The eastern crisis: 202 B. C. The Roman senate had been eager to conclude a satisfactory peace with Carthage as soon as possible in order to devote its undivided attention to a crisis which had arisen in the eastern Mediterranean. There Ptolemy IV of Egypt had died in 203 B. C., leaving the kingdom to an infant son who was in the hands of corrupt and dissolute advisors. Egypt had lost her command of the eastern Mediterranean at the time of Rome’s First Carthaginian War, and later (217 B. C.) had only saved herself in a war against Syria by calling to arms a portion of the native population. This step had led to internal racial difficulties which weakened the position of the dynasty. At this juncture Philip V of Macedon, who had emerged with credit from his recent struggle with Rome and his foes in Greece, and Antiochus III of Syria, who had just returned from a series of successful campaigns (212–204 B. C.) which had recovered for his kingdom its eastern provinces as far as the Indus and had won for him the surname of “the Great,” judged the moment favorable for the realization of long-cherished ambitions at the expense of their rival, Egypt. They formed an alliance for the conquest of the outlying possessions of the Ptolemies, whereby Philip was to occupy those in the Aegean, while Antiochus was to seize Phoenicia and Palestine. In 202 B. C. they opened hostilities.
The appeal for Roman intervention: 201 B. C. But the operations of the forces of Philip in the Aegean brought him into war with Rhodes and with Attalus, King of Pergamon, while in Greece a quarrel, which developed between some of his allies and the Athenians, involved him in hostilities with the latter. From these three states [pg 90]and from Egypt, which, having been unable to prevent Antiochus from occupying her Syrian possessions, was now threatened with invasion, envoys were sent to Rome, to request Roman intervention on their behalf, on the ground that they were friends (amici) of Rome.
The status of amicitia. The Romans had adopted the idea of international friendship (amicitia, philia) from the Greeks in the course of the third century. Previously, their only conception of friendly relations between states was that of alliance (societas) based upon a perpetual treaty (foedus), which bound each party to render military assistance to the other and which neither could terminate at discretion. However, under the influence of ideas current among the Hellenic states they began to form friendships, i. e. to open up diplomatic relations with states and rulers. These amici (friends) could remain neutral in case Rome engaged in war, or they could render Rome support, which was, however, voluntary and not obligatory. And Rome enjoyed a similar freedom of action with regard to them.
Rome intervenes: 200 B. C. The Roman Senate, influenced by mixed motives—sympathy for the Hellenes and their culture, ambition to appear as arbiters of the fate of the Greek world, a desire for revenge upon Philip for his partial successes in the late war, and fear of seeing him develop into a more powerful enemy—was anxious to intervene. But, although the Roman fetials, the members of the priestly college which was the guardian of the Roman traditions in international relations, decided that Attalus and the other Roman amici might be regarded as allies (socii) and so be defended legitimately, the Roman people as a whole shrank from embarking upon another war. The Comitia once voted against the proposal, and at a second meeting was only induced to sanction it, when it was represented to them that they would have to face another invasion of Italy if they did not anticipate Philip’s action.
The Roman ultimatum. The Senate next sent ambassadors to the East to present an ultimatum to Philip, and at the same time to negotiate with Antiochus for the cessation of his attacks upon Egypt, for the Romans did not wish to have his forces added to those of the Macedonian king. When Philip was engaged in the siege of Abydos on the Hellespont he received the Roman terms, which were that he should abstain from attacking any cities of the Greeks or the possessions of Ptolemy, and should submit to arbitration his disputes with [pg 91]Attalus and the Rhodians. Upon his rejection of these proposals the war opened.
The Romans cross the Adriatic. Late in 200 B. C. a Roman army under the consul Sulpicius crossed into Illyricum and endeavored to penetrate into Macedonia. However, both in this and in the succeeding year, the Romans, although aided by the forces of the Aetolian Confederacy, Pergamon, Rhodes and Athens, were unable to inflict any decisive defeat upon Philip or to invade his kingdom.
However, with the arrival of the consul of 198, Titus Flamininus, the situation speedily changed. The Achaean Confederacy was won over to the side of Rome, and Flamininus succeeded in forcing Philip to evacuate his position in Epirus and to withdraw into Thessaly. In the following winter negotiations for peace were opened, but these led to nothing, for the Romans demanded the evacuation of Corinth, Chalcis and Demetrias, three fortresses known as “the fetters of Greece,” and Philip refused to make this concession.
Cynoscephalae: 197 B. C. The next year military operations were resumed with both armies in Thessaly. Early in the summer a battle was fought on a ridge of hills called Cynoscephalae (the Dog’s Heads) where the Romans won a complete victory. Although the Aetolians tendered valuable assistance in this engagement, the Macedonian defeat was due to the superior flexibility of the Roman legionary formation over the phalanx. Philip fled to Macedonia and sued for peace. The Aetolians and his enemies in Greece sought his utter destruction, but Flamininus realized the importance of Macedonia to the Greek world as a bulwark against the Celtic peoples of the lower Danube and would not support their demands. The terms fixed by the Roman Senate were: the autonomy of the Hellenes, the evacuation of the Macedonian possessions in Greece, in the Aegean, and in Illyricum, and an indemnity of 1000 talents ($1,200,000). The conditions Philip was obliged to accept (196 B. C.).
The proclamation of Flamininus: 196 B. C. At the Isthmian games of the same year Flamininus proclaimed the complete autonomy of the peoples who had been subject to Macedonia. The announcement provoked a tremendous outburst of enthusiasm. After spending some time in carrying this proclamation into effect and in settling the claims of various states, Flamininus returned to Italy in 194, leaving the Greeks to make what use they could of their freedom.
Antiochus in Asia Minor and Thrace. Even before Flamininus and his army had withdrawn from Greece the activities of Antiochus had awakened the mistrust of the Roman Senate and threatened to lead to hostilities. The Syrian king had completed the conquest of Lower Syria in 198, and then, profiting by the difficulties in which Philip of Macedon was involved, he turned his attention towards Asia Minor and Thrace with the hope of recovering the possessions once held by his ancestor, Seleucus I, in these quarters. The Romans were at the time too much occupied to oppose him, and, outwardly, he professed to be the friend of Rome and to be limiting his activities to the reëstablishing of his empire to its former extent. Eventually, in 195 B. C., he crossed over into Europe and proceeded to establish himself in Thrace. Negotiations with the Roman Senate seemed likely to lead to an agreement that the king should limit his expansion to Asia and recognize a sort of Roman suzerainty in Europe, when the action of the Aetolians precipitated a conflict.
The Aetolians and Rome. The Aetolians, who had been Rome’s allies in the war just concluded and who greatly exaggerated the importance of their services, were disgruntled because the kingdom of Macedonia had not been entirely dismembered and they had been restrained from enlarging the territory of the Confederacy at the expense of their neighbors. In short, they wished to take the place formerly held by Macedonia among the Greek states. Accustomed to regard war as a legitimate source of revenue, they did not easily reconcile themselves to Rome’s preservation of peace in Hellas. Ever since the battle of Cynoscephalae they had striven to undermine Roman influence among the Greeks, and now they sought to draw Antiochus into conflict with Rome.
Antiochus invades Greece: 192 B. C. In 192 B. C. they elected Antiochus as commander-in-chief of the forces of their confederacy and seized the fortress of Chalcis. This they offered to the king, to whom they also made an unauthorized promise of aid from Macedonia. Thereupon, trusting in the support promised by the Aetolians, Antiochus sailed to Greece with a small force of 10,000 men. It so happened that Hannibal, who in 196 B. C. had been forced to flee [pg 93]his native city owing to the machinations of his enemies and the Romans, was then at the court of Antiochus, where he had taken refuge. He advised his protector to invade the Italian peninsula, but Antiochus rejected the advice, probably with wisdom, for such a course would have required him to win the control of the sea, which was a task beyond his resources. But when, throughout his whole campaign, he neglected to make use of the services of the greatest commander of the age, he committed a most serious blunder. Had Hannibal led the forces of Antiochus the task of the Romans would not have been so simple.
Antiochus driven from Greece: 191 B. C. In 191 a Roman army under the consul Acilius Glabrio appeared in Greece and attacked and defeated the forces of Antiochus at Thermopylae. The king fled to Asia. Contrary to his hopes he had found but little support in Greece. Philip of Macedon and the Achaean Confederacy adhered to the Romans, and the Aetolians were rendered helpless by an invasion of their own country. Furthermore, the Rhodians and Eumenes, the new King of Pergamon, joined their navies to the Roman fleet.
The Romans cross over to Asia Minor: 190 B. C. As Antiochus would not hearken to the terms of peace laid down by the Romans, the latter resolved upon the invasion of Asia Minor. Two naval battles, won by the aid of Rhodes and Pergamon, secured the control of the Aegean and in 190 B. C. a Roman force crossed the Hellespont. For its commander the Senate had wished to designate Scipio Africanus, the greatest of the Roman generals. However, as he had recently been consul he was now ineligible for that office. The obstacle of the law was accordingly circumvented by the election of his brother Lucius to the consulate and his assignment to this command, and by the appointment of Publius to accompany him as extraordinary proconsul, with power equal to his own.
Magnesia: 190 B. C. One decisive victory over Antiochus at Magnesia in the autumn of 190 B. C. brought him to terms. He agreed to surrender all territory to the north of the Taurus mountains and west of Pamphylia, to give up his war elephants, to surrender all but ten of his ships of war, to pay an indemnity of 15,000 talents ($18,000,000) in twelve annual instalments, and to abstain from attacking the allies of Rome. Still, unlike Carthage, he was at liberty to defend himself if attacked. The Romans then proceeded to estab[pg 94]lish order in Asia Minor. The territories of their friends, Rhodes and Pergamon, were materially increased, while the enemies of the latter, the Celts of Galatia were defeated and forced to pay a heavy indemnity. Rome retained no territory in Asia, but left the country divided among a number of small states whose mutual jealousies rendered impossible the rise of a strong power which could venture to set aside the Roman arrangements.
The subjugation of the Aetolians: 189 B. C. The Roman campaign of 191 against the Aetolians had caused the latter, who were also attacked by Philip of Macedon, to seek terms. However, as the Romans demanded an unconditional surrender, the Aetolians decided to continue the struggle. In the next year no energetic measures were taken against them, but in 189 the consul Fulvius Nobilior pressed the war vigorously and besieged their chief city, Ambracia. But since the obstinate resistance of its defenders defied all his efforts, and since the Athenians were trying to act as mediators in bringing the war to a close, the Romans abandoned their demand for an unconditional surrender and peace was made on the following conditions. The Aetolian Confederacy gave up all territory captured by its enemies during the war and entered into a permanent alliance with Rome, whereby it was bound to send contingents to the Roman armies. Ambracia was surrendered and destroyed, and the Romans occupied the pirate nest of Cephallenia.
Rome and the Greek states. Although by her alliance with the Aetolians Rome had planted herself permanently on Greek soil, and in the war with Antiochus had claimed to exercise a sort of protectorate over the Greek world, still the Senate as yet gave no indication of reversing the policy of Flamininus, and the Greek states remained as the friends of Rome in the enjoyment of political independence. However, it was not long before these friendly relations became seriously strained and Rome was induced to embark upon a policy of interference in Greek affairs which ultimately put an end to the apparent freedom of Hellas. The fundamental cause of this change was that while Rome interpreted Greek freedom to mean liberty of action provided that the wishes and arrangements of Rome were respected, the Greeks understood it to mean the perfect freedom [pg 95]of sovereign communities, and resented bitterly any infringement of their rights. Keeping in mind these conflicting points of view, it is easy to see how difficulties were bound to arise which would inevitably be settled according to the wishes of the stronger power.
Rome and the Achaeans. The chief specific causes for the change in the Roman policy are to be found in the troubles of the Achaean Confederacy and the reviving ambitions of Macedonia. The Confederacy included many city-states which had been compelled to join it and which sought to regain their independence. This the Confederacy was determined to prevent. One such community was Sparta, and the policy of the Achaeans towards it in the matter of the restoration of Spartan exiles led to the Spartans appealing to Rome. The Roman decision wounded the susceptibilities of the Confederacy without settling the problem, and the tendency of the Achaeans to stand upon their rights provoked the anger of the Romans. Within the Confederacy there developed a pro-Roman party ready to submit to Roman dictatorship, and a national party determined to assert their right to freedom of action. From 180 B. C. the Romans deliberately fostered the aristocratic factions throughout the cities of Greece, feeling that they were the more stable element and more in harmony with the policy of the Senate. As a consequence the democratic factions began to look for outside support and cast their eyes towards Macedonia.
Rome and Macedonia. Philip V of Macedon considered that the assistance which he had furnished to Rome in the Syrian War was proof of his loyalty and warranted the annexation of the territory he had overrun in that conflict. But the Senate was not inclined to allow the power of Macedonia to attain dangerous proportions, and he was forced to forego his claims. Henceforth he was the bitter foe of the Romans. He devoted himself to the development of the military resources of his kingdom with the ultimate view of again challenging Rome’s authority in Greece. At his death in 179 B. C. he left an army of from 30,000 to 40,000 men and a treasure of 6,000 talents ($7,200,000). His son and successor Perseus inherited his father’s anti-Roman policy and entered into relations with the foes of Rome everywhere in Greece.
The Third Macedonian War: 171–167 B. C. But the Senate was kept well aware of his schemes by his enemies in Greece, especially Eumenes of Pergamon. Therefore they determined to forestall [pg 96]the completion of his plans and force him into war. In 172, a Roman commission visited Perseus and required of him concessions which meant the extinction of his independence. Upon his refusal to comply with the demands they returned home and Rome declared war. Now, when success depended upon energetic action, Perseus sought to avoid the issue and tried to placate the Romans, but in vain. In 171 a Roman force landed in Greece and made its way to Thessaly. But in the campaigns of this and the following year the Roman commanders were too incapable and their troops too undisciplined to make any headway. Nor did Perseus show ability to take advantage of his opportunities. Furthermore, by his parsimony he lost the chance to win valuable aid from the Dardanians, Gesatae, and Celts on his borders. Finally, in 168, the Romans found an able general in the consul Aemilius Paulus, who restored the morale of the Roman soldiers and won a complete victory over Perseus in the battle of Pydna. The Macedonian kingdom was at an end; its territory was divided into four autonomous republics, which were forbidden mutual privileges of commercium and connubium; a yearly tribute of fifty talents was imposed upon them; and the royal mines and domains became the property of the Roman state.
The aftermath of the war. Having disposed of Macedon the Romans turned their attention to the other Greek states with the intention of rewarding their friends and punishing their enemies. Everywhere death or exile awaited the leaders of the anti-Roman party, many of whose names became known from the seizure of the papers of Perseus. Although the Achaeans had given no positive proof of disloyalty 1000 of their leading men, among them the historian Polybius, were carried off to Italy nominally to be given the chance of clearing themselves before the Senate but really to be kept as hostages in Italy for the future conduct of the Confederacy.
The Rhodians, because they had endeavored to secure a peaceful settlement between Rome and Perseus, were forced to surrender their possessions in Asia Minor, and a ruinous blow was dealt to their commercial prosperity by the establishment of a free port at the island of Delos. Eumenes of Pergamon, whose actions had aroused suspicions, had to recognize the independence of the Galatians whom he had subdued. Far worse was the fate of Epirus. There seventy towns were sacked and their inhabitants to the number of 150,000 carried off into slavery.
[pg 97]Henceforth it was clear that Rome was the real sovereign in the eastern Mediterranean and that her friends and allies only enjoyed local autonomy, while they were expected to be obedient to the orders of Rome. This is well illustrated by the anecdote of the circle of Popilius. During the Third Macedonian War, Antiochus IV, Epiphanes, King of Syria, had invaded Egypt. After the battle of Pydna a Roman ambassador, Popilius by name, was sent to make him withdraw. Popilius met Antiochus before Alexandria and delivered the Senate’s message. The king asked for time for consideration, but the Roman, drawing a circle around him in the sand, bade him answer before he left the spot. Antiochus yielded and evacuated Egypt.
The spoils of this war with Macedonia brought an enormous booty into the Roman treasury, and from this time the war tax on property—the tributum civium Romanorum—ceased to be levied. The income of the empire enabled the government to relieve Roman citizens of all direct taxation.
During the Macedonian and Syrian Wars the Romans were busy strengthening and extending their hold upon northern Italy and Spain.
Cisalpine Gaul. Cisalpine Gaul, which had been largely lost to the Romans since Hannibal’s invasion, was recovered by wars with the Insubres and Boii between 198 and 191 B. C. A new military highway, the via Flaminia, was built from Rome to Ariminum in 187, and later extended under the name of the via Aemilia to Placentia; another, the via Cassia (171 B. C.), linked Rome and the Po valley by way of Etruria. New fortresses were established; Bononia (189) and Aquileia (181) as Latin colonies; Parma and Mutina (183) as colonies of Roman citizens. In this way Roman authority was firmly established and the way prepared for the rapid Latinization of the land between the Apennines and the Alps.
The Ligurians. In the same period falls the subjugation of the Ligurians. In successive campaigns, lasting until 172 B. C., the Romans gradually extended their sway over the various Ligurian tribes until they reached the territory of Massalia in southern Gaul. Roman colonies were founded at Pisa (180) and Luna (177).
[pg 98]Spain. The territory acquired from Carthage in Spain was organized into two provinces, called Hither and Farther Spain, in 197 B. C. But the allied and subject Spanish tribes were not yet reconciled to the presence of the Romans and serious revolts broke out. One of these was subdued by Marcus Porcius Cato in 196, another by Lucius Aemilius Paulus between 191 and 189, and a third by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus in 179 and 178 B. C. The settlement effected by Gracchus secured peace for many years. In Spain were founded Rome’s first colonies beyond the borders of Italy. Italica, near Seville, was settled in 206, and Carteia in 171; both as Latin colonies.
Roman foreign policy. The foreign relations of Rome from 167 to 133 B. C. fall into two distinct periods. In the earlier, Roman foreign policy is directed towards securing Roman domination throughout the Mediterranean by diplomatic means. War and annexation of territory are avoided as causing too great a drain upon the resources of the state and creating difficult administrative problems. In the later period this policy is abandoned for one more aggressively imperialistic, which does not hesitate to appeal to armed force and aims at the incorporation of conquered territory within the empire. This change of policy was largely due to the influence of that group in the senate which was eager for foreign commands, the honors of a triumph, and the spoils of war, as well as that of the non-senatorial financial interests which sought to open up new fields for exploitation. It was also felt that the prestige of Rome had suffered by the disregard of some of her diplomatic representations.
This policy of expansion resulted in prolonged wars in Spain, the annexation of Carthage and Macedon, the establishment of direct control over Greece, and the acquisition of territory in Asia Minor. The new tendencies become apparent shortly before 150 B. C.
The revolts of the Celtiberians and the Lusitanians: 154–139 B. C. In 154 B. C. revolts broke out in both Hither and Farther Spain. A series of long and bloody campaigns ensued, which were prolonged by the incapacity, cruelty and faithlessness of the Roman commanders, and caused a heavy drain upon the military resources of Italy. The chief opponents of the Romans were the Celtiberians of Hither, and the Lusitanians of Farther Spain. The desperate character of these wars made service in Spain very unpopular, and [pg 100]levies for the campaign of 151 were raised with difficulty. The tribunes interceded to protect certain persons, and when their intercession was disregarded by the consuls they cast the latter into prison. In 150 B. C. the pro-consul Galba treacherously massacred thousands of Lusitanians with whom he had made a treaty. For this he was brought to trial by Cato, but was acquitted.
The massacre led to a renewed outbreak under Viriathus, an able guerilla leader who defied the power of Rome for about eight years (147–139 B. C.). Forced eventually to yield, he was assassinated during an armistice by traitors suborned by the Roman commander. The complete subjugation of the Lusitanians soon followed.
The war with Numantia: 143–133 B. C. Meantime, after an interval of some years, in 143 the war had broken out afresh in the nearer province where the struggle centered about the town of Numantia. In 140 the Roman general Pompeius made peace upon easy terms with the Numantines, but later repudiated it, and the Senate ignored his arrangements. Again in 138 the tribunes interfered with the levy, so great was the popular aversion to service in Spain. The next year witnessed the disgraceful surrender of the consul Mancinus and his army, comprising 20,000 Romans, to the Numantines. By concluding a treaty he saved the lives of his army. But the Roman Senate perfidiously rejected the sworn agreement of the consul, made him the scapegoat and delivered him bound to the Numantines, who would have none of him.
At length, weary of defeats, the Romans re-elected to the consulship for 134 B. C. their tried general Scipio Aemilianus, the conqueror of Carthage, and appointed him as commander in Spain. His first task was to restore the discipline in his army. Then he opened the blockade of Numantia. After a siege of fifteen months the city was starved into submission and completely destroyed. A commission of ten senators reorganized the country and Spain entered upon a long era of peace.
The Third Punic War: 149–146 B. C. Its causes. The treaty which ended the Second Punic War had forbidden the Carthaginians the right to make war outside of Africa, or within it without the consent of Rome. At the same time their enemy Masinissa had been [pg 101]established as a powerful prince on their borders. In such a situation future Roman intervention was inevitable. But for a generation Carthage was left in peace. A pro-Roman party was in control there and bent all its energies to the peaceful revival of Carthaginian commerce. And the Romans, after a period of suspicion which ended with the exile of Hannibal in 196, regarded Carthaginian prosperity without enmity. However, this prosperity in the end led to the ruin of the city, for it awakened the envy of the Senate and the financial interests of Rome, which became only too ready to seize upon any excuse for the destruction of their ancient rival.
Cato and Carthage. The opportunity came through the action of Masinissa. This chieftain, knowing the restrictions imposed upon Carthage by her treaty with Rome, and sensing the change in the Roman attitude towards that city after 167 B. C., revived old claims to Carthaginian territory. Carthage could only appeal to Rome for protection, but in 161 and 157 the Roman commissions sent to adjust the disputes decided in favor of Masinissa. A member of the commission of 157 was the old Marcus Porcius Cato, who was still obsessed with the fear which Carthage had inspired in his youth, and who returned from his mission filled with alarm at the wealth of the city and henceforth devoted all his energies to accomplish its overthrow. In the following years he concluded all his speeches in the Senate with the words, “Carthage must be destroyed.”
The Roman ultimatum: 149 B. C. A fresh attack by Masinissa occurred in 151 B. C. Enraged, the Carthaginians took the field against him, but suffered defeat. The Romans at once prepared for war. Conscious of having overstepped their rights and fearful of Roman vengeance, the Carthaginians offered unconditional submission in the hope of obtaining pardon. The Senate assured them of their lives, property and constitution, but required hostages and bade them execute the commands of the consuls who crossed over to Africa with an army and ordered the Carthaginians to surrender their arms and engines of war. The Carthaginians, desirous of appeasing the Romans at all costs, complied. Then came the ultimatum. They must abandon their city and settle at least ten miles from the sea coast. This was practically a death sentence to the ancient mercantile city. Seized with the fury of despair the Carthaginians improvised weapons and, manning their walls, bade defiance to the Romans.
[pg 102]The siege of Carthage: 149–146 B. C. For two years the Romans, owing to the incapacity of their commanders, accomplished little. Then disappointment and apprehension led the Roman people to demand as consul Scipio Aemilianus, who had already distinguished himself as a military tribune. He was only a candidate for the aedileship and legally ineligible for the consulate. But the restrictions upon his candidature were suspended, and he was elected consul for 147 B. C. A special law entrusted him with the conduct of the war in Africa. He restored discipline in the Roman army, defeated the Carthaginians in the field and energetically pressed the siege of the city. The Carthaginians suffered frightfully from hunger and their forces were greatly reduced. In the spring of 146 B. C. the Romans forced their way into the city and captured it after desperate fighting in the streets and houses. The handful of survivors were sold into slavery, their city levelled to the ground and its site declared accursed. Out of the Carthaginian territory the Romans created a new province, called Africa. The last act in the dramatic struggle between the two cities was ended.
The Fourth Macedonian War: 149–148 B. C. The mutual rivalries among the Greek states, which frequently evoked senatorial intervention, and the ill-will occasioned by the harshness of the Romans towards the anti-Roman party everywhere, caused a large faction among the Hellenes to be ready to seize the first favorable opportunity for freeing Greece from Roman suzerainty.
Relying upon this antagonism to Rome, a certain Andriscus, who claimed to be a son of Perseus, appeared in Macedonia in 149 and claimed the throne. He made himself master of the country and defeated the first Roman forces sent against him. However, he was crushed in the following year at Pydna by the praetor Metellus, and Macedonia was recovered. The four republics were not restored but the whole country was organized as a Roman province (148 B. C.).
The Achaeans assert their independence. The Achaean Confederacy was one of the states where the feeling against Rome ran especially high. There the irksomeness of the Roman protectorate was heightened by the return of the survivors of the political exiles [pg 103]of 167, 300 in number. The anti-Roman party, supported by the extreme democratic elements in the cities, was in control of the Confederacy when border difficulties with Sparta broke out afresh in 149 B. C. The matter was referred to the Senate for settlement, but the Achaeans did not await its decision. They attacked and defeated Sparta, confident that the hands of the Romans were tied by the wars in Spain, Africa and Macedonia.
The dissolution of the Confederacy: 146 B. C. The Roman Senate determined to punish the Confederacy by detaching certain important cities from its membership. But in 147 the Achaean assembly tempestuously refused to carry out the orders of the Roman ambassadors, in spite of the fact that the Macedonian revolt had been crushed. Their leaders, expecting no mercy from Rome, prepared for war and they were joined by the Boeotians and other peoples of central Greece. The next year they resolved to attack Sparta, whereupon the Romans sent a fleet and an army against them under the consul Lucius Mummius. Metellus, the conqueror of Macedonia, subdued central Greece and Mummius routed the forces of the Confederacy at Leucopetra on the Isthmus (146 B. C.). Corinth was sacked and burnt; its treasures were carried off to Rome; and its inhabitants sold into slavery. Its land, like that of Carthage, was added to the Roman public domain. Like Alexander’s destruction of Thebes this was a warning which the other cities of Greece could not misinterpret. A senatorial commission dissolved the Achaean Confederacy as well as the similar political combinations of the Boeotians and Phocians, The cities of Greece entered into individual relations with Rome. Those which had stood on the side of Rome, as Athens and Sparta, retained their previous status as Roman allies; the rest were made subject and tributary. Greece was not organized as a province, but was put under the supervision of the governor of Macedonia.
The province of Asia. In 133 B. C. died Attalus III, King of Pergamon, the last of his line. In his will he made the Roman people the heir to his kingdom, probably with the feeling that otherwise disputes over the succession would end in Roman interference and conquest. The Romans accepted the inheritance but before they took [pg 104]possession a claimant appeared in the person of an illegitimate son of Eumenes II, one Aristonicus. He occupied part of the kingdom, defeated and killed the consul Crassus in 131, but was himself beaten and captured by the latter’s successor Perpena in 129.
Out of the kingdom of Pergamon there was then formed the Roman province of Asia (129 B. C.). The occupation of this country made Rome mistress of both shores of the Aegean and gave her a convenient bridgehead for an advance further eastward. The question of the financial administration of Asia and its relation to Roman politics will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.