ALL FORTUNE IS BENEFICIAL.

[The seuende prose.]

IAM NE IGITUR UIDES.

Sest þou nat P. Do you see what follows from our arguments? þan what þing folweþ alle þe þinges þat I
haue seid. B. What is it? what þing quod I. P. That all fortune is good. ¶ Certys quod she 4164
outerly þat al fortune is good. B. How can that be? and how may þat be
quod .I. P. Since all fortune, whether prosperous or adverse, is for the reward of the good or the punishment of the bad, all fortune is good which is either just or useful. ¶ Now vndirstand quod she so as [alle
fortune wheyther so it be Ioyeful fortune / or aspre]
fortune is ȝiuen eiþer by cause of gerdonynge or ellys of 4168
exercisynge of goode folk or ellys by cause to punissen.
or ellys to chastysen shrewes. ¶ þan is alle fortune
good. þe whiche fortune is certeyne þat it be eiþer ryȝtful
or profitable. But let us put this opinion among those positions which thou saidst were not commonly believed by the people. ¶ For soþe þis is a ful verray resoun 4172
quod I. and yif I considere þe purueaunce and þe
destine þat þou tauȝtest me a litel here byforne þis sentence
is susteyned by stedfast resouns. but yif it like
vnto þe lat vs noumbre hem amonges þilk[e] þinges of 4176
whiche þou seidest a litel here byforne þat þei ne were
nat able to ben ywened to þe poeple. P. Why so? ¶ whi so quod she.
B. Because it is a common expression that the fortune of such a one is bad. for þat þe comune worde of men mysusiþ quod I.
þis manere speche of fortune. and sein ofte tymes [þat] 4180
þe fortune of som wyȝt is wicked.

PUNISHMENT IS BENEFICIAL.

P. Do you wish me to conform for awhile to the language of the people, lest we should seem to depart too much from the popular mode of expression? wilt þou þan quod
she þat I proche a litel to þe wordes of þe poeple so it
seme nat to hem þat I be ouer moche departid as fro þe
vsage of man kynde. B. As you please. as þou wolt quod I. P. Is everything profitable that is good? ¶ Demest 4184
þou nat quod she þat al þing þat profitiþ is good. B. Yes, certainly. ȝis
quod I. P. That which exercises or corrects is profitable? certis þilk þing þat exercisiþ or corigiþ profitiþ.
B. It is. I confesse it wel quod I. P. Therefore it is good? þan is it good quod she.
B. Yes. whi nat quod I. P. This is the fortune of the virtuous who combat with adversity, or of those who, relinquishing vice, pursue the path of virtue? but þis is þe fortune [quod she] of 4188
hem þat eiþer ben put in vertue and batailen aȝeins
aspre þinges. or ellys of hem þat eschewen and declinen
fro vices and taken þe weye of vertue. B. It is. ¶ þis ne may
nat I denye quod I P. The vulgar regard that prosperity which is bestowed as a reward on the good to be beneficial, and they believe those calamities by which the wicked are punished as the most miserable things that can be imagined. ¶ But what seist þou of þe myrye 4192
fortune þat is ȝeuen to good folk in gerdoun deuiniþ
ouȝt þe poeples þat it is wicked. nay forsoþe quod I. but
þei demen as it soþe is þat it is ryȝt good. ¶ And what
seist þou of þat oþer fortune quod she. þat al þouȝ it 4196
be aspre and restreiniþ þe shrewes by ryȝtful tourment.
weniþ ouȝt þe poeple þat it be good. nay quod I. ¶ But
þe poeple demiþ þat it be most wrecched of alle þinges
þat may ben þouȝt. But in following the popular opinion, let us beware of being involved in some new and incredible conse­quence. war now and loke wel quod she 4200
lest þat we in folwyng þe opynioun of poeple haue confessed
and concluded þing þat is vnable to be wened to
þe poeple. B. What is that? what is þat quod I P. We have decided that the fortune of the virtuous or of those growing up in virtue must needs be good—but that the fortune of the wicked must be most wretched. ¶ Certys quod she it
folweþ or comeþ of þinges þat ben graunted þat alle 4204
fortune what so euer it be. of hem þat eyþer ben in
possessioun of vertue. [or in the encres of vertu] or ellys
in þe purchasynge of vertue. þat þilke fortune is good.
¶ And þat alle fortune is ryȝt wicked to hem þat 4208
dwellen in shrewednesse. as who seiþ. and þus weneþ
nat þe poeple.

THE FORTUNE OF THE VIRTUOUS IS GOOD.

B. That’s true, though none dare acknowledge it. ¶ þat is soþe quod I. ¶ Al be it so
þat noman dar confessen it ne byknowen it. P. Why so? The wise man ought not to be cast down, when he has to wage war with Fortune, no more than the valiant man ought to be dismayed on hearing the noise of the battle. ¶ whi so
quod she. For ryȝt as no strong man ne semeþ nat to 4212
[* fol. 33.] abassen or disdaignen as *ofte tyme as he hereþ þe noise
of þe bataile. ne also it ne semeþ nat to þe wyse man to
beren it greuously as oft[e] as he is lad in to þe strif of
fortune. The dangers of war enable the one to acquire more glory, and the difficulties of the other aid him to confirm and improve his wisdom. for boþe to þat on man and eke to þat oþer 4216
þilke difficulte is þe matere to þat oon man of encrese
of his glorious renoun. and to þat oþer man to conferme
hys sapience. þat is to seine þe asprenesse of hys estat.

Thus virtue, in its literal acceptation, is a power that, relying on its own strength, overcomes all obstacles. ¶ For þerfore is it called uertue. for þat it susteniþ and 4220
enforceþ by hys strengþes þat it nis nat ouer-comen by
aduersites. You, who have made so much progress in virtue, are not to be carried away by delights and bodily lusts. ¶ Ne certys þou þat art put in þe encrese
or in þe heyȝt of uertue ne hast nat comen to fleten wiþ
delices and forto welken in bodyly lust. You must engage in a fierce conflict with every fortune—with adversity, lest it dismay you—with prosperity, lest it corrupt you. ¶ þou sowest 4224
or plauntest a ful egre bataile in þi corage aȝeins euery
fortune. for þat þe sorweful fortune ne confounde þe nat.
ne þat þe myrye fortune ne corrumpe þe nat. Seize the golden mean with all your strength. All below or above this line is a contemptible and a thankless felicity. ¶ Occupy
þe mene by stedfast strengþes. for al þat euer is vndir 4228
þe mene. or ellys al þat ouer-passeþ þe mene despiseþ
welefulnesses. ¶ As who seiþ. it is vicious and ne haþ
no mede of hys trauaile. The choice of fortune lies in your own hands, but remember that even adverse fortune, unless it exercises the virtues of the good or chastises the wicked, is a punishment. ¶ For it is set in ȝoure hand.
as who seiþ it lieþ in ȝoure power what fortune ȝow is 4232
leuest. þat is to seyne good or yuel. ¶ For alle fortune
þat semeþ sharpe or aspre yif it ne exercise nat þe good
folk. ne chastisiþ þe wicked folk. it punisseþ.

WE CHOOSE OUR OWN FORTUNE.

[The seuende Metur.]

BELLA BIS QUENIS. ET CETERA.

ÞE wrekere Atrides carried on a ten years’ war to punish the licentious Paris. attrides ¶ þat is to seyne agamenon þat 4236
wrouȝt[e] and continued[e] þe batailes by ten ȝere
recouered[e] and purged[e] in wrekyng by þe destruccioun
of troie þe loste chambres of mariage of hys broþer
þis is to seyn þat [he] agamenon wan aȝein Eleine þat 4240
was Menelaus wif his broþer. With blood he purchased propitious gales for the Grecian fleet, by casting off all fatherly pity, and sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia to the vengeance of Diana. In þe mene while þat
þilke agamenon desired[e] to ȝeuen sailes to þe grekysshe
nauye and bouȝt[e] aȝein þe wyndes by blode. he
vncloþed[e] hym of pite as fader. and þe sory prest 4244
ȝiueþ in sacrifiynge þe wreched kuyttyng of þrote of þe
douȝter. ¶ þat is to sein þat agamenon lete kuytten þe
þrote of hys douȝter by þe prest. to maken alliaunce wiþ
hys goddes. and for to haue wynde wiþ whiche he 4248
myȝt[e] wende to troie. Ulysses bewailed his lost mates, devoured by Polyphemus, but, having deprived the Cyclop of his sight, he rejoiced to hear the monster’s roar. ¶ Itakus þat is to sein vlixies
bywept[e] hys felawes ylorn þe whiche felawes þe
fiers[e] pholifemus ligginge in his grete Caue had[de]
freten and dreint in hys empty wombe. but naþeles 4252
polifemus wood for his blinde visage ȝeld to vlixies ioye
by hys sorowful teres. þis is to seyn þat vlixes smot
oute þe eye of poliphemus þat stod in hys forhede.

THE LABOURS OF HERCULES.

for whiche vlixes hadde ioie whan he saw poliphemus 4256
wepyng and blynde. Hercules is renowned for his many labours, so successfully overcome. ¶ Hercules is celebrable for hys
hard[e] trauaile He overthrew the proud Centaurs; he dawntede þe proude Centauris half
hors half man. he slew the Nemean lion and wore his skin as a trophy of his victory; and he rafte þe despoylynge fro þe
cruel lyoun þat is to seyne he slouȝ þe lyoun and 4260
rafte hym hys skyn. he smote the Harpies with his arrows; he smot þe brids þat hyȝten
arpijs [in þe palude of lyrne] wiþ certeyne arwes.
he caried off the golden apples of the Hesperides, and killed the watchful dragon; he rauyssed[e] applis fro þe wakyng dragoun. and
hys hand was þe more heuy for þe golde[ne] 4264
metal. he bound Cerberus with a threefold chain; He drouȝ Cerberus þe hound of helle by
hys treble cheyne. he gave the body of proud Diomede as food for the tyrant’s horses; he ouer-comer as it is seid haþ
put an vnmeke lorde fodre to hys cruel hors ¶ þis is
to sein. þat hercules slouȝ diomedes and made his hors 4268
to etyn hym. he slew the serpent Hydra; and he hercules slouȝ Idra þe serpent and
brend[e] þe venym. he caused Achelous to hide his blushing head within his banks; and achelaus þe flode defouled[e] in
his forhede dreint[e] his shamefast visage in his
strondes. þis is to sein þat achelaus couþe transfigure 4272
hym self in to dyuerse lykenesse. and as he fauȝt wiþ
orcules at þe laste he turnid[e] hym in to a bole and
hercules brak of oon of hys hornes. and achelaus for
shame hidde hym in hys ryuer. he left Antæus dead upon the Lybian shore; ¶ And [he] hercules 4276
[* fol. 33 b.] *cast[e] adoun Antheus þe geaunt in þe strondes of
libye. he appeased Evander’s wrath by killing Cacus; and kacus apaised[e] þe wraþþes of euander. þis
is to sein þat hercules slouȝ þe Monstre kacus and
apaised[e] wiþ þat deeþ þe wraþþe of euander. he slew the Erymanthean boar; ¶ And 4280
þe bristled[e] boor marked[e] wiþ scomes þe sholdres of
hercules. þe whiche sholdres þe heye cercle of heuene
sholde þreste. and bore the weight of Atlas upon his shoulders. and þe laste of his labours was þat he
sustened[e] þe heuene vpon his nekke vnbowed. These labours justly raised him to the rank of a god. and he 4284
deserued[e] eftsones þe heuene to ben þe pris of his
laste trauayle Go then, ye noble souls, and follow the path of this great example. ¶ Goþ now þan ȝe stronge men þere as
þe heye weye of þe grete ensample ledeþ ȝou. ¶ O nice
men whi nake ȝe ȝoure bakkes. as who seiþ. O ye slothful ones, wherefore do ye basely fly! ¶ O ȝe 4288
slowe and delicat men whi fley ȝe aduersites. and ne
fyȝten nat aȝeins hem by vertue to wynnen þe mede of
þe heuene. He who conquers earth doth gain the heavens. for þe erþe ouer-comen ȝeueþ þe sterres.
¶ þis is to seyne þat whan þat erþely lust is ouer-comen. 4292
a man is maked worþi to þe heuene.

EXPLICIT LIBER QUARTUS.

THE EXISTENCE OF CHANCE.

INCIPIT LIBER QUINTUS.

[The fyrste prose.]

DIXERAT ORACIONISQUE CURSUM.

She hadde When Philosophy had thus spoken, and was about to discuss other matters I interrupted her. seid and tourned[e] þe cours of hir resoun to
somme oþer þinges to ben tretid and to ben ysped.
B. Thy exhortation is just and worthy of thy authority, but thou saidst that the question of the Divine Superintendence or Providence is involved with many others—and this I believe. þan seide I. Certys ryȝtful is þin amonestyng and ful 4296
digne by auctorite. but þat þou seidest som tyme þat
þe questioun of þe deuyne purueaunce is enlaced wiþ
many oþer questiouns. I vndir-stonde wel and proue it
by þe same þinge. I am desirous, however, of knowing whether there be such a thing as Chance, and what thou thinkest it is. but I axe yif þat þou wenest þat hap 4300
be any þing in any weys. and if þou wenest þat hap be
any [thing] what is it. P. I hasten to fulfil my promise and to show the road to your own country. þan quod she. I haste me to
ȝelden and assoilen þe to þe dette of my byheste and
to shewen and opnen þe wey by whiche wey þou maist 4304
come aȝein to þi contre. But although these things you question me about are profitable to know, yet they lead us a little out of our way. ¶ but al be it so þat þe þinges
whiche þat þou axest ben ryȝt profitable to knowe.
ȝitte ben þei diuers somwhat fro þe paþe of my purpos.

And by straying from the path you may be too fatigued to return to the right road. And it is to douten þat þou ne be maked weery by 4308
mysweys so þat þou ne mayst nat suffise to mesuren þe
ryȝt weye. B. Don’t be afraid of that, for it will refresh me as much as rest to know these things in which I am delightfully interested. ¶ Ne doute þe þer-of no þing quod I. for
forto knowen þilke þinges to-gidre in þe whiche þinges
I delite me gretly. þat shal ben to me in stede of reste. 4312
Syn it nis nat to douten of þe þinges folwynge whan
euery side of þi disputisoun shal be stedfast to me by
vndoutous feiþ. þan seide she. þat manere wol I don
þe. and bygan to speken ryȝt þus P. I will then comply with thy requests. ¶ Certys quod she 4316
yif any wyȝt diffinisse hap in þis manere. þat is to seyn.

DEFINITION OF CHANCE.

If we define Chance to be an event produced by an unintelligent motion, and not by a chain or connection of causes, I should then affirm that Chance is nothing and an empty sound. þat hap is bytidynge y-brouȝt forþe by foelyshe
moeuynge. and by no knyttyng of causes. ¶ I conferme
þat hap nis ryȝt nauȝt in no wise. and I deme al 4320
outerly þat hap nis ne dwelliþ but a voys. ¶ As who
seiþ. but an ydel worde wiþ outen any significacioun of
þing summittid to þat vois. What room is there for folly and disorder where all things are restrained by order, through the ordinance of God? for what place myȝt[e] ben
left or dwellynge to folie and to disordinaunce. syn þat 4324
god lediþ and streyniþ alle þinges by ordre. For it is a great truth that nothing can spring out of nothing. ¶ For þis
sentence is verray and soþe þat no þinge ne haþ his
beynge of nouȝt. to [the] whiche sentence none of þise
olde folk ne wiþseide neuere al be it so þat þei ne 4328
vndirstoden ne moeueden it nauȝt by god prince and
gynner of wirkyng. but þei casten as a manere foundement
of subgit material. þat is to seyn of [the] nature
of alle resoun. Now, if anything arises without the operation of a cause, it proceeds from nothing. and ȝif þat ony þinge is woxen or comen 4332
of no causes. þan shal it seme þat þilke þinge is comen
or woxen of nouȝt. But if this is impossible, then there can be no such a thing as Chance, as we have defined it. but yif þis ne may nat ben don.
þan is it nat possible þat þere haþ ben any swiche þing
as I haue diffinissid a litel here byforne. B. Is there nothing, then, that may be called Chance or Fortune? ¶ How shal 4336
it þan ben quod I. nis þer þan no þing þat by ryȝt may
be cleped eyþer happe or ellis auenture of fortune. Is there nothing (hid from the vulgar) to which these words may be applied? or is
[* fol. 34.] þer ouȝt al *be it so þat it is hidd fro þe poeple to
whiche þise wordes ben couenable.

P. Aristotle defines this matter with much precision and probability. Myn aristotul quod 4340
she. in þe book of his phisik diffinisseþ þis þing by
short resoun and neyȝe to þe soþe. B. How? ¶ In whiche manere
quod I. P. So often as a man does anything for the sake of any other thing, and another thing than what he intended to do is produced by other causes, that thing so produced is called Chance. ¶ As ofte quod she as men don any þing for
grace of any oþer þing. and an oþer þinge þan þilke 4344
þing þat men ententen to doon bytideþ by som[e] causes
it is ycleped happe. As if a man trench the ground for tillage and find gold, then this is believed to happen by chance, although it is not so. ¶ Ryȝt as a man dalf þe erþe by
cause of tylienge of þe felde. and fond þere a gobet of
golde by-doluen. þan wenen folk þat it is fallen by fortunous 4348
bytydyng. but for soþe it nis nat for nauȝt for
it haþ hys propre causes of whiche causes þe cours vnforseyn
and vnwar semiþ to han maked happe. For if the tiller had not ploughed the field, and if the hider of the gold had not concealed it in that spot, the gold had not been found. ¶ For
yif þe tilier in þe erþe ne delue nat in þe felde. and yif 4352
þe hider of þe golde ne hadde hidd þe golde in þilke
place. þe golde ne had[de] nat ben founde. These, then, are the causes of a fortuitous acquisition which proceeds from a conflux of encountering causes, and not from the intention of the doer. þise ben
þan þe causes of þe abreggynge of fortune hap. þe whiche
abreggynge of fortune hap comeþ of causes encountrynge 4356
and flowyng to-gidre to hem selfe. and nat by þe entencioun
of þe doer. For neither the hider of the gold ¶ For neiþer þe hider of þe gold.

nor the husbandman intended or understood that the gold should be found. ne þe deluer of þe felde ne vndirstanden nat þat þe
golde sholde han be founde. but as I seide. But it happened by the concurrence of these two causes that the one did dig where the other had hidden the money. it bytidde 4360
and ran to-gidre þat he dalf þere as þat oþer hadde hidd
þe golde. Chance, then, is an unexpected event, by a concurrence of causes, following an action designed for a particular purpose. Now may I þus diffinissen happe. ¶ Happe
is an vnwar bytydyng of causes assembled in þinges þat
ben don for som oþer þinge. but þilke ordre procedynge 4364
by an vneschewable byndynge to-gidre. This concurrence of causes proceeds from that order which flows from the fountain of Providence and disposes all things as to place and time. whiche þat
descendeþ fro þe wel of purueaunce þat ordeineþ alle
þinges in hire places and in hire tymes makeþ þat þe
causes rennen and assemblen to-gidre. 4368

[The fyrste Metur.]

RUPIS ACHEMENIE.

TIgris Where the flying Parthian doth pierce his pursuers with his shafts, there from the Achemenian heights flow the Tigris and Euphrates, but soon their streams divide and flow into separate channels. [and] eufrates resoluen and spryngen of a welle in
þe kragges of þe roche of þe contre of achemenye þere
as þe fleenge [batayle] ficchiþ hire dartes retournid in
þe brestes of hem þat folwen hem. ¶ And sone aftre 4372
þe same ryueres tigris and eufrates vnioygnen and departen
hire watres. But should they unite again, in the impetuous stream, boats, ships, and trees would be all intermingled, whirled about; and blind Chance seems to direct the current’s course. and yif þei comen to-gidre and ben
assembled and clepid to-gidre in to o cours. þan moten
þilke þinges fletyn to-gidre whiche þat þe water of þe 4376
entrechaungyng flode bryngeþ þe shippes and þe stokkes
araced wiþ þe flood moten assemble. and þe watres
ymedlyd wrappiþ or implieþ many fortunel happes or
maneres. But the sloping earth, the laws of fluids, govern these things. þe whiche wandryng happes naþeles þilke enclinyng 4380
lowenes of þe erþe. and þe flowynge ordre of
þe slidyng water gouerniþ. So though Chance seems to wander unrestrained, it is nevertheless curbed and restrained by Divine Providence. ¶ Ryȝt so fortune þat
semeþ as [þat] it fletiþ wiþ slaked or vngouerned[e]
bridles. It suffriþ bridles þat is to seyn to ben gouerned 4384
and passeþ by þilke lawe. þat is to sein by þe deuyne
ordinaunce.

ON FREE WILL.

[The .2^de. prose.]

ANIMADUERTO INQUAM.

Þis B. Is there any free-will in this chain of cohering causes? vndirstonde I wel quod I. and accorde wel þat it
is ryȝt as þou seist. but I axe yif þer be any liberte 4388
or fre wil in þis ordre of causes þat cliuen þus to-gidre
in hem self. Or doth the chain of destiny constrain the motions of the human mind? ¶ or ellys I wolde witen yif þat þe
destinal cheine constreiniþ þe moeueuynge of þe corages
of men. P. There is a freedom of the will possessed by every rational being. yis quod she þer is liberte of fre wille. ne þer 4392
ne was neuer no nature of resoun þat it ne hadde liberte
of fre wille. A rational being has judgment to judge of and discern everything. ¶ For euery þing þat may naturely vsen
resoun. it haþ doom by whiche it discerniþ and demiþ
euery þing. Of himself he knows what he is to avoid or to desire. He seeks what he judges desirable, and he shuns what he deems should be avoided. ¶ þan knoweþ it by it self þinges þat ben 4396
to fleen. and þinges þat ben to desiren. and þilk þing
þat any wyȝt demeþ to ben desired þat axeþ or desireþ
he and fleeþ [thilke] þing þat he troueþ ben to fleen.

PROVIDENCE SEES ALL THINGS.

A rational being possesses, then, the liberty of choosing and rejecting. ¶ wher-fore in alle þinges þat resoun is. in hem also is 4400
libertee of willyng and of nillynge. This liberty is not equal in all beings. ¶ But I ne ordeyne
nat. as who seiþ. I ne graunte nat þat þis libertee be
euene like in alle þinges. In heavenly substances, as spirits, &c., judgment is clear, and the will is incorruptible, and has a ready and efficacious power of doing things which are desired. forwhi in þe souereyns deuynes
substaunces. [* fol. 34 b.] þat is to *seyn in spiritȝ ¶ Iugement is 4404
more clere and wil nat be corumped. and haþ myȝt
redy to speden þinges þat ben desired. The souls of men must needs be more free when employed in the contemplation of the Divine Mind, and less so when they enter into a body, and still less free when enclosed and confined in earthly members; but the most extreme servitude is when they are given over to vice and wholly fallen from their proper reason. ¶ But þe soules
of men moten nedes ben more free whan þei loken hem
in þe speculacioun or lokynge of þe deuyne þouȝt. and 4408
lasse free whan þei sliden in to þe bodies. and ȝit lasse
free whan þei ben gadred to-gidre and comprehendid in
erþely membris. but þe last[e] seruage is whan þat þei
ben ȝeuen to vices. and han yfalle fro þe possessioun of 4412
hire propre resoun For at once they are enveloped by the cloud of ignorance and are troubled by pernicious desires, by yielding to which they aid and increase that slavery which they brought upon themselves, and thus even under the liberty proper to them, they remain captives. ¶ For after þat þei han cast aweye
hir eyen fro þe lyȝt of þe souereyn soþefastnesse to lowe
þinges and dirke ¶ Anon þei dirken by þe cloude of
ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talentȝ. to þe 4416
whiche talentȝ whan þei approchen and assenten. þei
hepen and encresen þe seruage whiche þei han ioigned
to hem self. and in þis manere þei ben caitifs fro hire
propre libertee. Yet the eye of Providence, beholding all things from eternity, sees all this and disposes according to their merit all things as they are predestinated. þe whiche þinges naþeles þe lokynge of 4420
þe deuyne purueaunce seeþ þat alle þinges byholdeþ
and seeþ fro eterne. and ordeyneþ hem eueryche in her
merites. as þei ben prodestinat. He, as Homer says of the sun, sees and hears all things. and it is seid in grek.
þat alle þinges he seeþ and alle þinges he hereþ. 4424

GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE AND MAN’S FREE WILL.

[The .2^de. Metur.]

PURO CLARUM LUMINE.

HOmer wiþ þe The sweet-tongued Homer sings of the sun’s pure light. Yet the sun’s beams cannot pierce into the inner bowels of the earth, nor into the depths of the sea. hony mouþe. þat is to seyn. homer
wiþ þe swete dites syngeþ þat þe sonne is cleer by
pure lyȝt. naþeles ȝit ne may it nat by þe inferme lyȝt
of hys bemes breken or percen þe inwarde entrailes of 4428
þe erþe. or ellys of þe see. But God, the world’s maker, beholding from on high, has his vision impeded neither by earth nor cloud. ¶ so ne seeþ nat god makere
of þe grete worlde to hym þat lokeþ alle þinges from on
heye ne wiþstandiþ nat no þinges by heuynesses of erþe.
ne þe nyȝt ne wiþstondeþ nat to hym by þe blake 4432
cloudes. At a glance he sees all events, present, past, and future. ¶ þilke god seeþ in o strook of þouȝt alle
þinges þat ben or weren or schullen come. God, then, that alone sees all things, may indeed be called the true Sun. ¶ and þilke
god for he lokeþ and seeþ alle þinges al oon. þou maist
seyn þat he is þe verray sonne. 4436

[The .3^de. prose.]

TAMEN EGO EN INQUAM.

ÞAn seide I B. I am distracted by a more difficult doubt than ever. now am I confounded by a more harde
doute þan I was. what doute is þat quod she.
¶ For certys I coniecte now by whiche þinges þou art
troubled. God’s foreknowledge seems to me inconsistent with man’s free-will. It semeþ quod I to repugnen and to contrarien 4440
gretly þat god knoweþ byforn alle þinges. and
þat þer is any fredom of liberte. For if God foresees all things, and cannot be deceived, then that which Providence hath foreseen must needs happen. for yif so be þat god
lokeþ alle þinges byforn. ne god ne may nat ben
desseiuid in no manere. þan mot it nedes ben þat alle 4444
þinges bytyden þe whiche þat þe purueaunce of god haþ
sein byforn to comen. If God from eternity doth foreknow not only the works, but the designs and wills of men, there can be no liberty of will—nor can there be any other action or will than that which a Divine and infallible Providence hath foreseen. ¶ For whiche yif þat god
knoweþ by-forn nat oonly þe werkes of men. but also
hir conseils and hir willes. þan ne shal þer be no 4448
liberte of arbitre. ne certys þer ne may ben noon oþer
dede ne no wille but þilke whiche þe deuyne purueaunce
þat ne may nat ben desseiued haþ feled byforn For if things fall out contrary to such foreseeing, and are wrested another way, the prescience of God in regard to futurity would not be sure and unerring—it would be nothing but an uncertain opinion of them: but I take it to be impious and unlawful to believe this of God. ¶ For
yif þat þei myȝten wryþen awey in oþer manere þan þei 4452
ben purueyed. þan ne sholde þer ben no stedfast prescience
of þinge to comen but raþer an vncerteyn
oppinioun. þe whiche þinge to trowen on god I deme it
felonie and vnleueful. Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some. For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be hid from the divine Providence. ¶ Ne I ne proeue nat þilk 4456
same resoun. as who seiþ I ne allowe nat. or I ne preise
nat þilke same resoun by whiche þat som men wenen
þat þei mowen assoilen and vnknytten þe knot of þis
questioun. ¶ For certys þei seyn þat þing nis nat to 4460
come for þat þe purueaunce of god haþ seyn it byforne.
þat is to comen but raþer þe contrarie. ¶ And þat
is þis þat for þat þe þing is to comen þat þerfore
ne may it nat ben hyd fro þe purueaunce of god. 4464
[* fol. 35.] Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides. For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall should be foreseen. *and in þis manere þis necessite slydiþ aȝein in to þe
contrarie partie. ne it ne byhoueþ [nat] nedes þat þinges
bytiden þat ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes /
þat thinges þat ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it 4468
were ytrauailed. As if the question was, which was the cause of the other—prescience the cause of the necessity of future events, or the necessity the cause of the prescience of future events? as who seiþ. þat þilke answere procediþ
ryȝt as þouȝ men trauailden or weren bysy to
enqueren þe whiche þing is cause of whiche þinges. as
wheþer þe prescience is cause of þe necessite of þinges to 4472
comen. or ellys þat þe necessite of þinges to comen is
cause of þe purueaunce. But I will prove that, however the order of causes may stand, the event of things foreseen is necessary, although prescience doth not seem to impose a necessity upon future things to fall out. ¶ But I ne enforce me nat now
to shewen it þat þe bytidyng of þinges y-wist byforn is
necessarie. how so or in what manere þat þe ordre of 4476
causes haþ it self. al þouȝ þat it ne seme nat þat þe
prescience brynge in necessite of bytydynge of þinges
to comen. For if a man sit—the belief in the sitting is true; and, on the other hand, if the opinion is true of his sitting, he must needs sit. ¶ For certys yif þat any wyȝt sitteþ it byhoueþ
by necessite þat þe oppinioun be soþe of hym 4480
þat coniectiþ þat he sitteþ. and aȝeinward. al so is it of
þe contrarie. yif þe oppinioun be soþe of any wyȝt for
þat he sitteþ it byhoueþ by necessite þat he sitte In both cases there is a necessity—in the latter that the person sits—in the former, that the opinion concerning the other is true. ¶ þan
is here necessite in þat oon and in þat oþer. for in þat 4484
oon is necessite of sittynge. But the man does not sit because the opinion of his sitting is true, but the opinion is true because the action of his being seated was antecedent in time. and certys in þat oþer is
necessite of soþe but þerfore ne sitteþ nat a wyȝt for þat
þe oppinioun of sittyng is soþe. but þe oppinioun is
raþer soþe for þat a wyȝt sitteþ by-forn. So that although the cause of truth arises from the sitting, there is a common necessity in both. and þus al 4488
þouȝ þat þe cause of soþe comeþ of [þe] syttyng. and
nat of þe trewe oppinioun. Algates ȝitte is þer comune
necessite in þat oon and in þat oþer. Thus may we reason concerning Providence and future events. ¶ þus sheweþ it
þat I may make semblable skils of þe purueaunce of god 4492
and of þinges to come. For allowing things are foreseen because they are to happen, and that they do not befall because they are foreseen, it is necessary that future events should be foreseen of God, or if foreseen that they should happen; and this alone is sufficient to destroy all idea of free-will. ¶ For al þouȝ for þat þat þinges
ben to comen. þer-fore ben þei purueid. nat certys for
þei ben purueid. þer-fore ne bytide þei nat. ȝit naþeles
byhoueþ it by necessite þat eiþer þe þinges to comen 4496
ben ypurueied of god. or ellys þat þe þinges þat ben
purueied of god bitiden [.s.] by necessite. ¶ And þis
þing oonly suffiseþ I-nouȝ to distroien þe fredome of
oure arbitre. þat is to seyn of oure fre wille But it is preposterous to make the happening of temporal things the cause of eternal prescience, which we do in imagining that God foresees future events because they are to happen. ¶ But now 4500
[certes] sheweþ it wel how fer fro þe soþe and how vp
so doun is þis þing þat we seyn þat þe bytidinge of
temporel þinges is þe cause of þe eterne prescience.
¶ But forto wenen þat god purueiþ [the] þinges to comen. 4504
for þei ben to comen. what oþer þing is it but forto
wene þat þilke þinges þat bitiden som tyme ben causes
of þilke souereyne purueaunce þat is in god. And, moreover, when I know that anything exists, it is necessary for my belief that it should be. ¶ And
her-to I adde ȝitte þis þing þat ryȝt as whan þat I woot 4508
þat o þing is it byhoueþ by necessite þat þilke self þing
be. So also when I know that an event shall come to pass, it must needs happen. and eke þat whan I haue knowe þat any þinge shal
bitiden so byhoueþ it by necessite þat þilk[e] same
þing bytide. The event, therefore, of a thing foreseen must befall. so folweþ it þan þat þe bytydynge of þe 4512
þinge Iwist by-forn ne may nat ben eschewed. Lastly, if a person judge a thing to be different to what it is—this is not knowledge, but a false opinion of it, and far from the true knowledge. ¶ And
at þe last[e] yif þat any wyȝt wene a þing to ben oþer
weyes þan it is. it nys nat oonly vnscience. but it is deceiuable
oppinioun ful diuerse and fer fro þe soþe of 4516
science. If, therefore, a thing be so to happen that the event of it is neither necessary nor certain, how can any one foresee what is to happen? ¶ wher-fore yif any þing be so to comen so þat
þe bytydynge of it ne be nat certeyne ne necessarie.
¶ who may weten [byforn] þat þilke þing is to come.

FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL.

For as pure knowledge has no element in it of falsehood, so what is comprehended by true knowledge cannot be otherwise than as comprehended. ¶ For ryȝt as science ne may nat be medelyd wiþ falsnesse. 4520
as who seiþ þat yif I woot a þing. it ne may nat
be fals þat I ne woot it. ¶ Ryȝt so þilk þing þat
is conceyued by science ne may [nat] ben noon
oþer weyes þan [as] it is conceiued. Hence it is that true knowledge cannot err, because everything must precisely be what true knowledge perceives it to be. For þat is þe cause 4524
whi þat science wantiþ lesynge. as who seiþ. whi þat
witynge ne receyueþ nat lesynge of þat it woot. ¶ For
it byhoueþ by necessite þat euery þinge [be] ryȝt as science
comprehendiþ it to be. What follows, then? How does God foreknow these uncertain contingencies? what shal I þan sein. ¶ In 4528
whiche manere knoweþ god byforn þe þinges to comen.
¶ yif þei ne be nat certeyne. For if he thinks that a thing will inevitably happen, which possibly may not, he is deceived—but this is sheer blasphemy. ¶ For yif þat he deme
þat þei ben to comen vneschewably. and so may be þat
[* fol. 35 b.] it is possible þat þei ne shullen *nat comen. god is 4532
desseiued. but nat only to trowen þat god is desseiued.
but for to speke it wiþ mouþe it is a felonous synne.
But if God discerns that just as things are to come they shall come; if he knows that they may or may not come, what sort of prescience is this, which comprehends nothing certain, nothing invariable? ¶ But yif þat god woot þat ryȝt so as þinges ben to
comen. so shulle þei comen. so þat he wit[e] egaly. as 4536
who seiþ indifferently þat þinges mowen ben don or
ellys nat don. what is þilke prescience þat ne comprehendiþ
no certeyne þinge ne stable. Or how does divine prescience differ from human opinion, if He hath an uncertain judgment of things, whereof the events are uncertain and unfixed? or ellys what difference
is þer bytwixe þe prescience. and þilke iape-worþi 4540
dyuynynge of Tiresie þe diuinour þat seide. ¶ Al þat
I seie quod he eyþer it shal be. or ellys it ne shal nat
be. Or ellis how moche is worþe þe diuyne prescience
more þan þe oppinioun of mankynde yif so be þat it 4544
demeþ þe þinges vncerteyne as men don. of þe whiche
domes of men þe bytydynge nis nat certeyne. But if there can be no uncertainty in his knowledge, who is the source of all certainty; the event of all things which he foreknows must be fixed and inevitable. ¶ But
yif so be þat noon vncerteyne þinge may ben in hym
þat is ryȝt certeyne welle of alle þinges. þan is þe 4548
bytydynge certeyne of þilke þinges whiche he haþ wist
byforn fermely to comen. Whence it follows that men have no freedom in their designs and actions; because the Divine Mind, endowed with an infallible foresight, constrains and binds them to a certain event. For whiche it folweþ þat þe
fredom of þe conseils and of þe werkes of mankynde nis
non syn þat þe þouȝt of god seeþ alle þinges with outen 4552
errour of falsnesse byndeþ and constreiniþ hem to a
bitidynge by necessite. and yif [this] þing be on-is
grauntid and receyued. þat is to seyn. þat þer nis no
fre wille. þan sheweþ it wel how gret distruccioun and 4556
how grete damages þer folwen of þinges of mankynde.

FATE UNDER THE CONTROL OF PROVIDENCE.

¶ For in ydel ben þer þan purposed and byhyȝt medes
of goode folk. and peynes to badde folk. syn þat no
moeuynge of free corage uoluntarie ne haþ nat deserued 4560
hem. þat is to seyn neiþer mede nor peyne. Rewards and punishments now deemed just and equitable, will be considered most unjust, when, it is allowed, that mankind are not prompted by any will of their own, to either virtue or vice, but in all their actions are impelled by a fatal necessity. ¶ And it
sholde seme þan þat þilke þinge is alþer worste whiche
þat is nowe demed. for alþer moste iuste and moste
ryȝtful. þat is to seyn þat shrewes ben punyssed. or 4564
ellys þat good[e] folk ben ygerdoned. þe whiche folk
syn þat þe propre wille [ne] sent hem nat to þat oon ne
to þat oþer. þat is to seyn. neþer to good[e] ne to
harme. but constreineþ hem certeyne necessite of þinges 4568
to comen. Nor would there be such things as virtue or vice, but such a medley of the one and the other as would be productive of the greatest confusion. ¶ þanne ne shollen þer neuer ben ne neuer
weren vice ne vertue. but it sholde raþer ben confusioun
of alle desertes medlid wiþoute discresioun. ¶ And
ȝitte þer folweþ an oþer inconuenient of þe whiche þer 4572
ne may ben þouȝt ne more felonous ne more wikke. And from this it will follow—that since all order comes of Divine Providence, and that there is no freedom of the human will, that also our vices must be referred to the author of all good—which is a most impious opinion. and
þat is þis þat so as þe ordre of þinges is yledd and
comeþ of þe purueaunce of god. ne þat no þing nis
leueful to þe conseils of mankynde. as who seiþ þat 4576
men han no power to done no þing. ne wilne no þing.
þan folweþ it þat oure vices ben refferred to þe mak[er]e
of alle good. as who seiþ þan folweþ it. þat god auȝt[e]
han þe blame of oure vices. syn he constreiniþ by 4580
necessite to don vices. Then is it useless to hope for anything from God, or to pray to him. þan nis þer no resoun to han
hopen in god. ne forto preien to god. For why should men do either, when all they can desire is irreversibly predestined? ¶ For what
sholde any wyȝt hopen to god. or whi sholde he preien
to god. syn þat þe ordenaunce of destine whiche þat ne 4584
may nat ben enclined. knytteþ and streiniþ alle þinges
þat men may desiren. Hope and prayer being thus ineffectual, all intercourse is cut off between God and man. ¶ þan sholde þere be don awey
þilke oonly alliaunce bytwixen god and men. þat is to
seien to hopen and to preien. By reverent and humble supplication we earn divine grace, a most inestimable favour, and are able to associate with the Deity, and to unite ourselves to the inaccessible light. but by þe preis of ryȝtfulnesse 4588
and of veray mekenesse we deserue þe gerdoun
of þe deuyne grace whiche þat is inestimable. þat is to
sein þat it is so grete þat it ne may nat ben ful ypreised.
and þis is oonly þe manere. þat is to seyen hope and 4592
prayeres. for whiche it semeþ þat [men] mowen speken
wiþ god. and by resoun of supplicacioun ben conioigned
to þilk clernesse þat nis nat approched no raþer or
þat men byseken it and emprenten it. If men believe that hope and prayer have no power because of the necessity of future events, by what other way can we be united, and hold fast to the sovereign Lord of all things? And yif men 4596
ne wene [nat] þat [hope] ne preiers ne han no strengþes.
by þe necessite of þinges to comen y-resceiued. what
þing is þer þan by whiche we mowen be conioygned
and clyuen to þilke souereyne prince of þinges. Wherefore mankind must be dissevered and disunited from the source of its existence, and shrink from its beginning. ¶ For 4600
whiche it byhoueþ by necessite þat þe lynage of mankynde
[* fol. 36.] as *þou songe a litel here byforne ben departed
and vnioyned from hys welle and faylen of hys bygynnynge.
þat is to seien god. 4604