“I am inclined to think, although further study might modify this opinion, that the wealth of Havana is such that a judicious system of taxation would yield a revenue of $15 per head, or upward of $3,000,000, and this, if honestly and judiciously collected and expended, would probably be twice the actual net revenue now enjoyed by the city. The collection of taxes of all kinds is now farmed out on a basis of five per cent. commission for collection, which is added to the tax. The tax collector states that there are no arrears, but this statement is vigorously disputed. The whole system of taxation is radically different from that used in American cities, and the system has been so long in operation, and is so intertwined with the system of taxation for the Island, that it would probably be unwise to attempt to introduce American methods during the period of military occupation, the duration of which is so uncertain. It would seem that all that can be done is to make an honest collection, substantially on the basis of existing laws, increasing such items as in the judgment of the military governor can stand an increase without hardship. Such arbitrary changes would create no surprise, as the population has for generations been accustomed to having them made by the Spanish Governor-General.”
Arbitrary changes are the one thing the military authorities should avoid in Cuba, for therein lies our greatest danger with these people. The fact that the people were accustomed to such action under Spanish rule makes them far more sensitive to such action than they otherwise would have been. Note the flutter in Santiago because of the order to send the custom-house funds to Havana, a perfectly righteous order in itself, but promulgated in too arbitrary a manner. Notwithstanding this it created something akin to a panic in Santiago, principally because it reminded the people of that province of the high-handed Spanish way of doing things. It is not advisable to increase either the debt or revenue of Havana at present, but, in the opinion of the author, it would be far wiser to keep the total revenues about as they now exist. The sources of revenue may be changed, however, to great advantage; increased in some directions, reduced in others. For example, ordinances should be passed compelling the owners of all houses not having water supply (and, according to General Greene, there are about 18,000 of these) to put in a water supply immediately. If this were done the water tax could be spread over a larger number of population, the individual taxes reduced, and yet the revenue from this source measurably increased. A good water-works, like that of Havana, should be made self-sustaining, and under proper management the profits from this department could easily be made sufficient to pay all the expenses, and at the same time to take care of the interest and sinking fund of the water-works bonds. From the American point of view the most unwise tax in Havana is that which has made the slaughter-houses of that city a constant source of scandal. To-day every kilogram of meat killed and used costs the people of Havana 4¼ cents, and thus the cost of living of the poorer classes is greatly increased; yet the revenues of the slaughter-house are pledged to pay the interest on the water-works bonds, when the water-works themselves are ample security for this purpose.
The real estate of the city should be reassessed fairly and justly, and a tax-rate arranged which would relieve many of the professions and industries of unnecessary taxation. It would seem from a glance at the budget of Havana that, if this were done, and the petty, annoying taxes abolished, sufficient revenue could easily be raised for all legitimate purposes. As a matter of fact, a very large proportion of the taxes collected for municipal purposes in Havana has been diverted from legitimate channels only to find its way into the pockets of those who have had charge of municipal affairs. According to the evidence of several witnesses who appeared before the author in Havana, a large amount of money was exacted from the people of the city by corruption, in the way of petty fines paid direct to officials, and not into the treasury of the state, and also large sums of money in the shape of payment for indulgences, much in the same manner as the Tammany officials exact tribute from those conducting illegitimate business or those engaged in breaking the ordinances of the city. Relief from this sort of exaction has been at once felt in Havana, but will not be fully appreciated until the present Governor of the city is able to ferret out and stop these several forms of imposition.
THE heading of this chapter is somewhat misleading, for, strictly speaking, Cuba has neither banks nor currency—that is, of her own. The basis of the money which circulated in Cuba before the military occupation of the United States was Spanish gold, principally the centen, or twenty-five-peseta piece, the value of which had been inflated to $5.30 by royal decree. Owing to the scarcity of this coin and to the fear that it might leave the Island, in 1893 the French louis, or twenty-franc piece was similarly inflated by royal decree and made legal tender in Cuba at $4.24. The silver coins of Cuba were of Spanish origin: the peso, or dollar, the medio peso, or half dollar, the peseta, twenty-cent piece, the real, or dime, and the medio real, corresponding to our nickel. There are also the usual bronze coins. The silver money of Cuba has for some time been worth only its market value, and that subject to daily changes. At various periods in the history of Cuba the Spanish Government at Madrid has attempted to force bank bills on the people of Cuba, and such attempts, as a rule, have ended disastrously to the people of the Island. The Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, a semi-official institution, whose governor was appointed by the Spanish Government, has also at times issued bank bills, and to the credit of this institution they have always been redeemed ultimately. As much cannot be said of the Government, whose repudiated bank bills, aggregating about $17,000,000, are at this moment only worth six or seven cents on the dollar. The passing of the control of the Island into the hands of the military authorities of the United States has happily ended all the currency complications of Cuba, and the order of President McKinley, which went into force January 1, 1899, will in a short time not only bring order out of confusion, but gradually reduce the currency systems of Cuba to a sound basis, making gold and silver alike worth one hundred cents the world over—no more, no less. The object of this order is not only to unify the Cuban currency, but in time to replace the present system by the monetary system of the United States.
There is no need for entering further into the history of Cuban currency, but in the following pages will be given the reasons which led up to the Executive Order of December 28, 1898. Considering that the author was called upon by the President of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury to make a report upon this subject, and the report was subsequently adopted and acted upon, therefore the facts herein stated may be regarded as official. The real point at issue in relation to Cuban currency and the only one which caused the United States authorities any trouble was that arising from the inflation by royal decree of the Spanish twenty-five-peseta pieces, popularly known as alfonsinos, or centen, and the subsequent inflation of the French twenty-franc piece, the so-called louis, which, as we have seen, were given a legal value of $4.24 and decreed since the end of 1893 as legal money.
The Spanish authorities at Madrid, having thus inflated two gold coins six per cent. above their current value and about ten per cent. above their intrinsic value—for the mint value of these two coins at Havana is $4.776 and $3.8208 respectively—the United States authorities at Washington were now called upon to inflate a third gold coin and make the American eagle worth $11 in Cuba and our $5 gold piece current there at $5.50. As a temporary measure this might have had some justification, and the statements in support of it from Cuban bankers, planters, and business men had a certain degree of plausibility. The process, however, is entirely artificial, and whatever was done in this direction to-day must be undone some other day, and the only question the Administration had to decide was whether the inflation should be taken out when the United States authorities took possession or the operation postponed to some more opportune time. The danger in following the advice of some influential financiers of Havana lay in the adoption by the United States Government of a bad precedent in Cuban financiering, inaugurated by the Spanish Government, a precedent for which the United States was in no manner responsible.
The reckoning day must come for all inflated values, whether of paper, of silver, or of gold; and when that day comes someone will suffer. Fortunately, in this case the degree of suffering was small, varying only from six to ten per cent. The practical question would seem to be how to disinflate these two coins with the least possible disturbance to mortgages, contracts, notes, and all classes of existing agreements to pay money.
Current matters will adjust and take care of themselves. It is generally known that all transactions in Cuba since the close of the war have been made with the belief that the United States would not continue the royal decree of Spain, and that the inflations would collapse with the disappearance of Spanish rule.
In Santiago the author found the bankers and financiers in favour of leaving matters as they existed and adopting similar methods in the rest of the Island, namely, reducing the $5.30 gold piece to $5. This was the view taken by Mr. Schuman, of Schuman & Co., Santiago.
On this question the Chamber of Commerce of Santiago, in a thoughtfully prepared memorial, submitted to the President of the United States, say:
“It is frequently difficult in this market to effect change, especially in small sales, for the want of fractional currency. As this makes considerable difference in transactions, the chamber considers it necessary for the American Government to remedy this difficulty by sending sufficient silver fractional money, utilising it to pay the army of occupation.
“This chamber has heard that the administration of the custom-house of this port has solicited the Government at Washington to declare American money legal and obligatory tender in all transactions which take place in this territory, and we consider this movement premature, as the political situation of the country is not settled; and furthermore, prejudicial to commercial interests and to the public wealth by the depreciation it would cause in the Spanish gold in circulation and for the difficulty it will occasion through the lack of American money in sufficient quantity for these transactions. For this reason we beg that this petition will not be considered, it being even more inopportune, since the resolution of the civil governor of the province on the first of August last, establishing the legal value of Spanish gold, is just and has given satisfactory results.”
Speaking to the author on the same subject, Mr. Brooks, of Brooks & Co., Santiago, a careful financier and capable business man, said:
“Regarding the currency question, we should also be inclined to support the opinion of the Chamber of Commerce, to leave matters as they are at present, i.e., the Spanish and French gold coins having been disinflated, to leave them as current circulating medium, including for the payment of custom-house duties. It is also always a small advantage for the sugar estates to pay their labour in Spanish gold as it represents a saving of three to four per cent. as compared with paying them in American money, as where a planter now pays $5 Spanish, he would, with a change in the circulating medium, have to pay $5 American, which would represent from three to four per cent. advance in wages without receiving any compensation from his sugar shipped to the United States, from which, in former years, and with inflated gold values, he derived an advantage of ten per cent.”
A partial adjustment of the question was suggested to the author by Dr. Antonio Jover, director of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, and as Dr. Jover is an authority on Cuban finances, the statement thus made is quoted in full:
“The only way to settle all the difficulties of the present Spanish monetary state of things is to declare legal tender the American dollar and admit at par all Spanish gold coins.
“1. Thus the onza should be worth $16; the medio onza $8; the doubloon, $4; the escudo, $2; the centen, $5—that is, pretty nearly its intrinsic alloy and weight value.
“2. The English sovereign ought to be taken for $5, and the French louis (which circulates in Cuba in great numbers) for $4.
“This arrangement, that slightly improves the value of the Spanish gold,—for the centen is worth in the New York market $4.87 or $4.90 at the utmost,—would tend to drive to Cuba the foreign coins of this country, perfectly useless for circulation. As for the Spanish silver, it is considered there almost as a merchandise or stock value subject to daily quotation, and it is really troublesome in its use. Therefore I would propose to give it a fixed value in American gold, thus—
| Value. | |
| The peso | $0.60 |
| The medio-peso | .30 |
| The peseta | .12 |
| The real | .06 |
| The medio-real | .03 |
“This value is a little less than the price of quotation to-day, but it is much more than it was a few months ago, but I do not think acceptable the use of any coin without a fixed, invariable value. Now, as the American currency and the American silver would stand at the par value, and, on the other hand, the Spanish silver is at the present quoted higher in Spain, there too would likely go a large quantity, if not all, Spanish silver coins; that nevertheless would not be objectionable, but rather convenient to both nations. Bronze or copper coins should be received just at half their face value; the centavo for half a cent American gold, and the two-centavo piece for one cent. But as this implies a change in the standard value of the Spanish gold dollar, which up to the present has been the basis of all contracts and dealings of the country, it will be necessary to fix a date to implant the new system, and that can be no other but the 1st of January next. Hence, from that date all money transactions will be understood to be on the basis of American gold, with American currency; Spanish, French, and English gold at par value; American silver to be accepted also at its full value only in quantities not exceeding $5; Spanish silver at the stated rate, and foreign silver coin as merchandise.
“As for all contracts and stipulations in money matters standing at present to be fulfilled after the appointed date of the 1st of January, I believe it would be but right to be paid off with six per cent. discount, which would simply disinflate them, because they were made with the basis of gold coins which had six per cent. premium; and discounting the same six per cent. when they were settled with coins whose said premium had been taken off, although the intrinsic value of which coins had remained unaltered during the time, would only be common morality and fair equity. Lastly, all those who would attempt to alter the value of money ought to be severely punished, according to the law of the country.”
With these supplemental facts, the case is fully and impartially before the reader. To accept the proposition of the Havana bankers meant a continuation of the inflated value of ten per cent. To concede the proposition of Dr. Jover and the Santiago financier would reduce the inflation about six per cent., still retaining Spanish and French gold in circulation at a slightly increased value. (Dr. Jover even includes the British sovereign at $5.) The other and only remaining course would be to accept United States money at its full value for customs and taxes and the foreign coins at their intrinsic or mint value.
After carefully considering all these facts, the Honourable Secretary of the Treasury, Lyman J. Gage, prepared and submitted to the President the following order in relation to the future currency of Cuba:
“Executive Mansion, Washington,
December 28, 1898.
“It is hereby ordered that on and after January 1, 1899, and until otherwise provided, all customs, taxes, public and postal dues in the Island of Cuba shall be paid in United States money, or in foreign gold coin such as the Spanish alfonsinos (centen) and the French louis, which will be accepted in payment of such customs, taxes, public and postal dues at the following rates:
| Alfonsinos (25-peseta piece) | $4.82 |
| Louis (20-franc piece) | 3.86 |
“That all existing contracts for the payments of money shall be payable in the money denominated in such contracts, and where French and Spanish gold shall be the stipulated money of payment they shall be received in their present decreed inflated values, i. e., alfonsinos (25-peseta piece) $5.30; louis (20-franc piece) $4.24, or in United States money at the relative value set forth in the above table, namely, $4.82 for alfonsinos (25-peseta piece) and $3.86 for louis (20-franc piece).
“It is further ordered that on and after January 1, 1899, and until further provided, the following Spanish silver coins now in circulation in the Island of Cuba shall be received for customs, taxes, public and postal dues at the following fixed rates in American money:
| The peso | $0.60 |
| The medio-peso | .30 |
| The peseta | .12 |
| The real | .06 |
| The medio-real | .03 |
“Bronze and copper coins now current in the Island of Cuba will be received at their face value for fractional parts of a dollar in a single payment to an amount not exceeding 12 cents (1 peseta).
“William McKinley.”
FIRE DEPARTMENT, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
FIRE DEPARTMENT, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
In signing and promulgating the above order, the currency question of Cuba has been settled for all time to come on a sound basis. In offering to accept for the present the Cuban peso or silver dollar for sixty cents, American money, the United States Government merely delays the migration of the coin to Spain. At this price it is profitable to ship them to Spain, but at fifty cents they would have disappeared so rapidly that a commercial disturbance might have followed on account of scarcity of silver dollars and fractional currency. It is not probable, nor is it asserted that this adjustment can be accomplished without hardship to some debtors and a slight financial disturbance. It is not, however, apprehended that the trouble will be as great as some have anticipated. In Santiago the first step to absolutely sound finance was taken last summer and six per cent. of the inflation squeezed out. The business interests in that part of the Island were opposed to a continuation of the ten per cent. inflation, and merely asked of the United States Government that the several gold coins in circulation should be left at their face value. As one of the evils arising from disinflation, certain Cuban bankers put forward the fact that it will mean an increase of from four to ten per cent. in the wages of labour, which Cuban industries cannot afford. Such a result, if true, cannot be regarded as an evil, but, on the contrary, a benefit to the poorer classes, whose condition in Cuba is deplorable beyond description.
In the iron mines at Santiago the large American enterprises have already adjusted themselves to the new conditions and are paying their labour seventy-five cents per day American currency instead of a Spanish dollar worth sixty-five cents in Cuba and only sixty cents in exchange for United States currency. The author, when in the mining districts of this province, heard no complaints, either from the proprietors or the labourers. Stress was laid in the arguments before the President and Secretary Gage upon the loss to the debtor who has borrowed on a fictitious value and must pay the premium, and the unfortunate Cuban sugar-planter is especially singled out for sympathy. That the planter will suffer cannot be denied, but the advent of the United States into Cuba will lighten so many of his burdens that his condition is not without hope. All the customs duties on his imported food supplies, as will be seen in the chapter on the tariff, have been reduced, and many important commodities put upon the free list. The duty on his sugar machinery has been reduced to ten per cent. ad valorem; on his locomotives and railway supplies to twenty per cent.; and all along the line the taxes have been cut down. It is not probable that his land taxes will be collected during the present fiscal year, and the return of peace, establishment of law and order, and protection of property will immeasurably improve his lot. If, therefore, the sugar-planter of Cuba will gauge his present outlook by a glance backward and compare it with his condition last year at this time, he may face the new year with less gloomy premonitions as to his future than some of the testimony taken by the United States Government on the effects of disinflation would indicate. The action of the President, by and with the advice of the able financier at the head of the Treasury Department, will give Cuba a sound currency, which must be the foundation of her future fiscal prosperity.
The proof of the poverty of Cuba is a scarcity of capital, manifest in many different ways. The difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of selling sugar plantations proves the scarcity of capital and at the same time the precarious situation of the sugar industry. The decrease in the price of property is a natural consequence of lack of disposable capital, and this is why the rate of money is so high; it can only be caused by lack of capital, and not of money, since scarcity or abundance of money has only a limited influence on rates of interest. Nearly all the banks established for the last twenty or thirty years in Cuba have disappeared, owing to the losses experienced by the gradual increase of the poverty of the country; the want of resources rendering it impossible to start these banks anew or establish new ones with Cuban capital.
A few years ago there were in Havana, besides the Spanish Bank and the Bank of Commerce, the Industrial Bank, the San José, the Alianza, the Maritime Security Bank, and the Caja de Ahorros (savings bank). Excepting the first two, all have stopped working, and if the two surviving ones have outlived the others, it is because the Spanish Bank enjoys official privilege, and because the Bank of Commerce, though compelled twice to reduce its capital, owns valuable property, as, for example, the Regla warehouses and the United Railroads, which property, if the Island were prosperous, would be worth several millions more than it is to-day.
It is almost incredible that, having such extensive relations with foreign countries, the condition of banks in Cuba should be so precarious, especially as the Island feels more every year the need of banking facilities, without which no modern country can prosper. Although not as important as regular banks, savings banks are a gauge of public wealth, since their object is to gather the economies of the working classes and create capital for the promotion of industries. The only savings bank in Cuba failed in 1884, ruining in its fall not only those who had deposited their funds, but also the shareholders; and to this day no other institution has been established to take its place, and at the present moment there is not a single public institution where money can be deposited in large or small quantities earning interest!
In foreign countries the thrift of the working classes is the corner-stone of new industries. Are there in Cuba any economies or annual profits that can be capitalised? The sugar industry, the base of Cuban wealth, yields to-day no profit save in exceptional cases. The tobacco industry since 1895 has been in a critical condition, and as all the other industries depend on these two, or are of comparatively limited importance, it may be said that work and capital yield no profit in Cuba at present; since either no profits are realised, or, if they are, they leave the Island. This aspect of the present economic situation of Cuba is of immense importance and not only explains the actual situation at this moment, but shows that the hope of improvement alone lies in the prosperity of these industries.
The history of banking in Cuba is sad with financial disasters. The only bank which has survived during half a century is the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba. This concern was originally chartered as the Spanish Bank of Havana, and although it was a private institution, owned by shareholders, the Spanish Government maintained the right of appointing the governor, and in many other ways controlled its actions. At various times this bank has itself issued bank bills, and at other times it has been the medium through which the Spanish Government endeavoured to circulate its own paper money. The notes of the bank itself, as already stated, have never been repudiated, though during hard times, as a result of the Ten Years’ War, the bank bills of the Spanish Bank were at a small discount. Sixteen years ago the Spanish Bank of Havana was reorganised and the name changed to the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba. At the present time this bank has no bills in circulation; the paper currency now valued at but a few cents on the dollar, which was issued during the war by the Spanish Government through the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, is not regarded by the shareowners of the bank nor by the public as the issue of the bank itself. The history of these bills is briefly as follows: In order to meet the expenses of the last war, the Spanish Government arranged to issue $20,000,000 worth of paper money. As a security and partial fund for redemption of the same, the Madrid authorities deposited in the vaults of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba $6,330,000 in silver against this issue. For a while this bullion, together with the mandate of the Spanish Government that these bills must be accepted as legal tender, kept the currency floating somewhat below par. The people of Cuba, however, had been deceived so many times in relation to paper money that they were suspicious of these bills from the beginning, and when in due course of time Spain gradually and dishonestly absorbed from the bank all silver upon which the paper money had been issued, the bills depreciated until they were absolutely refused in all business transactions. This entailed considerable loss, as the street railways and cabs of the city were compelled to take them in spite of this great depreciation in value. Finally, they were repudiated on all sides. A temporary value was given this paper by accepting ten per cent. in the payment of customs dues. This raised it up to twelve to fifteen cents on the dollar. Immediately upon the military occupancy of the United States the value of these bills fell still lower, and they are to-day worth but a few cents on the dollar, and are held chiefly by Government contractors and speculators.
Realising that a decided change would take place in banking as soon as the United States took charge of affairs, the shareholders of the Bank of Spain met some months ago in Havana and reorganised the bank, making it a private concern, and changing its by-laws so that it could do business as a private institution, untrammelled by Government interference.
Among other uses to which the Government of Spain put the Spanish Bank was that of a collecting agency for practically all taxes other than those of the custom-houses. The value of receipts for direct taxation that have been delivered for collection to the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, from the fiscal year 1885-86, when this institution commenced the collection, with right of seizure, to 1894-95, both inclusive, actual amounts collected, deductions, and amounts pending collection as per vouchers, and accounts rendered to the Treasury by this institution, are as follows:
| Fiscal Years. | Face Value. | Collected. | Deductions Pending for which Bank was not responsible. |
Pending Collections. |
Per cent. of face value uncollected. |
| Pesos C. | Pesos C. | Pesos C. | Pesos C. | ||
| 1885-86 | 5,021,271.25 | 4,561,976.18 | 438,029.78 | 21,265.29 | 0.423 |
| 1886-87 | 5,240,651.50 | 4,655,776.10 | 547,435.19 | 37,440.21 | 0.714 |
| 1887-88 | 5,386,627.83 | 4,758,446.22 | 575,840.11 | 52,341.50 | 0.971 |
| 1888-89 | 5,316,367.75 | 4,694,829.26 | 549,628.25 | 71,910.24 | 1.352 |
| 1889-90 | 4,878,047.21 | 4,304,196.24 | 497,220.89 | 76,630.08 | 1.570 |
| 1890-91 | 5,336,611.25 | 4,659,477.26 | 571,994.17 | 105,139.82 | 1.970 |
| 1891-92 | 4,242,982.34 | 3,696,877.74 | 428,374.80 | 117,729.80 | 2.774 |
| 1893-93 | 5,357,928.97 | 4,635,278.61 | 572,890.51 | 149,759.85 | 2.795 |
| 1893-94 | 5,092,200.41 | 4,505,426.32 | 432,163.62 | 154,610.47 | 3.036 |
| 1894-95 | 5,163,321.70 | 4,421,631.99 | 534,492.41 | 207,197.30 | 4.012 |
| 51,036,010.21 | 44,893,915.92 | 5,148,069.73 | 994,024.56 |
The above table gives a good idea of how this arrangement worked during normal times. There were two or three features in it, however, which were bad, and which the author is glad to notice that the United States Government in renewing the agreement of the Bank of Spain for the present fiscal year, that is, the year ending June 30, 1899, has obliterated. The Spanish Government paid the five per cent. on the receipts given the bank, and not on the money collected. This resulted in great abuses, because the delinquents during the years of war were fifteen, sixteen, and forty-three per cent. respectively. The punishment of delinquents has also been considerably modified by the United States authorities.
The following table gives the receipts for direct taxation that have been delivered for collection to the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba from the fiscal year 1895-96 to 1896-97, both inclusive, actual amounts collected, deductions, and receipts pending collection up to December 12, 1898, as per data at hand in the Spanish Bank:
| Fiscal Years. | Face Value. | Collected. | Deductions Pending for which Bank was not responsible. |
Pending Collections. |
Per cent. of face value uncollected. |
| 1895-96 | $ 4,802,936.66 | $3,460,998.24 | $ 579,002.52 | $ 762,935.90 | 15.88 |
| 1896-97 | 4,589,735.08 | 3,283,286.51 | 547,975.70 | 758,472.87 | 16.52 |
| 1897-98 | 4,341,112.87 | 2,250,806.74 | 223,119.47 | 1,867,186.66 | 43.01 |
| $13,733,784.61 | $8,995,091.49 | $1,350,097.69 | $3,388,595.43 |
This table and the one preceding it were prepared for the author by the governor of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba and differ from the table prepared by the Spanish authorities which will be found in the chapter on the revenue of Cuba. In the report furnished by the officials, the face value of the tax receipts is given in one column and the actual amount collected in another, the third column showing, under the caption of “Total Delinquent Taxes,” the amounts uncollected, without any explanation as to why they were not collected. The governor of the Spanish Bank in the two tables given above includes a fourth column, namely, deductions for which the bank was not responsible. The bank authorities claim that the amounts represented in this column were receipts which were not valid, inasmuch as they were claims in many cases upon persons dead and upon property which had been destroyed by fire. The governor of the bank thinks it an injustice to the bank to add these under the general head of delinquent taxes, without this explanation.
It is easy to enforce and collect the customs duties; but the collection of internal revenue taxes is a much more difficult matter. The United States authorities found, on coming into possession of the Island of Cuba, January 1st, that all the receipts of taxes for the present fiscal year were in the hands of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba; that this institution had not only six or seven branch banks in various parts of the Island, but also in the neighbourhood of 258 sub-district or collecting agencies. The bank assumed all the responsibility of these agencies, and it was decided to place in its hands for the present fiscal year this work, for the reason that it had all the machinery and there would be no loss in revenue. An agreement was entered into between the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba and the United States military authorities, and an order issued from Washington to the bank to make the collection, but the arrangement engendered such opposition among the Cubans that the order was revoked and the work was placed entirely in the hands of the American authorities under General Brooke.
THE question of the payment of insurgent soldiers and of certain legitimate indebtedness incurred by the insurgent government has an important bearing upon the civil, if not the industrial reconstruction of the Island of Cuba. This matter was referred to a commission of Cuban officers, consisting of General Garcia, General José Miguel Gomez, Colonel Manuel Sanguily, Colonel José Ramon Villalon, Dr. José Gonzales Lanuza, Señor Gonzalo de Quesada, and Mr. Horatio S. Rubens, who acted as interpreter. This commission came to Washington in November for the purpose of aiding in the pacification of the people of Cuba. General Garcia unhappily was taken ill of pneumonia and died. This delayed the work somewhat and took from the commission one of its strongest members. The commission had several informal interviews with the President, the members of the Cabinet, and finally with the author, who, as Special Commissioner for the United States to Cuba, took the testimony of these gentlemen and prepared a report on the subject for the consideration of the President and Secretary of the Treasury. The substance of this report is of permanent public interest, as it was the first official step towards the settlement of a question that must be adjusted before the entire Cuban army will disband and go to work. It also has considerable bearing upon the industrial future of Cuba.
The gentlemen comprising this commission were briefly informed by the author as to the work committed to him, namely, an inquiry into the economic condition of the Island of Cuba and the recommendation of such measures for the commercial and industrial reconstruction of that country as might appear advisable after impartially consulting all interests. They were told that so far as the United States was concerned, Cuba had won her economic and industrial freedom. That the work had been performed with scrupulous regard to the interest of the people of Cuba. That the aim had been the rehabilitation of its industries and the building up of the country generally with as little friction as possible. That in accordance with instructions received from both the President and Secretary of the Treasury the tariff of Cuba had been framed so that there should be no discrimination in favour of the United States, and that the same tariff laws would be applied alike to all countries, so that Cuba was now free to purchase her supplies in the world’s markets wherever they were best and cheapest, and not compelled to buy in a dear market, as under Spanish rule. They were furthermore informed that hereafter the revenues of the country were to be used exclusively for the economical and honest government of the Island and that the largest portion would not be drained away to pay the enormous interest charged (aggregating $10,500,000) upon an indebtedness which had unrighteously been saddled upon a people already bowed down under the double yoke of war and debt. Lastly they were asked to state fully and frankly, as citizens of Cuba, their views on any subject bearing upon the reconstruction of Cuba.
In reply, these gentlemen said, in substance, that they were entirely satisfied with the course the Government of the United States had pursued in relation to these economic questions, and realised the fact that Cuba had become free, commercially and industrially. They then proceeded to discuss the important problem of how the existing transitory condition of the Island could best be changed to a permanent civil life, without friction in Cuba or trouble and annoyance throughout the United States. Their purpose, they avowed, was simply to co-operate with the United States toward the restoration of order, without which, in their opinion, there could be no reconstruction of industries and no return of prosperity. Their purpose was, they assured the author, to advise with the people of the United States, to the end that everything might be harmonious and that the people of Cuba might get to work as soon as possible.
Speaking for all the gentlemen above named, Colonel José R. Villalon said:
“The discharge of the army of Cuba is a very complex and difficult problem. It has to be done for humanity’s sake, in one sense; those men who have been working and suffering have to be remunerated in some way. But that is not the only point of view. We have got to look towards the maintaining of order and we have got to give them compensation or gratification or a certain amount of money with which they can go back to their homes and their agricultural labours. In doing that we have a duty to our country so far as the Cubans are concerned, but, at the same time, it seems to me that it is a high political measure on the part of the United States to prevent now what would afterwards be very difficult to suppress. If we scatter these 30,000 men (approximately) throughout the country without any resources whatever—men who for the last two or three years have been accustomed to live upon the resources of the country or forage on the enemy and who are used to the hardships of the campaign—it will not be very difficult to foresee that in spite of the good nature and good disposition of the people these men will be forced to do what they do not wish to do by their nature. If the men are left as they are, with their present needs unsupplied, they will go to the woods and will be a source of disorder and brigandage, which will be very difficult for the United States to suppress; and for the sake possibly of saving a few million dollars now the nation will be obliged afterwards to spend many more millions, in addition to the sacrifice of many lives. It is an economic question. Unless something is done to relieve their needs the disorder of the Island will be prolonged indefinitely. As an example, I would call attention to the case of your Indians in this country, who now and then break away. In Cuba the condition will be worse, for there they would have the shelter of the woods, and besides the Americans would not be able to stand the climate as well as they stand their own. Ultimately, of course, they will succumb, but it will be at the cost of a great many lives and a great many millions of dollars.
MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
“Besides, there is another thing; that if to-day we provide for their needs and restore order, it is the wish of every inhabitant of Cuba to contribute their share towards this. If these men are supplied now, they will not have the moral support of the people of Cuba should they not go to work; but the people of Cuba will see that they are punished. If, however, they had the moral support of the people of Cuba it would be difficult to punish them.
“There is another point, and that is with regard to the amount of money required. Although they have not said anything about this, nevertheless, there is a tendency to lessen this amount. We want to say that although the measure, in principle, will be very good, even if it does not attend to all of the needs at present; though it will be a moral obligation from ourselves to the United States, it will not solve the problem, because the sum determined upon is not enough. If the revenues of the Island of Cuba ought to be mortgaged to repay whatever advances they have received from the United States now, it will not be a very difficult matter to make this amount a few millions more.”
The above gives a fair summary of the general tenor of the testimony taken, and it is believed fairly represents the views of these gentlemen. Testimony was also taken in relation to the payment of certain legitimate debts which, as these gentlemen felt, the good faith of the people of Cuba had been pledged to pay. On being asked the probable amount of this indebtedness, they said it was not in excess of $2,250,000 or $2,500,000. The first and most important matter and the one which, they insist, will have much to do with the pacification of the Island, is the payment of some sort of compensation to the impoverished Cuban soldiers. These gentlemen were asked if they had in their possession any estimate as to the number of soldiers, the length of service, and the amount of money necessary for the purpose they had in mind. An itemised account, they were told, would make a useful supplement to the interesting and instructive testimony given.
In compliance with this request, these gentlemen prepared and presented certain tables, with additional verbal testimony. This testimony was subsequently reduced to writing. It purports to be a statement showing the number of officers and privates of the Cuban army and their time of service. On behalf of Cuba, these gentlemen informed the author that had Cuba been recognised as an independent nation, their first duty would have been to pay all legal obligations contracted during the struggle for independence. They request that the United States, acting as trustee for Cuba, will give this subject a careful hearing and enable the people of Cuba to disband the army and complete the pacification of the Island. They recognise the fact that $3,000,000 has been appropriated for a purpose similar to this, but regard it as inadequate. The figures submitted by these gentlemen, as representing the pay which the insurgent army, in their opinion, has earned, are somewhat startling. The summary is as follows:
| ESTIMATE FOR PAYMENT OF INSURGENT TROOPS | ||
| 11 | Major-Generals | $179,450 |
| 19 | Generals of Division | 296,175 |
| 54 | Brigadier-Generals | 682,825 |
| 153 | Colonels | 1,491,750 |
| 290 | Lieutenant-Colonels | 2,362,800 |
| 578 | Majors | 3,870,240 |
| 965 | Captains | 4,561,800 |
| 1245 | Lieutenants | 3,763,800 |
| 1794 | Sub-Lieutenants | 4,952,880 |
| 2130 | 1st Sergeants | 3,796,200 |
| 3123 | 2d Sergeants | 4,605,600 |
| 4509 | Corporals | 5,238,240 |
| 30,160 | Privates | 21,502,620 |
| 45,031 | $57,304,380 | |
The pay promised the Cuban army is very much higher (except in the grade of generals) than the amounts actually paid the officers and men in the United States army, as will be seen from the following comparison of the salaries of the two armies:
| SALARIES PAID CUBAN AND UNITED STATES ARMIES PER MONTH | ||
| Cuban. | United States. | |
| Major-General. | $500 | $625 |
| General of Division | 450 | ... |
| Brigadier-General | 400 | 458.33 |
| Colonel | 325 | 290.67 |
| Lieutenant-Colonel | 275 | 250 |
| Major | 220 | 208.33 |
| Captain | 130 | 150 |
| Lieutenant | 100 | 125 |
| Sub-Lieutenant | 90 | 116.67 |
| 1st Sergeant | 60 | 25 |
| 2d Sergeant | 50 | 18 |
| Corporal | 40 | 15 |
| Private | 30 | 13 |
It is not assumed by the gentlemen who prepared the above estimates that claims of such magnitude could be seriously considered by an independent Republic. The resources of the Island at present are entirely inadequate to shoulder such a debt. Upon the reduced basis of the salaries paid the United States soldiers, the reduction would be about one half, or less than $30,000,000, an equally impossible sum. On the other hand, that some aid should be rendered by the United States to enable these soldiers to disband and go to work would seem both feasible and just. It could easily be met by the revenue of the Island, and would have a decided effect in securing permanent peace and the early establishment of a stable government in Cuba. If done now under the guidance of the United States it would prevent excessive payment to the troops hereafter. In the same manner the liquidation of the small amount of outstanding obligation—not exceeding $2,500,000—might settle the debt question for all time to come. Especially if all other advances for these purposes were prohibited until such debt was adjusted to the satisfaction of the United States. In case the ultimate solution of the Cuban question should be, as it is quite within the range of probability, annexation, the independent government will not previously have had the opportunity of incurring improvident indebtedness, which ultimately may have to be assumed by the United States. In short, whatever may be done in this matter, or however it may be done, the United States should control and safeguard the finances of the Island for a considerable period. It has been very truly stated that should an independent government be established and recognised, the United States will no longer be able to control the financial legislation of the Island. It can, however, by the plan proposed, and very properly, not only save money for Cuba while under its military possession or control, but also prevent the making of unnecessary improvident or other loans by such independent government, except with the consent, or approval in advance, of the United States. This can be readily done, if, when making an advance for the benefit of Cuba, the right to apply the customs receipts and other revenues of the Island to the repayment of the principal and interest of such advance be reserved to the United States. In this way all reckless expenditure may be prevented and all speculative or independent bond issues be avoided and at the same time quick assistance be rendered those whose position at present is deplorable in the extreme.
THE revenues and expenditures of the Island of Cuba for the fiscal year 1898-99, according to the reports obtained by the author from the Secretary of the Treasury, Marquis Rafael Montoro, may be thus summarised:
| BALANCE OF THE ESTIMATED RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE BUDGET OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA FOR 1898-99 | |||
| Expenditures. | Amount. | Receipts. | Amount. |
| Sovereignty Expenditure | $22,500,808.59 | Custom-Houses | 14,705,000 |
| Local. | Internal Revenue | 1,640,650 | |
| General Expenditures | 159,605.50 | Lotteries | 1,900,500 |
| State-Church, Justice, and Government | 1,612,859.44 | Miscellaneous Revenue | 1,536,000 |
| Treasury | 708,978.51 | ||
| Public Instruction | 247,033.02 | Estimates of Total Revenue | $26,374,045.68 |
| Public Works and Communications | 1,036,582.10 | ||
| Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce | 108,178.52 | ||
| Deduct Amounts not Specified | 17,314.27 | ||
| Total | $26,356,731.41 | ||
| Receipts | $ 26,359,650.00 | ||
| Expenses | 26,356,731.41 | ||
| Surplus | $2,918.59 | ||
While the revenues are all derived from the various species of taxation exacted from the people of Cuba, the expenditures are divided into two important classes: those under the head of “Sovereignty Expenses,” or expenses of the General Government, which, according to this estimate, aggregate $22,500,808.59, and those which, under the head of “Local Expenses” aggregating $3,873,237.09, constitute the expenditures for the immediate necessities of the Island. In order to obtain a clear view of the possibilities of revenue and the probable future expenses of the Island of Cuba, these receipts and expenditures should be further examined.
Taxes in Cuba, as will be seen from the above exhibit, are collected under six general classifications, namely: (1) taxes and imposts, including excise and liquor taxes, and taxes on railway freight and passengers; (2) receipts from custom-houses, which include taxes on imports and exports, loading and unloading merchandise, fines and passports; (3) internal revenue, including stamped paper,[14] postage stamps, warrants for payment issued by the State, diplomas and titles, stamps on letters of exchange or deeds of transfer, on insurance policies, on matches, and on almost every other conceivable sort of deed and document; (4) lotteries, are put down in the above table as yielding $1,900,500; (5) revenue from State property, including rents and sale of lands and rent from docks; (6) revenue from miscellaneous sources, some of which seem somewhat mythical. These comprise the general sources of revenue which appear in this report, and from which the Secretary of the Treasury, Marquis Montoro, informed the author he hoped to secure for the fiscal year 1898-99 the following sums:
| Sources of Revenue. | Estimated Amount Spanish Gold. |
| Taxes and Imposts | $ 6,142,500 |
| Custom-Houses | 14,705,000 |
| Internal Revenue | 1,640,650 |
| Lotteries | 1,900,500 |
| State Property | 435,000 |
| Miscellaneous Revenue | 1,536,000 |
| Total Estimated Revenue | $26,359,650 |
As to how much of this has been collected or how much can be collected, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty. Spanish official reports are not very reliable documents at the best, and during the last three years of internal dissensions, frequent changes in officials, and war, they appear to be at their worst. The only possible light on the subject which the author was able to obtain was a statement of the actual taxes as levied between 1887 and 1897, inclusive, and the actual amounts collected at the custom-houses and by the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, for under Spanish administration the latter institution collected all taxes other than customs.
According to these figures, the custom-house receipts of Cuba fell from $14,708,509.10 in 1895 to $9,648,369.94 in 1897-98. While the value of the tax receipts handed to the Spanish Bank for collection for the fiscal year 1896-97 exceeded $5,000,000, the actual money collected was only $3,266,583.37, while for the next fiscal year, 1897-98, out of receipts aggregating in the neighbourhood of $4,500,000, only $2,377,742.21 was realised. The exhibits show that rural real estate, which, under prosperous conditions, should yield in taxes from $880,000 to $1,000,000, is incapable of paying anything. Out of receipts aggregating in 1897-98 over $800,000, the Spanish Bank only collected $89,661.98 from these properties. Nor will it be possible in the reconstruction of the Island to secure revenue from these sources, for the burned and destroyed estates are yielding nothing to their owners. City property which, in times of prosperity, should yield upward of $2,000,000, or even $3,000,000, in 1897-98 only yielded $1,140,230.12.
This tax, however, and the receipts from customs will be the first to recover, as the immediate effects of permanent peace and honest government will be felt in the cities and towns and seaports. Lotteries will become a doubtful, if not impossible source of revenue. The collections from internal revenue may keep up to the estimate, though the income from State property and miscellaneous revenues seems upon examination a rather doubtful resource for the new government to rely upon. Judged from the actual revenue collected in 1897-98, had present conditions prevailed, it is extremely doubtful if the real revenue collected for 1898-99 would have reached more than half the rosy estimates put forth by the Marquis Montoro. The fact is apparent to those who know existing conditions in Cuba that the people of the Island are just now in such an impoverished condition that the agricultural interests are simply incapable of paying taxes.
The cities will soon be all right again, and under honest municipal government, taxes on urban property will be paid. The influx of commodities of all sorts, to make up for losses and destruction by war and low stocks due to the blockade, will increase the custom-house receipts. The reduction of duties on machinery and railway supplies may increase the importations of these articles, and thus the lower rates of duty will yield a revenue which the present high rates, by making importations impossible, fail to do. By putting an end to smuggling, and by honestly administering the custom-houses, the United States Government may increase the revenue, but the proposed reduction of duties of the amended tariff in a measure offsets this. Unless, therefore, some new source of revenue is found practicable (and the Spanish seem to have exhausted all known means of raising revenue), reliance for the future will have to be on five of the six revenue sources above enumerated. If for the first year or two they should yield in all $15,000,000, it will probably be all the revenue that may safely be estimated. Much will naturally depend upon the foreign imports. The cable despatches from Havana, as this volume goes to press, indicate that the customs revenue will be fully up to the author’s estimates.
Aside from special imports, such as specie, leaf tobacco, etc., the value of the imports of merchandise proper into Cuba the last normal year (1895) was upward of $60,000,000. An average tariff rate of twenty-five per cent. on this valuation of imported merchandise would itself yield $15,000,000. As a matter of fact, the duties collected in 1895 were $14,587,920.57, on a total importation of merchandise other than specie of $61,443,334.65, or about an average of twenty-five per cent. To be sure, the nominal tariff rates were much higher in 1895 than they will be in 1899, but there is a possibility of making up for the loss by reason of lower duties by abolishing smuggling and honestly administering the custom-houses. It is impossible, however, to estimate on this, because, to do so with any degree of success, it would be necessary to reduce to figures the losses of revenue by smuggling, undervaluation, and misclassification. This is an impossibility.
The tariff which the Spanish Government enacted and put in force in the Island of Cuba in September, 1897, and which, with modifications in the shape of war taxes, was in force in ports of Cuba in possession of the Spanish Government until the change of government, January 1, 1899, is based upon the preceding tariffs. Both this tariff and its predecessors seem to lack rational basis, so far as Cuba is concerned, the aim apparently being to secure, by the means of exorbitant customs duties revenue for the Spanish exchequer and profits for Spanish subjects, without the slightest regard for the welfare of the people of Cuba. While the duties seem to have been levied with this idea, the classifications and methods of administration are so complicated and obscure that they easily lend themselves to every known species of revenue fraud, from false classifications and undervaluations to smuggling of the most barefaced character. In fact, the author, after a careful inquiry into the Cuban tariff and an examination of several hundred witnesses in Havana and other cities of Cuba, reached the conclusion that almost every form of revenue iniquity has been perpetrated upon the people of this Island by the ruling powers.
Not only was the tariff constructed in a way that compelled the Cuban producer to purchase the articles he needed and could not himself manufacture, of Spain, instead of in the cheaper markets, but also it levied almost prohibitive duties on such articles as Spain could not under any circumstances send to Cuba. For example, the Spanish exporter was able, by a discriminating duty of more than one hundred per cent. against other countries, to import from Minnesota to Barcelona American flour and reship it to Cuba at a price just below the price of the American article shipped direct to Cuba, upon which a duty nearly three times as great as that exacted from Spain had to be paid. On the other hand, Spain took little interest in such articles as machinery and railway supplies, including steel rails and locomotives, because she neither produced them nor could she purchase elsewhere and reship as Spanish production.
The amended tariff for the Island, which went into force January 1, 1899, was framed on the general plan of the “open door” for all nations; that is, the merchandise of all nations will be admitted on an equal footing, or at the same rate of duty. There is but one uniform rate of duty, and that, as far as possible, a revenue, not a protective rate. In a few cases, a protective rate has been allowed, for the purpose of encouraging Cuban home industry, but as over half of all the imports into Cuba are food products, not produced to advantage in the Island, the rates of duty rarely exceed twenty-five per cent. ad valorem. In this connection, it will be interesting to note the value of the merchandise imported, divided by schedules or classes (page 217).
It will be seen from the following exhibit that Schedule 12, “Alimentary Substances,” covering all food products, is the most important of all the schedules, representing more than half the total imports into Cuba during 1895, and aggregating over $31,000,000. Next in importance to this is Schedule 4, “Cotton and Manufactures thereof,” aggregating nearly $6,000,000, or ten per cent. of the total imports; Schedule 1, “Ores, etc.,” aggregating in the neighbourhood of $4,750,000, ranking third, and so on through the list.
| TABLE SHOWING VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO CUBA BY TARIFF CLASSES FOR THE LAST NORMAL YEAR, 1895-96 | |||
| Number of Schedule. | Commodity. | Value Imports, 1895-96. | |
| Class | I. | Stones, earths, ores, etc. | $ 4,733,358.12 |
| “ | II. | Metals, and manufactures of | 2,063,281.95 |
| “ | III. | Pharmacy and chemicals | 2,166,414.92 |
| “ | IV. | Cotton, and manufactures of | 5,908,202.23 |
| “ | V. | Hemp, flax, jute, and other vegetable fibres and manufactures of | 3,587,713.23 |
| “ | VI. | Wool, bristles, etc., and manufactures of | 1,060,192.13 |
| “ | VII. | Silk, and manufactures of | 315,010.00 |
| “ | VIII. | Paper and its applications | 1,257,132.94 |
| “ | IX. | Wood, etc., and manufactures of | 2,054,057.57 |
| “ | X. | Animals and animal wastes | 3,880,209.64 |
| “ | XI. | Instruments, machinery, etc. | 2,123,315.43 |
| “ | XII. | Alimentary substances | 31,179,289.98 |
| “ | XIII. | Miscellaneous | 1,115,156.51 |
| $61,443,334.65 | |||
In conjunction with the above table, the following recapitulation of values of exports and reshipments into Cuba during 1895-96 is given:
| RECAPITULATION OF VALUES OF EXPORTS AND RESHIPMENTS IN CUBA DURING 1895-96 | |||||
| Exports | First Quarter | Second Quarter | Third Quarter | Fourth Quarter | Total |
| Classes of goods: | |||||
| Timber | $286,190.70 | $ 267,068.47 | $ 200,878.03 | $ 130,463.90 | $ 848,601.10 |
| Cigars | 6,616,458.97 | 4,374,938.70 | 6,389,770.95 | 6,666,672.71 | 24,047,841.33 |
| Sugar | 26,288,456.91 | 30,457,278.50 | 10,679,269.55 | 7,572,016.36 | 74,997,021.32 |
| Molasses | 427,886.11 | 1,010,657.35 | 152,205.65 | 8,846.30 | 1,599,595.41 |
| Rum and liquors | 352,393.44 | 292,808.18 | 267,277.53 | 121,991.00 | 1,034,470.15 |
| Other articles | 1,332,714.86 | 2,538,509.69 | 2,738,024.01 | 1,112,242.44 | 7,721,491.00 |
| Total | 35,304,100.99 | 38,941,260.89 | 20,427,425.72 | 15,612,232.71 | 110,285,020.31 |
| Reshipment: | |||||
| Foreign goods | 15,462.65 | 8,477.91 | 17,567.05 | 27,524.08 | 69,031.69 |
| Spanish goods | 61,343.08 | 27,477.62 | 28,718.17 | 29,276.53 | 146,815.40 |
| Total | 76,805.73 | 35,955.53 | 46,285.22 | 56,800.61 | 215,847.09 |
| Special exports | 207,477.55 | 166,881.15 | 2,092,960.13 | 153,326.30 | 2,620,645.13 |
| Grand total | $35,588,384.27 | $39,144,097.57 | $22,566,671.07 | $15,822,359.62 | $113,121,512.53 |
The grand total of the trade of the Cuban ports for the last normal year was nearly $175,000,000. Perhaps with allowance for smuggling and undervaluations, this total may have reached $200,000,000; possibly it may have exceeded those figures. However this may be, Cuba, under a satisfactory government and normal conditions, may be easily said to represent from $200,000,000 to $250,000,000 in the world’s commerce. This fact gives some idea of the vast trade possibilities of Cuba after a complete rehabilitation and industrial reconstruction of the Island.
In the following table the author has carefully compiled from the several available sources of information the average receipts from 1886 to 1897, inclusive, of the several custom-houses of Cuba:
| TOTAL CUSTOM-HOUSE RECEIPTS IN ISLAND OF CUBA FROM 1886 TO 1897, INCLUSIVE | |||
| Custom-Houses. | Total for Twelve Years. | Average per Year. | Ratio of Total. |
| Havana | $106,132,753.38 | $ 8,844,396.11 | 69.9 |
| Cienfuegos | 13,691,144.65 | 1,140,928.72 | 9.0 |
| Matanzas | 9,381,754.10 | 781,812.84 | 6.2 |
| Santiago de Cuba | 7,668,501.66 | 639,041.81 | 5.1 |
| Cardenas | 4,363,935.76 | 363,661.32 | 2.9 |
| Sagua la Grande | 2,994,082.56 | 249,506.88 | 2.0 |
| Caibarien | 1,705,523.71 | 142,126.97 | 1.1 |
| Nuevitas | 1,564,595.30 | 130,382.94 | 1.0 |
| Guantanamo | 1,380,693.44 | 115,057.79 | 0.9 |
| Gibara | 1,186,480.34 | 98,873.37 | 0.8 |
| Manzanillo | 913,896.91 | 76,158.07 | 0.6 |
| Baracoa | 373,498.11 | 31,124.85 | 0.2 |
| Trinidad | 194,656.85 | 16,221.40 | 0.1 |
| Santa Cruz | 107,935.59 | 8,994.63 | 0.1 |
| Zaza | 91,276.51 | 7,606.38 | 0.1 |
| Total | $151,750,728.87 | $12,645,894.08 | 100.00 |
During the twelve years, it should be stated the largest amount of revenue was collected in 1886, when it was $15,330,778.96, and the smallest amount last year, namely, $9,648,369.94. The receipts show the working of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, which, while it greatly added to the prosperity of the Island, decreased the revenues which Spain sought to secure for herself.
From the above table it will be seen that the total amount of revenue collected during these twelve years averaged $12,645,894.08 per year; that the custom-house of Havana collected 69.9 per cent, and Cienfuegos—which is an important city, and, in the opinion of the author, the city which, under the new conditions, will show the most rapid development—9 per cent., ranking second. In the custom-house district of Santiago, the average revenue receipts per year have been 5.1 per cent. The inclusion in this district of Guantanamo, Gibara, Manzanillo, and Baracoa will probably increase the collections for the province to nearly ten per cent. of the total revenue of the Island.
The following is a similar table to that given above, but gives at a glance the customs receipts from imports and exports at each port:
| RECEIPTS FROM IMPORTS AND EXPORTS—1886-1897 | ||||
| Custom-Houses. | Imports. | Exports. | ||
| Average Twelve Years. |
Per Cent. of Total Imports. |
Average Twelve Years. |
Per Cent. of Total Exports. | |
| Havana | $7,882,855.48 | $961,540.63 | ||
| Cienfuegos | 1,094,962.53 | 45,966.19 | ||
| Matanzas | 723,978.04 | 57,834.80 | ||
| Santiago de Cuba | 625,517.97 | 13,523.84 | ||
| Cardenas | 297,738.05 | 65,923.27 | ||
| Sagua la Grande | 207,422.23 | 42,084.65 | ||
| Caibarien | 127,011.98 | 15,114.99 | ||
| Nuevitas | 122,282.25 | 8,100.69 | ||
| Guantanamo | 103,198.88 | 11,858.91 | ||
| Gibara | 63,371.21 | 35,502.16 | ||
| Manzanillo | 60,664.85 | 15,493.22 | ||
| Baracoa | 31,122.49 | 2.36 | ||
| Trinidad | 11,963.02 | 4,258.38 | ||
| Santa Cruz | 4,679.98 | 4,314.65 | ||
| Zaza | 4,520.12 | 3,086.26 | ||
| Aggregate | $11,361,289.08 | 8.33 | $1,284,605.00 | 8.33 |