QUAM UARIIS FIGURIS.

ÞE bestes Various are the shapes of created beings. Some creep along the ground and trace the dust in furrows as they go; passen by þe erþes by ful dyuerse figures 4956
for somme of hem han hir bodies strauȝt and
crepen in þe dust and drawen after hem a trais or a
forghe contynued. þat is to sein as addres or snakes.
others with nimble wings float through the air; and oþer bestes by [the] wandryng lyȝtnesse of hir 4960
wenges beten þe wyndes and ouer-swymmen þe spaces
of þe longe eyer by moist flee[y]nge. some with their feet impress the ground, or tread lightly o’er the meads, or seek the shady grove. and oþer bestes
gladen hem to diggen her traas or her stappes in þe
erþe wiþ hir goynge or wiþ her feet. or to gone eyþe[r] 4964
by þe grene feldes or [elles] to walken vnder þe wodes.
Though we see an endless variety of forms, yet all are prone; to the earth they bend their looks, increasing the heaviness of their dull sense. and al be it so þat þou seest þat þei alle discorden by
dyuerse formes. algate hire [faces] enclini[n]g heuieþ hire
dulle wittes. Man alone doth raise aloft his noble head; light and erect he spurns the earth. Onlyche þe lynage of man heueþ heyest hys 4968
heyȝe heued and stondeþ lyȝt wiþ hys vpryȝt body and
byholdeþ þe erþe vndir hym. Thou art admonished by this figure then, unless by sense deceived, that whilst taught by thy lofty mien to look above, thou shouldst elevate thy mind lest it sink below its proper level. [and] but-ȝif þou erþely man
wexest yuel oute of þi witte. þis figure amonesteþ þe þat
axest þe heuene wiþ þi ryȝt[e] visage. and hast areised 4972
þi forhede to beren vp on heye þi corage so þat þi þouȝt
ne be nat yheuied ne put lowe vndir foot. sen þat þi
body is so heye areised.

DEFINITION OF ETERNITY.

PROSA VLTIMA.

QUONIAM IGITUR UTI PAULO ANTE.

ÞEr-fore þan Since everything which is known is not, as I have shown, perceived by its own inherent properties, but by the faculties of those comprehending them, let us now examine the disposition of the Divine nature. as I haue shewed a litel her byforne þat 4976
al þinge þat is ywist nis nat knowen by hys nature
propre. but by þe nature of hem þat comprehenden it.
¶ Lat vs loke now in as moche as it is leueful to vs. as
who seiþ lat vs loken now as we mowen whiche þat þe 4980
estat is of þe deuyne substaunce so þat we mowen [ek]
knowen what his science is. All rational creatures agree in affirming that God is eternal. þe comune iugement of alle
creatures resonables þan is þis þat god is eterne. lat vs
considere þan what is eternite. For certys þat shal 4984
shewen vs to-gidre þe deuyne nature and þe deuyne
science And eternity is a full, total, and perfect possession of a life which shall never end. This will appear more clearly from a comparison with temporal things. ¶ Eternite þan is perfit possessioun and al
togidre of lijf interminable and þat sheweþ more clerely
by þe comparisoun or collacioun of temporel þinges. Temporal existence proceeds from the past to the present, and thence to the future. for 4988
al þing þat lyueþ in tyme it is present and procediþ fro
preteritȝ in to futures. þat is to sein. fro tyme passed
in to tyme comynge. And there is nothing under the law of time, which can at once comprehend the whole space of its existence. ne þer nis no þing establissed in
tyme þat may enbracen to-gidre al þe space of hys lijf. 4992

THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL.

Having lost yesterday it does not as yet enjoy to-morrow; and as for to-day it consists only in the present transitory moment. for certys ȝit ne haþ it nat taken þe tyme of þe morwe.
and it haþ lost þat of ȝister-day. and certys in þe lijf
of þis day ȝe ne lyuen no more but ryȝt as in þis moeueable
and transitorie moment. Whatever, therefore, is subjected to a temporal condition, as Aristotle thought of the world, may be without beginning and without end; and although its duration may extend to an infinity of time, yet it cannot rightly be called eternal: for it doth not comprehend at once the whole extent of its infinite duration, having no knowledge of things future which are not yet arrived. þan þilke þinge þat suffriþ 4996
temporel condicioun. a[l]þoughe þat [it] bygan neuer
to be. ne þoughe it neuere cese forto be. as aristotle
demde of þe worlde. and al þouȝ þat þe lif of it be
strecchid wiþ infinite of tyme. [* fol. 39.] ȝit al*gates nis it no 5000
swiche þing þat men myȝten trowen by ryȝt þat it is
eterne. for al þouȝ þat it comprehende and embrace þe
space of life infinite. ȝit algates ne [em]braceþ it nat þe
space of þe lif alto-gidre. for it ne haþ nat þe futures 5004
þat ne ben nat ȝit. ne it ne haþ no lenger þe preteritȝ
þat ben ydon or ypassed. For what is eternal must be always present to itself and master of itself, and have always with it the infinite succession of time. but þilke þing þan þat haþ
and comprehendiþ to-gidre alle þe plente of þe lif interminable.
to whom þere ne failiþ nat of þe future. 5008
and to whom þer nis nat of þe preterit escapid nor
ypassed. þilk[e] same is ywitnessed or yproued by ryȝt
to ben eterne. and it byhoueþ by necessite þat þilke
þinge be alwey present to hym self and compotent. as 5012
who seiþ alwey present to hym self and so myȝty þat al
by ryȝt at hys plesaunce. and þat he haue al present
þe infinit of þe moeuable tyme. Therefore some philosophers, who had heard that Plato believed that this world had neither beginning nor end, falsely concluded, that the created universe was coeternal with its Creator. wherfore som men
trowen wrongefully þat whan þei heren þat it semid[e] 5016
to plato þat þis worlde ne had[de] neuer bygynnynge
of tyme. ne þat it neuere shal haue faylynge. þei wenen
in þis manere þat þis worlde ben maked coeterne wiþ
his makere. as who seiþ. þei wenen þat þis worlde and 5020
god ben maked to-gidre eterne. and it is a wrongful
wenynge. But it is one thing to be conducted through a life of infinite duration, which was Plato’s opinion of the world, and another thing to comprehend at once the whole extent of this duration as present which, it is manifest, can only belong to the Divine mind. for oþer þing is it to ben yladd by lif interminable
as plato graunted[e] to þe worlde. and oþer
þing is it to embracen to-gidre alle þe presence to þe lif 5024
interminable. þe whiche þing it is clere and manifest
þat it is propre to þe deuine þouȝt. Nor ought it to seem to us that God is prior to and more ancient than his creatures by the space of time, but rather by the simple and undivided properties of his nature. ne it ne sholde nat
semen to vs þat god is elder þan þinges þat ben ymaked
by quantite of tyme. but raþer by þe proprete of hys 5028
symple nature. The infinite progression of temporal things imitates the ever-present condition of an immovable life: for þis ilke infinit[e] moeuyng of temporel
þinges folwiþ þis presentarie estat of þe lijf inmoeueable.

GOD IS ETERNAL.

and since it cannot copy nor equal it from an immovable and simply present state, it passes into motion and into an infinite measure of past and future time. and so as it ne may nat contrefeten it ne feynen
it ne ben euene lyke to it. for þe inmoeueablete. þat is 5032
to seyn þat is in þe eternite of god. ¶ it faileþ and
falleþ in to moeuynge fro þe simplicite of [the] presence
of god. and disencresiþ to þe infinite quantite of
future and of preterit. But since it cannot possess at once the whole extent of its duration, yet, as it never ceases wholly to be, it faintly emulates that whose perfection it can neither attain nor express, by attaching itself to the present fleeting moment, which, because it resembles the durable present time, imparts to those things that partake of it an appearance of existence. and so as it ne may nat han togidre 5036
al þe plente of þe lif. algates ȝitte for as moche as
it ne cesiþ neuere forto ben in som manere it semeþ
somde[l] to vs þat it folwiþ and resembliþ þilke þing
þat it ne may nat attayne to. ne fulfille. and byndeþ it 5040
self to som manere presence of þis litel and swifte
moment. þe whiche presence of þis lytele and swifte
moment. for þat it bereþ a manere ymage or lykenesse
of þe ay dwellynge presence of god. it graunteþ to 5044
swiche manere þinges as it bitidiþ to þat it semeþ hem
þat þise þinges han ben and ben But as it cannot stop or abide it pursues its course through infinite time, and by gliding along it continues its duration, the plenitude of which it could not comprehend, by abiding in a permanent state. and for [þat] þe presence
of swiche litel moment ne may nat dwelle þer-for
[it] rauyssid[e] and took þe infinit[e] wey of tyme. þat 5048
is to seyn by successioun. and by þis manere it is ydon.
for þat it sholde continue þe lif in goynge of þe whiche
lif it ne myȝt[e] nat embrace þe plente in dwellynge.
If we would follow Plato in giving things their right names, let us say that God is eternal and the world perpetual. and for þi yif we willen putte worþi name[s] to þinges 5052
and folwen plato. lat vs seyn þan soþely þat god is
eterne. and þat þe worlde is perpetuel. His knowledge, surpassing the progression of time, is ever present, containing the infinite space of past and future times, and embraces in his clear insight all things, as if they were now transacting. þan syn þat
euery iugement knoweþ and comprehendiþ by hys owen
nature þinges þat ben subiect vnto hym. þere is soþely 5056
al-wey to god an eterne and presentarie estat. and þe
science of hym þat ouer-passeþ alle temporel moe[ue]ment
dwelliþ in þe symplicite of hys presence and embraceþ
and considereþ alle þe infinit spaces of tymes 5060
preteritȝ and futures and lokeþ in þis symple knowynge
alle þinges of preterit ryȝt as þei weren ydoon presently
ryȝt now Prescience is, then, a foreknowledge, not of what is to come, but of the present and never-failing now (in which God sees all things as if immovably present). ¶ yif þou wolt þan þenke and avisen þe
[* fol. 39 b.] prescience by whiche it knoweþ al[le] þinges *þou ne 5064
shalt nat demen it as prescience of þinges to comen.

DEFINITION OF PRESCIENCE.

but þou shalt demen [it] more ryȝtfully þat it is science
of presence or of instaunce þat neuer ne fayleþ. Therefore foreknowledge is not so applicable a term as providence—for God looks down upon all things from the summit of the universe. for
whiche it nis nat ycleped prouidence but it sholde raþer 5068
be cleped purueaunce þat is establissed ful fer fro ryȝt
lowe þinges. and byholdeþ from a-fer alle þinges ryȝt as
it were fro þe heye heyȝte of þinges. Do you think that God imposes a necessity on things by beholding them? It is not so in human affairs. whi axest þou þan
or why disputest þou þan þat þilke þinges ben don by 5072
necessite whiche þat ben yseyen and yknowen by þe
deuyne syȝt. syn þat for soþe men ne maken nat þilke
þinges necessarie. whiche þat þe[i] seen be ydoon in
hire syȝt. Does your view of an action lay any necessity upon it? for addiþ þi byholdynge any necessite to þilke 5076
þinges þat þou byholdest present. B. No. ¶ Nay quod I. P. By parity of reason it is clear that whilst you see only some things in a limited instant, God sees all things in his ever-present time. p.
Certys þan yif men myȝte maken any digne comparisoun
or collacioun of þe presence diuine. and of þe presence
of mankynde. ryȝt so as ȝe seen somme þinges in þis 5080
temporel presente. ryȝt so seeþ god alle þinges by hys
eterne present. His Divine prescience therefore does not change the nature of things—but only beholds those things as present to him which shall in time be produced. ¶ wherfore þis dyuyne prescience ne
chaungeþ nat þe nature ne þe proprete of þinges but
byholdeþ swyche þinges present to hym ward. as þei 5084
shollen bytiden to ȝow ward in tyme to come. Nor does he judge confusedly of them, but knows at one view what will necessarily and what will not necessarily happen. ne it ne
confoundeþ nat þe Iugementȝ of þinges but by of syȝt
of hys þouȝt he knoweþ þe þinges to comen as wel
necessarie as nat necessarie. ryȝt so as whan ȝe seen togidre 5088
a man walke on þe erþe and þe sonne arysen in
[the] heuene. al be it so þat ȝe seen and byholden þat
oon and þat oþer to-gidre. ȝit naþeles ȝe demen and
discerne þat þat oon is uoluntarie and þat oþer is necessarie. 5092

THE NATURE OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

The eye of God, seeing all things, doth not alter the properties of things, for everything is present to him, though its temporal event is future. ¶ Ryȝt so þan [the] deuyne lokynge byholdynge
alle þinges vndir hym ne troubleþ nat þe qualite of
þinges þat ben certeynely present to hym ward. but as
to þe condicioun of tyme for soþe þei ben future. When God knows that anything is to be, he knows at the same time that it is not under the necessity of being—but this is not conjecture, but certain knowledge founded upon truth. for 5096
whiche it folwiþ þat þis nis non oppinioun. but raþer a
stedfast knowyng ystrengeþed by soþenes. þat whan
þat god knoweþ any þinge to be he ne vnwoot nat þat
þilke þinge wanteþ necessite to be. þis is to seyn þat 5100
whan þat god knoweþ any þinge to bitide. he woot wel
þat it ne haþ no necessite to bitide. If you insist that what God foresees shall and must happen; and that which cannot do otherwise than happen, must needs happen, and so bind me to admit a necessity, I must confess that things are under such a restraint; but it is a truth that we scarce can comprehend, unless we be acquainted with the Divine counsels. and yif þou seist
here þat þilke þinge þat god seeþ to bytide it ne may
nat vnbytide. as who seiþ it mot bitide. ¶ and þilke 5104
þinge þat þat ne may nat vnbytide it mot bitide by
necessite. and þat þou streine me to þis name of necessite.
certys I wol wel confessen and byknowe a þinge of
ful sadde trouþe. but vnneþ shal þere any wyȝt [mowe] 5108
seen it or comen þer-to. but yif þat he be byholder of þe
deuyne þouȝte. For I will answer you thus. That the thing which is to happen in relation to the Divine knowledge is necessary; but, considered in its own nature, seems free and absolute. ¶ for I wol answere þe þus. þat þilke
þinge þat is future whan it is referred to þe deuyne
knowyng þan is it necessarie. but certys whan it is vndirstonden 5112
in hys owen kynde men sen it [is] vtterly fre
and absolut from alle necessite. There are two kinds of necessity—one simple; as men must necessarily die—the other is conditional, as if you know a man walks he must necessarily walk—for that which is known cannot be otherwise than what it is apprehended to be. for certys þer ben two
maneres of necessites. þat oon necessite is symple as
þus. þat it byhoueþ by necessite þat alle men be mortal 5116
or dedely. an oþer necessite is condicionel as þus. yif
þou wost þat a man walkiþ. it byhoueþ by necessite þat
he walke. þilke þinge þan þat any wyȝt haþ yknowe to
be. it ne may ben non oþer weyes þan he knoweþ it to be. 5120

PRESCIENCE AND NECESSITY.

But this condition does not infer the absolute necessity, for the nature of the thing itself does not here constitute the necessity, but the necessity arises from the conjunction of the condition. ¶ but þis condicioun ne draweþ nat wiþ hir þilke
necessite symple. For certys þis necessite condicionel.
þe propre nature of it ne makeþ it nauȝt. but þe adieccioun
of þe condicioun makiþ it. No necessity compels a man to walk who does so willingly, but it must be necessary that he walk when he does step forward. for no necessite ne constreyneþ 5124
a man to [gon / þat] gooþ by his propre wille. al be it
so þat whan he gooþ þat it is necessarie þat he gooþ.

So everything that is present to the eye of Providence must assuredly be, although there is nothing in its own nature to constitute that necessity. ¶ Ryȝt on þis same manere þan. yif þat þe purueaunce
of god seeþ any þing present. [* fol. 40.] þan mot þilke *þinge be 5128
by necessite. al þouȝ þat it ne haue no necessite of hys
owen nature. Since God beholds all future events proceeding from free-will as actually present—these events in relation to Divine sight are necessary—yet in relation to themselves they are absolutely free. but certys þe futures þat bytyden by fredom
of arbitre god seeþ hem alle to-gidre presentȝ. þise
þinges þan [yif] þei ben referred to þe deuyne syȝt. 5132
þan ben þei maked necessarie to þe condicioun of þe
deuyne knowynge. but certys yif þilke þinges ben considred
by hem self þei ben absolut of necessite. and ne
forleten nat ne cesen nat of þe liberte of hire owen 5136
nature. All things which God foresees shall surely come to pass; but some of these things proceed from free-will, which although they happen, yet do not thereby change their nature, þan certys wiþ outen doute alle þe þingus
shollen be doon whiche þat god woot by-forn þat þei
ben to comen. but somme of hem comen and bitiden of
[free] arbitre or of fre wille. þat al be it so þat þei bytiden. 5140

PROVIDENCE AND HUMAN INTENTIONS.

as before they happened they had it in their power not to happen. ȝit algates ne lese þei nat hire propre nature ne
beynge. by þe whiche first or þat þei were doon þei
hadden power nat to han bitidd. But it is a thing of no moment then, whether things are necessary in their own nature or not, since by the condition of the Divine knowledge they fell out as if they were necessitated. Boece. what is þis
to seyn þan quod I. þat þinges ne ben nat necessarie by 5144
hire propre nature. so as þei comen in alle maneres in
þe lykenesse of necessite by þe condicioun of þe deuyne
science. P. The difference is explained in the instances lately given you, of the man walking, &c. Philosophie. þis is þe difference quod she. þat
þo þinges þat I purposed[e] þe a litel here byforn. þat 5148
is to seyn þe sonne arysynge and þe man walkynge þat
þerwhiles þat þilke þinges ben ydon. þei ne myȝten nat
ben vndon. The event of the former was necessary before it befell, whereas that of the latter was altogether free. naþeles þat oon of hem or it was ydon it
byhoued[e] by necessite þat it was ydon. but nat þat 5152
oþer. ryȝt so it is here þat þe þinges þat god haþ present.
wiþ outen doute þei shulle ben. but somme of hem descendiþ
of þe nature of þinges as þe sonne arysynge.
and somme descendiþ of þe power of þe doers as þe man 5156
walkynge. B. Then I did not go from the truth when I said that some things referred to the Divine knowledge are necessary, while considered in themselves they are not under the bond of necessity. ¶ þan seide I. no wronge þat yif þat þise
þinges ben referred to þe deuyne knowynge þan ben þei
necessarie. and yif þei ben considered by hem selfe þan
ben þei absolut from þe bonde of necessite. In the same way everything that is an object of sense is general when considered in relation to reason—but particular when considered by itself. ryȝt so [as] 5160
alle þinges þat appiereþ or sheweþ to þe wittes yif þou
referre it to resoun it is vniuersel. and yif þou referre
it or look[e] it to it self. þan is it synguler. But you may say—If I am able to change my purpose I can deceive providence by changing that which she hath foreseen I would do. but now
yif þou seist þus þat yif it be in my power to chaunge 5164
my purpose. þan shal I voide þe purueaunce of god.
whan þat perauenture I shal han chaunged þo þinges
þat he knoweþ byforn. þan shal I answere þe þus

GOD’S KNOWLEDGE FIXED AND UNCHANGED.

P. You may perhaps alter your purpose—but as providence takes note of your intentions, you cannot deceive her; for you cannot escape the divine prescience though you have the power, through a free-will, to vary and diversify your actions. ¶ Certys þou maist wel chaungen þi purpos but for as 5168
mochel as þe present soþenesse of þe deuyne purueaunce
byholdeþ þat þou mayst chaungen þi purpose. and
wheþir þou wolt chaunge it or no. and whider-ward
þat þou tourne it. þou maist nat eschewen þe deuyne 5172
prescience ryȝt as þou ne mayst nat fleen þe syȝt of þe
present eye. al þouȝ þat þou tourne þi self by þi fre
wille in to dyuerse accioun. But you may say—Shall the divine knowledge be changed according to the mutability of my disposition, and the apprehensions of the Deity fluctuated with my changing purposes? ¶ But þou mayst seyn
aȝeyne how shal it þan be. shal nat þe dyuyne science 5176
ben chaunged by my disposicioun whan þat I wol o
þing now and now an oþer. and þilke prescience ne
semeþ it nat to enterchaunge stoundes of knowynges.
as who seiþ. ne shal it nat seme to vs þat þe deuyne 5180
prescience enterchaungeþ hys dyuers stoundes of knowynge.
so þat it knowe somme tyme o þing and somme tyme
þe contrarie. No, indeed! The view of the Deity foreruns every future event, and brings it back into the presence of his own knowledge, which does not vary, as you imagine, to conform to your caprices, but remaining fixed, at once foresees and comprehends all your changes. ¶ No for soþe. [quod I] for þe deuyne syȝt
renneþ to-forne and seeþ alle futures and clepeþ hem aȝein 5184
and retourniþ hem to þe presence of hys propre knowynge.
ne he ne entrechaungeþ nat [so] as þou wenest þe
stoundes of forknowyng [as] now þis now þat. but he
ay dwellynge comiþ byforn and enbraceþ at o strook 5188
alle þi mutaciouns. This faculty of comprehending and seeing all things as present, God does not receive from the issue of futurities, but from the simplicity of his own nature. and þis presence to comprehenden
and to sen alle þinges. god ne haþ nat taken it of þe
bitydynge of þinges forto come. but of hys propre symplicite.

AN ANSWER TO FORMER OBJECTIONS.

Here, then, is an answer to your former objection—that it is folly to think that our future actions and events are the causes of the prescience of God. ¶ and her by is assoiled þilke þing þat þou 5192
puttest a litel her byforne. þat is to seyne þat it is vnworþi
þinge to seyn þat oure futures ȝeuen cause of þe
science of god For the Divine mind, embracing and comprehending all things by a present knowledge, plans and directs all things and is not dependent upon futurity. [* fol. 41 b.] ¶ For certys *þis strengþe of þe deuyne
science whiche þat enbraceþ alle þinge by his presentarie 5196
knowynge establisseþ manere to alle þingus and it
ne awiþ nat to lattere þinges. Since no necessity is imposed upon things by the Divine prescience, there remains to men an inviolable freedom of will. and syn þat þise þinges
ben þus. þat is to seyn syn þat necessite nis nat in
þinges by þe deuyne prescience. þan is þer fredom of 5200
arbitre. þat dwelleþ hool and vnwemmed to mortal men.
And those laws are just which assign rewards and punishments to men possessing free-will. ne þe lawes ne purpose nat wikkedly meedes and peynes
to þe willynges of men þat ben vnbounde and quit of
alle necessite.

Moreover, God, who sits on high, foreknows all things, and the eternal presence of his knowledge concurs with the future quality of our actions, dispensing rewards to good and punishments to evil men. ¶ And god byholder and forwiter of 5204
alle þinges dwelliþ aboue and þe present eternite of hys
syȝt renneþ alwey wiþ þe dyuerse qualite of oure dedes
dispensyng and ordeynynge medes to good[e] men. and
tourmentȝ to wicked men. Nor are our hopes and prayers reposed in, and addressed to God in vain, which when they are sincere cannot be inefficacious nor unsuccessful. ne in ydel ne in veyn ne ben 5208
þer nat put in god hope and prayeres. þat ne mowen
nat ben vnspedful ne wiþ oute effect whan þei ben ryȝtful

Resist and turn from vice—honour and love virtue, exalt your mind to God (the truest hope), offer up your prayers with humility. ¶ wiþstond þan and eschewe þou vices. worshippe
and loue þou vertus. areise þi corage to ryȝtful hoopes. 5212
ȝelde þou humble preiers an heyȝe. If you are sincere you will feel that you are under an obligation to lead a good and virtuous life, inasmuch as all your actions and works are done in the presence of an all-discerning Judge. grete necessite of
prowesse and vertue is encharged and comaunded to
ȝow yif ȝe nil nat dissimulen. ¶ Syn þat ȝe worchen
and doon. þat is to seyn ȝoure dedes and ȝoure workes 5216
by-fore þe eyen of þe Iuge þat seeþ and demeþ alle
þinges. [To whom be goye and worshipe bi Infynyt
tymes / AMEN.]

EXPLICIT LIBER QUINTUS. ET VLTIMUS.