439. Formation of troops before and during deployment. Troops are massed preparatory to deployment when the nature of their deployment can not be foreseen or it is desirable to shorten the column or to clear the road. Otherwise, in the deployment of large commands, whether in march column, in bivouac, or massed, and whether forming, for attack or for defense, they are ordinarily first formed into a line of columns to facilitate the extension of the front prior to deploying.
The rough line or lines of columns thus formed enable troops to take advantage of the terrain in advancing and shorten the time occupied in forming the firing line. (425)
440. Action of brigade and regimental commanders in deployment of division. In deploying the division, each brigade is assigned a definite task or objective. On receipt of his orders, the brigade commander conducts his brigade in column or in line of regiments, until it is advisable that it be broken into smaller columns. He then issues his order, assigning to each regiment its task, if practicable. In a similar manner the regimental commanders lead their regiments forward in column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order. It is seldom advisable to break up the battalion before issuing orders for its deployment. (426)
441. Personal reconnaissance before deployment. Each subordinate commander, after receiving his order for the action, should precede his command as far as possible, in order to reconnoiter the ground personally, and should prepare to issue his orders promptly. (427)
442. Each commander to guard his command against surprise. Each commander of a column directs the necessary reconnaissance to front and flanks; by this means and by a judicious choice of ground he guards against surprise. (428)
443. Premature formation of firing line to be avoided. The premature formation of the firing line causes unnecessary fatigue and loss of time, and may result in a faulty direction being taken. Troops once deployed make even minor changes of direction with difficulty, and this difficulty increases with the length of the firing line. (429)
444. Rectification of deployment in wrong direction. In the larger units, when the original deployment is found to be in the wrong direction, it will usually be necessary to deploy the reserve on the correct front and withdraw and assemble the first line. (430)
445. Number of troops to be deployed in beginning. To gain decisive results, it will generally be necessary to use all the troops at some stage of the combat. But in the beginning, while the situation is uncertain, care should be taken not to engage too large a proportion of the command. On the other hand, there is no greater error than to employ too few and to sacrifice them by driblets. (For division of the battalion in attack see 335–339.) (431)
446. Dense, well-directed, and controlled line of heavy fire gives fire superiority. When it is intended to fight to a decision, fire superiority is essential. To gain this, two things are necessary: A heavy fire and a fire well-directed and controlled. Both of these are best obtained when the firing line is as dense as practicable, while leaving the men room for the free use of their rifles.
If the men are too widely separated, direction and control are very difficult, often impossible, and the intensity of fire is slight in proportion to the front occupied. (432)
447. Density of 1 man per yard; occupation of only sections of long lines. In an attack or stubborn defense the firing line should have a density of one man per yard of front occupied.
Where the tactical situation demands the holding of a line too long to be occupied throughout at this density, it is generally better to deploy companies or platoons at one man per yard, leaving gaps in the line between them, than to distribute the men uniformly at increased intervals. (433)
448. Use of thin firing line. A relatively thin firing line may be employed when merely covering the movements of other forces; when on the defensive against poor troops; when the final action to be taken has not yet been determined; and, in general, when fire superiority is not necessary. (434)
449. Length of firing line employed by whole force; strength of supports and reserves; density of charging line. The length of the firing line that the whole force may employ depends upon the density of the line and the strength in rear required by the situation.
Supports and reserves constitute the strength in rear.
In a decisive attack they should be at least strong enough to replace a heavy loss in the original firing line and to increase the charging line to a density of at least one and one-half men per yard and still have troops in rear for protection and for the other purposes mentioned above. (435)
450. Strength of reserve; troops deployed varying from 1 to 10 men per yard. In the original deployment the strength of the reserve held out by each commander comprises from one-sixth to two-thirds of his unit, depending upon the nature of the service expected of the reserve.
A small force in a covering or delaying action requires very little strength in rear, while a large force fighting a decisive battle requires much. Therefore, depending upon circumstances, the original deployment, including the strength in rear, may vary from 1 to 10 men per yard. Against an enemy poorly disciplined and trained, or lacking in morale, a thinner deployment is permissible. (436)
451. Density of whole deployment varies with size of command. The density of the whole deployment increases with the size of the command, because the larger the command the greater the necessity for reserves. Thus, battalion acting alone may attack two men per yard of front, but a regiment, with three battalions, may only double the front of the one battalion. (437)
452. Division of battle line into battle districts and density of deployment therein. By the assignment of divisions or larger units to parts of a line of battle several miles long, a series of semi-independent battle, or local combat, districts are created.
The general deployment for a long line of battle comprising several battle districts is not directly considered in these regulations. The deployments treated of herein are those of the infantry within such districts.
The density of deployment in these districts may vary greatly, depending upon the activity expected in each. Within these battle districts, as well as in smaller forces acting alone, parts of the line temporarily of less importance may be held weakly, in order to economize troops and to have more at the decisive point. (438)
453. Extent of front occupied by a unit depends upon security of flanks. The front that a unit may occupy when deployed depends also upon whether its flanks are secured. If both flanks are secured by other troops, the unit may increase its front materially by reducing its reserve or supports. If only one flank is so secured, the front may still be somewhat increased, but the exposed flank must be guarded by posting the supports or reserve toward that flank.
Natural obstacles that secure the flanks have practically the same effect upon deployment. (439)
454. Regiments, battalions, and companies deployed side by side. Except when assigned as supports or reserve, regiments in the brigade, battalions in the regiment, and companies in the battalion are, when practicable, deployed side by side. (440)
455. Battalions furnish firing line and supports; larger units furnish reserves; employment of reserve. In the deployment, battalions establish the firing line, each furnishing its own support.
In each unit larger than the battalion a reserve is held out, its strength depending upon circumstances. In general, the reserve is employed by the commander to meet or improve conditions brought about by the action of the firing line. It must not be too weak or too split up. It must be posted where the commander believes it will be needed for decisive action, or where he desires to bring about such action. When necessary, parts of it reënforce or prolong the firing line. (441)
(For the battalion in Attack, see pars. 342–346)
456. Fire superiority means success; how to obtain fire superiority. An attack is bound to succeed if fire superiority is gained and properly used.
To gain this superiority generally requires that the attack employ more rifles than the defense; this in turn means a longer line, as both sides will probably hold a strong firing line. (442)
457. When frontal attack may be successful. With large forces, a direct frontal attack gives the attacker little opportunity to bring more rifles to bear. However, if the enemy is unduly extended, a frontal attack may give very decisive results. (443)
458. When turning movements are allowable. Owing to the difficulty of control and the danger of the parts being defeated in detail, wide turning movements are seldom allowable except in large forces. (444)
459. Advantages of enveloping attack. If the attack can be so directed that, while the front is covered, another fraction of the command strikes a flank more or less obliquely (an enveloping attack), the advantages gained are a longer line and more rifles in action; also a converging fire opposed to the enemy's diverging fire. (445)
460. Envelopment of both flanks. An envelopment of both flanks should never be attempted without a very decided superiority in numbers. (446)
461. Enveloping attacks result in local frontal attacks; advantage of envelopment. The enveloping attack will nearly always result locally in a frontal attack, for it will be met by the enemy's reserve. The advantage of envelopment lies in the longer concentric line, with its preponderance of rifles and its converging fire. (447)
462. Coöperation between frontal and enveloping attacks; the two attacks to be deployed considerable distance from hostile positions. Coöperation between the frontal and enveloping attacks is essential to success. Both should be pushed vigorously and simultaneously, and ordinarily both should move simultaneously to the charge; but at the final stage of the attack conditions may sometimes warrant one in charging while the other supports it with fire.
The envelopment of a flank is brought about with difficulty when made by troops already deployed in another direction or by their reserves. The two attacks should be deployed at a suitable distance apart, with the lines of attack converging in rear of the hostile position. The troops that are to make the enveloping attack should deploy in the proper direction at the start and should be given orders which enable them to gain their point of deployment in the most direct and practical manner.
The enveloping attack is generally made the stronger, especially in small forces. (448)
463. Distance from hostile position at which deployment is made; foreground to be cleared of hostile detachments before deployment. Where open terrain exposes troops to hostile artillery fire it may be necessary to make the deployment 2 miles or more from the hostile position.
The foreground should be temporarily occupied by covering troops. If the enemy occupies the foreground with detachments, the covering troops must drive them back. (449)
464. Moving well forward and deploying at night. To enable large forces to gain ground toward the enemy, it may sometimes be cheaper and quicker in the end to move well forward and to deploy at night. In such case the area in which the deployment is to be made should, if practicable, be occupied by covering troops before dark.
The deployment will be made with great difficulty unless the ground has been studied by daylight. The deployment gains little unless it establishes the firing line well within effective range of the enemy's main position. (See Night Operations, par. 580–590.) (450)
465. Each unit deploys on its direction line; intervals between battalions on firing line. Each unit assigned a task deploys when on its direction line, or opposite its objective, and when it has no longer sufficient cover for advancing in close order. In the firing line, intervals of 25 to 50 yards should be maintained as long as possible between battalions. In the larger units it may be necessary to indicate on the map the direction or objective, but to battalion commanders it should be pointed out on the ground. (451)
466. Post of reserve; reserve charged with flank protection. The reserve is kept near enough to the firing line to be on hand at the decisive stage. It is posted with reference to the attack, or to that part of the attacking line, from which the greater results are expected; it is also charged with flank protection, but should be kept intact.
Supports are considered in paragraphs 262 to 265, inclusive, and 335 to 339, inclusive. (452)
467. Firing line to advance as far as possible before opening fire. The firing line must ordinarily advance a long distance before it is justified in opening fire. It can not combat the enemy's artillery, and it is at a disadvantage if it combats the defender's long-range rifle fire. Hence it ignores both and, by taking full advantage of cover and of the discipline of the troops, advances to a first firing position at the shortest range possible, as explained in par. 344.
Formations for crossing this zone with the minimum loss are considered in paragraphs 249 to 257, inclusive. These and other methods of crossing such zones should be studied and practiced. (453)
468. Invisibility best protection while advancing. The best protection against loss while advancing is to escape the enemy's view. (454)
469. Advance of battalions. Each battalion finds its own firing position, conforming to the general advance as long as practicable and taking advantage of the more advanced position of an adjacent battalion in order to gain ground.
The position from which the attack opens fire is further considered in paragraphs 343–345, inclusive. (455)
470. Infantry moving to the attack passing through deployed artillery. It will frequently become necessary for infantry moving to the attack to pass through deployed artillery. This should be done so as to interfere as little as possible with the latter's fire, and never so as to cause that fire to cease entirely. As far as practicable, advantage should be taken of intervals in the line, if any. An understanding between artillery and infantry commanders should be had, so as to effect the movement to the best advantage. (456)
471. Advanced elements of firing line not to open fire on main hostile position. In advancing the attack, advanced elements of the firing line or detachments in front of it should not open fire except in defense or to clear the foreground of the enemy. Fire on the hostile main position should not be opened until all or nearly all of the firing line can join in the fire. (457)
(See pars. 414–438.)
472. Fire superiority sought at first firing position, and to be maintained until charging point is reached; size of rushing units. At the first firing position the attack seeks to gain fire superiority. This may necessitate a steady, accurate fire a long time. The object is to subdue the enemy's fire and keep it subdued so that the attacking troops may advance from this point to a favorable place near the enemy from which the charge may be made. Hence, in the advance by rushes, sufficient rifles must be kept constantly in action to keep down the enemy's fire; this determines the size of the fraction rushing. (458)
473. Futility of advancing without fire superiority. To advance without fire superiority against a determined defense would result in such losses as to bring the attack to a standstill or to make the apparent success barren of results. (459)
474. Signs that fire superiority has been gained. Diminution of the enemy's fire and a pronounced loss in effectiveness are the surest signs that fire superiority has been gained and that a part of the firing line can advance. (460)
475. Retiring under fire in daylight suicidal; intrenching. The men must be impressed with the fact that, having made a considerable advance under fire and having been checked, it is suicidal to turn back in daylight.
If they can advance no farther, they must intrench and hold on until the fall of darkness or a favorable turn in the situation develops.
Intrenching is resorted to only when necessary. Troops who have intrenched themselves under fire are moved forward again with difficulty. (461)
476. Supports and reserves occupying trenches vacated by firing line, to improve same. Supports and reserves occupying intrenchments vacated by the firing line should improve them, but they must not be held back or diverted from their true missions on this account. (462)
477. Greater detail of conduct of fire attack. Paragraphs 346 to 354, inclusive, deal more in detail with the conduct of the fire attack. (463)
(See pars. 355–356)
478. What fire superiority accomplishes; psychological moment for charge determined by tactical instinct. Fire superiority beats down the enemy's fire, destroys his resistance and morale, and enables the attacking troops to close on him, but an actual or threatened occupation of his position is needed to drive him out and defeat him.
The psychological moment for the charge can not be determined far in advance. The tactical instinct of the responsible officer must decide. (464)
479. When, and distance over which charge should be made.
The defenders, if subjugated by the fire attack, will frequently leave before the charge begins. On the other hand, it may be necessary to carry the fire attack close to the position and follow it up with a short dash and a bayonet combat. Hence the distance over which the charge may be made will vary between wide limits. It may be from 25 to 400 yards.
The charge should be made at the earliest moment that promises success; otherwise the full advance of victory will be lost. (465)
480. Charge to be made with approval of commander of attacking line; battalion commanders signal commander of line when ready to charge; charge to be made simultaneously. The commander of the attacking line should indicate his approval, or give the order, before the charge is made. Subordinate commanders, usually battalion commanders, whose troops are ready to charge, signal that fact to the commander. It may be necessary for them to wait until other battalions or other parts of the line are ready or until the necessary reserves arrive.
At the signal for the charge the firing line and nearby supports and reserves rush forward. (See pars. 355 and 356.)
The charge is made simultaneously, if possible, by all the units participating therein, but once committed to the assault, battalions should be pushed with the utmost vigor and no restraint placed on the ardor of charging troops by an attempt to maintain alignment. (466)
481. Charge not to be made without sufficient troops; reserves give impetus; avoiding too dense a mass. Before ordering the charge the commander should see that enough troops are on hand to make it a success. Local reserves joining the firing line in time to participate in the charge give it a strong impetus. Too dense a mass should be avoided. (467)
482. Line to be strengthened by prolongation. The line should be strengthened by prolongation, if practicable, and remaining troops kept in formation for future use; but rather than that the attack should fail, the last formed body will be sent in, unless it is very apparent that it can do no good. (468)
483. Additional force for pursuit. To arrive in the hostile position with a very compact firing line and a few formed supports is sufficient for a victory, but an additional force kept well in hand for pursuit is of inestimable value. (469)
484. Premature charge to be avoided; charging without authority from the rear. A premature charge by a part of the line should be avoided, but if begun, the other parts of the line should join at once if there is any prospect of success. Under exceptional conditions a part of the line may be compelled to charge without authority from the rear. The intention to do so should be signaled to the rear. (470)
485. Confidence in ability to use bayonet. Confidence in their ability to use the bayonet gives the assaulting troops the promise of success. (471)
486. Pursuing fire; disordered units not to pursue. If the enemy has left the position when the charging troops reach it, the latter should open a rapid fire upon the retreating enemy, if he is in sight. It is not advisable for the mixed and disordered units to follow him, except to advance to a favorable firing position or to cover the reorganization of others. (472)
487. Pursuing troops; reorganization of charging line; preparations to meet counter-attack. The nearest formed bodies accompanying or following the charge are sent instantly in pursuit. Under cover of these troops order is restored in the charging line. If the captured position is a part of a general line or is an advanced post, it should be intrenched and occupied at once.
The exhaustion of officers and men must not cause the neglect of measures to meet a counter-attack. (473)
488. Steps to be taken when attack receives temporary setback. If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop the rearward movement and will reëstablish the firing line in a covered position as close as possible to the enemy. (474)
489. Steps to be taken if attack is abandoned. If the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facilitates the task of checking and reorganizing them. The point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. The withdrawal of the attacking troops should be covered by the artillery and by reserves, if any are available.
(See Night Operations, pars. 580–590.) (475)
490. Full fruits of victory reaped by pursuit. To reap the full fruits of victory a vigorous pursuit must be made. The natural inclination to be satisfied with a successful charge must be overcome. The enemy must be allowed no more time to reorganize than is positively unavoidable. (476)
491. Parts played in pursuit by reserve, artillery, and charging troops. The part of the reserve that is still formed or is best under control is sent forward in pursuit and vigorously attacks the enemy's main body or covering detachments wherever found.
The artillery delivers a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy; the disordered attacking troops secure the position, promptly reform and become a new reserve. (477)
492. Strengthening of position captured, if section of general line. If the captured position is a section of the general line, the breach should be heavily occupied, made wider, and strongly secured by drawing on all reserves in the vicinity. (478)
493. Pursuit by parallel roads. After the pursuit from the immediate battlefield, pursuit by parallel roads is especially effective where large commands are concerned. (479)
494. Artillery and cavalry in pursuit. Artillery and cavalry are very effective in pursuit. (480)
495. Modifications of attack in case of fortifications. Few modifications enter into the problem of attacking fortifications. Such as are to be considered relate chiefly to the greater time and labor of advancing, the more frequent use of darkness and the use of hand grenades to augment the fire. (481)
496. Approaching charging point under cover of darkness. If the enemy is strongly fortified and time permits, it may be advisable to wait and approach the charging point under cover of darkness. The necessary reconnaissance and arrangements should be made before dark. If the charge is not to be made at once, the troops intrench the advanced position, using sand bags if necessary. Before daylight the foreground should be cleared of obstacles. (482)
497. Charging without fire preparation. If the distance is short and other conditions are favorable, the charge may be made without fire preparation. If made, it should be launched with spirit and suddenness at the break of day. (See Night Operations pars. 580–590.) (483)
498. Advancing to charging point by sapping. In siege operations troops are usually advanced to the charging point by sapping. This method, however, presupposes that an early victory is not necessary, or that it is clearly inadvisable to attempt more direct methods. (484)
499. Requisites of the holding attack. The holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the secondary nature of the attack.
The holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear, but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that of a decisive attack. (485)
500. Post and strength of supports and reserves. Supports and reserves are kept at short distances. Their strength is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves. (486)
501. Holding attacks developing into decisive attacks. Holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks should be correspondingly strong in rear. (487)
502. Feint attacks. All feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. Their weakness is in rear and is concealed. (488)
503. Requirements of a good defensive position. The first requirement of a good position is a clear field of fire and view to the front and exposed flanks to a distance of 600 to 800 yards or more. The length of front should be suitable to the size of the command and the flanks should be secure. The position should have lateral communication and cover for supports and reserves. It should be one which the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission.
A position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found. The one should be taken which conforms closest to the description. (489)
504. Utilization of natural cover; construction of fieldworks and obstacles. The natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. In addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles.
The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. That the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if conditions are found to be other than expected. (490)
505. Construction of communicating and cover trenches, head cover, etc. When time and troops are available the preparations include the necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs, etc. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition.
The supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural cover is not available. (491)
506. Dummy trenches. Dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste time and ammunition and to divert its fire. (492)
507. Location, extent, garrison, etc., of fieldworks. The location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. Officers must be able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (See "Field Fortifications," Chapter XVI, Part III.) (493)
508. Outlining trace of trenches in combat exercises. In combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of construction, garrisons, etc. (494)
509. Density of whole deployment. The density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available artificial or natural protection for the troops. (495)
510. Density of firing line. If exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in attack. If the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of fire, it may be made thinner.
Weaker supports are permissible. For the same number of troops the front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line. (496)
511. Strength in rear to be increased when change from defensive to offensive is contemplated. If it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding strength in rear provided. This strength is in the reserve, which should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports permit. Even in a passive defense the reserve should be as strong as in the attack; unless the flanks are protected by other means. (497)
512. Post of supports; cover for supports. Supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the attack. When natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose, communicating and cover trenches are constructed. If time does not permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports greatly exposed in rear. (498)
513. Post of reserve. The reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as a whole, according to the developments. The distance from firing line to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack; it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly retreat.
The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of the reserve. (499)
514. Post of reserve when situation is no longer in doubt. When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best opportunity for counter attack. Usually the same flank best suits both purposes. (500)
515. Detaching part of reserve to protect opposite flank. In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely protective mission. (501)
516. Assignment of front to units. The commander assigns to subordinates the front to be occupied by them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units in the firing line. (502)
517. Division of extended position into sections. An extended position is so divided into sections that each has, if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the terrain.
Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist in the line. (503)
518. Size of units occupying sections; battalions to be kept intact. The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the latter's natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable, battalions should be kept intact and assigned as units to sections or parts of sections. (504)
519. Adjoining sections or machine guns to cover dead space. Where important dead space lies in front of one section, an adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose. (505)
520. Advanced posts and other dispersion to be avoided. Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion, should be avoided. (506)
521. Position itself not fully occupied until infantry attack begins. Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front. (507)
522. Fire alone unable to stop attack. Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary. (508)
523. Steps to be taken if night attack is expected. If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected, troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks of the section. (509)
524. Short range fire and bayonet in night attack. Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks. The bayonet is the chief reliance. (See Night Operations pars. 580–590.) (510)
525. Passive defense; only offensive wins. The passive defense should be assumed only when circumstances force it. Only the offensive wins. (511)
526. Active defense seeks favorable decision; counter attack necessary. An active defense seeks a favorable decision. A favorable decision can not be expected without counter attack. (512)
527. Protection of flanks by natural obstacles necessary in passive defense position. A passive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by natural obstacles is generally out of the question. (513)
528. Post of troops for counter attack. Where the defense is assumed with a view to making a counter attack, the troops for the counter attack should be held in reserve until the time arrives for such attack. The defensive line should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force for the offensive may be as large as possible.
The force for the counter attack should be held echeloned in rear of the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed attack. (514)
529. Manner of making counter attack. The counter attack should be made vigorously and at the proper time. It will usually be made:
By launching the reserve against the enemy's flank when his attack is in full progress. This is the most effective form of counter attack.
Straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire.
Or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has reached the defensive position and is in disorder. (515)
530. Minor counter attacks. Minor counter attacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive the enemy from important positions gained by him. (516)
531. The important considerations in a delaying action. When a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations are:
The enemy should be forced to deploy early. The field of fire should therefore be good at distances from 500 to 1,200 yards or more; a good field of fire at close range is not necessary.
The ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as soon as the position is vacated. (517)
532. Thin firing line answers purpose; purposes of supports and reserve. A thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer the purpose. Supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks.
The reserve should be posted well in rear to assist in the withdrawal of the firing line. (518)
533. Value of artillery. Artillery is especially valuable to a delaying force. (519)
534. Characteristics of meeting engagements. Meeting engagements are characterized by the necessity for hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the necessity for rapid deployment, frequently under fire; and usually by the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. These conditions give further advantages to the offensive. (520)
535. General action on meeting enemy. The whole situation will usually indicate beforehand the proper general action to be taken on meeting the enemy. (521)
536. Meagerness of information; qualities of commander to be relied upon. Little fresh information can be expected. The boldness, initiative, and determination of the commander must be relied upon. (522)
537. Meeting engagement affords ideal opportunity to certain commanders. A meeting engagement affords an ideal opportunity to the commander who has intuition and quick decision and who is willing to take long chances. His opponent is likely to be overcautious. (523)
538. The mission determines method of attack. The amount of information that the commander is warranted in awaiting before taking final action depends entirely upon his mission. One situation may demand a blind attack; another may demand rapid, partial deployment for attack, but careful and time-consuming reconnaissance before the attack is launched. (524)
539. Advantage accrues to side deploying the faster. A great advantage accrues to the side which can deploy the faster. The advantage of a close-order formation, favoring rapid deployment, becomes more pronounced with the size of the force. (525)
540. Advantages of first troops to deploy. The first troops to deploy will be able to attack with longer firing lines and weaker supports than are required in the ordinary case. But if the enemy succeeds in deploying a strong defensive line, the attack must be strengthened accordingly before it is wasted. (526)
541. Things to be done by the leading troops. If the situation warrants the advance, the leading troops seek to deploy faster than the enemy, to reach his flanks, check his deployment, and get information. In any event, they seek to cover the deployment of their own troops in rear—especially the artillery—and to seize important ground. (527)
542. Post of commander of long column meeting enemy; function of advance guard; action of column. The commander of a long column which meets the enemy should be with the advance guard to receive information promptly and to reconnoiter. If he decides to fight, the advance guard must hold the enemy while the commander formulates a plan of action, issues the necessary orders, and deploys the main body. Meantime, the column should be closing up, either in mass or to form line of columns, so that the deployment, when determined upon, may be made more promptly. (528)
543. Action of advance guard prior to receipt of orders. The action of the advance guard, prior to the receipt of orders, depends upon the situation. Whether to attack determinedly or only as a feint, or to assume the defensive, depends upon the strength of the advance guard, the terrain, the character of the hostile force encountered, and the mission and intentions of the commander of the whole. (529)
544. Main body should be used as a whole and not put into action piecemeal. If the enemy is beforehand or more aggressive, or if the advance guard is too weak, it may be necessary to put elements of the main body into action as fast as they arrive, in order to check him. This method should be avoided; it prevents the formation and execution of a definite plan and compels piecemeal action. The best results are obtained when the main body is used as a whole. (530)
545. Withdrawal generally effected at heavy cost; rear guard and distance to be placed between enemy and defeated troops. The withdrawal of a defeated force can generally be effected only at a heavy cost. When it is no longer possible to give the action a favorable turn and the necessity for withdrawal arises, every effort must be made to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the defeated troops. (531)
546. Use of artillery, machine guns, and cavalry. Artillery gives especially valuable assistance in the withdrawal. The long-range fire of machine guns should also be employed. Cavalry assists the withdrawal by charging the pursuing troops or by taking flank positions and using fire action. (532)
547. Use of reserve to check the pursuit. If an intact reserve remains, it should be placed in a covering position, preferably on a flank, to check the pursuit and thus enable the defeated troops to withdraw beyond reach of hostile fire.
The covering position of the reserve should be at some distance from the main action, but close enough to bring the withdrawing troops quickly under the protection of its fire. It should have a good field of fire at effective and long ranges and should facilitate its own safe and timely withdrawal. (533)
548. Part of line to be withdrawn first; retreating troops to be gotten under control as soon as possible. If the general line is divided, by terrain or by organization, into two or more parts, the firing line of the part in the least danger from pursuit should be withdrawn first. A continuous firing line, whose parts are dependent upon one another for fire support, should be withdrawn as a whole, retiring by echelon at the beginning of the withdrawal. Every effort must be made to restore the organizations, regain control, and form column of march as soon as the troops are beyond the reach of hostile fire.
As fast as possible without delaying the march, companies, and the larger units should be reformed, so that the command will again be well in hand. (534)
549. Action taken by commander; selection of rendezvous point. The commander of the whole, having given orders for withdrawal, should go to the rear, select a rendezvous point, and devote himself to the reorganization of his command.
The rendezvous point is selected with regard to the natural channels of movement approximately straight to the rear. It should be distant from the battlefield and should facilitate the gathering and protection of the command. (535)
550. 1. Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results.
2. Make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result.
3. Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate.
4. Do not attempt complicated maneuvers.
5. Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion.
6. Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses.
7. Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known.
8. Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action.
9. Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain.
10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority.
11. Keep up reconnaissance.
12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as practicable.
13. Do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth the cost.
14. Spare the command all unnecessary hardship and exertion. (536)
551. Machine guns are weapons of emergency. Machine guns must be considered as weapons of emergency. Their effectiveness combined with their mobility renders them of great value at critical, though infrequent, periods of an engagement. (537)
552. Machine guns to be used for short periods, when opportunities present themselves. When operating against infantry only, they can be used to a great extent throughout the combat as circumstances may indicate, but they are quickly rendered powerless by efficient field artillery and will promptly draw artillery fire whenever they open. Hence their use in engagements between large commands must be for short periods and at times when their great effectiveness will be most valuable. (538)
553. Machine guns attached to advance guard; use in meeting engagements. Machine guns should be attached to the advance guard. In meeting engagements they will be of great value in assisting their own advance, or in checking the advance of the enemy, and will have considerable time to operate before hostile artillery fire can silence them.
Care must be taken not to leave them too long in action. (539)
554. Use of machine guns with rear guard. They are valuable to a rear guard which seeks to check a vigorous pursuit or to gain time. (540)
555. Machine guns in attack; fire of position. In attack, if fire of position is practicable, they are of great value. In this case fire should not be opened by the machine guns until the attack is well advanced. At a critical period in the attack, such fire, if suddenly and unexpectedly opened, will greatly assist the advancing line. The fire must be as heavy as possible and must be continued until masked by friendly troops or until the hostile artillery finds the machine guns. (541)
556. Machine guns in defense. In the defense, machine guns should be used in the same general manner as described above for the attack. Concealment and patient waiting for critical moments and exceptional opportunities are the special characteristics of the machine-gun service in decisive actions. (542)
557. Machine guns as part of reserve; use in covering withdrawal. As part of the reserve, machine guns have special importance. If they are with the troops told off to protect the flanks, and if they are well placed, they will often produce decisive results against a hostile turning movement. They are especially qualified to cover a withdrawal or make a captured position secure. (543)
558. Machine guns not to form part of firing line of attack. Machine guns should not be assigned to the firing line of an attack. They should be so placed that fire directed upon them is not likely to fall upon the firing line. (544)
559. Effectiveness of machine guns against skirmish line, except when lying down or crawling. A skirmish line can not advance by walking or running when hostile machine guns have the correct range and are ready to fire. Machine-gun fire is not specially effective against troops lying on the ground or crawling. (545)
560. Silencing of machine guns by infantry. When opposed by machine guns without artillery to destroy them, infantry itself must silence them before it can advance.
An infantry command that must depend upon itself for protection against machine guns should concentrate a large number of rifles on each gun in turn and until it has silenced it. (546)
In addition to the above, which the Infantry Drill Regulations gives on the subject of machine guns, the following, based on the use of machine guns in the European War, is given:
561. Machine guns essentially automatic rifles. They are essentially automatic rifles, designed to fire the ordinary rifle cartridge and capable of delivering a stream of small bullets at a rate of as high as 600 per minute. Experience in the European war has determined that the rate of 400 shots per minute is the desirable maximum. Their ranges are the same as for the rifle. The fire of a machine gun has been estimated as equal to that of 30 men.
562. Mounts. Machine guns are usually mounted on tripods or wheels. The weight of certain types is such that they can readily be carried by the soldier from one point to another.
563. Methods of transportation. While machine guns are usually designed to be carried or packed, they are easily adapted to various methods of transportation. In the European war we find them mounted on sleds during the winter campaign; on specially designed motor cycles with side cars and accompanied by other motor cycles carrying ammunition; on wheels; on wagons; on armored automobiles; aeroplanes; and finally in the powerful "tanks" of the English.
564. Concealment. Machine guns while usually considered as weapons of emergency have been used in attack and defense in the European war in all stages. Their mobility and deadly effect have made them of great value. Once their position is discovered they are quickly put out of action by artillery. Owing to this fact the armies in Europe have used alternative positions and have used every means to conceal the guns. Hedges, walls, and pits are used and every effort is used to conceal the flame of discharge. This is usually accomplished by keeping the muzzle well in rear of its cover or loop hole. Machine guns almost invariably betray their positions as soon as they enter into action. The present tendency seems to be to hold them concealed and place them into position in the trenches or emplacements at the moment of combat.
Extraordinary means have been resorted to in hiding the guns until they are needed. In the German line, dugouts underground were constructed to conceal the machine guns and crews. Often they permitted the first line of the attack to pass over them and then appeared in rear and opened a deadly fire on the backs of the troops.
565. Use in villages. In villages, machine guns were used with terrible effect, firing from cellars or windows. The only successful method of destroying them was with hand grenades and even this was costly.
566. Location on the defense. On the defense machine guns should be mounted in salients and at points where cross fire can be obtained. This makes it more difficult for the enemy to locate the guns. Frontal fire is not so often successful.
567. Location in attack. In the attack it is accepted that machine guns must cover the Infantry at short and long ranges while other machine guns must accompany the attacking troops to hold the positions or trenches gained.
The second or third line would seem to be the best position for machine guns when accompanying troops.