13. But this is so important a matter, and there have been such monstrous doctrines and projects put forth by Malthus, by the Edinburgh Reviewers, by Lawyer Scarlett, by Lawyer Nolan, by Sturges Bourne, and by an innumerable swarm of persons who have been giving before the House of Commons what they call “evidence:” there have been such monstrous doctrines and projects put forward by these and other persons; and there seems to be such a lurking desire to carry the hostility to the working classes still further, that I think it necessary in order to show, that these English poor-laws, which have been so much calumniated by so many greedy proprietors of land; I think it necessary to show, that these poor-laws are the things which men of property, above all others, ought to wish to see maintained, seeing that, according to the opinions of the greatest and the wisest of men, they must suffer most in consequence of the abolition of those laws; because, by the abolition of those laws, the right given by the laws of nature would revive, and the destitute would take, where they now simply demand (as Blackstone expresses it) in the name of the law. There has been some difference of opinion, as to the question, whether it be theft or no theft; or, rather, whether it be a criminal act, or not a criminal act, for a person, in a case of extreme necessity from want of food, to take food without the assent and even against the will, of the owner. We have, amongst our great lawyers, Sir Matthew Hale and Sir William Blackstone, who contend (though as we shall see, with much feebleness, hesitation, and reservation,) that it is theft, notwithstanding the extremity of the want; but there are many, and much higher authorities, foreign as well as English, on the other side. Before, however, I proceed to the hearing of these authorities, let me take a short view of the origin of the poor laws in England; for that view will convince us, that, though the present law was passed but a little more than two hundred years ago, there had been something to effect the same purpose ever since England had been called England.

14. According to the Common Law of England, as recorded in the Mirrour of Justices, a book which was written before the Norman Conquest; a book in as high reputation, as a law-book, as any one in England; according to this book, Chapter 1st, Section 3d, which treats of the “First constitutions made by the antient kings;” According to this work, provision was made for the sustenance of the poor. The words are these: “It was ordained, that the poor should be sustained by parsons, by rectors of the church, and by the parishioners, so that none of them die for want of sustenance.” Several hundred years later, the canons of the church show, that when the church had become rich, it took upon itself the whole of the care and expense attending the relieving of the poor. These canons, in setting forth the manner in which the tithes should be disposed of, say, “Let the priests set apart the first share for the building and ornaments of the church; let them distribute the second to the poor and strangers, with their own hands, in mercy and humility; and let them reserve the third part for themselves.” This passage is taken from the canons of Elfric, canon 24th. At a later period, when the tithes had, in some places, been appropriated to convents, acts of Parliament were passed, compelling the impropriators to leave, in the hands of their vicar, a sufficiency for the maintenance of the poor. There were two or three acts of this sort passed, one particularly in the twelfth year of Richard the Second, chapter 7th. So that here we have the most ancient book on the Common Law; we have the canons of the church at a later period; we have acts of Parliament at a time when the power and glory of England were at their very highest point; we have all these to tell us, that in England, from the very time that the country took the name, there was always a legal and secure provision for the poor, so that no person, however aged, infirm, unfortunate, or destitute, should suffer from want.

15. But, my friends, a time came when the provision made by the Common Law, by the Canons of the Church, and by the Acts of the Parliament coming in aid of those canons; a time arrived, when all these were rendered null by what is called the Protestant Reformation. This “Reformation,” As it is called, sweeped away the convents, gave a large part of the tithes to greedy courtiers, put parsons with wives and children into the livings, and left the poor without any resource whatsoever. This terrible event, which deprived England of the last of her possessions on the continent of Europe, reduced the people of England to the most horrible misery; from the happiest and best fed and best clad people in the world, it made them the most miserable, the most wretched and ragged of creatures. At last it was seen that, in spite of the most horrible tyranny that ever was exercised in the world, in spite of the racks and the gibbets and the martial law of Queen Elizabeth, those who had amassed to themselves the property out of which the poor had been formerly fed, were compelled to pass a law to raise money, by way of tax, for relieving the necessities of the poor. They had passed many acts before the FORTY-THIRD year of the reign of this Queen Elizabeth; but these acts were all found to be ineffectual, till, at last, in the forty-third year of the reign: of this tyrannical Queen, and in the year of our Lord 1601, that famous act was passed, which has been in force until this day; and which, as I said before, is still in force, notwithstanding all the various attempts of folly and cruelty to get rid of it.

16. Thus, then, the present poor-laws are no new thing. They are no gift to the working people. You hear the greedy landowners everlastingly complaining against this law of Queen Elizabeth. They pretend that it was an unfortunate law. They affect to regard it as a great INNOVATION, seeing that no such law existed before; but, as I have shown, a better law existed before, having the same object in view. I have shown, that the “Reformation,” as it is called, had sweeped away that which had been secured to the poor by the Common Law, by the Canons of the Church, and by ancient Acts of Parliament. There was nothing new, then, in the way of benevolence towards the people, in this celebrated Act of Parliament of the reign of Queen Elizabeth; and the landowners would act wisely by holding their tongues upon the subject; or, if they be too noisy, one may look into their GRANTS, and see if we cannot find something THERE to keep out the present parochial assessments.

17. Having now seen the origin of the present poor-laws, and the justice of their due execution, let us return to those authorities of which I was speaking but now, and an examination into which will show the extreme danger of listening to those projectors who would abolish the poor-laws; that is to say, who would sweep away that provision which was established in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, from a conviction that it was absolutely necessary to preserve the peace of the country and the lives of the people. I observed before that there has been some difference of opinion amongst lawyers as to the question, whether it be, or be not, theft, to take without his consent and against his will, the victuals of another, in order to prevent the taker from starving. Sir Matthew Hale and Sir William Blackstone say that it is theft. I am now going to quote the several authorities on both sides, and it will be necessary for me to indicate the works which I quote from by the words, letters, and figures which are usually made use of in quoting from these works. Some part of what I shall quote will be in Latin: but I shall put nothing in that language of which I will not give you the translation. I beg you to read these quotations with the greatest attention; for you will find, at the end of your reading, that you have obtained great knowledge upon the subject, and knowledge, too, which will not soon depart from your minds.

18. I begin with Sir Matthew Hale, (a Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in the reign of Charles the Second,) who, in his Pleas of the Crown, Chap. IX., has the following passage, which I put in distinct paragraphs, and mark A, B, and C.

19. A. “Some of the casuists, and particularly Covarruvius, Tom. I. De furti et rapinæ restitutione, § 3, 4, p. 473; and Grotius, de jure belli, ac pacis; lib. II. cap. 2. § 6, tell us, that in case of extreme necessity, either of hunger or clothing, the civil distributions of property cease, and by a kind of tacit condition the first community doth return, and upon this those common assertions are grounded: ‘Quicquid necessitas cogit, defendit.’ [Whatever necessity calls for, it justifies.] ‘Necessitas est lex temporis et loci.’ [Necessity is the law of time and place.] ‘In casu extremæ necessitatis omnia sunt communia.’ [In case of extreme necessity, all things are in common;] and, therefore, in such case theft is no theft, or at least not punishable as theft; and some even of our own lawyers have asserted the same; and very bad use hath been made of this concession by some of the Jesuitical casuists of France, who have thereupon advised apprentices and servants to rob their masters, where they have been indeed themselves in want of necessaries, of clothes or victuals; whereof, they tell them, they themselves are the competent judges; and by this means let loose, as much as they can, by their doctrine of probability, all the ligaments of property and civil society.”

20. B. “I do, therefore, take it, that, where persons live under the same civil government, as here in England, that rule, at least by the laws of England, is false; and, therefore, if a person being under necessity for want of victuals, or clothes, shall, upon that account, clandestinely, and ‘animo furandi,’ [with intent to steal,] steal another man’s goods, it is felony, and a crime, by the laws of England, punishable with death; although, the judge before whom the trial is, in this case (as in other cases of extremity) be by the laws of England intrusted with a power to reprieve the offender, before or after judgment, in order to the obtaining the King’s mercy. For, 1st, Men’s properties would be under a strange insecurity, being laid open to other men’s necessities, whereof no man can possibly judge, but the party himself. And, 2nd, Because by the laws of this kingdom [here he refers to the 43 Eliz. cap. 2] sufficient provision is made for the supply of such necessities by collections for the poor, and by the power of the civil magistrate. Consonant hereunto seems to be the law even among the Jews; if we may believe the wisest of kings. Proverbs vi. 30, 31. ‘Men do not despise a thief, if he steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry, but if he be found, he shall restore seven-fold, he shall give all the substance of his house.’ It is true, death among them was not the penalty of theft, yet his necessity gave him no exception from the ordinary punishment inflicted by their law upon that offence.”

21. C. “Indeed this rule, ‘in casu extremæ necessitatis omnia sunt communia,’ does hold, in some measure, in some particular cases, where, by the tacit consent of nations, or of some particular countries or societies, it hath obtained. First, among the Jews, it was lawful in case of hunger to pull ears of standing corn, and eat, (Matt. xii. 1;) and for one to pass through a vineyard, or olive-yard, to gather and eat without carrying away. Deut. xxiii. 24, 25. Second, By the Rhodian law, and the common-maritime custom, if the common provision for the ship’s company fail, the master may, under certain temperaments, break open the private chests of the mariners or passengers, and make a distribution of that particular and private provision for the preservation of the ship’s company.” Vide Consolato del Mare, cap. 256. Le Customes de la Mere, p. 77.

22. Sir William Blackstone agrees, in substance, with Hale; but he is, as we shall presently see, much more eager to establish his doctrine; and, we shall see besides, that he has not scrupled to be guilty of misquoting, and of very shamefully garbling, the Scripture, in order to establish his point. We shall find him flatly contradicting the laws of England; but, he might have spared the Holy Scriptures, which, however, he has not done.

23. To return to Hale, you see he is compelled to begin with acknowledging that there are great authorities against him; and he could not say that Grotius was not one of the most virtuous as well as one of the most learned of mankind. Hale does not know very well what to do with those old sayings about the justification which hard necessity gives: he does not know what to do with the maxim, that, “in case of extreme necessity all things are owned in common.” He is exceedingly puzzled with these ancient authorities, and flies off into prattle rather than argument, and tells us a story about “jesuitical” casuists in France, who advised apprentices and servants to rob their masters, and that they thus “let loose the ligaments of property and civil society.” I fancy that it would require a pretty large portion of that sort of faith which induced this Protestant judge to send witches and wizards to the gallows; a pretty large portion of this sort of faith, to make us believe, that the “casuists of France,” who, doubtless, had servants of their own, would teach servants to rob their masters! In short, this prattle of the judge seems to have been nothing more than one of those Protestant effusions which were too much in fashion at the time when he wrote.

24. He begins his second paragraph, or paragraph B., by saying, that he “takes it” to be so and so; and then comes another qualified expression; he talks of civil government “as here in England.” Then he says, that the rule of Grotius and others, against which he has been contending, “he takes to be false, at least,” says he, “by the laws of England.” After he has made all these qualifications, he then proceeds to say that such taking is theft; that it is felony; and it is a crime which the laws of England punish with death! But, as if stricken with remorse at putting the frightful words upon paper; as if feeling shame for the law and for England itself, he instantly begins to tell us, that the judge who presides at the trial is intrusted, “by the laws of England,” with power to reprieve the offender, in order to the obtaining of the King’s mercy! Thus he softens it down. He will have it to be LAW to put a man to death in such a case; but he is ashamed to leave his readers to believe, that an English judge and an English king WOULD OBEY THIS LAW!

25. Let us now hear the reasons which he gives for this which he pretends to be law. His first reason is, that there would be no security for property, if it were laid open to the necessities of the indigent, of which necessities no man but the takers themselves could be the judge. He talks of a “strange insecurity;” but, upon my word, no insecurity could be half so strange as this assertion of his own. Blackstone has just the same argument. “Nobody,” says he, “would be a judge of the wants of the taker, but the taker himself;” and Blackstone, copying the very words of Hale, talks of the “strange insecurity” arising from this cause. Now, then, suppose a man to come into my house, and to take away a bit of bacon. Suppose me to pursue him and seize him. He would tell me that he was starving for want of food. I hope that the bare statement would induce me, or any man in the world that I do call or ever have called my friend, to let him go without further inquiry; but, if I chose to push the matter further, there would be the magistrate. If he chose to commit the man, would there not be a jury and a judge to receive evidence and to ascertain whether the extreme necessity existed or not?

26. Aye, says Judge Hale; but I have another reason, a devilish deal better than this, “and that is, the act of the 43d year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth!” Aye, my old boy, that is a thumping reason! “Sufficient provision is made for the supply of such necessities by collections for the poor, and by the power of the civil magistrate.” Aye, aye! that is the reason; and, Mr. Sir Matthew Hale, there is no other reason, say what you will about the matter. There stand the overseer and the civil magistrate to take care that such necessities be provided for; and if they did not stand there for that purpose, the law of nature would be revived in behalf of the suffering creature.

27. Hale, not content however with this act of Queen Elizabeth, and still hankering after this hard doctrine, furbishes up a bit of Scripture, and calls Solomon the wisest of kings on account of these two verses which he has taken. Hale observes, indeed, that the Jews did not put thieves to death; but, to restore seven-fold was the ordinary punishment, inflicted by their law, for theft; and here, says he, we see, that the extreme necessity gave no exemption. This was a piece of such flagrant sophistry on the part of Hale, that he could not find in his heart to send it forth to the world without a qualifying observation; but even this qualifying observation left the sophistry still so shameful, that his editor, Mr. Emlyn, who published the work under authority of the House of Commons, did not think it consistent with his reputation to suffer this passage to go forth unaccompanied with the following remark: “But their (the Jews’) ordinary punishment being entirely pecuniary, could affect him only when he was found in a condition to answer it; and therefore the same reasons which could justify that, can, by no means, be extended to a corporal, much less to a capital punishment.” Certainly: and this is the fair interpretation of these two verses of the Proverbs. Puffendorf, one of the greatest authorities that the world knows anything of, observes, upon the argument built upon this text of Scripture, “It may be objected, that, in Proverbs, chap. vi. verses 30, 31, he is called a thief, and pronounced obnoxious to the penalty of theft, who steals to satisfy his hunger; but whoever closely views and considers that text will find that the thief there censured is neither in such extreme necessity as we are now supposing, nor seems to have fallen into his needy condition merely by ill fortune, without his own idleness or default: for the context implies, that he had a house and goods sufficient to make seven-fold restitution; which he might have either sold or pawned; a chapman or creditor being easily to be met with in times of plenty and peace; for we have no grounds to think that the fact there mentioned is supposed to be committed, either in time of war, or upon account of the extraordinary price of provisions.”

28. Besides this, I think it is clear that these two verses of the Proverbs do not apply to one and the same person; for in the first verse it is said, that men do not despise a thief if he steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry. How, then, are we to reconcile this with morality? Are we not to despise a thief? It is clear that the word thief does not apply to the first case; but to the second case only; and that the distinction was here made for the express purpose of preventing the man who took food to relieve his hunger from being confounded with the thief. Upon any other interpretation, it makes the passage contain nonsense and immorality; and, indeed, Grotius says that the latter text does not apply to the person mentioned in the former. The latter text could not mean a man taking food from necessity. It is impossible that it can mean that; because the man who was starving for want of food could not have seven-fold; could not have any substance in his house. But what are we to think of Judge Blackstone, who, in his Book IV., chap. 2, really garbles these texts of Scripture. He clearly saw the effect of the expression, “MEN DO NOT DESPISE;” he saw what an awkward figure these words made, coming before the words “A THIEF;” he saw that, with these words in the text, he could never succeed in making his readers believe that a man ought to be hanged for taking food to save his life. He clearly saw that he could not make men believe that God had said this, unless he could, somehow or other, get rid of those words about NOT DESPISING the thief that took victuals when he was hungry. Being, therefore, very much pestered and annoyed by these words about NOT DESPISING, what does he do but fairly leave them out! And not only leave them out, but leave out a part of both the verses, keeping in that part of each that suited him, and no more; nay, further, leaving out one word, and putting in another, giving a sense to the whole which he knew well never was intended. He states the passage to be this: “If a thief steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry, he shall restore seven-fold, and shall give all the substance of his house.” No broomstick that ever was handled would have been too heavy or too rough for the shoulders of this dirty-souled man. Hale, with all his desire to make out a case in favour of severity, has given us the words fairly: but this shuffling fellow; this smooth-spoken and mean wretch, who is himself thief enough, God knows, if stealing other men’s thoughts and words constitute theft; this intolerably mean reptile has, in the first place, left out the words “men do not despise:” then he has left out the words at the beginning of the next text, “but if he be found.” Then in place of the “he,” which comes before the words “shall give” he puts the word “and;” and thus he makes the whole apply to the poor creature that takes to satisfy his soul when he is hungry! He leaves out every mitigating word of the Scripture; and, in his reference, he represents the passage to be in one verse! Perhaps, even in the history of the conduct of crown-lawyers, there is not to be found mention of an act so coolly bloody-minded as this. It has often been said of this Blackstone, that he not only lied himself, but made others lie; he has here made, as far as he was able, a liar of King Solomon himself: he has wilfully garbled the Holy Scripture; and that, too, for the manifest purpose of justifying cruelty in courts and judges; for the manifest purpose of justifying the most savage oppression of the poor.

29. After all, Hale has not the courage to send forth this doctrine of his, without allowing that the case of extreme necessity does, “in some measure,” and “in particular cases,” and, “by the tacit or silent consent of nations,” hold good! What a crowd of qualifications is here! With what reluctance he confesses that which all the world knows to be true, that the disciples of Jesus Christ pulled off, without leave, the ears of standing corn, and ate them “being an hungered.” And here are two things to observe upon. In the first place this corn was not what we call corn here in England, or else it would have been very droll sort of stuff to crop off and eat. It was what the Americans call Indian corn, what the French call Turkish corn; and what is called corn (as being far surpassing all other in excellence) in the Eastern countries where the Scriptures were written. About four or five ears of this corn, of which you strip all the husk off in a minute, are enough for a man’s breakfast or dinner; and by about the middle of August this corn is just as wholesome and as efficient as bread. So that, this was something to take and eat without the owner’s leave; it was something of value; and observe, that the Pharisees, though so strongly disposed to find fault with everything that was done by Jesus Christ and his disciples, did not find fault of their taking the corn to eat; did not call them thieves; did not propose to punish them for theft; but found fault of them only for having plucked the corn on the Sabbath-day! To pluck the corn was to do work, and these severe critics found fault of this working on the Sabbath-day. Then, out comes another fact, which Hale might have noticed if he had chosen it; namely, that our Saviour reminds the Pharisees that “David and his companions, being an hungered, entered into the House of God, and did eat the show-bread, to eat which was unlawful in any-body but the priests.” Thus, that which would have been sacrilege under any other circumstances; that which would have been one of the most horrible of crimes against the law of God, became no crime at all when committed by a person pressed by hunger.

30. Nor has Judge Hale fairly interpreted the two verses of Deuteronomy. He represents the matter thus: that, if you be passing through a vineyard or an olive-yard you may gather and eat, without being deemed a thief. This interpretation would make an Englishman believe that the Scripture allowed of this taking and eating, only where there was a lawful foot-way through the vineyard. This is a very gross misrepresentation of the matter; for if you look at the two texts, you will find, that they say that, “when thou comest into;” that is to say, when thou enterest or goest into, “thy neighbour’s vineyard, then thou mayest eat grapes thy fill at thine own pleasure, but thou shalt not put any in thy vessel;” that is to say, that you should not go and make wine in his vineyard and carry it away. Then in case of the corn, precisely the same law is laid down. You may pluck with your hand; but not use the hook or a sickle. Nothing can be plainer than this: no distinction can be wiser, nor more just. Hale saw the force of it; and therefore, as these texts made very strongly against him, he does not give them at full length, but gives us a misrepresenting abbreviation.

31. He had, however, too much regard for his reputation to conclude without acknowledging the right of seizing on the provisions of others at sea. He allows that private chests may be broken open to prevent men from dying with hunger at sea. He does not stop to tell us why men’s lives are more precious on sea than on land. He does not attempt to reconcile these liberties given by the Scripture, and by the maritime laws, with his own hard doctrine. In short, he brings us to this at last: that he will not acknowledge, that it is not theft to take another man’s goods, without his consent, under any circumstances; but, while he will not acknowledge this, he plainly leaves us to conclude, that no English judge and no English king will ever punish a poor creature that takes victuals to save himself from perishing; and he plainly leaves us to conclude, that it is the poor-laws of England; that it is their existence and their due execution, which deprive everybody in England of the right to take food and raiment in case of extreme necessity.

32. Here I agree with him most cordially; and it is because I agree with him in this, that I deprecate the abominable projects of those who would annihilate the poor-laws, seeing that it is those very poor-laws which give, under all circumstances, really legal security to property. Without them, cases must frequently arise, which would, according to the law of nature, according to the law of God, and as we shall see before we have done, according to the law of England, bring us into a state, or, at least, bring particular persons into a state, which as far as related to them, would cause the law of nature to revive, and to make all things to be owned in common. To adhere, then, to these poor-laws; to cause them to be duly executed, to prevent every encroachment upon them, to preserve them as the apple of our eye, are the duty of every Englishman, as far as he has capacity so to do.

33. I have, my friends, cited, as yet, authorities only on one side of this great subject, which it was my wish to discuss in this one Number. I find that to be impossible without leaving undone much more than half my work. I am extremely anxious to cause this matter to be well understood, not only by the working classes, but by the owners of the land and the magistrates. I deem it to be of the greatest possible importance; and, while writing on it, I address myself to you, because I most sincerely declare that I have a greater respect for you than for any other body of persons that I know any thing of. The next Number will conclude the discussion of the subject. The whole will lie in a very small compass. Sixpence only will be the cost of it. It will creep about, by degrees, over the whole of this kingdom. All the authorities, all the arguments, will be brought into this small compass; and I do flatter myself that many months will not pass over our heads, before all but misers and madmen will be ashamed to talk of abolishing the poor-rates and of supporting the needy by grants and subscriptions.

I am,
Your faithful friend and
Most obedient servant,
Wm. Cobbett.

NUMBER II.

34. In the last Number, paragraph 33, I told you, that I would, in the present Number, conclude the discussion of the great question of theft, or no theft, in a case of taking another’s goods without his consent, or against his will, the taker being pressed by extreme necessity. I laid before you; in the last Number, Judge Hale’s doctrine upon the subject; and I there mentioned the foul conduct of Blackstone, the author of the “Commentaries on the Laws of England.” I will not treat this unprincipled lawyer, this shocking court sycophant; I will not treat him as he has treated King Solomon and the Holy Scriptures; I will not garble, misquote, and belie him, as he garbled, misquoted, and belied them; I will give the whole of the passage to which I allude, and which my readers may find in the Fourth Book of his Commentaries. I request you to read it with great attention; and to compare it, very carefully, with the passage that I have quoted from Sir Matthew Hale, which you will find in paragraphs from 19 to 21 inclusive. The passage from Blackstone is as follows:

35. “There is yet another case of necessity, which has occasioned great speculation among the writers upon general law; viz., whether a man in extreme want of food or clothing may justify stealing either, to relieve his present necessities. And this both Grotius and Puffendorf, together with many other of the foreign jurists, hold in the affirmative; maintaining by many ingenious, humane, and plausible reasons, that in such cases the community of goods by a kind of tacit concession of society is revived. And some even of our own lawyers have held the same; though it seems to be an unwarranted doctrine, borrowed from the notions of some civilians: at least it is now antiquated, the law of England admitting no such excuse at present. And this its doctrine is agreeable not only to the sentiments of many of the wisest ancients, particularly Cicero, who holds that ‘suum cuique incommodum ferendum est, potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum;’ but also to the Jewish law, as certified by King Solomon himself: ‘If a thief steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry, he shall restore seven-fold, and shall give all the substance of his house:’ which was the ordinary punishment for theft in that kingdom. And this is founded upon the highest reason: for men’s properties would be under a strange insecurity, if liable to be invaded according to the wants of others; of which wants no man can possibly be an adequate judge, but the party himself who pleads them. In this country especially, there would be a peculiar impropriety in admitting so dubious an excuse; for by our laws such a sufficient provision is made for the poor by the power of the civil magistrate, that it is impossible that the most needy stranger should ever be reduced to the necessity of thieving to support nature. This case of a stranger is, by the way, the strongest instance put by Baron Puffendorf, and whereon he builds his principal arguments; which, however they may hold upon the continent, where the parsimonious industry of the natives orders every one to work or starve, yet must lose all their weight and efficacy in England, where charity is reduced to a system, and interwoven in our very constitution. Therefore, our laws ought by no means to be taxed with being unmerciful, for denying this privilege to the necessitous; especially when we consider, that the king, on the representation of his ministers of justice, hath a power to soften the law, and to extend mercy in cases of peculiar hardship. An advantage which is wanting in many states, particularly those which are democratical: and these have in its stead introduced and adopted, in the body of the law itself, a multitude of circumstances tending to alleviate its rigour. But the founders of our constitution thought it better to vest in the crown the power of pardoning peculiar objects of compassion, than to countenance and establish theft by one general undistinguishing law.”

36. First of all, I beg you to observe, that this passage is merely a flagrant act of theft, committed upon Judge Hale; next, you perceive, that which I noticed in paragraph 28, a most base and impudent garbling of the Scriptures. Next, you see, that Blackstone, like Hale, comes, at last, to the poor-laws; and tells us that to take other men’s goods without leave, is theft, because “charity is here reduced to a system, and interwoven in our very constitution.” That is to say, to relieve the necessitous; to prevent their suffering from want; completely to render starvation impossible, makes a part of our very constitution. “THEREFORE, our laws ought by no means to be taxed with being unmerciful for denying this privilege to the necessitous.” Pray mark the word therefore. You see, our laws, he says, are not to be taxed with being unmerciful in deeming the necessitous taker a thief. And why are they not to be deemed unmerciful? BECAUSE the laws provide effectual relief for the necessitous. It follows, then, of course, even according to Blackstone himself, that if the Constitution had not provided this effectual relief for the necessitous, then the laws would have been unmerciful in deeming the necessitous taker a thief.

37. But now let us hear what that Grotius and that Puffendorf say; let us hear what these great writers on the law of nature and of nations say upon this subject. Blackstone has mentioned the names of them both; but he has not thought proper to notice their arguments, much less has he attempted to answer them. They are two of the most celebrated men that ever wrote; and their writings are referred to as high authority, with regard to all the subjects of which they have treated. The following is a passage from Grotius, on War and Peace, Book II., chap. 2.

38. “Let us see, further, what common right there appertains to men in those things which have already become the property of individuals. Some persons, perchance, may consider it strange to question this, as proprietorship seems to have absorbed all that right which arose out of a state of things in common. But it is not so. For, it is to be considered, what was the intention of those who first introduced private property, which we may suppose to have been such, as to deviate as little as possible from natural equity. For if even written laws are to be construed in that sense, as far as it is practicable, much more so are customs, which are not fettered by the chains of writers.—Hence it follows, first, that, in case of extreme necessity, the pristine right of using things revives, as much as if they had remained in common; because, in all human laws, as well as in the law of private property, this case of extreme necessity appears to have been excepted.—So, if the means of sustenance, as in case of a sea-voyage, should chance to fail, that which any individual may have, should be shared in common. And thus, a fire having broken out, I am justified in destroying the house of my neighbour, in order to preserve my own house; and I may cut in two the ropes or cords amongst which any ship is driven, if it cannot be otherwise disentangled. All which exceptions are not made in the written law, but are presumed.—For the opinion has been acknowledged amongst Divines, that, if any one, in such case of necessity, take from another person what is requisite for the preservation of his life, he does not commit a theft. The meaning of which definition is not, as many contend, that the proprietor of the thing be bound to give to the needy upon the principle of charity; but, that all things distinctly vested in proprietors ought to be regarded as such with a certain benign acknowledgment of the primitive right. For if the original distributors of things were questioned, as to what they thought about this matter, they would reply what I have said. Necessity, says Father Seneca, the great excuse for human weakness, breaks every law; that is to say, human law, or law made after the manner of man.”

39. “But cautions ought to be had, for fear this license should be abused: of which the principal is, to try, in every way, whether the necessity can be avoided by any other means; for instance, by making application to the magistrate, or even by trying whether the use of the thing can, by entreaties, be obtained from the proprietor. Plato permits water to be fetched from the well of a neighbour upon this condition alone, that the person asking for such permission shall dig in his own well in search of water as far as the chalk: and Solon, that he shall dig in his own well as far as forty cubits. Upon which Plutarch adds, that he judged that necessity was to be relieved, not laziness to be encouraged.”

40. Such is the doctrine of this celebrated civilian. Let us now hear Puffendorf; and you will please to bear in mind, that both these writers are of the greatest authority upon all subjects connected with the laws of nature and of nations. We read in their works the result of an age of study: they have been two of the great guides of mankind ever since they wrote: and, we are not to throw them aside, in order to listen exclusively to Parson Hay, to Hulton of Hulton, or to Nicholas Grimshaw. They tell us what they, and what other wise men, deemed to be right; and, as we shall by and by see, the laws of England, so justly boasted of by our ancestors, hold precisely the same language with these celebrated men. After the following passage from Puffendorf, I shall show you what our own lawyers say upon the subject; but I request you to read the following passage with the greatest attention.

41. “Let us inquire, in the next place, whether the necessity of preserving our life can give us any right over other men’s goods, so as to make it allowable for us to seize on them for our relief, either secretly, or by open force, against the owner’s consent. For the more clear and solid determination of which point, we think it necessary to hint in short on the causes upon which distinct properties were first introduced in the world; designing to examine them more at large in their proper place. Now the main reasons on which properties are founded, we take to be these two; that the feuds and quarrels might be appeased which arose in the primitive communion of things, and that men might be put under a kind of necessity of being industrious, every one being to get his maintenance by his own application and labour. This division, therefore, of goods, was not made, that every person should sit idly brooding over the share of wealth he had got, without assisting or serving his fellows; but that any one might dispose of his things how he pleased; and if he thought fit to communicate them to others, he might, at least, be thus furnished with an opportunity of laying obligations on the rest of mankind. Hence, when properties were once established, men obtained a power, not only of exercising commerce to their mutual advantage and gain, but likewise of dispensing more largely in the works of humanity and beneficence; whence their diligence had procured them a greater share of goods than others: whereas before, when all things lay in common, men could lend one another no assistance but what was supplied by their corporeal ability, and could be charitable of nothing but of their strength. Further, such is the force of property, that the proprietor hath a right of delivering his goods with his own hands; even such as he is obliged to give to others. Whence it follows, that when one man has anything owing from another, he is not presently to seize on it at a venture, but ought to apply himself to the owner, desiring to receive it from his disposal. Yet in case the other party refuse thus to make good his obligation, the power and privilege of property doth not reach so far as that the things may not be taken away without the owner’s consent, either by the authority of the magistrate in civil communities, or in a state of nature, by violence and hostile force. And though in regard to bare Natural Right, for a man to relieve another in extremity with his goods, for which he himself hath not so much occasion, be a duty obliging only imperfectly, and not in the manner of a debt, since it arises wholly from the virtue of humanity; yet there seems to be no reason why, by the additional force of a civil ordinance, it may not be turned into a strict and perfect obligation. And this Seldon observes to have been done among the Jews; who, upon a man’s refusing to give such alms as were proper for him, could force him to it by an action at law. It is no wonder, therefore, that they should forbid their poor, on any account, to seize on the goods of others, enjoining them to take only what private persons, or the public officers, or stewards of alms, should give them on their petition. Whence the stealing of what was another’s, though upon extreme necessity, passed in that state for theft or rapine. But now supposing under another government the like good provision is not made for persons in want, supposing likewise that the covetous temper of men of substance cannot be prevailed on to give relief, and that the needy creature is not able, either by his work or service, or by making sale of anything that he possesses, to assist his present necessity, must he, therefore, perish with famine? Or can any human institution bind me with such a force that, in case another man neglects his duty towards me, I must rather die, than recede a little from the ordinary and regular way of acting? We conceive, therefore, that such a person doth not contract the guilt of theft, who happening, not through his own fault, to be in extreme want, either of necessary food, or of clothes to preserve him from the violence of the weather, and cannot obtain them from the voluntary gift of the rich, either by urgent entreaties, or by offering somewhat equivalent in price, or by engaging to work it out, shall either forcibly or privily relieve himself out of their abundance; especially if he do it with full intention to pay the value of them whenever his better fortune gives him ability. Some men deny that such a case of necessity, as we speak of, can possibly happen. But what if a man should wander in a foreign land, unknown, friendless, and in want, spoiled of all he had by shipwreck, or by robbers, or having lost by some casualty whatever he was worth in his own country; should none be found willing either to relieve his distress, or to hire his service, or should they rather (as it commonly happens,) seeing him in a good garb, suspect him to beg without reason, must the poor creature starve in this miserable condition?”

42. Many other great foreign authorities might be referred to, and I cannot help mentioning Covarruvius, who is spoken of by Judge Hale, and who expresses himself upon the subject in these words: “The reason why a man in extreme necessity may, without incurring the guilt of theft or rapine, forcibly take the goods of others for his present relief, is because his condition renders all things common. For it is the ordinance and institution of nature itself, that inferior things should be designed and directed to serve the necessities of men. Wherefore the division of goods afterwards introduced into the world doth not derogate from that precept of natural reason, which Suggests, that the extreme wants of mankind may be in any manner removed by the use of temporal possessions.” Puffendorf tells us, that Peresius maintains, that, in case of extreme necessity, a man is compelled to the action, by a force which he cannot resist; and then, that the owner’s consent may be presumed on, because humanity obliges him to succour those who are in distress. The same writer cites a passage from St. Ambrose, one of the Fathers of the church, which alleges that (in case of refusing to give to persons in extreme necessity) it is the person who retains the goods who is guilty of the act of wrong doing, for St. Ambrose says; “it is the bread of the hungry which you detain; it is the raiment of the naked which you lock up.”

43. Before I come to the English authorities on the same side, let me again notice the foul dealing of Blackstone; let me point out another instance or two of the insincerity of this English court-sycophant, who was, let it be noted, Solicitor-general to the queen of the “good old King.” You have seen, in paragraph 28, a most flagrant instance of his perversion of the Scriptures. He garbles the word of God, and prefaces the garbling by calling it a thing “certified by King Solomon himself;” and this word certified he makes use of just when he is about to begin the scandalous falsification of the text which he is referring to. Never was anything more base. But, the whole extent of the baseness we have not yet seen; for, Blackstone had read Hale, who had quoted the two verses fairly; but besides this, he had read Puffendorf, who had noticed very fully this text of Scripture, and who had shown very clearly that it did not at all make in favour of the doctrine of Blackstone. Blackstone ought to have given the argument of Puffendorf; he ought to have given the whole of his argument; but particularly he ought to have given this explanation of the passage in the Proverbs, which explanation I have inserted in paragraph 27. It was also the height of insincerity in Blackstone, to pretend that the passage from Cicero had anything at all to do with the matter. He knew well that it had not; he knew that Cicero contemplated no case of extreme necessity for want of food or clothing; but, he had read Puffendorf, and Puffendorf had told him, that Cicero’s was a question of the mere conveniences and inconveniences of life in general; and not a question of pinching hunger or shivering nakedness. Blackstone had seen his fallacy exposed by Puffendorf; he had seen the misapplication of this passage of Cicero fully exposed by Puffendorf; and yet the base court-sycophant trumped it up again, without mentioning Puffendorf’s exposure of the fallacy! In short this Blackstone, upon this occasion, as upon almost all others, has gone all lengths; has set detection and reproof at defiance, for the sake of making his court to the government by inculcating harshness in the application of the law, and by giving to the law such an interpretation as would naturally tend to justify that harshness.

44. Let us now cast away from us this insincere sycophant, and turn to other law authorities of our own country. The Mirrour of Justices, (quoted by me in paragraph 14,) Chap. 4, Section 16, on the subject of arrest of judgment of death, has this passage. Judgment is to be staid in seven cases here specified: and the seventh is this: “in POVERTY, in which case you are to distinguish of the poverty of the offender, or of things; for if poor people, to avoid famine, take victuals to sustain their lives, or clothes that they die not of cold, (so that they perish if they keep not themselves from cold,) they are not to be adjudged to death, if it were not in their power to have bought their victuals or clothes; for as much as they are warranted so to do by the law of nature.” Now, my friends, you will observe, that I take this from a book which may almost be called the BIBLE of the law. There is no lawyer who will deny the goodness of this authority; or who will attempt to say that this was not always the law of England.

45. Our next authority is one quite as authentic, and almost as ancient. The book goes by the name of Britton, which was the name of a Bishop of Hereford, who edited it, in the famous reign of Edward the first. The book does, in fact, contain the laws of the kingdom as they existed at that time. It may be called the record of the laws of Edward the First. It begins thus, “Edward by the grace of God, King of England and Lord of Ireland, to all his liege subjects, peace, and grace of salvation.” The preamble goes on to state, that people cannot be happy without good laws; that even good laws are of no use unless they be known and understood; and that, therefore, the king has ordered the laws of England thus to be written and recorded. This book is very well known to be of the greatest authority, amongst lawyers, and in Chap. 10 of this book, in which the law describes what constitutes a BURGLAR, or house-breaker, and the punishment that he shall suffer (which is that of death,) there is this passage: “Those are to be deemed burglars who feloniously, in time of peace, break into churches or houses, or through walls or doors of our cities, or our boroughs; with exception of children under age, and of poor people who for hunger, enter to take any sort of victuals of less value than twelve pence; and except idiots and mad people, and others that cannot commit felony.” Thus, you see, this agrees with the Mirrour of Justices, and with all that we have read before from these numerous high authorities. But this, taken in its full latitude, goes a great length indeed; for a burglar is a breaker-in by night. So that this is not only a taking; but a breaking into a house in order to take! And observe, it is taking to the value of twelve pence; and twelve pence then was the price of a couple of sheep, and of fine fat sheep too; nay, twelve pence was the price of an ox, in this very reign of Edward the First. So that, a hungry man might have a pretty good belly-full in those days without running the risk of punishment. Observe, by-the-by, how time has hardened the law. We are told of the dark ages, of the barbarous customs, of our forefathers: and we have a Sir James Mackintosh to receive and to present petitions innumerable, from the most tender hearted creatures in the world, about “softening the criminal code;” but, not a word do they ever say about a softening of this law, which now hangs a man for stealing the value of a RABBIT, and which formerly did not hang him till he stole the value of an OX! Curious enough, but still more scandalous, that we should have the impudence to talk of our humanity, and our civilization, and of the barbarousness of our forefathers. But, if a part of the ancient law remain, shall not the whole of it remain? If we hang the thief, still hang the thief for stealing to the value of twelve pence; though the twelve pence now represents a rabbit instead of an ox; if we still do this, would Blackstone take away the benefit of the ancient law from the starving man? The passage that I have quoted is of such great importance as to this question, that I think it necessary to add, here, a copy of the original, which is in the old Norman-French, of which I give the translation above. “Sunt tenus burgessours trestous ceux, que felonisement en temps de pees debrusent esglises ou auter mesons, ou murs, ou portes de nos cytes, ou de nos burghes; hors pris enfauntz dedans age, et poures, que, pur feyn, entrêt pur ascun vitaille de meindre value q’de xii deners, et hors pris fous nastres, et gens arrages, et autres que seuent nule felonie faire.”

46. After this, lawyers, at any rate, will not attempt to gainsay. If there should, however, remain any one to affect to doubt of the soundness of this doctrine, let them take the following from him who is always called the “pride of philosophy,” the “pride of English learning,” and whom the poet Pope calls “greatest and wisest of mankind.” It is Lord Bacon of whom I am speaking. He was Lord High Chancellor in the reign of James the First; and, let it be observed, that he wrote those “law tracts,” from which I am about to quote, long after the present poor-laws had been established. He says (Law Tracts, page 55,) “The law chargeth no man with default where the act is compulsory and not voluntary, and where there is not consent and election; and, therefore, if either there be an impossibility for a man to do otherwise, or so great a perturbation of the judgment and reason, as in presumption of law a man’s nature cannot overcome, such necessity carrieth a privilege in itself.—Necessity is of three sorts: necessity of conservation of life; necessity of obedience; and necessity of the act of God or of a stranger.—First, of conservation of life; if a man steal viands (victuals) to satisfy his present hunger, this is no felony nor larceny.”

47. If any man want more authority, his heart must be hard indeed; he must have an uncommonly anxious desire to take away by the halter the life that sought to preserve itself against hunger. But, after all, what need had we of any authorities? What need had we even of reason upon the subject? Who is there upon the face of the earth, except the monsters that come from across the channel of St. George; who is there upon the face of the earth, except those monsters, that have the brass, the hard hearts and the brazen faces, which enable them coolly to talk of the “MERIT” of the degraded creatures, who, amidst an abundance of food, amidst a “superabundance of food,” lie quietly down and receive the extreme unction, and expire with hunger? Who, upon the face of the whole earth, except these monsters, these ruffians by way of excellence; who, except these, the most insolent and hard-hearted ruffians that ever lived, will contend, or will dare to think, that there ought to be any force under heaven to compel a man to lie down at the door of a baker’s and butcher’s shop, and expire with hunger! The very nature of man makes him shudder at the thought. There want no authorities; no appeal to law books; no arguments; no questions of right or wrong: that same human nature that tells me that I am not to cut my neighbour’s throat, and drink his blood, tells me that I am not to make him die at my feet by keeping from him food or raiment of which I have more than I want for my own preservation.

48. Talk of barbarians, indeed; Talk of “the dark and barbarous ages.” Why, even in the days of the Druids, such barbarity as that of putting men to death, or of punishing them for taking to relieve their hunger, was never thought of. In the year 1811, the Rev. Peter Roberts, A. M. published a book, entitled Collectanea Cambrica. In the first volume of that book, there is an account of the laws of the Ancient Britons. Hume, and other Scotchmen, would make us believe, that the ancient inhabitants of this country were a set of savages, clothed in skins and the like. The laws of this people were collected and put into writing, in the year 694 before Christ. The following extract from these laws shows, that the moment civil society began to exist, that moment the law took care that people should not be starved to death. That moment it took care, that provision should be made for the destitute, or that, in cases of extreme necessity, men were to preserve themselves from death by taking from those who had to spare. The words of these laws (as applicable to our case) given by Mr. Roberts, are as follows:—“There are three distinct kinds of personal individual property, which cannot be shared with another, or surrendered in payment of fine; viz., a wife, a child, and argyfrew. By the word argyfrew is meant, clothes, arms, or the implements of a lawful calling. For without these a man has not the means of support, and it would be unjust in the law to unman a man, or to uncall a man as to his calling.” Triad 53d.—“Three kinds of THIEVES are not to be punished with Death. 1. A wife, who joins with her husband in theft. 2. A youth under age. And 3. One who, after he has asked, in vain, for support, in three towns, and at nine houses in each town.” Triad 137.

49. There were, then, houses and towns, it seems; and the towns were pretty thickly spread too; and, as to “civilization” and “refinement,” let this law relative to a youth under age, be compared with the new orchard and garden law, and with the tread-mill affair, and new trespass law!

50. We have a law, called the Vagrant Act, to punish men for begging. We have a law to punish men for not working to keep their families. Now, with what show of justice can these laws be maintained? They are founded upon this; the first, that begging is disgraceful to the country; that it is degrading to the character of man, and, of course, to the character of an Englishman; and, that there is no necessity for begging, because the law has made ample provision for every person in distress. The law for punishing men for not working to maintain their families is founded on this, that they are doing wrong to their neighbours; their neighbours, that is to say, the parish, being bound to keep the family, if they be not kept by the man’s labour; and, therefore, his not labouring is a wrong done to the parish. The same may be said with regard to the punishment for not maintaining bastard children. There is some reason for these laws, as long as the poor-laws are duly executed; as long as the poor are duly relieved, according to law; but, unless the poor-laws exist; unless they be in full force; unless they be duly executed; unless efficient and prompt relief be given to necessitous persons, these acts, and many others approaching to a similar description, are acts of barefaced and most abominable tyranny. I should say that they would be acts of such tyranny; for generally speaking, the poor-laws are, as yet, fairly executed, and efficient as to their object.

51. The law of this country is, that every man, able to carry arms, is liable to be called on, to serve in the militia, or to serve as a soldier in some way or other, in order to defend the country. What, then, the man has no land; he has no property beyond his mere body, and clothes, and tools; he has nothing that an enemy can take away from him. What justice is there, then, in calling upon this man to take up arms and risk his life in the defence of the land: what is the land to him? I say, that it is something to him; I say, that he ought to be called forth to assist to defend the land; because, however poor he may be, he has a share in the land, through the poor-rates; and if he be liable to be called forth to defend the land, the land is always liable to be taxed for his support. This is what I say: my opinions are consistent with reason, with justice, and with the law of the land; but, how can Malthus and his silly and nasty disciples; how can those who want to abolish the poor-rates or to prevent the poor from marrying; how can this at once stupid and conceited tribe look the labouring man in the face, while they call upon him to take up arms, to risk his life, in defence of the land? Grant that the poor-laws are just; grant that every necessitous creature has a right to demand relief from some parish or other; grant that the law has most effectually provided that every man shall be protected against the effects of hunger and of cold; grant these, and then the law which compels the man without house or land to take up arms and risk his life in defence of the country, is a perfectly just law; but, deny to the necessitous that legal and certain relief of which I have been speaking; abolish the poor laws; and then this military-service law becomes an act of a character such as I defy any pen or tongue to describe.

52. To say another word upon the subject is certainly unnecessary; but we live in days when “stern necessity” has so often been pleaded for most flagrant departures from the law of the land, that one cannot help asking, whether there were any greater necessity to justify Addington for his deeds of 1817 than there would be to justify a starving man in taking a loaf? Addington pleaded necessity, and he got a Bill of Indemnity. And, shall a starving man be hanged, then, if he take a loaf to save himself from dying? When Six Acts were before the Parliament, the proposers and supporters of them never pretended that they did not embrace a most dreadful departure from the ancient laws of the land. In answer to Lord Holland, who had dwelt forcibly on this departure from the ancient law, the Lord Chancellor, unable to contradict Lord Holland, exclaimed, “Salus populi suprema lex,” that is to say “The salvation of the people is the first law.” Well, then, if the salvation of the people be the first law, the salvation of life is really and bona fide the salvation of the people; and, if the ordinary laws may be dispensed with, in order to obviate a possible and speculative danger, surely they may be dispensed with, in cases where to dispense with them is visibly, demonstrably, notoriously, necessary to the salvation of the lives of the people: surely, bread is as necessary to the lips of the starving man, as a new law could be necessary to prevent either house of parliament from being brought into contempt; and surely, therefore, Salus populi suprema lex may come from the lips of the famishing people with as much propriety as they came from those of the Lord Chancellor!

53. Again, however, I observe, and with this I conclude, that we have nothing to do but to adhere to the poor-laws which we have; that the poor have nothing to do, but to apply to the overseer, or to appeal from him to the magistrate; that the magistrate has nothing to do but duly to enforce the law; and that the government has nothing to do, in order to secure the peace of the country, amidst all the difficulties that are approaching, great and numerous as they are; that it has nothing to do, but to enjoin on the magistrates to do their duty according to our excellent law; and, at the same time, the government ought to discourage, by all the means in their power, all projects for maintaining the poor by any other than legal means; to discourage all begging-box affairs; all miserable expedients; and also to discourage, and, where it is possible, fix its mark of reprobation upon all those detestable projectors, who are hatching schemes for what is called, in the blasphemous slang of the day, “checking the surplus population” who are hatching schemes for preventing the labouring people from having children: who are about spreading their nasty beastly publications; who are hatching schemes of emigration; and who, in short, seem to be doing every-thing in their power to widen the fearful breach that has already been made between the poor and the rich. The government has nothing to do but to cause the law to be honestly enforced; and then we shall see no starvation, and none of those dreadful conflicts which the fear of want, as well as actual want, never fail to produce. The bare thought of forced emigration to a foreign state, including, as it must, a transfer of all allegiance, which is contrary to the fundamental laws of England; or, exposing every emigrating person to the danger of committing high treason; the very thought of such a measure, having become necessary in England, is enough to make an Englishman mad. But, of these projects, these scandalous nasty beastly and shameless projects, we shall have time to speak hereafter; and in the mean while, I take my leave of you, for the present, by expressing my admiration of the sensible and spirited conduct of the people of Stockport, when an attempt was, on the 5th of September, made to cheat them into an address, applauding the conduct of the Ministers! What! Had the people of Stockport so soon forgotten 16th of August! Had they so soon forgotten their townsman, Joseph Swan! If they had, they would have deserved to perish to all eternity. Oh, no! It was a proposition very premature: it will be quite soon enough for the good and sensible and spirited fellows of Stockport; quite soon enough to address the Ministers, when the Ministers shall have proposed a repeal of the several Jubilee measures, called Ellenborough’s law; the poacher-transporting law; the sun-set and sun-rise transportation law; the tread-mill law; the select-vestry law; the Sunday-toll laws; the new trespass law; the new treason law; the seducing-soldier-hanging law; the new apple-felony law; the SIX ACTS; and a great number of others, passed in the reign of Jubilee. Quite soon enough to applaud, that is, for the sensible people of Stockport to applaud, the Ministers, when those Ministers have proposed to repeal these laws, and, also, to repeal the malt tax, and those other taxes, which take, even from the pauper, one half of what the parish gives him to keep the breath warm in his body. Quite soon enough to applaud the Ministers, when they have done these things; and when in addition to all these, they shall have openly proposed a radical reform of the Commons House of Parliament. Leaving them to do this as soon as they like, and trusting, that you will never, on any account, applaud them until they do it, I, expressing here my best thanks to Mr. Blackshaw, who defeated the slavish scheme at Stockport, remain,

Your faithful friend,
and most obedient servant,
Wm. Cobbett.