than submit to this, he stood ready to make the experiment of fighting the government force, separated as that force was from its Eastern base of supplies; to lay waste the Mormon settlements, if it became necessary to use this method of causing a federal retreat by starvation; and, if this failed, to withdraw his flock to some new Zion farther south.
In accordance with this view, as soon as news of the approach of the troops reached Salt Lake Valley, all the church industries stopped; war supplies weapons and clothing were manufactured and accumulated; all the elders in Europe were ordered home, and the outlying colonies in Carson Valley and in southern California were directed to hasten to Salt Lake City. A correspondent of the San Francisco Bulletin at San Bernardino, California, reported that in the last six months the Mormons there had sent four or five tons of gunpowder and many weapons to Utah, and that, when the order to "gather" at the Mormon metropolis came, they sacrificed everything to obey it, selling real estate at a reduction of from 20 to 50 per cent, and furniture for any price that it would bring. The same sacrifices were made in Carson Valley, where 150 wagons were required to accommodate the movers. In Salt Lake City the people were kept wrought up to the highest pitch by the teachings of their leaders. Thus, Amasa W. Lyman told them, on October 8, that they would not be driven away, because "the time has come when the Kingdom of God should be built up."* Young told them the same day, "If we will stand up as men and women of God, the yoke shall never be placed upon our necks again, and all hell cannot overthrow us, even with the United States troops to help them."** Kimball told the people in the Tabernacle, on October 18: "They [the United States] will have to make peace with us, and we never again shall make peace with them. If they come here, they have got to give up their arms." Describing his plan of campaign, at the same service, after the reading of the correspondence between Young and Colonel Alexander, Young said: "Do you want to know what is going to be done with the enemies now on our border? As soon as they start to come into our settlements, let sleep depart from their eyes and slumber from their eyelids until they sleep in death. Men shall be secreted here and there, and shall waste away our enemies in the name of Israel's God."***
Young was equally explicit in telling members of his own flock what they might expect if they tried to depart at that time. In a discourse in the Tabernacle, on October 25, he said:—
"If any man or woman in Utah wants to leave this community, come to me and I will treat you kindly, as I always have, and will assist you to leave; but after you have left our settlements you must not then depend upon me any longer, nor upon the God I serve. You must meet the doom you have labored for.... After this season, when this ignorant army has passed off, I shall never again say to a man, 'Stay your rifle ball,' when our enemies assail us, but shall say, 'Slay them where you find them."'*
Kimball, on November 8, spoke with equal plainness on this subject:—
"When it is necessary that blood should be shed, we should be as ready to do that as to eat an apple. That is my religion, and I feel that our platter is pretty near clean of some things, and we calculate to keep it clean from this time henceforth and forever .... And if men and women will not live their religion, but take a course to pervert the hearts of the righteous, we will 'lay judgment to the line and righteousness to the plummet,' and we will let you know that the earth can swallow you up as did Koran with his hosts; and, as Brother Taylor says, you may dig your graves, and we will slay you and you may crawl into them."*
The Mormon songs of the day breathed the same spirit of defiance to the United States authorities. A popular one at the Tabernacle services began:—
Another still more popular song, called "Zion," contained these words:—
When the Mormons found that the federal forces had gone into winter quarters, the Nauvoo Legion was massed in a camp called Camp Weber, at the mouth of Echo canyon. This canyon they fortified with ditches and breastworks, and some dams intended to flood the roadway; but they succeeded in erecting no defences which could not have been easily overcome by a disciplined force. A watch was set day and night, so that no movement of "the invaders" could escape them, and the officer in charge was particularly forbidden to allow any civil officer appointed by the President to pass.
This careful arrangement was kept up all winter, but Tullidge says that no spies were necessary, as deserting soldiers and teamsters from the federal camp kept coming into the valley with information.
The territorial legislature met in December, and approved Governor Young's course, every member signing a pledge to maintain "the rights and liberties" of the territory. The legislators sent a memorial to Congress, dated January 6, 1858, demanding to be informed why "a hostile course is pursued toward an unoffending people," calling the officers who had fled from the territory liars, declaring that "we shall not again hold still while fetters are being forged to bind us," etc. This offensive document reached Washington in March, and was referred in each House to the Committee on Territories, where it remained. When the federal forces reached Fort Bridger, they found that the Mormons had burned the buildings, and it was decided to locate the winter camp—named Camp Scott—on Black's Fork, two miles above the fort. The governor and other civil officers spent the winter in another camp near by, named "Ecklesville," occupying dugouts, which they covered with an upper story of plastered logs. There was a careful apportionment of rations, but no suffering for lack of food.
An incident of the winter was the expedition of Captain Randolph B. Marcy across the Uinta Mountains to New Mexico, with two guides and thirty-five volunteer companions, to secure needed animals. The story of his march is one of the most remarkable on record, the company pressing on, even after Indian guides refused to accompany them to what they said was certain death, living for days only on the meat supplied by half-starved mules, and beating a path through deep snow. This march continued from November 27 to January 10, when, with the loss of only one man, they reached the valley of the Rio del Norte, where supplies were obtained from Fort Massachusetts. Captain Marcy started back on March 17, selecting a course which took him past Long's and Pike's Peaks. He reached Camp Scott on June 8, with about fifteen hundred horses and mules, escorted by five companies of infantry and mounted riflemen.
During the winter Governor Cumming sent to Brigham Young a proclamation notifying him of the arrival of the new territorial officers, and assuring the people that he would resort to the military posse only in case of necessity. Judge Eckles held a session of the United States District Court at Camp Scott on December 30, and the grand jury of that court found indictments for treason, resting on Young's proclamation and Wells's instructions, against Young, Kimball, Wells, Taylor, Grant, Locksmith, Rockwell, Hickman, and many others, but of course no arrests were made.
Meanwhile, at Washington, preparations were making to sustain the federal authority in Utah as soon as spring opened.* Congress made an appropriation, and authorized the enlistment of two regiments of volunteers; three thousand regular troops and two batteries were ordered to the territory, and General Scott was directed to sail for the Pacific coast with large powers. But General Scott did not sail, the army contracts created a scandal,** and out of all this preparation for active hostilities came peace without the firing of a shot; out of all this open defiance and vilification of the federal administration by the Mormon church came abject surrender by the administration itself.
The principal contract, that for the transportation of all the supplies, involving for the year 1858 the amount of $4,500,000, was granted, without advertisement or subdivision, to a firm in Western Missouri, whose members had distinguished themselves in the effort to make Kansas a slave state, and now contributed liberally to defray the election expenses of the Democratic party."
When Major Van Vliet returned from Utah to Washington with Young's defiant ultimatum, he was accompanied by J. M. Bernhisel, the territorial Delegate to Congress, who was allowed to retain his seat during the entire "war," a motion for his expulsion, introduced soon after Congress met, being referred to a committee which never reported on it, the debate that arose only giving further proof of the ignorance of the lawmakers about Mormon history, Mormon government, and Mormon ambition.
In Washington Bernhisel was soon in conference with Colonel T. L. Kane, that efficient ally of the Mormons, who had succeeded so well in deceiving President Fillmore. In his characteristically wily manner, Kane proposed himself to the President as a mediator between the federal authorities and the Mormon leaders.* At that early date Buchanan was not so ready for a compromise as he soon became, and the Cabinet did not entertain Kane's proposition with any enthusiasm. But Kane secured from the President two letters, dated December 3.** The first stated, in regard to Kane, "You furnish the strongest evidence of your desire to serve the Mormons by undertaking so laborious a trip," and that "nothing but pure philanthropy, and a strong desire to serve the Mormon people, could have dictated a course so much at war with your private interests." If Kane presented this credential to Young on his arrival in Salt Lake City, what a glorious laugh the two conspirators must have had over it! The President went on to reiterate the views set forth in his last annual message, and to say: "I would not at the present moment, in view of the hostile attitude they have assumed against the United States, send any agent to visit them on behalf of the government." The second letter stated that Kane visited Utah from his own sense of duty, and commended him to all officers of the United States whom he might meet.
Kane's method of procedure was, throughout, characteristic of the secret agent of such an organization as the Mormon church. He sailed from New York for San Francisco the first week in January, 1858, under the name of Dr. Osborn. As soon as he landed, he hurried to Southern California, and, joining the Mormons who had been called in from San Bernardino, he made the trip to Utah with them, arriving in Salt Lake City in February. On the evening of the day of his arrival he met the Presidency and the Twelve, and began an address to them as follows: "I come as ambassador from the Chief Executive of our nation, and am prepared and duly authorized to lay before you, most fully and definitely, the feelings and views of the citizens of our common country and of the Executive toward you, relative to the present position of this territory, and relative to the army of the United States now upon your borders." This is the report of Kane's words made by Tullidge in his "Life of Brigham Young." How the statement agrees with Kane's letters from the President is apparent on its face. The only explanation in Kane's favor is that he had secret instructions which contradicted those that were written and published. Kane told the church officers that he wished to "enlist their sympathies for the poor soldiers who are now suffering in the cold and snow of the mountains!" An interview of half an hour with Young followed—too private in its character to be participated in even by the other heads of the church. An informal discussion ensued, the following extracts from which, on Mormon authority, illustrate Kane's sympathies and purpose:—
"Did Dr. Bernhisel take his seat?"
Kane—"Yes. He was opposed by the Arkansas member and a few others, but they were treated as fools by more sagacious members; for, if the Delegate had been refused his seat, it would have been TANTAMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR."
"I suppose they [the Cabinet] are united in putting down Utah?"
Kane—"I think not."*
Kane was placed as a guest, still incognito, in the house of an elder, and, after a few days' rest, he set out for Camp Scott. His course on arriving there, on March 10, was again characteristic of the crafty emissary. Not even recognizing the presence of the military so far as to reply to a sentry's challenge, the latter fired on him, and he in turn broke his own weapon over the sentry's head. When seized, he asked to be taken to Governor Cumming, not to General Johnston.* "The compromise," explains Tullidge, "which Buchanan had to effect with the utmost delicacy, could only be through the new governor, and that, too, by his heading off the army sent to occupy Utah." A fancied insult from General Johnston due to an orderly's mistake led Kane to challenge the general to a duel; but a meeting was prevented by an order from Judge Eckles to the marshal to arrest all concerned if his command to the contrary was not obeyed.
"Governor Cumming," continued Tullidge, "could do nothing less than espouse the cause of the `ambassador' who was there in the execution of a mission intrusted to him by the President of the United States."**
Kane did not make any mistake in his selection of the person to approach in camp. Judged by the results, and by his admissions in after years, the most charitable explanation of Cumming's course is that he was hoodwinked from the beginning by such masters in the art of deception as Kane and Young. A woman in Salt Lake City, writing to her sons in the East at the time, described the governor as in "appearance a very social, good-natured looking gentleman, a good specimen of an old country aristocrat, at ease in himself and at peace with all the world."* Such a man, whom the acts and proclamations and letters of Young did not incite to indignation, was in a very suitable frame of mind to be cajoled into adopting a policy which would give him the credit of bringing about peace, and at the same time place him at the head of the territorial affairs.
In looking into the causes of what was, from this time, a backing down by both parties to this controversy, we find at Washington that lack of an aggressive defence of the national interests confided to him by his office which became so much more evident in President Buchanan a few years later. Defied and reviled personally by Young in the latter's official communications, there was added reason to those expressed in the President's first message why this first rebellion, as he called it, "should be put down in such a manner that it shall be the last." But a wider question was looming up in Kansas, one in which the whole nation recognized a vital interest; a bigger struggle attracted the attention of the leading members of the Cabinet. The Lecompton Constitution was a matter of vastly more interest to every politician than the government of the sandy valley which the Mormons occupied in distant Utah.
On the Mormon side, defiant as Young was, and sincere as was his declaration that he would leave the valley a desert before the advance of a hostile force, his way was not wholly clear. His Legion could not successfully oppose disciplined troops, and he knew it. The conviction of himself and his associates on the indictments for treason could be prevented before an unbiased non-Mormon jury only by flight. Abjectly as his people obeyed him,—so abjectly that they gave up all their gold and silver to him that winter in exchange for bank notes issued by a company of which he was president,—the necessity of a reiteration of the determination to rule by the plummet showed that rebellion was at least a possibility? That Young realized his personal peril was shown by some "instructions and remarks" made by him in the Tabernacle just after Kane set out for Fort Bridger, and privately printed for the use of his fellow-leaders. He expressed the opinion that if Joseph Smith had "followed the revelations in him" (meaning the warnings of danger), he would have been among them still. "I do not know precisely," said Young, "in what manner the Lord will lead me, but were I thrown into the situation Joseph was, I would leave the people and go into the wilderness, and let them do the best they could.... We are in duty bound to preserve life—to preserve ourselves on earth—consequently we must use policy, and follow in the counsel given us." He pointed out the sure destruction that awaited them if they opened fire on the soldiers, and declared that he was going to a desert region in the territory which he had tried to have explored "a desert region that no man knows anything about," with "places here and there in it where a few families could live," and the entire extent of which would provide homes for five hundred thousand people, if scattered about. In these circumstances "a way out" that would free the federal administration from an unpleasant complication, and leave Young still in practical control in Utah, was not an unpleasant prospect for either side.
A long Utah letter to the Near York Herald (which had been generally pro-Mormon in tone) dated Camp Scott, May 22, 1858, contained the following: "Some of the deceived followers of the latest false Prophet arrived at this post in a most deplorable condition. One mater familiar had crossed the mountains during very severe weather in almost a state of nudity. Her dress consisted of a part of a single skirt, part of a man's shirt, and a portion of a jacket. Thus habited, without a shoe or a thread more, she had walked 157 miles in snow, the greater part of the way up to her knees, and carried in her arms a sucking babe less than six weeks old. The soldiers pulled off their clothes and gave them to the unfortunate woman. The absconding Saints who arrive here tell a great many stories about the condition and feeling of their brethren who still remain in the land of promise.... Thousands and thousands of persons, both men and women, are represented to be exceedingly desirous of not going South with the church, but are compelled to by fear of death or otherwise."
Governor Cumming, in his report to Secretary Cass on the situation as he found it when he entered Salt Lake City, said that, learning that a number of persons desirous of leaving the territory "considered themselves to be unlawfully restrained of their liberty," he decided, even at the risk of offending the Mormons, to give public notice of his readiness to assist such persons. In consequence, 56 men, 38 women, and 71 children sought his protection in order to proceed to the States. "The large majority of these people;" he explained, "are of English birth, and state that they leave the congregation from a desire to improve their circumstances and realize elsewhere more money for their labor."
Kane having won Governor Cumming to his view of the situation, and having created ill feeling between the governor and the chief military commander, the way was open for the next step. The plan was to have Governor Cumming enter Salt Lake Valley without any federal troops, and proceed to Salt Lake City under a Mormon escort of honor, which was to meet him when he came within a certain distance of that city. This he consented to do. Kane stayed in "Camp Eckles" until April, making one visit to the outskirts to hold a secret conference with the Mormons, and, doubtless, to arrange the details of the trip.
On April 3 Governor Cumming informed General Johnston of his decision, and he set out two days later. General Johnston's view of the policy to be pursued toward the Mormons was expressed in a report to army headquarters, dated January 20:—
"Knowing how repugnant it would be to the policy or interest of the government to do any act that would force these people into unpleasant relations with the federal government, I have, in conformity with the views also of the commanding general, on all proper occasions manifested in my intercourse with them a spirit of conciliation. But I do not believe that such consideration of them would be properly appreciated now, or rather would be wrongly interpreted; and, in view of the treasonable temper and feeling now pervading the leaders and a greater portion of the Mormons, I think that neither the honor nor the dignity of the government will allow of the slightest concession being made to them."
Judge Eckles did not conceal his determination not to enter Salt Lake City until the flag of his country was waving there, holding it a shame that men should be detained there in subjection to such a despot as Brigham Young.
Leaving camp accompanied only by Colonel Kane and two servants, Governor Cumming found his Mormon guard awaiting him a few miles distant. His own account of the trip and of his acts during the next three weeks of his stay in Mormondom may be found in a letter to General Johnston and a report to Secretary of State Cass.* As Echo canyon was supposed to be thoroughly fortified, and there was not positive assurance that a conflict might not yet take place, the governor was conducted through it by night. He says that he was "agreeably surprised" by the illuminations in his honor. Very probably he so accepted them, but the fires lighted along the sides and top of the canyon were really intended to appear to him as the camp-fires of a big Mormon army. This deception was further kept up by the appearance of challenging parties at every turn, who demanded the password of the escort, and who, while the governor was detained, would hasten forward to a new station and go through the form of challenging again: Once he was made the object of an apparent attack, from which he was rescued by the timely arrival of officers of authority.**