The Project Gutenberg eBook of Interpretation and Inspiration, by John William Burgon.

But there is a fallacy or a falsity at every step of this argument. For when did the Gospel ever "centre in attachment?" or when was "the whole of Christianity contained" in one short sentence? Supposing too that "a world of the understanding" does come in between the first century and the sixth; how does it follow that it is "impossible" to apply the language of the Creeds to the interpretation of Holy Scripture? Explain to me how that "world of understanding" affects the Nicene Creed? Even in the case of that most precious Creed called the Athanasian,—why need we assume that "the growth of ideas" has been a spurious growth? What if it should prove, on the contrary, that the development has been that of the plant from the seed [211]? Above all, why talk of "the fourth or sixth century,"—as if the Creeds were not essentially much older; nay, co-eval with Christianity itself?... Such writing shews nothing so much as a confused mind,—a weak, ill-informed, and illogical thinker.

Indeed Mr. Jowett seems to be altogether in the dark on the subject of the Creeds: for he speaks of them as "the result of three or four centuries of reflection and controversy," (p. 353,)—which is by no means true of all of them; nor, except in a certain sense, of any. But when he inquires,—"If the occurrence of the phraseology of the Nicene age in a verse of the Epistles would detect the spuriousness of the verse in which it was found,—how can the Nicene or Athanasian Creed be a suitable instrument for the interpretation of Scripture?" (p. 354.)—he simply asks a fool's question. The cases are not only not parallel, but there is not even any analogy between them. Let us hear him a little further:—

"Absorbed as St. Paul was in the person of Christ, ... he does not speak of Him as 'equal to the Father,' or 'of one substance with the Father [212].' Much of the language of the Epistles, (passages for example such as Romans i. 2: Philippians ii. 6,) would lose their meaning if distributed in alternate clauses between our Lord's Humanity and Divinity [213]. Still greater difficulties would be introduced into the Gospels by the attempt to identify them with the Creeds [214]. We should have to suppose that He was and was not tempted [215]; that when He prayed to His Father He prayed also to Himself [216]; that He knew and did not know 'of that hour' of which He as well as the angels were ignorant [217]. How could He have said 'My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?' or 'Father, if it be possible let this cup pass from Me.' How could He have doubted whether 'when the Son of Man cometh He shall find faith upon the earth [218]?' These simple and touching words," (p. 355,)—pah!

Now if what precedes means anything at all,—(I am by no means certain however that it does!)—it means that the writer does not believe in the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ. Unless the sentence which is without a reference to the foot of the page be not a denial of the fundamental Doctrine of the Faith [219],—I do not understand it. But look at all which precedes; and then say if those are the remarks of a man entitled to dogmatize "On the Interpretation of Scripture." ... If Mr. Jowett really means that the Creeds cannot be reconciled with the Bible,—how can he himself subscribe to the VIIIth Article? If he means nothing of the kind,—why does he write in such a weak, cloudy, illogical way?

But the whole of the case has not even yet been stated. Down from the remote period of which we have been hitherto speaking,—the age of primitive Creeds, and [oe]cumenical Councils, and ancient Fathers,—in every country of the civilized world to which the Gospel has spread,—the loftiest Intellect, the profoundest Learning, the sincerest Piety, have invariably endorsed the ancient and original method of interpretation. I am not implying that such corroboration was in any sense required; but the circumstance that it has been obtained, at least deserves attention. Modes of thought are dependent on times and countries. There is a fashion in all things. Great advances in Science,—grand epochs in civilization,—vicissitudes of opinion,—difference of institutions, national traditions, and the like,—might be supposed to have wrought a permanent change even in this department of Sacred Science. But it is not so. The storm has raged from one quarter or other of the heavens, but has ever spent its violence in vain. Still has the Church Catholic retained her own unbroken tradition. To keep to the history of that Church to which we, by God's mercy, belong:—The constant appeal, at the time of our own great Reformation, was to the Fathers of the first four centuries. Ever since, the temper and spirit of our Commentators has been to revert to the same standard, to reproduce the same teaching. The most powerful minds and the most holy spirits,—English Divines of the deepest thought and largest reading,—let me add, of the soundest judgment and severest discrimination,—have, in every age, down to the present, gratefully accepted not only the method, but even the very details of primitive Patristic Interpretation. But "the acceptance of a hundred generations and the growing authority arising from it,"—like "the institutions based upon such ancient writings, and the history into which they have entwined themselves indissolubly for many centuries,"—all conspire to "constitute a perpetually increasing and strengthening [220]" body of evidence on the subject of Sacred Interpretation.

Now, to oppose to the learning, and piety, and wisdom, of every age of the English Church,—to the unbroken testimony of the Church Universal,—(3) to the torrent of Patristic Antiquity,—(4) the decision of early Councils, and (5) the 'still small voice' of primitive Creeds,—yet more, (6) to the constant practice of the Apostles,—and, above all, (7) to the indisputable method of our Divine Lord Himself;—to oppose to all this mighty accumulation of evidence, the simple à priori convictions of—Mr. Jowett! savours so strongly of the ridiculous, that it really seems superfluous to linger over the antithesis for a single moment.

4. Our task might now be looked upon as completed.—It only remains, in justice to the gentleman whose method we have been considering, to ascertain by what considerations he is induced to reject that method of Interpretation which, as we have seen, enjoys such overwhelming sanction.

(i) In opposition to what goes before, then, he throws out a suggestion, that "nothing would be more likely to restore a natural feeling on this subject than a History of the Interpretation of Scripture. It would take us back to the beginning; it would present in one view the causes which have darkened the meaning of words in the course of ages." (p. 338-9.) "Such a work would enable us to separate the elements of Doctrine and Tradition with which the meaning of Scripture is encumbered in our own day." (p. 339.)

Let us here be well understood with our author. The advantage of a good "History of Interpretation" would indeed be incalculably great. But Mr. Jowett, (like most other writers of his class,) assumes the point he has to prove, when he insinuates that the result of such a contribution to our Theological Literature would be to shew that all the world has been in error for 1700 years, and that he alone is right. That 'erring fancy' has often been at work in the fields of sacred criticism,—who ever doubted? That there have been epochs of Interpretation,—different Schools,—and varying tastes, in the long course of so many centuries of mingled light and darkness, learning and barbarism;—what need to declare? A faithful history of Interpretation would of course establish these facts on a sure foundation.

But the Reverend Author forgets his Logic when he goes on from these undoubted generalities to imply that all has been confusion and utter uncertainty until now. Above all, common regard for the facts of the case ought to have preserved him from putting forth so monstrous a falsehood as the following:—"Among German Commentators there is for the first time in the history of the world, an approach to agreement and certainty." (p. 340.)

Let us however,—passing by the many crooked remarks and unsound inferences with which the Reverend writer, (more suo,) delights to perplex a plain question [221],—invite him to abide by the test which he himself proposes. For 1700 years, (he says,) the Interpretation of Scripture has been obscured and encumbered by successive Schools of Interpretation. The Interpreter's concern (he says) is with the Bible itself. "The simple words of that book he tries to preserve absolutely pure from the refinements of later times.... The greater part of his learning is a knowledge of the text itself." [He is evidently the very man who sweeps the house to discover the pearl of great price. (p. 414.)] "He has no delight in the voluminous literature which has overgrown it. He has no theory of Interpretation. A few rules guarding against common errors are enough for him.... He wants to be able to open his eyes, and see or imagine things as they truly are." (p. 338.) [How crooked by the way is all this! "He has no theory of Interpretation [222]?" Why, no; for the best of all reasons. He denies Inspiration altogether! His "theory" is that the Bible is an uninspired Book! ... How peculiar too, and how plaintive is the "want" of the supposed Interpreter, "to he able to open his eyes;"—glued up, as they no doubt are, by the superstitious tendencies of the nineteenth century, and the tyranny of an intolerant age!]

But we may perhaps state the matter more intelligibly and simply, thus:—In order to ascertain the true principle of Scriptural Interpretation, let us,—divesting ourselves of the complicated and voluminous lore of 1700 years,—resort to the Bible itself. Let us go for our views to the fountain-head; and abide by what we shall discover there.

A fairer proposal (as I think) never was made. It exactly describes the method which I have humbly endeavoured myself to pursue in the ensuing Sermons. The inquiry will be found elaborated from p. 141 to p. 160 of the present volume; and the result is to be read on the last-named page, in the following words:—"that it may be regarded as a fundamental rule, that the Bible is not to be interpreted like a common book. This I gather infallibly from the plain fact, that the inspired writers themselves habitually interpret it as no other book either is, or can be interpreted.—Next, I assert without fear of contradiction that inspired Interpretation, whatever varieties of method it may exhibit, is yet uniform and unequivocal in this one result; namely, that it proves Holy Scripture to be of far deeper significancy than at first sight appears. By no imaginable artifice of Rhetoric or sophistry of evasion,—by no possible vehemence of denial or plausibility of counter assertion,—can it be rendered probable that Scripture has invariably one only meaning; and that meaning, the most obvious and easy."

Now, the reader is requested to observe that what precedes is the direct contradictory of the position which Mr. Jowett has written his Essay in order to establish. And thus we keep for ever coming back to his πρῶτον ψεῦδος,—the fundamental falsity which underlies the whole of what he has written.

(ii) But although we have eagerly resorted to Scripture itself in order to ascertain on what principle Scripture ought to be interpreted, we cannot for a moment allow some of the sophistries with which the Reverend Author has encumbered the question, to escape without castigation. He may not first court an appeal to the School of Apostolical Interpretation; and then, before the result of that appeal has been ascertained, go off in praise of the illumination of the present age; and claim to represent the Theological mind of Europe in his own person. "Educated persons," (he has the impertinence to assert,) "are beginning to ask (!), not what Scripture may be made to mean, but what it does. And it is no exaggeration to say that he who in the present state of knowledge will confine himself to the plain meaning of words, and the study of their context, may know more of the original spirit and intention of the authors of the New Testament than all the controversial writers of former ages put together." (pp. 340-1.) This might be tolerated perhaps, in the self-constituted oracle of a Mechanics' Institute; but as proceeding from a Divinity Lecturer in one of the first Colleges in Oxford, I hesitate not to declare that such an opinion is simply disgraceful.

Very much of a piece with this, in point of flippancy,—(though barely consistent with his frequent assertions that the entire subject is hemmed in by grave difficulties,)—are the Regius Professor of Greek's remarks on the value of learning as a help to the Interpretation of Holy Writ. "Learning obscures as well as illustrates." (p. 337.)—"There seem to be reasons for doubting whether any considerable light can be thrown on the New Testament from inquiry into the language." (p. 393.)—"Minute corrections of tenses or particles are no good." (p. 393.)—"Discussions respecting the chronology of St. Paul's life and his second imprisonment; or about the identity of James, the brother of the Lord; or, in another department, respecting the use of the Greek article,—have gone far beyond the line of utility." (p. 393.) "The minuteness of the study of Greek in our own day has also a tendency to introduce into the text associations which are not really found there." (p. 391.)—Lastly, he complains of "the error of interpreting every particle, as though it were a link in the argument; instead of being, as is often the case, an excrescence of style." (p. 391.)

So then, in brief, the Fathers are in a conspiracy to mislead: Creeds and Councils encumber the sense: Modern Commentators are not to be trusted: the comparison of Scripture with Scripture, except it be "of the same age and the same authors," "will tend rather to confuse than to elucidate:" (p. 383:) "Learning obscures," and an accurate appreciation of the meaning of the text is "no good!"—"When the meaning of Greek words is once known [223], the young student has almost all the real materials which are possessed by the greatest Biblical scholar, in the book itself." (p. 384.) In a word, (as Dr. Moberly has had the manliness to remark,)—"It simply comes to this: A little Greek, (not too much,) and a strong self-relying imagination, and you may interpret Holy Scripture as well as—Mr. Jowett!" (p. lxii.) ... Benighted himself, the unhappy author of this Essay is so apprehensive lest a ray of light from Heaven shall break in upon one of his disciples,—even sideways, as it were, from the margin of the Bible,—that he carefully prohibits "the indiscriminate use of parallel passages" as "useless and uncritical." ... Yet may one not with discrimination refer to the margin?—Better not! "No good!" (p. 393.) replies the Oracle. "Even the critical use of parallel passages is not without danger." (p. 383.) ... O shame! And all this from a College Tutor and Lecturer on Divinity! this from one entrusted with the care of educating young men! this from a Regius Professor of Greek [224]!

Mr. Jowett congratulates himself that "Biblical criticism has made two great steps onward,—at the time of the Reformation, and in our own day." But his notion is amply refuted by the known facts of the case: for when he adds,—"The diffusion of a critical spirit in History and Literature is affecting the criticism of the Bible in our own day in a manner not unlike the burst of intellectual life in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries;" (p. 340;) he clearly requires to be reminded that the success of the Divinity of the Reformation was owing to the grand appeal then made to the Patristic writings.

So far then as any of ourselves are resorting to those sources of information, there may be a faint resemblance in kind between the spirit which animates us, and that which wrought so nobly in the Fathers of our spiritual freedom,—Cranmer and Ridley and the other learned and holy men who revised our Offices. But if "German Commentators" and their method be supposed to be the ideals to which the age is tending, then the Theology of the middle of the nineteenth century stands in marked contrast to what prevailed in the middle of the sixteenth; and our spirit is the very reverse of theirs.—But I hasten on.

(iii) "The uncertainty which prevails in the Interpretation of Scripture," Mr. Jowett proposes to get rid of,—(this is in fact the aim of his entire Essay,) by denying that there are in Scripture any deeper meanings to interpret. In the meantime, by every device in his power, he seeks from à priori considerations, (as we have seen,) to shew that no such meanings can exist. We allow ourselves to be biassed, to a singular extent, he says, "by certain previous suppositions with which we come to the perusal of Scripture." (p. 342.) But for this, "no one would interpret Scripture as many do." (Ibid.) Let us ascertain then what these erroneous "suppositions" are.

(α) "The failure of a prophecy is never admitted, in spite of Scripture and of history, (Jer. xxxvi. 30. Isaiah xxiii. Amos vii. 10-17.)" (p. 343.)

Now this can only mean two things: viz. first, that a Divine Prophecy is not an infallible utterance: and secondly, that the three places quoted from the Old Testament are proofs of the fallibility of Prophecy; proofs which ought to overcome prejudice, and persuade men to renounce their "previous supposition" that Prophecy is infallible.

Certainly the charge is a grave one. For if Prophecy is untrue, then what becomes of Inspiration?

And yet, how stands the case? The writer seems to have expected "that no one would refer to the passages that he has bracketed, or that all would be too ignorant to know the utter groundlessness of his assumption. If there are, in the whole Scripture, two past prophecies which were signally and remarkably fulfilled, they are the first two which he has selected as instances to be dropped down, without a remark, of the failure of Scripture prophecies! And as to the third passage, surely it implies an 'incuria' which might be deemed 'crassa' to have asserted that it contained an instance of the non-fulfilment of Prophecy: for it implies that Mr. Jowett has read the verses to which he refers with so little attention as not to have discovered that the prediction which failed of its fulfilment was no utterance of Amos, but was the message of Amaziah, the priest of Bethel, in which he falsely attributes to Amos words he had not spoken!... Surely such slips as these are as discreditable to a scholar as a Divine [225]!"

And this, from a gentleman who has the impertinence to remind us oracularly, that "he who would understand the nature of Prophecy in the Old Testament, should have the courage to examine how far its details were minutely fulfilled!" (p. 347.) Are we then to infer that Mr. Jowett's courage failed him when he came to Amos vii. 10-17?

(β) "The mention of a name later than the supposed age of the prophet is not allowed, as in other writings, to be taken in evidence of the date. (Isaiah xlv. 1.)" (p. 343.)

But what is the meaning of this complaint when applied to Isaiah's well known prophecy concerning Cyrus? In the words of the excellent critic last quoted,—"We know not that we could point to such an instance as this in the writings of any other author of credit. Of course, Mr. Jowett knows as well as we do the distinction between History and Prophecy; and that the mention in any document of the name of one who was unborn at the time fixed as the date of the writing, would be at once a complete disproof of its accuracy as a history of the past, and a proof of its accuracy as a prediction of the future. Of course he also remembers that the point he has to prove is that this passage is History and not Prediction; and his mode of proving is this; he assumes that it is a history of the past,—advancing as a charge against the believers of Revelation, that they do not, (as they would in any other History,) reject the genuineness of the passage because it embalms a future name in a past history!... This audacious, (for we cannot use a weaker word,) assumption of what he has to prove, pervades his Essay [226]."

And thus, into whatever department of speculation we follow this writer, the tortuous path is still found to conduct us back to the same underlying fallacious assumption,—viz. that the Bible is like any other Book; in other words, is not inspired.

(γ) Persons in Mr. Jowett's position, "find themselves met by a sort of presupposition that 'God speaks not as Man speaks.'"—(p. 343.)

"A sort of presupposition," indeed!... Does the Reverend gentleman really expect that we will stoop so low as argue this point also with him? It shall suffice to have branded him with his own words.

"The suspicion of Deism, or perhaps of Atheism, awaits inquiry. By such fears, a good man (!) refuses to be influenced: a philosophical mind (!) is apt to cast them aside with too much bitterness. It is better to close the book, than to read it under conditions of thought which are imposed from without." (p. 343.)

Well surely, the proximity to Balliol College of the scene of Cranmer and Ridley's martyrdom, must have turned the brain of the Regius Professor of Greek!—Let him be well assured however that not rational "Inquiry," but irrational assumption; not the modest cogitations of "a philosophical mind," but the arrogant dreams of a weak and confused intellect, are what have excited such general indignation of late, among "good men," from one end of the Kingdom to the other. Nor could anything probably of equal pretensions be readily appealed to, which is nevertheless more truly unphilosophical, fallacious, and foolish, than the Essay now under consideration.

(iv) Subsequently, (p. 344,) Mr. Jowett professes to grapple with the phenomenon of Inspiration. His method is instructive. He begins by inadvertently advancing a direct untruth: for he asserts that for none "of the higher or supernatural views of Inspiration is there any foundation in the Gospels or Epistles." (p. 345.)—Had he then forgotten St. Paul's statements in Gal. i. 1, 11-17: ii. 2, 7-9. 1 Cor. xv. 3. Ephes. iii. 3, &c., &c.? But I have established the contradictory of the Professor's position in the ensuing Sermons, p. 53 to p. 57, to which the reader must be referred.—This done, he proceeds to assert that,

(α) Inspiration does not preserve a writer from inaccuracy. And the charge is substantiated by the following ridiculous enumeration:—"One [Evangelist] supposes the original dwelling-place of our Lord's Parents to have been Bethlehem [227], another Nazareth [228]." (This from a Lecturer on Divinity! Does Mr. Jowett then suppose that his readers have never opened the Gospels, and do not know better? Why, both his statements are simply false!)—"They trace His genealogy in different ways." (Yes. In two. And why not in twenty? Is Mr. Jowett not aware that a genealogy may be differently traced through different ancestors?)—"One mentions the thieves blaspheming: another has preserved to after ages the record of the penitent thief:" (And why should he not?)—"They appear to differ about the day and hour of the Crucifixion." (Yes, they appear to differ: but they do not differ!)—"The narrative of the woman who anointed our Lord's feet with ointment is told in all four, each narrative having more or less considerable variations." (There is no conceivable reason why this should not have been as Mr. Jowett relates; but, as a matter of fact, we have here another of this Gentleman's private blunders,—shewing what an uncritical reader he must be, of that book concerning which he presumes to dogmatize so freely.)—"These are a few instances of the differences which arose in the traditions of the earliest ages respecting the history of our Lord." (Nay, but this is to beg the whole question!)—"He who wishes to investigate the character of the sacred writings should not be afraid to make a catalogue of them all, with the view of estimating their cumulative weight." (p. 346.) (Truly, it would be well for Mr. Jowett if he had as little to fear from such "investigations" as the Evangelists!)

"In the same way, he who would understand the nature of Prophecy in the Old Testament, should have the courage to examine how far its details were minutely fulfilled. The absence of such a fulfilment may further lead him to discover that he took the letter for the spirit in expecting it." (p. 347.) But really this is again simply to beg the whole question. Unbecoming in any writer, how absurd also is such a sentence from the pen of one who, (as we have lately seen,) no sooner descends to particulars than he makes himself ridiculous by betraying his own excessive ignorance.... "The letter for the spirit," also! which is one of the 'cant' expressions of Mr. Jowett and his accomplices in 'free handling,'—based evidently on a misconception of the meaning of 2 Cor. iii. 6. The contrast recurs at pp. 36, 357, 375, 425, &c., &c.

(β) Still bent on shewing that Inspiration does not secure Scripture from blots and blemishes, Mr. Jowett proceeds as follows. (I must present him to the reader, for a short space, in extenso; since by no other expedient can the complicated fallacies of his very intricate and perverse method be exposed.)

"Inspiration is a fact which we infer from the study of Scripture,—not of one portion only, but of the whole." (p. 347.) (Now even this is not a correct way of stating the case. Still, because the words may bear an honourable sense, we pass on.)—"Obviously then, it embraces writings of very different kinds,—the book of Esther, for example, or the Song of Solomon, as well as the Gospel of St. John." (That the volume of Inspiration is of this complex character, and that it embraces writings so diverse, is beyond dispute.)—"It is reconcileable with the mixed good and evil of the characters of the Old Testament, which nevertheless does not exclude them from the favour of God." (Why the Inspiration of a writer should not be 'reconcileable' with any amount of wickedness in the persons about whom he writes,—I am quite at a loss to perceive. Neither do I see why "the mixed good and evil" of certain "characters of the Old Testament," (or of the New either,) should "exclude them from the favour of God." What else becomes of your hope, and mine, of Eternal Life?)—"Inspiration is also reconcileable," (he proceeds,)—"with the attribution to the Divine Being of actions at variance with that higher revelation which He has given of Himself in the Gospel." (Is this meant as an insult to "the Divine Being?" or simply as a slur on Revelation? Either way, we reject the charge with indignation [229].)—"It is not inconsistent with imperfect or opposite aspects of the Truth, as in the Book of Job or Ecclesiastes:" (Nothing which comes from God should be called "imperfect:" but why different aspects of the Truth should not be brought out, by different writers, as by St. Paul and by James,—it is hard to see.)—"With variations of fact in the Gospels, or the Books of Kings and Chronicles:" (We do not admit that Inspiration is consistent with "variations of fact;" but with different versions of the same incident, it is confessedly compatible.)—"With inaccuracies of language in the Epistles of St. Paul." (With grammatical inelegancies, no doubt; but not with logical inaccuracies.)—"For these are all found in Scripture:" (This statement, by the way, should have been substantiated by at least as many references as there are heads in the indictment,)—"neither is there any reason why they should not be; except a general impression that Scripture ought to have been written in a way different from what it has." (Just as if Mankind for 1800 years had been the victims of an à priori conception as to how Holy Scripture ought to have been written!)—"A principle of progressive revelation admits them all; and this is already contained in the words of our Saviour, 'Moses because of the hardness of your hearts;' or even in the Old Testament, 'Henceforth there shall be no more this proverb in the house of Israel?'" (O if Catholic writers were to expound Holy Scripture with the license of these gentlemen!... That the scheme of Revelation has been progressive, is a Theological truism. What that has to do with the question in hand, I see not.)—"For what is progressive is necessarily imperfect in its earlier stages:" ("Imperfect" in what sense?)—"and even erring to those who come after." (No, not in that sense imperfect, certainly!) ... "There is no more reason why imperfect narratives should be excluded from Scripture than imperfect grammar; no more ground for expecting that the New Testament would be logical or Aristotelian in form, than that it would be written in Attic Greek." (Now why this cloudy shuffling about "imperfect narratives,"—instead of saying what you mean, like a man! Further,—Is Mr. Jowett so weak as not to perceive that there is no force whatever in his supposed parallel? The Discourses of the Incarnate Son, for instance, are certainly anything but "Aristotelian in form." His dialect,—(Angels bowed to catch it, I nothing doubt!)—was that of the despised Galilee. But need the teaching it conveyed have therefore been "imperfect?" Why may not the least perfect Greek be the vehicle for the more perfect Doctrine? What connexion is there between the casket and the jewel which it encloses?)

(γ) The Reverend writer promises us help, from "another consideration which has been neglected by writers on this subject." (The announcement makes us attentive.)—"It is this,—that any true Doctrine of Inspiration must conform to all well-ascertained facts of History or of Science." (We scarcely see the drift of this ill-worded proposition; but are disposed to assent.)—"The same fact cannot be true and untrue," (Who ever supposed that it could?)—"any more than the same words can have two opposite meanings." (But why glide at once into a gross falsity? Are there not plenty of words and speeches, of the kind called 'equivocal' or 'ambiguous,' which are of this nature? I am content to refer this writer to his own pages, for the abundant refutation of his own assertion. No man in the world knows better than Mr. Jowett that "the same words can have two opposite meanings.") "The same fact cannot be true in Religion, when seen by the light of Faith; and untrue in Science, when looked at through the medium of evidence or experiment." (Why not? For example,—'He maketh His Sun to rise.' 'If God so clothe the grass of the field.' 'God said, Let there be light.' Who sees not that the view which Faith and which Physical Science respectively take of the same phenomenon, may essentially differ?)—"It is ridiculous to suppose that the Sun goes round the Earth in the same sense in which the Earth goes round the Sun;" (Very ridiculous.)—"or that the world appears to have existed, but has not existed, during the vast epochs of which Geology speaks to us." (Leave out the words, "appears to have," and this also is undeniable.)—"But if so, there is no need of elaborate reconcilements of Revelation and Science." (How does that follow? If what is thought to be Divinely revealed, and what is thought to be scientifically ascertained, seem to be conflicting truths,—why should not an effort be made to reconcile them?) "They reconcile themselves the moment any scientific truth is distinctly ascertained." (Yes: by the Human simply trying to thrust the Divine out of doors!)—"As the idea of Nature enlarges, the idea of Revelation also enlarges:" (I deny that there is any such intimate connexion as this author supposes between Physical Science and Divinity,)—"it was a temporary misunderstanding which severed them." (But when were Nature and Revelation ever for an instant "severed?")—"And as the knowledge of Nature which is possessed by the few is communicated in its leading features at least, to the many, they will receive it with a higher conception of the ways of God to Man. It may hereafter appear as natural to the majority of Mankind to see the Providence of God in the order of the world, as it once was to appeal to interruptions of it." (p. 349.) (As if an increased knowledge of Nature were the condition of Theological enlightenment!... I presume that the latter clause,—so hazy and the reverse of obvious in its meaning!—is intended to convey the sentiment which Mr. Baden Powell expresses as follows:—"The inevitable progress of research must, within a longer or shorter period, unravel all that seems most marvellous; and what is at present least understood will become as familiarly known to the Science of the future, as those points which a few centuries ago were involved in equal obscurity, but now are thoroughly understood [230].")

(δ) We are next informed "that there are a class of scientific facts with which popular opinions on Theology often conflict.... Such especially are the facts relating to the formation of the Earth and the beginnings of the Human Race." (p. 349.) (And pray, what "facts" are these, relative to the "beginnings of the Human Race," which conflict with Scripture?) ... "Almost all intelligent persons are agreed that the earth has existed for myriads of ages:" (Which is perfectly true.)—"The best informed are of opinion that the history of nations extends back some thousand years before the Mosaic Chronology." (Which is decidedly false.)—"Recent discoveries in Geology may perhaps open a further vista of existence for the human species; while it is possible, and may one day be known, that Mankind spread not from one but from many centres over the globe; or, (as others say,) that the supply of links which are at present wanting in the chain of animal life may lead to new conclusions respecting the origin of Man." (A cool way, this, of anticipating that something which 'may'—(or may not!)—be discovered hereafter, will demonstrate that the beginning of the Bible is all a fable!)—"Now," (proceeds our author,) "let it be granted that" "the proof of some of these facts, especially of those last-mentioned, is wanting; still it is a false policy to set up Inspiration or Revelation in opposition to them, a principle which can have no influence on them, and should be kept rather out of their way." (Considerate man!) "The Sciences of Geology and comparative Philology are steadily gaining ground. Many of the guesses of twenty years ago have been certainties; and the guesses of to-day may hereafter become so. Shall we peril Religion (!) on the possibility of their untruth? on such a cast to stake the life of Man, implies not only a recklessness of facts (!), but a misunderstanding of the nature of the Gospel. If it is fortunate for Science, it is perhaps more fortunate for Christian Truth, that the admission of Galileo's discovery has for ever settled the principle of the relations between them."—(pp. 349-50.) ...

Now, what a curious picture of a perverse and crooked mind does such a sentence exhibit! Divine Revelation can "have no influence" of course, on facts of any kind, (including facts in Physical Science,) when once those facts have been well ascertained. But, in the entire absence of such facts, why should we refuse to listen to the well ascertained Revelation of God? Nothing is more emphatic, for example, than the Divine declaration that the whole Human family is derived from a single pair; and the origin of Man is plainly set down in Genesis. Why then oppose to this, the confessedly undiscovered fact that "mankind spread from many centres;" and the purely speculative possibility that, hereafter, a certain theory "may lead to new conclusions respecting the origin of Man?"—As for "Religion" being "perilled on the possibility" of the truth or untruth of the Sciences of Geology and comparative Philology;—we really would submit that God may be safely left to take care of His own; and that "peril," there is,—there can be,—none!

And then, the maudlin tenderness of an "Essayist and Reviewer" (of all persons in the world!) for "the life of Man,"—meaning thereby his Christian hope, and Faith in the Redeemer!... As if, (first,) Man's "Life" were in any sense endangered, by our upholding the honour and authority of the Bible! And (secondly,) as if the age had shewn itself in the least degree impatient of scientific investigation! And (thirdly,) as if Religion depended, or could be made to depend, on Physical phenomena, or on the progress of Natural Science, at all! ... I scruple not to say that arguments like these impress me with the meanest opinion of Mr. Jowett's intellectual powers: while they prove to demonstration that he does not in the least understand the subject on which he yet writes with such feeble vehemence.

But I may not proceed any further, or my pages will equal in extent those of the gentleman already named. Indeed, to follow that most confused of thinkers, and crooked of disputants, through all his perverse pages; to expose his habitual paltry evasive dodging,—his shifting equivocations,—his misapplications of Scripture,—his unworthy insinuations,—his plaintive puerilities of thought and sentiment;—would require a thick volume.—If Mr. Jowett does not deny the Personality of the Holy Ghost, he ought to be thoroughly ashamed of himself for penning sentences which can lead to no other inference. For he ought to know that when men talk of words "receiving a more exact meaning than they will truly bear;" and of what "is spoken in a figure being construed with the severity of a logical statement, while passages of an opposite tenour are overlooked or set aside:"—(p. 360.) men mean to repudiate the doctrine which those words are thought to convey; not to imply their acceptance of it.—So again, if Mr. Jowett holds the doctrine of Original Sin, he ought to be heartily ashamed of himself for having insinuated that it depends "on two figurative expressions of St. Paul to which there is no parallel in any other part of Scripture." (p. 361.)—Nor, however moderate his attainments as a teacher of Divinity, ought he to be capable of putting forth such a notorious misstatement as that the doctrine of Infant Baptism rests upon a verse in the Acts (xvi. 33,)—which verse has really nothing whatever to do with the question[231]. (p. 360.)

Professor Jowett shuts up his Essay with a passage which, for a certain amount of tender pathos in the sentiment, has been often quoted, and sometimes admired, He says:—

"The suspicion or difficulty which attends critical inquiries is no reason for doubting their value. The Scripture nowhere leads us to suppose that the circumstance of all men speaking well of us is any ground for supposing that we are acceptable in the sight of God. And there is no reason why the condemnation of others should be witnessed to by our own conscience. Perhaps it may be true that, owing to the jealousy or fear of some, the reticence of others, the terrorism of a few, we may not always find it easy to regard these subjects with calmness and judgment. But, on the other hand, these accidental circumstances have nothing to do with the question at issue; they cannot have the slightest influence on the meaning of words, or on the truth of facts....

"Lastly, there is some nobler idea of truth than is supplied by the opinion of mankind in general, or the voice of parties in a Church. Every one, whether a student of Theology or not, has need to make war against his prejudices no less than against his passions; and, in the religious teacher, the first is even more necessary than the last.... He who takes the prevailing opinions of Christians and decks them out in their gayest colours,—who reflects the better mind of the world to itself—is likely to be its favourite teacher. In that ministry of the Gospel, even when assuming forms repulsive to persons of education (!), no doubt the good is far greater than the error or harm. But there is also a deeper work which is not dependent on the opinions of men, in which many elements combine, some alien to Religion, or accidentally at variance with it. That work can hardly expect to win much popular favour, so far as it runs counter to the feelings of religious parties. But he who bears a part in it may feel a confidence, which no popular caresses or religious sympathy could inspire, that he has by a Divine help been enabled to plant his foot somewhere beyond the waves of Time. He may depart hence before the natural term, worn out with intellectual toil; regarded with suspicion by many of his contemporaries; yet not without a sure hope that the love of Truth, which men of saintly lives often seem to slight, is, nevertheless, accepted before God."—(pp. 432-3.)

My respect for a fellow-man induces me to offer a few remarks on all this.

Let me be permitted then to declare that I am as incapable as any one who ever breathed the air of this lower world, of making light of the sentiments of true genius. I can respond with my whole heart to the passion-stricken cry of one who, when "regarded with suspicion by many of his contemporaries," is observed to hail his fellows with confidence, across the gulph of Time; and as it were implore them, after many days, to do him right. Nay, were I to behold a man of splendid, but misguided powers, elaborating from God's Word a plausible system of his own, whereby to bring back the Golden Age to suffering Humanity; and insisting that he beheld in the common revelations of the Spirit, the unsuspected outlines of such a form of polity as Man never dreamed of,—(nor, it may be, Angels either;)—I should experience a kind of generous sympathy with this bright-eyed enthusiast; even while I proceeded to test his wild dream by what I believed to be the standard of right Reason. Then, as the specious fabric was seen suddenly to collapse and melt away, should I not, with affectionate sorrow, secretly mourn that such brilliant parts had not been enlisted on the side of Truth? and feel as if I could have been content to go about for life maimed in body, or hopelessly impoverished in estate, if so great a disaster could but have been prevented as the loss of one who ought to have been a standard-bearer in Israel?

Once more. Although the cold shade of unbelief has never for an instant, (thank God!) darkened my spirit; so that one may not be very apt to sympathize with men who walk about hampered with a doubt; yet, were one to know, (as one has often known,—too often, alas!) that the arrow was rankling in a friend's heart,—who by consequence shunned the society of his fellows, and walked in moody abstraction,—looking as if life had lost its charm, and as if nothing on the earth's surface were any longer to him a joy;—would one not be the first to go after such a sufferer; and seek whether a firm hand and steady eye might not avail to extract the poisoned shaft? If that might not be, at least by daily acts of unaltered kindness, and the ways which brotherly sympathy suggests, who would not strive to recover such an one? If all other arts proved unavailing, it would remain for a man with the ordinary instincts of humanity, in silence and sorrow at least, to look on, while the solitary doubter was paying the bitter penalty,—doubtless, of his sin.

But how widely different,—rather, how utterly dissimilar,—is the phenomenon before us! Here is a singularly confused and shallow thinker oppressed with the vastness of his discovery, that the Bible—has nothing in it! Here is a Clergyman of the Church of England, and a Lecturer in Divinity, whose difficulty is how he shall convince the world that the Bible is—like any other book! Here is the sceptical fellow of a College, conspiring with six others, to produce a volume of which Germany itself, (having changed its mind,) would already be ashamed!... Mr. Jowett is enthusiastic for a negation! Without belief himself, he cannot rest because Christendom has, on the whole, a good deal of belief remaining! If he may but unsettle somebody's mind,—his Essay will have achieved its purpose, and its author will not have lived in vain!... Sublime privilege for "the only man in the University of Oxford who" is said to "exercise a moral and spiritual influence at all corresponding to that which was once wielded by John Henry Newman [232]!"

I shall be thought a very profane person, I dare say, by the friends and apologists of Mr. Jowett, if I avow that the passage with which he concludes his Essay, instead of sounding in my ears like the plaintive death-song of departing Genius, sounds to me like nothing so much as the piteous whine of a schoolboy who knows that he deserves chastisement, and perceives that he is about to experience his deserts. System, or Theory, the Reverend Gentleman has none to propose. Views, except negative ones, Mr. Jowett is altogether guiltless of. Can anybody in his senses suppose that a man "has, by a Divine help (!), been enabled to plant his foot somewhere beyond the waves of Time," (p. 433,) who doubts everything, and believes nothing? Can any one of sane mind dream that posterity will come to the rescue of a man who, when he is asked for his story, rejoins, (with a well-known needy mechanic,) that he has "none to tell, Sir?" What then is posterity to vindicate? What has the Regius Professor of Greek written so many weak pages to prove? Just nothing! If Mr. Jowett's Essay could enforce the message it carries, the result would simply be that the world would become disbelievers in the Inspiration of the Bible: they would disbelieve that Scripture has any sense but that which lies on the surface: they would therefore disbelieve the Prophets and Evangelists and Apostles of Christ: they would disbelieve the words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself!... Has Mr. Jowett, then, grown grey under the laborious process of arriving at this series of negations? When he anticipates "departing hence before the natural term," does he mean that he is "worn out with the intellectual toil" of propounding nothing! and that he expects the sympathy and gratitude of posterity for what he has propounded?

But this is not all. Instead of coming abroad, (if come abroad he must,) in that garb of humility which befits doubt,—that self-distrust which becomes one whose fault, or whose misfortune it is, that he simply cannot believe,—Mr. Jowett assumes throughout, the insolent air of intellectual superiority; the tone of one at whose bidding Theology must absolutely 'keep moving.' A truncheon and a number on his collar, alone seem wanting. The menacing voice, and authoritative air, are certainly not away,—as I proceed to shew.

"It may be observed that a change in some of the prevailing modes of Interpretation, is not so much a matter of expediency as of necessity. The original meaning of Scripture is beginning to be understood." (p. 418.)

"Criticism has far more power than it formerly had. It has spread itself over ancient, and even modern history.... Whether Scripture can be made an exception to other ancient writings, now that the nature of both is more understood; whether ... the views of the last century will hold out,—these are questions respecting which" (p. 420.) it is hard to judge.

"It has to be considered whether the intellectual forms under which Christianity has been described, may not also be in a state of transition." (p. 420.)

"Now, as the Interpretation of Scripture is receiving another character, it seems that distinctions of Theology which were in great measure based on old Interpretations, are beginning to fade away." ... "There are other signs that times are changing, and we are changing too." (p. 421.)

"These reflections bring us back to the question with which we began,—What effect will the critical Interpretation of Scripture have on Theology?" (p. 422.)

Again:—"As the time has come when it is no longer possible to ignore the results of criticism, it is of importance that Christianity should be seen to be in harmony with them." (p. 374.) (The sentences which immediately follow shall be exhibited in distinct paragraphs, in order that they may separately enjoy admiration. Each is a gem or a curiosity in its way.)

"That objections to some received views should be valid, and yet that they should be always held up as the objections of Infidels,—is a mischief to the Christian cause."

"It is a mischief that critical observations which any intelligent man can make for himself (!), should be ascribed to Atheism or Unbelief."

"It would be a strange and almost incredible thing that the Gospel, which at first made war only on the vices of mankind, should now be opposed to one of the highest and rarest of human virtues,—the love of Truth."

"And that in the present day the great object of Christianity should be, not to change the lives of men, but to prevent them from changing their opinions; that would be a singular inversion of the purposes for which Christ came into the world."

We are really constrained to pause for a moment, and to inquire what this last sentence means. Are not "the lives of men" mainly dependent on "their opinions?" Why then contrast the two? And which of our "opinions" does Mr. Jowett desire to see changed? Would he have us resign our belief in the Atonement? reject the Divinity of Christ? deny the Personality of the Holy Ghost? put the Bible on a level with Sophocles and Plato? ridicule the idea of Inspiration?... How would it be a "singular inversion of the purposes of Christ's Coming," that Christianity should "prevent" mankind from "changing" such "opinions" as these?

"The Christian religion is in a false position when all the tendencies of knowledge are opposed to it." (All the tendencies of knowledge, then, are opposed to the Christian Religion!)

"Such a position cannot be long maintained, or can only end in the withdrawal of the educated classes from the influences of Religion." (So we are to look for "the withdrawal of the educated classes from the influences of Religion[233]!") After anticipating "religious dissolution," because of "the progress of ideas, (!) with which Christian teachers seem to be ill at ease," (!) Mr. Jowett, (who we presume is speaking of himself,) says, "Time was when the Gospel was before the Age:" (The Gospel is therefore now behind the age!)—"when the difficulties of Christianity were difficulties of the heart only:" (When was that?)—"and the highest minds found in its truths not only the rule of their lives, but a well-spring of intellectual delight." (All this then has ceased to be the case! "The highest minds" being of course represented by—Mr. Jowett!)

"Is it to be held a thing impossible that the Christian Religion, instead of shrinking into itself, (!) may again embrace the thoughts of men upon the earth?" (that is to say, "embrace the thoughts" of—Mr. Jowett!)—"Or is it true that since the Reformation 'all intellect has gone the other way'?"

"But for the faith that the Gospel might win again the minds of intellectual men," (such men as Mr. Jowett?)—"it would be better to leave Religion to itself, instead of attempting to draw them together." (p. 376.)

Now this kind of language, in daily life, would be called sheer impertinence; and the person who could talk so before educated gentlemen would probably receive an intimation that he was making himself offensive. He would certainly be looked upon as a weak and conceited person. I really am unable to see why things should be written and printed which no one would presume to say! ... Encircled by a little atmosphere of fog of his own creating, Mr. Jowett is evidently under the delusion that his own confused vision and misty language are the result of the giddy eminence to which, (leaving his fellow-mortals far behind him,) he has contrived, all alone, to soar. He anticipates the complaint of some unhappy disciple, that he "experiences a sort of shrinking or dizziness at the prospect which is opening before him:" whereupon Mr. Jowett invites the "highly educated young man," (p. 373,) to consider "that he may possibly not be the person who is called upon to pursue such inquiries." Who are they for, then? "No man should busy himself with them who has not clearness of mind enough to see things as they are." (p. 430.) The clearness of mind, for example, which belongs to Mr. Jowett!

True enough it is that had such airs been assumed by such an one as Richard Hooker, who achieved the first four books of his 'Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity' before he was 40; and dying in his 46th year, proved himself to be the greatest genius of his age:—had language like Mr. Jowett's been found on the lips of Joseph Butler, who when he was 44 produced his immortal 'Analagy,' and at the age of 26 delivered his famous Rolls 'Sermons:'—had Bishop Bull been betrayed into the language of self-complacency when, at the age of 35, he made himself famous by his 'Harmonia Apostolica:'—the proceeding would have been intelligible, however much one might have lamented such an exhibition of weakness.... But when the speaker proves to be one of the very shallowest of thinkers, and most confused of reasoners;—a man who, although grey-headed, has done nothing whatever for Literature, sacred or profane;—nor indeed is known out of Oxford except for having been thought to deny the Doctrine of the Atonement;—a man who dogmatizes in a Science of which he clearly does not know so much as the very alphabet; and presumes to dispute about a Bible which he has evidently not read with the attention which is due even to a first-rate uninspired book;—then, one's displeasure and impatience assume the form of indignation and disgust. The Divine who, purposing to prove that Holy Scripture is in kind like any other book, does so by inveighing against those who treat it differently; and indeed, on every occasion, assumes as proved the thing he has to prove[234]:—is obviously the very man to vaunt the privileges of the intellect. The student of the Bible who mistakes the utterance of a lying prophet for the language of Amos, and then boldly charges the lie upon the inspired author of a book of Canonical Scripture;—is of course a proper person to discuss the Prophetic Canon. The gentleman who flatters himself that he has been sweeping the house to find the pearl of great price, (p. 414,) is a very pretty person, truly, to lecture about the Gospel!... I forbear reproaching Mr. Jowett with his invariable misapplications or misapprehensions of the meaning of Scripture: his false glosses, and truly preposterous specimens of exegesis [235]. I am content to take leave of him, while he is flattering himself that he has "found the pearl of great price, after sweeping the house:" (p. 414:) and under that melancholy delusion, I fear he must be left,—holding the broom in his hands.

On a review of these Seven Essays, few things strike one more forcibly than the utterly untenable ground occupied by their authors. They are "in a position in which it is impossible to remain. The theory of Mr. Jowett and his fellows is as false to philosophy as to the Church of England. More may be true, or less; but to attempt to halt where they would stop is a simple absurdity [236]."

To exactness of method or System, their work can hardly pretend; and yet they have a system,—which has only not been rounded into symmetry, by the singular circumstance that these seven writers "have written in entire independence of one another, and without concert or comparison." They avow a common purpose, however; for they "hope" that their joint labours "will be received as an attempt to illustrate," (whatever that may mean,) "the advantage derivable to the cause of Religion and Moral Truth" from what they have here attempted; and which they justly characterize as "free handling." Putting oneself in their position, it is easy to imagine the sorrow and concern,—the horror rather,—with which a good man, when the first edition of 'Essays and Reviews' made its appearance, would have discovered the kind of complicity into which he had been inadvertently betrayed; and how eagerly he would have withdrawn from a literary partnership which had resulted so disastrously. At the end of nine large editions, however, the corporate responsibility of each individual author has become fully established; and besides the many proofs of sympathy between the several authors which these pages contain [237], it is no longer doubtful that the sentiments of the work are to be quoted without reference to the individual writers. It would be unfair to assume that not one of these seven men has had the manliness to avow that his own individual convictions are opposed to those of his fellows. We are compelled to regard their joint labours as one production. It is the corporate efficacy of the several contributions which constitutes the chief criminality of the volume. It is to the respectability and weight of the conjoined names of its authors, and to their combined efforts, that 'Essays and Reviews' are indebted for all their power.

What then is the system, or theory, or view, advocated by these seven Authors?—They are all agreed that we are "placed evidently at an epoch when Humanity finds itself under new conditions, to form some definite conception to ourselves of the way in which Christianity is henceforward to act upon the world which is our own." (p. 158.) To do this, we must emerge from our "narrow chamber of Doctrinal and Ecclesiastical prepossessions." (Ibid.) Accordingly, we find insinuated "a very wide-spread alienation, both in educated and uneducated persons, from the Christianity which is ordinarily presented in our Churches and Chapels." (p. 150.) There has been "a spontaneous recoil." (p. 151.) We cannot "resist the tide of civilization on which we are borne." (p. 412.) "The time has come when it is no longer possible to ignore the results of criticism." It is therefore "of importance that Christianity should be seen to be in harmony with them." (p. 374.) "The arguments of our genuine critics, with the convictions of our most learned clergy" (p. 66) are all opposed to the actual teaching of the Church. Meantime, "the Christian Religion is in a false position when all the tendencies of knowledge are opposed to it." (p. 374.) "Time was when the Gospel was before the age: ... when the highest minds found in its truths not only the rule of their lives, but a well-spring of intellectual delight. Is it to be held a thing impossible that the Christian Religion may again embrace the thoughts of men upon the earth?" (pp. 374-5.)

In the mean time, the Bible is a stubborn fact in the way of the new Religion. Nay, the English Book of Common Prayer is a great hindrance; for those "formulæ of past thinkings, have long lost all sense of any kind;" (p. 297;) so that the Prayer-book "is on the way to become a useless encumbrance, the rubbish of the past, blocking the road." (Ibid.) But the Prayer-book confessedly stands on a different footing from the Bible. The Bible erects itself hopelessly in the way of "the negative religion." (p. 151.) O those many prophecies, which for 4000 long years sustained the faith of God's chosen people, and at last found fulfilment in the person of Christ, or in the circumstances which attended the establishment of His Kingdom! O that glorious retinue of types and shadows which heralded Messiah's approach!... And then,—O the miraculous evidence which attested to the reality of His Divinity [238]! O the confirmation, (to those who needed it,) when He walked the water, and stilled the storm, and cast out devils by His word, and by one strong cry broke the gates of Death, and caused Lazarus to "Come forth!" ... O the solemn independent testimony borne by Creeds, from the very birthday of Christianity,—(whether planted in Syria or in Asia Minor, in Africa or in Italy, in Greece or in Gaul; "in Germany or in Spain, among the Celts or in the far East, in Egypt or in Libya, or in the middle regions of the globe [239].") Lastly,—O the adoring voice of the whole Church Catholic throughout the world, for many a succeeding century,—translating, expounding, defining, explaining, defending to the death!... How shall all this formidable mass of evidence possibly be set aside?

It is plain that Prophecy must be evacuated of its meaning; or rather, must be denied entirely: and to do this, falls to the share of the vulgar and violent Vice-Principal of Lampeter College. Disprove he cannot; so he sneers and rails and blusters instead. Prophecy, he calls "omniscience;" "a notion of foresight by vision of particulars;" (p. 70;) "a kind of clairvoyance," (p. 70,) and "literal prognostication." (p. 65.) Mr. Jowett (as we have lately seen [240],) lends plaintive help: but indeed Dr. Williams does not lack supporters.

To deny the truth of Miracles falls to the lot of the Savilian Professor of Astronomy. His method has the merit of extreme simplicity: for it is based on the ground that, in the writer's opinion, Miracles are impossible,—which of course must be held to be decisive of the question.

The battle against the Inspiration of the Word of God is reserved for the Regius Professor of Greek; who requires for his purpose twice the space of any of his fellows. His method is also of the simplest kind, when divested of its many encumbrances. He simply assumes it as proved that the Bible is a book not essentially different from Sophocles and Plato. In other words he assumes that the Bible is not inspired; and reproaches, pities, or sneers at every one who is not of his opinion.

In the meantime, What is Prophecy? What are Miracles? Of what sort is that Bible which has imposed upon mankind so grossly, and so long? They are facts, and must be explained. What are they? Prophecy, then, is "only the power of seeing the ideal in the actual, or of tracing the Divine Government in the movements of men." (p. 70.) As for Miracles, "their evidential force is wholly relative to the apprehensions of the parties addressed ... Columbus' prediction of the Eclipse to the native islanders," (p. 115,) is advanced as an illustration of the nature of the argument from Miracles. By whatever method the Bible has attained its present footing in the world, it is a book which has been hitherto misunderstood; and it must plainly be dealt with after a new fashion. Our Lord's Incarnation, Temptation, Death and Burial, Resurrection and Ascension into Heaven,—all His Miracles, in short, will be best interpreted Ideologically; in other words, by a principle "which resolves into an ideal the whole of the historical and doctrinal person of Jesus." (p. 200.) So interpreted, "the Gospel may win again the minds of intellectual men;" (p. 376;) but it will find it no easy matter. There is in fact "a higher wisdom" than the Gospel, "which is known to those who are perfect,"—"that reconcilement," namely, "of Faith and Knowledge which may be termed Christian Philosophy." (p. 413.)

The great object, in short, is to bring about "a reconciliation" (p. 375,) between "the minds of intellectual men" (p. 376,) and Christianity. Such a reconciliation is to be regarded as a "restoration of belief." (p. 375.) And it is to be effected by "taking away some of the external supports, because they are not needed and do harm: also because they interfere with the meaning." (p. 375.)—Those "external supports" are (1) a belief in the Inspiration of the Bible;—(2) the writings of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church;—(3) Creeds and the decisions of Councils;—(4) the works of Anglican Divines;—(5) Learning; (p. 337;)—(6) a profound acquaintance with the Greek language; (p. 393;)—(7) a minute knowledge of Greek Grammar; (p. 391;)—(8) the Doctrine of the Greek Article;—(9) the free use of the parallel passages.... The Bible, when interpreted by any self-relying young man who knows a little Greek, and attends to the meaning of words,—will be seen in all the freshness of its early beauty, like an old picture which has been recently cleaned. "A new interest" will be excited by this new Bible, which will "make for itself a new kind of authority." By being thus literally interpreted, it will be transformed into "a spirit." Then, (but not before) the Bible will enjoy the sublime satisfaction of keeping pace with the Age. It may so, even yet, "embrace the thoughts of men upon the earth."

But what kind of thing will this Bible be? The beginning of Genesis, (pp. 207-253,) is to be rejected because it "is not an authentic utterance of Divine knowledge, but a human utterance, which it has pleased Providence to use in a special way for the education of mankind." (p. 253.) We are invited to "a frank recognition of the erroneous views of Nature which the Bible contains." (p. 211.) Thus, all miraculous transactions will have to be explained away. The volume of Prophecy will have to be regarded as a volume of History. The very History will have to be read with distrust. Like other records, it is subject to the conditions of "knowledge which existed in an early stage of the world." (p. 411.) It does not even begin to be authentic, until b.c. 1900; or rather, until b.c. 900 [241]. What remains is to be looked upon as "the continuous witness in all ages of the higher things in the heart of man," (p. 375,)—(whatever that may happen to mean.) The Gospel is to be looked upon as "a life of Christ in the soul, instead of a theory of Christ which is in a book, or written down," (p. 423.) "The lessons of Scripture, when disengaged from theological formulas, have a nearer way to the hearts of the poor." (p. 424.) Even "in Missions to the heathen, Scripture is to be treated as the expression of universal truths, rather than of the tenets of particular men and Churches." (p. 423.) It is anticipated that this "would remove many obstacles to the reception of Christianity." (Ibid.) "It is not the Book of Scripture which we should seek to give the heathen;" "but the truth of the Book; the mind of Christ and His Apostles, in which all lesser details and differences should be lost and absorbed;" "the purer light or element of Religion, of which Christianity is the expression." (p. 427.) ... Such is the ghostly phantom, by the aid of which the Heathen are to become evangelized!