The armies rested on the “Fourth,”—one under the bright laurels secured by the brave work of the day before, but in profound sorrow over the silent forms of the host of comrades who had fallen during those three fateful days, whose blood bathed the thirsty fields of Gettysburg, made classic by the most stupendous clash of conflict of that long and sanguinary war; while gentle rain came to mellow the sod that marked the honored rest of friend and foe; the other, with broken spirits, turned from fallen comrades to find safety away from the fields that had been so promising of ennobling fruits. The enemy had cast his lines on grounds too strong for lead and steel, and, exhausted alike of aggressive force and means of protracted defence, there was nothing left for the vanquished but to march for distant homeward lines.

The cavalry left on the Blue Ridge joined the Confederate left late on the afternoon of the 3d. Orders for retreat were issued before noon of the 4th, and trains of wounded and other impedimenta were put in motion by the Chambersburg and Fairfield routes, the army to march after night by the latter,—the Second Corps as rear-guard, the First to follow the Third and push on to secure the crossings of the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters. It was daylight of the 5th when the road was open for the march of the First, and a later hour of the morning before the Second could follow.

Pursuit was made by the enemy, led by cavalry and the Sixth Corps, and the rear-guard had to deploy near Fairfield to check it. Rain was helping us. Before the enemy could get through the mud and push his batteries over the boggy fields, our trains had reached the mountain gorge, and the rear-guard was on the march following. Direct pursuit of the solid ranks was changed to march down the east of the mountains, but the firmer broad road gave the Confederates easier march. Kilpatrick got his cavalry in on the wagon-trains and destroyed a number, but did not delay the march of the column.

On this retreat the army, already crippled of its pride, was met by the dispiriting news of another defeat at Vicksburg, which meant that the Mississippi was free to the Federals from its source to the Gulf. Diverting incidents occurred, but we were in poor mood for them. As we approached Hagerstown, two grotesque figures stepped into the road about a hundred yards in front of us,—one a negro of six feet and a hundred and eighty pounds, the other a white man of about five feet seven. The negro was dressed in full uniform of the Union infantry, the white man in travel-stained butternut dry-goods. The negro had a musket on his shoulder. Riding up to them, it was observed that the musket was at the cock-notch. The negro was reminded that it was unsoldier-like to have the gun at a cock, but said that he wanted to be ready to save and deliver his prisoner to the guard; it was his proudest capture during the march, and he wanted credit for it. The man was a recruit lately from abroad, and did not seem to care whether or not he was with his comrades. However, there were doubts if he understood a word that was said. The uniform was a tight fit, and the shoes were evidently painful, but the black man said that he could exchange them. He was probably the only man of the army who had a proud story to take home.

The Union cavalry came severely upon our left flank at Hagerstown, forcing Stuart to call for infantry support. Parts of Semmes’s and G. T. Anderson’s brigades were sent, crossed the Antietam, and had uncomfortable experience with the horse artillery near Funkstown. They had dire complaints to make of the way cavalrymen put them in columns of fours against batteries, when they could have advanced more rapidly and effectively in line of battle and saved half of their men lost.

Halting for rest near Falling Waters, a sudden alarm was brought down the road by a cavalryman riding at speed, who reported all of the enemy’s cavalry on a sweeping ride against us. The troops were thrown together to wait, but the cavalry charge proved to be a carriage-load of lady refugees. Some of the cavalry did get over upon the trains parked at Williamsport, but there were many wounded near there who could handle their muskets, many infantry up from Winchester, and some of Imboden’s cavalry, besides some batteries who held the ground, and Stuart eventually got up, when the enemy drew off.

On the 6th and 7th the commands were up, and deployed their lines from Falling Waters to cover the bridge and ford at Williamsport. But the river was full, past fording at Williamsport, and a raiding party from Harper’s Ferry had partially destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters. Infantry trenches were made along the lines, batteries were put in position, and we were ready in a day or two to receive our successful adversary. He found some mud along his route, and was not up until the 12th, when he appeared and spread his lines along the Confederate front, but positions were changed,—he had the longer outer curve, while the Confederates were on the concentrating inner lines. He made his field-works and other arrangements, had some reinforcements since his battle, and was well organized.

On the forenoon of the 13th, General Lee sent for me, and announced that the river was fordable and the bridge repaired, that the trains would be started at once, and the troops would follow when night could conceal the move. The First and Third Corps were to cross by the bridge, the Second by the ford. As the lines were comfortable, the roads heavy, it occurred to me that the hurried move during a single night would be troublesome; suggestion was offered that the trains and wounded should move over during the night, and give us easy march the next night, but the waters on the other side were high, and only enough mills running to supply food from day to day, and the weather treacherous, so the general thought it better to hurry on. The march by the Williamsport crossing over the firm, broad turnpike was made without trouble. The route to the bridge was over a new road; at the ends of the bridge were green willow poles to prevent the wheels cutting through the mud, but the soil underneath was wet and soggy under the long season of rain, and before night rain again began to fall.

General Lee, worn by the strain of the past two weeks, asked me to remain at the bridge and look to the work of the night. And such a night is seldom experienced even in the rough life of the soldier. The rain fell in showers, sometimes in blinding sheets, during the entire night; the wagons cut deep in the mud during the early hours, and began to “stall” going down the hill, and one or two of the batteries were “stalled” before they reached the bridge. The best standing points were ankle-deep in mud, and the roads half-way to the knee, puddling and getting worse. We could only keep three or four torches alight, and those were dimmed at times when heavy rains came. Then, to crown our troubles, a load of the wounded came down, missed the end of the bridge, and plunged the wagon into the raging torrent. Right at the end of the bridge the water was three feet deep, and the current swift and surging. It did not seem possible that a man could be saved, but every one who could get through the mud and water rushed to their relief, and Providence was there to bring tears of joy to the sufferers. The wagon was righted and on the bridge and rolled off to Virginia’s banks. The ground under the poles became so puddled before daylight that they would bend under the wheels and feet of the animals until they could bend no farther, and then would occasionally slip to one side far enough to spring up and catch a horse’s foot and throw him broadside in the puddled mud. Under the trials and vexations every one was exhausted of patience, the general and staff were ready for a family quarrel as the only relief for their pent-up trouble, when daylight came, and with it General Lee to relieve and give us opportunity for a little repose.

The division of the Third Corps under General Pettigrew formed the rear of the infantry line, which was to be covered by Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry. But the cavalry brigadier rode off and crossed the river, leaving, it is said, a squadron for the duty, and the squadron followed the example of the brigadier. The consequence was that when Kilpatrick’s cavalry rode up it was taken to be the Confederates ordered for their rear-guard. Instead of friends, however, General Pettigrew found a foe. He was surprised by a dashing cavalry charge, was wounded, and died after a few days. Some artillery, three standards (of the Virginia infantry), and a large number of prisoners were taken. General Meade claimed two thousand.

General Lee thought to occupy the gaps of the Blue Ridge by his cavalry, and rest his army in the Valley of Virginia, in threatening lines against Washington City, but found the Shenandoah River full and past fording, and before the tide began to recede General Meade crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge and began to occupy the gaps, which called for a southern march of the Confederates. On the 19th my command was ordered to Millwood to secure, if possible, Ashby’s Gap, but as the enemy’s cavalry was on the opposite bank, and the waters were too high for us to get over, we marched on to Manassas, then for Chester Gap. As high up as Front Royal the river was found past fording, but part of a pontoon bridge was at hand. General Corse, who had joined us, hurried and succeeded in getting his brigade over in time to occupy Chester Gap, and putting his regiment under Colonel Arthur Herbert in the west end of Manassas Gap. The balance of Pickett’s men crossed by putting the arms and ammunition in the boats, the men swimming, and sent reinforcements to General Corse and Colonel Herbert, when the enemy’s cavalry withdrew. One bridge was laid and spliced, and the march southward was resumed.

RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG. ACCIDENT DURING THE NIGHT-CROSSING OF THE POTOMAC ON A PONTOON BRIDGE.

The next day another demonstration was made by the enemy’s cavalry at Manassas Gap, but Hood’s division was there and McLaws’s was at the Chester Gap, where another heavy body of cavalry approached. An effort was made to get behind the latter by hidden lines of march, but the plan of catching cavalry with infantry was not successful, though General Wofford thought for a time that his trap was well laid. The march was continued, and the head of the column reached Culpeper Court-House on the 24th. Benning’s brigade, left on guard at Gaines’s Cross-Roads till the Third Corps could relieve him, was attacked by a strong cavalry force. On the approach of the Third Corps he thought to organize, with General A. P. Hill, another plan to entrap the cavalry in a thick wood, but the riders found little difficulty in getting away. General Ewell was detained a little, and found, upon approaching Front Royal, that General Wright’s brigade, left there to hold the gaps for him, was engaged in skirmishing with the enemy’s infantry. He reinforced the brigade, held the enemy back, then changed his march west, crossed the Blue Ridge at Thornton’s Gap, and ordered Early’s division, that was not yet up, through the Valley by Strasburg. He reached Madison Court-House on the 29th.

General Meade got his army together near Warrenton on the 31st of July, and ordered a detachment of artillery, cavalry, and infantry across the Rappahannock at Kelly’s Ford and the railroad bridge. The command drove our cavalry back till it was reinforced by infantry, when the enemy was pushed back beyond Brandy Station.

General Ewell was called down from Madison Court-House, behind the Rapidan, and the First and Third Corps were marched into position behind the river on the 3d of August, leaving the cavalry at Culpeper Court-House.

General Lee suffered during the campaign from his old trouble, sciatica, and as soon as he found rest for his army applied to the authorities for a change of commanders. The President refused, pleading that he had no one to take his place. At the time he had two generals of his own choosing who were not in authority adequate to their rank,—Joseph E. Johnston, the foremost soldier of the South, who had commanded the army from its organization until he was wounded at Seven Pines, and G. T. Beauregard, the hero of Sumter and the first Bull Run, well equipped and qualified for high command. But the President was jealous of Johnston, and nourished prejudice against Beauregard.

CHAPTER XXX.

To me the emergency seemed so grave that I decided to write the Honorable Secretary of War (excusing the informality under the privilege given in his request in May) expressing my opinion of affairs in that military zone. I said that the successful march of General Rosecrans’s army through Georgia would virtually be the finishing stroke of the war; that in the fall of Vicksburg and the free flow of the Mississippi River the lungs of the Confederacy were lost; that the impending march would cut through the heart of the South, and leave but little time for the dissolution; that to my mind the remedy was to order the Army of Northern Virginia to defensive work, and send detachments to reinforce the army in Tennessee; to call detachments of other commands to the same service, and strike a crushing blow against General Rosecrans before he could receive reinforcing help; that our interior lines gave the opportunity, and it was only by the skilful use of them that we could reasonably hope to equalize our power to that of the better-equipped adversary; that the subject had not been mentioned to my commander, because like all others he was opposed to having important detachments of his army so far beyond his reach; that all must realize that our affairs were languishing, and that the only hope of reviving the waning cause was through the advantage of interior lines.

A few days after the letter was despatched the subject happened up while discussing affairs with General Lee, when I felt warranted in expressing my views and relieving my mind of the serious apprehensions that haunted me. He inquired if I was willing to go West and take charge there. To that I consented, provided the change could be so arranged as to give me an opportunity, by careful handling of the troops before accepting battle, to gain their confidence; providing, at the same time, that means could be arranged for further aggressive march in case of success.

At that time the railway passing our camps on the Rapidan through Virginia and East Tennessee to Chattanooga was open and in good working order. General Bragg’s army was near Chattanooga, General Buckner’s in East Tennessee, near Knoxville, General Samuel Jones’s army, or parts of an army, in Southwest Virginia. There was but one railway,—from Cincinnati via Louisville and Nashville to Chattanooga. On that road General Rosecrans was marching against General Bragg. On the direct route to East Tennessee over the Cumberland Mountains General Burnside was moving into East Tennessee against General Buckner’s forces.

A few days after the conversation with General Lee, he was called down to Richmond. In the course of a week he wrote, viz.:

General Lee next wrote to inquire as to the time necessary for the movement of my corps into Tennessee. As there were but two divisions, McLaws’s and Hood’s, and Alexander’s batteries, two days was supposed to be ample time. The transportation was ordered by the quartermaster’s department at Richmond, and the divisions were made ready to board the trains as soon as they could reach us.

The success of the plan was thought from the first to depend upon its prompt and vigorous execution, and it was under those conditions that General Lee agreed to reinforce the army in Tennessee, together with the assurance that vigorous pursuit, even to the Ohio River, should follow success. The onward march was repeatedly urged, not only in return for the use of part of the army, but to relieve General Lee of apprehension from the army in front of him; but it was not until the 9th of September that the first train came to Orange Court-House to start with its load of troops. Meanwhile, General Buckner had left his post in East Tennessee and marched south to draw nearer the army under General Bragg about Chattanooga, leaving nothing of his command in East Tennessee except two thousand men at Cumberland Gap, under General Frazer, partially fortified. General Burnside had crossed the mountains, and was not only in East Tennessee, but on that very day General Frazer surrendered to him his command at Cumberland Gap without a fight.

These facts were known to the Richmond authorities at the time of our movements, but not to General Lee or myself until the move was so far advanced as to prevent recall. So that we were obliged to make the circuit through the Carolinas to Augusta, Georgia, and up by the railroad, thence through Atlanta to Dalton and Ringgold. It was the only route of transit left us. There were two routes between Richmond and Augusta, one via Wilmington, the other through Charlotte, North Carolina, but only a single track from Augusta to Chattanooga. The gauges of the roads were not uniform, nor did the roads connect at the cities (except by drays and other such conveyances). The roads had not been heavily worked before the war, so that their rolling stock was light and limited.

Instead of two days of moving, it was not until the 25th that our artillery joined us near Chattanooga. Hood’s division was first shipped, and three brigades, or the greater part of three, were landed at the railroad station, and joined General Bragg’s army on the 18th and 19th of September, but that army had been manœuvred and flanked out of Chattanooga, Buckner’s out of East Tennessee, and both were together down below the borders of Georgia.

As I left General Lee’s tent, after bidding him good-by, he walked out with me to my horse. As my foot was in the stirrup he said again, “Now, general, you must beat those people out in the West.” Withdrawing my foot to respectful position I promised, “If I live; but I would not give a single man of my command for a fruitless victory.” He promised again that it should be so; said that arrangements had been made that any success that we had would be followed; that orders to that effect had been given; that transportation was also ordered to be prepared, and the orders would be repeated.

While the troops were in transit, Jenkins’s South Carolina brigade was transferred to Hood’s division, so that we had two South Carolina and four Georgia brigades of the two divisions, which gave us some little trouble in keeping our men on the cars passing by their homes. The people crowded every station to give us their all in most acceptable rations, and to cheer us with wishes for a happy issue.

The train upon which I rode reached Catoosa about two o’clock of the afternoon of the 19th of September. That upon which our horses were came up at four o’clock. Only part of the staff of the corps was with me, and General Alexander was with his batteries far away in South Carolina. As soon as our horses could be saddled we started, Lieutenant-Colonels Sorrel and Manning and myself, to find the head-quarters of the commanding general. We were told to follow the main road, and did so, though there were many men coming into that road from our right bearing the wounded of the day’s battle; the firing was still heard off to the right, and wagons were going and coming, indicating our nearness to the field. Nothing else occurring to suggest a change of the directions given us, we followed the main road.

It was a bright moonlight night, and the woodlands on the sides of the broad highway were quite open, so that we could see and be seen. After a time we were challenged by an outlying guard, “Who comes there?” We answered, “Friends.” The answer was not altogether satisfying to the guard, and after a very short parley we asked what troops they were, when the answer gave the number of the brigade and of the division. As Southern brigades were called for their commanders more than by their numbers, we concluded that these friends were the enemy. There were, too, some suspicious obstructions across the road in front of us, and altogether the situation did not look inviting. The moon was so bright that it did not seem prudent to turn and ride back under the fire that we knew would be opened on us, so I said, loudly, so that the guard could hear, “Let us ride down a little way to find a better crossing.” Riding a few rods brought us under cover and protection of large trees, sufficiently shading our retreat to enable us to ride quietly to the rear and take the road over which we had seen so many men and vehicles passing while on our first ride.

We reached General Bragg’s head-quarters at eleven o’clock, reported, and received orders, which he had previously given other commanders, for attack early in the morning. Our bivouac was made near the general head-quarters, and we rode at daylight to find the troops. Hood’s brigades that had arrived before us had been at work with the left of the army, which was assigned as my command. Lieutenant-General Polk was commanding the right wing.

Two brigades of McLaws’s division, Kershaw’s and Humphreys’s, came in the afternoon, and marched during the night and across the Chickamauga River.

The army had forced its way across the Chickamauga under severe skirmishes, little less than a battle, during the greater part of the 19th, and some of the commands had been engaged on the 18th working on the same plan.

The written order giving the plan was issued on the 18th. In general terms, it was to cross the Chickamauga, strike the enemy’s left, and roll it back on his right by a wheel to the left so as to come in between the enemy and Chattanooga. The work had been so persistent and assiduous during part of the 18th and all of the 19th, that General Rosecrans came to understand the plan as well as his adversary, and to arrange accordingly.

With my instructions for the 20th the commanding general gave me a map showing prominent topographical features of the grounds from the Chickamauga River to Mission Ridge, and beyond to the Lookout Mountain range.

At early dawn I found the left wing. It was composed of Buckner’s corps (Stewart’s and Preston’s divisions), a new division under General Bushrod R. Johnson, the division of General T. C. Hindman, and three of Hood’s brigades. Buckner’s corps had been cut in two. His division on the right of the left wing was under General Stewart, while Preston’s division, on the extreme left, on the bank of the Chickamauga, was assigned, by the order for battle, as the pivot upon which the battle should wheel. The commands stood: Stewart’s, Johnson’s, Hindman’s, and Preston’s divisions; Hood’s brigades in rear of Johnson’s line. General Buckner reported his artillery as amounting to about thirty guns. Three batteries were reported, of four guns each, with Hindman’s division, Johnson’s and Hood’s commands being without artillery. The brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys were ordered, with Hood’s, to be used as a column of assault, by brigades, at a hundred paces interval.

As the battle was ordered for daylight, it seemed too late to draw Buckner’s divisions into reciprocal relations, and we had yet to find the right wing. As it was not in touch or sight, General Stewart was ordered to find it. He marched about half a mile to his right and found that he was nearly half a mile in advance of the right wing. His move made place for Hood’s column, which was called to the line, and General Stewart broke his right to rear to guard that flank until the right wing could get to the front. The divisions were formed in two lines, two brigades on the front line, others of the second line in support, except Hood’s five brigades in column. General McLaws and two of his brigades, two of Hood’s, and Alexander’s artillery were on the rails, speeding for the battle as fast as steam could carry them, but failed to reach it. When organized for battle the left wing stood about three hundred yards east of the Lafayette-Chattanooga dirt road. As the battle was ordered for wheel to the left on Preston’s division as pivot, his (Trigg’s) brigade was echeloned on the left of Hindman’s division. The purpose of the commander in ordering the wheel on the left as pivot was to push in, from the start, between the enemy and his new base at Chattanooga.

No chief of artillery for the command reported, and a brief search failed to find one. The field, so far as it could be surveyed, however, was not a field, proper, but a heavy woodland, not adapted to the practice of artillery. The hour of battle was at hand, but the right wing was not yet organized. Some of the troops were without rations, their wagons, having lost the lines of march through the woodlands, failing to reach them until after daylight, when they were further delayed cooking their food.

The right wing was formed of D. H. Hill’s corps, Breckenridge’s and Cleburne’s divisions, W. H. T. Walker’s corps of Walker’s and Liddell’s divisions, Cheatham’s division of Polk’s corps, artillery battalions of Majors Melancthon Smith, T. R. Hotchkiss, and R. E. Groves, and batteries of Lieutenant R. T. Beauregard, Captain E. P. Howell, Captain W. H. Fowler, and Lieutenant Shannon.

As it formed it stood with D. H. Hill’s corps on the right, Breckenridge’s and Cleburne’s divisions from right to left, Cheatham’s division on the left of Cleburne’s rear, and Walker’s reserve corps behind Hill’s corps; but when arranged for battle it was about half a mile in rear of the line upon which the left wing was established. The Confederate commander rode early in the morning to hear the opening of the battle. As the sounds failed to reach him, he became anxious, sent orders of inquiry for the cause of delay, and repeated his orders for attack, and finally rode to his right wing and gave peremptory orders.

Marching through the woods to line up on the left wing, the left of the right wing was found to overlap my division on the right, yet our extreme right was found to overreach the left of the enemy’s field-works by two brigades, and reconnoissance found the road between the enemy and Chattanooga open and free of obstructions or troops to defend it. On the right of Breckenridge’s division was Armstrong’s division of cavalry dismounted, and beyond his right was Forrest’s other division of cavalry, Pegram’s. Some miles off from our left was Wheeler’s division of cavalry, under Wharton and Martin.

The Union army from left to right was: first the Fourteenth Corps, General George H. Thomas commanding, four divisions,—Baird’s division on the left, then Reynolds’s and Brannan’s, the latter retired to position of reserve, and Negley’s. (The last named had been left, on the night of the 19th, on guard near the Glen House, but was ordered early on the 20th to join General Thomas, and one of the brigades did move promptly under the order; the other brigades (two) failed to receive the order.) Then the Twentieth Corps, three divisions,—Jefferson C. Davis’s, R. W. Johnson’s, and P. H. Sheridan’s,—on the right, General A. McD. McCook commanding the corps. Next was the Twenty-first Corps, three divisions,—T. J. Wood’s, J. M. Palmer’s, and H. P. Van Cleve’s,—General T. L. Crittenden commanding the corps. It was in position on the east slope of Mission Ridge, ordered to be prepared to support the corps of the right or left, or both; one of its brigades had been left to occupy Chattanooga. Wilder’s mounted infantry, on the right of the Twentieth Corps, was ordered to report to the commander of that corps for the day’s work. A reserve corps under General Gordon Granger was off the left of the Union army to cover the gap in Mission Ridge at Rossville and the road from the Union left to that gap. Minty’s cavalry was with this corps, and posted at Mission Mills. General Granger had Steedman’s division of two brigades and a brigade under Colonel D. McCook. General R. B. Mitchell, commanding Union cavalry, was on their right at Crawfish Springs, with orders to hold the crossings of the Chickamauga against the Confederate cavalry.

It seems that parts of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps, Johnson’s and Van Cleve’s divisions, were under General Thomas in the fight of his left on the 19th, and remained with him on the 20th. The purpose of the posting of the Union army was to hold open its routes for Chattanooga by the Rossville and Dry Valley roads. As before stated, the Confederate commander’s design was to push in between the Union army and Chattanooga, recover his lost ground, and cut the enemy’s line of supplies.

The commanders of the armies were on the field early on the 20th. The failure of the opening of the Confederates at daylight gave opportunity for a reconnoissance by light of day, by which it was learned that the road from the Union left was open, not guarded nor under close observation; but the commander ordered direct assault under the original plan,—his back to the river, the Union army backing on Mission Ridge. The Chickamauga River, rising from the mountains south, flows in its general course a little east of north to conflux with the Tennessee River. The Ridge runs nearly parallel with the river, and opens up a valley a mile wide. It is a bold outcropping of limestone about one hundred feet above the valley, with occasional passes, or gaps, that are strong points of guard for defence. Four miles northwest from the Union left was the gap at Rossville, called for the old Cherokee chief. On its right was the pass of the Dry Valley road, and immediately in its rear was the McFarland Gap. The line of the Lafayette road lies about parallel with the Ridge to within a mile of the Union left, when it bends westward and leads to the Rossville Gap. The Dry Valley road crosses the Chickamauga at Glass’s Mills, courses along the east slope of the Ridge, crosses it, and joins on the west the road that crosses at the McFarland Gap.

The Union left was east of the Chattanooga-Rossville road, but crossed the road to the west and formed in broken front. The left and right of Thomas’s line was retired or broken to the rear. The Union commander rode over his lines on the afternoon of the 19th and ordered his front covered by such field-works as could be constructed during the night.

General Thomas covered his lines by log and rail obstructions. The corps of Rosecrans’s right formed two lines of rail defences for infantry. The batteries had the ascending slopes of the Ridge for positions, and their field was more favorable otherwise for artillery practice than was that of the Confederates advancing from the valley and more densely timbered forests. They had two hundred and forty-six guns. The records do not give satisfactory accounts of the number of Confederate guns, but they probably numbered not less than two hundred.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Before the Confederate commander engaged his battle he found the road between the enemy’s left and Chattanooga open, which gave him opportunity to interpose or force the enemy from his works to open battle to save his line. But he preferred his plan of direct attack as the armies stood, and opened his battle by attack of the right wing at 9.30 A.M. of the 20th. He was there, and put the corps under Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill to the work. Breckenridge’s and Cleburne’s divisions, Breckenridge on the right, overreached the enemy’s left by two brigades, Stovall’s and Adams’s, but the other brigade, Helm’s, was marched through the wood into front assault of the enemy behind his field-works. This brigade made desperate repeated and gallant battle until the commander, Benjamin H. Helm, one of the most promising brigadiers, was killed, when its aggressive work was suspended.

The other brigades crossed the Chattanooga road, changed front, and bore down against the enemy’s left. This gave them favorable ground and position. They made resolute attack against Baird’s left, threatening his rear, but he had troops at hand to meet them. They had a four-gun battery of Slocum’s of the Washington Artillery,[178] and encountered Dodge’s brigade and parts of Willick’s, Berry’s, and Stanley’s, and superior artillery. In the severe contention General Adams fell seriously hurt, and the brigades were eventually forced back to and across the road, leaving General Adams on the field.

A separate attack was then made by Cleburne’s division, the brigades of Polk and Wood assaulting the breastworks held by the divisions of Johnson and Palmer. These brigades, after severe fight, were repulsed, and their positions were covered by Deshler’s brigade. General Deshler received a mortal wound from a fragment of shell, leaving the brigade in the hands of the gallant Colonel Roger Q. Mills (our afterwards distinguished statesman). General Thomas called repeatedly for reinforcements, and received assurances that they were coming, even to include the army if necessary to hold the left.

Johnson’s brigade of Cheatham’s division was ordered to support the brigade under Colonel Mills, and the reserve corps under General W. H. T. Walker (Gist’s and Liddell’s divisions) was ordered into the Breckenridge battle, Gist’s brigade against the left angle of the breastworks, and Walthall’s to the place of Cleburne’s division. The other brigade of Gist’s division supported the battle of his own brigade, and General Liddell was ordered with Govan’s brigade to advance, passing beyond the enemy’s left to the Chattanooga road, and wheel to the left against his left rear. The troops, without exception, made a brave, desperate fight, but were unsuccessful, and forced to suspend aggressive work.

As the grand wheel to the left did not progress, I sent, at eleven o’clock, to say to General Bragg that my column of attack could probably break the enemy’s line if he cared to have it go in. Before answer came, General Stewart, commanding my right division, received a message from General Bragg to go in and attack by his division, and reported that the Confederate commander had sent similar orders to all division commanders. He advanced, and by his severe battle caused the Union reserve division under General Brannan to be drawn to the support of that front, and this attack, with that of the divisions of our right against those of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, so disturbed General Thomas that other reinforcements were called to support his defence.

General Stewart was in hot engagement before word reached me that the battle had been put in the hands of division commanders; but my orders reached General Hood in time to hold him and commanders on his left before he received notice from the commanding general, and the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys were ordered nearer the rear of his column. The divisions of B. R. Johnson and Hindman were ordered to follow in close echelon on Hood’s left. Buckner’s pivoting division under Preston was left to the position to which the Confederate chief had assigned it.

In our immediate front were the parts of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps in two lines covered by rail defences and well-posted batteries. At the early surging of his lines through the forest, General Hood came under the fire of this formidable array of artillery and infantry, and found his lines staggering under their galling missiles, and fast losing strength as the fire thickened. His leading brigade was decimated, but his others pushed to the front to take and pursue the assault. The divisions of B. R. Johnson and Hindman were pressed hard on Hood’s left, and the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys closed to his support, when a bold push gave us the first line of the enemy and a large number of his guns; but General Hood was fearfully wounded, supposed to be fatally; General Benning, of his “Rock Brigade,” lost his horse, and thought General Hood was killed. He cut a horse loose from a captured gun, mounted, and using part of a rope trace as his riding whip, rode to meet me and report disaster. He had lost his hat in the mêlée, and the brigade disappeared under the steady crushing fire so quickly that he was a little surprised. He reported, “General Hood killed, my horse killed, my brigade torn to pieces, and I haven’t a man left.” I asked if he didn’t think he could find one man. The question or the manner seemed to quiet somewhat his apprehensions and brought affirmative answer, when he was told to collect his men and join us at the front; that we had broken and carried the first line; that Johnson’s division, on his left, was then in the breach and pushing on, with Hindman on his left, spreading battle to the enemy’s limits; that Stewart’s division would hold it on our right, and the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys then on the quick step would be with us in a minute and help restore the battle to good organization. Just then these two brigades burst through the brush in cheerful, gallant march, and brought him back to his usual courageous, hopeful confidence.

As we approached a second line, Johnson’s division happened to strike it while in the act of changing position of some of the troops, charged upon and carried it, capturing some artillery, Hood’s and Hindman’s troops pressing in close connection. This attack forced the parts of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps from that part of the field, back over Missionary Ridge, in disordered retreat, and part of Negley’s division of the Fourteenth Corps by the same impulsion. As our right wing had failed of the progress anticipated, and had become fixed by the firm holding of the enemy’s left, we could find no practicable field for our work except by a change of the order of battle from wheel to the left, to a swing to the right on my division under General Stewart. The fire of the enemy off my right readily drew Hood’s brigades to that bearing. Johnson’s and Hindman’s divisions were called to a similar move, and Buckner’s pivotal division under General Preston, but General Buckner objected to having his left “in the air.”

Presently a discouraging account came from General Hindman, that in the progress of his battle his left and rear had been struck by a formidable force of cavalry; that Manigault’s brigade was forced back in disorder, and his other brigades exposed on their open left could not be handled. I wrote him a note commending the brave work of his division, and encouraging renewed efforts; urged him to have his brigades in hand, and bring them around to close connection on Johnson’s left.

On the most open parts of the Confederate side of the field one’s vision could not reach farther than the length of a brigade. Trigg’s brigade was ordered to the relief of Manigault’s, which had been forced back to the Lafayette road, and the balance of Preston’s division was ordered to follow, if necessary, to support that part of the field, and our cavalry far away from my left was called to clean it up and pursue the retreating columns. It seems that Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry had struck Manigault’s left and put it back in disorder, and a brigade, or part of a brigade, of cavalry coming against the rear, increased the confusion and drove it back to the Lafayette road, when Trigg’s brigade advanced to its relief. The two put the attacking forces back until they found it necessary to retire beyond the ridge and cover the withdrawal of trains left exposed by the retreat of troops of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps. General Hindman gathered his forces and marched for the left of Johnson’s division, and Preston’s brigade under General Trigg was returned to the point of its first holding.

Our front, cleared of opposing forces, was soon changed forward, and formed at right angle to its first line to seek the enemy’s line standing against our right wing. Calls were repeated for the cavalry to ride in pursuit of the retreating forces, and guard the gaps of the ridge behind the enemy standing in front of our right wing. In the new position of the left wing its extreme left encountered the enemy rallying in strong position that was heavily manned by field batteries. At the same time my left was approaching the line of fire of one of our batteries of the right wing.

General Johnson thought that he had the key of the battle near Snodgrass Hill. It was a key, but a rough one. He was ordered to reorganize his own brigades and those of Hindman’s division for renewed work; to advance a line of skirmishers, and give time to the troops for refreshment, while I rode along the line to observe the enemy and find relations with our right wing.

It was after one o’clock, and the hot and dry and dusty day made work fatiguing. My lunch was called up and ordered spread at some convenient point while I rode with General Buckner and the staffs to view the changed conditions of the battle. I could see but little of the enemy’s line, and only knew of it by the occasional exchange of fire between the lines of skirmishers, until we approached the angle of the lines. I passed the right of our skirmishers, and, thinking I had passed the enemy’s, rode forward to be accurately assured, when I suddenly found myself under near fire of his sharp-shooters concealed behind the trees and under the brush. I saw enough, however, to mark the ground line of his field-works as they were spread along the front of the right wing, and found that I was very fortunate in having the forest to cover the ride back until out of reach of their fire. In the absence of a chief of artillery, General Buckner was asked to establish a twelve-gun battery on my right to enfilade the enemy’s works and line standing before our right wing, and then I rode away to enjoy my spread of Nassau bacon and Georgia sweet potatoes. We were not accustomed to potatoes of any kind in Virginia, and thought we had a luxury, but it was very dry, as the river was a mile and more from us, and other liquids were over the border. Then, before we had half finished, our pleasures were interrupted by a fragment of shell that came tearing through the woods, passed through a book in the hands of a courier who sat on his horse hard by reading, and struck down our chief of ordnance, Colonel P. T. Manning, gasping, as was supposed, in the struggles of death. Friends sprang forward to look for the wound and to give some aid and relief. In his hurry to enjoy and finish his lunch he had just taken a large bite of sweet potato, which seemed to be suffocating him. I suggested that it would be well to first relieve him of the potato and give him a chance to breathe. This done, he revived, his breath came freer, and he was soon on his feet ready to be conveyed to the hospital. In a few days he was again on duty.