The topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished without an examination of the celebrated dictum, "To think is to condition." Those who have held this to be universally true, have also received its logical sequence, that to the finite intellect God cannot appear self-comprehending. In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not a universal, but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, to circumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall best enter upon this labor by answering the question, What is thinking?
First. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is called thinking. Second. Specifically, all acts of reflection are thinkings. Under this head we notice two points. a. That act of the Understanding in which an object presented by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and generic elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations determined, is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I distinguish specifically that it is domestic, and generically that it is carnivorous. b. That act of the finite spiritual person by which he compares the judgments of the Understanding with the a priori laws of the Pure Reason, and by this final standard decides their truth or error. Thus, the judgment of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought to hunt down and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The standard of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is found to involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, the intuitions of the reason. These, in the finite person, come after a process of reflection, and are partly consequent upon it; yet they take place in another faculty, which is developed by this process; but they are such, that by no process of reflection alone could they be. Thinking, in the Universal Genius, is the sight, at once and forever, of all possible object of mental effort. It is necessary and spontaneous, and so is an endowment, not an attainment; and is possessed without effort. We are prepared now to entertain the following statements:—
A. So far as it represents thinking as the active, i. e. causative ground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not true. The fact of the thinking is not, cannot be, the ground of the condition. The condition of the object thought, whatever the form of thinking may be, must lie as far back at least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's self, as ground for his Genius, must also be ground for all conditions. Yet men think of an object in its conditions. This is because the same Being who constructed the objects in their conditions, constructed also man as thinker, correlated to those conditions, so that he should think upon things as they are. In this view, to think is not condition, but is mental activity in the conditions already imposed. Thus it is with the Understanding; and the process of thinking, as above designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in a, of the second general definition. It follows, therefore,
B. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within the sphere of conditions proper,—observing the distinction of conditions into two classes heretofore made,—the finite intellect must act under them, and see those objects upon which they lie, accordingly,—as, for instance, a geometrical figure must be seen in Time and Space,—so far it is true, and no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, is to see it under all the conditions imposed upon the bird as flying, and the observer as seeing. But when men intuit the a priori truth, Malice is criminal, they perceive that it lies under no conditions proper, but is absolute and universal. We perceive, then,
C. That for all mental operations which have as object pure laws and ideal forms, and that Being in whom all these inhere, this dictum is not true. The thinker may be conditioned in the proper sense of that term; yet he entertains objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they are not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality of the principle in morals above noted that I perceive it to be such, and that necessarily.
Assuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, is meant, not that the thinker, by the act of thinking, constructs the conditions, but that he recognizes in himself, as thinking subject, and in the object thought, the several conditions (proper) thereof,—the following statements will define the province of this dictum.
1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, and the discursive Understanding, lie wholly within it.
2. Created spiritual persons, as constituted beings, also lie wholly within it. But it extends no farther. On the other hand,
3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit pure laws, and pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms themselves lie wholly without it.
4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those laws and forms inhere. Or, in general terms,
When conditions (proper) already lie upon the object thought, since the thinker must needs see the object under its conditions, it is true that, To think is to condition. But so far as it is meant that thinking is such a kind of operation that it cannot proceed except the object be conditioned, it is not true; for there are processes of thought whose objects are unconditioned.
The question, "What are Space and Time?" with which Mr. Spencer opens his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," introduces a subject common to all the Limitists, and which, therefore, should be considered in this part of our work. A remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in the "North American Review" for October 1864, applies with equal force here in reference to another essay by the same writer, in the preceding July number of that periodical. At most, his view can only be unfolded. He has left nothing to be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and difficult as this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought at least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than the Sense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and so will we do.
In general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are a priori conditions of created being. The following extracts are in point. "Pure Space, therefore, as given in the primitive intuition, is pure form for any possible phenomenon. As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is given in the primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and universal. Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological order subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction from experience, nor at all given by experience; but it is wholly independent of all experience, prior to it, and without which it were impossible that any experience of outer object should be." "Pure Time, as given in the intuition, is immediately beheld to be conditional for all possible period, prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily continuing, though all bounded period be taken away."—Rational Psychology, pp. 125, 128.
Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as conditions. Space is the a priori condition of material being. Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man, be stripped of all its material appurtenances, and left to exist as pure spirit, it could hold no communication with any other being but God; and no other being but he could hold any communication with it. It would exist out of all relation to Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the a priori condition of all created being, of the spiritual as well as material. In the case just alluded to, the isolated spiritual person would have a consciousness of succession and duration, although he would have no standard by which to measure that duration, he could think in processes, and only in processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time. Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "Space in reference to time has no significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the internal sense only, and in these there can be only succession. The inner phenomenon may endure in time, but can have neither length, breadth, nor thickness in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon, may fill a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with any outer or inner side."—Rational Psychology, p. 135.
Space and Time may also be distinguished thus: "Space has three dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions in space,—length, breadth, and thickness. In other words, it is solid room. "Time has but one dimension," or, rather, but one dimension can enter into Time,—length. In Time there can only be procession. Space and Time may then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical," illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they may be defined as follows:
"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.
"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence."
Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object may come into it; the other, that event may occur in it. There is for neither a final unit nor any limit. All objects are divisible in Space, and all periods in Time; and thus also are all limits comprehended, but they are without limit. Turning now from these more general aspects of the subject, a detailed examination may be conducted as follows.
The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen above, that Space and Time are a priori conditions of created being. We can best consider this law in its application to the facts, by observing two general divisions, with two sub-divisions under each. Space and Time have, then, two general phases, one within, and one without, the mind. Each of these has two special phases. The former, one in the Sense, and one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, and one without, the Universe.
First general phase within the mind. First special phase, in the Sense. "As pure form in the primitive intuition, they are wholly limitless, and void of any conjunction in unity, having themselves no figure nor period, and having within themselves no figure nor period, but only pure diversity, in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and periods may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are pure, a priori, formal laws, which are conditional to the being of any sense as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this sense could present no figure or period, till some figure or period was produced into it by an external agency. As such necessary formal laws, Space and Time "have a necessity of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other words, the fact that all phenomena must appear in them, lies beyond the province of power. This, however, is no more a limit to the Deity than it is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good. In our experience the Sense gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the actual phenomena of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with ideal objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the physical sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, by the activity of the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing some form in the inner or mental sense, from forms actually observed. Upon both alike the formal law of Space and Time must lie.
Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although there is pure form, if there was no more than this, no notion of a system of things could be. Each object would have its own space, and each event its own time. But one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another object and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some ground by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a unity of Space and Time; so that all objects shall be seen in one Space, and all events in one Time. "A notional connective for the phenomena may determine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of all space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena and their space and time in an objective experience." The operation of the Understanding is, then, the connection, by a notional, of all particular spaces and times; i. e. the space and time of each phenomenon in the Sense, into a comprehensive unity of Space and Time, in which all phenomena can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, not only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space and time, but all phenomena must be seen in one Space and Time. This connection of the manifold into unity is the peculiar work of the Understanding. An examination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a general formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must be seen in Space, and all events in Time, involves the subordinate law:
That no mind can observe material objects or any events except under the conditions of Space and Time; or, to change the phraseology, Space and Time are a priori conditional to the being of any mind or faculty in a mind capable of observing a material object or any event. This will, perhaps, be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However that may be, this is true, but is only a part of the truth. The rest will appear just below. The reader will notice that no exception is made to the law here laid down, and will start at the thought that this law lies upon the Deity equally as upon created beings. No exception is made, because none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as unqualified in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on an earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of numbers does the law of Space and Time condition all intellect. The Deity can no more see a house out of all relation to Space and Time than he can see how to make two and two five.
Second general phase, without the mind. First special phase, within the Universe. All that we are now to examine is objective to us; and all the questions which can arise are questions of fact. Let us search for the fact carefully and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It was found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and Time as pure conditions for matter and event. We are now to observe the pure become the actual condition; or, in other words, we are to see the condition realized. Since, then, we are to observe material objects and events in a material system, it is fitting to use the Sense and the Understanding; and our statements and conclusions will conform to those faculties.
We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in the form of a sphere in which all things are included. This spherical system is complete, definite, limited, and so has boundaries. A portion of "immeasurable void"—Space—has been occupied. Where there was nothing, something has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our having a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time in the Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying, all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the boundaries of the Universe, and thus enables spaces and times to be. We have no concept except as in limits, and those limits are conceived to be substance. In other words, space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept. Take away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession of events which forms the duration, and in the concept pure negation is left. To illustrate. Suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of vacuum. Is this vacuum an entity? Not at all. It can neither be perceived by the Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a space. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube was object to us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries. All, then, that is object, all that is entity, is substance. In our concept, therefore, a space is solid distance within the substance, and the totality of all distances in the Universe is conceived to be Space. Again; suppose there pass before our mind a procession of events. One event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession of events is a time, and the recurring event marks a period in time. The events proceeding are all that there is in the concept; and apart from the procession a conception of time is impossible. The procession of all the events of the Universe, that is duration, is our concept of Time. Thus, within the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration; and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. Let us assume for a moment that our concept is the final truth, and observe the result. In that concept space is limited by matter, and matter is conceived of as unlimited. This result is natural and necessary, because matter, substance, "a space-filling force," is the underlying notional upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is truly illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really atheism, logically follows. Again; in our concept time is duration, and duration is conceived of as unlimited. If so, the during event is unlimited. From this hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows. But bring our concept into the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of finding matter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is seen to be illimitable and pure condition, that matter may establish a limit within it. And Time, instead of being duration, and so limited by the during event, is found to be illimitable and pure condition, that event may have duration in it. This brings us to the
Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. We have been considering facts in an objective experience, and have used therefore the Sense and Understanding, as was proper. What we are now to consider is a subject of which all experience is impossible. It can therefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object in Space, and all during event in Time; in a word, remove the Universe, and what will be left? As the Universe had a beginning, and both it and all things in it are conditioned by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will its conditions cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, upon which would be imposed no conditions of Space and Time? These questions are answered in the statement of them. Those conditions must remain. When we have abstracted from our concept all substance and duration, there is left only void. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe there was void. Also, that in void there is no thing, no where, and no when; or, void is the negation of actual substance, space and time. But pure Space and Time, as a priori conditions that material object and during event may be, have not ceased. There is still room, that an object may become. There is still opportunity, that an event may occur. By the Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being for material object and occurring event, as the conditions of mental activity have for mind; and they have their peculiar characteristics exactly according with what they do condition, just as the laws of thought have their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the moral law must be given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him; and this is an a priori condition of the being of such person. Precisely similar is the relation between Space and Time as a priori conditions, and object and event upon which they lie. The moral law has its characteristics, which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and Time have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object and event. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, and both as a priori conditions of a Universe, must have the same necessity of being that God has. They must be, as he must be. But observe, they are pure conditions, and no more. They are neither things nor persons. The idea of them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can be assigned their logical position, but further than this the mind cannot go.
The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of the positions stated above. We have not wrought to pain such soul, but only for truth, and the clue of escape from all dilemmas. The only question to be raised is, are they true? If a more patient investigation than we have given to this subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only have failed as others before us have; but we shall love the truth which shall be found none the less. But if they shall be found true, then is it certain that God always knew them so and was always pleased with them, and no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them, however much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. Most blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those pure words of the apostle John, "No lie is of the truth."
The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is that primarily God was out of all relation to Space and Time. He was out of all relation to Space, because he is not material object, thereby having limits, form, and position in Space. He was out of all relation to Time, because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible objects of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can learn nothing, and can experience no process of thought. Within his mind no event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, while this is true, it is equally true that, as the Creator, he is conditioned by Space and Time, just as he is conditioned by himself; and it may be found by future examination that they are essential to that Self. But, whatever conclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a subject, this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; and Space and Time, whatever they are, will, can in no wise interfere with and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. It is a pleasure to be able to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as those contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore alluded to.
"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are veiled in impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to Space and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of God. Such timidity has but a slender title to respect. If the Laws of Thought necessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion that Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative but to accept of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join in the search for truth, who trembles at the sight of it when found. But a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by anticipation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is infinite, Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. Limitation is possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be two infinite Spaces, two infinite Times, or two infinite Gods; but while infinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds may. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space; when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite Space and Time will limit the infinite God. But not before. Time exists ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, God exists ubiquitously and eternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so long as Space and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and absolutely incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is irreverent."
AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES
IN THE WRITINGS OF THE LIMITISTS.
ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM
HAMILTON.
It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice it particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated essay, "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof; and which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments adduced, and illustrations presented, in the first part, in behalf of the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the analysis and attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes, an excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as sufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark will be expected. A few subordinate passages in the essay above referred to may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of criticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention is now called.
In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: "Now, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the proposition, that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality, and relation." It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism, that the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when used to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite—what? The fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus stated:—The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in that Person, is immediately known in consciousness, and this, not by difference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the Pure Reason. In this act the object seen—the idea—is held right in the Reason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not known by difference, because there is no other object but the one before that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality, because it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated, with which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen to be what it is in itself, and as out of all relation. A little below, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin, thus:—"The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of philosophy." The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact that, by a constituting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of a priori first principles, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the condition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.
These two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated "statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." The four "opinions," to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are too well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is believed, the true opinion, which is as follows.
The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable as a fact, is known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all this, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the spiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to be primarily unconditioned, i. e. out of all relation, difference, and plurality.
"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force except with regard to things in nature.
Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an exhaustive knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But equally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive, reliable knowledge of him as he is, we cannot be moral beings under his moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the expression of God's nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not love—hate; or he is indifferent, i. e. love has no relation to him. If the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true that he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which the Limitists assert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our whole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we ought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him and beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of affection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow; and, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does such a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer sensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a conclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made the soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It is impossible, then, to think of God except as love. We know what love is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and his spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as follows.
In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities in common with him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him negatively; i. e. they know that he is the opposite of themselves.
That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir William Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the Understanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination. He says: "In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function; both seek the one in the many;—the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'" In this sentence, and the remarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends the assigned function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than his. For "both faculties" do not "perform the same function." Only the Understanding seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks the many in the one. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are exactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and gathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason sees the truth first, as necessary a priori law, and holding it up as standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is guilty of a most glaring petitio principii. For, the very question at issue is, whether "both faculties" do "perform the same function"; whether "both" do "seek the one in the many." In order not to leave the hither side of the question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice is criminal. Is this primarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which conditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to be taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its letters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true experience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an idea of right and wrong, as an a priori law, is organic in man; and, by our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in consciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one principle was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was seen first, and as necessarily true. Take another illustration. All religions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of agreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men, produced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form, is associated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How shall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first human beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable objection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then there would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant people have the experience,—persons who never learned anything but the rudest forms of work, from the accumulated experience of others; nor by their own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple agricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said they were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact, that philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people, either immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the least philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point, none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or Brahm, or God, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men, were this possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn now and examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above, respecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come directly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its form, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual takes it—"the one,"—and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of nature—"the many,"—and is satisfied. And this is an experience not peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the illiterate,—those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions. These illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length, showing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure phenomena by an original and fixed standard, as, "This man is malicious, and therefore wicked." Between the two modes of procedure, the following distinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful, only probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what may be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and experience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is made plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir William Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely mistaken one class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind. In view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that, whether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never "has clearly shown that the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality," for it is impossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective reality is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important "knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover, unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," and not "a fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of God, who comprehends all positives. A little after, Hamilton says: "And while he [Kant] appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of Ideas," &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the Reason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative answer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly, and the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of thought into positive and negative is simply absurd. All thought is positive. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient expression for the refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not thoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are a part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction, we see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of the human race affirms this.
The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. "For those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who consequently employ the terms Absolute, Infinite, Unconditioned, as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively bound to prove that their idea of the One corresponds, either with that Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes both, or that it excludes both. This they have not done, and, we suspect, have never attempted to do." The italics are Hamilton's. The above statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute, therein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand, and an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," as applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since we seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the definitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found consistent, and pertinent to Space and Time, have been further found irrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is the Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to Space and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The terms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to him, have entirely different significations from what they will when applied to Space and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former. The questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as must those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the Person, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as qualities, consistently inhere in that unity. As this has already been done in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.
Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton quotes from him as follows: "The condition of intelligence is difference; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms." In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues from this, thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable, it must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or, second, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of both." Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: "The third hypothesis, on the other hand, is contradictory of the plurality of intelligence; for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is therefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of plurality and difference."
In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost, if not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to assign plurality, relation, difference, and—to adopt a valuable suggestion of Mr. Spencer—likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely psychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed out, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about, things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with an absolutely certain knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject this faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if the logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If "an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms," then is it impossible that we should know God, or that he should know himself. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is revolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of mental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as a most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is so plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked it. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle that every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth; and hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is true. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic will give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A plurality of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence; but objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly known by an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference, and likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense and Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the Reason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are self-evident, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions. Whatever knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly gain under the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for "mammals" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple, unanalyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a direct insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and likeness: for this is a quality of the self-existent Person, and so belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.
Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given by the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for example, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that many characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color, skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also, that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as well, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One color belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover, relates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of likeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and possesses those marks just named, which, though differing among themselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a commonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of characteristics, and connecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and Understanding.
2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of a priori laws, of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of God as the Supreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's attention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and analysis. In the latter it is by comprehension and synthesis. Take the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. No one but a Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or oughtness is a simple idea." This being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the author seeks to maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot be distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is sui generis. Hence, it cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If known at all, it must be known as it is in itself, by a spontaneous insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason, and such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the doctrine of "intellectual intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in subjecting all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and difference."
Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states certain problems, which he is "confident" Cousin cannot solve. There is nothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should have so presented them. Following the passage—which is here quoted—will be found what appear simple and easy solutions.
"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)—(1) how liberty can be conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plurality;—(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final causes;—(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without operating as an efficient cause;—(4) or how, in fine, morality can be founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;—these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve."
1. Liberty cannot be conceived. It must be intuited. There is "a plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge of that plurality." 2. "A faculty" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot determine itself at all. Only a spiritual person can resolve, can have a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence. Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be influenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and only he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a liberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;" and, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment both in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and qualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is thoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to answer this whole passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The infinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible, and indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint in the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a multitude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which enables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put in force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides that the best mode shall be. He also possesses all-power. This is his endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not person, but faculty in the person. So is it with the power. So then this Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He is not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him to choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under chance, because he is certain which is the best mode of action to gain the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity, which has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for answering all difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or chance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his followers.
This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is manifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety, and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom its author reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe him to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the intellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but desire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems inscrutable.
In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly noticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found plainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the Understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge. The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the mind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies them; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human"; or of "starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine"; where, upon the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process, based upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any knowledge of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, "God made man in his own image." If man's mind is wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot know truth as God knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty, man cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a moral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must know the law as it is. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will do. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is one. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation that God feels. And such an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an agent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be assumed as granted.
Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which Mr. Mansel, in his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that "First Cause," if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and that "Infinite" and "Absolute" are not pertinent to Cause, but to Person. So then when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him, not as Cause, for this is incidental, but as the infinite and absolute Person, for these three marks are essential. Further, these last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause expresses "an a priori Element of connection, and thus a primitive understanding-conception." Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the term Cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He defines "the Absolute" to be "that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being," when it is rather the exclusion of the possibility of any other Being. Again, he defines "the Infinite" to be "that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity." "That which" means the thing which, for which is neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the Thing. This Thing "is free from all possible limitation." How can that be when the Being he thus defines is, must be, necessarily existent, and so is bound by one of the greatest of limitations, the inability to cease to be. But some light may be thrown upon his use of the term "limitation" by the subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing "which is free from all possible limitation" is "that than which a greater is inconceivable." Moreover, this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible "attributes," and is in every possible "mode of existence" "from all eternity." Respecting the phrase "than which a greater is inconceivable," two suppositions may be made. Either there may be a thing "greater" than, and diverse from, all other things; or there may be a thing greater than, and including all, other things. Probably the latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but it is Materialistic Pantheism. This Being must be in every "mode of existence" "from all eternity." Personality is a "mode of existence"; therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode of existence, therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. Yet again these two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive; then this Being must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually exclusive modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, therefore, utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great as to be without limits? Has greatness anything to do with infinity? Manifestly not. It becomes necessary, then, to recur to and amplify those definitions which we have already given to the terms he uses.
Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary Being.
Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by which he is endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and totality. Or in other words, having this quality, he is wholly independent of any other being; and also the possibility of the existence of any other independent Being is excluded; and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all possible beings must depend.
Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives him universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that he possesses all possible endowments in perfection.
Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, which his very constituting elements themselves impose, are not removed by these qualities. For instance, the possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom, Power, and the like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession of them in perfect harmony is essential to his perfectness in the entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars him from the undue exercise of any one of his attributes; or, concisely, his perfection restrains him from being imperfect. We revert, then, to the fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, between improper limitations, or those which are involved in perfection; and proper limitations, or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence; and applying it here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of as belonging to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection which constitutes him the Ultimate.
In this view infinity can have no relevancy to "number." It is not that God has one, or one million endowments. It asks no question about the number; and cares not for it. It is satisfied in the assertion that he possesses all that are possible, and in perfect harmony. It is, further, an idea, not a concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be "conceived." No analogy of "line" or "surface" has any pertinence; because these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding and Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, is, the quality of an intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes;—for there can be no number without limitation, since the phrase unlimited number is a contradiction of terms;—but this limitation involves no lack, because there are no "others," which can be "thereby related to it, as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness." Without doubt it is, in a certain sense, true, that "the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality." This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and from him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion by no means follows, in which he says: "What kind of an Absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included." This is founded upon the suppressed premiss, that such a Being must do what he does, and his creatures must do what they do; and so evil must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may be admitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: viz., that he sees in the ideals of his Reason how his laws may be violated, and so, how sin may and will be in this moral system; but it is a perversion of words to say that this knowledge on the part of God is evil.
The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law, is involved in the knowing how such agent may keep that law. But the fact of the knowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation. On the other hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced by those persons whom God has made, who violate his moral laws. He being perfectly wise and perfectly good, for perfectly wise and good reasons sustains them in the ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of things, no persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. That definition of the term absolute, upon which Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit only for the Sense and Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of all existence. It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid down, it may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, as that of finite person, may be denied to God, and no lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's blasphemy may, then, be answered as follows: God is the infinite and absolute spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. Infinity and absoluteness are qualities of the Person as thus organized. The quality of absoluteness, for instance, as transfusing the essence, is the endowment of pure independence, and involves the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being, and the possession of the ability to create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as Hegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, except he is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. But in so far as it means—and this is undoubtedly what Hegel did mean—that God must be the efficient author of sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must produce evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true nature of the subject he had in hand,—the character of God. From the above considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the Reason are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things—the Universe—are dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent.
The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted with entire approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly vitiated by their author's indefensible assumption, that cause is "indispensable" to our idea of the Deity. As was remarked above, the notion of cause is incidental. The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not. Hence we may freely admit that "the cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause." It is also true that "the conception"—idea—"of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation." The position we have taken is in advance of this, for we say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. Introducing, then, not "the idea of succession in time," but the idea of the logical order, we rightly say, "the Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause." Nor are we here "checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite." "Causation is a possible mode of existence," and yet "that which exists without causing" is infinite. How is this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment. Now, taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort of the Deity, this is true. Before that act he was perfect in every possible endowment, and accorded his choice thereto. He was able to create, but did not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that act, he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no essential change in God. But he was in one mode of being before, and in another mode of being in and after that act. Yet he was equally perfect, and equally blessed, before as after. What then follows? This: that there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he should be a potential creator, and in that act he should become an actual creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, i. e. the infinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "if Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits," his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic understanding-conception of God, which thinks him the sum of all that was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this, he is actual. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that is required to fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, whom it qualifies, possesses all fulness, has all the forms and springs of being in himself. It is optional with him whether he will create or not; and his remaining out of all relation, or his creating a Universe, and thus establishing relations to and for himself, in no way affect his essential nature, i. e. his infinity. He is a person, possessing all possible endowments, and in this does his infinity consist. In this view, "creation at any particular moment of time" is seen to be the only possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. Such a Person, the necessary Being, must have been in existence before the Universe; and his first act in producing that Universe would mark the first moment of time. No "alternative of Pantheism" is, can be, presented to the advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that scheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd.
One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next paragraph he says, that, "supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness." But the difficulties which he then raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained thus. Always in God's consciousness the subject and object are identical. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. Hence all relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent upon him; and it is a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose, that any relation which falls in idea within him, and only becomes actual at his will, is any proper limitation. Both subject and object are thus absolute, being identical; and yet there is no contradiction.
The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute Being any interrelations, as of attributes among themselves, or of attributes to the Being. This arises from an erroneous definition of the term absolute. The definition heretofore given in this treatise presents no such difficulty. The possession of these attributes and interrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of another independent Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the consistency of his being what he must be. If then "the almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple," uses the term "simple" in the same sense that it would have when applied to the idea of moral obligation, viz., that it is unanalyzable, then that voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice of antiquity in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong; and is to be treated as that was. On such questions opinions have no weight. The search is after a knowledge which is sure, and which every man may have within himself. We land, then, in no "inextricable dilemma." The absolute Person we see to be conscious; and to possess complexity in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, difference, and likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, established the Universe, which is still entirely dependent upon him; from which he differs, and with which he is not identified.
Again Mr. Mansel says: "A mental attribute to be conceived as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is potential only, with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and an unrealized potentiality is a limitation." With our interpretation the assertion is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute of the Deity is most assuredly "in actual exercise," upon every one of its "possible objects" as ideas. But the objects are not therefore actual. Neither is there any need that they should ever become so. He sees them just as clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he does as actual objects. All ideal objects are "unrealized potentialities"; and yet they are the opposite of limitations proper. But this sentence, as an expression of the thought which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to convey, is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception that infinity is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity as quality of the necessarily existent Person, and it directly follows that this or that act, of that Person, in no way disturbs that infinity. The quality conditions the acting being; but the act of that being cannot limit the quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the reverse. Hence the questions arising from the interrelations of Power and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at once. Infinity as quality, not amount, pervades them all, and holds them all in perfect harmony, adjusting each to each, in a melody more beautiful than that of the spheres. Even "the existence of Evil" is "compatible with that of" this "perfectly good Being." He does not will that it shall be; neither does he will that it shall not be. If he willed that it should not be, and it was, then he would be "thwarted"; but only on such a hypothesis can the conclusion follow. But he does will that certain creatures shall be, who, though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, are, like him, final causes,—the final arbiters of their own destinies, who in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and may choose good or ill. He made these creatures, knowing that some of them would choose wrong, and so evil would be: but he did not will the evil. He only willed the conditions upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper bars to prevent the evil; and the a priori facts of his immutable perfection in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, are decisive of the consequent fact, that, in willing those conditions, God did the very best possible deed. If it be further asserted that the fact, that the Being who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not wisely prevent sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better to have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same as to say, that it is essential to God's perfection that he be imperfect; or, that it was better for the perfect Being to violate his Self than to permit sin. If any one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives, there remains no ground of argument with him; but only "a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversary."
Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel further remarks: "Let us however suppose for an instant, that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection." On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not belong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God is, as ground for what God does, and standing in the logical order before his act; and it will directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity in no way modifies his perfection. What God is, remains permanent and perfect, and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as the point of departure, that, before that point, God was in a state of complete blessedness, and that after that point he was also in such a state; and, further, that while these two states are equal, there is not "complete indifference," because there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine mind, why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when it was, and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged in his conduct, gives to the two states equality, and yet differentiates the one from the other.
"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being?" It cannot be conceived at all. The faculty of the mind by which it forms a concept—the discursive Understanding—is impotent to conceive what cannot be conceived—the act of creation. The changes of matter can be concluded into a system, but not the power by which the matter came to be, and the changes were produced. If the how is known at all, it must be seen. The laws of the process must be intuited, as also the process as logically according with those laws. The following is believed to be an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the above question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses as a priori organic elements of his being, all possible endowments in perfect harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible combinations of laws, are at once and always present before the Eye of his Reason, which is thus constituted Universal Genius. These combinations may be conveniently named ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way dependent upon his will, but are rather a priori conditional of any creative activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange themselves into systems,—archetypes of what may be, some of which may appear nobler, and others inferior. This Person, being such as we have stated, possesses also as endowment all power, and thereby excludes the possibility of there being any "other" power. This power is adequate to do all that power can do,—to accomplish all that lies within the province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not to exert his power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and the power will be simply power. But whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power, and organize it according to the ideal forms, the Universe will become. In all this the Person, "of his own will," freely establishes whatever his unerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but are only a manifestation of that fulness,—a declaration of his glory. In a word, Creation is that executive act of God by which he combines with his power that ideal system which he had chosen because best, or it is the organization of ample power according to perfect law. If one shall now ask, "How could he send forth the power?" it is to be replied that the question is prompted by the curiosity of the "flesh," man's animal nature; and since no representation—picture—can be made, no answer can be furnished. It is not needed to know how God is, or does anything, but only that he does it. All the essential requirements of the problem are met when it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all fulness is in God, that from this fulness he established all other beings and their natural relations, and that no relation is imposed upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the evil of the understanding-conception, that creation is the bringing of something out of nothing. There is an actual self-existent ground, from which the Universe is produced. Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts with the a priori idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is "before all things, and by whom all things consist,"—who organizes his own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces the Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness.