Scorning all opposition, William I had not even attempted to conciliate one of the two great parties which divided the Belgian population: the conservative Catholics and the Liberals, advocates of the "Rights of Man" and opposed to the influence of the Church. He had alienated the first by his attempt to monopolize education and the second by the autocratic manner in which he suppressed all opposition. The prosecution against a Liberal journalist, De Potter, who attacked the Government's policy in Le Courier des Pays-Bas, brought about the reconciliation of the two parties against the common enemy, in 1828, just as the harsh attitude of Joseph II had caused the alliance of Van der Noot and Vonck on the eve of the Brabançonne Revolution. From anti-Government, the movement became gradually anti-Dutch, and party grievances were henceforth merged into a revival of patriotic feeling, aiming first at administrative separation and later at complete independence.

The final outburst was no doubt hastened by the 1830 Revolution in France, when the legitimist dynasty was overthrown in favour of Louis Philippe d'Orléans, just as the taking of the Bastille determined a corresponding movement in Belgium against Austrian rule. But nothing could be more misleading than to attribute to French influence the popular demonstration which took place in Brussels, on August 25th, following a performance of Auber's Muette de Portici at the Monnaie Theatre. The song which stirred such wild enthusiasm in the breasts of the Brussels people was purely patriotic, and it was to defend the rights of their country that they sacked the house of Van Maenen, King William's unpopular minister, and the offices of Le National, whose director, a French pamphleteer named Libri, was looked upon as a Dutch agent. It is true that the French flag was for a short time hoisted at the Hôtel de Ville, but it was soon replaced by the three colours of Brabant.

French influences had been at work, but the French party remained a small minority. Every act of the leaders of the revolution shows that they were bent on obtaining first administrative separation, and later, after such a proposal had been made impossible through the king's stubborn attitude, complete independence. Never did the idea of a union with France commend itself to the people. From Brussels, standing on the language frontier, the revolution spread to Walloon Liége and Flemish Louvain. Most of the important towns, with the exception of Ghent and Antwerp, joined in the movement in both parts of the country. The Prince of Orange, whose popularity was used in order to calm the multitude, came to visit Brussels, but, unable to make any definite promise, he was obliged to fly from the city.

Even at that last hour, the joint kingdom of the Netherlands might have been saved, since the most enthusiastic leaders, like Gendebien, only urged autonomy; but King William remained deaf to all advice of moderation and sent a Dutch army of 12,000 men against Brussels under Prince Frederick. The revolutionary leaders had preserved but small hope, owing to the unpreparedness of the defence. The Belgian success in the street-fighting which took place near the Rue Royale and the adjoining streets was nothing short of a miracle. After three days, Prince Frederick was obliged to leave the town, leaving 2,500 dead behind him; but the losses on the Belgian side had also been heavy, and all reconciliation had become impossible. A provisional Government was formed, a National Congress summoned, the complete independence of the country proclaimed and a new Constitution prepared, a special commission adopting the principle of constitutional monarchy (October 4th).

Meanwhile, the few towns, including Ghent and Antwerp, which had not already done so expelled their garrisons, the citadel of Antwerp alone remaining in Dutch hands.

The fascinating scheme endorsed by the Vienna Congress had completely miscarried. Though only a ruler of great political talent could have realized it, the story of the fifteen years of union between the two countries shows that the king and his Dutch ministers were unable to master the very elements of the difficult proposition they had to solve. Up to the last months several opportunities offered themselves to them of retracing their steps and retrieving the situation. They failed to seize them. A careful survey of events will show that the action brought against De Potter and the choice of The Hague as the seat of the Supreme Court did more to estrange the Belgian bourgeoisie from Dutch rule than the activity of French propagandists. The initial blunder of William I was to ignore the fact that Belgium was not merely a group of ownerless provinces, but a nation as strong in her soul, if not as happy in her fate, as the Dutch nation, deserving the same care and the same consideration. Had he acted as a national prince he would have succeeded, in spite of the sad memories of past oppression, as many princes had succeeded before. But he remained essentially Dutch in his manners and his political outlook, and as such he was bound to fail, as Joseph II, Maximilian and Philip II had failed before him.

modern belgium (treaties of 1830-1839 and 1919).
View larger image

CHAPTER XXV

Throughout the negotiations the autocratic Powers—Prussia, Austria and Russia—were opposed to the Belgians. They treated them as rebels who ought to be only too happy to buy their independence at any price. As a matter of fact, if the same wave of nationalism which had stirred Belgium had not, at the same time, caused serious trouble in Poland and Italy, it is doubtful whether England and France could have induced the Conference to accept even the principle of Belgian independence. But, owing to their internal troubles, both Russia and Austria were disinclined to take action, and Prussia would have found herself isolated if she had maintained an uncompromising attitude.

The Belgians, on the other hand, from the very beginning of the negotiations, placed themselves on an equal footing with Holland, and considered the Conference as a mediator, not as an arbiter. They gratefully accepted its intervention as "prompted by feelings of sympathy for the sufferings of Belgium and by humanitarian motives," but refused energetically to bind themselves by any engagement. When, on December 20th, Belgian independence was finally recognized, the Provisory Government remarked that "the balance of power in Europe can still be ensured, and a general peace maintained, by making Belgium independent, strong and happy. If Belgium were to be left without strength and happiness, the new arrangement would be threatened with the same fate as that of the political combination of 1815. Independent Belgium has her share of European duties to fulfil, but it would be difficult to conceive what obligations could be imposed upon her by treaties in the conclusion of which she had no voice."

Such a complete consciousness of their national rights on the part of the Belgian plenipotentiaries can only be explained by the fact that such consciousness had never ceased to exist. This was no new nation struggling for its birth, but an Old nation, as old as any of those who had assumed the responsibility of planning her future. The Belgian statesmen of 1830 had nothing to improvise. They had merely to pick up the threads broken through the vicissitudes of European struggle. Their new Constitution was based on the old Joyous Entry of Brabant, which Joseph II had vainly attempted to abolish, and whose memory forty years of French and Dutch centralization had not succeeded in obliterating. Their foreign policy was, in the same way, inspired by a firm attachment to their past and a firmer belief in their future. The London Conference was not long in realizing, when faced by such men as Lebeau, Van de Weyer and De Mérode, that they had not merely to deal with vague idealists or eloquent demagogues. It is not enough to say that Belgium was well represented. It would be more accurate to say that her delegates had a good case to defend.

Three treaties were prepared by the London Conference in the course of the negotiations. The first included a series of conditions formulated in January 1831 and known as "Bases of Separation." The second was the outcome of new negotiations which took place during the following months, and is known as "the Treaty of XVIII Articles" (July 1831). The third, framed after the defeat of the Belgian troops by the Dutch and the military and naval intervention of the Powers, is known as "the Treaty of XXIV Articles" (November 1831). Accepted by the Belgians, it was first rejected by William I, and finally sanctioned by him in 1839. This is the final settlement which popular history will remember as the "scrap of paper."

According to the Bases of Separation, Belgium lost the left bank of the Scheldt, but this stream was to remain entirely free. She also lost Luxemburg, which "would continue to belong to the German Confederation."

It will be remembered that, under the treaty of Vienna, this Belgian province had been converted into a Grand Duchy and given to King William, in exchange for his possessions in Germany, but the king had declared, at the time, that the "Grand Duchy would be considered as an integral part of the State." Accordingly, Luxemburg shared the political life of the rest of the kingdom, sending deputies to the Chambers and being, from every point of view, considered as a Belgian province. Luxemburgers had even taken a prominent part in the revolutionary movement. One of them remarked in Congress, during the debate which followed the Conference resolutions, that "national sovereignty was transferred from Brussels to the Foreign Office," and by an overwhelming majority (169 against 9) the Congress protested against any delimitation of Belgian territory made without the consent of the representatives of the nation.

A period of acute tension followed this refusal. King William had not raised the blockade of the Scheldt, in spite of the conditions of the armistice, and the Belgians consequently continued their military operations in front of Maestricht, which had not yet been evacuated. The Conference urged cessation of hostilities and prompt acceptance. The Government remaining obdurate, an ultimatum was sent fixing June 1st as the last date on which the Belgians had to submit and threatening military intervention. On June 6th, Lord Ponsonby, British representative at Brussels, and General Belliard, the French representative, were formally recalled by their respective Governments, but the action of the Powers was delayed owing to differences of opinion concerning the method of intervention. This allowed Belgium some time to reopen negotiations, and her delegates in London finally obtained the revision of the "Bases of Separation." A new agreement was drafted, on June 26th, known as "the Treaty of XVIII Articles," according to which Belgium became permanently neutral, while the questions of Luxemburg and Maestricht remained in abeyance, further negotiations concerning the contested territories having to be pursued direct between Belgium and Holland.

leopold i.
(Reigned 1831-1865).
From a portrait by Liévin de Winne.
View larger image
Ph. B.

This diplomatic success was not only due to the perseverance of the Belgian delegates but also to Prince Leopold's wise decision not to accept the crown unless a satisfactory solution was reached. It must be recalled that, as soon as the Belgian Congress had decided on constitutional monarchy, the names of several candidates had been discussed. The conservative Powers favoured the candidature of the Prince of Orange, hoping thus to restore in the future the union of the two countries. But this proposal had met with an overwhelming opposition in Belgium. The candidature of the Duke of Nemours, son of Louis Philippe, had then been considered, and by a narrow majority of two votes the Belgian Congress decided in his favour. Such a choice could not be approved in England, since it would have meant, sooner or later, French hegemony over the Belgian coast and Antwerp. Louis Philippe, therefore, refused the Belgian offer. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, widower of Princess Charlotte, was practically an English Prince, having spent most of his life in England; he was of German extraction, and a marriage was contemplated between him and Princess Marie Louise, Louis Philippe's daughter. He had already acquired a great reputation for wisdom, which gained him later the title of the "Nestor of Europe." It was felt that no better man could be found to fill such a delicate post, and both English and French diplomats were inclined to remove all obstacles which might prevent him from accepting the Belgian offer.

The Prince's influence and the Belgian diplomats' firm attitude succeeded in altering the Conference's views. The Belgians were no longer treated as rebels and ordered to submit, but as free people whose claims must be considered. "Everybody says," wrote Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, "that the Belgians are mad and that it is useless to discuss with them. I have noticed that there is a good deal of method in their madness." Talleyrand, who was not too well disposed towards the Belgian emissaries and "their reticences," wrote on June 24th: "We have been in conference for forty hours, but the Belgian delegates are so little accustomed to this kind of negotiations, they create so many difficulties, that we cannot get on and I am tired out. A conference took place to-day at Prince Leopold's; it lasted until eight. It will continue at my house and last probably till late in the night." The next day, the XVIII Articles were signed.

Prince Leopold having accepted the crown, the new treaty was sanctioned by the Belgian Congress on July 9th. Less than a month later, on August 2nd, the Dutch armies, breaking the armistice, invaded Belgian territory and defeated the Belgian forces at Louvain. Owing to the armed intervention both of England and France, the Dutch were forced to retreat, but these military operations had set the seal on Belgian hopes.

The Powers were now "firmly determined to stop, by all available means, the resumption of hostilities which would threaten Europe with a general war," and, on November 15th, King Leopold was obliged to accept, under strong protest, a new agreement, known as "the Treaty of XXIV Articles," which, though preserving the country's independence and neutrality, deprived her of her natural frontiers and tore from her territories whose inhabitants had shared her life since the early Middle Ages. The Scheldt was given the status of an international river, according to the General Act of Vienna, the supervision of pilotage, buoying and dredging operations being entrusted to a Dutch-Belgian commission. Belgium retained half of Luxemburg (the area known to-day as the province of Luxemburg), while the other half, with the town of Luxemburg, remained in the hands of the Dutch king, and constituted a Grand Duchy attached to the German Confederation. "In exchange" for their portion of Luxemburg, the Belgians were obliged to relinquish their rights over Eastern Limburg and Maestricht, which became the Dutch provinces of the same name. Such were the "final and irrevocable" decisions of the Powers.

Though the compromise was entirely in his favour, King William refused to sanction it. From the beginning of the negotiations the Dutch had contended that, by the separation of Belgium and Holland, Article XIV of the treaty of Münster (that is to say, the right of Holland to close the Scheldt in time of peace or war) came into force again. Disregarding the liberal principles laid down at Vienna, they wanted to go back to the old régime of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which subjected Belgium to their control. Holding Maestricht, the key of the Meuse, and the Lower Scheldt, the key of Antwerp, they intended to treat independent Belgium as they had treated the Spanish and Austrian provinces.

Laborious negotiations proceeded during the following years, and, in 1838, King William declared himself at last prepared to sign the treaty on the consideration of the payment of a toll of one florin and a half per ton on every ship entering and leaving the stream on its way to Antwerp.

Meanwhile, Limburg and Luxemburg had remained Belgian, and the bonds attaching the sacrificed provinces to the country had become so strong that the forthcoming settlement provoked emphatic protests. Petitions were sent to the king, and delegations came to Brussels urging resistance. Once more, Belgian negotiators multiplied their efforts in London and Paris. But, this time, the friendly Powers remained adamant and the Government was made to understand that, if the Belgians created difficulties, nothing would prevent the German Confederation and the King of Holland from annexing Luxemburg and Limburg by force. In the spring of 1839 the Belgian Chamber was at last compelled to give its final decision. Three ministers had resigned from the Government. The Austrian and Prussian "chargés d'affaires" had left the capital. It was common knowledge that several Prussian army corps were massed on the Eastern frontier. Under such a threat, and this time without the support of England and France, the Chamber was faced with the cruel alternative of sanctioning partial annexation or seeing the very life of the nation jeopardized by foreign invasion. The deputies of Limburg and Luxemburg were the most emphatic in their opposition: "Suicide will follow fratricide," exclaimed a deputy of Maestricht, while a representative of Ruremonde urged armed resistance. "I would rather give my life a thousand times," protested a Luxemburger, "than a vote which would oppress my conscience until my last day." On March 12th, Mr. Metz, who was unable to walk through illness, was carried to his seat and declared that "neither the king, nor the Conference, nor the Government, nor the Chambers had the right to dispose of his life" by "a sacrilegious treaty which takes away four hundred thousand Belgians from the country of their choice and covers Belgium with eternal shame."

The Government's action was defended by Mr. Nothomb, who, though a Luxemburger and an ardent patriot, realized too well the danger of the situation not to urge submission: "We have not yet had the opportunity of rendering any service to Europe. She has no reason to be grateful to us. If it were not for our pressing need of independence, nothing up to now justifies our existence. What matter to her our national soul tempered by age-long traditions! If we resist, she will put an end to our existence as a free State with a stroke of the pen. In bending before the inevitable, Belgium will save her nationality, spare the disputed districts the horrors of war, and make a sacrifice which Europe will be obliged to take into account on the day when, bearing no responsibility in the outbreak of war, the country will be able to claim her revenge!" Another argument urged by some supporters of the Government was based on the fact that, though not legally bound by her former acceptance of the XXIV Articles, which had remained in abeyance for seven years, Belgium's faith had been pledged to it: "I believe," said one of them, "that international treaties have a real value, that they are not merely scraps of paper. I believe that Right more than Force governs the affairs of this world, and that, in the end, it pays to fulfil one's obligations, however painful these may be."

A tragic incident occurred on March 14th. Mr. Bekaert-Baekelandt, deputy of Courtrai, had first been opposed to the Government's policy. He had, however, been gradually convinced that all resistance had become useless. This conversion to the inevitable had broken his heart. He ended his speech by alluding to the return at a future date of the deputies of the sacrificed provinces to the Belgian Chamber. "Meanwhile," he said, "they will remain Belgians like ourselves, and they will be generous enough to consider that our votes are extorted by force, that they are a painful sacrifice imposed upon us by foreign nations. They will no doubt appreciate how powerless we are to avoid this sad obligation...." He did not proceed further, and fell dead.

These manifestations have been compared with the heartrending scenes which took place at the time of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but it would be wrong to draw too hasty conclusions from such a comparison. On the one hand, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine is far more recent. On the other, Dutch administration and the Grand-Ducal régime did not provoke the same opposition among the people. If Belgian irredentism proved very strong at the beginning, it gradually diminished, owing mainly to the fact that the patriots, on both sides of the frontier, were unable to entertain any hope of reunion during the long period of neutrality which paralysed Belgian foreign policy. Recent manifestations which took place on the occasion of the revision of the 1839 treaties towards the reunion of Zeeland Flanders, Luxemburg and Limburg to Belgium must, however, not be misjudged. They must not be considered as the outcome of a crude instinct towards aggrandisement, following the military success of the Belgian army at the end of the Great War, or of a wild thirst for revenge, but merely as the outburst of irredentist feelings, nursed in silence during eighty years of neutrality, and revived, among a certain group of intellectuals, by the fierce struggle waged by the nation for the safeguard of its liberties. As for the demand of military guarantees made by the Government during these negotiations, a demand which must be clearly distinguished from the irredentist agitation just mentioned, it was merely prompted by the circumstances in which Belgium is placed at the present time. The territorial losses inflicted upon the country in 1839 were largely compensated for by the pact of neutrality entered into by the Great Powers, which provided Belgium with the strongest and most unequivocal guarantees respecting her territorial integrity. Provided these guarantees were observed faithfully, the closing of the Scheldt by Holland in time of war, the critical situation on the Eastern frontier created by the indefensible cul-de-sac of Dutch Limburg, and the supremacy in Luxemburg of a foreign Power, did not seriously jeopardize the country's security. The treaties of 1839 were considered as forming a whole, the moral safeguard of guaranteed neutrality counterbalancing, to a certain extent, the new territorial encroachments. With the disappearance of neutrality, the substitution of new guarantees of security for the old ones seemed obvious. The demands formulated at the Paris Conference by the Belgian people and Government—free access from the sea towards Belgian ports in order to ensure communication between the country and her allies in time of war, a military entente with Holland towards the defence of Dutch Limburg, and a rapprochement with Luxemburg—were therefore the natural outcome of the revision of the 1839 settlement.

CHAPTER XXVI

The same treaty granted Belgium independence. Within these narrow limits, she remained at least mistress of her destinies. She had her own king, her own Government, her own Constitution. As far as internal affairs were concerned, she enjoyed full sovereignty. She was diminished, but not deeply altered. She maintained, in the nineteenth century, all the main characteristics which had distinguished her history and civilization during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Two races, two languages, were still associated on her soil. Walloons and Flemings took an equal share in the framing of her future. The sea remained free for commercial purposes, and the great European roads, which had so largely contributed in the past to placing her in the forefront of European nations, still found in the country their natural and necessary meeting-place. This main fact must be made evident if one attempts to explain the causes of the Belgian renaissance during the nineteenth century. It is not enough to say that the Belgium of Leopold I and Leopold II followed the tradition of the Belgium of Charles V and Philip the Good. It must be added that modern Belgium, in spite of gradual encroachments, had remained whole. Such encroachments having taken place on all sides, the nucleus was untouched. Belgium preserved her great towns and her main streams. No essential organ of the national body had been impaired.

As far as internal affairs were concerned, Belgium then emerged free and sound from the turmoil of three centuries of European warfare. For external affairs, she was still subjected to the restriction of guaranteed neutrality. It is scarcely necessary to dwell on the distinction between self-imposed neutrality, such as that existing in Switzerland, and the régime of guaranteed neutrality imposed by the Powers on Belgium. The first is no restriction of the sovereign rights of the State upon its foreign policy, the second takes away from it practically all initiative in foreign matters. If the Powers bound themselves, in the 1839 treaty, not to violate the integrity of Belgian territory and to defend the country in case of attack, Belgium, on her side, undertook to observe strictly the rules of neutrality and to take necessary measures towards the defence of her frontiers. It might be argued, and it has been argued frequently in Belgium, that such neutrality could not prevent a nation from possessing colonies and concluding a defensive alliance for the sole purpose of safeguarding herself. But, as a matter of fact, rival Powers could not give such a liberal interpretation to the text of the treaties. First from the French side, later from the German side, Belgium was constantly held under suspicion. Any manifestation of public opinion concerning foreign affairs was deeply resented, her military policy was narrowly watched, she could not take a step towards self-defence or economic expansion without provoking some discontent among the Powers. Thanks to the firmness of her statesmen and, more than once, to the friendly support of Great Britain, she was able to resist urgent demands. But it goes without saying that the Belgian Government, anxious to preserve their dignity, avoided all possible cause of friction, so that Belgium scarcely ever made use of her legitimate right to determine, within some limits, her foreign policy. Neutrality, to all intents and purposes, meant paralysis. For many, it meant worse than that—carelessness and apathy.

After the eight years of uncertainty which followed the first signature of the XXIV Articles—eight years during which all parties joined under the permanent Dutch menace—two currents of thought divided Belgian opinion. The first attempted to minimize the military responsibility of the country, and, trusting blindly to the promise of the Powers, to reduce to a strict minimum Belgium's military charges in men and money. The second saw clearly that, without an adequate army and the necessary defences, Belgium would be unable to fulfil her obligations in case her integrity should be violated, and would suffer in consequence; it realized that any weakness in the country's defences increased the temptation of some Powers to break their pledge. It is easy to understand that the first school was generally more popular than the other, and rallied not only the sincere idealists who thought such a contingency as the tearing up of solemn treaties absolutely impossible, but many unscrupulous politicians only too anxious to use the popular catchword "Not a penny, not a soldier," or "Niemand gedwongen soldaat," for electoral purposes. The Belgians had always been stubbornly opposed to conscription; it will be remembered that they resisted all attempts at enforcing it in the past and that it was the main cause of the War of Peasants (1798) against the "Sans Culottes." To a people which, by tradition, was strongly adverse to militarism and centralization, it was only too easy to misrepresent measures of self-defence, urgently required by the European situation, as the first step towards autocracy and oppression. The partisans of military safeguards found themselves, therefore, in a minority, and their only support was the personal influence of the Belgian kings, who, from the first days of the new régime till the eve of the war, never ceased to emphasize the evident danger of disregarding the country's international responsibilities. It is true that, with the lapse of time, the danger became more and more threatening, but, on the other hand, the "anti-militarists" found a fresh argument in the fact that, during so many years, the country had been able to weather the storm.

The first trouble arose in connection with the Socialist revolution which broke out in France in 1848. In the previous year, Marx and Engels had established their headquarters in Brussels, where they drafted the "Manifesto of the Communist Party." The Belgians, however, were not prepared to adopt it, and the revolutionaries decided to invade the country from the South. Bands organized in France and secretly encouraged by some French leaders attempted to cross the frontier near Mouscron, at Risquons Tout, but their advance was easily checked by the Belgian forces.

The only consequence of these disturbances was the vote by the Chamber of a new grant towards the reinforcement of the army: "No doubt," said the Minister Rogier on that occasion, "it will cost something to equip a greater number of men. But has one ever estimated the cost of an invasion, even if it only lasted a week?" In 1850, Leopold II wrote to one of his ministers: "Without means of defence you will be the plaything of everyone."

A greater danger loomed ahead. Louis Napoleon had, by the coup d'état of December 1, 1851, imposed his dictatorship on France. Many prominent exiles and refugees came to Belgium, and the Brussels papers openly expressed their opinion of the new dictator. So that Belgium, which three years before had been branded as ultramontane, was now denounced as a nest of communists and rebels. Pressure was even brought to bear on the Government to introduce Press censorship. It was duly ignored, and the relations between the two countries became strained. One year later, Napoleon became Emperor of the French, and all clear-sighted Belgians realized that he was only awaiting an opportunity to extend his power and authority towards the North. This was shown plainly by the French policy with regard to Luxemburg.

The emperor having approached the King of Holland in view of obtaining from him the cession of the Grand Duchy, a conference was called in London (May 1867) at which the independence, neutrality and inviolability of the duchy were placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers. Thwarted in this direction by European diplomacy, Napoleon III attempted to obtain a footing in Luxemburg by controlling the railways. In January 1868 the Compagnie de l'Est, under guarantee of the French Government, took over from the Compagnie Guillaume Luxembourg its railway lines both in Luxemburg and Belgian territory. Further negotiations began with the Belgian companies Grand Luxemburg and Chemins de fer Liégeois-Limbourgeois, which would have placed all the main railways of Luxemburg and South-eastern Belgium in French hands. Warned in time, the Premier, Frère-Orban, instructed the Belgian representative in Paris to declare that Belgium would never consent to such an arrangement. Napoleon's threats remained without result, the Belgian policy being strongly upheld by Lord Clarendon, and, in July 1869, a protocol was signed annulling the contracts of the Compagnie de l'Est as far as the Belgian railways were concerned. At the same time, Napoleon III, anxious to find at any cost "compensations" for the increased prestige which Prussia obtained from her Danish and Austrian victories, had sounded that Power regarding a project of partition of the Netherlands. His proposal, first kept secret and subsequently revealed by Bismarck on the morrow of the declaration of war in 1870, was to annex Belgium to France, while Prussia would be left a free hand in Holland. The publication of this revelation by The Times did more than anything else to alienate British public opinion, if not from France at least from the French emperor, during the Franco-Prussian War.

Baron Chazal, who had joined the Belgian ministry in 1857, succeeded in convincing the Cabinet of the necessity of reinforcing Belgian defences. In view of the superiority of the French army—for the threat came evidently from that quarter at the time—it was decided to give up the idea of defending the country by a cordon of inefficient fortresses, and to build round Antwerp a powerful "entrenched camp," where the Belgian army could retreat and maintain itself until reinforcements came from abroad. It goes without saying that the only country which would be in a position to send such reinforcements to Antwerp, in case of an invasion, was Great Britain, and Antwerp was purposely chosen as the only position where considerable forces could conveniently be disembarked from the sea. In view of the present interpretation placed on the 1839 treaties by Holland, which gives to the latter country the right to close the Scheldt in time of war, this scheme seems, to say the least, hastily conceived. But the Dutch exclusive sovereignty over the Scheldt did not appear nearly so definite at the time as it appears now. No mention being made of the matter in the 1839 settlement, many Belgian authorities considered that the stream was placed under a régime of co-sovereignty, and it seemed then incredible that the Dutch should stop the passage of relief ships.

In the face of strong popular opposition, the Chamber voted a credit of 50,000,000 francs for the Antwerp fortifications, and General Brialmont, one of the foremost military engineers in Europe, was entrusted with the work. After its completion, Antwerp was considered one of the strongest fortified towns in the world.

As soon as a conflict became imminent between France and Prussia, Great Britain, in accordance with her traditional policy as far as Belgium was concerned, demanded from the two Powers a declaration confirming Belgian neutrality. The situation in 1870 corresponds exactly to that in 1914, and the language used by Mr. Asquith during the first days of August of the latter year seems to echo the words uttered forty years before by his great chief. "It would be impossible for us not to interfere," firmly declared Mr. Gladstone, "should we witness the destruction of Belgium's liberty and independence." In both cases, British policy was inspired by the guarantee mentioned in the treaties, a guarantee which not only implied safety for Belgium, but also absolute opposition to any Power attempting to seize the Belgian coast. The motives were the same, the steps taken were the same, the outcome only was different. Both the French emperor and Bismarck confirmed, in 1870, the inviolability of Belgian territory, the latter stating that such a declaration was not required, the treaties being sufficiently explicit on the subject.

Why did Germany respect in 1870 a treaty which she ignored in 1914? Even without taking into account the change in German mentality since her victory, military conditions were totally different. The strong chain of fortifications on the French Eastern frontier had not yet been erected, and the strength of the Belgian army appeared by no means negligible. Before the enormous increase of modern armies which took place during the twenty years of "armed peace," 80,000 men might have made all the difference one way or the other. It was approximately the strength of the French army which surrendered at Sedan. After this great defeat, German Headquarters declared their intention to pursue the fugitives into Belgian territory if the French forces attempted to escape being encircled by crossing the frontier. Such steps, however, were not rendered necessary. While showing their intense sympathy for the vanquished, the Belgians fulfilled most scrupulously all their obligations, and the European diplomats who had conceived the idea of neutralizing "the cockpit of Europe" could congratulate themselves. Their arrangements had worked perfectly, and for once Belgium had not been drawn into the conflict.

In the light of recent events, it is almost to be regretted that the test had been so successful. More than anything else, the 1870 experience allayed suspicion in and out of Belgium. The Powers refrained from pressing on the country the necessity for further armaments, and the hands of the anti-militarists in Belgium, instead of being weakened (as they ought to have been if events had been placed in their proper light), were considerably strengthened.

leopold ii.
(Reigned 1865-1909).
View larger image
Ph. B.

During the long period of armed peace which followed, while the Powers formed, on one side the "Triplice" (1883), on the other the "Duplice" (1891) and the Entente Cordiale (1904), while armies and fleets were increased tenfold and German aggressive policy asserted itself more and more acutely, Belgium's defences were only slowly reinforced, in spite of the desperate efforts of disinterested patriots and of the stern warnings of the kings. The name of Leopold II must be associated here with that of Albert I. Both were prompted in their action by the same motives that inspired Leopold I's policy. They placed security on a level with, and even above, prosperity. Standing aloof from party intrigues, they were in a position to appeal to all patriots without distinction, and to make use of the services of a little band of clear-sighted citizens who saw the centre of danger transferred from France to Germany, and watched the young Empire's military and economic development with growing anxiety. Foremost among them stood Emile Banning, author of a prophetic report on the Meuse defences (1881-86). Nothing illustrated more clearly the crippling influence of neutrality on Belgian international thought than the way this man of genius was ignored by his fellow-citizens. In any other country, he would have exercised a considerable influence on public opinion. In Belgium, he was only heard by a few statesmen and, happily, by Leopold II, who no doubt had his report in mind when, in 1887, he warned one of his ministers of the necessity of Belgium not only safeguarding her independence, but "preventing the passage" of foreign troops through her territory. Germany had now become the main source of danger, but in order to avoid all criticism it was decided to build two bridgeheads, one at Namur and the other at Liége. The first commanded the upper valley of the Meuse, the second the middle course of the stream; one was facing France, the other Germany. The plan of defence was consequently developed, the forts enabling the army to make a short stand before retiring into the entrenched camp of Antwerp. It is largely to Banning's clearsightedness and to Leopold II's firm attitude that Western Europe owes the respite given by the resistance of Liége in August 1914. Had not General Brialmont's original plans of the forts been unduly curtailed, this resistance would have proved still more effective.

Credits for the defences of Liége and Namur, like those of Antwerp a few years before, were voted grudgingly by a Chamber lulled into a false state of security by the experience of 1870. But, if public opinion was little inclined to devote money to improve the country's defences, it became obdurate when experts advised a reform of the Belgian military system. Not only were the effectives ridiculously small, compared with the size of the German and French armies, but recruiting was managed through a system of drawing lots, to which was added the evil of "substitution"—that is to say, the sons of the bourgeois class who drew a "bad number" were entitled to buy a substitute, who took their place in the ranks. A campaign for personal and general service was launched, but in spite of the king's support it met with little success. A certain number of volunteers were added to the normal effectives in 1902, and in 1908, after the sensational journey of William II to Tangiers, new credits were voted for the development of the Antwerp defences. To those who objected that fortifications would be useless if Belgium did not possess a sufficient army to man them, the king answered: "Let us have the stones first. The men will come later." When the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgian Independence gave him at last the opportunity of breaking the silence imposed upon him by the Congo campaign, he uttered a supreme warning to the nation: "Let us not be overconfident in our present prosperity; let us stand closer and closer together around our flag. Nations, like human beings, have to pass through a critical age which brings about old age or premature death. Its date, for young nations, falls during the last quarter of the first century of their existence." Once more, on February 18, 1909, he imparted to a friend—for his lack of popularity had made public declarations useless at that time—his anxieties regarding the future: "It is indispensable that we should possess a good army, that we should be able to defend ourselves, and thus, in conformity with our international obligations, prevent the crossing of our territory by a foreign army, and make such crossing as costly as possible, in order to remove the temptation from those who would be inclined to attempt it.... On my return from my recent journey to Germany, I warned all concerned that Germany is building more ships and increasing her military expenses. We must efficiently complete our fortifications and our equipment. You know that neither one nor the other can be improvised...."

Leopold II attached such importance to the adoption of personal service, proposed in 1909, that he deliberately postponed an operation which might have saved his life, in order to be able to sign the decree which placed the Bill on the Statute Book. He died three days later.[1]

This supreme satisfaction was not unmixed. Important concessions had had to be made. The voluntary system was maintained to a certain extent, only one son per family being called up for a short time (fifteen months). The passing of the Bill was a victory in principle, but it only increased very slightly the strength of the Belgian army.

The Pan-German campaign was in full swing by then. Maps were published, beyond the Rhine, showing large portions of Belgium painted in imperial red, like the rest of the Reich. Pamphlets and books appeared claiming Antwerp as a German port and connecting East Africa with the German Cameroons through the Belgian Congo. Still the majority of the Belgians would not believe that such views were shared by the German Emperor and his Government. It was only after the Agadir coup (1911) and Algeciras (1912) that M. de Broqueville, Minister of War, strongly supported by King Albert, was able to carry through a Bill introducing general and compulsory service, which would have placed the army on a proper footing if its provisions had been rendered immediately effective. Unhappily, the Bill only provided for a gradual increase, the army reaching its full strength of 340,000 men in 1917. This last reservation proved nearly fatal to the country, for, when mobilization was ordered, in July 1914, the total forces available only amounted to 117,000 men, of which the combatant portion was reduced to 93,000 bayonets—an increase of only 10,000 over the effectives of 1870.

There are few subjects so depressing as the slow development of Belgian defences under the threat of invasion. Each time the situation became serious, as in 1848, 1852, 1908 and 1911, public opinion allowed some progress to be made. But it came always too late. The people were ready to face their responsibilities, but they could not be made to realize them. Blindly relying on the 1839 treaties, absorbed in their economic and intellectual development, they showed little interest in international affairs. Those who did, found themselves in the dilemma either of taking refuge in a fools' paradise or of powerlessly facing an ever-growing menace. Neutrality may have saved Belgium in 1870, full independence might have saved her in 1914.

CHAPTER XXVII

One month after the first outbreak of the Belgian Revolution, elections were already taking place. An almost equal number of Liberals (the successors of the Vonckists) and of Catholics (Statists) were returned to the Congress whose duty was to frame the new Constitution. It is typical of the spirit of patriotic union between both parties and of the adaptability of the Belgians to their new independent life that these deputies, most of whom had no experience of political life, succeeded, within two months, in drafting a Constitution which has since served as a model for several European nations. It was the result of various influences: the groundwork—based on individual liberty, equality before the law, freedom of the press, of worship, of public meeting, of association and of teaching—was no doubt inspired by the French. On the other hand, the preponderance of legislative power, represented by the Chamber and the Senate, over the executive, the principle of ministerial responsibility, placing the king outside and above parties, was the result of English influence: but perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the new Constitution was the way in which provincial and communal rights were safeguarded, the communes, in particular, preserving practical autonomy for local affairs, with the only restriction that the burgomaster was to be nominated by the king. The Belgian Constitution struck the balance between centralization, inherited from the period of French rule, and particularism, which had, from the Burgundian period, been the most striking feature in Belgian politics. If we associate, in our minds, particularism with the traditional conservatism of the Catholic peasantry and centralization with modern industrial developments and the intellectual culture of the large towns, we shall obtain a fairly good idea of the two general tendencies which divided public opinion in Belgium during the nineteenth century and whose main features may be recognized not only in politics, but also in the economic, intellectual and artistic development of the country.