An entire year elapsed, chiefly on account of the unhealthiness of the season in London, before James summoned his first parliament. It might perhaps have been more politic to have chosen some other city; for the length of this interval gave time to form a disadvantageous estimate of his administration and to alienate beyond recovery the puritanical party. Libels were already in circulation, reflecting with a sharpness never before known on the king's personal behaviour, which presented an extraordinary contrast to that of Elizabeth.[490] The nation, it is easy to perceive, cheated itself into a persuasion, that it had borne that princess more affection than it had really felt, especially in her latter years; the sorrow of subjects for deceased monarchs being often rather inspired by a sense of evil than a recollection of good. James however little heeded the popular voice, satisfied with the fulsome and preposterous adulation of his court, and intent on promulgating certain maxims concerning the dignity and power of princes, which he had already announced in his discourse on the "True Law of Free Monarchies," printed some years before in Scotland. In this treatise, after laying it down that monarchy is the true pattern of divinity, and proving the duty of passive obedience, rather singularly, from that passage in the book of Samuel where the prophet so forcibly paints the miseries of absolute power, he denies that the kings of Scotland owe their crown to any primary contract, Fergus, their progenitor, having conquered the country with his Irish; and advances more alarming tenets, as that the king makes daily statutes and ordinances enjoining such pains thereto as he thinks meet, without any advice of parliament or estates; that general laws made publicly in parliament may by the king's authority be mitigated or suspended upon causes only known to him; and that, "although a good king will frame all his actions to be according to the law, yet he is not bound thereto, but of his own will and for example-giving to his subjects."[491] These doctrines, if not absolutely novel, seemed peculiarly indecent as well as dangerous, from the mouth of a sovereign. Yet they proceeded far more from James's self-conceit and pique against the republican spirit of presbyterianism than from his love of power, which (in its exercise I mean, as distinguished from its possession) he did not feel in so eminent a degree as either his predecessor or his son.

In the proclamation for calling together his first parliament, the king, after dilating, as was his favourite practice, on a series of rather common truths in very good language, charges all persons interested in the choice of knights for the shire to select them out of the principal knights or gentlemen within the county; and for the burgesses, that choice be made of men of sufficiency and discretion, without desire to please parents and friends, that often speak for their children or kindred; avoiding persons noted in religion for their superstitious blindness one way, or for their turbulent humour other ways. We do command, he says, that no bankrupts or outlaws be chosen, but men of known good behaviour and sufficient livelihood. The sheriffs are charged not to direct a writ to any ancient town being so ruined that there are not residents sufficient to make such choice, and of whom such lawful election may be made. All returns are to be filed in chancery, and if any be found contrary to this proclamation, the same to be rejected as unlawful and insufficient, and the place to be fined for making it; and any one elected contrary to the purport, effect, and true meaning of this proclamation, to be fined and imprisoned.[492]

Question of Fortescue and Goodwin's election.—Such an assumption of control over parliamentary elections was a glaring infringement of those privileges which the House of Commons had been steadily and successfully asserting in the late reign. An opportunity very soon occurred of contesting this important point. At the election for the county of Buckingham, Sir Francis Goodwin had been chosen in preference to Sir John Fortescue, a privy counsellor, and the writ returned into chancery. Goodwin having been some years before outlawed, the return was sent back to the sheriff, as contrary to the late proclamation; and, on a second election, Sir John Fortescue was chosen. This matter being brought under the consideration of the House of Commons, a very few days after the opening of the session, gave rise to their first struggle with the new king. It was resolved, after hearing the whole case, and arguments by members on both sides, that Goodwin was lawfully elected and returned, and ought to be received. The first notice taken of this was by the Lords, who requested that this might be discussed in a conference between the two houses, before any other matter should be proceeded in. The Commons returned for answer, that they conceived it not according to the honour of the house to give account of any of their proceedings. The Lords replied, that having acquainted his majesty with the matter, he desired there might be a conference thereon between the two houses. Upon this message, the Commons came to a resolution that the speaker with a numerous deputation of members should attend his majesty, and report the reasons of their proceedings in Goodwin's case. In this conference with the king, as related by the speaker, it appears that he had shown some degree of chagrin, and insisted that the house ought not to meddle with returns, which could only be corrected by the court of chancery; and that since they derived all matters of privilege from him and his grant, he expected they should not be turned against him. He ended by directing the house to confer with the judges. After a debate which seems, from the minutes in the journals, to have been rather warm, it was unanimously agreed not to have a conference with the judges; but the reasons of the house's proceeding were laid before the king in a written statement or memorial, answering the several objections that his majesty had alleged. This they sent to the Lords, requesting them to deliver it to the king, and to be mediators in behalf of the house for his majesty's satisfaction; a message in rather a lower tone than they had previously taken. The king sending for the speaker privately, told him that he was now distracted in judgment as to the merits of the case; and for his further satisfaction, desired and commanded, as an absolute king, that there should be a conference between the house and the judges. Upon this unexpected message, says the journal, there grew some amazement and silence. But at last one stood up and said: "The prince's command is like a thunderbolt; his command upon our allegiance like the roaring of a lion. To his command there is no contradiction; but how or in what manner we should now proceed to perform obedience, that will be the question."[493] It was resolved to confer with the judges in presence of the king and council. In this second conference, the king, after some favourable expressions towards the house, and conceding that it was a court of record, and judge of returns, though not exclusively of the chancery, suggested that both Goodwin and Fortescue should be set aside, by issuing a new writ. This compromise was joyfully accepted by the greater part of the Commons, after the dispute had lasted nearly three weeks.[494] They have been considered as victorious, upon the whole, in this contest, though they apparently fell short in the result of what they had obtained some years before. But no attempt was ever afterwards made to dispute their exclusive jurisdiction.[495]

Shirley's case of privilege.—The Commons were engaged during this session in the defence of another privilege, to which they annexed perhaps a disproportionate importance. Sir Thomas Shirley, a member, having been taken in execution on a private debt before their meeting, and the warden of the Fleet prison refusing to deliver him up, they were at a loss how to obtain his release. Several methods were projected; among which, that of sending a party of members with the serjeant and his mace, to force open the prison, was carried on a division; but the speaker hinting that such a vigorous measure would expose them individually to prosecution as trespassers, it was prudently abandoned. The warden, though committed by the house to a dungeon in the Tower, continued obstinate, conceiving that by releasing his prisoner he should become answerable for the debt. They were evidently reluctant to solicit the king's interference; but aware at length that their own authority was insufficient, "the vice-chamberlain, according to a memorandum in the journals, was privately instructed to go to the king, and humbly desire that he would be pleased to command the warden, on his allegiance, to deliver up Sir Thomas; not as petitioned for by the house, but as if himself thought it fit, out of his own gracious judgment." By this stratagem, if we may so term it, they saved the point of honour, and recovered their member.[496] The warden's apprehensions, however, of exposing himself to an action for the escape gave rise to a statute, which empowers the creditor to sue out a new execution against any one who shall be delivered by virtue of his privilege of parliament, after that shall have expired, and discharges from liability those out of whose custody such persons shall be delivered. This is the first legislative recognition of privilege.[497] The most important part of the whole is a proviso subjoined to the act, "That nothing therein contained shall extend to the diminishing of any punishment to be hereafter, by censure in parliament, inflicted upon any person who hereafter shall make or procure to be made any such arrest as is aforesaid." The right of commitment, in such cases at least, by a vote of the House of Commons, is here unequivocally maintained.

Complaints of grievances.—It is not necessary to repeat the complaints of ecclesiastical abuses preferred by this House of Commons, as by those that had gone before them. James, by siding openly with the bishops, had given alarm to the reforming party. It was anticipated that he would go farther than his predecessor, whose uncertain humour, as well as the inclinations of some of her advisers, had materially counterbalanced the dislike she entertained of the innovators. A code of new canons had recently been established in convocation with the king's assent, obligatory perhaps upon the clergy, but tending to set up an unwarranted authority over the whole nation; imposing oaths and exacting securities in certain cases from the laity, and aiming at the exclusion of nonconformists from all civil rights.[498] Against these canons, as well as various other grievances, the Commons remonstrated in a conference with the upper house, but with little immediate effect.[499] They made a more remarkable effort in attacking some public mischiefs of a temporal nature, which, though long the theme of general murmurs, were closely interwoven with the ancient and undisputed prerogatives of the Crown. Complaints were uttered, and innovations projected by the Commons of 1604, which Elizabeth would have met with an angry message, and perhaps visited with punishment on the proposers. James however was not entirely averse to some of the projected alterations, from which he hoped to derive a pecuniary advantage. The two principal grievances were, purveyance and the incidents of military tenure. The former had been restrained by not less than thirty-six statutes, as the Commons assert in a petition to the king; in spite of which the impressing of carts and carriages, and the exaction of victuals for the king's use, at prices far below the true value, and in quantity beyond what was necessary, continued to prevail under authority of commissions from the board of green cloth, and was enforced, in case of demur or resistance, by imprisonment under their warrant. The purveyors, indeed, are described as living at free quarters upon the country, felling woods without the owners' consent, and commanding labour with little or no recompense.[500] Purveyance was a very ancient topic of remonstrance; but both the inadequate revenues of the Crown, and a supposed dignity attached to this royal right of spoil, had prevented its abolition from being attempted. But the Commons seemed still more to trench on the pride of our feudal monarchy, when they proposed to take away guardianship in chivalry; that lucrative tyranny, bequeathed by Norman conquerors, the custody of every military tenant's estate until he should arrive at twenty-one, without accounting for the profits. This, among other grievances, was referred to a committee, in which Bacon took an active share. They obtained a conference on this subject with the Lords, who refused to agree to a bill for taking guardianship in chivalry away, but offered to join in a petition for that purpose to the king, since it could not be called a wrong, having been patiently endured by their ancestors as well as themselves, and being warranted by the law of the land. In the end the Lords advised to drop the matter for the present, as somewhat unseasonable in the king's first parliament.[501]

In the midst of these testimonies of dissatisfaction with the civil and ecclesiastical administration, the House of Commons had not felt much willingness to greet the new sovereign with a subsidy. No demand had been made upon them, far less any proof given of the king's exigencies; and they doubtless knew by experience, that an obstinate determination not to yield to any of their wishes would hardly be shaken by a liberal grant of money. They had even passed the usual bill granting tonnage and poundage for life, with certain reservations that gave the court offence, and which apparently they afterwards omitted. But there was so little disposition to do anything further, that the king sent a message to express his desire that the Commons would not enter upon the business of a subsidy, and assuring them that he would not take unkindly their omission. By this artifice, which was rather transparent, he avoided the not improbable mortification of seeing the proposal rejected.[502]

Commons' vindication of themselves.—The king's discontent at the proceedings of this session, which he seems to have rather strongly expressed in some speech to the Commons that has not been recorded,[503] gave rise to a very remarkable vindication, prepared by a committee at the house's command, and entitled "A Form of Apology and Satisfaction to be delivered to his Majesty," though such may not be deemed the most appropriate title. It contains a full and pertinent justification of all those proceedings at which James had taken umbrage, and asserts, with respectful boldness and in explicit language, the constitutional rights and liberties of parliament. If the English monarchy had been reckoned as absolute under the Plantagenets and Tudors as Hume has endeavoured to make it appear, the Commons of 1604 must have made a surprising advance in their notions of freedom since the king's accession. Adverting to what they call the misinformation openly delivered to his majesty in three things; namely, that their privileges were not of right, but of grace only, renewed every parliament on petition; that they are no court of record, nor yet a court that can command view of records; that the examination of the returns of writs for knights and burgesses is without their compass, and belonging to the chancery: assertions, they say, "tending directly and apparently to the utter overthrow of the very fundamental privileges of our house, and therein of the rights and liberties of the whole Commons of your realm of England, which they and their ancestors, from time immemorial, have undoubtedly enjoyed under your majesty's most noble progenitors;" and against which they expressly protest, as derogatory in the highest degree to the true dignity and authority of parliament, desiring "that such their protestation might be recorded to all posterity;" they maintain, on the contrary, "1. That their privileges and liberties are their right and inheritance, no less than their very lands and goods; 2. That they cannot be withheld from them, denied or impaired, but with apparent wrong to the whole state of the realm; 3. That their making request, at the beginning of a parliament, to enjoy their privilege, is only an act of manners, and does not weaken their right; 4. That their house is a court of record, and has been ever so esteemed; 5. That there is not the highest standing court in this land that ought to enter into competition, either for dignity or authority, with this high court of parliament, which, with his majesty's royal assent, gives law to other courts, but from other courts receives neither laws nor orders; 6. That the House of Commons is the sole proper judge of return of all such writs, and the election of all such members as belong to it, without which the freedom of election were not entire." They aver that in this session the privileges of the house have been more universally and dangerously impugned than ever, as they suppose, since the beginnings of parliaments. That in regard to the late queen's sex and age, and much more upon care to avoid all trouble, which by wicked practice might have been drawn to impeach the quiet of his majesty's right in the succession, those actions were then passed over which they hoped in succeeding times to redress and rectify; whereas, on the contrary, in this parliament, not privileges, but the whole freedom of the parliament and realm had been hewed from them. "What cause," they proceed, "we, your poor Commons, have to watch over our privileges is manifest in itself to all men. The prerogatives of princes may easily and do daily grow. The privileges of the subject are for the most part at an everlasting stand. They may be by good providence and care preserved; but being once lost, are not recovered but with much disquiet." They then enter in detail on the various matters that had arisen during the session—the business of Goodwin's election, of Shirley's arrest, and some smaller matters of privilege to which my limits have not permitted me to allude. "We thought not," speaking of the first, "that the judge's opinion, which yet in due place we greatly reverence, being delivered what the common law was, which extends only to inferior and standing courts, ought to bring any prejudice to this high court of parliament, whose power being above the law is not founded on the common law, but have their rights and privileges peculiar to themselves." They vindicate their endeavours to obtain redress of religious and public grievances: "Your majesty would be misinformed," they tell him, "if any man should deliver that the kings of England have any absolute power in themselves, either to alter religion, which God defend should be in the power of any mortal man whatsoever, or to make any laws concerning the same, otherwise than as in temporal causes, by consent of parliament. We have and shall at all times by our oaths acknowledge, that your majesty is sovereign lord and supreme governor in both."[504] Such was the voice of the English Commons in 1604, at the commencement of that great conflict for their liberties, which is measured by the line of the house of Stuart. But it is not certain that this apology was ever delivered to the king, though he seems to allude to it in a letter written to one of his ministers about the same time.[505]

Session, 1605.—The next session, which is remarkable on account of the conspiracy of some desperate men to blow up both Houses of Parliament with gunpowder on the day of their meeting, did not produce much worthy of our notice. A bill to regulate, or probably to suppress, purveyance was thrown out by the Lords. The Commons sent up another bill to the same effect, which the upper house rejected without discussion, by a rule then perhaps first established, that the same bill could not be proposed twice in one session.[506] They voted a liberal subsidy, which the king, who had reigned three years without one, had just cause to require. For though he had concluded a peace with Spain soon after his accession, yet the late queen had left a debt of £400,000, and other charges had fallen on the Crown. But the bill for this subsidy lay a good while in the House of Commons, who came to a vote that it should not pass till their list of grievances was ready to be presented. No notice was taken of these till the next session beginning in November 1606, when the king returned an answer to each of the sixteen articles in which matters of grievance were alleged. Of these the greater part refer to certain grants made to particular persons in the nature of monopolies; the king either defending these in his answer, or remitting the parties to the courts of law to try their legality.

Union with Scotland debated.—The principal business of this third session, as it had been of the last, was James's favourite scheme of a perfect union between England and Scotland. It may be collected, though this was never explicitly brought forward, that his views extended to a legislative incorporation.[507] But in all the speeches on this subject, and especially his own, there is a want of distinctness as to the object proposed. He dwells continually upon the advantage of unity of laws, yet extols those of England as the best, which the Scots, as was evident, had no inclination to adopt. Wherefore then was delay to be imputed to our English parliament, if it waited for that of the sister kingdom? And what steps were recommended towards this measure, that the Commons can be said to have declined, except only the naturalisation of the ante-nati, or Scots born before the king's accession to our throne, which could only have a temporary effect?[508] Yet Hume, ever prone to eulogise this monarch at the expense of his people, while he bestows merited praise on his speech in favour of the union, which is upon the whole a well-written and judicious performance, charges the parliament with prejudice, reluctance, and obstinacy. The code, as it may be called, of international hostility, those numerous statutes treating the northern inhabitants of this island as foreigners and enemies, were entirely abrogated. And if the Commons, while both the theory of our own constitution was so unsettled and its practice so full of abuse, did not precipitately give in to schemes that might create still further difficulty in all questions between the Crown and themselves, schemes, too, which there was no imperious motive for carrying into effect at that juncture, we may justly consider it as an additional proof of their wisdom and public spirit. Their slow progress however in this favourite measure, which, though they could not refuse to entertain it, they endeavoured to defeat by interposing delays and impediments, gave much offence to the king, which he expressed in a speech to the two houses, with the haughtiness, but not the dignity, of Elizabeth. He threatened them to live alternately in the two kingdoms, or to keep his court at York; and alluded, with peculiar acrimony, to certain speeches made in the house, wherein probably his own fame had not been spared.[509] "I looked," he says, "for no such fruits at your hands, such personal discourses and speeches, which of all other, I looked you should avoid, as not beseeming the gravity of your assembly. I am your king; I am placed to govern you, and shall answer for your errors; I am a man of flesh and blood, and have my passions and affections as other men; I pray you, do not too far move me to do that which my power may tempt me unto."[510]

Continual bickerings between the Crown and Commons.—It is most probable, as experience had shown, that such a demonstration of displeasure from Elizabeth would have ensured the repentant submission of the Commons. But within a few years of the most unbroken tranquillity, there had been one of those changes of popular feeling which a government is seldom observant enough to watch. Two springs had kept in play the machine of her administration, affection and fear; attachment arising from the sense of dangers endured, and glory achieved for her people, tempered, though not subdued, by the dread of her stern courage and vindictive rigour. For James not a particle of loyal affection lived in the hearts of the nation, while his easy and pusillanimous, though choleric disposition, had gradually diminished those sentiments of apprehension which royal frowns used to excite. The Commons, after some angry speeches, resolved to make known to the king through the speaker their desire, that he would listen to no private reports, but take his information of the house's meaning from themselves; that he would give leave to such persons as he had blamed for their speeches to clear themselves in his hearing; and that he would by some gracious message make known his intention that they should deliver their opinions with full liberty, and without fear. The speaker next day communicated a slight but civil answer he had received from the king, importing his wish to preserve their privileges, especially that of liberty of speech.[511] This, however, did not prevent his sending a message a few days afterwards, commenting on their debates, and on some clauses they had introduced into the bill for the abolition of all hostile laws.[512] And a petition having been prepared by a committee under the house's direction for better execution of the laws against recusants, the speaker, on its being moved that the petition be read, said that his majesty had taken notice of the petition as a thing belonging to himself, concerning which it was needless to press him. This interference provoked some members to resent it, as an infringement of their liberties. The speaker replied that there were many precedents in the late queen's time, where she had restrained the house from meddling in politics of divers kinds. This, as a matter of fact, was too notorious to be denied. A motion was made for a committee "to search for precedents of ancient as well as later times that do concern any messages from the sovereign magistrate, king or queen of this realm, touching petitions offered to the House of Commons." The king now interposed by a second message, that, though the petition were such as the like had not been read in the house, and contained matter whereof the house could not properly take knowledge, yet if they thought good to have it read, he was not against the reading. And the Commons were so well satisfied with this concession, that no further proceedings were had; and the petition, says the journal, was at length, with general liking, agreed to sleep. It contained some strong remonstrances against ecclesiastical abuses, and in favour of the deprived and silenced puritans, but such as the house had often before in various modes brought forward.[513]

The ministry betrayed, in a still more pointed manner, their jealousy of any interference on the part of the Commons with the conduct of public affairs in a business of a different nature. The pacification concluded with Spain in 1604, very much against the general wish,[514] had neither removed all grounds of dispute between the governments, nor allayed the dislike of the nations. Spain advanced in that age the most preposterous claims to an exclusive navigation beyond the tropic, and to the sole possession of the American continent; while the English merchants, mindful of the lucrative adventures of the queen's reign, could not be restrained from trespassing on the rich harvest of the Indies by contraband and sometimes piratical voyages. These conflicting interests led of course to mutual complaints of maritime tyranny and fraud; neither likely to be ill-founded, where the one party was as much distinguished for the despotic exercise of vast power, as the other by boldness and cupidity. It was the prevailing bias of the king's temper to keep on friendly terms with Spain, or rather to court her with undisguised and impolitic partiality.[515] But this so much thwarted the prejudices of his subjects that no part perhaps of his administration had such a disadvantageous effect on his popularity. The merchants presented to the Commons, in this session of 1607, a petition upon the grievances they sustained from Spain, entering into such a detail of alleged cruelties as was likely to exasperate that assembly. Nothing however was done for a considerable time, when after receiving the report of a committee on the subject, the house prayed a conference with the Lords. They, who acted in this and the preceding session as the mere agents of government, intimated in their reply, that they thought it an unusual matter for the Commons to enter upon, and took time to consider about a conference. After some delay this was granted, and Sir Francis Bacon reported its result to the lower house. The Earl of Salisbury managed the conference on the part of the Lords. The tenor of his speech, as reported by Bacon, is very remarkable. After discussing the merits of the petition, and considerably extenuating the wrongs imputed to Spain, he adverted to the circumstance of its being presented to the Commons. The Crown of England was invested, he said, with an absolute power of peace and war; and inferred, from a series of precedents which he vouched, that petitions made in parliament, intermeddling with such matters, had gained little success; that great inconveniences must follow from the public debate of a king's designs, which, if they take wind, must be frustrated; and that if parliaments have ever been made acquainted with matter of peace or war in a general way, it was either when the king and council conceived that it was material to have some declaration of the zeal and affection of the people, or else when they needed money for the charge of a war, in which case they should be sure enough to hear of it; that the Lords would make a good construction of the Commons' desire, that it sprang from a forwardness to assist his majesty's future resolutions, rather than a determination to do that wrong to his supreme power which haply might appear to those who were prone to draw evil inferences from their proceedings. The Earl of Northampton, who also bore a part in this conference, gave as one reason among others, why the Lords could not concur in forwarding the petition to the Crown, that the composition of the House of Commons was in its first foundation intended merely to be of those that have their residence and vocation in the places for which they serve, and therefore to have a private and local wisdom according to that compass, and so not fit to examine or determine secrets of state which depend upon such variety of circumstances; and although he acknowledged that there were divers gentlemen in the house of good capacity and insight into matters of state, yet that was the accident of the person, and not the intention of the place; and things were to be taken in the institution, and not in the practice. The Commons seemed to have acquiesced in this rather contemptuous treatment. Several precedents indeed might have been opposed to those of the Earl of Salisbury, wherein the Commons, especially under Richard II. and Henry VI., had assumed a right of advising on matters of peace and war. But the more recent usage of the constitution did not warrant such an interference. It was however rather a bold assertion, that they were not the proper channel through which public grievances, or those of so large a portion of the community as the merchants, ought to be represented to the throne.[516]

Impositions on merchandise without consent of parliament.—During the interval of two years and a half that elapsed before the commencement of the next session, a decision had occurred in the court of exchequer, which threatened the entire overthrow of our constitution. It had always been deemed the indispensable characteristic of a limited monarchy, however irregular and inconsistent might be the exercise of some prerogatives, that no money could be raised from the subject without the consent of the estates. This essential principle was settled in England, after much contention, by the statute entitled Confirmatio Chartarum, in the 25th year of Edward I. More comprehensive and specific in its expression than the Great Charter of John, it abolishes all "aids, tasks, and prises, unless by the common assent of the realm, and for the common profit thereof, saving the ancient aids and prises due and accustomed;" the king explicitly renouncing the custom he had lately set on wool. Thus the letter of the statute and the history of the times conspire to prove, that impositions on merchandise at the ports, to which alone the word prises was applicable, could no more be levied by the royal prerogative after its enactment, than internal taxes upon landed or movable property, known in that age by the appellations of aids and tallages. But as the former could be assessed with great ease, and with no risk of immediate resistance, and especially as certain ancient customs were preserved by the statute,[517] so that a train of fiscal officers, and a scheme of regulations and restraints upon the export and import of goods became necessary, it was long before the sovereigns of this kingdom could be induced constantly to respect this part of the law. Hence several remonstrances from the Commons under Edward III. against the maletolts or unjust exactions upon wool, by which, if they did not obtain more than a promise of effectual redress, they kept up their claim, and perpetuated the recognition of its justice, for the sake of posterity. They became powerful enough to enforce it under Richard II., in whose time there is little clear evidence of illegal impositions; and from the accession of the house of Lancaster it is undeniable that they ceased altogether. The grant of tonnage and poundage for the king's life, which from the time of Henry V. was made in the first parliament of every reign, might perhaps be considered as a tacit compensation to the Crown for its abandonment of these irregular extortions.

Henry VII., the most rapacious, and Henry VIII., the most despotic, of English monarchs, did not presume to violate this acknowledged right. The first who had again recourse to this means of enhancing the revenue was Mary, who, in the year 1557, set a duty upon cloths exported beyond seas, and afterwards another on the importation of French wines. The former of those was probably defended by arguing, that there was already a duty on wool; and if cloth, which was wool manufactured, could pass free, there would be a fraud on the revenue. The merchants however did not acquiesce in this arbitrary imposition, and as soon as Elizabeth's accession gave hopes of a restoration of English government, they petitioned to be released from this burthen. The question appears, by a memorandum in Dyer's Reports, to have been extra-judicially referred to the judges, unless it were rather as assistants to the privy council that their opinion was demanded. This entry concludes abruptly, without any determination of the judges.[518] But we may presume, that if any such had been given in favour of the Crown, it would have been made public. And that the majority of the bench would not have favoured this claim of the Crown, we may strongly presume from their doctrine in a case of the same description, wherein they held the assessment of treble custom on aliens for violation of letters patent to be absolutely against the law.[519] The administration, however, would not release this duty, which continued to be paid under Elizabeth. She also imposed one upon sweet wines. We read of no complaint in parliament against this novel taxation; but it is alluded to by Bacon in one of his tracts during the queen's reign, as a grievance alleged by her enemies. He defends it, as laid only on a foreign merchandise, and a delicacy which might be forborne.[520] But considering Elizabeth's unwillingness to require subsidies from the common, and the rapid increase of foreign traffic during her reign, it might be asked why she did not extend these duties to other commodities, and secure to herself no trifling annual revenue. What answer can be given, except that, aware how little any unparliamentary levying of money could be supported by law or usage, her ministers shunned to excite attention to these innovations which wanted hitherto the stamp of time to give them prescriptive validity?[521]

James had imposed a duty of five shillings per hundredweight on currants, over and above that of two shillings and sixpence, which was granted by the statute of tonnage and poundage.[522] Bates, a Turkey merchant, having refused payment, an information was exhibited against him in the exchequer. Judgment was soon given for the Crown. The courts of justice, it is hardly necessary to say, did not consist of men conscientiously impartial between the king and the subject; some corrupt with hope of promotion, many more fearful of removal, or awe-struck by the frowns of power. The speeches of Chief Baron Fleming, and of Baron Clark, the only two that are preserved in Lane's Reports, contain propositions still worse than their decision, and wholly subversive of all liberty. "The king's power," it was said, "is double—ordinary and absolute; and these have several laws and ends. That of the ordinary is for the profit of particular subjects, exercised in ordinary courts, and called common law, which cannot be changed in substance without parliament. The king's absolute power is applied to no particular person's benefit, but to the general safety; and this is not directed by the rules of common law, but more properly termed policy and government, varying according to his wisdom for the common good; and all things done within those rules are lawful. The matter in question is matter of state, to be ruled according to policy by the king's extraordinary power. All customs (duties so called) are the effects of foreign commerce; but all affairs of commerce and all treaties with foreign nations belong to the king's absolute power; he therefore who has power over the cause, must have it also over the effect. The seaports are the king's gates, which he may open and shut to whom he pleases." The ancient customs on wine and wool are asserted to have originated in the king's absolute power, and not in a grant of parliament; a point, whether true or not, of no great importance, if it were acknowledged, that many statutes had subsequently controlled this prerogative. But these judges impugned the authority of statutes derogatory to their idol. That of 45 E. 3, c. 4, that no new imposition should be laid on wool or leather, one of them maintains, did not bind the king's successors; for the right to impose such duties was a principal part of the Crown of England, which the king could not diminish. They extolled the king's grace in permitting the matter to be argued, commenting at the same time on the insolence shown in disputing so undeniable a claim. Nor could any judges be more peremptory in resisting an attempt to overthrow the most established precedents, than were these barons of King James's exchequer, in giving away those fundamental liberties in which every Englishman was inherited.[523]

Remonstrances against impositions in session of 1610.—The immediate consequence of this decision was a book of rates, published in July 1608, under the authority of the great seal, imposing heavy duties upon almost all merchandise.[524] But the judgment of the court of exchequer did not satisfy men jealous of the Crown's encroachments. The imposition on currants had been already noticed as a grievance by the House of Commons in 1606. But the king answered that the question was in a course for legal determination; and the Commons themselves, which is worthy of remark, do not appear to have entertained any clear persuasion that the impost was contrary to law.[525] In the session, however, which began in February 1610, they had acquired new light by sifting the legal authorities, and instead of submitting their opinions to the courts of law, which were in truth little worthy of such deference, were the more provoked to remonstrate against the novel usurpation those servile men had endeavoured to prop up. Lawyers, as learned probably as most of the judges, were not wanting in their ranks. The illegality of impositions was shown in two elaborate speeches by Hakewill and Yelverton.[526] And the country gentlemen, who, though less deeply versed in precedents, had too good sense not to discern that the next step would be to levy taxes on their lands, were delighted to find that there had been an old English constitution not yet abrogated, which would bear them out in their opposition. When the king therefore had intimated by a message, and afterwards in a speech, his command not to enter on the subject, couched in that arrogant tone of despotism which this absurd prince affected,[527] they presented a strong remonstrance against this inhibition; claiming "as an ancient, general, and undoubted right of parliament to debate freely all matters which do probably concern the subject; which freedom of debate being once foreclosed, the essence of the liberty of parliament is withal dissolved. For the judgment given by the exchequer, they take not on them to review it, but desire to know the reasons whereon it was grounded; especially as it was generally apprehended that the reasons of that judgment extended much farther, even to the utter ruin of the ancient liberty of this kingdom, and of the subjects' right of property in their lands and goods."[528] "The policy and constitution of this your kingdom (they say) appropriates unto the kings of this realm, with the assent of the parliament, as well the sovereign power of making laws, as that of taxing, or imposing upon the subjects' goods or merchandises, as may not, without their consents, be altered or changed. This is the cause that the people of this kingdom, as they ever showed themselves faithful and loving to their kings, and ready to aid them, in all their just occasions, with voluntary contributions; so have they been ever careful to preserve their own liberties and rights, when anything hath been done to prejudice or impeach the same. And therefore when their princes, occasioned either by their wars, or their over-great bounty, or by any other necessity, have without consent of parliament set impositions, either within the land, or upon commodities either exported or imported by the merchants, they have, in open parliament, complained of it, in that it was done without their consents: and thereupon never failed to obtain a speedy and full redress, without any claim made by the kings, of any power or prerogative in that point. And though the law of property be original, and carefully preserved by the common laws of this realm, which are as ancient as the kingdom itself; yet these famous kings, for the better contentment and assurance of their loving subjects, agreed, that this old fundamental right should be further declared and established by act of parliament. Wherein it is provided, that no such charges should ever be laid upon the people, without their common consent, as may appear by sundry records of former times. We, therefore, your majesty's most humble Commons assembled in parliament, following the example of this worthy case of our ancestors, and out of a duty of those for whom we serve, finding that your majesty, without advice or consent of parliament, hath lately, in time of peace, set both greater impositions, and far more in number, than any your noble ancestors did ever in time of war, have, with all humility, presumed to present this most just and necessary petition unto your majesty, that all impositions set without the assent of parliament may be quite abolished and taken away; and that your majesty, in imitation likewise of your noble progenitors, will be pleased, that a law be made during this session of parliament, to declare that all impositions set, or to be set upon your people, their goods or merchandises, save only by common assent in parliament, are and shall be void."[529] They proceeded accordingly, after a pretty long time occupied in searching for precedents, to pass a bill taking away impositions; which, as might be anticipated, did not obtain the concurrence of the upper house.

Doctrine of king's absolute power inculcated by clergy.—The Commons had reason for their apprehensions. This doctrine of the king's absolute power beyond the law had become current with all who sought his favour, and especially with the high church party. The convocation had in 1606 drawn up a set of canons, denouncing as erroneous a number of tenets hostile in their opinion to royal government. These canons, though never authentically published till a later age, could not have been secret. They consist of a series of propositions or paragraphs, to each of which an anathema of the opposite error is attached; deducing the origin of government from the patriarchal regimen of families, to the exclusion of any popular choice. In those golden days the functions both of king and priest were, as they term it, "the prerogatives of birthright;" till the wickedness of mankind brought in usurpation, and so confused the pure stream of the fountain with its muddy runnels, that we must now look to prescription for that right which we cannot assign to primogeniture. Passive obedience in all cases without exception to the established monarch is inculcated.[530]

It is not impossible that a man might adopt this theory of the original of government, unsatisfactory as it must appear on reflection, without deeming it incompatible with our mixed and limited monarchy. But its tendency was evidently in a contrary direction. The king's power was of God, that of the parliament only of man, obtained perhaps by rebellion; but out of rebellion what right could spring? Or were it even by voluntary concession, could a king alienate a divine gift, and infringe the order of Providence? Could his grants, if not in themselves null, avail against his posterity, heirs like himself under the great feoffment of creation? These consequences were at least plausible; and some would be found to draw them. And indeed if they were never explicitly laid down, the mere difference of respect with which mankind could not but contemplate a divine and human, a primitive or paramount, and a derivative authority, would operate as a prodigious advantage in favour of the Crown.

The real aim of the clergy in thus enormously enhancing the pretensions of the Crown was to gain its sanction and support for their own. Schemes of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, hardly less extensive than had warmed the imagination of Becket, now floated before the eyes of his successor Bancroft. He had fallen indeed upon evil days, and perfect independence on the temporal magistrate could no longer be attempted; but he acted upon the refined policy of making the royal supremacy over the church, which he was obliged to acknowledge, and professed to exaggerate, the very instrument of its independence upon the law. The favourite object of the bishops in this age was to render their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, no part of which had been curtailed in our hasty reformation, as unrestrained as possible by the courts of law. These had been wont, down from the reign of Henry II., to grant writs of prohibition, whenever the spiritual courts transgressed their proper limits; to the great benefit of the subject, who would otherwise have lost his birthright of the common law, and been exposed to the defective, not to say iniquitous and corrupt, procedure of the ecclesiastical tribunals. But the civilians, supported by the prelates, loudly complained of these prohibitions, which seem to have been much more frequent in the latter years of Elizabeth and the reign of James, than in any other period. Bancroft accordingly presented to the star-chamber, in 1605, a series of petitions in the name of the clergy, which Lord Coke has denominated Articuli Cleri, by analogy to some similar representations of that order under Edward II.[531] In these it was complained that the courts of law interfered by continual prohibitions with a jurisdiction as established and as much derived from the king as their own, either in cases which were clearly within that jurisdiction's limits, or on the slightest suggestion of some matter belonging to the temporal court. It was hinted that the whole course of granting prohibitions was an encroachment of the king's bench and common pleas, and that they could regularly issue only out of chancery. To each of these articles of complaint, extending to twenty-five, the judges made separate answers, in a rough, and, some might say, a rude style, but pointed and much to the purpose; vindicating in every instance their right to take cognisance of every collateral matter springing out of an ecclesiastical suit, and repelling the attack upon their power to issue prohibitions, as a strange presumption. Nothing was done, nor, thanks to the firmness of the judges, could be done, by the council in this respect. For the clergy had begun by advancing that the king's authority was sufficient to reform what was amiss in any of his own courts, all jurisdiction spiritual and temporal being annexed to his Crown. But it was positively and repeatedly denied in reply, that anything less than an act of parliament could alter the course of justice established by law. This effectually silenced the archbishop, who knew how little he had to hope from the Commons. By the pretensions made for the church in this affair, he exasperated the judges, who had been quite sufficiently disposed to second all rigorous measures against the puritan ministers, and aggravated that jealousy of the ecclesiastical courts which the common lawyers had long entertained.

Cowell's Interpreter.—An opportunity was soon given to those who disliked the civilians, that is, not only to the common lawyers, but to all the patriots and puritans in England, by an imprudent publication of a Doctor Cowell. This man, in a law dictionary dedicated to Bancroft, had thought fit to insert passages of a tenor conformable to the new creed of the king's absolute or arbitrary power. Under the title King, it is said:—"He is above the law by his absolute power, and though for the better and equal course in making laws he do admit the three estates unto council, yet this in divers learned men's opinion is not of constraint, but of his own benignity, or by reason of the promise made upon oath at the time of his coronation. And though at his coronation he take an oath not to alter the laws of the land, yet this oath notwithstanding, he may alter or suspend any particular law that seemeth hurtful to the public estate. Thus much in short, because I have heard some to be of opinion that the laws are above the king." And in treating of the Parliament, Cowell observes: "Of these two one must be true, either that the king is above the parliament, that is, the positive laws of his kingdom, or else that he is not an absolute king. And therefore though it be a merciful policy and also a politic mercy, not alterable without great peril, to make laws by the consent of the whole realm, because so no part shall have cause to complain of a partiality, yet simply to bind the prince to or by these laws were repugnant to the nature and constitution of an absolute monarchy." It is said again, under the title Prerogative, that "the king, by the custom of this kingdom, maketh no laws without the consent of the three estates, though he may quash any law concluded of by them;" and that he "holds it incontrollable, that the king of England is an absolute king."[532]

Such monstrous positions from the mouth of a man of learning and conspicuous in his profession, who was surmised to have been instigated as well as patronised by the archbishop, and of whose book the king was reported to have spoken in terms of eulogy, gave very just scandal to the House of Commons. They solicited and obtained a conference with the lords, which the attorney-general, Sir Francis Bacon, managed on the part of the lower house; a remarkable proof of his adroitness and pliancy. James now discovered that it was necessary to sacrifice this too unguarded advocate of prerogative: Cowell's book was suppressed by proclamation, for which the Commons returned thanks, with great joy at their victory.[533]

It is the evident policy of every administration, in dealing with the House of Commons, to humour them in everything that touches their pride and tenaciousness of privilege, never attempting to protect any one who incurs their displeasure by want of respect. This seems to have been understood by the Earl of Salisbury, the first English minister who, having long sat in the lower house, had become skilful in those arts of management which his successors have always reckoned so essential a part of their mystery. He wanted a considerable sum of money to defray the king's debts, which, on his coming into the office of lord treasurer after Lord Buckhurst's death, he had found to amount to £1,300,000, about one-third of which was still undischarged. The ordinary expense also surpassed the revenue by £81,000. It was impossible that this could continue, without involving the Crown in such embarrassments as would leave it wholly at the mercy of parliament. Cecil therefore devised the scheme of obtaining a perpetual yearly revenue of £200,000, to be granted once for all by parliament; and the better to incline the house to this high and extraordinary demand, he promised in the king's name to give all the redress and satisfaction in his power for any grievances they might bring forward.[534]

Renewed complaints of the Commons.—This offer on the part of government seemed to make an opening for a prosperous adjustment of the differences which had subsisted ever since the king's accession. The Commons accordingly, postponing the business of a subsidy, to which the courtiers wished to give priority, brought forward a host of their accustomed grievances in ecclesiastical and temporal concerns. The most essential was undoubtedly that of impositions, which they sent up a bill to the Lords, as above mentioned, to take away. They next complained of the ecclesiastical high commission court, which took upon itself to fine and imprison, powers not belonging to their jurisdiction, and passed sentences without appeal, interfering frequently with civil rights, and in all its procedure neglecting the rules and precautions of the common law. They dwelt on the late abuse of proclamations assuming the character of laws. "Amongst many other points of happiness and freedom," it is said, "which your majesty's subjects of this kingdom have enjoyed under your royal progenitors, kings and queens of this realm, there is none which they have accounted more dear and precious than this, to be guided and governed by the certain rule of the law, which giveth both to the head and members that which of right belongeth to them, and not by any uncertain or arbitrary form of government, which, as it hath proceeded from the original good constitution and temperature of this estate, so hath it been the principal means of upholding the same, in such sort as that their kings have been just, beloved, happy, and glorious, and the kingdom itself peaceable, flourishing, and durable so many ages. And the effect, as well of the contentment that the subjects of this kingdom have taken in this form of government, as also of the love, respect, and duty, which they have by reason of the same rendered unto their princes, may appear in this, that they have, as occasion hath required, yielded more extraordinary and voluntary contribution to assist their kings, than the subjects of any other known kingdom whatsoever. Out of this root hath grown the indubitable right of the people of this kingdom, not to be made subject to any punishment that shall extend to their lives, lands, bodies, or goods, other than such as are ordained by the common laws of this land, or the statutes made by their common consent in parliament. Nevertheless, it is apparent, both that proclamations have been of late years much more frequent than heretofore, and that they are extended, not only to the liberty, but also to the goods, inheritances, and livelihood of men; some of them tending to alter some points of the law, and make a new; other some made, shortly after a session of parliament, for matter directly rejected in the same session; other appointing punishments to be inflicted before lawful trial and conviction; some containing penalties in form of penal statutes; some referring the punishment of offenders to courts of arbitrary discretion, which have laid heavy and grievous censures upon the delinquents; some, as the proclamation for starch, accompanied with letters commanding enquiry to be made against the transgressors at the quarter-sessions; and some vouching former proclamations to countenance and warrant the later, as by a catalogue here underwritten more particularly appeareth. By reason whereof there is a general fear conceived and spread amongst your majesty's people, that proclamations will, by degrees, grow up, and increase to the strength and nature of laws; whereby not only that ancient happiness, freedom, will be much blemished (if not quite taken away) which their ancestors have so long enjoyed; but the same may also (in process of time) bring a new form of arbitrary government upon the realm: and this their fear is the more increased by occasion of certain books lately published, which ascribe a greater power to proclamations than heretofore had been conceived to belong unto them; as also of the care taken to reduce all the proclamations made since your majesty's reign into one volume, and to print them in such form as acts of parliament formerly have been, and still are used to be, which seemeth to imply a purpose to give them more reputation and more establishment than heretofore they have had."[535]

They proceed, after a list of these illegal proclamations, to enumerate other grievances, such as the delay of courts of law in granting writs of prohibition and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of the council of Wales over the four bordering shires of Gloucester, Worcester, Hereford, and Salop,[536] some patents of monopolies, and a tax under the name of a licence recently set upon victuallers. The king answered these remonstrances with civility, making, as usual, no concession with respect to the ecclesiastical commission, and evading some of their other requests; but promising that his proclamations should go no farther than was warranted by law, and that the royal licences to victuallers should be revoked.

Negotiation for giving up the feudal revenue.—It appears that the Commons, deeming these enumerated abuses contrary to law, were unwilling to chaffer with the Crown for the restitution of their actual rights. There were, however, parts of the prerogative which they could not dispute, though galled by the burthen; the incidents of feudal tenure, and purveyance. A negotiation was accordingly commenced and carried on for some time with the court, for abolishing both these, or at least the former. The king, though he refused to part with tenure by knight's service, which he thought connected with the honour of the monarchy, was induced, with some real or pretended reluctance, to give up its lucrative incidents, relief, primer seisin, and wardship, as well as the right of purveyance. But material difficulties recurred in the prosecution of this treaty. Some were apprehensive that the validity of a statute cutting off such ancient branches of prerogative might hereafter be called in question; especially if the root from which they sprung, tenure in capite, should still remain. The king's demands, too, seemed exorbitant. He asked £200,000 as a yearly revenue over and above £100,000, at which his wardships were valued, and which the Commons were content to give. After some days' pause upon this proposition, they represented to the Lords, with whom, through committees of conference, the whole matter had been discussed, that if such a sum were to be levied on those only who had lands subject to wardship, it would be a burthen they could not endure; and that if it were imposed equally on the kingdom, it would cause more offence and commotion in the people than they could risk. After a good deal of haggling, Salisbury delivered the king's final determination to accept of £200,000 per annum, which the Commons voted to grant as a full composition for abolishing the right of wardship, and dissolving the court that managed it, and for taking away all purveyance; with some further concessions, and particularly, that the king's claim to lands should be bound by sixty years' prescription. Two points yet remained, of no small moment; namely, by what assurance they could secure themselves against the king's prerogative, so often held up by court lawyers as something uncontrollable by statute, and by what means so great an imposition should be levied; but the consideration of these was reserved for the ensuing session, which was to take place in October.[537] They were prorogued in July till that month, having previously granted a subsidy for the king's immediate exigencies. On their meeting again, the Lords began the business by requesting a conference with the other house about the proposed contract. But it appeared that the Commons had lost their disposition to comply. Time had been given them to calculate the disproportion of the terms, and the perpetual burthen that lands held by knight's service must endure. They had reflected too on the king's prodigal humour, the rapacity of the Scots in his service, and the probability that this additional revenue would be wasted without sustaining the national honour, or preventing future applications for money. They saw that after all the specious promises by which they had been led on, no redress was to be expected as to those grievances they had most at heart; that the ecclesiastical courts would not be suffered to lose a jot of their jurisdiction, that illegal customs were still to be levied at the out-ports, that proclamations were still to be enforced like acts of parliament. Great coldness accordingly was displayed in their proceedings; and in a short time, this distinguished parliament, after sitting nearly seven years, was dissolved by proclamation.[538]

Dissolution of parliament—Character of James.—It was now perhaps too late for the king, by any reform or concession, to regain that public esteem which he had forfeited. Deceived by an overweening opinion of his own learning, which was not inconsiderable, of his general abilities which were far from contemptible, and of his capacity for government, which was very small, and confirmed in this delusion by the disgraceful flattery of his courtiers and bishops, he had wholly overlooked the real difficulties of his position; as a foreigner, rather distantly connected with the royal stock, and as a native of a hostile and hateful kingdom, come to succeed the most renowned of sovereigns, and to grasp a sceptre which deep policy and long experience had taught her admirably to wield.[539] The people were proud of martial glory, he spoke only of the blessing of the peacemakers; they abhorred the court of Spain, he sought its friendship; they asked indulgence for scrupulous consciences, he would bear no deviation from conformity; they writhed under the yoke of the bishops, whose power he thought necessary to his own; they were animated by a persecuting temper towards the catholics, he was averse to extreme rigour; they had been used to the utmost frugality in dispensing the public treasure, he squandered it on unworthy favourites; they had seen at least exterior decency of morals prevail in the queen's court, they now heard only of its dissoluteness and extravagance;[540] they had imbibed an exclusive fondness for the common law as the source of their liberties and privileges; his churchmen and courtiers, but none more than himself, talked of absolute power and the imprescriptible rights of monarchy.[541]

Death of Lord Salisbury.—James lost in 1611 his son Prince Henry, and in 1612 the lord treasurer Salisbury. He showed little regret for the former, whose high spirit and great popularity afforded a mortifying contrast; especially as the young prince had not taken sufficient pains to disguise his contempt for his father.[542] Salisbury was a very able man, to whom perhaps his contemporaries did some injustice. The ministers of weak and wilful monarchs are made answerable for the mischiefs they are compelled to suffer, and gain no credit for those which they prevent. Cecil had made personal enemies of those who had loved Essex or admired Raleigh, as well as those who looked invidiously on his elevation. It was believed that the desire shown by the House of Commons to abolish the feudal wardships, proceeded in a great measure from the circumstance that this obnoxious minister was master of the court of wards; an office both lucrative and productive of much influence. But he came into the scheme of abolishing it with a readiness that did him credit. His chief praise, however, was his management of continental relations. The only minister of James's cabinet who had been trained in the councils of Elizabeth, he retained some of her jealousy of Spain, and of her regard for the protestant interests. The court of Madrid, aware both of the king's pusillanimity and of his favourable dispositions, affected a tone in the conferences held in 1604, about a treaty of peace, which Elizabeth would have resented in a very different manner.[543] On this occasion, he not only deserted the United Provinces, but gave hopes to Spain that he might, if they persevered in their obstinacy, take part against them. Nor have I any doubt that his blind attachment to that power would have precipitated him into a ruinous connection, if Cecil's wisdom had not influenced his councils. During this minister's life, our foreign politics seem to have been conducted with as much firmness and prudence as his master's temper would allow; the mediation of England was of considerable service in bringing about the great truce of twelve years between Spain and Holland in 1609; and in the dispute which sprang up soon afterwards concerning the succession to the duchies of Cleves and Juliers, a dispute which threatened to mingle in arms the catholic and protestant parties throughout Europe,[544] our councils were full of a vigour and promptitude unusual in this reign; nor did anything but the assassination of Henry IV. prevent the appearance of an English army in the Netherlands. It must at least be confessed that the king's affairs, both at home and abroad, were far worse conducted after the death of the Earl of Salisbury than before.[545]

Lord Coke's alienation from the court.—The administration found an important disadvantage, about this time, in a sort of defection of Sir Edward Coke (more usually called Lord Coke), chief justice of the king's bench, from the side of prerogative. He was a man of strong, though narrow, intellect; confessedly the greatest master of English law that had ever appeared; but proud and overbearing, a flatterer and tool of the court till he had obtained his ends, and odious to the nation for the brutal manner in which, as attorney-general, he had behaved towards Sir Walter Raleigh on his trial. In raising him to the post of chief justice, the council had of course relied on finding his unfathomable stores of precedent subservient to their purposes. But soon after his promotion, Coke, from various causes, began to steer a more independent course. He was little formed to endure a competitor in his own profession, and lived on ill terms both with the lord chancellor Egerton, and with the attorney-general, Sir Francis Bacon. The latter had long been his rival and enemy. Discountenanced by Elizabeth, who, against the importunity of Essex, had raised Coke over his head, that great and aspiring genius was now high in the king's favour. The chief justice affected to look down on one as inferior to him in knowledge of our municipal law, as he was superior in all other learning and in all the philosophy of jurisprudence. And the mutual enmity of these illustrious men never ceased till each in his turn satiated his revenge by the other's fall. Coke was also much offended by the attempts of the bishops to emancipate their ecclesiastical courts from the civil jurisdiction. I have already mentioned the peremptory tone in which he repelled Bancroft's Articuli Cleri. But as the king and some of the council rather favoured these episcopal pretensions, they were troubled by what they deemed his obstinacy, and discovered more and more that they had to deal with a most impracticable spirit.