A. D.Ratio.Authorities.
1-37 1 to 10.97 Rome. Rate under Augustus and Tiberius.
37-41 1 to 12.17 Rome. Reign of Caligula.  The silver coinage much debased, consequently the ratio of the metals pure was about 1 to 11.
54-68 1 to 11.80 Rome. Reign of Nero.
69-79 1 to 11.54 Rome. Reign of Vespasian.
81-96 1 to 11.30 Rome. Reign of Domitian.
138-161 1 to 11.98 Rome. Reign of Antoninus.
312 1 to 14.40 Byzantium. Reign of Constantine. Arbitrary.
438 1 to 14.40 Byzantium and Rome. Theodosian code. Arbitrary.
864 1 to 12.00 Probable ratio, as shown by the Edictum Pistense, under the Carlovingian dynasty.
1260 1 to 10.50 Average ratio in the commercial cities of Italy. Local or doubtful.
1344-1660 1 to —— England. Numerous mint indentures given in McLeod's Political Economy, page 475. The ratio, except when fixed arbitrarily and in violation of market price, varied between about 1.12 and 1.14 during the two hundred and fifty-seven years included in this period.
1351 1 to 12.30   Ratio in North Germany as shown by the very accurate rules of the Lubeck mint, corroborated in the main by the accounts of the Teutonic Order of Knights, averaged in periods of forty years.
1375 1 to 12.40
1403 1 to 12.80
1411 1 to 12.00
1451 1 to 11.70
1463 1 to 11.60
1453-1494 1 to 10.50 Ratio according to the accounts of the Teutonic knights. As the ratio fixed in England by numerous mint indentures from 1465 to 1509 was about 1.12 this German ratio is considered local or doubtful.

It will thus be observed that during the one thousand four hundred and ninety-two years from the coming of Christ to the discovery of America, silver never went below the ratio of 14.40 to one of gold.

The relations which the metals have borne to each other since the discovery of the New World will appear from the following:

Table showing the relative values of gold and silver in the various countries of the world from the discovery of America to 1680.

A. D.Ratio.Authorities.
1497 1 to 10.70 Spain. Reign of Isabella. Edict of Medina. Local.
1500 1 to 10.50 Germany. Adam Riese's Arithmetic. Local or doubtful.
1551 1 to 11.17 Germany. Imperial mint regulations. Arbitrary or local.
1559 1 to 11.44 German Imperial mint regulations.
1561 1 to 11.70  France. Mint regulations.
1575 1 to 11.68
1623 1 to 11.74 Upper Germany. Mint regulations.
1640 1 to 13.51 France. Mint regulations. Transition period.
1665 1 to 15.10 France. Mint regulations.
1667 1 to 14.15 Upper Germany. Mint regulations. Doubtful.
1669 1 to 15.11 Upper Germany. Mint regulations.
1679 1 to 15.00  France. Mint regulations.
1680 1 to 15.40

Table showing the ratio of silver to 1 of gold from 1687 to the demonetization of silver by Germany and the United States and the closing of the Mints to its free coinage.

[From the Report (1890) of the Director of the U. S. Mint on the Production of the Precious Metals in the United States.]

[Note.—From 1687 to 1832 the ratios are taken from Dr. A. Soetbeer; from 1833 to 1878 from Pixley and Abell's tables; and from 1879 to 1889 from daily cable-grams from London to the Bureau of the Mint.]

Year.Ratio.Year.Ratio.Year.Ratio.Year.Ratio.
    1687     14.94 1721 15.05 1755 14.68 1789 14.75
1688     14.94     1722 15.17 1756 14.94 1790 15.04
1689 15.02 1723 15.20 1757 14.87 1791 15.05
1690 15.02 1724 15.11 1758 14.85 1792 15.17
1691 14.98     1725     15.11 1759 14.15 1793 15.00
1692 14.92 1726     15.15     1760 14.14 1794 15.37
1693 14.83 1727 15.24 1761 14.54 1795 15.55
1694 14.87 1728 15.11 1762 15.27 1796 15.65
1695 15.02 1729 14.92 1763 14.99     1797         15.41    
1696 15.00 1730 14.81     1764         14.70     1798 15.59
1697 15.20 1731 14.94 1765 14.83 1799 15.74
1698 15.07 1732 15.09 1766 14.80 1800 15.68
1699 14.94 1733 15.18 1767 14.85 1801 15.46
1700 14.81 1734 15.39 1768 14.80 1802 15.26
1701 15.07 1735 15.41 1769 14.72 1803 15.41
1702 15.52 1736 15.18 1770 14.62 1804 15.41
1703 15.17 1737 15.02 1771 14.66 1805 15.79
1704 15.22 1738 14.91 1772 14.52 1806 15.52
1705 15.11 1739 14.91 1773 14.62 1807 15.43
1706 15.27 1740 14.94 1774 14.62 1808 16.08
1707 15.44 1741 14.92 1775 14.72 1809 15.96
1708 15.41 1742 14.85 1776 14.55 1810 15.77
1709 15.31 1743 14.85 1777 14.54 1811 15.53
1710 15.22 1744 14.87 1778 14.68 1812 16.11
1711 15.29 1745 14.98 1779 14.80 1813 16.25
1712 15.31 1746 15.13 1780 14.72 1814 15.04
1713 15.24 1747 15.26 1781 14.78 1815 15.26
1714 15.13 1748 15.11 1782 14.42 1816 15.28
1715 15.11 1749 14.80 1783 14.48 1817 15.11
1716 15.09 1750 14.55 1784 14.70 1818 15.35
1717 15.13 1751 14.39 1785 14.92 1819 15.33
1718 15.11 1752 14.54 1786 14.96 1820 15.62
1719 15.09 1753 14.54 1787 14.92 1821 15.95
1720 15.04 1754 14.48 1788 14.65 1822 15.80

Year.Ratio.Year.Ratio.Year.Ratio.Year.Ratio.
    1823     15.84 1836 15.72 1849 15.78 1861 15.50
1824     15.82     1837 15.83 1850 15.70 1862 15.35
1825 15.70     1838     15.85 1851 15.46 1863 15.37
1826 15.76 1839     15.62     1852 15.59 1864 15.37
1827 15.74 1840 15.62     1853     15.33 1865 15.44
1828 15.78 1841 15.70 1854     15.33     1866 15.43
1829 15.78 1842 15.87 1855 15.38 1867 15.57
1830 15.82 1843 15.93 1856 15.38     1868     15.59
1831 15.72 1844 15.85 1857 15.27 1869     15.60    
1832 15.73 1845 15.92 1858 15.38 1870 15.57
1833 15.93 1846 15.90 1859 15.19 1871 15.57
1834 15.73 1847 15.80 1860 15.29 1872 15.63
1835 15.80 1848 15.85

By the foregoing table it will be seen that in the three hundred and seventy-five years from 1497 to 1872 the maximum separation of the metals was only as 1 to 16.25—notwithstanding the widest divergencies during that long period in the yield of the two metals from the mines. It will be observed that all the later quotations are from the London market, but it is a significant fact that in France, where, by the law of 7 Germinal, An XI, (1803,) free coinage was permitted to both metals, at the ratio of 15½ of silver to 1 of gold, for a period of seventy years, and until the coinage of silver was limited, there was at no time the slightest variance from that relation.

When silver was deprived of the full money function, and all the money-work of society was placed on gold, the metals began to separate. The following table shows the degree of that separation from year to year:

Table showing the ratio of silver to 1 of gold since the demonetization of silver by Germany and the United States, and the closing of all mints of the western world to its free coinage:

1873       15.92 1882       18.19
1874       16.17 1883       18.64
1875       16.59 1884       18.57
1876       17.88 1885       19.41
1877       17.22 1886       20.78
1878       17.94 1887       21.13
1879       18.40 1888       21.99
1880       18.05 1889       22.10
1881       18.16

The foregoing figures show that it is only since the legislative proscription of silver by Germany and the United States, and the closing of all the European mints to its coinage, that any material change took place in the ratio between the two metals, which conclusively demonstrates that the present divergence in the relative values of the two metals is directly due to the legal outlawry of silver and not to natural causes.

Not only has the concurrent use of the two metals as money had the sanction of all time, but the approval of the greatest minds of history, and, when not blinded by self-interest, the approval of practical and experienced financial minds. So well recognized is this fact that I need only cite a few instances of such approval.

Alexander Hamilton said:

To annul the use of either of the metals as money is to abridge the quantity of circulating medium, and is liable to all the objections which arise from a comparison of the benefits of a full with the evils of a scanty circulation. (Report to Congress, 1791.)

Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Hamilton, indorsed this view, saying:

I return you the report on the mint. I concur with you that the unit must stand on both metals. (Letter to Hamilton, February, 1792.)

In his "Recherches sur l'or et sur l'argent," 1843, Léon Fanchet said:

If all the nations of Europe adopted the system of Great Britain, the price of gold would be raised beyond measure, and we should see produced in Europe a most lamentable result. The Government can not decree that legal tender shall be only gold, in place of silver, for that would be to decree a revolution, and the most dangerous of all, because it would be a revolution leading to unknown results (qui marcherait vers l'inconnu).

In a memoir read before the French Institute in 1868, M. Wolowski said:

The suppression of silver would bring on a veritable revolution. Gold would augment in value with a rapid and constant progress, which would break the faith of contracts and aggravate the situation of all debtors, including the nation. It would add at one stroke of the pen at least three milliards to the twelve milliards of the public debt.

In a debate in the French Senate on January 28, 1870, Senator Dumas eloquently pleaded for caution in dealing with a subject of such farreaching importance as the demonetization of one of the money metals. He said:

Those who approach these questions for the first time decide them at once. Those who study them with care hesitate. Those who are obliged practically to decide doubt and stop, overwhelmed with the weight of the enormous responsibility.

The quantities of the precious metals which are now sufficient may become insufficient, and we should proceed with great prudence before we diminish that which constitutes a part of the riches of the human race. Sometimes gold takes the place of silver. Sometimes silver takes the place of gold. This keeps up the general equilibrium. Nobody can guaranty that the present vast production of gold will continue. The placers are found on the surface of the earth, and may be exhausted by the very facility of working them. Silver presents itself in the form of subterranean veins. Science may contribute to accelerate its extraction. In presence of the unknown, which dominates the future, we should practice a prudent reserve.

Before a French monetary convention in 1869 testimony was given by M. Wolowski, by Baron Rothschild, and by M. Rouland, governor of the Bank of France.

M. Wolowski said:

The sum total of the precious metals is reckoned at fifty milliards, one-half gold and one-half silver. If, by a stroke of the pen, they suppress one of these metals in the monetary service, they double the demand for the other metal, to the ruin of all debtors.

M. Rouland, governor of the Bank of France, said:

We have not to do with ideal theories. The two moneys have actually co-existed since the origin of human society. They co-exist because the two together are necessary, by their quantity, to meet the needs of circulation. This necessity of the two metals, has it ceased to exist? Is it established that the quantity of actual and prospective gold is such that we can now renounce the use of silver without disaster?

Baron Rothschild said:

The simultaneous employment of the two precious metals is satisfactory and gives rise to no complaint. Whether gold or silver dominates for the time being, it is always true that the two metals concur together in forming the monetary circulation of the world, and it is the general mass of the two metals combined which serves as the measure of the value of things. The suppression of silver would amount to a veritable destruction of values without any compensation.

At the session (October 30, 1873) of the Belgian Monetary Commission, Professor Laveleye, one of the most luminous writers on economic subjects, said:

Debtors, and among them the state, have the right to pay in gold or silver, and this right can not be taken away without disturbing the relation of debtors and creditors, to the prejudice of debtors, to the extent of perhaps one-half, certainly of one-third. To increase all debts at a blow (brusquement) is a measure so violent, so revolutionary, that I can not believe that the Government will propose it or that the Chambers will vote it.

WHY WAS THE AUTOMATIC SYSTEM INTERFERED WITH?

Some thirteen years ago, as Chairman of the Monetary Commission appointed by Congress to investigate the causes of the changes in the relative values of the precious metals, I submitted to this body a report, in which I took occasion to refer to the motives which evidently influenced the creditor classes of the western world in destroying the automatic system of money. From that Report I quote as follows:

The world has generally favored, theoretically if not practically, the automatic metallic system, and adjusted its business to it. Some nations adopted one metal as their standard, and some the other, and some adopted both. Those that adopted both metals served as a balance-wheel to steady with exactness their relative value. The practical effect of all of this was the same as if all nations had adopted both, because it secured the entire stock of both at a fixed equivalency for the transaction of the business of the world. While some nations have changed their money metal, or, having had paper money, have resumed specie payments in one metal, the policy of a general demonetization of one of the metals was first broached only about twenty years ago. About ten years later a formidable propaganda was organized to fasten that policy upon the commercial world.

This new school of financial theorists advocate the retention of metal as the material of money, but favor its subjection to governmental interference in every respect. Whenever new mines are discovered, or old ones yield or promise to yield more abundantly, instead of freely accepting their product in accordance with the automatic theory, they advocate its rejection through the restriction or the absolute prohibition of the coinage of either or both metals, or through the limitation or the abolition of the legal-tender function of one of them. Whenever the interests of the creditor and income classes seem to be in danger of being impaired by an increase in the volume and decrease in the value of money, or in other words, by a general rise in prices, these modern theorists are clamorous in double-standard countries for the demonetization of one of the money metals, and in single-standard countries for the shifting of the money function from the metal which promises the most to the one that promises the least abundant supply. They are extremely anxious for the retention of the material of which the money-standard is composed when such material is rising in value and prices are falling, and exceedingly apprehensive of the evil and inconvenience which they predict as sure to result from changing it.

Whenever a fall in prices occurs, through either a natural or artificial contraction in the volume of money, they maintain that it is due to antecedent inflation and extravagance, or to overproduction through persistent and reckless industry; if the contraction be natural, that it can not be helped, and if artificial, that though it may inflict great temporary losses on the masses of the people, it will be sure to result in their ultimate benefit, and they console the sufferers with the comforting assurance that such contraction is necessary in order to reach the lowest depths of that "hard pan" whose foundations they have previously undermined by demonetizing one of the metals, and upon which alone they claim that money, capital, and labor can securely and harmoniously rest. But when the material composing the standard is falling in value and prices are rising, they immediately discover that the maintenance of the value of the standard is the all-important consideration, and that its material is of no importance whatever and should be at once changed to "redress the situation." After having reduced one of the metals to a commodity by depriving it of the money function, these theorists complacently point to the resulting fluctuations in the value as a justification of the act producing them, and as a conclusive proof of the unfitness for money of the demonetized metal. * * *

Metallic money, on this theory, is no longer automatic, but is as completely subjected to governmental control for all injurious purposes as paper money. But, unlike paper money, the control over this kind of metallic money can only be exercised in the baneful direction of decreasing its volume, and thereby making property cheaper and money scarcer and dearer.

This is a one-sided system, which can operate only in the interest of the security creditor, the usurer, and pawnbroker, whom it enables, through the falling prices which itself occasions, to swallow up the shrunken resources of the debtor, but is impotent to protect the interests of the unsecured business creditor, the debtor, or society, when, from any cause, the supply of the money metals becomes deficient.

The world has expended a vast amount of labor in the production of the precious metals, and has made great sacrifices in upholding the automatic metallic system of money, and has a right to insist that it shall be consistently let alone to work out its own conclusions, or that it be abandoned.

The history of the subsequent struggle to remonetize silver only serves to illustrate and emphasize the correctness of that statement of the case.

Between 1810 and 1849, according to Tooke and Newmarch (recognized authorities on the subject), gold increased in value 145 per cent. which is equivalent to a fall in the general range of prices of 59 per cent. No movement was then made or suggestion offered by the debtors, or by any class of the community, to add any new money-metal to the metals already in use, with the view of increasing the volume of money, so that the equity of time contracts might be maintained, and the value of the unit of money kept at a steady and unchanging level.

But as soon as the discoveries of gold were made in the alluvial deposits of California and Australia, or rather as soon as it was suspected that money would thereby become considerably increased in volume, the annuitants and income classes, the creditors everywhere, took steps to avert what they characterized as a great calamity. They openly declared their purpose, by every means in their power, to prevent a decline in the value of money, so that the purchasing power of their incomes might not be reduced. They determined to go to any length in order to prevent the rise of prices which their aggressive instincts led them to fear would follow the additions to the money volume of the world by the natural and much needed yield of the mines.

The fiat therefore went forth that one of the metals must be discarded.

THE PROPOSITION FIRST MADE TO DEMONETIZE GOLD.

If anything were needed to demonstrate that the reason for the demonetization of silver was the cupidity of the creditor classes—the money-lenders, annuitants, and those in receipt of fixed incomes—and that it was not any defect inhering in the metal silver, nor any change in its adaptability to subserve the purposes of money, it is to be found in the significant fact that the metal first selected for demonetization was not silver but gold—that metal which has since become the idol of the money-changers, and which is now declared to be the only "natural" money. The openly-avowed determination was to increase the value of money, and in order to accomplish that purpose the metal which promised the largest yield was to be condemned and stripped of its ancient monetary function. So strongly was this determination set forth, so earnestly was it presented, and so urgently pressed on the ground of duty that its achievement came to be regarded as the fulfillment of a high moral purpose.

It was with gold then as it came to be with silver afterward, and as it always is with whatever interferes with the interests of privileged classes, intrenched in power and prerogative,—the determination to destroy it being arrived at, measures were taken to prove that the public good required its destruction. While the purpose was to discard the metal, whether gold or silver, which threatened most immediately and seriously to reduce the purchasing power of money, the argument was that a decrease in the purchasing power of money was a calamity against the happening of which every energy should be directed.

The privileged classes found then, as they find now, able and ingenious advocates and defenders among the literary and educated guilds of the period. The celebrated De Quincy, in England, attempted to prove, and to his own satisfaction did prove upon figures drawn from his fears and a brilliant imagination, that the least yield of gold to be expected from the mines of California and Australia for an indefinite period in the future, was the yearly sum of $350,000,000.

M. Chevalier, in France, vehemently proclaimed the necessity of discarding one of the money metals, and that one not silver but gold. In his work upon the "Fall of Gold" M. Chevalier, in 1856, said:

The quantity of gold annually thrown on the general market approaches in round numbers a milliard of francs ($200,000,000). Those two countries (California and Australia) must yet for a long series of years produce gold in such quantities and on such conditions as to render a marked decline in its value inevitable.

It is absolutely certain that so vast a production should be accompanied with a great reduction in value.

In no direction can a new outlet be seen sufficiently large to absorb the extraordinary production of gold which we are now witnessing, so as to prevent a fall in its value.

Unless, then, we possess a very robust faith in the immobility of human affairs, we must regard the fall in the value of gold as an event for which we should prepare without loss of time.

The "preparation" which Chevalier advocated was the discarding of that metal which gave promise of the greatest abundance. He did not attempt to hide his purpose. He boldly stated that his object was to enhance the value of money. This object was also clearly expressed on a later occasion by another distinguished advocate of dear money, Mr. Victor Bonnet, of France, in the Journal des Economistes. He said:

The world is now saturated with the precious metals, and if there is any danger against which it is necessary to guard, it is that this saturation should become greater. * * *

If the annual production of gold is now reduced to 500,000,000 francs, let us thank Heaven for it, and let us wish that it may not be too rapidly increased, whereby we should be embarrassed. It is the too great abundance and not the scarcity of metallic money which is to be apprehended.

GOLD DEMONETIZED.

In 1857 the German states and Austria demonetized gold; and had it not been for the opposition of France, which insisted on retaining the double standard, the movement might have become general on the continent. With England, however, nothing could be done. More than a generation had passed since it had declared for the single standard of gold, and its creditors and income classes—the shrewdest, most adept, and watchful of financiers—did not believe that the large yields of gold would long continue.

The creditor classes of the continent, finding England immovable and realizing that the object sought by the English creditors was identical with their own, namely, the increase in the value of money and the depression of prices, concluded that the common purpose could be as well served by the demonetization of one as by that of the other. This conclusion was emphasized by developments on the Comstock lode whose bountiful and beneficent yield of silver was the fitting supplement to the great discoveries of gold on the Pacific coast. The danger of a decline in the value of money was more imminent than ever. The annuitants became alarmed. Commissions were sent from Europe to the Pacific coast to investigate the subject. The United States, too, sent a commissioner to examine into the condition and prospects of the Comstock, and, imbued with many of the characteristics of De Quincey and Chevalier, the United States commissioner, in 1868, reported that if all other mines were worked with the machinery used on the Comstock "their yield would flood the world."

Like many of the present opponents of silver he was endowed with the gift of prophecy, and accordingly we find him confidently predicting that other and innumerable rich lodes of silver would be found on the Pacific coast which would be worked with great profit. The attack on gold was immediately changed to a combined attack on silver. From that period till the present no means have been left untried to belittle and degrade that metal, and also to disparage those who are in favor of continuing it as one of the money metals of the world.

It was then announced with all the dogmatism of authority that silver was unfit to be used as money. Defects were suddenly discovered in it that the scrutiny of three thousand years had failed to disclose. Its weight and bulk were found to be insuperable obstacles to its use as money. Yet the specific gravity of silver is no greater now than it has been for all the ages during which it has been used as money by all mankind, nor is it any heavier or more bulky than it was in 1851 or 1857, when Belgium, Germany, and Austria demonetized gold and made the "heavy," "bulky," and "inconvenient" metal, silver, their only money metal. Silver can now be transported from place to place with less risk and at no greater expense than gold, and at much less cost than at any previous period in the history of the world.

The objection that silver is too heavy for the pocket is an objection common to all metallic money. We see hardly any gold in circulation in this country—infinitely less than of silver. When our people have a choice as to the form in which they will take money they prefer paper representatives as being the most convenient. The extraordinary perfection to which the arts of the engraver and paper maker have been brought gives paper money a security against counterfeiting and imitation far superior to any immunity which can be claimed for the metals. The marvellous inventions of modern times in the form of safes and vault-locks render it a matter of practically no risk to store the metals, both silver and gold, so that paper representatives of them may be issued. These representatives are preferred by the general mass of the people, and have almost entirely occupied the channels of circulation to the exclusion of both metals. A silver certificate for $1,000 weighs no more than a gold certificate for the same amount.

THE MOTIVE FOR DEMONETIZING SILVER.

The motive for the demonetization of silver was precisely the same that had previously inspired the demonetization of gold. The object was to demonetize one of the metals—that metal which promised the greatest abundance, and which would contribute most largely to maintaining at an equitable level the general range of prices. The motive in both cases was to aggrandize the privileged classes—the income and the creditor classes of the world—and by means of a subtle and sinister manipulation of the money volume, whose effects it is not always easy to trace to their true cause, to practically confiscate the reward of the hard toil of the masses. To all intent and purpose the design was to establish a new system of slavery for the western world, of which the debtor classes among the white races should be the victims.

When demonetization was determined on there was no pretense that there was any difficulty in maintaining a parity between the two metals at the established ratio.

In the official résumé of the doings of the French monetary commission of 1869 the arguments upon both sides were summed up.

In behalf of the gold standard it was said:

The rise in price which has taken place within twenty years in a great number of articles of merchandise is evidently due to many causes, such as war, bad harvests, and increase in consumption; but it is very probable that the depreciation of the precious metals has contributed to it, since there has been a striking coincidence between the rise of prices and the production of the new mines of gold and silver. The annual production of the two metals, which was only $80,000,000 in 1847, exceeds now $200,000,000. It has nearly tripled, and it is easy to see that the real value of the metals has diminished. It is difficult to estimate exactly what the diminution is, but whatever it may be it demands the attention of governments, because it affects unfavorably all that portion of the population whose income, remaining nominally the same, undergoes a yearly diminution of purchasing power. As governments control the weight and standard of money, they ought so far as possible to assure its value. And as it is admitted that the tendency of the metals is to depreciate, this tendency should be arrested by demonetizing one of them.

In behalf of the double standard it was replied as follows: