THE UNKNOWN CANNOT BE DESIRED.

QUE NAM DISCORS

What Say what discordant cause looses the bonds of things? discordable cause haþ to-rent and vnioigned þe
byndyng or þe alliaunce of þinges. þat is to seyne
þe coniunccioun of god and of man. What power doth make these two great truths (i. e. Providence and Free-will) contend, which when separate are plain and clear, but united appear dark and perplexed? ¶ whiche god
haþ establissed so grete bataile bitwixen þise two soþefast 4608
or verray þinges. þat is to sein bytwixen þe purueaunce
of god and fre wille. þat þei ben synguler and
diuided. ne þat þei ne wolen nat ben medeled ne
coupled to-gidre. but þer nis no discorde to [tho] verray 4612
þinges. but þei cleuen certeyne al wey to hem self. The mind of man encumbered by the earthly body, can never, with her cloudy sight, discover the subtle and close bonds of things. but
þe þouȝt of man confounded and ouerþrowen by þe dirke
membris of þe body ne may nat by fir of his dirk[ed]
lokynge. þat is to seyn by þe vigour of hys insyȝt while 4616
þe soule is in þe body knowen þe þinne subtil knyttynges
of þinges. But why does man burn with ardour to learn the hidden notes of truth? ¶ But wherfore eschaufiþ it so by so
grete loue to fynden þilke note[s] of soþe y-couered. (glosa)
þat is to sein wherfore eschaufiþ þe þouȝt of man by so 4620
grete desir to knowen þilke notificaciouns þat ben yhidd
vndir þe couertours of soþe. Why gropes he for he knows not what? None seek to know what is known. woot it ouȝt þilke þinges
þat it anguissous desireþ to knowe. as who seiþ nay.
¶ For no man ne trauaileþ forto witen þinges þat he woot. 4624
and þerfore þe texte seiþ þus. ¶ [Glosa] Si enim anima
ignorat istas subtiles connexiones. responde. vnde est
quod desiderat scire cum nil ignotum possit desiderare.
¶ But who traua[i]leþ to wyten þinges y-knowe. If he knows them not, what does he so blindly seek? and yif 4628
þat he ne knoweþ hem nat. what sekiþ þilke blynde
þouȝt. Who wishes for things he hath never known? what is he þat desireþ any þinge of whiche he
woot ryȝt nat. as who seiþ who so desiriþ any þing
nedis som what he knoweþ of it. or ellys he ne couþe 4632
nat desire it. or who may folwen þinges þat ne ben nat
ywist Or if he seek, where shall he find them? Or if he find, how shall he be sure that he has found what he sought for? ¶ and þouȝ [þat] he seke þo þinges where shal
he fynden hem. what wyȝt þat is al vnknowynge and
ignoraunt may knowe þe forme þat is yfounde. The pure soul that sees the divine thought, knows all the secret chains of things. ¶ But 4636
whan þe soule byholdeþ and seeþ þe heye þouȝt. þat is
to seyn god. þan knoweþ it to-gidre þe somme and þe
singularites. þat is to seyn þe principles and eueryche
by hym self. Yet, though now hidden in its fleshly members, it hath some remembrance of its pure state—it retains the sums of things, but has lost their particulars. ¶ But now while þe soule is hidd in þe 4640
cloude and in þe derknesse of þe membris of þe body.
it ne haþ nat al forȝeten it selfe. but it wiþholdeþ þe
somme of þinges and lesiþ þe singularites. He who seeks truth is not in either circumstance (i. e. seeking for what he knows or knows not), he knoweth not all things, nor hath he wholly forgotten all. þan who so
þat sekeþ soþenesse. he nis in neiþer nouþir habit. for 4644
he not nat alle ne he ne haþ nat alle for-ȝeten. But he ponders on what he knows, that he may add those things that he hath forgotten to those that he retains. ¶ But
ȝitte hym remembriþ þe somme of þinges þat he wiþholdeþ
and axeþ counseil and tretiþ depelyche þinges
ysein byforne. [Glosa] þat is to sein þe grete somme in 4648
hys mynde. [textus] so þat he mowe adden þe parties
þat he haþ forȝeten. to þilke þat he haþ wiþholden.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS AGAINST PROVIDENCE.

TAMEN ILLA UETUS INQUIT HEC EST.

Þanne seide P. This is the old objection against Providence, so ably handled by Cicero in his Book of Divination; and you yourself have anxiously discussed it. she. þis is quod she þe olde questioun of
þe purueaunce of god. and marcus tulius whan he 4652
deuided[e] þe deuinaciouns. þat is to sein in hys booke
þat he wroot of deuinaciouns. he moeued[e] gretly þis
questioun. and þou þi self hast souȝt it mochel and
outerly and long[e]. But neither of you have offered a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. but ȝit ne haþ it nat ben determined 4656
ne yspedd fermely and diligently of any of yow.
The cause of this mystery is that the human understanding cannot conceive the simplicity of the divine prescience, for if it were possible to comprehend this, every difficulty would at once disappear. ¶ And þe cause of þis derkenesse and [of this] difficulte
is for þat þe moeuynge of þe resoun of mankynde ne
may nat moeuen to. þat is to sein applien or ioygnen to 4660
þe simplicite of þe deuyne prescience. ¶ þe whiche
symplicite of þe deuyne prescience ȝif þat men [myhten
thinken it in any manere / þat is to seyn / þat yif men] myȝte
þinken and comprehenden þe þinges as god seeþ hem. 4664
þan ne sholde þer dwellen outerly no doute. I shall, therefore, try to explain and solve this difficult question. þe whiche
resoun and cause of difficulte I shal assaie at þe laste
to shewen and to speden. [* fol. 36 b.] ¶ whan I haue *firste
[yspendyd / and] ansewered to þo resouns by whiche þou 4668
art ymoeued. I ask, then, why you do not approve the reasoning of such as think—that Prescience does not obstruct the liberty of the will, because it is not the necessitating cause of future events? ¶ For I axe whi þou wenest þat þilk[e]
resouns of hem þat assoilen þis questioun ne ben nat
spedeful ynouȝ ne sufficient þe whiche solucioun or þe
whiche resoun for þat it demiþ þat þe prescience nis nat 4672
cause of necessite to þinges to comen. þan ne weneþ it
nat þat fredom of wille be distourbed or ylett by prescience.

NECESSITY AND PRESCIENCE.

Do you draw an argument of the necessity of future events, from any other topic than this,—that those things which are foreknown must of necessity happen? for ne drawest þou nat argumentes from ellys
where of þe necessite of þinges to comen. As who seiþ 4676
any oþer wey þan þus. but þat þilke þinge[s] þat þe prescience
woot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. þat is to
seyn þat þei moten bitide. If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man’s will free and unconstrained? ¶ But þan yif þat prescience
ne putteþ no necessite to þinges to comen. as þou þi self 4680
hast confessed it and byknowen a litel herbyforne. ¶ what
cause [or what] is it. as who seiþ þere may no cause be.
by whiche þat þe endes (exitus) uoluntarie of þinges
myȝten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng. For argument sake let us suppose there is no prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will alone be under the power of necessity? ¶ For 4684
by grace of possessioun. so þat þou mowe þe better vndirstonde
þis þat folweþ. ¶ I pose (inpossibile) þat
þer ne be no prescience. þan axe I quod she in as
moche as apperteniþ to þat. sholde þan þinges þat 4688
comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden by
necessite. B. No. Boicius. nay quod I. P. Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will would still remain entire and absolute. þan aȝeinward quod
she. I suppose þat þere be prescience but þat ne putteþ
no necessite to þinges. þan trowe I þat þilk self fredom 4692
of wille shal dwellen al hool and absolut and vnbounden.
But although Prescience, you may say, is not the necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable necessity. but þou wolt sein þat al be it so þat prescience
nis nat cause of þe necessite of bitidynge to þinges to
comen. ¶ Algates ȝitte it is a signe þat þe þinges ben 4696
to bytiden by necessite. by þis manere þan al þouȝ þe
prescience ne hadde neuer yben. ȝit algate or at þe
lest[e] wey. it is certeyne þing þat þe endys and þe
bitydynges of þinges to comen sholde ben necessarie. 4700

For the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself, but only points out what the individual is. ¶ For euery sygne sheweþ and signifieþ oonly what þe
þing is ¶ but it ne makiþ nat þe þing þat it signifieþ.
Wherefore, it must be first proved that everything happens by necessity before we can conclude that prescience is a sign of that necessity. ¶ For whiche it byhoueþ firste to shewen þat no þing
ne bitidiþ [þat it ne bytydith] by necessite. so þat it 4704
may apere þat þe prescience is signe of þis necessite
For if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the sign of that which has no existence. ¶ or ellys yif þere nere no necessite. certys þilke prescience
ne myȝt[e] nat ben signe of þinge þat nis nat.

NOT ALL THINGS CONTROLLED BY NECESSITY.

The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity, must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign causes. ¶ But certys it is nowe certeyne þat þe preue of þis 4708
susteniþ by stedfast resoun ne shal nat ben ladd ne
proued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wiþ oute.
but by causes couenable and necessarie ¶ But þou
mayst sein how may it be þat þe þinges ne bitiden nat 4712
þat ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ryȝt as we
trowen þat þo þinges whiche þat þe purueaunce woot byforn
to comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [þat] ne sholde
we nat demen. but raþer al þouȝ [þat] þei schal bitiden. 4716
ȝit ne haue þei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden.
and þis maist þou lyȝtly aperceyuen by þis þat I shal
seyn. We see many things when they are done before our eyes; such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like nature. but we seen many þinges whan þei ben don byforn
oure eyen ryȝt as men seen þe karter worken in þe 4720
tournynge and in attempryng or in adressyng of hys
kartes or chariottes. ¶ and by þis manere as who seiþ
mayst þou vnderstonde of alle manere oþir werkemen.
Now, is there any necessity which compels these things to be done? ¶ Is þere þanne any necessite as who seiþ in oure lokynge 4724
[þat] constreineþ or compelliþ any of þilke þinges
to ben don so. B. No. For if all things were moved by compulsion—the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless. b. nay quod I ¶ For in ydel and in
veyne were alle þe effect of crafte yif þat alle þinges
weren moeued by constreynynge. þat is to seyn by constreynynge 4728
of oure eyen or of oure syȝt. P. The things, then, which are done are under no necessity that they should be done; then first before they were done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by necessity. P. þise þingus
þan quod she þat whan men don hem ne han non
necessite þat men don hem. eke þo same þinges first or
þei be don. þei ben to comen wiþ out necessite. for whi 4732
þer ben somme þinges to bytide of whiche þe endys
[* fol. 37.] and þe bitidynges of hem ben absolut *and quit of alle
necessite. These things therefore, although foreknown, have free events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to come. for certys I ne trowe nat þat any man wolde seyn
þis. þat þo þinges þat men don now þat þei ne weren 4736
to bitiden. first or þei were ydon ¶ and þilk same
þinges al þouȝ þat men hadden ywyst hem by-forn.
ȝitte þei han fre bitidynges. for ryȝt as science of
þinges present ne bryngeþ in no necessite to þinges 4740
[þat men doon // Ryht so the prescience of thinges to
comen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytiden
But you may doubt whether there can be any certain prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for here there seems to be an evident contradiction. but þou mayst seyn þat of þilke same it is ydouted. as
wheþer þat of þilke þinges þat ne han non endes and 4744
bytidynges necessaryes yif þer-of may ben any prescience

THE NATURE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE.

If things are foreknown, you may contend they must necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing but what is absolutely certain. ¶ For certys þei seme to discorde. for þou
wenest þat yif þat þinges ben yseyn byforn þat necessite
folweþ hem. and yif (et putas) necessite faileþ hem þei ne 4748
myȝten nat ben wist byforn. and þat no þinge ne may
ben comprehendid by science but certeyne. And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion. and yif þo
þinges þat ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueied
as certeyn. For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of things otherwise than they really are. it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppinioun nat 4752
soþefastnesse of science [and þou weenyst þat it be diuerse
fro the hoolnesse of science / þat any man sholde deme
a thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self]. The cause of this error is that men imagine that their knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known, whereas it is quite the reverse. and þe
cause of þis errour is. þat of alle þe þinges þat euery 4756
wyȝt haþ yknowe. þei wenen þat þo þinges ben y-knowe
al oonly by þe strengþe and by þe nature of þe þinges
þat ben ywyst or yknowe. and it is al þe contrarie. for
alle þat euere is yknowe. Things are not known from their inherent properties, but by the faculties of the observer. it is raþer comprehendid and 4760
yknowen nat after his strengeþ and hys nature. but after
þe faculte þat is to seyn þe power and [the] nature of
hem þat knowen. The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way, and the touch in another. and for þat þis shal mowe shewen by
a short ensample þe same roundenes of a body .O. oþer 4764
weyes þe syȝt of þe eye knoweþ it. and oþer weyes þe
touching. The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and by beholding it comprehends its form. þe lokynge by castynge of his bemes waiteþ
and seeþ fro afer alle þe body to-gider wiþ oute mouynge
of it self. But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round. but þe touchinge cliuiþ and conioigneþ to þe 4768
rounde body (orbi) and moueþ abouten þe environynge.
and comprehendiþ by parties þe roundenesse.

SENSE, REASON, AND INTELLIGENCE.

Man himself is surveyed in divers ways—by the senses, by the imagination, by reason, and by the intelligence (of the Deity). ¶ and þe man hym self oþer weies wyt byholdiþ hym. and
oþerweyes ymaginacioun and oþer weyes resoun. and 4772
oþer weyes intelligence. The senses take note of his material figure—the imagination considers the form alone, exclusive of the matter. ¶ For þe wit comprehendiþ
fro wiþ outen furþe þe figure of þe body of þe man. þat
is establissed in þe matere subiect. But þe ymaginacioun
[comprehendith only the figure with owte the matere / 4776

Reason transcends the imaginations, and examining existences in general discovers the particular species, but the eye of Intelligence soars still higher; for, going beyond the bounds of what is general, it surveys the simple forms themselves, by its own pure and subtle thought: Resoun surmounteth ymaginacioun] and comprehendeþ
by an vniuersel lokynge þe commune spece (speciem)
þat is in þe singuler peces. ¶ But þe eye of intelligence
is heyȝer for it sourmounteþ þe envirounynge of þe 4780
vniuersite and lookeþ ouer þat by pure subtilite of þouȝt.

in which this is chiefly to be considered, that the higher power of perception embraces the lower; but the inferior cannot attain to the energy of the superior: þilk same symple forme of man þat is perdurably in þe
deuyne þouȝt. in whiche þis auȝt[e] gretely to ben considered
þat þe heyest strengþe to comprehenden þinges 4784
enbraceþ and conteyneþ þe lower[e] strengþe [but the
lowere strengthe ne arysith nat in no manere to heyere
strengthe]. for the senses cannot go beyond the perception of matter; the imagination cannot comprehend existences in general, nor can the reason conceive the simple form. for wit ne may no þinge comprehende oute of
matere. ne þe ymagynacioun ne lokeþ nat þe vniuerseles 4788
speces. ne resoun ne takeþ nat þe symple forme. so as
intelligence takeþ it. But the Intelligence looking down (as from above) and having conceived the form, discerns all things that are below it, and comprehends what does not fall within the reach of the other faculties of the mind. but þe intelligence þat lokeþ al
abouen whan it haþ comprehendid þe forme it knoweþ
and demeþ alle þe þinges þat ben vndir þat forme. but 4792
she knoweþ hem vndir þilke manere in þe whiche it
comprehendiþ þilke same symple forme þat ne may
neuer be knowen to non of þat oþer. þat is to seyn to
non of þo þre forseide strengþes of þe soule. Without the aid of those faculties Intelligence comprehends things formally (i. e. by beholding their simple forms) by one effort of mind. for it 4796
knoweþ þe vniuersite of resoun and þe figure of þe ymaginacioun.
and þe sensible material conseiued. and þou
wenest þat it be diuerse fro þe hoolnesse of science. þat
any man sholde deme a þing to ben oþerweyes þan it is 4800
it self and þe cause of þis errour etc’. vt supra. by wit.
Reason, without the aid of Imagination and Sense, in considering things in general, comprehends all imaginable and sensible things. ne it ne vseþ nat nor of resoun ne of ymaginacioun ne
of wit wiþ oute forþe but it byholdeþ alle þinges so as I
shal seye. by a strok of þouȝt formely wiþ oute discours 4804
or collacioun ¶ Certys resoun whan it lokeþ any þing
vniuersel it ne vseþ nat of ymaginacioun nor of wit and
algates ȝit [it] comprendiþ þe þinges ymaginable and
sensible. For instance, reason defines her general conceptions thus:— [* fol. 37 b.] for resoun is she þat *diffinisseþ þe vniuersel 4808
of hir conseite ryȝt þus. Man is a rational two-footed animal, which, though it be a general idea, yet every one knows that man thus defined is perceived both by the imagination and the senses, notwithstanding that in this instance reason does not make use of imagination or the senses, but of her own rational conception. ¶ Man is a resonable t[w]o-footid
beest. and how so þat þis knowynge [is] vniuersel.
ȝit nys þer no wyȝt þat ne woot wel. þat a man is [a thing]
ymaginable and sensible ¶ and þis same considereþ wel 4812
resoun. but þat nis nat by ymaginacioun. nor by witte.
but it lokiþ it by [a] resonable concepcioun.

The imagination also, although it derives its power of seeing and forming figures from the senses, yet in the absence and without the use of the senses it considers and comprehends all sensible things by its own imaginative power. ¶ Also ymaginacioun
al be it so. þat it takeþ of wit þe bygynyngus
to seen and to formen þe figures. algates al þouȝ þat wit 4816
ne ware not present. ȝit it envirouniþ and comprehendiþ
alle þinges sensible. nat by resoun sensible of demynge.
but by resoun ymaginatif. Do not you see that men attain to the knowledge of things more by their own faculties, than by the inherent property of things? ¶ sest þou nat þan þat alle
þe þinges in knowynge vsen more of hir faculte or of hir 4820
power. þan þei don of [the] faculte or of power of þinges
þat ben yknowen. Nor is it unreasonable that it should be so—for since every judgment is the act of the person judging; every one must needs do his own work by the help of his own faculties, and not by the aid of foreign power. ne þat nis no wronge. for so as euery
iugement is þe dede or þe doynge of hym þat demeþ. It
byhoueþ þat euery wyȝt performe þe werke and hys entencioun 4824
nat of forein power; but of hys propre power.

HOW OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OUTWARD THINGS IS GAINED.

QUONDAM PORTICUS ATTULIT.

ÞE porche þat Fallacious and obscure was the lore of the Stoics, is to sein a gate of þe toune of athenis
þer as philosophres hadde hir congregacioun to dispoyten.
and þilke porche brouȝt[e] somtyme olde men ful 4828
derke in hire sentences. þat is to sein philosophers þat
hyȝten stoiciens. who taught that images of things obvious to the senses were imprinted on the mind by external objects, and that the soul is at first like a mirror or a clean parchment, free from figures and letters. þat wenden þat ymages [and] sensibilites
þat is to sein sensible ymaginaciouns. or ellys ymaginacioun
of sensible þinges weren inprentid in to soules 4832
fro bodies wiþ oute forþe. ¶ As who seiþ þat þilke
stoiciens wenden þat þe soule hadde ben naked of it
self. as a mirour or a clene parchemyn. so þat alle
fygures mosten [fyrst] comen fro þinges fro wiþ oute in to 4836
soules. and ben inprentid in to soules. Textus. Ryȝt
as we ben wont some tyme by a swift poyntel to ficchen
lettres emprentid in þe smoþenesse or in þe plainesse of
þe table of wex. or in parchemyn þat ne haþ no figure 4840
[ne] note in it. But if the mind is passive in receiving the impressions of outward objects, whence proceeds the knowledge by which the mind comprehends all things? Glosa. But now arguiþ boece aȝeins þat
oppinioun and seiþ þus. but yif þe þriuyng soule ne
vnplitiþ no þing. þat is to sein ne doþ no þing by hys
propre moeuynges. but suffriþ and lieþ subgit to þe 4844
figures and to þe notes of bodyes wiþ oute forþe. and
ȝeldeþ ymages ydel and veyne in þe manere of a
mirour. whennes þriueþ þan or whennes comeþ þan
þilke knowyng in oure soule. þat discerniþ and byholdeþ 4848
alle þinges. Whence its force to conceive individual existences, to separate those things when known, to unite divided things, and to choose and change its path, soaring to the highest and descending to the lowest things—and returning to itself, to confute false things by the true? and whennes is þilke strengþe þat
byholdeþ þe syngulere þinges. or whennes is þe strengþe
þat dyuydeþ þinges yknowe. and þilke strengþe þat
gadereþ to-gidre þe þinges deuided. and þe strengþe þat 4852
cheseþ hys entrechaunged wey for som tyme it heueþ
vp þe heued. þat is to sein þat it heueþ vp þe entencioun
to ryȝt heye þinges. and som tyme it discendiþ in
to ryȝt lowe þinges. and whan it retourniþ in to hym 4856
self. it repreuiþ and destroieþ þe false þinges by þe
trewe þinges. This cause is more efficacious and powerful to see and to know things, than that cause which receives the characters impressed like servile matter. ¶ Certys þis strengþe is cause more
efficient and mochel more myȝty to seen and to knowe
þinges. þan þilke cause þat suffriþ and resceyueþ þe 4860
notes and þe figures inpressed in manere of matere Yet the sense in the living body excites and moves the mental powers; as when the light striking the eyes causes them to see, or as the voice rushing into the ear excites hearing. algates
þe passioun þat is to seyn þe suffraunce or þe wit
in þe quik[e] body goþ byforne excitynge and moeuyng
þe strengþes of þe þouȝte. ryȝt so as whan þat 4864
clerenesse smyteþ þe eyen and moeuiþ hem to seen. or
ryȝt so as voys or soune hurtliþ to þe eres and commoeuiþ
hem to herkne. Then is the force of thought excited; it calls forth the images within itself, and adds to them the outward forms, blending external images with the counterparts concealed within. þan is þe strengþe of þe þouȝt
ymoeuid and excitid and clepeþ furþe þe semblable 4868
moeuynges þe speces þat it halt wiþ inne it self. and
addiþ þo speces to þe notes and to þe þinges wiþ out
forþe. and medeleþ þe ymages of þinges wiþ out forþe
to þe forme[s] yhid wiþ inne hym self. 4872

INTELLIGENCE A DIVINE ATTRIBUTE.

QUOD SI IN CORPORIBUS SENCIENDIS.

*QUESTIO.

But what Although there are in objects certain qualities which strike externally upon the senses, and put their instruments in motion; although the passive impression upon the body precedes the action of the mind, [yif] þat in bodies to ben feelid þat is
to sein in þe takynge of knowelechinge of bodyly
þinges. and al be it so þat þe qualites of bodies þat ben
obiect fro wiþ oute forþe moeuen and entalenten þe instrumentes 4876
of þe wittes. and although the former rouses the latter to action, yet if in the perception of bodily things, the soul is not by the impression of external things made to know these things, but by its own power judgeth of these bodily impressions, and al be it so þat þe passioun
of þe body þat is to seyn þe witte [or the] suffraunce
[goth to-forn the strengthe of the workynge corage / the
which passioun or suffraunce] clepiþ furþe þe dede of 4880
þe þouȝt in hym self. and moeueþ and exiteþ in þis
mene while þe formes þat resten wiþ in forþe. and yif
þat in sensible bodies as I haue seid oure corage nis nat
ytauȝt or enprentid by passioun to knowe þise þinges. 4884
but demiþ and knoweþ of hys owen strengþe þe passioun
or suffraunce subiect to þe body. how much more shall those pure spiritual beings (as God or angels) discern things by an act of their understanding alone, without the aid of impressions from external objects? Moche more þan þoo
þinges þat ben absolut and quit fram alle talentȝ or
affecciouns of bodies. as god or hys aungels ne folwen 4888
nat in discernynge þinges obiect from wiþ oute forþe.
but þei accomplissen and speden þe dede of hir þouȝt For this reason, then, there are several sorts of knowing distributed among various beings. by þis resoun.
¶ þan þere comen many manere knowynges
to dyuerse and differyng substaunces. For sense (or sensation) destitute of all other knowledge is allotted to those creatures that have no motion, as shell-fish. for þe wit 4892
of þe body þe whiche witte is naked and despoyled of
alle oþer knowynges. þilke witte comeþ to bestes þat ne
mowen nat moeuen hem self here ne þere. as oystres
and muscles and oþer swiche shelle fysshe of þe see. 4896
þat cliuen and ben norissed to roches. But imagination is given to such brutes capable of motion, and having in some degree the power of desiring or refusing. but þe ymaginacioun
comeþ to remuable bestes þat semen to han talent
to fleen or to desiren any þinge. Reason, however, is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God. but resoun is al only to
þe lynage of mankynde ryȝt as intelligence is oonly þe 4900
deuyne nature. Hence His (i. e. God’s) knowledge exceeds all other, comprehending both what belongs to His own nature, and what is comprehended by all inferior creatures. of whiche it folweþ þat þilke knowyng
is more worþe þan [th]is[e] oþer. syn it knoweþ by hys
propre nature nat only hys subiect. as who seiþ it ne
knoweþ nat al oonly þat apperteiniþ proprely to hys 4904
knowynge. but it knoweþ þe subgitȝ of alle oþer knowynges.

THE POWERS OF SENSE AND IMAGINATION.

But how shall it be then, if sense and imagination oppose reason, affirming that the general idea of things, which reason thinks it so perfectly sees, is nothing? but how shal it þan be yif þat wit and ymaginacioun
stryuen aȝeins resonynge and sein þat of þilke
vniuersel þinges. þat resoun weneþ to seen þat it nis 4908
ryȝt nauȝt. For what falls under the cognisance of the senses and imagination cannot be general. for wit and ymaginacioun seyn þat þat. þat
is sensible or ymaginable it ne may nat ben vniuersel.
þan is eiþer þe iugement of resoun [soth]. ne þat
þer nis no þinge sensible. or ellys for þat resoun woot 4912
wel þat many þinges ben subiect to wit and to ymaginacioun.
þan is þe consepcioun of resoun veyn and fals
whiche þat lookeþ and comprehendiþ. þat þat is
sensible and synguler as uniuersele. But if reason should answer to this—that in her idea of what is general she comprehends whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their knowledge is confined to material figures; and therefore in all real knowledge of things we must give the greatest credit to that faculty which has a more steadfast and perfect judgment of things. and ȝif þat resoun 4916
wolde answeren aȝein to þise two þat is to sein to wit
and to ymaginacioun. and sein þat soþely she hir self.
þat is to seyn þat resoun lokeþ and comprehendiþ by
resoun of vniuersalite. boþe þat þat is sensible and þat 4920
þat is ymaginable. and þat þilke two þat is to seyn wit
and ymaginacioun ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhaunsen
hem self to knowynge of vniuersalite for þat
þe knowyng of hem ne may exceden nor sourmounten 4924
þe bodyly figure[s] ¶ Certys of þe knowyng of þinges
men auȝten raþer ȝeue credence to þe more stedfast and
to þe more perfit iugement. In a controversy of this kind ought not we, who possess faculties of reason, &c., to side with reason and espouse her cause? In þis manere stryuynge
þan we þat han strengþe of resonynge and of ymaginynge 4928
and of wit þat is to seyn by resoun and by ymaginacioun
and by wit. [and] we sholde raþer preise þe cause
of resoun. as who seiþ þan þe cause of wit or ymaginacioun.

REASON SHOULD SUBMIT TO INTELLIGENCE.

The case is entirely similar when human reason thinks the Divine Intelligence cannot behold future events in any other way than she herself is capable of perceiving them. semblable þinge is it þat þe resoun of mankynde 4932
ne weneþ nat þat þe deuyne intelligence byholdeþ or
knoweþ þinges to comen. but ryȝt as þe resoun of mankynde
knoweþ hem. For thus you argue:— for þou arguist and seist þus.

What things are not necessitated cannot be foreknown; therefore there is no prescience of these things, for, if there were, everything would be fixed by an absolute necessity. þat yif it ne seme nat to men þat somme þinges han certeyne 4936
and necessarie bytidynges. þei ne mowen nat ben wist
byforn certeynely to bytiden. þan nis [ther] no prescience
of þilke þinges. and yif we trowen þat prescience
ben in þise þinges. þan is þer no þinge þat it ne 4940
bitidiþ by necessite. If it were possible to enjoy the intelligence of the Deity, we should then deem it right that sense and imagination should yield to reason, and also judge it proper that human reason should submit to the Divine Intelligence. but certys yif we myȝten han þe
[* fol. 38 b.] iugement of þe deuyne þouȝt as we *ben parsoners of
resoun. ryȝt so as we han demed. it byhoueþ þat ymaginacioun
and wit ben byneþe resoun. ryȝt so wolde 4944
we demen þat it were ryȝtful þing þat mans resoun
auȝt[e] to summitten it self and to ben byneþe þe deuyne
þouȝt. Let us, therefore, strive to elevate ourselves to the height of the supreme intelligence—there shall reason see what she cannot discover in herself; and that is in what manner the prescience of God sees and defines all things; although they have no certain event; and she will see that this is no mere conjecture, but rather simple, supreme, and unlimited knowledge. for whiche þat yif we mowen. as who seiþ.
þat yif þat we mowen I conseil[e] þat we enhanse vs in 4948
to þe heyȝt of þilke souereyne intelligence. for þere shal
resoun wel seen þat þat it ne may nat by-holden in it
self. and certys þat is þis in what manere þe prescience
of god seeþ alle þinges certeins and difinissed al þouȝ þei 4952
ne han no certein issues or by-tydynges. ne þis is non
oppinioun but it is raþer þe simplicite of þe souereyn
science þat nis nat enclosed nor yshet wiþinne no boundes.