1. The enterpriser guarantees to the capitalist-lender a fixed return. Agents will yield the highest economic rent of which they are capable only in the hands of those who can use them with exceptional skill. Owners of capital who for any reason, such as youth, inexperience, ill health, incapacity, or conflicting duties, are not able to make agents yield the average rent, seek out, or are sought out by, those who in general can make the agents yield more than the average. The interest contract between them is one of mutual advantage, in that the enterpriser pays a definite sum to the investor unable himself to apply his productive agents. Immense sums of capital are now put into the hands of small enterprisers, such as Western farmers improving their lands, builders of city homes and business blocks, and small manufacturers. But stocks and bonds of corporations give a wide variety of investments which shade off from the safer or capitalistic type, to the more uncertain, or enterpriser's type. First-mortgage bonds, being a first claim on the income and property, have the highest security and yield generally the lowest interest. Even national bonds are not absolutely safe, and for that reason as well as because of their fluctuation in price, even their purchase has something of the nature of an enterprise. Stocks are the enterpriser's type of investment, the dividends being more uncertain, but giving the chance of a higher return than the average. It is because some stand ready to assume the risk of making goods yield average returns or more, that others can sit and enjoy a fixed income with little effort and in comparative security.
2. The enterpriser gives up the certain income to be got by lending his own capital, and, becoming a borrower, offers his capital as insurance to the lender. Every business has an element of uncertainty in it, and some one must meet the risk. A man with marked ability as an organizer of industry is rarely found long without capital of his own. But even a penniless man who can gain the confidence of investors is able to get backing and to secure the necessary funds to engage in business. The lenders in such a case, however, run a greater risk than when the enterpriser is a man of some means, and they therefore ask a higher rate of interest than if they were loaning to a wealthy man or to a wealthy company. They are in part the enterprisers. When, as usually, the enterpriser invests some of his own capital, it is a guarantee of his good faith, a sort of insurance reserve to protect the lender from loss. The first loss falls on the enterpriser, and the chance of loss to the lender is in large part, though not entirely, eliminated. It is characteristic of modern loans that the borrower may be rich, not poor,—often richer than the lender. The mortgage on real estate and the creditor's claim on a merchant's property usually give security of far greater value than the loan.
3. The enterpriser gives to other workers a definite amount for services applied to distant ends. In discussing the wage system it was pointed out that most labor at the present time is put upon future goods. It is not known what they will be worth a month or a year later when they mature as consumption goods; their present worth can merely be estimated. If they prove to be worth little, the profits may be nothing or less than nothing. The enterpriser, however, buys the services for ready money, embodies them in goods, and assumes the risk; the goods may sell for more or less than the wages. It is sometimes said with a certain irony that if the enterpriser assumes the risk he is very careful to pay so little for labor that he does not lose. In this naive view the enterpriser is so independent of the market that he can pay much or little as he pleases. In fact in many cases he gains little, and in many he loses and loses largely.
4. The enterpriser risks his own services and accepts an indefinite chance instead of a definite amount for them. Assuming the risk for the right conduct of industry, he backs himself, expresses his faith in himself as a manager who can make labor earn more than the prevailing wages and make capital yield more than the prevailing rate of interest. If it were otherwise, he would loan what capital he has instead of borrowing more; instead of employing others, he would himself seek employment in some other industry. Men are constantly shifting from the class of hired workers to that of enterprisers. It is a rude and often tragic process of adjustment and selection that enables men having ability as enterprisers to continue in that work, and forces others into the class of employees.
5. The enterpriser is the economic buffer; economic forces are transmitted through him. In a more primitive industry each man is wage-earner, capitalist, and enterpriser combined in one. As industry develops, some of the factors of cost become distinguishable, and relatively stable and calculable. A low rate of interest, ranging from three to four per cent., can be secured with practical certainty by putting one's money into good corporation securities, into the savings-bank, or into national bonds. Contract wages in each class of labor also are fixed by competition at a point where they are a medium or average of gains and losses. The enterpriser is the most movable element. As the specialized risk-taker, he is the spring or buffer, which takes up and distributes the strain of industry. He feels first the influence of changing conditions. If the prices of his products fall, the first loss comes upon him, and he avoids further loss as best he can by paying less for materials and labor. At such times the wage-earners look upon him as their evil genius, and usually blame him for lowering their wages, not the public for refusing to buy the product at the former high prices. Again, if prices rise, he gains from the increased value of the stock in his hand that has been produced at low cost. If the employer often appears to be a hard man, his disposition is the result of "natural selection." He is placed between the powerful, selfish forces of competition, and his economic survival is conditioned on vigilance, strength, and self-assertion. Weak generosity cannot endure.
6. Profits therefore fluctuate more from industry to industry and from man to man than do other incomes. As a somewhat exceptional case, small employers in industries such as baking and tailoring, may for long periods get less for their work than their employees get in wages. The pride in being an employer and occasional chances of greater gains perhaps explain the fact. The fluctuations of the market may sweep away from the enterpriser not only all his "profits," but all his accumulated wealth. As a consequence, profits may be at other times very high, for men will not take the risk of great losses unless there is a chance of large gains. While the income of the salaried man is occasionally advanced, and then for long periods remains unchanged, the profits of enterprise come in waves. In seasons of prosperity the income of the employer swells with a dramatic swiftness while rents and wages move tardily upward. But for years again the employer earns a return hardly exceeding a low interest on the capital invested in the enterprise, or runs the business for a time at a loss. Profits of this kind should not be spoken of as a percentage. Greater or less, they are the net result attributable to the enterpriser's skill, and bear no fixed or calculable relation to any capital investment.
1. Some apparent profits are due to antisocial or criminal acts. Cheating, lying, breaking of contracts, bribery of public officials, and many similar acts may greatly increase individual incomes. These are not profits, as the term is here understood, but they are hard to distinguish from profits in practical life. One man gains a temporary success by acts that are later punished as crimes; another, guilty of like deeds, escapes conviction for lack of evidence or on technicalities, and enjoys ill-gotten wealth. More fortunes, however, are due to actions on the border-line of ethics, which society is not yet honest enough to condemn or wise enough to prevent. No code of laws can be framed that will make possible the punishment of all antisocial acts. Any law that would catch all the guilty would injure many of the innocent. Economic analysis may exclude from the concept of profits the gains made by such means, but only omniscience could distinguish them in every actual case from "swag and boodle."
2. Some profits are the result of pure chance or luck. What is luck? A result that is not calculable, coming to pass in conditions where a rational choice is not possible, is called luck, for lack of another name. Now pure luck often brings temporary profit to the individual, but chance does not in the least account for the average and abiding profits. There is bad luck as well as good luck. According to the law of chance, in the tossing of a coin for "heads and tails," one side is as likely to come up as the other, and in the long run the number of heads and tails will be equal. Where cases are numerous, losses and gains distribute themselves about a general average, and may be eliminated by insurance, as that against fire, flood, lightning, against sickness of the employer, which would cripple the business, or against his death, which would check it. But many factors evade all attempts to reduce them to rule, and chance remains a considerable factor in the success of many individuals. It still sometimes appears better to be born lucky than rich.
3. Some profits are temporary gains from happy but not entirely accidental choice of the best course. Many cases of profit said to be due to chance are found on closer knowledge to be due to superior judgment. A slight advantage in choice will give now and then apparently chance gains. The adventurer who, on the discovery of gold, goes at once to California or to Alaska, may stumble upon a gold-mine. It is luck; but if he stays at home it is more likely, according to the theory of chances, that he will stumble over an ash-heap. In places where gold-mines are comparatively plentiful, one takes chances between a load of lead and a bag of money. Throughout life there is constant opportunity, but it must be sought. One who has the good judgment to be ever at the right time at the place where he has the best chance of stumbling upon a good thing, usually gets the advantage, and men call it luck. The more the causes of success in general are studied, the larger is found the element of choice, the smaller that of luck. Some writers make these temporary gains the essence of profits. Considering that profits are always due to the introduction of new and better methods, and not to the continued use of better ones, they argue that as the knowledge of these becomes common property profits will disappear. But this in our view is a partial truth.
4. Continuing profits arise from the continued exercise of superior judgment. After all the chance elements are taken into account, there remain differences in the abilities of men, and a continued and ever-renewed need of organizing power. Profits, being recognized as due to these differences in the abilities just as rent is due to differences in the fertility and efficiency of goods, have therefore been called differential gains. There would be no objection to the term were it not intended to emphasize a supposed difference between profits and rents on the one hand and interest wages on the other.
Some writers have so magnified the thought that the enterpriser's function is to assume risk, as to make it a denial of the view that profits are the earnings of ability. The risks of business are not those of the throwing of dice in which (if it is fair) skill plays no part, and gains in the long run offset losses. Business risks are rather those of the rope-walker in crossing Niagara; the task is easily undertaken by the skilful Blondin, it is fatally dangerous to the man of unsteady nerve and limb. Profits are due not to risks, but to superior skill in taking risks. They are not subtracted from the gains of labor but are earned, in the same sense in which the wages of skilled labor are earned. So long as some men have better organizing ability than others, have better judgment, are better able to take the risks, there is reason to believe that profits will continue.
Profits are the share, or income, of the enterpriser for his skill in directing industry and in assuming the risks. Despite the complex influences, they are determined by his contribution to industry essentially as is the value of any skilled service.
1. Profit-sharing is rewarding labor with a share of the profits in addition to contract wages. The essential mark of profit-sharing is that the additional payment depends on the net profits of the whole business at the end of the year. It is not to be confused with a free gift, or with special privileges granted by the employer, such as lunch-rooms, bathrooms or houses at a low rent. Profit-sharing is a contract made in advance, not a free gift. Nor is it the same as a bonus or premium for a larger output, made contingent on the physical product, on the increased number of pieces turned out by the workmen, individually or in groups. Premium for output is given for something directly under the influence of the worker. The amount of profits is affected by the amount of output, but also by a number of other things that are quite outside the control of the workmen.
2. The purpose of the employer in adopting profit-sharing is to stimulate the industry of the workers, thus reducing waste and cost of labor and supervision. The employer adopting the plan does not intend to lose by it; he believes that if he can get his workmen to take an interest in the business his costs will be reduced. He offers to divide with them the resulting savings. There is, in every factory, greater or less waste of materials, destruction of tools, and loss of time, that no rules or penalties can prevent. If the worker can be made to take a strong enough personal interest he will use care when the eye of the foreman is not upon him. The product also can be slightly increased in many ways by the workmen's exertions or suggestions. In some cases the quality of the work cannot be insured by the closest inspection as well as it can be by a small degree of personal interest. Either responsibility for the fault cannot be fixed, or the defect is one not measurable by any easily applied standard. Strikes are averted, good feeling is promoted, and contentment is furthered if the interest of the worker can be made to approach, and actually to be in harmony with, that of the employer. The economic result of the plan, if it can be made to work, must be to reduce the costs of these establishments below what they are. The crucial question is whether this alone insures that the costs will be less than those of competitors, thus giving a source out of which an increased amount, really a wage, can be paid to the laborer. This additional wage is made conditional on the employer's success in gaining a net profit on the year's business.
3. The profit-sharing plan is now successfully working in over one hundred firms in America and Europe. The plan was first tried in Paris by Leclaire, a house-painter. In house-painting there is often a great waste of materials and time by men working singly or in small groups in different parts of the city. By this new method Leclaire enlisted the aid of the workmen, reduced the costs, and increased the profits. It is a remarkable fact that the plan has been continued successfully by the same firm to the present time. The most important examples of profit-sharing in the United States are the Pillsbury Mills in Minneapolis, Procter and Gamble's soap-factories at Ivorydale, O., and the Nelson Mfg. Co. at Leclaire, Ill. In some cases both manufacturer and workman value the system highly. N. P. Gilman, the author of "Profit Sharing," puts the ratio of successes very high. Others declare that the failures are mostly lost sight of and are very many. The proportion of business done in this way is not large. One hundred firms is a very small fraction of one per cent. of the total number of firms in Germany, France, England, and America. A still more important fact is that this method of remuneration did not spread in the ten years preceding 1900.
4. The failure of profit-sharing to grow is due to objections on the side both of the employer and of the workman. On the side of the workman there is the bookkeeping difficulty. He is suspicious, and he lacks knowledge of the business. If at the end of the year the books show no profits, the workman loses confidence, considers the plan to be mere deception, and rejects it. Moreover, the plan puts a limitation upon the workman's freedom to compete for better wages by changing his place of work. It is almost indispensable to make length of service a condition to the sharing of profits. Workmen coming and going, working only a few months, cannot be allowed to share; the percentage given to the others increases with length of employment. Whenever men are thus practically subject to a fine (equal to the amount of shared profits) if they accept a better position, there is danger of a covert lowering of wages. The plan tends to break up the trade-unions, which is one of the reasons that the employers like it, and is the reason that organized labor opposes it. The employer on his part objects to the interference with his management, the troublesome inspection of the books, and the constant grumbling and complaint of the workmen. It makes known the amount of his profits; if they are large, the advertising of his success invites competition; if they are small, publicity injures his credit and depresses the value of his property. In view of all these difficulties it is not surprising that while the plan often starts promisingly, it usually loses its efficiency after a short trial. Business methods are severely subject to the principle of the survival of the fittest. Through competition and the survival of the firms that adopt improvements, better methods must eventually supplant poorer ones. If a method fails to spread when it has been tried for fifty years and all are free to adopt it, there must be some defects inherent in it. That must be our conclusion as to profit-sharing.
5. It is usually better to make wages depend on the worker's efficiency rather than on the profits of the whole business. The strongest motive to efficiency is present when reward is connected immediately and directly with effort, not with some result only slightly under the worker's control. In profit-sharing the added share is only partially due to increased effort of the worker. Labor is but one of the groups of costs. Profits are the net result of many influences. Chief among these is the wisdom of the enterpriser in planning and conducting the business. The "profits" may be nothing, though the worker may be exerting himself to the utmost. The plan is, therefore, reactionary, not in accord with the general progress of the wage system, which is tending constantly to centralize responsibility, to put the risk into the hands of competent managers, and to secure to the worker a definite amount in advance, as high as conditions make possible. The system of premiums, or bonus payments, for output, gives in most cases better results and is rapidly spreading. It is sounder in conception and works better in practice. This premium depends on the increase by the laborer of the output of his particular machine or process as compared with a standard based on the experience of some definite period.
1. Producers' coöperation is the union of workers in a self-employing group to do away with any other enterpriser than themselves, and to secure for themselves the profits. Its object is not to do away with any return on the capital investment. Capital may be borrowed either from outsiders or from the individual coöperators, and is paid a stipulated interest apart from the profits. The source of the gain is to be found in the saving of what the worker looks upon as the needless drain of profits into the pockets of the employer. The hope is that the enterpriser's function (if it is admitted that he has any useful function) will be performed by the workers collectively or through their representatives. They undertake to furnish brain as well as muscle, management as well as hand-work. The hope is even to increase the profits through increasing the stimulus to the workers and by saving in friction, disputes, and strikes.
2. Practically the plan has been made to work in a comparatively few simple industries. The most notable examples of successful coöperation in America have been the cooper-shops in Minneapolis. There were a simple problem of costs, few and uniform materials, patterns, and qualities of product, few machines and much hand-labor, simple well-known processes, a sure local market. Mr. Lloyd, in a recent book, describes many successful societies in England, but they are all of a simple sort of industry, as agriculture and dairy-farming. Within the whole field of industry, this method of organization makes little if any progress. Most experiments have failed and the successful ones often become ordinary stock companies with the most able men in control. Therefore, whether losing or making money, they nearly all cease to exist as coöperative enterprises. This result has disappointed the prophecies of many wise men of seventy-five years ago. In the time of John Stuart Mill, great expectations were entertained of the future of productive coöperation, which was thought to be a solution of the whole social problem.
3. The main difficulty in productive coöperation is to secure managing ability of a high order. There is no touchstone for business talent, no way of selecting it with any certainty in advance of trial. This selection is made hard in coöperative shops by the jealousies and rivalries, and by the politics among the workmen. A man thus selected by his fellows finds it almost impossible to enforce discipline. In coöperation there is occasionally developed good business ability that might have remained dormant under the wage system; some workmen showing unusual capacity cease to be handicraftsmen. But the unwillingness on the part of the workers to pay high salaries results in the loss of able managers. Having demonstrated their ability, the leaders go to competing industries where their function is not in such bad repute, and where higher salaries can be earned; or they go into business independently, being able easily to get control of the necessary capital.
4. Most coöperative schemes have suffered from a lack of good theory, an inability of the workers to see the importance of the enterpriser's service. Most men make a very imperfect analysis of the productive process. They see that a large part of the product does not go to the workmen; they see the gross amount going to the enterpriser, and they ignore the fact that this contains the cost of materials, interest on capital, and incidental expenses. They ignore further that the enterpriser's function is a productive and essential one. The theory of exploitation, or robbery, as explaining the employer's profits, is very commonly held in a more or less vague way by workmen. With a body of intelligent and thoroughly honest workmen, keenly alive to the truth, the dangers, and the risks of the enterprise, coöperation would be possible in many industries where now it is not. The producers' coöperative schemes usually stumble into an unsuspected pitfall. When a heedless and over-confident army ventures into an enemy's country without a knowledge of its geography, without a map, and without leaders that have been tested on the field of battle, the result can easily be foreseen.
1. Consumers' coöperation is the union of a number of buyers to save for themselves the profits of the merchants or agents. There are many classes of consumers' coöperation, but the chief ones are: (1) to sell goods (retail stores); (2) to provide insurance (coöperative insurance companies); (3) to provide credit or capital (coöperative banks). These are also productive enterprises, for the merchant's work adds value to the goods, the insurance company and its agent do a real service, the profits of the small bank are, ordinarily, earned fairly under existing conditions. The terms producers' and consumers' coöperation merely set in contrast the part of the productive process that is undertaken. Producers' coöperation is concerned with the earlier steps, usually stopping when the product is disposed of to wholesale or retail merchants. Consumers' coöperation (often called distributive coöperation) is concerned with the later steps, the placing of a consumption good (rarely also productive agents) into the hands of the final user. It imparts the same value to goods that the retail merchant does. The one thing this class of coöperators is sure of when they begin is a number of consumers to make use of the service or products they purpose to supply; hence the name.
2. The waste of competitive mercantile business is the source from which it is expected that the savings of the coöperative enterprise will come. It is a great expense to the retail dealer to secure a body of customers. Rent of store-room, clerk hire, interest on invested capital are fixed charges, which can be met only on condition of a regular and frequent turnover of the stock. To attract customers the dealer must have a well-located store, must advertise, keep open long hours, and pay idle clerks. Frequently he must give credit, raising the price enough to cover the expense of bookkeeping, collection, bad accounts, and loss of interest. The public's likings, whims, lack of judgment, and lack of business analysis make these charges necessary. There are many communities where it would be impossible to carry on a cash business even at considerably lower prices. Customers are exacting and require the costly delivery of small packages; two horses and a driver must travel two miles to deliver a spool of thread or a half-dozen oranges. Frequent changes of fashion and the shifting of customers from one store to another keep the merchant always insecure in his trade. A number of buyers mutually agreeing to pay cash, to buy at certain times, to place all their orders with one store, to go to a cheaper location, down an alley or into a basement, can save much of this cost on one condition: that the management approaches in its efficiency that of ordinary competitive business. In spite of all these advantages, if there is inefficient management the final cost will be no less than that of ordinary business.
3. Despite the possibilities of saving, most coöperative stores fail through a lack of good management. Note first the greater successes. Since 1842, from which time it dates, the coöperative-store movement has progressed steadily in England, where the scores of retail societies are federated and own large wholesale stores. The long experience has developed good methods and a conservatism almost inconceivable to an American mind. They are practically great stock companies in which one can buy a share at a small cost and become a purchaser at usual prices, receiving a dividend later according to the amount of his purchases. Coöperative stores in American universities are generally successful, apparently because they don't coöperate. Some get into politics and go the way of the wicked. The survivors gravitate into the hands of a committee of the faculty, which tries to employ an efficient manager, and administers the business as a public trust without private profit. The wastefulness of multiplying orders for text-books to be used by a class whose number is definitely known in advance, and the comparatively uniform character of the supplies, make economy peculiarly easy in this case. A large part of the services of the coöperative store, however, are indirect; it reduces and regulates the charges in the stores near by.
Nearly all the Granger stores, started thirty years ago in great numbers, and most of the coöperative stores among American workmen, have failed. The failure is easily explained by the ignorance of danger, by lack of harmony, by credit sales, and by inefficient management. The wastes of competitive business are partly a tax imposed upon men (taken collectively) by their lack of business method; the community is not intelligent enough, honest enough, or self-sacrificing enough to do business in the most economical way. Partly they are the price paid for variety and change, and for the cherished American right "to kick"—something difficult for the members of a coöperative store to do without hurting themselves.
4. The experience with these plans verifies the analysis of the enterpriser's function: pure profits are the earnings of a productive service. Comparing these three plans, they are seen to be alike in seeking to make workers share some of the profits, to change the destination to which profits would go. The first would create profits by the effort of the workers, and give them a part of the saving. The second would have collective workers perform the enterpriser's work in the factory and get his reward. The third would have collective buyers do the work of the merchant and save his profits and other costs. The last is the easiest to do. Profit-sharing is next in difficulty, and producers' coöperation is the hardest of all to put into practice. In some cases, under some conditions, the enterpriser's services may be more economically performed than at present, for the waste is great. But taking men as they are and things as they are, in most places the enterpriser's service is necessary and must be paid for. His contribution to the success of the industry depends on his nature and ability, and it can be distinguished theoretically and practically from the contribution made by the workmen. Nothing but changes in human nature, in education, and in morality can diminish the necessity for his service.
1. The term monopoly is used loosely and in many senses. In popular discussion monopoly means almost any wealthy corporation or the power the corporation possesses, a power which is usually thought of as oppressive. Even economists have held the vaguest ideas regarding monopoly. The recent rise of trusts and monopolies has given a large new body of facts bearing upon the subject, but all the resulting discussion by the public and by economists has not brought agreement upon a definition entirely satisfactory. When usage has not settled upon any one meaning, the selection of a definition is in a measure arbitrary, though it may be guided by logic and considerations of expediency. Let us state the various meanings and indicate the one adopted in this discussion.
2. Monopoly should not be used as synonymous with scarcity. Scarcity is the essential condition of all value. The simplest things—bricks, sand, the commonest unskilled labor—would have no value were there not a degree of scarcity relative to the wants that may be gratified. "Monopoly," whatever else it means, always conveys the idea of some exceptional kind of scarcity, scarcity due in part to some source or cause not ordinarily present. It is a bad practice in definition to apply two words to one idea, leaving the other idea unnamed, as is done when monopoly is made synonymous with scarcity. Both words are needed. Such a usage unfortunately is common in economic literature. Many economic writers, for example, have called landownership monopoly, saying that land being the work of nature cannot be increased by men, and therefore must always be scarce. Even if it were true that in the economic sense land could be produced by man, there still would be confusion here between a general class of goods and a special thing. The fact that a particular field cannot be duplicated does not make a monopoly of land as a whole, any more than the existence of desert land in Arizona makes land valueless or a free good. Nor is a land-owner a monopolist any more than is the owner of a valuable machine. The owner of forty acres of land worth four hundred dollars, or the owner of a village lot worth a hundred dollars, can hardly be called a monopolist. It leads to absurdity to use the word monopoly with reference to landownership indiscriminately. Neither mere scarcity nor the limitation of natural stores should be called monopoly when ownership is scattered and combination between owners does not exist.
3. The ability of superior material agents and of skilled workers to secure higher returns than do poor ones does not constitute monopoly. The free competition assumed in abstract discussions of value, does not mean equal capacity or efficiency, but the legal freedom and personal willingness to move a productive agent into the highest industrial place it is capable of holding. The rocky field does not compete with the fertile one in the sense that it can yield the same uses. The field fit only for potatoes does not compete with those rare and favored localities that can raise the best wines. The gardener earning two dollars a day does not compete with the skilled physician with an income of twenty thousand dollars a year, for he has not the economic capacity to do so; but he is free to compete (as is the owner of the rocky field) unless law, caste, class legislation, social prejudice, or some other objective factor forbids. Anything, however, that prevents the labor or capital of buyers or sellers from application for which they are fitted, defeats free competition. To use the term monopoly of any and every limitation of economic ability is to extend it to every case of value. To use it of the high wages of skilled workmen, where no union to suppress competition exists among them, is to make it a colorless synonym of scarcity. It should be confined to a narrower and more exclusive use. Some special kinds of limitation should be connected with the idea of monopoly.
4. The limitation connected with monopoly is not that of economic capacity but that of ownership and control. The derivation of the word from the Greek points to the general thought: monos, alone, poléo, to sell, a single seller, the sole source of supply in a given market. The term was first used in England of special grants or patents of monopoly from the crown to make or deal in specified articles, such as soap, candles, etc. The political power of the state created and defended the monopoly. This policy is pursued in a limited degree to-day for the encouragement of invention, in the granting of patents and copyrights. In the current definition, "The exclusive right, power, or privilege of dealing in some article or trading in some market," the term "dealing in" is well chosen, for it is broad enough to cover cases of buying as well as selling, and includes power derived from political as well as from other sources. But the term "exclusive" is too absolute, allows of no gradations, and makes the definition applicable only in the rarest cases.
5. Monopoly is such a degree of control over the supply of goods in a given market that a net gain will result to the seller if a portion is withheld. Every producer has control over some agents and some portion of the supply of products; but ordinarily the portion controlled by any one is so small that withholding it entirely from sale would not cause the market price to rise in any appreciable degree. The producer in such a case regulates his action as if the market price were fixed beyond his control, and he uses his productive agents fully up to the point where costs equal price on the marginal unit of product. A skilled worker getting five dollars a day loses that sum every day he is idle. A landowner whose land can command a competitive rent of ten dollars an acre must take that sum or less, or nothing; he cannot get more. How can a net gain ever result from a smaller sale? As a reduction of supply results in a higher price, it is possible, as is seen in the paradox of value, for a situation to arise in the case of some goods, where a smaller number of units yield a larger sum in the market than a larger number of units. But the seller's interest lies not in the increase of total sales, but in that of net gains. Net gains, being the product of the number of units sold multiplied by the gain on each unit, increase at a much faster rate than do total sales. The existence of monopoly power in any degree depends therefore on several factors: the effect of contraction of supply in raising prices, the effect on costs, the number of units remaining in the ownership of the one contracting supply, and the possibility of preventing others from increasing supply later to profit by the higher prices.
1. Monopoly gets its power from political, economic, and commercial sources. A political monopoly derives its power of control from a special grant from the government, forbidding others to engage in that business. The typical political monopoly is that conferred by a crown patent bestowing the exclusive right to carry on a certain business. A second kind is that conferred by a patent for invention, or the copyright on books, the object of which is to stimulate invention, research, and writing by giving the full control and protection of the government to the inventor and writer or their assignees. In this case the privilege is socially earned by the monopolist; it is not gotten for nothing. Moreover, the patent is limited in time, expires and becomes a social possession. A third kind is a government monopoly for purposes of revenue. In France, the government controls the tobacco trade, and the high price charged for tobacco makes the monopoly yield a large income. A fourth kind are public franchises for public service, as street-railways, lights, gas, waterworks, etc. These are granted to private capitalists to induce them to invest capital in something which has public utility.
Economic monopoly arises when the ownership of scarce natural agents, as mines, land, water-power, comes under the control of one man or one group of men who agree on a price. Economic monopoly is a result of private property that is undesigned by the government or by society. It is exceptional, considering the whole range of private property, but it is important. The oil-wells embracing the main sources of the world's supply have come under one control. One corporation may control so many of the richest iron-mines of the country as to be able to fix a price different from that which would result under competition. Coal-mines, especially those of some peculiar and limited kind, such as anthracite, appear to become easily an object of monopolization. Economic monopoly merges into political monopolies, such as patents and franchises. Private property is a political institution designed to further social welfare, and only rarely is any particular property a monopoly. Private control of great natural resources doubtless would have been prohibited had it been foreseen.
Commercial monopoly, variously called contractual, organized, or capitalistic monopoly, arises where men unite their wealth to control a market, to overpower or intimidate opposition, and to keep out or limit competition by the mere magnitude of their wealth. These various kinds so merge into each other that they cannot always be distinguished in practice. A patent may help a capitalistic monopoly in getting control of a market; great wealth may enable a company to get control of rare natural resources.
2. Monopolies may, for special purposes, be classified also as selling and buying, producing and trading, lasting and temporary, general and local. The terms selling and buying monopoly explain themselves, though the latter conflicts with the etymology. Under conditions of barter the selling and the buying monopoly would be the same thing in two aspects. A selling monopoly is by far the more common, but a buying monopoly may be connected with it. A large oil-refining corporation that sells most of the product may by various methods succeed in driving out the competitors who would buy the crude oil. It thus becomes practically the only outlet for the oil product, and the owners of the land thus must share their ownership with the buying monopoly by accepting, within certain limits, the price it fixes. The Hudson Bay Company, dealing in furs, had practically this sort of power in North America. Many instances can be found, yet, relatively to the selling monopolies, those of the buying kind are rare. A producing monopoly is one controlling the manufacture or the source of supply of an article; a trading monopoly is one controlling the avenues of commerce between the source and the consumers. Monopolies are lasting or temporary, according to the duration of control. By far the larger number are of the temporary sort, because high prices strongly stimulate efforts to develop other sources of supply. Yet the average profits of a monopoly may be large throughout a succession of periods of high and low prices. Monopolies are general or local, according to the extent of territory where their power is felt. At its maximum where transportation and other costs most effectually shut out competition, monopoly power shades off to zero on the border-line of competitive territory.
3. Degrees of power to affect price result from varying extent of control; monopoly is a relative term. The term monopoly by its derivation has reference to a single seller; but there are other thoughts in the concept. Monopoly has reference also to the amount of the supply controlled. The frequent use of the adjectives partial, limited, and virtual are implied but usually superfluous recognitions of the relative character of monopoly. Ownership of a particular knife, pencil, book, makes one the unique seller of it, but confers no monopoly power, as the power of substitution is practically absolute; the welfare of no one depends in any appreciable measure on that particular pencil. Ownership of an important fraction of an entire species of goods gives more power to affect value. One owning a large part of the desirable building sites or houses in town may gain by occasionally letting one stand vacant in order to drive better bargains with tenants. A trade-union may control most of the labor-supply of one kind in a town. But the test of monopoly is that a gain results from a higher price and fewer sales. It begins at the point where there is a motive to limit the supply in accordance with the paradox of value. The control of an entire species of goods gives price-fixing power, limited only by substitution of goods. Even though one person controlled all the coal and wood in any market, their prices still would be limited. If there were but one possible source of meat-supply, most people could live without meat. The monopoly of great species of goods can thus be seen gradually to merge from one grade into another. It is a matter of quality as well as quantity. There is more or less of it in the different industries, and, as noted in the preceding paragraph, it varies over time and territory.