Mahomedan Representation
| Resolution VII. The proportion of Mahomedans in the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly as laid down in the Congress-League Scheme must be maintained. | (VIII) (d) Mahomedan representation in every legislature should be in the proportions mentioned in the Scheme adopted by the Congress and the Muslim League at Lucknow in 1916. |
Army Commissions
Public Services
| Resolution XVII. That this Congress is of opinion that the proportion of annual recruitment to the Indian civil service to be made in England should be 50 per cent. to start with, such recruitment to be by open competition in India from persons already appointed to the Provincial Civil Service. | X (a) This Conference thanks the Secretary of State and the Viceroy for recommending that all racial bars should be abolished and for recognizing the principle of recruiting of all the Indian public services in India and in England instead of any service being recruited for exclusively in the latter country. |
Franchise for Women
| Resolution VIII. Women possessing the same qualifications as are laid down for men in any part of the Scheme shall not be disqualified on account of sex. |
The All-India Muslim League is in substantial accord with the resolutions of the Special Congress. It will be easily seen that Indian opinion, of both Hindus and Mussulmans, is substantially in accord in their demands for the democratization of the Central government and in their criticism of the rest of the scheme. The Indians have thus exercised their right of self-determination through their popular bodies and are entitled to get what they demand. After all, what they ask for is only a modest instalment of autonomy under British control.
In the appendices the reader will find a comparative table showing (a) the present Constitution of Government in India (b) the proposals of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy (c) and the Congress League Scheme.
.... for equality of right amongst nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental issues this country and her allies are fighting to establish in this war.
David Lloyd George
“The War Aims of the Allies.” Speech delivered to delegates of the Trade Unions, at the Central Hall, Westminster, January 5, 1918.
I beg to record my strong opinion that in the matter of Indian industries we are bound to consider Indian interests firstly, secondly, and thirdly. I mean by “firstly” that the local raw products should be utilised, by secondly, that industries should be introduced and by “thirdly” that the profits of such industry should remain in the country.
Sir Frederick Nicholson
Quoted on page 300, Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-1918.
Economic bondage is the worst of all bondages. Economic dependence, or the lack of economic independence, is the source of all misery, individual or national. A person economically dependent upon another is a virtual slave, despite appearances. He who supplies food and raiment and the necessities of life is the real master.
The desire for gain dominates the world and all its activities. Even religion, as ordinarily understood, interpreted and administered, is a game of pounds and shillings, say what one may to the contrary. There are exceptions to this statement, but they are few and far between. The world does not subsist by bread alone, but without bread it cannot exist even for a minute. The generality of the world cares more for bread than for anything else, though there are individuals and groups of individuals who would not stoop to obtain bread by dishonorable means and those also who would die rather than obtain bread by the violation of their soul.
There are numerous ways in which a subject nation feels the humiliation and helplessness of her position, but none is so telling and so effective as the subordination of her economic interests to those of the dominant power. This is especially true in these days of free and easy transportation, of quick journeys, and of scientific warfare. In any struggle between nations, the victory eventually must rest with the one in possession of the largest number of “silver bullets.” It is true that silver bullets alone will not do unless there are brains and bodies to use them, but the latter without the former are helpless.
A nation may be the greatest producer of food; yet she may die of hunger from lack of ability to keep her own produce for herself. Food obeys the behest of the silver bullets. The law of self-preservation, therefore, requires only that nations be free to regulate their own household, subject to the condition that thereby they do not violate the rules of humanity or trample upon the rights of any human being.
Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford have, in parts of their Report, been extremely candid. The value of their joint production lies in this candidness. In no other part, perhaps, have they been so candid as in the one dealing with “Industries and Tariff.” In Paragraph 331 they frankly admit the truth of the following observation of the late Mr. Ranade on the economic effects of British rule in India:
“The political domination of one country by another attracts far more attention than the more formidable, though more unfelt, domination which the capital, enterprise and skill of one country exercise over the trade and manufactures of another. This latter domination has an insidious influence which paralyses the springs of all the various activities which together make up the life of a nation.”
In the course of a letter addressed to the Westminster Gazette in 1917, Lord Curzon said that “the fiscal policy of India during the last thirty or forty years has been shaped far more in Manchester than in Calcutta.” This candid admission about “the subordination of Indian fiscal policy to the Secretary of State and a House of Commons powerfully affected by Lancashire influence,” is the keynote of the Indian demand for Home Rule. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report say so quite frankly and fairly in Paragraphs 332 to 336 of their report, from which we make the following extracts:
“The people are poor; and their poverty raises the question whether the general level of well-being could not be materially raised by the development of industries. It is also clear that the lack of outlet for educated youth is a serious misfortune which has contributed not a little in the past to political unrest in Bengal. But perhaps an even greater mischief is the discontent aroused in the minds of those who are jealous for India by seeing that she is so largely dependent on foreign countries for manufactured goods. They noted that her foreign trade was always growing, but they also saw that its leading feature continued to be the barter of raw materials valued at relatively low prices for imported manufactures, which obviously afforded profits and prosperity to other countries industrially more advanced. Patriotic Indians might well ask themselves why these profits should not accrue to their country: and also why so large a portion of the industries which flourished in the country was financed by European capital and managed by European skill.”
“The fact that India’s foreign trade was largely with the United Kingdom gave rise to a suspicion that her industrial backwardness was positively encouraged in the interests of British manufactures, and the maintenance of the excise duty on locally manufactured cotton goods in the alleged interests of Lancashire is very widely accepted as a conclusive proof of such a purpose. On a smaller scale, the maintenance of a Stores Department at the India Office is looked upon as an encouragement to the Government to patronize British at the expense of local manufacturers.”
There can thus be no autonomy without fiscal autonomy. In fact, the latter alone is the determining characteristic of an autonomous existence.
The one national trait which distinguishes the British from other nations of the world is their habit of truthfulness and frankness. When we say that we do not thereby mean that all Britishers are equally truthful—to the same extent and degree. But we do mean that on the whole the British nation has a larger percentage of truthful and candid persons in her family than any other nation on the face of the earth. Where their interests clash with those of others, they can be as hard, exacting and cruel as any one else in the world. But repentance overtakes them sooner than it does the others. They have a queer but admirable faculty of introspection which few other people possess to the same extent and in the same numbers. This is what endears them even to those who are never tired of cursing their snobbishness and masterful imperialism. The faculty of occasionally seeing themselves with the eyes of others, makes them the most successful rulers of men. They are as a nation lacking in imagination, but there are individuals amongst them who can see, if they will, their own faults; who can and do speak out their minds honestly and truthfully, even though by so doing they may temporarily earn odium and unpopularity.
The remarks and observations of the eminent authors of the Report relating to the fiscal relations of India and England reflect the honesty of their purpose and the sincerity of their mind as no other part of the Report does. They have entered upon the subject with great diffidence and, though expressing themselves with marked candor and fairness, have refrained from making any definite recommendations.
In this respect it will be only fair to acknowledge the equally candid opinion of Mr. Austin Chamberlain, who, in 1917, made a most significant confession by stating on an important occasion that “India will not remain, and ought not to remain content to be a hewer of wood and a drawer of water for the rest of the Empire.”
To our simple minds, not accustomed to the anomalies of official life, it seems inexplicable how, after these candid admissions, the authors could have any hesitation in recommending the only remedy by which India’s wrong could be righted and her economic rights secured in the future—viz., fiscal autonomy.
In Paragraph 335 the authors of the report give the genesis of the Swadeshi boycott movement of 1905, and very pertinently observe that “in Japanese progress and efficiency” the educated Indians see “an example of what could be effected by an Asiatic nation free of foreign control,” or in other words, of what could be achieved by India, if she had a national government of her own interested in her industrial advance. Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford thus rightly observe that “English theories to the appropriate limits of the State’s activity are inapplicable in India” and that if the resources of the country are to be developed the Government must take action.
“After the war,” add the authors, “the need for industrial development will be all the greater unless India is to become a mere dumping-ground for the manufactures of foreign nations which will then be competing all the more keenly for the markets on which their political strength so perceptibly depends. India will certainly consider herself entitled to claim all the help that her Government can give her to enable her to take her place as a manufacturing country; and unless the claim is admitted it will surely turn into an insistent request for a tariff which will penalize imported articles without respect of origin.”
Further on the Report states:
“We are agreed therefore that there must be a definite change of view; and that the Government must admit and shoulder its responsibility for furthering the industrial development of the country. The difficulties by this time are well-known. In the past, and partly as a result of recent swadeshi experiences, India’s capital has not generally been readily available; among some communities at least there is apparent distaste for practical training, and a comparative weakness of mutual trust; skilled labour is lacking, and although labour is plentiful, education is needed to inculcate a higher standard of living and so to secure a continuous supply; there is a dearth of technical institutions; there is also a want of practical information about the commercial potentialities of India’s war products. Though these are serious difficulties, they are not insuperable; but they will be overcome only if the State comes forward boldly as guide and helper. On the other hand, there are good grounds for hope. India has great natural resources, mineral and vegetable. She has furnished supplies of manganese, tungsten, mica, jute, copra, lac, etc., for use in the war. She has abundant coal, even if its geographical distribution is uneven; she has also in her large rivers ample means of creating water-power. There is good reason for believing that she will greatly increase her output of oil. Her forest wealth is immense, and much of it only awaits the introduction of modern means of transportation, a bolder investment of capital, and the employment of extra staff; while the patient and laborious work of conservation that has been steadily proceeding joined with modern scientific methods of improving supplies and increasing output, will yield a rich harvest in the future. We have been assured that Indian capital will be forthcoming once it is realized that it can be invested with security and profit in India; a purpose that will be furthered by the provision of increased facilities for banking and credit. Labor, though abundant, is handicapped by still pursuing uneconomical methods, and its output would be greatly increased by the extended use of machinery. We have no doubt that there is an immense scope for the application of scientific methods. Conditions are ripe for the development of new and for the revival of old industries, and the real enthusiasm for industries which is not confined to the ambitions of a few individuals but rests on the general desire to see Indian capital and labour applied jointly to the good of the country, seem to us the happiest augury.”
The views of educated India about fiscal policy have been very faithfully reproduced in Paragraphs 341 and 342, which also we reproduce almost bodily:
“Connected intimately with the matter of industries is the question of the Indian tariff. This subject was excluded from the deliberations of the Industrial Commission now sitting because it was not desirable at that juncture to raise any question of the modification of India’s fiscal policy; but its exclusion was none the less the object of some legitimate criticism in India. The changes which we propose in the Government of India will still leave the settlement of India’s tariff in the hands of a government amenable to Parliament and the Secretary of State; but inasmuch as the tariff reacts on many matters which will henceforth come more and more under Indian control, we think it well that we should put forward for the information of His Majesty’s Government the views of educated Indians upon this subject. We have no immediate proposals to make; we are anxious merely that any decisions which may hereafter be taken should be taken with full appreciation of educated Indian opinion.
“The theoretical free trader, we believe, hardly exists in India at present. As was shown by the debates in the Indian Legislative Council in March, 1913, educated Indian opinion ardently desires a tariff. It rightly wishes to find another substantial basis than that of the land for Indian revenues, and it turns to a tariff to provide one. Desiring industries which will give him Indian-made clothes to wear and Indian-made articles to use, the educated Indian looks to the example of other countries which have relied on tariffs, and seizes on the admission of even free traders that for the nourishment of nascent industries a tariff is permissible. We do not know whether he pauses to reflect that these industries will be largely financed by foreign capital attracted by the tariff, although we have evidence that he has not learned to appreciate the advantages of foreign capital. But whatever economic fallacy underlies his reasoning, these are his firm beliefs; and though he may be willing to concede the possibility that he is wrong, he will not readily concede that it is our business to decide the matter for him. He believes that as long as we continue to decide for him we shall decide in the interests of England and not according to his wishes; and he points to the debate in the House of Commons on the differentiation of the cotton excise in support of his contention. So long as the people who refuse India protection are interested in manufactures with which India might compete, Indian opinion cannot bring itself to believe that the refusal is disinterested or dictated by care for the best interests of India. This real and keen desire for fiscal autonomy does not mean that educated opinion in India is unmindful of Imperial obligations....”
These admissions should put India’s claims for fiscal autonomy beyond the range of doubt and dispute, but so strange are the ways of modern statesmanship that consistency and logic are not the necessary accompaniments thereof.
The authors have advanced another very strong argument for the economic development of India, viz., “military value,” which makes the case conclusive. This argument has been supplied by the Great War and is so well known that we need not state it in their words.
If India is to prosper and take her legitimate place in the British Commonwealth, and in the great family of Nations of the World, it is absolutely necessary that she should be given complete fiscal freedom to manage her own affairs, develop her own industries and do her own trading. Considering her size and resources, it wounds her self-respect and makes her feel exceedingly mean and small to go begging for alms and charity every time there is a failure of rains and the cry of famine is raised.
For a nation of 315 millions of human beings living in a country which nature has endowed with all its choicest blessings, rich and fertile soil, plenty of water and sun, an abundant supply of metals and coal, willing labor, artistic skill and a power of manipulating for beauty and elegance unexcelled in the world—to exist in pitiful economic dependence is a condition most deplorable and most pathetic. We want no charity, no concessions, no favors, no preference. What we most earnestly beg and ask for is an opportunity.
For a synopsis of the findings and recommendations of the Industrial Commission mentioned in this chapter see appendix 1.
In December, 1917, the Government of India appointed a committee of three Englishmen and two Indians (1) “to investigate and report on the nature and extent of the criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movements in India, (2) to examine and consider the difficulties that have arisen in dealing with such conspiracies and to advise as to the legislation, if any, necessary to enable the government to deal effectively with them.” Of the three English members, Mr. Justice Rowlatt of the King’s Bench Division, England, was appointed as president, and of the other two, one was a judge in the service of the Government and the other a member of a Board of Revenue in one of the Indian Provinces. Of the two Indians, one was a judge and the other a practicing lawyer.
This committee submitted its report in April, 1918, which was published by the Government of India in July of the same year. The president, Mr. Justice Rowlatt’s letter covering the report gives the nature of the evidence upon which their report is based, which is as follows: “Statements have been placed before us with documentary evidence by the Governments of Bengal, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burmah as well as by the Government of India. In every case, except that of Madras, we were further attended by officers of the government, presenting this statement, who gave evidence before us. In the two provinces in which we held sittings, namely, Bengal and Punjab, we further invited and secured the attendance of individuals, or as deputed by associations, of gentlemen who we thought might give us information from various non-official points of view.”
It is clear from this statement that the investigation of the committee was neither judicial nor even semi-judicial; it was a purely administrative inquiry conducted behind the backs of the individuals concerned, without the latter having any opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses or giving their explanations of the evidence against them. While the different Governments in India were fully represented in each case by the ablest of their servants, the individuals investigated were not. We do not want to insinuate that either the Governments or the officers deputed by them were unfair in their evidence. All that we want to point out is that the other side had no opportunity of putting their case before the committee. Consequently, it is no wonder that one comes across many traces of political and racial bias both in the introduction and the Report.
The very first paragraph of the introduction betrays either ignorance on the part of the committee about the ancient history of India, or a deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of the Hindu State. The committee says: “Republican or Parliamentary forms of governments as at present understood were neither desired nor known in India until after the establishment of British rule. In the Hindu State the form of government was an absolute monarchy, though the monarch was by the Hindu Shastras hedged round by elaborate rules for securing the welfare of his subjects and was assisted by a body of councillors, the chief of whom were Brahmin members of the priestly class which derived authority from a time when the priests were the sole repositories of knowledge and therefore the natural instruments of administration.” The statements made in this paragraph do not represent the whole truth.
The committee ignores the fact that Republican or Parliamentary forms of Government “as at present understood” were neither desired nor known in any part of the world, except perhaps England itself until after the establishment of British rule in India.[1] Then the committee has altogether ignored that, in the Hindu State, the form of government was not an absolute monarchy always and in all parts of India. There is ample historical evidence to prove that India had many Republican States, along with oligarchies and monarchies at one and the same period of her history. The second part of the second sentence is also not correct, because the priestly class derived its authority from a time when the priests were not the sole repositories of knowledge. The several Hindu political treatises belong to a period when the whole populace was highly educated and could take substantial part in the determination of the affairs of their country.
Equally misleading is the last sentence of the introduction where the committee says that it is among the Chitpavan Brahmins of the Poona district that they first find indications of a revolutionary movement. This statement is incorrect, if it means that after the establishment of British rule in India no attempt had been made to overthrow it prior to the Revolutionary movement inaugurated by the Poona Brahmins. The statement ignores three such attempts which are known to history; viz., (a) the great Mutiny of 1857, (b) the Wahábee Rebellion of Bengal, and (c) the Kúká Rebellion of the Punjab; not to mention other minor attempts made in other places by other people.
Yet we think that this report is a very valuable document, giving in one place the history and the progress of the Revolutionary Movement in India. The findings and the recommendations of the committee may not be all correct, but the material collected and published for the first time is too valuable to be neglected by anyone who wants to have an intelligent grasp of the political situation in India, such as has developed within the last twenty years.
The committee gives a summary of its conclusions as to the conspiracies in Chapter XV, which we copy verbatim:
“In Bombay they have been purely Brahmin and mostly Chitpavan. In Bengal the conspirators have been young men belonging to the educated middle classes. Their propaganda has been elaborate, persistent and ingenious. In their own province it has produced a long series of murders and robberies. In Bihar and Orissa, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and Madras, it took no root, but occasionally led to crime and disorder. In the Punjab the return of emigrants from America, bent on revolution and bloodshed, produced numerous outrages and the Ghadr conspiracy of 1915. In Burma, too, the Ghadr movement was active, but was arrested.
“Finally came a Mohammedan conspiracy confined to a small clique of fanatics and designed to overthrow British rule with foreign aid.
“All these plots have been directed towards one and the same objective, the overthrow by force of British rule in India. Sometimes they have been isolated; sometimes they have been interconnected; sometimes they have been encouraged and supported by German influence. All have been successfully encountered with the support of Indian loyalty.”
In this general summary the committee has made no attempt to trace out the causes that led to the inauguration of the revolutionary movement and its subsequent progress. A chapter on that subject would have been most illuminating.
In chapters dealing with provinces they have selected some individuals and classes on whom to lay blame for “incitements” to murders and crimes, but have entirely failed to analyze the social, political and economic conditions which made such incitements and their success possible.
It is clear even from this summary that the only two provinces where the revolutionary propaganda took root and resulted in more than occasional outrages were Bengal and the Punjab.
In the Bombay Presidency, revolutionary outrages did not exceed three within a period of 20 years (from 1897 to 1917), two murders and one bomb-throwing. Besides, three trials for conspiracies are mentioned all within a year (1909-1910), two in Native States and one in British territory. Altogether 82 men were prosecuted for being involved in these conspiracies. The total result comes to this, that in the course of 20 years about 100 persons were found to be involved in a revolutionary movement in a territory embracing an area of 186,923 square miles and a population of 27 million human beings. This is surely by no means a formidable record justifying extraordinary legislation such as is proposed.[2] The net loss of human life did not exceed three, though unfortunately all three victims were Europeans.
Bihar and Orissa formed part of the province of Bengal during most of the period covered by the revolutionary movement of Bengal, viz., from 1906 to 1917. It was in Bihar which was then a part of Bengal, that in 1908, the first bomb was thrown. The only other revolutionary outrage that took place in Bihar was one in 1913, resulting in the murder of two Indians.
In the United Provinces of Agra and Oude, the only tangible evidence of revolutionary activity recorded by the committee is the Benares Conspiracy that came to light in 1915-1916. The only outrage noted is that of the alleged murder of a fellow revolutionary by a member of the same gang.
To the Central provinces the committee has given a practically clean bill.
In Madras the revolutionary outrages consisted of one murder (of a European Magistrate) and one conspiracy involving nine persons.
The conspiracies and intrigues detected in Burma are ascribed to people of other provinces and not a single outrage from that province itself is reported.
So we find that in the period from 1906 to 1907, both inclusive, outside the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, the revolutionary crime was limited to three outrages and three conspiracies in the Bombay Presidency, one outrage in Bihar, one outrage and one conspiracy in the United Provinces, one outrage and one conspiracy in Madras and some intrigues and conspiracies during the war in Burma. Thus the only two provinces in which the revolutionary movement established itself to any appreciable extent was Bengal and the Punjab.
In the Punjab, again, the first revolutionary crime took place in December, 1912, and the second in 1913 and the rest all during the War. Cases of seditious utterances and writings are not included in the term “revolutionary crime” used in the above paragraphs. It was from Bengal, then, that before the War revolutionary propaganda was carried on to any large extent, revolutionary movements organized and revolutionary crimes committed. About half of the Report deals with Bengal and the general findings of the committee may be thus summarized:
(1) That the object of the movement was the overturning of “the British government in India by violent means” (p. 15 and also p. 19).
(2) That the class among whom the movement spread was comprised of the Bhadralok (the respectable middle class). The committee says:
“The people among whom he (i.e., Barendra, the first Bengali revolutionary propagandist) worked, the bhadralok of Bengal, have been for centuries peaceful and unwarlike, but, through the influence of the great central city of Calcutta, were early in appreciating the advantages of Western learning. They are mainly Hindus and their leading castes are Brahmins, Kayasthas and Vaidyas; but with the spread of English education some other castes too have adopted bhadralok ideals and modes of life. Bhadralok abound in villages as well as in towns, and are thus more interwoven with the landed classes than are the literate Indians of other provinces. Wherever they live or settle, they earnestly desire and often provide English education for their sons. The consequence is that a number of Anglo-vernacular schools, largely maintained by private enterprise, have sprung up throughout the towns and villages of Bengal. No other province of India possesses a network of rural schools in which English is taught. These schools are due to the enterprise of the bhadralok and to the fact that, as British rule gradually spread from Bengal over Northern India, the scope of employment for English-educated Bengalis spread with it. Originally they predominated in all offices and higher grade schools throughout Upper India. They were also, with the Parsees, the first Indians to send their sons to England for education, to qualify for the Bar, or to compete for the higher grades of the Civil and Medical services. When, however, similar classes in other provinces also acquired a working knowledge of English, the field for Bengali enterprise gradually shrank. In their own province bhadralok still almost monopolize the clerical and subordinate administrative services of Government. They are prominent in medicine, in teaching and at the Bar. But, in spite of these advantages, they have felt the shrinkage of foreign employment; and as the education which they receive is generally literary and ill-adapted to incline the youthful mind to industrial, commercial or agricultural pursuits, they have not succeeded in finding fresh outlets for their energies. Their hold on land, too, has weakened, owing to increasing pressure of population and excessive sub-infeudation. Altogether their economic prospects have narrowed, and the increasing numbers who draw fixed incomes have felt the pinch of rising prices. On the other hand, the memories and associations of their earlier prosperity, combined with growing contact with Western ideas and standards of comfort, have raised their expectations of the pecuniary remuneration which should reward a laborious and, to their minds, a costly education. Thus as bhadralok learned in English have become more and more numerous, a growing number have become less and less inclined to accept the conditions of life in which they found themselves on reaching manhood. Bhadralok have always been prominent among the supporters of Indian political movements; and their leaders have watched with careful attention events in the world outside India. The large majority of the people of Bengal are not bhadralok but cultivators, and in the eastern districts mainly Muhammadans; but the cultivators of the province are absorbed in their own pursuits, in litigation, and in religious and caste observances. It was not to them but to his own class that Barendra appealed. When he renewed his efforts in 1904, the thoughts of many members of this class had been stirred by various powerful influences.” [The italics are ours.]
We have given this lengthy extract as it shows conclusively (a) that the movement originated and spread among people who had received Western education, most of the leaders having been educated in England and (b) that the root cause of the movement was economic.
(3) That various circumstances occasioned by certain Government measures “specially favored the development” of the movement (p. 16). Among the measures specially mentioned are (a) the University law of Lord Curzon “which was interpreted by politicians as designed to limit the numbers of Indians educated in English and thus to retard national advance”; (b) the partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon. “It was the agitation that attended and followed on this measure that brought previous discontent to a climax.”
(4) That the revolutionary movement received a substantial impetus by the failure of constitutional agitation for the reversal of the policy that decided on partitioning Bengal into two divisions. This failure led to two different kinds of agitation, open and secret: (a) open economic defiance by Swadeshi and boycott—Swadeshi was the affirmative and boycott the negative form of the same movement. Swadeshi enjoined the use of country made articles; boycott was directed against English imports, (b) open propaganda by a more outspoken and in some instances violent press, (c) open control of educational agencies by means of national institutions, (d) open stimulus to physical education and physical culture, (e) nationalistic interpretation of religious dogma and forms (open), (f) organization of secret societies for more violent propaganda, for learning and teaching the use of firearms, for the manufacture of bombs, for illicit purchase and stealing of firearms, for assassination and murder, (g) secret attempts to tamper with the army, (h) conspiracies for terroristic purposes and for obtaining sinews of war by theft, robbery and extortion.
The following two extracts which the committee has taken from one of the publications of the revolutionary party called Mukti Kon Pathe (what is the path of salvation) will explain clauses (f) and (g) and (h).
“The book further points out that not much muscle was required to shoot Europeans, that arms could be procured by grim determination, and that weapons could be prepared silently in some secret place. Indians could be sent to foreign countries to learn the art of making weapons. The assistance of Indian soldiers must be obtained. They must be made to understand the misery and wretchedness of the country. The heroism of Sivaji must be remembered. As long as revolutionary work remained in its infancy, expenses could be met by subscriptions. But as work advanced, money must be extracted from society by the application of force. If the revolution is being brought about for the welfare of society, then it is perfectly just to collect money from society for that purpose. It is admitted that theft and dacoity are crimes because they violate the principle of good society. But the political dacoit is aiming at the good of society, “so no sin but rather virtue attaches to the destruction of this small good for the sake of some higher good. Therefore if revolutionaries extort money from the miserly or luxurious members of society by the application of force, their conduct is perfectly just.”
Mukti Kon Pathe further exhorts its readers to obtain the “help of the native soldiers.... Although these soldiers for the sake of their stomach accept service in the Government of the ruling power, still they are nothing but men made of flesh and blood. They, too, know (how) to think; when therefore the revolutionaries explain to them the woes and miseries of the country, they, in proper time, swell the ranks of the revolutionaries with arms and weapons given them by the ruling power.... Because it is possible to persuade the soldiers in this way, the modern English Raj of India does not allow the cunning Bengalis to enter into the ranks of the army.... Aid in the shape of arms may be secretly obtained by securing the help of the foreign ruling powers.”
(5) That except in five cases the idea of private gain never entered into the activities of the revolutionaries and of the five persons referred to three were taxi-cab drivers either hired or coerced to coöperate in revolutionary enterprise (p. 20).
(6) That “the circumstances that robberies and murders are being committed by young men of respectable extraction, students at schools and colleges, is indeed an amazing phenomenon the occurrence of which in most countries would be hardly credible.”
(7) That “since the year 1906 revolutionary outrages in Bengal have numbered 210 and attempts at committing such outrages have amounted to 101. Definite information is in the hands of the police of the complicity of no less than 1038 persons in these offences. But of these, only 84 persons have been convicted of specified crimes in 39 prosecutions, and of these persons, 30 were tried by tribunals constituted under the Defence of India Act. Ten attempts have been made to strike at revolutionary conspiracies by means of prosecutions directed against groups or branches. In these prosecutions 192 persons were involved, 63 of whom were convicted. Eighty-two revolutionaries have rendered themselves liable to be bound over to be of good behaviour under the preventive sections of the Criminal Procedure Code. In regard to 51 of these, there is direct evidence of complicity in outrages. There have, moreover, been 59 prosecutions under the Arms and Explosives Acts which have resulted in convictions of 58 persons.”
We wish the committee had also supplemented this information by a complete record of the punishments that were imposed on persons convicted of revolutionary crime in the ten years from 1906 to 1917. We are sure such a statement would have been most informing and illuminating. It would have conclusively established the soundness of the half-hearted finding that “the convictions ... did not have as much effect as might have been expected in repressing crime.” In fact they had no effect. They only added fuel to the fire.
(8) That persons involved in revolutionary crime belonged to all castes and occupations and the vast bulk of them were non-Brahmins. They were of all ages, from 10-15 to over 45, the majority being under 25. The committee has in an appendix (p. 93) given three tables of statistics as to age, caste, occupation or profession of persons convicted in Bengal of revolutionary crimes or killed in commission of such crimes during the years 1907-1917. This clause is based on these statistics.
We are afraid, however, that these statistics do not afford quite a correct index of the age, caste, occupation and position of all the people in Bengal that were and are sympathetically interested in the revolutionary movement of Bengal.
In investigating reasons for failure of ordinary machinery for the prevention, detection and punishment of crime in Bengal, the committee has assigned six reasons: (a) want of evidence, (b) paucity of police, (c) facilities enjoyed by criminals, (d) difficulty in proof of possession of arms, etc., (e) distrust of evidence, (f) the uselessness, in general, of confession made to the Police. These reasons, however, do not represent the whole truth. Some of the most daring crimes were committed in broad daylight, in much frequented streets of the metropolis and in the presence of numerous people. Moreover, the Government did not depend on ordinary law. Measure after measure was enacted to expedite and facilitate convictions. Extraordinary provisions were made to meet all the difficulties pointed out by the committee and extraordinary sentences were given in the case of conviction. Yet the Government failed either to extirpate the movement or to check it effectively or to bring the majority of offenders to book.
The members of the committee have frankly admitted: “That we do not expect very much from punitive measures. The conviction of offenders will never check such a movement as that which grew up in Bengal unless the leaders can be convicted at the outset.” They pin their faith on “preventive” measures recommended by them. It was perhaps not within their scope to say that the most effective preventive measure was the removal of the political and economic causes that had generated the movement. The committee has studiously avoided discussing that important point, but now and then they have incidentally furnished the real clue to the situation. Discussing the “accessibility of Bengal schools and colleges to Revolutionary influences,” they quote a passage from one of the reports of the Director of Public Instruction in Bengal. We copy below the whole of this paragraph, as, to us, it seems to be very pertinent to the issue.