On July 12th the board met and organized, electing me as chairman. The decisions of the board were to be binding for one year and thereafter could be terminated by either side upon a thirty days' notice. For two weeks we held hearings, morning and afternoon, at the Oriental Hotel, Manhattan Beach, New York. When the hearings were over, the board adjourned until early September, when the work of making the awards was begun. Because of my nomination for Governor by the Progressive Party at the time, I found it advisable to relinquish the chairmanship of the board to Dr. Van Hise, although I continued my membership and active interest to the end.
The hearings were reported and consisted of 1250 pages of testimony. The questions that confronted the board were not alone whether or not the wages in a given case should be raised, but, if it was found that the rate was inadequate, by what margin should it be increased? It was fairly difficult to arrive at principles of standardization applicable to so many roads, and to fix a basis of differentiation for the many and complicated branches of employment. The whole subject, however, had our most careful and painstaking consideration. We took up the whole intricate problem of the running of railroads, with relation to the several kinds of work performed by the engineers, in passenger service, freight service, in switching, and in yard work, bearing in mind always that railways were public utilities and that the necessities and comfort of the whole people depended upon their functioning; and that therefore the necessity for uninterrupted service far transcended the interests of either the roads on the one side or the employees on the other.
Our decisions as finally printed made a book of one hundred and twenty-three pages. One of our chief recommendations was that National and State wage commissions be created which should function in relation to labor engaged in public utilities as the public service commissions functioned toward capital. I quote from the report:
Especially for the public utilities is it important that labor should have a just wage, and if the existing wages are not adequate, they should be increased. If a just increase in wages places the public utilities in a position that does not enable them to secure a fair return upon capital invested and maintain a proper reserve, they should be allowed to increase their rates until they are in that position.
Another point upon which we laid stress was the limitation of the right to strike:
While it is clear from the public point of view that a concerted strike of railway employees for a great region would be as intolerable as a strike of the postal clerks; on the other hand, the position of the employees is a very natural one. They feel under existing conditions that the power to strike is their only weapon of defense against employers and the only means by which they can enforce a betterment of their conditions of service. They realize, too, that the principle of concerted action, for all the railroads in a great section of the country, gives them a most effective weapon, and they are naturally loath to relinquish or impair it.
While this is the situation under the present conditions, and the railway employees feel that they cannot surrender their right to strike, the necessity would no longer exist for the exercise of this power, if there were a wage commission which would secure them just wages.
Finally, it is the belief of the Board that in the last analysis the only solution—unless we are to rely solely upon the restraining power of public opinion—is to qualify the principle of free contract in the railroad service. A strike in the army or navy is mutiny and universally punished as such. The same principle is applied to seamen because of the public necessity involved. A strike among postal clerks, as among the teachers of our public schools, would be unthinkable. In all these cases, the employment, to borrow a legal phrase, is affected with a public use; and this of necessity qualifies the right of free concerted action which exists in private employments.
However, if the principle be accepted that there are certain classes of service thus affected with a public interest and men who enter them are not free concertedly to quit the service, then these men must be guarded in the matter of wages and conditions by public protection; and this it is believed can best be done through an interstate wage commission.
The report was signed by six members of the board, Mr. Willard adding an explanatory statement. Mr. Morrissey wrote a dissenting opinion. For a number of years the findings of this board, with slight alterations, continued to be effective in adjusting wages for the different kinds of service among the engineers, and in governing conditions and number of working hours of the employees.
The President's Industrial Conference of 1919-20, of which I was a member, was of value chiefly in that it correlated the best ideas in practice throughout the country with regard to the prevention and relief of industrial unrest and the betterment in general of the relationship between employer and employee, and that it published suggestions based on these ideas, of which the main points were the following:
1. The parties to the dispute may voluntarily submit their differences for settlement to a board, known as a Regional Adjustment Conference. This board consists of four representatives selected by the parties, and four others in their industry chosen by them and familiar with their problems. The board is presided over by a trained government official, the regional chairman, who acts as a conciliator. If a unanimous agreement is reached, it results in a collective bargain having the same effect as if reached by joint organization in the shop.
2. If the Regional Conference fails to agree unanimously, the matter, with certain restrictions, goes, under the agreement of submission, to the National Industrial Board, unless the parties prefer the decision of an umpire selected by them.
3. The voluntary submission to a Regional Adjustment Conference carries with it an agreement by both parties that there shall be no interference with production pending the processes of adjustment.
4. If the parties, or either of them, refuse voluntarily to submit the dispute to the processes of the plan of adjustment, a Regional Board of Inquiry is formed by the regional chairman, of two employers and two employees from the industry, and not parties to the dispute. This Board has the right, under proper safeguards, to subpoena witnesses and records, and the duty to publish its findings as a guide to public opinion.
5. The National Industrial Board in Washington has general oversight of the working of the plan.
6. The plan is applicable also to public utilities, but in such cases, the government agency, having power to regulate the service, has two representatives in the Adjustment Conference. Provision is made for prompt report of its findings to the rate regulating body. The Conference makes no recommendation of a plan to cover steam railroads and other carriers, for which legislation has recently been enacted by Congress. (Esch-Cummins Bill.)
7. The plan provides machinery for prompt and fair adjustment of wages and working conditions of government employees. It is especially necessary for this class of employees, who should not be permitted to strike.
8. The plan involves no penalties other than those imposed by public opinion. It does not impose compulsory arbitration. It does not deny the right to strike. It does not submit to arbitration the policy of the "closed" or "open" shop.
9. The plan is national in scope and operation, yet it is decentralized. It is different from anything in operation elsewhere. It is based upon American experience and is designed to meet American conditions. It employs no legal authority except the right of inquiry. Its basic idea is stimulation to settlement of differences by the parties in conflict, and the enlistment of public opinion toward enforcing that method of settlement.
Unfortunately nothing came of the painstaking work of this conference beyond the publishing of its final report of March 6, 1920.
The chairmanship of the New York Public Service Commission did not at all appeal to me when first Governor Whitman offered it to me. The commission as it then existed had unfortunately lost public confidence to a large extent, and I felt that it was not the kind of service for which I was especially qualified. However, it was pointed out to me that there was constant danger of strikes on the part of the thousands of workmen engaged in the construction of subway and elevated extensions, and an added appeal was made to me in view of the considerable experience I had had in adjusting labor difficulties. And so, after declining, I was finally prevailed upon by the Governor and the late George W. Perkins, in December, 1915, to accept this arduous duty.
As soon as it became known that I had accepted the chairmanship, the Governor received a communication from William Henry Hodge, the distinguished engineer, announcing his willingness to serve on the commission, although before my selection he had refused such appointment. The other members of the commission were: Charles E. Hervey, William Hayward, and Traverse H. Whitney. Messrs. Hayward and Hodge left the commission, when we entered the war, to join the army. Mr. Hayward was commissioned Colonel, having organized the 15th New York, afterward the 369th United States Infantry, a regiment of colored men who performed gallant service in France. Mr. Hodge was commissioned Major and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, and gave his splendid talents to the services of his country in building roads to the battle fronts of France. Due to his strenuous labors over there, this gifted engineer and exemplary patriot died shortly after the armistice.
The commission had charge of the building of the subways and elevated lines then in process, as well as the regulation of traffic and all public utilities. As the war progressed, it became clearer that our country would inevitably be drawn in, and therefore increasingly important that nothing should prevent the functioning of our public utilities. And accordingly it was not long before my services as adjuster and arbitrator of labor difficulties were needed. The cost of living was rapidly rising, and there was great unrest among laborers; and the demand for skilled and unskilled labor grew day by day. When our country entered the war, it was highly important for the moral effect upon our own people, as well as to avoid giving encouragement to our enemies, that the transportation system of our greatest metropolis should operate without interruption. During the following year and a half I was able to adjust a dozen or more important labor disputes and to prevent a number of strikes. The situation was complicated by the fact that the laborers were not employees of the commission, but of the several contractors to whom contracts had been awarded under conditions of fierce competition, so that every increase in wages materially affected their profits and in the end caused many of them to suffer considerable loss. I had to appeal to the patriotism of both sides, and it is a pleasure to be able to state that in every instance the response was most gratifying.
Roosevelt offers me a place in his Cabinet—I retire permanently from private business—I become Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor—-The scope of the department—My bureau chiefs—At home in the Venetian Palace—Cabinet dinners—What Roosevelt drank—Roosevelt's fondness for terrapin—South Carolina labor immigration—The Japanese question; the "Gentlemen's Agreement"; General Kuroki's visit; the courts and Japanese naturalization—My trip to Hawaii; Viscount Ishii—Japanese transits between Canada and Mexico; Japanese immigration statistics; I suggest a naturalization treaty with Japan—Anti-Japanese agitation renewed in California—The Four Power Treaty of the Washington Conference—Immigration head tax immunity for diplomats—Revision of naturalization laws; prevention of fraudulent naturalization—More frequent steamboat inspection —The Alaskan salmon fisheries—Organization of the Council of Commerce, predecessor to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States—The Council of Labor—Roosevelt's Nobel Peace Prize Foundation—A visit to Georgia; my old homes at Columbus and Talbotton—Quentin Roosevelt—Social life in Washington; Christmas celebration in the White House; the President's New Year's reception; I give the last Cabinet dinner.
Before I became a member of President Roosevelt's official family, I was in what he termed his "kitchen cabinet." My experiences in both cabinets are among the treasured recollections of my life.
We were the unofficial advisers who met round the luncheon and dinner table and afterwards in the White House study, where the President spoke without reserve of his executive problems and read for our criticism and counsel his rough drafts of congressional messages, speeches, and notes to foreign governments.
Holding no portfolios of state, these "kitchen cabinet ministers" yet gave of their best; were always prepared to toil to any extent to be of assistance to the President. He had the quality of vitalizing things—a situation or condition coming within his executive ken became so charged with life and imagination that men wanted to put their hands and minds to it. They served Roosevelt as energetically and loyally as if the grave responsibilities of state were upon their own shoulders.
International relations and labor arbitration were the public activities which interested me most. The President had appointed me a member of the permanent board of arbitration at The Hague to succeed the late Benjamin Harrison, and shortly thereafter in his charming manner had designated me as a member of his "kitchen cabinet." Thus there had commenced for me a memorable series of conferences.
There is much misapprehension regarding Roosevelt's so-called impulsiveness. This was evident to those who had an intimate view of the man at work. He was quick. He was a prodigious worker. He was so constituted and so self-trained that he had to do things immediately, get them out of the way. What people called his impulsiveness might have been more aptly termed his preparedness.
I had hundreds of opportunities to observe his methods. When he accepted an invitation to deliver an address or write an article, he would prepare it immediately, even if the occasion were two, three, or six months off. He revised considerably, showed his work freely to friends and associates for criticisms, but completed it at the earliest opportunity. He never waited. This method served to perfect his thought and expression on a given subject. His promptness left him free for other things.
The President never seemed to be hurried, though he always worked with a wonderful driving force. He seemed never to waste any time. It was play or work, and both with his whole heart.
His public addresses were almost invariably the result of preparation. It was seldom that he spoke extemporaneously. The fire and animation which he imparted in the delivery of his speeches certainly conveyed no impression that they might have been carefully prepared and considered at a desk in a study. The pages of his manuscript were so small and inconspicuous that they did not interfere with his natural gestures. The effect was almost as if he spoke extemporaneously. The written address, printed on sheets about 3 × 6 inches, and held in one hand, was completely lost sight of by the audience in those moments when Colonel Roosevelt became emphatic. In those moments he also interspersed extemporaneous remarks which brought out his arguments more vividly and forcefully.
I stopped in Washington and called on President Roosevelt, early in January of 1906, on my return from a short vacation in the South. He took me into his private room, where we found his personal and political friend, James H. Sheffield, and Senator Spooner. He spoke about the political changes in New York, the defeat of the machine in that State, the election of Herbert Parsons as chairman of the County Committee, and of young Wadsworth (now United States Senator), son-in-law of John Hay, as Speaker of the House. He took a special delight in the election of both of these men; he had a high regard for them personally and for what they stood. He said he had written a letter to Parsons which he hoped would be helpful to him.
The President asked me to come to lunch with him, which was another of those delightful, informal meetings. Besides Mrs. Roosevelt, his daughter Alice, and her fiancé, there were William Dudley Foulke, a former colleague of the President on the Civil Service Commission and friend of mine from my college days; Robert Hitt son of Congressman Hitt; and Lieutenant Fortesque, an officer of the Rough Riders.
After luncheon, the President asked me to wait for him in the Red Room, as he wanted to have a talk with me. When the other guests had departed, he came back to me and with his face beaming with geniality he said: "I don't know whether you know it or not, but I want you to become a member of my Cabinet. I have a very high estimate of your character, your judgment, and your ability, and I want you for personal reasons. There is still a further reason: I want to show Russia and some other countries what we think of the Jews in this country."
Of course I was gratified, very much gratified. I told him I had heard from several persons that he had spoken of this intention, but that I had meant to take no notice of it until he should speak to me about it; that I should certainly esteem it the very highest honor to become a member of the Cabinet, and especially to have the privilege of working alongside of him.
"I knew you would feel just that way; therefore I was anxious to let you know of my intention as long in advance as possible," replied the President. He said all this in such a cordial and affectionate manner that I was profoundly touched with this manifestation of close friendship for me.
He then added that he could not see that it would do any good, and might do harm, to make further protests or utterances regarding the massacres in Russia under the disorganized conditions there; and he did not want to do anything that might sound well here and have just the opposite effect there. He thought it would be much more pointed evidence of our Government's interest if he put a man like me into his Cabinet, and that such a course would doubtless have a greater influence than any words with the countries in which unreasonable discrimination and prejudice prevailed.
He told me that it might be July or even later before he could carry out his purpose. He would prefer to put me at the head of the Department of Commerce and Labor, because of my knowledge in that field, but he could not determine the specific position until later. But at any rate, I was to regard my appointment to one of the Cabinet positions as certain.
He asked whether I knew Senator Platt, and indicated that it might be well for several of my friends to have a talk with the Senator. But he quickly added that it would make no difference to him whether it suited the New York Senator or not, though it might perhaps be a little more agreeable if I did not have the latter's opposition. I preferred to feel that my selection was personal, which it really was, and without even the semblance of political influence; so I did not ask any of my friends to speak to Senator Platt, nor did I think he would oppose me.
My wife and the rest of my family were of course elated at hearing the news, particularly my brother Isidor, whose attitude toward me, his youngest brother, was always more like that of an affectionate father than a brother. I felt no trepidation, especially should I be selected for the Department of Commerce and Labor. My past training and interest in many of the subjects that came up under that department made me conversant with the main questions it had to administer.
Upon my return to New York I began to make arrangements for severing all business connections. This I thought wise, particularly if I became head of the Department of Commerce and Labor. It was not a necessary step, but I wanted it never to be said that I advocated any measure or made any decision that might in the remotest way be of advantage to my private interests. I spoke to Roosevelt about my intention, and he said that while it was not essential, if I could do so it would on the whole be advisable; that situated similarly he would do the same thing himself. Before assuming office, therefore, I had retired from business for good, and I have not since that time been connected with any business for personal profit.
My nomination was officially made in September, but it was not until early December, 1906, that I received a letter from William Loeb, Jr., the President's secretary, notifying me that the President desired me to assume office on December 17th. On that day, accordingly, I appeared at 9 A.M. at the Department of Commerce and Labor, then located in the Willard Building across the street from the Hotel Willard on Fourteenth Street. There I met my predecessor, Victor H. Metcalf, who had been appointed Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Metcalf welcomed me in a brief address and introduced me to the twelve bureau and five division chiefs of the department.
The Department of Commerce and Labor was the youngest of the nine departments of the Government, the bill creating it having been approved by President Roosevelt on February 14, 1903. Roosevelt had done much to establish the department and took great pride in it. The first Secretary of Commerce and Labor was George B. Cortelyou, who had been secretary to the President, and by reason of his intimate relations with the officials of the Government was admirably equipped to organize this department, which he did with great skill and administrative ability. After holding the office for about a year and a half, Secretary Cortelyou became Postmaster-General, and Victor H. Metcalf, Congressman from California, was appointed, thereby becoming the next Secretary of the Department on July 1, 1904; I was therefore the third.
The scope of the Department as constituted then was probably the largest of the nine branches of the Government. It was charged with the work of promoting the commerce, mining, manufacturing, shipping, and fishery industries of the country, as well as its transportation facilities and its labor interests; in addition it had jurisdiction over the entire subject of immigration. It had twelve bureaus: corporations; manufactures; labor; lighthouses; census; coast and geodetic survey; statistics, including foreign commerce; steamboat inspection; immigration and naturalization; and standards.
In order to coördinate the work of these various bureaus I instituted the simple method employed by large business administrators of having the several bureau chiefs come together with me twice a month to discuss and confer regarding the more important administrative subjects. This enabled me to keep better informed and served to make the various heads of bureaus conversant with the whole scope of the Department, preventing overlapping and duplication of functions. I learned that this simple administrative method had never been made use of before in federal departments, but thereafter it was adopted by several of the other department heads.
Thanks to Mr. Cortelyou's admirable organization of the department, I found, almost without exception, a fine and competent set of men in charge of its several branches. Some of them were friends of Roosevelt, members of his "tennis cabinet," and were thoroughly imbued with his spirit and ideals. The assistant secretary was Lawrence O. Murray, a capable and conscientious official. James R. Garfield, chief of the Bureau of Corporations, devoted himself to the difficult task of exposing the abuses and legal infractions of some of the great corporations, and did it with judgment and ability, and with conspicuous courage. Charles P. Neill, chief of the Bureau of Labor, a laboring man in his early days, and afterwards an instructor at Notre Dame, and professor of economics at the Catholic University, in Washington, D.C., was eminently qualified for his duties and had the confidence alike of labor leaders and employers. Dr. Samuel W. Stratton, a scientist of distinction and a fine administrator, was then chief of the Bureau of Standards, a veritable institution of science.
Fortunately, when the Department of Commerce and Labor was organized, the civil service law applied to all appointments excepting bureau chiefs, so that I was able to devote my time to the duties of my office, free from claims of patronage, which had been the bane of the older departments of the Government before the civil service law became so generally operative.
My wife had so promptly put our household in order that in a week after our arrival, we were comfortably installed in our Washington home, No. 2600 Sixteenth Street, a house known as the "Venetian Palace" from the style of its architecture. It was a new house, built by Mrs. John B. Henderson, and well suited to our needs and for entertaining. The social functions in Washington I found most agreeable. During the season we either gave a dinner or attended a dinner on an average of five evenings a week, but these occasions were not burdensome because they usually ended by ten-thirty o'clock.
According to custom, President Roosevelt at the beginning of the season designated the date on which each Cabinet member was to give a dinner to the President, and the date assigned to me was February 19th. It had been usual for each host to invite to this dinner all the other Cabinet members and their wives, which left little opportunity to invite others. Roosevelt changed this custom so that other friends of the host were invited rather than one's fellow members in the Cabinet. Foreign diplomats also were not invited, the entire purpose being to give these occasions the character of intimate gatherings, not large, usually from eighteen to twenty-five guests.
Our dinner went pleasantly. The President was in his usual good humor. Wines were served liberally, but it was Roosevelt's habit to drink very little. This I had observed on several previous occasions, both at the White House and elsewhere. Roosevelt usually took some white wine with apollinaris, and perhaps a glass of champagne. For this dinner my wife had secured the additional services of a certain colored cook in Washington, a woman famous for preparing terrapin, which was one of Roosevelt's favorite dishes.
Tuesday and Friday mornings, beginning at eleven o'clock, were the regular days for the meetings of the Cabinet, then as now. The day after taking office, therefore, I attended my first meeting, taking the chair assigned to me. It was labeled on the back "Secretary of Commerce and Labor, December 17, 1906."
The Cabinet table is oblong, the President seated at the head, and to his right and his left the secretaries in the order in which their departments were created—Secretary of State first to the President's right, Secretary of the Treasury first to the left, and so on. Being head of the ninth and youngest Department, my seat was at the foot of the table, opposite the President.
The meetings were informal and no minutes were taken or other record made. After some brief preliminary talk, in which the President often had some incident to relate or some amusing caricature or savage attack upon himself to exhibit, the business of the day began. The President calls on every secretary, but in no fixed order. He presents such matters as he may deem important, and upon which he may want discussion and advice.
At this meeting I intended not to bring up anything, preferring to wait, as the saying is, until I got "warm in my seat." But an important matter had come up that very morning upon which I had made a decision, based on the carefully reasoned opinion by the solicitor of the department, Mr. Charles Earl. The State of South Carolina, under one of its recent laws, had authorized its State Commissioner of Immigration to go to Europe and select a number of skilled factory hands for the industrial establishments of the State. There were about four hundred and fifty of these immigrants, and there was some question about admitting them. The Immigration Law of 1903, as well as previous laws, excepted the State from its contract labor clauses, and I therefore decided upon their admission.
Indeed, no subject in the department occupied my daily attention to the extent that immigration did. Fortunately, at the chief port of entry, Ellis Island in the New York Bay, there was a capable, conscientious, efficient commissioner, Robert Watchorn.
The right of the immigrant to land, after his medical examination, was based upon the decision of a board of inquiry. This board often made hurried and ill-considered decisions, especially when the immigration was large. In the case of exclusion, the immigrant has the right to appeal to the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor. Of course, cases coming under certain portions of the exclusion provisions, such as contract labor, mental deficiency, affliction with loathsome and contagious diseases, were easily enough disposed of; but under the provision "Likely to become a public charge" there was room for the personal attitude of the members of the board, and the fate of the immigrant then depended on whether or not these men were restrictionists. I felt that there was a domestic tragedy involved in every one of these cases, and as the law placed the ultimate decision upon the Secretary, I decided this responsibility was one that should not be delegated; so day by day I took up these decisions myself, frequently taking the papers home with me and carefully reviewing them before retiring.
Important among the immigration subjects were those which presented phases of the Japanese question, the immigration en masse of Japanese to the Pacific Coast States, California in particular. The question was brought up by Secretary Root at one of the Cabinet meetings. The city of San Francisco had taken action excluding Japanese from the public schools. It was deemed detrimental for the white children of tender ages to be in the same classes with older and even adult Japanese who came to these schools to learn English. My predecessor, who was a resident of California, had investigated and was conversant with all aspects of the case.
The President insisted that, as it directly affected the relations between the two nations, it was a national concern. Several members of the Cabinet also regarded the subject as one having serious probabilities. Secretary Root asked me whether I could furnish some data as to the use made of Hawaii by Japanese immigrants for circumventing our contract labor law, as many of the Japanese immigrants were coming to the mainland via Hawaii. Upon looking into this question I found during the year previous fully two thirds of the Japanese came via Hawaii. The President took the situation in hand and had the mayor of San Francisco and other leaders of the Japanese agitation come to Washington.
The obnoxious matter was finally adjusted with Japan in a manner to allay irritation by a "Gentlemen's Agreement," by which that country itself was to prevent the emigration of its laboring classes. It was, of course, much better that the Japanese interdict emigration of their own people than that we offend that nation's pride by preventing their entrance, although it was made clear that we should pass an exclusion law if they did not take prompt and effective action.
With some exceptions, this plan worked well. The whole Japanese question, however, was still smouldering. A few months later, during a call at the Department, the Japanese ambassador mentioned to me that in some parts of the Pacific Coast the Japanese were being molested in the streets and that, of course, such things made bad blood and stirred up the people in Japan, with which I had to agree. I admitted that this was an outrage, stating that I was sure our respective governments would do all in their power to maintain good relations, to which he replied that he did not see how those good relations could be disturbed.
Ambassador Aoki then referred to the naturalization of his countrymen in the United States. I told him that on that question I agreed entirely with the President, who in one of his recent speeches had dwelt emphatically on it, advocating laws for the naturalization of Japanese the same as accorded to other aliens. He then mentioned the Executive Order of the President with reference to Japanese immigration and the regulations for the enforcement of it. I told him I had these regulations in hand and he could rely upon me to make them so as to avoid every possible friction and reflect in every way the broad and liberal spirit of the administration; also that under the immigration act the matter was to a large extent in the control of Japan in issuing limited passports to the special classes affected, namely, skilled and unskilled labor.
After one of the Cabinet meetings I had a conversation with Secretary Root and submitted to him redrafted regulations for any suggestion or amendment that might appear to him desirable, for I was anxious that the Secretary of State should give the regulations critical examination, in view of their affecting our relations with Japan. He returned them to me within a few days with one or two slight changes, which I adopted, and out of them grew the "limited passports" provision of the Immigration Act of 1907.
From time to time I brought up the Japanese situation and emphasized that I regarded it in a most serious light. Meanwhile, whenever the opportunity presented itself I did whatever was possible to promote good-will between the two countries. Japan's great military chief, General Tamemoto Kuroki, paid a visit to the United States, and was given a gala dinner at the Hotel Astor in New York, following ovations to him all the way across the continent from the time he landed at San Francisco. There were over a thousand guests. Admiral Dewey was presiding officer; John H. Finley was toastmaster, and it was felt he was particularly chosen, being president of the College of the City of New York, because of the protest this would imply against the exclusion of Japanese children from the San Francisco public schools. I was invited to deliver an address, in which I said:
The Government and people of Japan, not unmindful of the good-will and early friendship of our country, are too wise to permit the San Francisco school incident, which was fostered by ignorance and propagated by injustice, to cloud their just appreciation of the enlightened spirit of American institutions.
Captain Tanaka, of General Kuroki's staff, had handed me in translation a message that the General had prepared for the American people, which I read in the course of my address. It was as follows:
The Japanese people love peace. They fought for peace. My nation wants peace in which to develop the opportunities that are hers. We have no other desire.
The profession which I have the misfortune to follow is noble only because sometimes it is necessary to establish conditions in which peace may be maintained and in which the arts of peace may flourish.
To this I added that nobler sentiments never fell from the lips of a conquering hero, and they would stand beside those uttered by our hero of the Appomattox: "Let us have peace." This was received with much enthusiasm.
Early in June, 1907, there was another outbreak in San Francisco against the restaurant keepers, and telegrams from Tokyo told of the irritation this caused among the people in Japan. At the Cabinet meeting I took the subject up again with considerable emphasis. I pointed out that these incidents were accumulating and were bristling with grave consequences; that Japan had come into the front rank among nations and could not afford to permit us or any other nation to slap her, as it were, in the face, or to treat her even in small things as a nation of inferior race. I brought up the subject of Japanese naturalization. As the law stood, a Japanese could not be naturalized, according to the rulings of one or two judges of the United States courts; but the subject had never been finally decided. A short time previous to this a Japanese seaman in Florida had filed a petition for naturalization which was granted, and I referred the matter to the Attorney-General to see whether that would not afford an incident wherewith to test the law. But no action was taken.
At first the President did not seem to attach to the subject the importance that I did, but Secretary Root immediately spoke up that he agreed with my view of it, and as the discussion went along, the rest of the Cabinet, as well as the President, gradually came over to my view. At the end the President remarked: "I am very glad you brought up that subject."
During the discussion I reviewed the whole legal aspect of the matter, and referred to the fact that the several decisions made had been based on Chinese precedents. I also touched on the ethnological aspect, that it was doubtful whether the Japanese could be classed as Mongolians. This phase appealed to Roosevelt, who seemed well informed in ethnological studies. I felt rather gratified with this thorough discussion of the subject. It had interested me for years, and I had been ruminating on it for several weeks.
At the last Cabinet meeting before the vacation season, each member referred to his plans for the summer. I had decided to combine business with pleasure by taking a trip along the Canadian border from Montreal to Vancouver to inspect the lighthouse and immigration services, then down the Pacific Coast and to Hawaii, where I might acquaint myself with regard to immigration as it affected the Japanese question. The President thought this would be a useful trip and urged me to take it.
In the administration of a department such as that of Commerce and Labor, it was important to familiarize one's self as much as possible with its outlying branches, to become personally acquainted with the various officers and the details of their work and surroundings, thereby to enable one better to do the administrative work than by remaining at one's desk.
After leaving Vancouver we stopped a few days each at Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco, where I conferred with the officials of the Department. From San Francisco we took a steamer to Hawaii, on board which we met George R. Carter, Governor of Hawaii, returning from a vacation in the United States, and Congressman and Mrs. Nicholas Longworth. It made a very pleasant party.
The authorities and the population gave us a rousing welcome, cannons saluted, and the militia was out to escort us. Only once before since the island became United States territory had a Cabinet official paid a visit, and that was two years before when Secretary of War Taft stopped there for a few days en route to Japan. We were comfortably installed in the Hotel Moana, in the suburb of Waikiki.
The islanders showered upon us bounteous hospitality in every conceivable form. We participated in rounds of dinners and receptions. Governor and Mrs. Carter entertained the Longworths and us in the official residence, the former palace of the Hawaiian rulers, in the throne room of which hung the portraits of those rulers from earliest times to the deposed Queen Liliuokalani. The reception was a brilliant occasion. The leading officials and the élite of the population were there; the grounds were beautifully illuminated; and the Royal Hawaiian Band played the soft, plaintive music so typical of the mild temperament of the people and the luxuriant foliage of the island. My time was much taken up with official and semi-official duties. The island residents impressed me with the great need for better shipping facilities between the mainland and the islands. The coastwise shipping laws applying to them since annexation penalized the carrying of passengers or freight in other than American bottoms. Foreign ships accepting either passengers or freight to American ports on the coast were heavily fined. The result was, not only inconvenience to residents who for one reason or another needed to leave the islands, but the loss of much perishable freight, principally fruit, which rotted on the wharves waiting for American ships. I promised them that I would do everything in my power to help them get the shipping facilities they needed.
A delegation of Japanese editors, representing the four Japanese newspapers of Honolulu, called to ascertain my views regarding Japanese matters in the islands, what my policy was with regard to Japanese immigration, and whether I believed that the preponderance of Japanese people in Hawaii was inimical to the interests of the territory. I answered them:
An ideal condition for the future welfare of these islands would be that there should not be too great a preponderance of any one race, but that an equilibrium be maintained.
I would impress upon you, and upon each of the several races here, to have a care not to exploit these islands and their resources for the benefit of the country from which they come, but to act in the spirit of loyalty to the government under which they live; of loyalty to the interests of the islands which afford such happy and ideal homes for them and their children. I am gratified that the public school system has such a great influence upon the young, who grow up with the American ideals and respect for the liberty of the individual. I would like to see an increasing number of Americans from the mainland come and settle in these islands, if for no other reason than to guarantee for all time to come the continuance of the American spirit for the benefit and welfare of all peoples who have made and will make their homes here.
Unfortunately the time at my disposal did not permit my visiting the various islands. We did, however, see everything to be seen at Oahu, the island upon which Honolulu is situated. Rear-Admiral Very took us on the U.S.S. Iroquois to visit Pearl Harbor, the famous landlocked bay large enough to shelter the battle fleets of several nations. We also visited the Waialua pineapple plantation and cannery, where twenty thousand cans of the large, luscious fruit were put up daily. The processes of paring, coring, slicing, and canning were done by machinery with great speed, and we enjoyed tasting the fruit as much as any school children might.
In Honolulu I met Viscount Ishii, who was then Japanese under-Secretary of State. He has since been ambassador at Washington and at this writing is ambassador at Paris. We had frequent conferences and went over the whole Japanese question. He had fully informed himself upon all phases of the subject, as well as regarding the idiosyncrasies of the Pacific Coast States in opposing the immigration of Japanese laborers. Ishii's thorough understanding of the situation at that time did much to smooth ruffled feelings in Japan. The Viscount returned to the States on the steamer with us.
As we sailed out of the harbor on the Asia, bedecked with Hawaiian flowers, the Royal Hawaiian Band played its farewell music. The last words we heard from the Hawaiian shore were "Aloha Nui," the Hawaiian farewell.
I had satisfied myself that, so far as concerned the carrying out of the President's Executive Order of March 14, 1907, the Japanese officials in both Hawaii and Japan were doing everything in their power. Hawaii at the time had a population of about 160,000, in round figures, of which about 80,000 were Japanese, 20,000 Chinese, and 25,000 native Hawaiians. Of the white element the biggest percentage were Portuguese, who numbered about 22,000, while all other Caucasians together, principally American, British, and German, numbered 14,000. It therefore behooved our officials on the islands, in the Pacific ports, and along the Mexican border, to be especially watchful to carry out the regulations which the Department had formulated with regard to the admission of Japanese or Korean skilled and unskilled labor.
Soon after my return I had a conference with the President at Oyster Bay. The President informed me that Secretary Taft was about to leave for Japan, to go from there to Russia by the Siberian Railroad. He said he had authorized him to see what could be done toward overcoming the difficulties in our relations, and what might be the effect in Japan if we were to endeavor to pass a law giving naturalization to Japanese exclusive of the laboring classes and the small traders who practically belonged to the same class. This subject the President had urged in his last Message to Congress.
On October 25th I brought up in the Cabinet meeting, for the information of the President, statistics regarding Japanese immigration up to October 1, 1907, which showed that the immigration for the twelve months then ended was almost double that of the preceding twelve months, and also that there had been an appreciable increase since April 1, when the President's Executive Order went into effect, compared with the previous months. The statistics regarding the transit of Japanese between Mexico and Canada showed that something like six hundred and seventy registered from April to September, but only about one third that number actually made the transits. It was presumed, therefore, that the rest got off within United States territory.
The President seemed very much annoyed with this condition of things. I recalled to his mind that when the regulations under his Executive Order were originally presented by me, they contained a clause, along the lines of the Chinese regulation on the subject, to prevent the abuse of transit privileges, but that he and the Cabinet had decided it to be unwise to put in that clause. A few months thereafter, when we first suspected the abuse of transit privileges, I directed an accurate account to be taken of these transits, the result of which I now presented.
The first impulse of the President was to direct that all transit be denied, but I pointed out that that would raise considerable objection, as it would place the Japanese in a special class in that respect. He insisted that something must be done. I suggested that the problem needed careful thought and I would take it up and prepare regulations similar to those for the Chinese. This I did, and the Japanese regulations differ only in that we do not require the photographing of the person to make the transit.
I did not propose to drop the matter of Japanese immigration and naturalization. Again and again I brought it up in Cabinet meetings. I believed the best way of adjusting the difficulties was to try to negotiate a treaty with Japan permitting the naturalization of Japanese other than laboring classes, and in return excluding all who came within the category of skilled or unskilled labor. The belief that such a treaty could be negotiated was confirmed by my talks with Ishii both at Honolulu and later when he visited Washington. The right to naturalization would be taken advantage of by only five or six thousand and would not, of course, be granted to the laborers then resident in the United States.
There were about seventy-three thousand Japanese in the United States, and it was fair to assume that two thirds of these were of the laboring class. Of the remainder there was a small percentage of women and children, and then there were those born in America. Japanese eligible for citizenship would therefore not exceed ten or twelve thousand, and it was reasonable to assume that not more than half of them would be willing to throw off their native allegiance. My belief was that such an adjustment of the problem would leave no irritation behind it.
The President did not think such a treaty would be confirmed by the Senate, and to have it rejected would make matters worse. Secretary Metcalf thought the California members would not agree to such an arrangement. Notwithstanding these objections I was of the opinion that such force of argument could be found in favor of the arrangement that even representatives from California would not fail to see its advantage.
The whole question simmered along for a year or more, during which our understanding with Japan in regard to the "Gentlemen's Agreement" and the regulations under it were put into concrete and final shape; that is, a letter was written by the Japanese ambassador to our Secretary of State setting forth the understanding of Japan, to which the Secretary replied accepting that understanding and setting forth the amicable relations existing between the two countries.
In late January, 1909, there was a recrudescence of anti-Japanese legislation in California. There were introduced in the State legislature three bills: (a) to exclude Japanese from ownership of land; (b) to segregate the Japanese in special districts of the city; (c) to prohibit Japanese from attending the public schools. With his usual good judgment the President telegraphed the Governor of California saying he was writing him and asking that he withhold any legislation affecting the Japanese until the receipt of that letter. For the time being this action had the desired effect.
The legislature of California was somewhat under the influence of agitators, like the Japanese and Korean Restriction League and some labor bodies. It was believed that the general sentiment of California was against such legislation, but either to avoid conflict, or from indifference or lack of public spirit, such sentiment did not make its influence felt. I had given out figures from month to month showing the number of immigrants from Japan as compared with previous figures. I then made public statistics which showed that for the calendar year 1907 the number of immigrants was 12,400, whereas for the calendar year 1908, after the Japanese Government had taken the matter in hand in accordance with the "Gentlemen's Agreement," the number of immigrants was 4400. Deducting the figure for the emigration from that 4400 left a total increase of Japanese population of only 185 for the year. The California agitators claimed my figures were erroneous, and that hordes of Japanese were surreptitiously coming from the Canadian and Mexican borders. I gave out several interviews to the press to the effect that the figures were absolutely correct; that it was absurd to deny their correctness as I had proofs in my hands; and that if the Californians still doubted them a committee might call on me and I should gladly lay my proofs before them. I had sent a copy of these figures, certified by me, to the California authorities.
Happily our relations with Japan are now more peaceful than they have been for some time, and to a large degree this has been accomplished by the Four Power Treaty negotiated at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in December, 1921. The various vexatious instances that I have referred to were stimulated by German officers stationed in the Far East and fostered by the sensational press in both Japan and our own country. By this means these happenings were exaggerated far beyond their significance. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911 came into being because of the aggression of Germany and Russia in the Far East. After the World War, of course, this condition no longer obtained, and as the raison d'être of the alliance had therefore vanished, there was a justified feeling in America that the continuance of the treaty was a menace to our country. This fact was not unrecognized in Great Britain itself. As Mr. Balfour stated at the Washington Conference, it was necessary to "annul, merge, destroy, as it were, this ancient and outward and unnecessary agreement, and replace it by something new, something effective, which should embrace all the powers concerned in the vast area of the Pacific." By the Four Power Treaty the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was automatically discontinued, and Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan became associated in friendly partnership as guardians of the peace in the Far East.
So far as concerns the relationship between our country and Japan, the transcendent importance of this treaty has been to supersede and overshadow all these minor matters that before were continually menacing our good relations. By the reservations prepared by the American delegates, and accepted by the other powers, it is provided that the treaty "shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers." Verily this treaty stands out as one of the great achievements of the Washington Conference.
To return to immigration problems during my incumbency as Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor, a minor though nevertheless annoying matter needing adjustment was the regulation with regard to the head tax. After the passage of the Immigration Law of 1903 a head tax of two dollars was levied upon all alien passengers, including even officials of foreign governments. In 1905 Attorney-General Moody had given an opinion to the effect that the tax applied to all alien passengers, whether officers of foreign governments or not. I thought this contrary to the law of nations and to well-established diplomatic usages recognized throughout the world.
As the subject also came within the province of another department, namely, the Department of State, I naturally brought it up at a Cabinet meeting. The President recommended that I issue orders in accordance with my suggestion, and Secretary Root agreed that it was an outrage to levy such a tax upon the representatives of foreign governments. Informally I took the matter up with Attorney-General Bonaparte, but as the decision against this immunity had been made by his Department he felt himself bound by the decision of his predecessor. He suggested that I issue the order on my own responsibility, but I decided for the time being not to do so. At a later Cabinet meeting I again brought up the matter, this time reading the order as I proposed it. The President and Secretary Root, also Secretary Taft, agreed that it should be issued, and this I did.
At the same time I discussed a provision of the Immigration Act of 1906 requiring masters of all vessels bringing in aliens, without exception, to fill out a blank or manifest giving the age, sex, calling, nationality, race, of each alien, and whether able to read or write, and whether anarchist or not. These blanks then had to be signed by the aliens. I prepared two circulars, one ordering the discontinuance of the head tax and the other discontinuing the filling out of these blanks so far as concerned diplomatic or consular officials and other persons duly accredited from foreign governments to the United States, in service or in transit.
At dinner at the British ambassador's home some weeks thereafter Lady Bryce mentioned having to sign a blank asking whether she believed in the practice of polygamy. Of course, she brought it up in a humorous way, but it was apparent that she had felt humiliated at such questioning. I told her I fully appreciated her feelings and was happy to be able to say that that stupid practice had been discontinued.
The subject of naturalization had occupied my attention for years past. Under the law then existing, as well as under older laws, a person could be naturalized not only in the United States courts, but in any State court having a seal. And the naturalization laws prior to the Act of 1906 were most carelessly administered. In the larger cities of many of the States naturalization applications were hurried through in bunches at the direction of some political boss. In that way many persons were naturalized who would have been found, had time been taken to sift the applications, not entitled to citizenship. The effects of so careless a method I saw in Turkey, and in my dispatches to the State Department I repeatedly pointed out the evil.
Largely growing out of my presentation of the subject, Mr. Gaillard Hunt, chief of the passport division of the State Department, had taken it up in his thorough manner and made a report to President McKinley, upon which the President appointed a commission to study the subject. The commission was renewed by President Roosevelt. Its report, known as House Document 326, 59th Congress, 2d Session, and entitled "Citizenship of the United States, Expatriation, and Protection Abroad," was the basis of the Act of 1906. This act went far in preventing fraudulent naturalization as well as in withdrawing protection from those who were using United States citizenship not with the intention of becoming part of the new country in which they had chosen to reside, but as a means to escape their duties as subjects of the country of their origin upon returning there to live, as had happened so often in Turkey.
For the proper carrying out of this law additional examiners were needed, and also about eleven additional assistant district attorneys. I therefore arranged with Attorney-General Bonaparte to appear with him before the Appropriations Committee of the House to explain the necessity of an appropriation to cover the enlargement of the corps for the enforcement and administration of the new law. During my experience abroad much of the time of our diplomatic representatives was taken up with questions relating to the protection of our citizens, and often this protection was invoked by persons who should never have been naturalized.
The exclusion and deportation of criminals and anarchists was another phase of the immigration service to which I had given considerable study. I found the law provided for arrest and deportation of criminal aliens only up to three years of the time of their landing, and that there was gross misconception regarding the scope of the law. There was no coöperation between our immigration officials and the local police departments for the detection of such persons. The police departments of most of our cities were disposed to assume that by virtue of the immigration law the whole subject was under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government; and on the other hand our officials did not confer with municipal officials to make use of the immigration law. It is one thing to provide for the exclusion of criminals and anarchists, but it is quite another to discover, on entry, whether a person belongs to either class. They are usually neither illiterate nor lacking in cunning and deception, but within three years they may be detected, as "birds of a feather flock together."
I decided to issue a circular to all commissioners of immigration and immigration inspectors, with a view to bringing about coöperation with the local officials. I took the subject up in the Cabinet and the President approved. It so happened that while this circular was being prepared, an Italian immigrant, recently arrived, killed a Catholic priest in Denver while the latter was officiating at a mass in his church, and a day or two thereafter another recently arrived immigrant, a Russian, attacked the chief of police of Chicago and his family with a dagger. Both of these men would have come under the deportation provisions of the immigration law had the police been aware of these provisions, as in both instances they had been suspected, by their affiliations and their talk, of being anarchists, as that term is defined in the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907. Under the local criminal laws this suspicion was not enough to justify arrest.
Appearing as it did immediately after these two incidents my circular had much publicity and brought about the deportation of a number of undesirables upon evidence supplied by the police and detective officers.
In a Department which covered so many and such varied subjects, the conflict between human and property interests was often apparent. I recall a remark by the President, as we were speaking about this, that whenever within my jurisdiction there occurred this conflict he was sure I would lean on the human side, and I could always count on his support.
A striking example of this conflict grew out of an order I issued for the inspection of excursion and ferry boats at least three times a year instead of once. The summer before I took office the boiler of the General Slocum, a large excursion boat on the Long Island Sound, blew up and caused the death of over a hundred women and children. As spring approached and the excursion season drew near, I made up my mind that I should make all possible provision to prevent the recurrence of any such disaster.
I accompanied the supervising inspector-general, George Uhler, to witness the inspection of some passenger boats plying between Washington and Norfolk, to get personal knowledge of the details of inspection. I carefully studied a report made to me by Mr. Murray, the assistant secretary of my Department, who had been a member of the board of inquiry into the Slocum disaster and later the Valencia wreck. I called a meeting of the board of supervising inspectors of steamboats and impressed upon them the importance of great care in inspection. I urged that no man be retained in the inspection service who was not thoroughly competent and efficient, since they had to deal with the protection of human life.
My order for more frequent inspection brought forth many objections from the steamboat owners, and, as is usual in such cases, a committee came to Washington and presented their grievances and objections direct to the President, in the hope of inducing him to overrule my instructions. They were patiently heard, but their main objection was that it would cost a little more and be a little more inconvenient to have three inspections instead of one, and the President gave them little more comfort than to make it quite clear that he was thoroughly in accord with my action for the provision of greater safety to human life. He told them he felt he was fortunate in having at the head of the Department of Commerce and Labor a man who was a humanitarian besides having large business experience, for while it was his purpose to harmonize human and business interests, always when they conflicted he would lean toward the human side, as I had done in issuing that order.
The President was deeply interested always in the natural resources of the country and their preservation, and asked me to take up the question of the Alaska salmon fisheries. It was certain that unless some drastic action was taken, the salmon would be destroyed in the Alaskan waters just as they had been in the Columbia River. Roosevelt was familiar with the problem and believed that Wood River ought to be closed. I devoted parts of two days to a hearing on the subject. The cannery interests were represented by their counsel and the Fishermen's Union by several of its officers. Senator Fulton, of Oregon, as well as the two Alaskan delegates in Congress, pleaded for the closing of the rivers.
After hearing all sides and studying the question I signed an order directing the closing of both the Wood and Nushagak Rivers to trap and net fishing, and if the law had permitted, I should have directed the closing also of Nushagak Bay, where extensive trap fishing was carried on.
When I was president of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation I was impressed with the importance of establishing a closer relationship between the commercial bodies of the country and the Government. Shortly after I became Secretary of Commerce and Labor, therefore, I sought to accomplish that end. I had a study made by Nahum I. Stone, tariff expert of the Bureau of Manufactures, of the relations between the European governments and their commercial bodies, especially in such countries as Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. I sent invitations to about forty of the leading chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and other commercial organizations throughout the country to send delegates to Washington for a two days' conference, with a view to bringing about an organization of these bodies for the purpose of coöperation between them and the departments of the Government having to do with commerce and manufactures.
Accordingly on December 5th a representative gathering of over one hundred delegates met in my Department, and I put before them a plan for organization. I invited Secretary Root, who took a deep interest in the scheme, and he made a thoughtful address, in which he impressed upon the gathering the things that ought to be done, and could be done only through organization and the power of concerted effort. Andrew D. White, our experienced ambassador at Berlin, had sent to the President a letter containing the proposal that a method of instruction in commerce be applied at the instance of our Government as had been done in agriculture; this interesting proposal I read to the meeting.
I then went with the delegates in a body to the White House where the President addressed them. In the afternoon Gustav H. Schwab, of the New York Chamber of Commerce, was elected temporary chairman and the organization of the council proceeded. A committee on organization and a committee on rules were appointed, and it was decided that an advisory committee of fifteen members was to have headquarters in Washington. The number of meetings to be held per year was fixed, as well as the annual dues. On December 5, 1907, the National Council of Commerce came into being.
A year later the first annual meeting was held in my Department. The Council now had permanent offices in the Adams Building, with William R. Corwine in charge. In my address to the delegates I stressed the importance of the development of our commercial relations with the South American republics, particularly in view of the rapidly approaching completion of the Panama Canal. At that time we had only twenty-three per cent of the foreign trade of South America, and one of the main requirements for increasing our share was the establishment of better shipping and postal facilities. To that end I recommended in my annual report that the Postal Subsidy Act of 1891 be extended to include ships of sixteen knots and over, and my colleagues, the Secretary of State and the Attorney-General, made similar recommendations.
A month after the change of Administration the executive committee of the Council held a meeting, again in the Department of Commerce and Labor, at which they passed the following resolution:
Resolved, by the members of the Executive Committee of the National Council of Commerce in meeting assembled in the office of the Hon. Charles Nagel, the present Secretary of Commerce and Labor, That they tender their heartiest thanks to the Hon. Oscar S. Straus, the former Secretary of Commerce and Labor, for his constant and well-directed efforts in forming and promoting the National Council of Commerce, expressing their appreciation of his far-sightedness, his patriotism, his energy, his fairness, and his friendship, assuring him of the high personal esteem in which he is held by all of them, and asserting that in their judgment he has laid the foundation for a movement which will redound not only to his credit as a Cabinet officer, but one which will ultimately be productive of incalculable benefit to the business interests of our country, the development of which he has so deeply at heart.
Later that year the Council was reorganized and called the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, which to-day is an important institution in the commercial life of our country.
To bring about a similar relationship between the Department and the labor bodies, I called another conference in February, 1909, to which I invited the leading labor representatives throughout the country, and about fifty attended. Unfortunately my term of office was drawing to an end and there was not time to organize this wing, but I urged the men to insist upon the continuance of the conferences and the coöperation with the Department thus established.
The matters discussed at this meeting were mainly how best to lessen unemployment, how the Division of Information under the Bureau of Immigration might be administered for the greater benefit of labor in general, and how the Nobel Peace Prize, which President Roosevelt had set aside for a foundation for the promotion of industrial peace, could be made most effective. There were addresses by Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor; Warren S. Stone, grand chief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; William F. Yates, president of the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association; and Terence V. Powderly, chief of the Division of Information in the Bureau of Immigration. The presiding officer was Daniel J. Keefe, Commissioner-General of Immigration and Naturalization.
During my term of office repeated efforts were made in Congress, backed by organized labor, to divide my Department and make two of it—the Department of Commerce and the Department of Labor. I successfully opposed this plan, my idea being that labor and capital were the two arms of industry, the proper functioning of which could best be secured by coöperation, which in turn could best be promoted by administering their interests together. In this I had the support of President Roosevelt. During the Taft Administration, however, the bill was passed creating the Department of Labor.