This happened often throughout the Middle Ages and until the nineteenth century. Gold and silver generally were coined at a ratio of weight corresponding exactly to their market ratio at a given moment, and every time the market conditions varied, one kind of the money went out of circulation, and the country was left either without the larger gold coins, or without subsidiary coin, or "small change." At length the plan was hit upon of issuing a limited number of subsidiary coins of less than full bullion value, that is, as "token coins." By this plan there is given to the minor coins a value greater than that of the bullion in them. The small profit made by the government on every penny, nickel, or dime issued, is a seigniorage charge. These minor coins, in somewhat confusing variety, circulate side by side with full-weight money, their value depending on the monopoly principle. The result of a large issue of any one denomination would be a lowering of its value. In practice their issue is determined by the needs of business and by the requests of citizens for small coins in exchange for standard money. One needing "change" gets it at the bank; when the bank finds its supply falling short it gets more from the government mints. As business increased in 1898, the demand for nickels, dimes, and quarters became unprecedented, and the mints worked night and day to supply them.
3. Gresham's law of the circulation of coins of different bullion value is: bad money drives out good money. This so-called "law" was stated in these circumstances: England had two kinds of metal money, silver and gold, which were coined at a fixed ratio in weight; and as the market value of the bullion changed, the new full-weight coins of the metal rising in value went out of circulation. The coining of the cheaper metal caused the melting or exporting of the one becoming dearer, and for those purposes the coins containing the most bullion were picked. Likewise full-weight coins disappear whenever money of less bullion value (either because containing more alloy, or because made of a cheaper metal or of paper) is poured into the circulation in large quantities.
Gresham's law needs some explanation, for it is frequently misunderstood. "Bad" money means money that has not the bullion value equal to its money value, money that is either debased in quality or light in weight. But not every piece of bad money will drive out every piece of good money. If that were so, a single bad penny would drive out of circulation all the gold. The law applies only under certain conditions. The "good" will leave the country only if the total amount of money in circulation is in excess of what would be needed if all were of full weight or best quality. Paradoxically speaking, if there is not too much of the bad money, it is just as good as the good money. The good money may not leave the country. It may be hoarded, or be picked out by banks and savings-institutions to retain as their reserve, or it may be melted for use in the arts. Gresham's "law" is thus a practical precept: keep the amount of token or light-weight coin limited to the field of its peculiar use, or it will cause the other forms, the fuller weight money, to leave for a better market. That better market may be the melting-pot or it may be a foreign country.
1. Government paper money may be defined as money for which a seigniorage of one hundred per cent. is charged. The order in the study of the money question is from seigniorage to paper money, because paper money embodies the principle of seigniorage in its extremest form. The issue of paper money grew out of the practice of debasing metal. The gain of seigniorage from paper money is greater and is just as easily secured. Government paper money is sometimes called "political money," in contrast with money whose value rests on the value of its material. In this sense, however, all coins containing an element of seigniorage, or monopoly value, are to that degree "political" money. The typical paper money is irredeemable, that is, it cannot be turned into bullion money on demand. It was simply put into circulation with the legal-tender quality. The "legal-tender" quality is the declaration of the government that the paper money must be accepted by citizens as a legal discharge for debts due them. The object of this is to compel people to use it as money whether they will or not. The purpose of the government in thus employing its power over the circulating medium is usually to profit, that is, to secure the value of the seigniorage for public purposes. Paper money differs from bank-notes in that it does not depend for its redemption on the credit of the issuer. It differs from bonds in that its value is not based on the interest it yields, but solely on its money uses. The issue of paper money may save the government the payment of interest on an equal amount of bonds. The promise to receive paper money in payment for taxes or for public lands, may help to maintain the value of the notes by reducing their quantity, but nothing short of prompt exchange for standard coins makes them truly redeemable.
2. The most notable examples of paper money in the eighteenth century were the American colonial currencies, the continental notes, and the French assignats. In all the American colonies before the Revolution notes or bills of credit were issued which were in most cases legal tender. Without exception they were issued in large amounts and without exception they depreciated. Parliament forbade the issues, but to no effect. The continental notes were issued by the Continental Congress in the first year of the war (1775), and for the next five years. The object at first was to anticipate taxes, and it was expected that the states would redeem and destroy the notes, but this was not done. The notes passed at par for a time, but depreciated rapidly as their number increased. The country had less than $10,000,000 of coin before the war, and when, in 1780, over $200,000,000 of notes were in circulation they were completely discredited; hence the phrase "not worth a continental." Specie quickly came back into use. A few years later the leaders of the French Revolution, failing to learn the lesson of the American experience, issued, on the security of land, notes called assignats in such enormous quantities that they became worth no more than the paper on which they were printed. In a figurative sense they may be said to have fallen to their "bullion" value.
3. Notable examples of paper money in the nineteenth century were the English bank-notes in the years 1797-1820, and the American greenbacks, 1862-79. There have been many other examples. During the Franco-Prussian War, France, through the medium of its great state bank, issued notes which only slightly depreciated. At the present time many countries—Russia, Austria, Portugal, Italy, all the South American republics—have depreciated paper currencies. But the English bank restriction of 1797-1820 is notable because it gave rise to the controversy which did most to develop the modern theory of the subject. The Bank of England was forbidden to redeem its notes in coin because the government wished to borrow all the coin the bank had. The result was the issue of a large amount of bank money not subject to the ordinary rule of redemption on demand. It was virtually government paper money. The notes depreciated and drove gold out of circulation, and not until 1820 was there a return to specie payments.
The United States under the constitution did not try paper money till 1862 when paper notes (called greenbacks, because of the color of ink with which the reverse side was printed) were issued as a war measure to the amount of about $450,000,000. Other interest-bearing notes were issued with legal-tender quality and circulated as money to some extent. Greenbacks depreciated in terms of gold, and gold rose in price until, in June, 1864, it sold at two hundred and eighty a hundred. Fourteen years elapsed after the war before these notes rose to par, in terms of gold.
4. Paper-money issues usually have had injurious effects on general industry. The purpose of the issue of paper money is generally to relieve the financial necessities of the government. It is a costly expedient, resorted to only in desperate extremities. A result usually unintended is the derangement of business and of the existing distribution of incomes. The rapid and unpredictable changes in prices give opportunity for speculative profits, but most legitimate business is injured. This incidental effect on debts and industry becomes the main motive of some citizens in advocating the issue. It is peculiarly liable to be the subject of political intrigue and of popular misunderstanding.
1. The commodity-money theorists declare that government is powerless to influence value, or to impart value to paper by law. There are two extreme views regarding the nature of paper money, and a third which endeavors to find the truth between these two. First is that of the commodity-money theorists, or the cost-of-production theorists, who will not admit that there is any other basis for the value of money than the cost of the material that is in it. Money made of paper, on a printing press, has a cost almost negligibly small, and, therefore, they say it can have no value. The fact that it does circulate, and is treated as if it had value, is explained by the commodity theorists as follows: While the paper note is a mere promise to pay, with no value in itself, it is accepted because of the hope of its redemption, just as is any private note. Depreciation in this view is due to loss of confidence; the rise toward par measures the hope of repayment. Such a view overlooks the feature in which paper money differs from ordinary credit paper. The value of one's promise to pay depends on his reputation and his resources; the resources constitute the basis of value. Bonds have value because they yield interest and are payable at a definite time in standard money. But paper money, lacking this basis for its value, has another basis in its money use, in its power to buy goods. The money demand in connection with the monopoly power of government over the money supply, furnishes a satisfactory logical explanation of the value of paper money.
2. The fiat-money advocates assert that government has unlimited power to maintain the value of paper money by conferring upon it the legal-tender quality. The meaning of fiat is "let there be," and the fiat-money advocates believe that the government has but to say, "let it be money," to invest paper with value. The typical fiat advocates in the United States were the "Greenbackers," those voters who wished to retain the paper money issued in the Civil War, and to increase its amount greatly. They saw in paper money an unlimited source of income to the government. They proposed the payment of the national debt, the support of the government without taxes, and the loan of unlimited money without interest to citizens. All might live in luxury if the extreme fiat-money theorists could realize their dream. There are still some survivors of this faith in the power of the government fiat. The depreciation that has taken place in every case where government notes have been issued, they declare to be due to a too mild enforcement of the law of legal tender. To them the fact that paper money may circulate for a time at par appears a reason why it always should. They do not admit that there is a saturation point in the use of money, and that its use is still further limited by the fear of larger issues. They do not see that the ultimate basis of the value of paper money is economic,—is in its money use, not in the fiat of the government.
3. A sound theory of paper money makes it a special case of monopoly value. It has been seen that the power of almost every monopoly over price is relative, not absolute. As the power of a great private corporation over the price of its product is limited, so is that of the government over the value of political money. The money use is the source of value to the paper notes. Business conditions remaining unchanged, the limit of possible issue without depreciation is the number of units in circulation before the paper money was issued, the saturation point of full-weight and full-value coins. Because governments generally have not stopped at that point, paper money has depreciated. Popular error and selfish interests force legislation beyond the reasonable limit. In a few cases only have there been public integrity and courage enough to retrace the steps before great harm resulted. It is principally this lack of control that prevents paper money from being a good circulating medium.
It is sometimes said that government cannot affect value in any way, but it can do so in many ways. Certainly one of the most remarkable is by the use of its monopoly power over the medium of exchange, whereby it can, under certain conditions, cause a piece of paper to have the value of a piece of gold. Thereby at the same time it affects the interests of nearly every member of society, raising or lowering the value of many kinds of property, and of many incomes.
1. The standard of deferred payments is the thing of value in which, by the law or by contract, the amount of a debt is expressed. A credit transaction is a lengthened exchange; one party fulfils his part of the contract, the other party promises to give an equivalent at a later date. The equivalent may be in any kind of goods; for example, in barter one may part with a horse on the promise of a cow to be received later; or a small horse on the promise of a large one; or a flock of sheep on the promise of its return at the end of the year with a part of the increase of the flock. A simple standard in which to express the debt is the thing borrowed, as horse, sheep, wheat, house, etc. This involves the use of the renting contract. Again, the thing to which the value of debts is referred may be a thing quite different from the goods borrowed, and with the growth of the money economy and the use of the interest contract, money comes more and more to be used as the standard. The parties express the debt in terms of the standard unit established by law.
2. The importance of the standard of deferred payments increases with the use of money and with the amount of outstanding debts. Until the use of money develops, the use of credit is difficult and limited; it becomes easy when the value of all things is expressed in terms of a common circulating medium. If all business were done for cash there would be no great interests affected when a change in the value of money occurred. Every dollar would change in value in the hands of the holder, but there the effect would cease. But the volume of outstanding debts expressed in terms of money now exceeds many fold the total value of the circulating medium. The value of all these debts changes in the same proportion as does that of the standard unit of money; when this is cheapened either by law or as a result of increasing supplies, a creditor to whom a thousand dollars are due loses the same as if he had a thousand metal dollars locked up in a strong chest.
Outstanding contract debts may be roughly divided into three classes: short-time loans, running less than a year; medium-time, running from one to five years; long-time, running over five years. Fluctuations are rarely rapid and great enough to affect appreciably the debtors and creditors in the case of short-time loans. The results are greater in the case of long-time loans, such as national, state, and city debts, bonds of corporations, mortgages given by farmers on their land or by owners of city real estate. A multitude of interests are affected by a change in the value of money. When, as in the years 1873-96, money gains in purchasing power (prices fall) receivers of fixed incomes are gainers. When, as in the years 1896-1903, the value of money falls, the revenues from educational and charitable endowments, the salaries of public officials, and all fixed incomes, lose purchasing power. In a capitalistic age, therefore, almost every individual is affected in some way by a change in the value of money. In most cases the change escapes recognition; people do not trace out the relation that an industrial change bears to their own interests. In a few notable cases, however, the change has been revolutionary as in the period following the discovery of America, when the feudal dues had come to be expressed in terms of money instead of labor services. In modern times, the mass of debts being greater than ever before, such changes as those following the discovery of gold in California or the decrease in gold production between 1873 and 1890 have the gravest economic results.
3. The best standards of deferred payments available—the precious metals, gold and silver—are still imperfect. The good that is most convenient as a standard of deferred payments is the one used as money. Gold to-day is constantly expressing the value of all other things. Borrowers prefer to make loans in the form of the general medium of exchange. From the usage of speaking of all things in terms of money, the false idea arises that the value of other things changes, but that the value of gold is always the same. Money is no such a fixed objective standard as a foot-rule or a pound weight. The value of gold rests on the estimates made by men, and is constantly changing according to conditions. A fixed objective standard of value is not possible of attainment. The value of the precious metals is stable as compared with most things. The current new supply is comparatively regular. For generations at a time there may be no radical changes in the output of gold and silver. For centuries there was no change in the methods of extraction. Recent inventions, however, have considerably altered these conditions. The nature of the use of gold and silver, likewise, is such as to make the demand for them, under ordinary conditions, most stable. The precious metals are but slowly worn out; only a portion of the annual output is used in the arts; there is, therefore, a large reservoir into which flows steadily a small stream; the existing stock is twenty or thirty times the annual output. Yet the value of the standard metals is never quite stable, and sometimes several influences combine, as in the last century, to affect their value greatly and suddenly.
4. Various ideals for a standard of deferred payments have been suggested—as return of equal enjoyment, of equal sacrifice, social expediency; and various standards—as labor, commodities, and the tabular standard. The ideal standard of deferred payments is one that will insure justice between borrower and lender. Different views have been taken as to what constitutes justice in this matter. The suggestion is attractive that the sum when returned should represent the same amount of enjoyment as it did when it was borrowed. Such a standard is impossible of realization in any general way, for men's circumstances are constantly changing. To insure even to the average man the same amount of enjoyment is only roughly possible. The same goods do not afford the same enjoyment when conditions have changed. Another suggestion is that the goods returned should represent the same sacrifice as those loaned. Here again the difficulty is in the lack of an objective standard. Whose sacrifice? That of the lender, who may be rich, or that of the borrower, who may be poor? Some have supposed the conditions of equal sacrifice were met by the labor standard, according to which the sum returned should purchase the same number of days of labor as when borrowed. But what kind of labor is to be taken, that of the lender or that of the borrower, or that of some one else? Labor is of many different qualities, which can be exactly compared only through their objective value in terms of some one good. The ideal of equal enjoyment has been supposed to be realized by the tabular standard, which consists of a number of leading commodities in fixed proportions. The money returned is to be enough to purchase the same goods at the expiration as at the making of the loan, and thus may be a larger or smaller sum than was borrowed. While this does not, as is sometimes claimed, insure equality of enjoyment, it averages the fluctuations of many goods, and thus prevents great extremes. This standard has been favored by notable monetary authorities, but the difficulties of its practical application are prohibitive.
It must be recognized that any possible concrete standard of deferred payments will sometimes work hardship to individuals. The best average results for justice and social welfare will be secured by measuring debts in goods that change least often, least rapidly, and in the least unpredictable manner. Gold thus far has proved itself worthy to serve as the standard.
1. The fall of prices in 1873 and the following years meant a great change in the standard of deferred payments. The monetary changes following the discovery of America were due to the inflow to Europe of great quantities of silver taken by force from the native American rulers, and from the rich mines. Silver, at that time throughout Europe the main standard of deferred payments, was thus greatly lowered in value. This change lightened all outstanding obligations, lowered the money rents of the peasants, and the customary dues of labor wherever they had come to be expressed in money form. By the third quarter of the nineteenth century gold had become in Europe and America the main standard, though silver still served as such in some countries. The output of gold in 1849-57 caused the greatest money inflation that has occurred since the sixteenth century, favoring in a similar manner the debtor classes. The substitution of gold for silver by some countries at that time, by making a great additional market for gold, helped in some degree to check the fall in its value.
The decline in the output of gold was a change of the opposite character, causing a fall of prices and increasing the burden of debts. From 1873 to 1896 there was almost constant decline of the prosperity of the agricultural classes, due in part to this money influence, but in part to influences which cannot be dwelt upon here, as they had nothing to do with the money question. There was complaint, agitation, and demand for relief on the part of many interests in France, Germany, England, and the United States.
2. Bimetallism, the use of two metals as standard moneys, was the remedy proposed. Bimetallism is legally complete when both metals are admitted to the mints for free coinage at an established ratio of weight; it is halting or limping when one of the metals is not freely coined. Bimetallism may be legally authorized, but not actually working. As soon as the legal ratio varies appreciably from the market value, only one of the metals will in fact be brought to the mint. National bimetallism is confined to a single country, as that in the United States before the Civil War, or in France before 1867. International bimetallism is an agreement among several nations to use two metals on the same terms, the only case in history being that of the Latin Union, which included France, Italy, Switzerland, and other countries. The discussion of international bimetallism in recent years has been on the proposal to make a much larger league of states than the Latin Union, embracing all the leading countries.
3. The main object of international bimetallism is to prevent the fluctuations of the standard of deferred payments. Commercial dealings between gold-using and silver-using countries are of great magnitude, and the use of different standards leads to many difficulties. Fluctuations in the ratio of the two metals occasion much uncertainty and loss to individual traders. The rise in the value of gold meant an increase in the burden of the public debts of silver-using countries which collect their revenues in silver, but which must pay their debts, principal and interest, in gold.
The theory of bimetallism is that the government can act on the value of the two metals through the principle of substitution. The metal tending to become dearer will not be coined, the other will be coined in greater quantities. The degree of influence that can thus be exerted on the value of the two metals depends on the size of the reservoir of the metal that is rising in price. When it all leaves circulation, the law on the statute book permitting it to be coined becomes a mere sounding phrase. In such a case there is bimetallism de jure, but monometallism de facto. The greater the league of states, the greater is the likelihood that the scheme will work. The economic theory of bimetallism was recognized by a majority of economists to be abstractly sound, but the political difficulties in the way of international agreements are great, and have proved to be insurmountable.
1. International bimetallism, despite many efforts, failed of adoption. This brief proposition sums up the history of the movement, from 1878 to 1892, to form a league of states and an agreement for international bimetallism. International conferences were held, and taken part in by the leading financiers of the world. France at first favored the policy, and the United States was always foremost in advocating it, while England in the main was opposed. Some of the advocates of bimetallism argued that the fall of prices was due not alone to economic forces, but also to a money conspiracy which had influenced legislation to introduce and continue the gold standard. This, of course, was strenuously denied. It is true that the commercial classes found gold the form of money most suitable to large business, and no doubt class interests entered into the question in some measure. The difficulties of the debtor class in America were peculiarly great, owing to the inflated paper currency, from 1862 to 1879, which had made our conditions quite abnormal. In the period of speculation following the Civil War an enormous mass of debts had been accumulated. The hopes of thousands of tillers of the soil suffering from a fall in prices, and of the great debtor class, clamoring for relief, were centered upon the success of this movement. Banking and other large business interests in general opposed it.
2. The plan of the free-silver advocates was to legalize national bimetallism in the United States at a ratio between gold and silver very different from the market ratio. Gold had become, long before 1860, the real standard of our money system, and after 1873 it was the only metal admitted to free coinage. Silver, little by little, was losing purchasing power in terms of gold, until from being worth, in 1873, one sixteenth as much, ounce for ounce, it became, in 1896, worth but one thirtieth as much as gold. It must be recognized that the power of silver to purchase general commodities fell much less than the change in its ratio to gold would indicate, gold having risen in terms of most other goods as well as of silver. Nevertheless, the proposal to open the mints to free silver at sixteen to one in the year 1896 meant a sudden and marked cheapening of money. The prime purpose was to lighten the burden of debts by making the standard of deferred payments cheaper. It was at first a debtors' movement, but to succeed it had to enlist the support of other large classes of voters. And thus, by force of political necessity, but doubtless in large part naïvely, it developed into the more sweeping theory that wages, welfare, and prosperity called for a larger supply of money independently of the effect on debts.
In its extreme form the free-silver plan was a fiat scheme, for some of its supporters believed that by the mere passage of the law the two metals could be made to bear to each other any ratio desired. But its most intelligent and high-minded advocates (who were moved to its support by a sincere sympathy and concern for the distressed agriculturalists) recognized fully that the force of the law was limited by economic conditions. The extreme opponents of the plan, ignoring the evident fact that the adoption of a metal as a standard money is one of the most essential of the market conditions, denied that government action could in any way affect the value. Most of the arguments presented on either side in the political campaigns showed little evidence of a sound theory of money. The victory of the gold standard in 1896 and 1900, it would seem, was due more to the well-founded fear that a sudden change of the money standard would cause a panic, than to a thorough understanding of the question.
3. The increase of the gold output has for the present checked the fall of prices. Before 1890, for a number of years, the average output of gold was shrinking till it reached a scant hundred million per year. At the same time, nations which recently had gone over to the gold standard were striving to secure large stocks for their banks and general circulation, and those great reservoirs, as a result, became better filled than they ever were before. After the opening of new gold-yielding territory in South Africa and in the Klondike, the annual output of gold became greater than it had ever been, being at the opening of the South African War in 1898 nearly three times that of ten years earlier. The present methods of extracting gold resemble those of fifty years ago as civilized industry resembles that of savages. Intricate machinery has taken the place of crude tools, chemical processes have been introduced, and the principal product results from the regular and certain working of deep mines rather than from chance surface discoveries. Great masses of debris can now be reworked profitably. In many parts of the world are enormous deposits of low-grade ores, before useless, that can be worked economically by present methods. For a generation at least the world's supply of gold is likely to continue larger than ever before in history, and prices in terms of gold probably will rise.
Though no change seems likely or possible at the present time, the free-silver advocate has been justified by events against those gold advocates who said that the amount of money has nothing to do with prices. Prices have gone up as gold has increased. The free-silver advocates have gotten what they wanted through a change for which neither party can claim the credit. Yet the present situation is unsatisfactory and undeveloped. A standard better than a single metal, more stable than a single commodity, is desirable if it can be found. The money question must arise again and in a new form before many years. The difficulty has not been finally settled; it is but postponed.
1. A bank is a business whose income is derived chiefly from lending its promises to pay. Banks have passed through many changes in the past three centuries. Originating on the street corner for exchange of money, they have evolved into great institutions of many forms, and performing many functions. The definition seems paradoxical, but it expresses what in modern thought is the essential feature of a bank: the lending of its credit. A reserve of money is needed by the man of business. But for the banks each man would have to keep his reserve in his own till. Except the small sum needed for current uses, a bank can keep this reserve more economically than individuals can. It has the advantages of large production similar to those of a large factory. The process of lending credit is called deposit and discount. It grew out of the deposit of actual money for safe keeping and the loaning to borrowers by the method of discounting their notes. The term now has a somewhat different meaning, for a merchant may obtain a deposit to-day without putting any money in the bank. He gets the bank to discount his notes or collateral security, and to enter the sum to his credit as a deposit. He becomes a depositor by borrowing, not by lending to the bank. The sum is under the borrower's control; he can check it out when he wishes; but he usually keeps a certain balance to his credit. The bank's gain is larger than ordinary interest, because it gets a discount on the large sums left in its possession. The bank increases its funds also by attracting deposits from those who do not care to borrow.
2. Functions not essential to banking are ordinary money-lending, money-changing, exchange to distant points, safe deposit, and issue of bank-notes. Banks often lend in the ordinary way, allowing borrowers to draw the money out at once, but this is not the business they prefer. Many individuals and corporations, such as endowed charities, colleges, insurance companies, lend great sums of their own money without thereby partaking in any degree of the peculiar character of banking. Money-changing (the exchange of coins of different countries) is done by banks, but likewise by many other agencies not sharing the essential banking character. Foreign and domestic exchange is the issue and cashing of "drafts" for money payments between distant places. Most banks are well fitted to perform this function, but some banks do not undertake it, and it is performed also by some business houses that are not banks. Safe deposit is the keeping of things to be returned in identical form, as silverware, notes, and papers. By banks in small towns this is sometimes done freely, sometimes for a slight charge; but in large cities safe-deposit vaults are generally quite unconnected with banks. Even bank-note issue is not essential to banking; most banks in the United States issue no notes, others issue very few. All these functions may be united under one management, but the essential banking function is deposit and discount.
3. The income of banks is derived from discounts, interest on their own capital, charges for exchange and collection, rents on investments, and profit from the loan of their bank-notes. The income of banks is drawn from different sources, according to the size of the community, and the nature of the banks. While in the villages and smaller cities they perform a number of functions, in the larger cities they usually specialize in a far greater degree. Like every other enterprise, a bank must start in business with some paid-up capital as a guarantee of credit. Further security is afforded by the limited liability of shareholders for losses, in proportion to their capital stock. The same amount of money could be loaned with less trouble and more cheaply without starting a bank, but used as a banking capital a part of it can be loaned while still serving to attract money deposits. Charges to smaller customers for exchange are a source of income to some banks, but in many cases this service is freely performed for regular customers and becomes a considerable expense. Banks make few investments in real estate or other physical property; it is, in fact, their duty to keep out of ordinary enterprises, but they are forced sometimes to take for unpaid debts things that have been held as security. Profits on bank-notes have at times been the main, possibly the sole, motive for starting banks; but that is not the case to-day when the right of issue is so strictly limited.
4. Banks are productive economic agents performing important industrial services. False ideas have long been entertained about the magic power of banks to produce wealth from nothing. To many, banks are a mystery much like paper money. Their opponents sometimes have pictured them as vampires fattening on the blood of industry. That they have shown abuses at times is undeniable, but, like other economic agents, they are to be judged by their net efficiency. The bank is a tool performing services similar to those of money. For some purposes money is an awkward and costly agent in comparison with banks. For remitting payments from New York to San Francisco or Hong Kong, money is a medieval device. Money can more safely be entrusted to a bank than to a strong chest in one's own house. The man who refused to make use of banks in this day would isolate himself economically, and would soon find himself out of any but the smallest business. He could no more get along without the banks than without the post, the telegraph, or the telephone.
The gathering of loanable funds by the banks, making them available at once, reduces hoarding, makes money move more rapidly, and creates a central market between borrowers and lenders for the sale of credit. While not creating more physical wealth directly, it adds to the efficiency of wealth; it oils the bearings of the industrial machine. To abolish banks would be to destroy labor-saving machinery. Banks perform incidentally a further service in developing better business methods in the community. In supplying credit to active business, banks are constantly passing judgment on the collateral security presented to them and on the solidity of the enterprises that are seeking support. They enforce promptness and exactitude in business dealings.
Because in their public nature banks are very analogous to money, they have always been looked upon as properly subject to more supervision than most private business, and government has always exercised a considerable measure of control over them, sometimes for good, sometimes for evil.
1. Typical bank money consists of notes issued by banks on the credit of their general assets, without special regulation by law. As no two leading countries have quite the same system of bank-notes, the subject is a difficult one. It is well to begin, therefore, with a clear conception of typical bank money, unregulated by government. Such a form of note is one with which few now living in the United States have had any experience, as the present national bank-notes differ in essential ways from the typical form. Typical bank-notes are notes issued by banks as a means of loaning their credit. The borrower, instead of receiving a credit balance at the bank subject to check, gets notes which he hands on to other men. These notes are returned for redemption to the issuing bank as soon as any one wishes specie in their stead. The limit of the issue of such notes is the need of the community for that form of money, and if they are promptly redeemed in gold on demand, they never can exceed that amount. A holder of a note (in the absence of special regulations) has the same claim on the bank that a depositor has. As it is to the interest of the bank to keep in circulation as many notes as possible, there is a temptation to abuse the power of note-issue, to which many banks yielded in the period of so-called "wild-cat banking" before the Civil War.
2. Bank-notes are viewed by some as a form of commercial credit. Typical bank-notes are not legal tender, and every one has the legal right to take or refuse them as he pleases. It is therefore said by some that bank-note issue is of no special concern to the state, that it can safely be left to individual self-interest. It is said that if one has little faith in a note, he may refuse to accept it. But in reality every one is compelled to take the money that is current. The average citizen cannot know the credit of distant banks, and thus has not the same power of judging wisely in taking bank-notes that he has in making deposits in the bank of his own neighborhood. Between bank-notes and ordinary promissory notes, there are other differences of a nature pretty generally recognized. Bank-notes pass without endorsement and thus depend on the credit of the bank alone, not like checks, on the credit of the person from whom received. They yield no interest to the holder. They are intended to be used as money and are so used. Thus they come near to paper money in their nature, and the banks are near to exercising the right of coinage.
3. By others, bank-notes are considered to be almost identical with government paper money. Some opponents of bank-note issue declare that it is a usurpation of the prerogatives of government, and that no power but the sovereign state should issue money. While many in America to-day hold this view, the comparison probably is false and strained. Typical bank-notes, unlike inconvertible paper money, depend for their value on the credit of the bank, not on their legal-tender quality and on political power. They must be redeemed on penalty of insolvency; government notes need not be, and yet will circulate at par if properly limited.
While these differences mark off government paper money pretty sharply from typical bank-notes, it must be noted that in many cases actual bank-note issues have been far from this typical form. In the days of "wild-cat" banking, bank-notes were issued in excess and fell below par, yet the man in a Western community who dared to ask the bank to redeem the notes in specie was not only frowned on by the bank, but condemned by the public, which felt that business was endangered by such a demand. Redemption on demand would have required a reduction of the amount of money in circulation and would have caused a fall in prices. Inflation of the bank currency went on with results almost identical with those following an excessive issue of government paper money. Not formal law but public opinion made such bank-notes essentially political money.