Resolute attempts continued to be made to withdraw the Acadians from the peninsula of Nova Scotia, both by threats and persuasions, and the Marquis de la Jonquiere issued a proclamation to those living within the bounds of what is now New Brunswick, declaring that all who did not within eight days take the oath of allegiance in the militia companies would be considered as rebels and driven from their lands. The companies of militia were ordered to drill on Sundays and Feast days and to hold themselves in readiness to defend themselves at any moment. A few months later the governor of Canada was able to report that all the Acadian inhabitants who were upon the lands of the king had taken the oath of fidelity. Twelve blank commissions were sent from Quebec to be issued to those most capable of fulfilling the duties of officers in the militia.

At Fort Menagoueche the work did not progress as fast as anticipated. The workmen had no tools except axes, and the Sieur de Gaspe complained that he had not been able to make the soldiers of the garrison work. He says “they are very bad subjects” and he dared not compel them to work apprehending their desertion. The fort was surrounded by four bastions and, in addition to the barracks and magazines, it was proposed to construct a building of logs, squared with the axe, to accommodate the chaplain and surgeon and to serve as a guard house.

Fort Boishebert, at Woodman’s Point on the Nerepis, was a difficult post to maintain owing to the insufficiency of the troops at de Gaspe’s disposal. He complains that the savages had broken in the door of the cellar and he thought it advisable to abandon it altogether. The Marquis de la Jonquiere ordered him to consult with Father Germain on the subject and meanwhile to double the guard. The missionary wrote he was of the same opinion as the Sieur de Gaspe, and permission was accordingly given to abandon the fort and to transport the supplies wherever they might be needed.

The Jesuit missionary at Penobscot, Father Gounon, proposed to spend the winter at “Nerepisse” with his Indians, but the governor of Canada did not at all approve of it, fearing that if the savages were to abandon their village the English would advance from the westward towards the River St. John. He apprehended that if only a small number of Indians remained at Penobscot, and these without a missionary, the enemy would win them to their side and, as a direful result, the English would presently establish themselves at Matsipigouattons, advancing to Peskadamokkanti (or Passamaquoddy) and so by degrees to the River St. John.

The situation on the St. John had now become a matter of international interest in view of the boundary dispute. The deliberations of the French and English commissioners began in 1750 and lasted four years. In preparing the French case the Marquis de la Galissonniere summoned to his aid the Abbes de L’Isle-Dieu and Le Loutre, who were both well informed as to the situation of Acadia and also filled with intense zeal for the national cause. We learn from letters of the Abbe de L’Isle-Dieu, written at Paris to the French minister early in the year 1753, that the two missionaries, in consultation with the Count de la Galissonniere, prepared several documents to elucidate the French case. Copies of these very interesting papers are now in the Canadian Archives at Ottawa, and have been published at Quebec in 1890 by the Abbe Casgrain in “Le Canada Francais.” The three most important of these documents are entitled:

1. Memorandum on the necessity of determining the limits of Acadia.

2. Plan for the settlement of the country in order to hasten the determining of the aforesaid limits.

3. Representation of the present state of the missions, French as well as Indians, in the southern part of New France in Canada.

In the first of these documents the following references are made to the River St. John:

“This post, so important to retain for France, has as commandant M. De Gaspe at Fort Menagoeck, built at the mouth of the river. The missionary on the river is Father Germain, Jesuit, who makes his residence at Ekauba (Aukpaque), distant about forty leagues from Fort Menagoeck.

“The savages of Father Germain’s mission are Marechites, and he has in addition the care of some French families settled on the river.

“At a distance of eighteen leagues from Father Germain’s post of duty is another called Medoctek, which is dependent on the same mission and served by the Jesuit father Loverga, who has been there nine months, and who has the care of a band of Marechites; but, in addition to the fact that Father Loverga is on the point of leaving, he would be useless there on account of his great age and it would be better to send there next spring Father Audren, since this mission is daily becoming more important, especially to the savages whose chief occupation is beaver hunting.

“The French inhabitants of the River St. John have suffered much by different detachments of Canadians and Indians, to the number of 250 or 300 men, commanded by M. de Montesson, a Canadian officer, whom they have been obliged to subsist, and for that purpose to sacrifice the grain and cattle needed for the seeding and tillage of their own fields. In the helpless position in which these inhabitants find themselves, it is thought that in order to afford them sufficient relief it would be advisable that the Court should send them immediately at least 1,000 barrels of flour, and the same quantity annually for some time, both for their own subsistence and for that of the garrison and the Indians. It would be well also to send them each year about 250 barrels of bacon; this last sort of provision being limited to this quantity because it is supposed, or at least hoped, there will be sent from Quebec some Indian corn and peas as well as oil and fat for the savages.”

The reference to the St. John river region in the document from which this extract is taken, concludes by strongly recommending that the supply of flour and bacon should be sent, not to the store houses at Quebec and Louisbourg, but directly to St. John, where it would arrive as safely as at any other port and with less expense to the king and much more expedition to the inhabitants.

It may be well now to pause in the narration of events to look a little more closely into the situation on the River St. John at the time of the negotiations between the rival powers with regard to the limits of Acadia.

The statement has been made in some of our school histories, “Acadia was ceded to the English by the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, and has remained a British possession ever since.” The statement is, to say the least, very misleading, so far as the St. John river country is concerned, for the French clung tenaciously to this territory as a part of the dominions of their monarch until New France passed finally into the hands of their rivals by the treaty of Paris in 1763.

Continuing their argument, the writers of the document state: “That it is by the River St. John that Quebec maintains her communication with Isle Royal and Isle St. Jean, [Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island], and also with Old France, during the season that the navigation of the River St. Lawrence is impracticable; and as this is the only way of communication for a considerable part of the year, possession of the route is indispensably necessary to France. All who have any special knowledge of Canada agree on this head, and their testimony finds confirmation in an English publication that lately appeared in London, entitled ‘The Present State of North America,’ in which the writer sounds the tocsin of war against France and, although partiality, inspired by love of country, has led him into many errors, he does not seek to disguise how important it is to deprive France of the right of navigation of the River St. John, which affords the only means of communication with Quebec during the winter. ‘The French,’ says the English author, ‘have often sent supplies and merchandise from Old France to Quebec, both in time of peace and of war, by the River St. John, so as to avoid the difficulties and risks of navigation by the River St. Lawrence. * * If we suffer them to remain in possession of that river they will always have an open communication between France and Canada during the winter, which they could have only from May to October by the River St. Lawrence.’

It is little to be wondered at that the French nation should have been very reluctant to part with their control of the St. John river. From the days of its discovery by Champlain it had become of increasing importance to them as a means of communication between the widely separated portions of New France. But more than this the river was in many of its features unrivelled in their estimation. Its remarkable falls near the sea, its massive walls of limestone at “the narrows” just above—which the French called “cliffs of marble”—its broad lake-like expansions, its fertile intervals and islands, the fish that swarmed in its waters and the game that abounded in its forests, its towering pines and noble elms were all known to them and had been noted by their early explorers. Champlain, L’Escarbot, Denys, Biard, La Hontan, Cadillac and Charlevoix had described in glowing words the wealth of its attractions. It is worth while in this connection to quote the description which Lamothe Cadillac penned in 1693—just two hundred and ten years ago:

Cadillac mentions the convenient route to Quebec via the River St. John. The Indians had used it from time immemorial and the French followed their example, as at a later period did the English. The missionaries Le Loutre and de L’Isle-Dieu in the statement prepared by them in 1753, already mentioned, say:—

By this route the troops commanded by the French officers Marin and Montesson arrived at Beausejour in less than a month from the time of their departure from Quebec, the distance being about 500 miles.

In the war of 1812 the 104th regiment, raised in this province, left St. John on the 11th day of February and on the 27th of the same month crossed the St. Lawrence on the ice and entered Quebec 1,000 strong, having accomplished a march of 435 miles in midwinter in sixteen days and, says Col. Playfair, without the loss of a man.

In the year 1837 the 43d Light Infantry marched from this province to Quebec in the month of December in almost precisely the same time, but the conditions were distinctly more favorable; the season was not nearly so rigorous, roads and bridges had been constructed over the greater portion of the route and supplies could be obtained to better advantage. Yet it is said the great Duke of Wellington observed of this march of the 43d Light Infantry, “It is the only achievement performed by a British officer that I really envy.” How much greater a feat was the march of the gallant hundred-and-fourth whose men, poorly fed and insufficiently clad, passed over the same route on snowshoes in the middle of a most inclement winter, a quarter of a century before, to defend Canadian homes from a foreign invader?

During the negotiations between the French and English commissioners on the boundaries of Acadia, the suggestion was made by the Abbes de L’Isle-Dieu and Le Loutre, that if it should be found impossible to hold all the lands north of the Bay of Fundy for France the St. John river region should be left undivided and in possession of its native inhabitants. As early as the year 1716 the Marquis de Vaudreuil had stated to the French government: “The English wish to seize upon the lands that the Abenakis and Indians of the River St. John occupy, under the pretext that this land forms part of Acadia ceded to them by the king. The Indians so far from withdrawing on this account have answered that this land has always belonged to them, and that they do not consider themselves subjects of the French, but only their allies.”

Vaudreuil admits that he encouraged this idea, and that his proposal to build a church for the Maliseets at Medoctec had as one of its principal objects the cementing of their alliance with the French and providing them with another inducement to cling to the locality where their church stood, and not by any means to abandon their old fort and village.

Of all the leaders of the French in Acadia, none was more active and influential than the Abbe Le Loutre. But while his energy, ability and patriotism are undoubted, his conduct has been the subject of severe criticism not only on the part of his adversaries but of the French themselves. He did not escape the censure of the Bishop of Quebec for meddling to so great an extent in temporal affairs, but the Bishop’s censure is mild compared to that of an anonymous historian, who writes: “Abbe Loutre, missionary of the Indians in Acadia, soon put all in fire and flame, and may be justly deemed the scourge and curse of this country. This wicked monster, this cruel and blood thirsty Priest, more inhumane and savage than the natural savages, with a murdering and slaughtering mind, instead of an Evangelick spirit, excited continually his Indians against the English. * * * All the French had the greatest horror and indignation at Le Loutre’s barbarous actions; and I dare say if the Court of France had known them they would have been far from approving of them.”

It is only fair to the Abbe Le Loutre to mention that the officer who criticizes him in this rude fashion was the Chevalier Johnston, an Englishman by birth and a puritan by religion and as such prejudiced against the French missionary. Johnston, however, served at Louisbourg on the side of France with great fidelity in the capacity of lieutenant, interpreter and engineer.

The Abbe de L’Isle-Dieu wrote the French minister, early the next year, that there was neither priest nor chapel at Fort Menagoueche, and that a missionary was needed on the lower part of the river. Father Germain had now for a long time been missionary to the Maliseets at Aukpaque (l’isle d’Ecouba) and having more than eighty families under his care found the fort too far removed to give due attention to the wants of the garrison.

The situation on the St. John at this time was not viewed with complacency by the authorities of Nova Scotia and New England. On the 18th October, 1753, Governor Hopson, of Nova Scotia, wrote the Lords of Trade and Plantations that he had been informed by Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, that since the arrival of a French missionary at the River St. John the conduct of the inhabitants had altered for the worse; the French had now 100 families settled on the river, had greatly strengthened the old fort at its mouth with guns and men, and had built a new one. Fort Boishebert, some miles up the river armed with twenty-four guns and garrisoned by 200 regulars. He also says a French frigate of thirty guns lay behind Partridge Island waiting for a cargo of furs, and that the French seemed to be entirely masters of the river.

It is not unlikely this statement is exaggerated, for the following summer Lieut.-Governor Lawrence says the French had at St. John only a small fort with three bad old guns, one officer and sixteen men; while of Indians there were 160 fighting men.

As time went on the Acadians became impatient at the delay in settling the limits of Acadia. In vain they were annually told the boundaries would soon be determined, all negotiation proved fruitless. Those who had crossed the isthmus into what is now the County of Westmorland found themselves undecided as to their future course. Their inclination—a very natural one—seems to have been to return to the fields they had abandoned, but the Abbe Le Loutre urged them to remain under French rule as the only way of enjoying unmolested the privileges of their religion. For their encouragement and protection Fort Beausejour was erected.

In the month of January, 1754, Lieut.-Governor Lawrence informed the Lords of Trade that the French were hard at work making settlements on the St. John and were offering great inducements to the Acadians of the peninsula to join them. He could not prevent some families from going, but the greater part were too much attached to their lands to leave them. In the opinion of Lawrence it was absolutely necessary, for the development and control of Acadia as an English colony, that the forts of Beausejour and the mouth of the River St. John should be destroyed, and the French driven from the settlements they were establishing north of the Bay of Fundy. Although the Indians had committed no hostilities for two years, he believed no dependence could be placed on their quietude so long as the French were allowed to exercise their disturbing influence among them.

A few weeks after Boishebert had been thus obliged to abandon Fort Menagouche there occurred the tragic event known as the “Acadian Expulsion.” The active agents employed by Lawrence and Shirley in this transaction were Colonel Monckton and his subordinates, of whom Lieut.-Colonel John Winslow and Capt. Murray were the most actively engaged. These officers evidently had little relish for the task imposed on them. Winslow in his proclamation to the inhabitants of Grand Pre, Minas, etc., says: “The duty I am now upon, though necessary, is very disagreeable to my natural make and temper.” The hostility of the New England troops to the Acadians added to the difficulties of their officers. Murray wrote to Winslow: “You know our soldiers hate them, and if they can find a pretence to kill them they will.”

Of recent years there has been much controversy concerning the expulsion of the Acadians and widely differing opinions have been expressed on the one hand by Parkman, Murdoch, Hannay, Hind and Aikins and on the other by Casgrain, Richard, Porier, Gaudet and Savary. Upon the merits of this controversy it is not necessary to enter, and it will be more in keeping with our present subject to refer to the Acadian Expulsion only as it concerns the history of events on the River St. John.

The position of the Sieur de Boishebert after the capture of Beausejour and the fort at St. John was a very embarassing one. His letter to the Chevalier de Drucour, who commanded at Louisbourg, is of interest in this connection.

“At the River St. John, 10 October, 1755.

“Monsieur,—As the enemy has constantly occupied the route of communication since the fall of Beausejour, I have not had the honor of informing you of the state of affairs at this place.

“I was compelled to abandon the fort—or rather the buildings—that I occupied on the lower part of the river in accordance with orders that I had received in case of being attacked. I have beaten a retreat as far as the narrows (detroits) of the river, from which the enemy has retired, not seeing any advantage sufficient to warrant an attempt to drive me from thence.

“I have succeeded, sir, in preventing the inhabitants of this place from falling under the domination of the English.

“Monsieur de Vaudreuil, approving this manoeuvre, has directed me to establish a temporary camp (camp volant) sit such place as I may deem most suitable. Even were I now to go to Quebec he could not give me any assistance, all the troops and militia being in the field.

“I received on the 16th of August a letter from the principal inhabitants living in the vicinity of Beausejour beseeching me to come to their assistance. I set out the 20th with a detachment of 125 men, French and Indians.”

Evidently the Marquis de Vaudreuil relied much upon the sagacity and courage of his lieutenant on the St. John river in the crisis that had arisen in Acadia. In his letter to the French colonial minister, dated the 18th October, 1755, he writes that the English were now masters of Fort Beausejour and that Boishebert, the commander of the River St. John, had burnt his fort, not being able to oppose the descent of the enemy. He had given him orders to hold his position on the river and supplies had been sent him for the winter. He hoped that Father Germain, then at Quebec, would return without delay to his Indian mission and act in concert with Boishebert. The marquis summarises his reasons for wishing to maintain the post on the River St. John as follows:—

“1. As long as I hold this river and have a detachment of troops there I retain some hold upon Acadia for the King, and the English cannot say that they have forced the French to abandon it.

2. I am assured of the fidelity of the Acadians and the Indians, who otherwise might think themselves abandoned and might yield to the English.

3. Mon. de Boishebert will rally the Acadians from far and near and will try to unite them and their families in one body. These Acadians, so reunited, will be compelled for their own security actively to resist the enemy if he presents himself.

4. Mon. de Boishebert will in like manner be engaged rallying the savages and forming of them a body equally important, and by corresponding with M. Manach, the missionary at Miramichi, will be able, in case of necessity, to unite the savages of that mission to his own in opposing the advance of the enemy.

5. He will be able constantly to have spies at Beausejour and Halifax, and to take some prisoners who will inform him of the situation and strength of the English.

6. He will be able to organize parties of Acadians and savages to harras the enemy continually and hinder his obtaining firewood for the garrison at Beausejour (Fort Cumberland).

7. By holding the River St. John I can at all times have news from Louisbourg.”

The Marquis adds that even if France failed to establish her claim to the territory north of the Bay of Fundy and should be forced to abandon it he hoped, by the aid of Boishebert and the missionaries, to withdraw the Acadians and their Indian allies to Canada. The Acadians north of the isthmus he estimated were about two thousand (perhaps 3,000 would have been nearer the truth) of whom seven hundred were capable of bearing arms. “It would be vexatious,” adds the Marquis, “if they should pass to the English.”

The voyage proved a tedious one and from time to time small parties of the Acadians were allowed on deck for air and exercise. A plot was laid to seize the ship. Accordingly six of the stoutest and boldest lay in readiness, and when those on deck were ordered below and the hatchway opened to allow them to descend, Belliveau and his friends sprang from the hold and in the twinkling of an eye were engaged in a desperate struggle with the crew. Reinforced by those who followed, the master of the vessel and his crew of eight men were soon overpowered and tied fast.

Belliveau, the leader of the spirited encounter, now took the helm and the course of the ship was reversed. Under full sail she careened to the wind until her former master cried to Belliveau that he would certainly break the main mast. He replied: “No fear of that; I made it and it is a good one.”

The sole result, of this bit of strategy seems to have been the capture of one poor Frenchman from whom the English learned that the Indians had gone, some to Passamaquoddy and others with Boishebert to Cocagne, also that there was “a French officer and about 20 men twenty-three miles up the River at a place called St. Anns.”

The Indians who had gone to Passamaquoddy managed to surprise at night a large schooner lying at anchor in Harbor L’Elang, bound from Boston to Annapolis Royal with provisions for the garrison. The schooner carried six guns and had on board a crew of ten men besides her captain and an artillery officer of the Annapolis garrison. The vessel was carried to St. John and hidden on the lower part of the river. The savages pillaged her so completely that on her arrival there remained only a small quantity of bacon and a little rum. The prisoners were sent by Boishebert to Canada along with others captured on various occasions.

The Acadian refugees continued to come to the River St. John in increasing numbers, and Boishebert and the missionaries soon found themselves reduced to sore straits in their endeavors to supply them with the necessaries of life. The Marquis de Vaudreuil was determined to hold the St. John river country as long as possible. He wrote the French minister, June 1, 1756: “I shall not recall M. de Boishebert nor the missionaries, nor withdraw the Acadians into the heart of the colony until the last extremity, and when it shall be morally impossible to do better.” It was his intention to send provisions and munitions of war to the Acadians and Indians.

Boishebert was endeavoring at this time, with the approval of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, to draw as many of the Acadians as possible to the River St. John and to induce them to oppose any advance on the part of the English. The French commander, however, soon found his position an exceedingly difficult one. After sending many families to Quebec and to the Island of St. John he had still six hundred people, besides the Indians, to provide for during the winter, and many refugees from Port Royal and elsewhere desired to come to the River St. John. The number of Acadians dependent on him received additions from time to time by the arrival of exiles returning from the south. In the month of June five families numbering fifty persons, arrived from Carolina and told Boishebert that eighty others were yet to arrive.

The idea that dominated the Marquis de Vaudreuil in providing these unfortunates with the necessaries of life seems to have been to utilize their services for the defence of Canada. “It would not be proper,” he says, “that they should be at the charges of the King without giving tangible proof of their zeal for the service of his majesty.” The governor not being able to provide for all the refugees at the River St. John, on account of the difficulty of transporting supplies by way of Temiscouata, gave directions to the Sieur de Boishebert to send to Miramichi the families he could not subsist on the St. John. The number of Acadians at Miramichi soon amounted to 3,500 persons.

The ensuing winter proved most trying to the destitute Acadians. The harvest had been extremely poor. In some cases the old inhabitants had nothing to live upon but the grain needed for seeding in the spring time. The conditions at Miramichi were probably not more wretched than on the River St. John. Of the former the Marquis de Vaudreuil writes in the following plaintive terms:——

“This part of Acadia holds out for the King although reduced to the most wretched state. Although ourselves in want, M. Bigot has sent a vessel with provisions to Miramichi, but she has unfortunately been delayed on the way by head winds. The misery of the Acadians there is so great that Boishebert has been compelled to reduce their allowance to ten pounds of peas and twelve pounds of meat per month, and it would have been further reduced had not forty bullocks been brought from Petitcodiac. This was the allowance for the month of January and, the fishery being exhausted, he could not hope to have the same resource the months following. In a word the Acadian mothers see their babes die at the breast not having wherewith to nourish them. The majority of the people cannot appear abroad for want of clothes to cover their nakedness. Many have died. The number of the sick is considerable, and those convalescent cannot regain their strength on account of the wretched quality of their food, being often under the necessity of eating horse meat extremely lean, sea-cow, and skins of oxen. Such is the state of the Acadians.

“The intendant, M. Bigot, is going to send a ship, as soon as the ice breaks, to carry such supplies as we can furnish them. Unless some assistance is sent by sea, the lands, cattle, and effects hidden in the woods must all be sacrificed, and the Acadians obliged to go elsewhere.”

At the beginning of the year 1756, the governors of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia discussed the situation of affairs on the St. John river, and agreed that steps must be taken as soon as possible to dislodge the French.

The Indians were at this time decidedly hostile to the English and Lawrence determined to wage against them a merciless warfare. Accordingly, with the advice and approval of his council, he issued a proclamation offering a reward of £30 for every Indian warrior brought in alive, a reward of £25 for the scalp of every male Indian above the age of sixteen years, and for every woman or child brought in alive the sum of £25; these rewards to be paid by the commanding officer at any of His Majesty’s Forts in the Province on receiving the prisoners or scalps.

This cold-blooded and deliberately issued proclamation of the chief magistrate of Nova Scotia and his council can scarcely be excused on the plea that the Abbe Le Loutre and other French leaders had at various times rewarded their savage allies for bringing in the scalps of Englishmen. As for the savages, they had, at least, the apology that they made war in accordance with the manner of their race, whereas the proclamation of the Governor of Nova Scotia was unworthy of an enlightened people. Nothing could be better calculated to lower and brutalize the character of a soldier than the offer of £25 for a human scalp.

About this time, two of the New England regiments were disbanded and returned to their homes, their period of enlistment having expired, and the difficulty of obtaining other troops prevented anything being attempted on the St. John for a year or two. Lawrence and Shirley, however, continued to discuss the details of the proposed expedition. Both governors seem to have had rather vague ideas of the number of the Acadians on the river and the situation of their settlements. Shirley says he learned from the eastern Indians and New England traders that their principal settlement was about ninety miles up the river at a place called St. Annes, six miles below the old Indian town of Aukpaque. He thought that 800 or 1,000 men would be a force sufficient to clear the river of the enemy and that after they were driven from their haunts the English would do well to establish a garrison of 150 men at St. Annes, in order to prevent the return of the French and to overawe the Indians. He also recommended that the fort at the mouth of the river, lately abandoned by Boishebert, should be rebuilt and a garrison of 50 men placed there.

The locations of the French settlements on the river at this period are described in detail in Dr. Ganong’s “Historic Sites in New Brunswick.” The largest settlement, and that farthest up the St. John, was at St. Annes Point, where the City of Fredericton stands today. Here the Acadians had cleared 600 or 700 acres of land and built a thriving village with a little chapel (near the site of Government House) and probably there was a sprinkling of houses along the river as far up as the Indian village of Aukpaque, six miles above. Their next settlement was at the mouth of the Oromocto, where 300 acres of land had been cleared. A very old settlement existed near the abandoned fort at the mouth of the Jemseg, but its growth had been retarded by the annoyances of the spring freshets and many of the inhabitants had been obliged to remove. There was an important settlement on the site now occupied by the village of Gagetown and houses were scattered along the river for several miles below. Another small settlement existed above the mouth of the Bellisle, and there may have been a few inhabitants at the mouth of the Nerepis where stood Fort Boishebert. At St. John the French had cleared some land on the west side of the harbor, and in Bruce’s map of 1761 the places cleared are marked as “gardens,” but it is probable that the inhabitants abandoned them and fled up the river in 1755 when their fort, “Menagoueche,” was destroyed by Captain Rous.

In the year 1756 England declared war against France and the capture of Louisbourg was proposed. The governor of Canada ordered Boishebert to hold himself in readiness to aid in its defence, and he accordingly proceeded to Cape Breton with a force of 100 Acadians and Canadians and about 250 Indians, many of them Maliseets of the River St. John. The latter did not go very willingly, for they had been reduced to so great a state of misery in consequence of not receiving the supplies they had expected from the French that they had entered into peace negotiations with the English. However by means of harangues and promises Boishebert contrived to bring them with him.

The Chevalier de Drucour, the commander at Louisbourg, urged the French minister to send at once presents and supplies for the savages. “These people,” he observes, “are very useful in the kind of warfare we are making, but unless we act towards them as they have been led to expect I will not answer that we shall have them with us next year.” He urges the French minister to send him some medals for distribution. The distinction of possessing one was very highly prized and often retained the fidelity of a whole village of the savages.

The expectations of Montcalm and de Vaudreuil as to the usefulness of Boishebert’s detachment in the defence of Louisbourg were doomed to disappointment, for Boishebert did not arrive at Louisbourg until near the end of the siege and with forces not one-third of the number that Drucour had been led to expect. Two depots of provisions had been placed in the woods for the use of the detachment, but the fact that Boishebert had only about 120 Acadians and a few Indians in addition to a handful of regulars, entirely frustrated Drucour’s design of harrassing the attacking English by a strong demonstration in their rear. About twenty of Boishebert’s Indians were engaged in a skirmish with the English and two of their chiefs having fallen the rest were so discouraged that they returned to their villages. Boishebert himself had a few unimportant skirmishes with outlying parties of the English, and then came the news of the surrender of Louisbourg. He immediately sent away the sick of his detachment, set fire to a thousand cords of wood and a quantity of coal to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and on the 29th July set out on his return to the St. John river. The English made a lively but fruitless pursuit.