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III. Later Babylonian Law

Bibliography

Very little is yet known regarding later Babylonian law. Dr. F. E. Peiser published in the Sitzungsberichte der Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1889, pp. 823 ff.) a very interesting fragmentarily preserved text (82-7-14, 988, in the British Museum), which contains either a collection of abstracts of cases which have been decided, or precedents, or else an extract from some code later than that of Ḥammurabi. Dr. Peiser thought that the date was the second year of Ashurbânipal, king of Babylon. This seems rather unlikely, but may, of course, be true.

In his inaugural dissertation, Dr. Peiser, under the title of Jurisprudentiae Babylonicae quae supersunt, commented upon and illustrated the above text by numerous examples of cases, actually occurring during the period of the second empire. But the whole collection of fragments of law with which he had to deal was too small to do more than show what may be hoped for as the result of future discoveries.

As specimens of these laws we may take the following:

Agent not able to recover without power of attorney

Law A. [Col. II. 4-14.]

The man who has sealed a tablet, by the name of another, in favor of an owner of a field, or has sealed a bond, and has not caused to be executed a deed giving him power of attorney, or has not taken a duplicate of such a tablet [cannot take possession]; the man, in whose name the tablet, or bond, is written, shall take that field, or house.

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If a man acted as buyer, or lender, for another, he incurred liabilities, for which he could not indemnify himself, unless he had secured from his principal a deed empowering him so to act. But, if without such power of attorney, A had acted for B, and bought a house, or field, of C, and had the conveyance made out to B, of course paying C; or had lent money to C, in the name of B; and the transaction had been completed, by sealing the deed of sale or bond; then B was the owner of the field, or house, or the creditor for the loan. A could not plead that he was the real owner, even if he had not been able to recover the purchase-money or loan from B, in whose name he had made it. B, whose name appeared in the deed or in the bond, was the rightful owner.

Responsibility of one who sells

Law B. [Col. II. 15-23.]

The man, who has sold a female slave and has had an objection made concerning her, shall take her back. The seller shall give to the buyer the price named in the deed of sale, to its exact amount, and shall pay half a shekel of silver for each of the children born to her.

How long after sale objection could be raised is not stated. In early times a month was allowed for fever to develop; in Assyrian contracts a hundred days were allowed for fever or seizure. But a sartu, or “vice,” could be pleaded, at any time, as ground for returning the slave. Here it is clear that time was allowed for a slave to bear one or more children, before the repudiation lost effect. It is noteworthy that the seller had to buy back such children. The maid may have been bought to bear her master children, and if these were not sound, the master had ground for complaint and could not be held responsible for them. Also it was objectionable to separate mother and children. The price named is trifling. Compare § 278 of the Code, where, however, no mention is made of the children of a maid.

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The next law is unintelligible at present, owing to the lacunae, and doubtful readings of the text, which, moreover, is only given in transcription. It appears to concern a woman and her interests in a field or plantation and the trees in it, and its produce.

Permanent settlements at marriage between father of bride and the bridegroom

Law C. [Col. III. 3-15.]

A man has given his daughter to a freeborn man and the father has fixed something in a deed and given to his son, and the first-named has fixed a marriage-portion for his daughter and they have mutually executed deeds of settlement. They shall not alter their deeds. The father shall give in full the settlement (nuṣurru), which he had promised his son by deed, to the father-in-law, and deliver it.

The father here named appears to be the father of the bridegroom. He must make a settlement on his son, as well as the father of the bride on his daughter. The point of the law seems to be that these settlements on the part of the parents to the young couple are irrevocable. No subsequent engagements entered into can affect them. This settlement by the bridegroom's father on his son, which he has to pay over to the bride's father, evidently takes the place of the terḫatu, or “bride-price” of the Code. The obligation of a father to find his son the means for a bride-price appears in the Code, § 166; but there is no section which answers directly to this law. The marriage-portion is now nudunnu, in the Code it was šeriktu, while nudunnu was the husband's gift to the wife.

Inheritance rights of children of second marriage

Law D. [Col. III. 16-22.]

When the father [of the bridegroom] has had his wife taken away by fate, has taken to himself a second wife, and she has borne him sons, the sons of the second wife shall take a third of his property remaining.

This appears as part of the same section as Law C, and is enacted again in Law K, page 69. It is not easy to see why it is here, except to make plain that settlements on [pg 072] marriages of the sons of the first family are a first charge on the father's property. The second family takes a third, not of all the father once had, but of what is left after these gifts by deed have been taken out. The married sons of the first family are not disinherited by virtue of these gifts, but take among them two-thirds of what is left. This is against the Code, § 167.

Procedure in case the father-in-law is unable to carry out his promise of dowry

Law E. [Col. III. 23-31.]

A man who has promised a marriage-portion to his daughter, or has written her a deed of gift, and afterward his means have diminished, shall give to his daughter a marriage-portion according to his means that are left. Father-in-law and son-in-law shall not quarrel one with the other.

Dr. Peiser has shown that the marriage-portion was often held back a long time. Suits were brought to recover it from fathers-in-law. There is no corresponding section in the Code.

Marriage-portion of childless wife

Law F. [Col. III. 32-37.]

A man has given a marriage-portion to his daughter and she has neither son nor daughter and fate has carried her off; her marriage-portion returns to her father's house.

Exactly as in the Code, § 163.

The first seven lines of Col. IV. are too fragmentary to give a connected sense, but are still concerned with the marriage-portion.

Rights of inheritance of a childless widow

Law G. [Col. IV. 8-24.]

A wife, whose marriage-portion her husband has received, who has no son or daughter, and fate has carried off her husband, shall be given from her husband's property the marriage-portion, whatever that was. If her husband has made her a gift, she shall receive the gift of her husband with her marriage-portion and take it away. If she had no marriage-portion, the judge shall estimate the property of her husband and, according to her husband's means, shall grant her something.

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It is noteworthy that in the above laws the old usage is reversed. Now the nudunnu is the marriage-portion, given with the bride, and the šeriktu is the husband's assignment to the wife. With this alteration the law agrees with the Code, § 171. But there she has a family.

The rights of a widow with children in case of re-marriage

Law H. [Col. IV. 25-45.]

A man has married a wife and she has borne him children; after that man has been carried off by fate, and that woman has set her face to enter the house of another, she shall take the marriage-portion which she brought from her father's house, and whatever her husband presented her as a gift, and shall marry the husband of her choice. As long as she lives, she shall enjoy food and drink from them. If there be children of this husband, they and the children of the former husband shall share her marriage-portion. The sisters....

This is practically the same as Code, § 170, but it is differently arranged and the phrases differ markedly. Note that the sisters were separately treated.

Division of the estate of a man twice married

Law K. [Col. V. 33-46.]

A man has married a wife and she has borne him children, and fate has carried off his wife; he has married a second wife and she has borne him children; after the father has gone to his fate, the children of the former wife shall take two-thirds of the goods of their father's house, the children of the second wife shall take one-third. Their sisters who are dwelling in their father's house....

This must be contrasted with § 167 of the Code. There all sons share equally. Here the first family take two-thirds. The sisters were also treated separately. It is clear that we have to do with a code which preserves many features of the early times, but has many new features of its own. It is greatly to be desired that further portions should be published.

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IV. The Social Organization Of The Ancient Babylonian State

The three great classes of the population: the gentry, the common men, and the slaves

The State appears in the light of the Ḥammurabi Code to have been composed of three great classes, the amêlu, the muškênu, and the ardu. To the first class belonged the king and the chief officers of state, and also the landed proprietors. Their liabilities for fines and punishments were higher. Also in their case the old law of “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” still held; while others came under a scale of compensations and damages. This may point to a racial difference. The ancient laws of Arabia may have been carried with them by Ḥammurabi's tribal followers, while the older subject-residents accepted the more commercial system of fines. The old pride of the Arab tribesman may have forbidden his taking money as payment for his damaged eye, or tooth. But the muškênu was more “humble,” as his name denotes, and may well have formed the bulk of the subject-population. He was a free man, not a beggar. He was not without considerable means, as we see from the sections referring to theft from him. He had slaves,62 and seems to have been liable to conscription. His fees to a doctor or surgeon were less than those paid by an amêlu. He paid less to his wife for a divorce,63 and could assault another poor man more cheaply than could an amêlu. There can be no doubt that the amêlu was the [pg 075] “gentleman” or “nobleman,” and the muškênu a common man, or poor man. But the exact force of the terms is uncertain.

In process of time amêlu came to be used, like our “sir,” and even “esquire,” of those who had no special qualifications for the title. Like the “gentleman's gentleman” of the servant's hall, he was only a respectable person. So, even in the Code, amêlu usually means no more than “man.” It already appears as a mere determinative of personality in the titles of laborers and artisans,64 when it cannot stamp them as landed proprietors. But it may mark them as members of the guilds of craftsmen and recall the respect due to such. If, however, we press this, we must admit a guild of day laborers.

There is no suggestion of any legal disability on the part of a muškênu; he is merely a person of less consideration. Whether or not his ranks were recruited from the children of slaves by free parents is not clear, but it is very probable that they were.

The slave was at his master's command and, like a child in his father's house, to some extent a chattel. He could be pledged for debt, as could a wife or child. He was subject to the levy,65 and his lot was so far unpleasant that we hear much of runaway slaves. It was penal to harbor a slave, or to keep one caught as a fugitive.66 Any injury done to him was paid for, and his master received the damages.67 But he was free to marry a free woman and the children were free. So a slave-girl was free on her master's death, if she had borne him children; and the children were also free. He was subject to mutilation for assaulting a free man, or repudiating his master.68 But his master had to pay for his cure, if sick.69 He was not free to contract, except by deed and bond.70 Yet he and his free wife [pg 076] could acquire property, half of which would fall to his wife and children on his death.

The levy-master and the warrant-officer

The Code reveals the existence of a class of men, who were indeed known from the letters of Ḥammurabi and the contemporary contracts, but whose functions are not easy to fix. They were the rîd ṣâbî and the bâ´iru. By their etymology these titles seemed to mean “slave-driver,” and “catcher.” But the Code sets them in a clearer light. They were closely connected, if not identical, officials. They had charge of the levy, the local quota for the army, or for public works. Hence “levy-master” and “warrant-officer” are suggestive renderings. For the former official, “taskmaster,” the one over the gang of forced laborers and reminiscent of the old time press-gang officers, is a fair translation. “Field cornet” would perhaps suit the military side. For some aspects of their office the ancient “reeve” may be compared. Whether the “catcher” actually was a local policeman, whose chief duty was to apprehend criminals and reluctant conscripts, is not yet clear. The same name is used of “fishermen,” who were “catchers” in another sense, and of hunters. A really satisfactory rendering is impossible, as we have now no officials whose duties actually correspond to theirs.

Their compensation

Each of these officials held what may be called a benefice, or perhaps a feoff. It consisted of land, house, and garden, certain sheep and cattle as stock, and a salary. It was directly ascribed to the king as benefactor. We may compare the Norman lords settled in England by the Conqueror, or the Roman soldier-colonists. The men may well have been the followers of the first founder of the dynasty. In a very similar way the Chaldean conqueror, Merodach-baladan II., long after, settled his Chaldean troops in Babylonia. We may regard these men as retainers of the king, and probably as originally foreigners. The benefice was held by them for [pg 077] personal service. They were to go “on the king's errand” when ordered. It was a penal offence to send a substitute.71 The errand might take them away from home and detain them a very long time. In such enforced absence the official might delegate his son to take his place and carry on his duty.72 This implies that there was a local duty besides the personal service. Further, this needed a grown man to discharge it.73 The locum tenens enjoyed the benefice,74 with a reserve of one-third for the wife to bring up the children of the absent official. An official by neglecting the care of his benefice ran the risk of forfeiture.75 This came about by his absence giving the locum tenens opportunity to acquire a prescriptive right, which he might do in three years, if he showed himself a more worthy holder. But this was only if the absentee had been neglectful, and a one-year tenancy conferred no such right.76

The risks of public service

The service on which the official might be engaged was evidently military and had risks. It is not certain whether the dannatu77 is really a “fortress,” or a “defeat.” The word has both meanings. It does not really matter. Either way the official is captured by the enemy of the king. He was bound to pay for his own ransom, if he had the means; or if not, his town must ransom him and, failing that, the state. But he could not raise money on his benefice. Moreover, while it could descend to his son, it was inalienable. No diminution by bequest to his female relatives, no sale of part of it, no mortgage on it, nor even its exchange for other like estate, was allowed.

Further, the official and his benefice were protected. He could not be hired out by his superior officers, nor in any way plundered or oppressed. He held tax free, subject only to his feudal duty.

The tributary

In some cases the tributary there is associated with these [pg 078] two officials. No duty is set down for him, beyond that implied in his name of paying a tribute. It is not clear that all land was held on one or the other scheme, but it is so in parts of the East still. Some land is held by personal service, some on payment of a tax. This tax later became the tithe. The personal service was later compounded for by furnishing a soldier or two for the army. The liability to serve in the levy continued to be borne by slaves and the lower classes.

All land subject to royal taxation

That all land did owe either personal service, or tax, is probably to be deduced from § 40, where we read that though a levy-master, warrant-officer, or tributary could alienate nothing of their holdings, other land-owners could do so. But they did so subject to the buyer taking over the duty, or service, of the land so transferred. One of the classes here named, the votary, appears subject to service elsewhere. The votary of Marduk is expressly exempt from this service.78 The merchant, who represents another class, appears very often to have been a foreigner, only temporarily resident in the country.

The votaries

The votary was already known to us from the contracts, but there was little to fix her functions. As seen in the Code, she was a highly favored person. Vowed to God, usually to Shamash at Sippara, or Marduk at Babylon, there seems little to connect her with the prostitute-votaries of Ishtar at Erech. She ordinarily lived in the convent, or “bride-house” of Shamash. She was given a portion, exactly like a bride, on taking her vow and becoming the “bride” of Shamash. But her property did not go to the convent. At her father's death, with her consent, her estate might be administered by her brothers, or she could farm it out. At any rate, she was provided for during her lifetime. But at her death, unless her father had specially given her power to bequeath it, her property went [pg 079] back to her family. She was not, however, doomed to spend all her days in the convent. She could leave it and even marry. But she was expected to maintain a high standard of respectability. For her to open a beer-shop or even enter one for drink was punished by burning. She remained a virgin, even if married. She could have no children and must provide her husband with a maid, if he wished to have a family. But she was carefully guarded from any reproach as childless. She ranks as a married woman, even if unmarried, and is protected from slander. Many noble ladies, and even kings' daughters, were votaries.79

The merchant

The merchant continually appears. Some passages suggest that he was a state official. But this is really pressing far the interest which the state took in him. He was, doubtless, like the Jew of the Middle Ages, a valuable asset to the king. He seems to have been the usual moneylender, so much so that in many places “merchant” and “creditor” are interchangeable. A man is usually said to borrow of “his merchant,” as we say “of his banker.” Doubtless, the king also borrowed from him. It is certain that the Code was very lenient to him. But the merchant also did business in the way of ordinary trade. As a capitalist he sent out his travellers and agents with goods far and wide, even into domains where the king's authority did not reach. Much of the Code is occupied with regulating the relations between the merchant and his agent. The agency was that form of commenda which is so characteristic of the East at the present. The agent takes stock or money of his principal, signs for it, agrees to pay so much profit, and goes off to seek a market, making what profit he can. There is much to suggest that the merchant was not usually a Babylonian. In later times, the Arameans were the chief merchants, and travelled all over Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, and into Asia Minor.

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