I approach this part of my prescribed duty with some hesitation, and not a little reluctance. Bystander is brilliant, learned, independent, and honest; and for these qualities, though differing from him on some important subjects, I entertain a respect and esteem amounting to affection. I hope, therefore, that I may not write a word here having even the semblance of discourtesy; for of that sort of treatment the gentleman in question has had a full share since he honored Canadians by casting his lot amongst us.
For the benefit of some readers who, possibly, may not have seen it, I may say that The Bystander is a "Monthly Review of Current Events," published in Toronto by Messrs. Hunter, Rose & Co., and written by a certain distinguished literary gentleman, as referred to above, whose name I would like to give here only that I feel in courtesy bound to respect the "impersonality of journalism," the protection of which the gentleman in question has the right, and with good reason, to claim.
The last three issues of The Bystander (for April, May and June) have each a paper on Col. Ingersoll, his lectures, and cognate subjects; the general tone of which is very liberal, but, at the same time, containing strictures upon Mr. Ingersoll and his teachings which I consider unfair and unjust (unintentionally no doubt), and to which I here propose briefly to reply.
Having heard Mr. Ingersoll lecture but once I am not in a position from personal knowledge to speak fully as to the alleged "blasphemy," and his general "tone" on the platform; but this much I can say, that Bystander's assertion that "he" (Ingersoll) "repels all decent men, whatever their convictions; for no decent man likes blasphemy any more than he likes obscenity," is certainly not true of the one lecture I heard, or of the score of others of his I have read. I humbly claim to be myself a "decent man," and I did not find myself "repelled" on listening to Ingersoll's lecture, but rather attracted. I also saw many decent people at the lecture (some from a distance), and they did not seem repelled; but, like myself, well-pleased. In Toronto, according to the reports in the Evening Telegram, there were large audiences of decent, intelligent people: and instead of being repelled, they greeted the lecturer with the most enthusiastic approbation and applause, repeated over and over again. The same reception was accorded him in Montreal, Belleville and Napanee.
Bystander contrasts Ingersoll's "offensive tone" on the platform with the "gentleness and sympathy of the Christian preacher on Mars' Hill," who, he tells us, "delivered the truths he bore at once with the dignity of simple earnestness, and with perfect tenderness towards the beliefs which he came to supersede." Let us, for a moment, examine this claim of "simple earnestness," and "perfect tenderness" in behalf of Paul the great preacher of the New Testament. Paul says, (Roman iii. 7) "For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why yet am I also judged as a sinner?" He also tells us (2nd Cor. 12: 16) that "being crafty, I caught you with guile," and likewise assures us that he was "all things to all men;" to the Jews he "became as a Jew," etc. What "simple earnestness" this is truly! And the Church of Christ has nearly always acted in accordance with this Scriptural doctrine that in lying for God's sake the "end justifies the means." Mosheim, the ecclesiastical historian, tells us that in the early ages of the Christian Church, "It was an act of virtue to deceive and lie, when by that means the interest of the church might be promoted."
As to Paul's "perfect tenderness toward the beliefs which he came to supersede," let us look a little into that. In writing to the Galatians he says [tenderly] "As we said before, so say I now again, if any man preach any other gospel unto you than that you have received, let him be accursed." (Gal. 1:9.) That is tender toleration for you! Again, "A man that is a heretic after the first and second admonition, reject" (Titus 4:9.) "I would they were even cut off which trouble you" (Gal. 5: 12.) We, Freethinkers, would stand a poor chance to-day if Paul's precepts were carried out! Again, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maranatha" (1 Cor. 16: 22.)-What "perfect tenderness" this is! With a vengeance are these curses and maledictions tender! Bystander may search in vain in Ingersoll's lectures, or any Freethinkers' writings, for such consummate bigotry, intolerance, and even cruelty as this "Christian preacher" pours out upon all who venture to differ from him in belief. And what "perfect tenderness" in Paul to denounce and stigmatize even those of his own church—his co-religionists—as "false apostles, deceitful workers, dogs, and liars!" Did Bystander or anybody else ever hear such language from Ingersoll or any other Freethinker? Is it not "offensive to any sensible and right-minded man?" Does it not "repel all decent men?"
Bystander admits that when Ingersoll "attacks dogmatic orthodoxy he is in the right." What more does he attack? This is exactly what he does attack, and Bystander admits that in so doing he is doing right, thus showing that he himself does not believe in dogmatic orthodoxy. Now, if the Christian's God, as described in the Bible, is included in "dogmatic orthodoxy" (and He surely must be) is Ingersoll blasphemous in attacking Him? Surely not, according to Bystander himself. Bystander may say, however, that he does not mean to include the Christian's God in the "irrational and obsolete orthodoxy," against which he admits "Ingersoll's arguments are really telling." But does Bystander himself believe in the God of the Bible? From the tenor of his language he surely cannot. Does he believe in the God of whom the Bible itself gives the following description? (For want of time to refer to, and space to insert chapter and verse, they are not given, but every Bible reader will recognize the passages given as substantially correct):—
"He burns with anger; his lips are full of indignation, and his tongue as a devouring fire." "His fury is poured out like fire, and the rocks are thrown down by him." "The Lord awaketh as one out of sleep, and like a mighty man that shouteth by reason of wine." "Smoke came out of his nostrils, and fire out of his mouth, so that coals were kindled by it." "He had horns coming out of his hand." "Out of his mouth went a sharp two-edged sword." "The Lord shall roar from on high. He roareth from his habitation. He shall shout as they that tread the grapes." "He is a jealous God." "He stirred up jealousy." "He was jealous to fury." "He rides upon horses." "The Lord is a man of war." "His anger will be accomplished, and his fury rest upon them, and then he will be comforted!" "His arrows shall be drunken with blood." "He is angry with the wicked every day." "A fire is kindled in mine anger and shall burn unto the lowest hell. I will heap mischief upon them; I will spend my arrows upon them I will also send the teeth of beasts upon them, and the poison of the serpents... both the young man and the virgin, the suckling also, and the man of gray hairs." [What did the "suckling" do to merit this?] "He reserveth wrath for his enemies." "He became angry and swore." "He cried and roared."
Does Bystander believe in a God like that? whom it is "blasphemy," it seems, for Ingersol to attack! It is true there are good qualities and attributes ascribed to God by the Bible as well as bad; but that does not affect the fact that these are ascribed to him; while the co-existence of two diametrically opposite sets of attributes in the same Being is simply absurd. Why is it blasphemy to attack such a conception of God, any more than to attack any of the other Pagan gods of antiquity? As he is represented in the Bible, He is certainly no better than they; and Bystander himself would have little hesitancy in making an onslaught on the Pagan gods. When primitive Judaism and Christianity set up a God for our worship and adoration, and at the same time tells us, "by the book," that He commanded the cruel, fiendish, and indiscriminate murder of men, women, and innocent children, we beg to decline to worship, or adore, or believe in any such Being; and we do not think it "blasphemy" to attack the false belief and the false God. When we read in the "word of God" that the Lord commanded one of his prophets to diet on excrement; that the Lord met Moses at a tavern and tried to kill him (see Exodus, 4, 24); that the sun and moon stood still; that it rained forty days and nights, and that nearly the whole world was drowned; that the first man—Adam—was made of clay, and Eve of a rib, about 6000 years ago; that the world was made in six days, and that vegetation flourished before there was any sun,—when we read of all these wonderful things, we beg to be excused from believing them, and claim the right to ridicule them to our heart's content. If this is "disrespect," or "insult," or an "ignoble spirit of irreverence," then we plead guilty to the charge, and are willing to abide by it.
We do not deny that there may be a God; we only deny the existence of such a one as the Bible sets forth. We attack only the gods whom barbarous peoples have fashioned in their own imaginations and set up for our worship, and not any high or noble conception of a Deity. We fully admit the existence of a great and mysterious power or force in the universe which we cannot understand or comprehend. We believe with Spencer in the great Unknown and Unknowable, and have no "attack" to make upon this power, no word of ridicule, no blasphemy; but, like Tyndall, stand in its presence with reverence and awe, acknowledging our ignorance.
While, however, acknowledging this unseen Power, we decline to anthropomorphise it—to call it a person or being, and invest it with mental and moral functions similar to our own, differing only in degree not in kind. It is only the anthropomorphism we attack—only the superstitions, assumptions and dogmas. We only attack that which is incredible and absurd—that which "shocks reason." We believe in religion—the Religion of Humanity—to do right—a religion of works instead of faith and creeds, and Bystander himself admits that "religion is carrying a weight which it cannot bear," and that, "unless the credible can be separated from the incredible, the reasonable from that which shocks reason, there will be a total eclipse of faith."
"The Cosmogony of Moses," says Bystander, "will, of course not bear the scrutiny of modern science; few probably are now so bigoted as to maintain that it will." If it will not bear such scrutiny, is it blasphemy to attack it, or its author? for the God of the Bible is the alleged author of that Cosmogony, inspiring Moses or whoever wrote it. But Bystander further remarks that the Mosaic Cosmogony "need not fear comparison with the Cosmogony of any other race." We thank him for that favor. It is exactly what we claim, to wit, that the Cosmogony of Moses, like all the others, is simply a human production, for it would be absurd to talk of "comparing" an inspired Cosmogony of divine origin with human Cosmogonies. Hence, according to Bystander himself, the Mosaic Cosmogony is simply, like the rest, human: only he thinks it a little better than the others. It will not, however, "bear the scrutiny of modern science." Very likely not! What then, becomes of the "fall of man," the "redemption" the "Ideal Man," and the whole Christian Superstructure which rests upon the Mosaic Cosmogony? If the pillars are taken away the building must come down.
It is also admitted by Bystander that "The moral code of Moses is tribal and primeval; it is alien to us who live under the ethical conditions of high civilization and the Religion of Humanity." Precisely so! And for this magnificent favor also, we again thank Bystander. No materialist or utilitarian could have possibly put it better; albeit a Christian would experience some moral obfuscation in trying to make out why, if the "moral code of Moses" is from heaven, it should be "alien to us" and to these times? He would be hardly able to understand why he should be comparing his Divine code with Pagan codes to see whether it is "worse or better than other codes framed in the same stage of human progress?" Let the Freethinkers take courage. Bystander, to all appearances, will soon be squarely on our side; and then we can truthfully say, that though the Christians have the greatest scientist, probably, in Canada (Prof. Dawson, of Montreal,) on their side, we will have the greatest scholar, historian and literateur in Canada on our side. Three cheers in the Liberal camp for Bystander! Indeed, we have some hopes, too, even of Prof. Dawson, whose Mosaic orthodoxy seems to be relaxing a little of late; and he evidently feels his isolation, his scientific brethren all being on our side.
While writing this, the Montreal Daily Witness of June 15th, 1880, comes to hand from a Freethought octogenarian friend in Port Hope (Wm. Sisson, Esq.) with the familiar pencil mark, drawing my attention to a report of the proceedings of "The Congregational Union," at present in session in Montreal. From it I learn that Rev. Hugh Pedley, B. A., made an address before the Union on "The Freethought of the Age," from which I cull the following, as reported in the Witness:—
"One of the principal difficulties," he said (of the clergy), "was the prevalence of freethought among the people. There was a time when the New Testament was received by almost everybody * * * But things had changed * * * Some time ago the weapons of skilled historians were turned first against the Old and then against the New Testament * * * Dr. Norman McLeod, writing from Germany, said, 'I am informed on credible testimony that ninety-nine out of every hundred persons here are sceptics.' * * * Germany was to-day more Pagan than Christian * * * The press passed up and down the land, scattering into every home things which set men thinking." [Ah! there is the secret; when men begin to think and reason on theological subjects as they do on secular, good-bye creeds! goodbye confessions!] "Goldwin Smith, a man who had so studied the past as to be able to interpret the present, had told us that a religious collapse of the most complete and tremendous character was apparent on every hand." It was only very recently that a sceptical work on 'Supernatural Religion' passed through a number of editions in a few months. Col. Ingersoll had recently visited the country. He came, he saw, and in some sense he conquered. (Cries of No! No!) The second night he had a much larger attendance than on the first. No matter who, ran Ingersoll down, he was a man of great power of oratory and strong in those qualities which control audiences.
The Rev. gentleman then referred deprecatingly to the inadequate-college training of theological students in "apologetics," as they were not allowed to read the works of sceptics for themselves, but had to take their tutors' version of the sceptics' arguments. This "putting up a little argument and then knocking it down," he said was neither "the fair nor the true way." He recommended putting "the very sceptical works into the hands of the students, and he would even say to go and hear Ingersoll if he came."
That "man's idea of God rises with his progress in civilization," Bystander admits; but he attempts to explain the fact away on theistic grounds, and dilute its strength as an argument that God is simply a projection of the human mind. He asks:—
"If this conception" (a conception of God) "flows from no reality, from what does it flow? It is a phenomenon of which, as of other phenomena, there must be some explanation; and we have not yet chanced to see in the writings of any Agnostic an explanation which seemed at all satisfactory."
I would respectfully suggest to Bystander that there is a satisfactory explanation, though to him it may not be so. In answering his question I will ask another. If the conception of, or belief in, a devil or devils, flows from no reality, from what does it flow? The same of witches, fairies, sprites, hob-goblins, et hoc genus omne. Belief in these is quite as general as belief in God, though Bystander's question seems to assume that belief in the latter is universal. This, however, is not the case, as has been conclusively shown in the foregoing reply to Wend-ling. Therefore, this "conception" argument, like the famous "design" argument, proves too much, and consequently proves nothing. As to the origin of the belief in spiritual agencies, and conceptions of God, Darwin tells us it is not difficult to comprehend how they arose. He says, "Descent of Man," vol. i, p. 63-5:—
"As soon as the important faculties of imagination, wonder, and curiosity, together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man would naturally have craved to understand what was passing around him, and have vaguely speculated on his own existence * * * The belief in spiritual agencies would easily pass into the belief of one or more Gods."
Bystander, while freely admitting that the Theistic theory is compassed with difficulties; and requires "re-statement," reminds us that the-"materialistic hypothesis is not free from difficulty." The difficulty he discovers in materialism relates to the order of priority of matter and force. He asks:—
"Which of the two is the First Principle? Force cannot have been produced by matter, for without force, matter cannot move, change, or generate at all. Matter cannot have been produced by force, because force is nothing but the impulsion of matter. Apparently there must have been something before both, which produced them and determined their relations; and it must be something beyond the range of sense."
Bystander. I think, has not correctly apprehended the materialistic position here, and hence the argument for a "something before both matter and force which produced them," being built upon a postulated premiss which we cannot accept, has no weight in establishing the existence of a God behind matter and force. His error lies in the assumption of the possibility of matter and force existing separately and independently. He asks, "Which of the two is the First Principle?" Our answer is, there can be no first as between matter and force, for there can be no matter without force, and vice versa. The two are inseparable, even in conception, and the existence of one is absolutely essential to the existence of the other. Hence the argument proceeding from the assumption of their divisibility and possible independence fails. The Theist has no right whatever, logically speaking, to assume that there "must have been something before matter and force which produced them." So long as matter and force are amply adequate (as far as we can discern) to the production of all cognizable phenomena, we are not warranted in assuming the existence of any being or thing behind them. As soon as the Theist does this, we have the logical right to carry his reasoning further, and at once assume something else behind it again, and thus not only one but a thousand gods could be postulated without the shadow of real proof of one of them.
There is an ultimate ground, however, upon which the Theist and Materialist may meet in common, and, so far as I can see, the only ultimate position they can occupy in perfect corelation. The universe exists; man as a part of the universe—a mode of existence—is here; in this we agree. Man, then, being himself the highest intelligence he knows of, continually seeks an explanation of the universe and of himself as a part of it. This is the common ground upon which we all stand—Rationalist, Theist, Agnostic, Atheist—barbarous and civilized—the weakest and the mightiest intellect.
All seek to explain the great mystery of the universe—some one way, some another—from the rude thaumaturgic fancies of the primitive barbarian up to the abstruse speculations and subtle reasonings of the cultured Pantheist, intellectual Agnostic, and logical Materialist. It is true one may be more reasonable and logical than the rest (as I undoubtedly think is the case), yet they all occupy the common ground of uncertainty. Not one can demonstrate his position, and in this we are all alike. (One, however, among all the rest thinks he knows he is right and can prove it, viz., the dogmatic Christian Theist.) We may all, therefore, stand together in the presence of Nature and acknowledge our ignorance. Though each school has its theory, its hypothesis, its solution, yet the mystery of the mighty universe is still an unsolved problem.
We have another reply to Ingersoll in a pamphlet of twenty pages, issued in Toronto, with the following modest title:—"A Refutation of Col. R. G. Ingersoll's Lectures, by 'A Rationalist.'" This proemial announcement is certainly calculated to excite high expectations; but it is only necessary to look into the rational (?) "refutation" (?) to see that the names the writer has given himself and pamphlet are both misnomers. How such an irrational jumble of orthodoxy, heterodoxy, obsolete philosophy, and moribund metaphysics could by any possibility pass for rationalism, even in the eyes of its author, is one of those profound mysteries which "no fellah can understand." Is it not a little singular that all these "replies" and "refutations" from the orthodox side come from theological nondescripts—from men who are but half orthodox (the other half not being recognizable), and not one reply from a thoroughly orthodox champion? A correlative fact, not without much significance, is that, though no argument comes from the orthodox side, the denunciations all come from that source. On the other hand in proportion as the opposing champion is unorthodox, in that ratio is he tolerant, courteous, and in favor of free speech and equal rights. "A Rationalist's" essay is pervaded by the kindliest spirit personally towards his opponent, and this, in a measure, redeems its literary and logical defects.
Though "Rationalist" zealously defends the Bible, and argues for a God, it is impossible to tell how much of the Bible he accepts, or what God he believes in. He says, "every jot and tittle of the Bible is inspired," yet in another place tells us, "The Apostle Paul is not one of the inspired writers," as "His words will not bear a spiritual interpretation." It would, therefore, seem that no part of the Bible is inspired except that which will stand this method of "spiritual interpretation." To get rid of the numerous errors, absurdities, and immoralities contained in the Bible, "Rationalist" spiritualizes them. He has a first-class recondite and spiritual meaning for every one of them, which seems to be entirely satisfactory—to himself. With the utmost facility everything is explained away; and armed with his occult style of Bible exegesis he can laugh at the infidel scientist. He says we must "rub off the literal meaning" in order to get at the spiritual, and by this convenient method every difficulty between the two sacred lids vanishes into thin air. This "rubbing off" business he also applies to the God of the Bible, whose characteristic anthropomorphism "Rationalist," of course, rubs all off, even his intelligence. So that there would seem to be little more left of the Jewish Jehovah, under modern scriptural exegesis, than what Beecher describes as a "dim and shadowy influence." "Rationalist" divests Deity of intelligence to escape the effects of the following argument:—
Seeing the logical force of this, he quibbles thus: "We do not say that God has intelligence, but that God is wisdom in form and love in essence, and therefore the infinite source of all intelligence." This will not do, Mr. "Rationalist!" It is entirely too vague. You must either contend for a personal or an impersonal God. Give us either Deism or Pantheism, and not an incongruous mixture, and then we will know on what ground to meet you. If you mean that God is simply the aggregate, or even the essence, of all intelligence, all love, all good, why this is a mere abstraction, and even an Atheist might accept it; but if you are contending for anything like the Christian's God, as set forth in the Bible, you will have to alter your definitions very materially.
As a specimen illustration of "Rationalist's" spiritual method of resolving Scriptural difficulties I give below his version of the story of Elisha, the children, and the bears, under the "rubbing off" process. We, Freethinkers, he says, will not "object to the bears" when we understand what the story means, and here is his elucidation, verbatim et literatim:—
"Elisha represents the external or literal words of Holy Writ on which the mantle of spiritual truth still rests. Children represent affections—don't fond mothers even yet call them 'little loves?'—They also correspond to the opposite, and so evil loves which destroy obedience to the external life of goodness, taught in, at least, some of the literal words of Scripture, naturally mock at the baldness of Elisha. Baldness, since it refers to the head, and the head corresponds to that union of will and intellect in man which rules, and is, the life, and ultimates in the very extreme of its very minute external, corresponds to the most external of the will and thought of Elisha, who represents the literal meaning of Scripture. So this incident means that evil loves could see no ultimate good to themselves in the doing of any good in a practical every-day way even where that was clearly enjoined, and rendered as beautiful externally as hair is, and therefore mocked at it, or rather at what seemed to them the lack of it. Then the bears, which correspond to the animal passions of the animal man, came out of the woods—woods correspond to the natural perceptions of natural truth in man—and utterly destroyed these evil loves out of the life. Again you see we find the same truth; that the Lord implants remains of goodness and truth in every degree of man's life, even in the natural man, fitted to cope with and conquer his evils, if man himself will but permit it."
There's a sample of "spiritual interpretation" for you! And what clearness is there, dear reader! Just return to the fourth sentence of the above extract, commencing with "Baldness," and re-read it, and see if you can make anything out of it. What the sentence does really mean is to me as profound a mystery as the incantations of a Gypsy thaumaturgist. It would be interesting to get "Rationalist" to try his hand at spiritualizing some of the following passages of Holy Writ:—
"In the same day shall the Lord shave with a razor that is hired," &c. "And it came to pass by the way in the inn, that the Lord met him" (Moses) "and sought to kill him." "I have seen God face to face." Per Contra: "No man hath seen God at any time." "I am the Lord, I change not, I will not go back, neither will I repent." Per Contra: "And God repented of the evil that he said he would do unto them, and he did it not." "There is no respect of persons with God." Per Contra: "Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated." "I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children." Per Contra: "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." "It is impossible for God to lie." Per Contra: "If the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that Prophet." "Be not afraid of them that kill the body." Per Contra: "And after these things Jesus would not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill him." "And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them to say, 'Go number Israel.'" Per Contra: "And Satan provoked David to number Israel." "I bear witness of myself, yet my record is true." Per Contra: "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true." "A man is not justified by the works of the law." Per Contra: "Ye see, then, how that by works a man is justified." "There shall no evil happen to the just." Per Contra: "All that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution." "Wisdom's ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace." Per Contra: "In much wisdom is much grief and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." "It shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days." Per Contra: "Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in power." "Thou shalt not: commit adultery." Per Contra: "Then said the Lord unto me, 'Go get, love a woman, an adulteress.'"
Here, certainly, is ample scope for exegetical ingenuity. The passages quoted, besides scores of others, many of them too indecent for these pages, would seem to require the touch of "Rationalist's" spiritual interpretation wand. When the literal meaning is "rubbed off," the occult, spiritual meaning will appear.
As a sample of "Rationalist's" metaphysical philosophy I give the following:—
"Will and love are identical... Will or love is life. A man cannot think unless he wills to think; and he can only think that which he wills—only that and nothing more. He can only do what he wills and thinks. There is no action which is not the effect of will and its thought. A man wills in order to think," etc. He also tells us that God gave man a will "as free as His own." Matter is spoken of as "mere dead inert matter."
Is more evidence than this needed that "Rationalist" is living in the past, and has utterly failed to grasp modern thought? His philosophy is bad, but his metaphysics is worse. Any man who at this day attempts to "refute" Materialists should at least be somewhat acquainted with the results of modern thought and scientific research; but "Rationalist" has apparently advanced no further than the occult Swedenborgian mysticism of the last century. Further, to talk to-day of "dead inert matter," is to talk the language of an obsolete philosophy of the past; for modern science and philosophy alike agree that matter is not "that mere empty capacity which philosophers have pictured her to be, but the universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her own womb." As Pope says:—
"See thro' this air, this ocean, and this earth, All matter quick and bursting into birth."
Equally absurd is this talk about "Free Will" and "Free Moral Agency." These metaphysico-theological dogmas have melted in the light of mental science, and are now as "dead as a door nail," of which fact "Rationalist" will be convinced if he will take the trouble to look into Hamilton, Combe, Mill, Buckle, Lewes, Spencer, Huxley and Tyndall, and he will then, probably, write no more such nonsense as quoted above. It is not necessary, however, for any observant and thoughtful man to go to any authorities outside his own mind to be convinced of the fallacy of the "Free Will" dogma, for his own observation and reflection will do it. And "Rationalist" can have the same conviction without the aid of science or philosophy,—without even observation or reflection. Let him turn to his Bible, which he champions, and read it, and he will find abundant proof (such as it is) that man's will is not free. Let him read the 8th, 9th and 11th Chapters of Romans. Let him then read Phil. 2, 13, "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure." Then read Isaiah, 46, 910, "I am God and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginnings and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my council shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure."
Now, I submit that if an omnipotent and omniscient God has "declared the end from the beginning," and ordered all "the things that are not yet done" (and you have his word for it here) how is it possible for mortal and finite man to do any thing contrary to the thing ordered, or accomplish any "end" but the one "declared from the beginning?" Here you, who believe in God and the Bible, have his word for it that he has declared all things "from the beginning." Man then must do and think as God has declared, and can do nothing else, hence he is not free.
The idea that "a man cannot think unless he wills to think" is too preposterous (laying the Bible aside) for any reasonable man to accept who is not a slave to creeds and dogmas. Let "Rationalist," after reading this sentence, stop reading, and assume a quiescent state (for of course his free will will enable him to do this)—a state of mental passivity, as it were,—let him will nothing for the time being,—and then see if thoughts of some kind do not spontaneously arise in his mind. And then let him will to have no thoughts for the space of five minutes, and see if the thoughts do not steal into his brain (providing of course he has one) unbidden, and in spite of him—in spite of all his boasted freewill power. Let any reader put this impossible and absurd dictum of "Rationalist" to the test, and he will have a living demonstration in his own brain, which will render any further argument on this point entirely superfluous.
"Rationalist" worries himself into inextricable confusion over causes and effects, first causes, first causes and last effects, etc., etc. Because Ingersoll has said "a first cause is just as impossible as a last effect," Rationalist well nigh swamps himself in a most ludicrous "muss-of-a muddle-of-a-jerry-cum-tumble" of bad diction and worse logic to prove that by such reasoning as Ingersoll's we come to "chaos" and to "nothing," (hasn't the gentleman himself come to chaos if not to nothing?) We reason everything out of existence, he says, and just now we will have left "no nature, no God, no man, no matter" (it would be no matter if some bipids were gone) "no force," no "nothing"— "literally nothing." Shades of Bacon! let us take breath; for this would certainly be a very bad state of things, from which "good Lord deliver us!" It would be nearly as bad as before the "creation," when nothing existed throughout the infinite realms of space save Jehovah himself.
I will endeavor to make what materialists mean by the impossibility of a first cause or last effect clear to "Rationalist." We believe in one existence, and only one—the universe—which, though never itself having been created or brought into existence (being eternal), is the primal (or "first" if you like) cause of all phenomena Rationalist will thus see that in one sense there is no first came as the universe is eternal, yet in another sense there is a first cause, viz.: the universe, as it is the primal cause of all phenomena. As to a "last effect," it should be obvious to every rational mind that as matter and force are indestructible, and hence eternal in duration, there can be no last effect; for as long as matter and force exist effects must of necessity ensue.
It is a great relief to a Freethinker to find a man among the clergy like Mr. Bray, in point of religious liberality. It is like coming upon an oasis in the waste desert of orthodox bigotry and intolerance.
Mr. Bray is the able editor of the Canadian Spectator, of Montreal; and also preaches, I believe, every Sunday in Zion Church in that city. Unlike his clerical brethren generally, when Mr. Ingersoll lectured in Montreal, in April last, Mr. Bray went to hear him, and answered him from his pulpit the two following Sundays. These "Discourses" were published in the succeeding numbers of his paper, the Spectator. Hear him on free speech:—
"In a free country all kinds of freedom must be allowed, and Mr. Ingersoll had just as much right to come here and say his say in his own manner, and according to his own discretion, as Mr. Hammond has to come and preach and teach in his way. If men are free to agree with us, they are also free to differ with us; to differ a little, to differ much, to differ altogether. If the Mayor had found a law by which he could prohibit Ingersoll from lecturing against our religious beliefs, I would have started an agitation at once for the repeal of that absurd and antiquated law. If hearing arguments against our faith is likely to unsettle us, then we had better be unsettled. We are badly off with all our religious literature and preaching, if we cannot endure any kind of criticism, and witticism, and argument."
These are brave words, and every fair-minded man in this Dominion will agree with Mr. Bray in his liberal and courageous utterances. They are timely words to go forth in that city where the war of sects has waxed so hot and virulent of late. Montreal needs more men like Bray in her churches, to mollify the bigotry, and stamp out the bitter feuds, and fierce antagonism of Christian against Christian.
As this pamphlet has already reached a much greater length than originally intended, I have but little space to devote to Mr. Bray's Reply to Ingersoll. One or two points, however, must be noticed.
Mr. Bray falls into the same error as "Bystander" in accusing
Ingersoll of attacking a theology which, he tells us, is "opposed to all reason," and now "well nigh obsolete." I would simply say if it is "obsolete," it is the stock in trade of the Christian Church today. Take away from it this obsolete theology (which is "opposed to all reason,") and there is nothing left of Christianity worth speaking of; for the morality Christianity contains does not of right belong to it It is Pagan. It has been appropriated by Christianity, and is not original with it. There is not a single moral precept in the Bible, but was taught before that book was written. (For proof of this, see Sir Wm. Jones, Max Muller, Lord Amberly, and "Supernatural Religion.") Therefore, when you take away the dogmas of Christianity—its "obsolete theology"—you take away Christianity itself to all intents and purposes. And hence the utter inconsistency and absurdity of our opponents in taxing us with merely attacking a dead theology, when that dead theology is all there is of a religion which they defend and wish to perpetuate. Seeing, then, that the theology of Christianity is admittedly dead, why not give it up and come over to us? for all you have left—the brotherhood of man—belongs to us: it is our RELIGION OF HUMANITY.
As the only salient point, to my mind, in Mr. Bray's reply to Ingersoll is dealt with in the following letter, which I addressed to the Spectator, and which appeared in its columns, I have only space here to reproduce that letter:—
To the Editor of the Canadian Spectator:
Sir,—In your issue of the 10th instant, in a discourse in reply to Col. Ingersoll, I find the following:—
"The lecturer, who seemed to imagine that he understood everything else, was compelled to acknowledge that he did not understand why there should be so much hunger and pain and misery. Why, the world over, life should live upon life. When he has cast Jehovah out of the Universe, he is pained and puzzled to account for the presence of wrong and sorrow. With God he cannot account for it; without God he cannot account for it. If Col. Ingersoll, or any other of that school, can give me an intelligent theory of life, and satisfactory solution of the problem of the presence of evil and pain without God, I am prepared to consider it."
Now, Sir, having the honor (or dishonor, as the case may be,) to belong to that school, I venture to take up the gauntlet thus thrown down. From our stand-point we are able, we think, to give an intelligent theory of these things; and although it may not be wholly devoid of mystery, we claim it is less mysterious than the Christian theory. We claim that the Materialistic explanation of the Universe and its phenomena is more reasonable and less mysterious than the Theistic; and this is why we find ourselves compelled to adopt it and become Atheists. On the Materialistic hypothesis of development and evolution we are certainly not "puzzled to account for the presence of wrong and sorrow," however much we may be pained at their fearful prevalence. It is only on the hypothesis of being under the governance of an omnipotent and infinitely benevolent Being that we are utterly unable to account for such-a state of things. Although the ultimate tendency of the forces of the-Universe seems to be towards a higher, and higher, and more perfect condition, not only for man, but all animals, and even plants, yet these-forces are, as Science abundantly proves, utterly without mercy—without pity for man or any other animal. Therefore, on the evolution philosophy of things, we can reasonably predicate pain, sorrow, and wrong; and are not puzzled at their existence. It is only on the theory of a good God controlling the Universe that we stand dumb with confusion and wonderment in the presence of all this woe, pain, misery, and wrong-with which the world is filled—this terrible "struggle for life," where the-strong prey upon the weak, where animal eats animal, and man eats-man!
The theologians have had upwards of two thousand years to reduce the Materialistic paradoxes of Epicurus on the existence of evil, but have they done so? If there be a God, and He is all-powerful, He could remove the surplus evil and pain from the world, and if He is all-good He would remove it, is an argument which has never yet been answered by a Paley, a Butler, a Dawson, or any other Christian Theist or Bible apologist. I use the phrase "surplus evil and pain" for this reason: As a sort of apology for the rank malevolence abroad in the world, and as an argument for the existence of a beneficent God, Christian Theists tell us that pain is necessary as an antecedent to the proper enjoyment of pleasure; that it is necessary to the growth and development of character; that the storm of the ocean is an essential pre-requisite to the adequate enjoyment of the subsequent calm; that all smooth sailing would be monotonous and insipid. Now, we will admit this for the sake of the argument; but there yet remains the mass of surplus evil to be accounted for, which is wholly unnecessary for such corrective and distributive purposes. It may, perhaps, be necessary that the tempest toss the ship about on the bosom of the ocean in order that the living freight may have a keener appreciation of the succeeding calm, and also to develop awe and sublimity in their breasts; but to accomplish this it is scarcely to the purpose to send all to the bottom of the ocean! That we may have a proper relish for our food and a due appreciation of the blessings of a good appetite, it may be necessary that we feel the pangs of hunger and starvation occasionally; but to give us this wholesome discipline it would seem hardly necessary that millions of human beings should actually be starved to death!
Now, on the theory of inexorable law* instead of a beneficent Providence, we are not surprised that a ship which is not strong enough to ride the storm should go to the bottom, even though five hundred bishops and clergymen be aboard supplicating an unknown God for succor. On the theory of inexorable and merciless law in which we are fast bound, we are not "puzzled" that millions of human beings should starve to death when these laws or conditions of Nature are violated in over-population and a false political and social economy. Or when a Tay bridge goes down with its living freight under the pressure of train and tempest, the Atheist is neither surprised nor puzzled: but the Christian, who worships a benevolent (?) God and believes that not a hair falls from his head without His notice, can only look at such a malevolent horror in dumb silence and amazement—he has no explanation. Our theory of the presence of evil in the world is, therefore, at least rational; but, is the Christian theory rational? Is it rational to-suppose that all the pain, sorrow, and evil in the world have been caused by the puerile circumstance of a woman eating an apple? This would be as monstrously unjust as it is irrational and absurd.
As to the origin and maintenance of life "without God," it is quite as comprehensible and rational without God as with one with the Christian conditions and qualifications. An universe of matter containing the "promise and potency of all forms and qualities of life" is as intelligible and comprehensible as a God outside the Universe embodying the potency of all life. From the time that Lucretius declared that "Nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the Gods," and Bruno that matter is the "universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her own womb," down to Prof. Tyndall, who discerns in matter "the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," scientists have never been able to discover the least intrusion of any creative power into the operations of