GOD THE SUPREME GOOD.

QUONIAM IGITUR QUI SCIT.7 7 Read que sit.

FOr as moche Now that thou hast had a faithful representation of future felicity as well as of the true happiness, I shall show thee in what the Perfection of Happiness consists. þan as þou hast seyn. whiche is þe
forme of goode þat nys nat perfit. and whiche is þe
forme of goode þat is perfit. now trowe I þat it were
goode to shewe in what þis perfeccioun of blisfulnesse is 2456
set. Our best plan will be to inquire whether there be in nature such a good as thou hast lately defined, lest we be deceived by the vanity of Imagination and be carried beyond the truth of the matter subjected to our inquiry. and in þis þing I trowe þat we sholden first enquere
forto witen yif þat any swiche manere goode as þilke
goode þat þou hast diffinissed a lytel her byforne. þat
is to seine souereyne goode may be founden in þe nature 2460
of þinges. For þat veyne ymaginacioun of þouȝt ne
desceiue vs nat. and putte vs oute of þe soþefastnesse
of þilke þinge þat is summyttid to vs. þis is to seyne.
but it may nat ben denoyed þat þilke goode ne is. 2464
¶ and þat it nis ryȝt as a welle of alle goodes. The sovereign good does exist, and is the source of all other good. ¶ For
al þing þat is cleped inperfit. is proued inperfit by þe
amenusynge of perfeccioun. or of þing þat is perfit. When we say that a thing is imperfect we assert that there is something else of its kind perfect. and
her of comeþ it. þat in euery þing general. yif þat. * fol. 21. þat 2468
men seen any þing þat is inperfit *certys in þilke general
þer mot ben somme þing þat is perfit. ¶ For yif so
be þat perfeccioun is don awey. men may nat þinke
nor seye fro whennes þilke þing is þat is cleped inperfit. 2472
Nature takes not her origin from things diminished and imperfect; but, proceeding from an entire and absolute substance, descends into the remotest and most fruitless things. ¶ For þe nature of þinges ne token nat her bygynnyng
of þinges amenused and inperfit. but it procediþ of
þingus þat ben al hool. and absolut. and descendeþ so
doune in to outerest þinges and in to þingus empty and 2476
wiþ oute fruyt. If there be an imperfect and fading felicity there must also be one stable and perfect. but as I haue shewed a litel her byforne.
þat yif þer be a blisfulnesse þat be frele and vein and
inperfit. þer may no man doute. þat þer nys som blisfulnesse
þat is sad stedfast and perfit. b. þis is concludid 2480
quod I fermely and soþefastly. But now consider wherein this felicity resides. That God is the governor of all things is proved by the universal opinion of all men. P. But considere
also quod she in wham þis blisfulnesse enhabiteþ. þe
commune acordaunce and conceite of þe corages of men
proueþ and graunteþ þat god prince of alle þingus is 2484
good. For since nothing may be conceived better than God, then He who has no equal in goodness must be good. ¶ For so as no þing ne may ben þouȝt bettre þan
god. it may nat ben douted þan þat [he þat] no þing is
bettre. þat he nys good. Reason clearly demonstrates (1) that God is good, and (2) that the sovereign good exists in him. ¶ Certys resoun sheweþ þat
god is so goode þat it proueþ by verray force þat perfit 2488
goode is in hym. If it were not so He could not be the Ruler of all things, for there would be some other being excelling him who possesses the supreme good and who must have existed before Him. ¶ For yif god ne is swiche. he ne
may nat ben prince of alle þinges. for certis som þing
possessyng in hym self perfit goode sholde ben more
þan god. and [it] sholde seme þat þilke þing were first 2492
and elder þan god. And we have already shown that the perfect precedes the imperfect; ¶ For we han shewed apertly þat
alle þinges þat ben perfit. ben first or þinges þat ben inperfit.

GOD THE SOURCE OF TRUE FELICITY.

wherefore, that our reasonings may not run on with infinity, we must confess that the Supreme God is full of perfect and consummate good. ¶ And for þi for as moche as [that] my resoun
or my proces ne go nat awey wiþoute an ende. we 2496
ouȝt[e] to graunten þat þe souereyne god is ryȝt ful of
souereyne perfit goode. And as we have seen that the perfect good is true happiness, it follows that the true felicity resides in the Supreme Divinity. and we han establissed þat þe
souereyne goode is verrey blisfulnesse. þan mot it nedes
ben [þat verray blysfulnesse is] yset in souereyne god. 2500
B. þis take I wel quod .I. ne þis ne may nat be wiþseid
in no manere. But let us see how we can firmly and irrefragably prove that the Supreme God contains in his own nature a plenitude of perfect and consummate good. ¶ But I preie þe quod she see now how
þou mayst preuen holily and wiþ-outen corrupcioun þis
þat I haue seid. þat þe souereyne god is ryȝt ful of 2504
souereyne goode. [In whych manere quod I.] wenest
þou ouȝt quod she þat þis prince of alle þinges haue
ytake þilke souereyne good any where þan of hym self.
¶ of whiche souereyne goode men proueþ þat he is ful 2508
ryȝt as þou myȝtest þinken. þat god þat haþ blisfulnesse
in hym self. and þat ilke blisfulnesse þat is in hym
were diuers in substaunce. If you think that God has received this good from without, then you must believe that the giver of this good is more excellent than God the receiver. ¶ For yif þou wene þat
god haue receyued þilke good oute of hym self. þou 2512
mayst wene þat he þat ȝaf þilke good to god. be more
goode þan is god. But we have concluded that there is nothing more excellent than God. ¶ But I am byknowen and confesse
and þat ryȝt dignely þat god is ryȝt worþi abouen alle
þinges. But if this supreme good is in Him by nature, and is nevertheless of a different substance, we cannot conceive, since God is the author of all things, what could have united these two substances differing one from another. ¶ And yif so be þat þis good be in hym by 2516
nature. but þat it is diuers from [hym] by wenyng
resoun. syn we speke of god prince of alle þinges feyne
who so feyne may. who was he þat [hath] conioigned
þise diuers þinges to-gidre. Lastly, a thing which essentially differs from another cannot be the same with that from which it is supposed to differ. and eke at þe last[e] se 2520
wel þat o þing þat is diuers from any þing. þat þilke
þing nis nat þat same þing. fro whiche it is vndirstonden
to ben diuers. Consequently, what in its nature differs from the chief good cannot be the supreme good. þan folweþ it. þat þilke þing þat
by hys nature is dyuers from souereyne good. þat þat 2524
þing nys nat souereyne good. But it would be impious and profane thus to conceive of God, since nothing can excel Him in goodness and worth. but certys þat were a
felonous corsednesse to þinken þat of hym. þat no þing
nis more worþe. In fact, nothing can exist whose nature is better than its origin. For alwey of alle þinges. þe nature
of hem ne may nat ben better þan his bygynnyng. 2528

THERE CANNOT BE TWO CHIEF GOODS.

We may therefore conclude that the Author of all things is really and substantially the supreme Good. ¶ For whiche I may concluden by ryȝt uerray resoun.
þat þilke þat is bygynnyng of alle þinges. þilke same
þing is good in his substaunce. B. Most rightly said! B. þou hast seid ryȝtfully
quod .I. P. But you have owned that true felicity is the sovereign good; then you must also grant that God is that true felicity. P. But we han graunted quod she þat 2532
souereyne good is blysfulnes. þat is soþe quod .I. þan
quod she mote we nedes graunten and confessen þat
þilke same souereyne goode be god. [* fol. 21 b.] B. Your conclusions follow from your premises. ¶ Certys *quod
.I. I ne may nat denye ne wiþstonde þe resouns purposed. 2536
and I see wel þat it folweþ by strengþe of þe
premisses. P. Let us see whether we cannot prove this more convincingly by considering it in this view, that there cannot be two sovereign goods which differ in themselves. ¶ Loke nowe quod she yif þis be proued
[yit] more fermely þus. ¶ þat þer ne mowen nat ben
two souereyne goodes þat ben diuerse amo[n]ges hem 2540
self. For it is plain that of the goods that differ one cannot be what the other is; wherefore neither of them can be perfect where one wants the other. þat on is nat þat þat oþer is. þan [ne] mowen
neiþer of hem ben perfit. so as eyþer of hem lakkiþ to
oþir. That which is not perfect cannot be the supreme good. but þat þat nis nat perfit men may seen apertly
þat it nis nat souereyne. Neither can the chief good be essentially different. þe þinges þan þat ben 2544
souereynely goode ne mowen by no wey ben diuerse.
But it has been shown that God and happiness are the chief good, wherefore the sovereign felicity and the Supreme Divinity are one and the same. ¶ But I haue wel conclude þat blisfulnesse and god ben
[the] souereyne goode. For whiche it mot nedes be þat
souereyne blisfulnesse is souerey[ne] dyuynite. ¶ No 2548
þing quod I nis more soþefast þan þis ne more ferme by
resoun. ne a more worþi þing þan god may nat ben
concluded. Following then the examples of geometricians who deduce their conse­quences from their propositions, I shall deduce to thee something like a corollary as follows:— P. vpon þise þinges þan quod she. ryȝt as
þise geometriens whan þei han shewed her proposiciouns 2552
ben wont to bryngen in þinges þat þei clepen porismes
or declaraciouns of forseide þinges. ryȝt so wil I ȝeue
þe here as a corolarie or a mede of coroune. Because by the attainment of felicity men become happy, and as felicity is the same as Divinity itself, therefore by the attainment of Divinity men are made happy. For whi.
for as moche as by þe getynge of blisfulnesse men ben 2556
maked blysful. and blisfulnesse is diuinite. ¶ þan is
it manifest and open þat by þe getyng of diuinite men
ben makid blisful. But as by the participation of justice or of wisdom men become just or wise, ryȝt as by þe getynge of iustice . . .
and by þe getyng of sapience þei ben maked wise. 2560

THE HAPPY MAN IS A GOD.

so by partaking of Divinity they must necessarily, and by parity of reason, become gods. ¶ Ryȝt so nedes by þe semblable resoun whan þei han getyn
diuinite þei ben maked goddys. Every happy man then is a god. But by nature there is only One; but by participation of Divine essence there may be many gods. þan is euery blisful
man god. ¶ But certis by nature. þer nys but oon god.
but by þe participaciouns of diuinite þere ne letteþ ne 2564
disturbeþ no þing þat þer ne ben many goddes. ¶ þis
is quod .I. a faire þing and a precious. ¶ Clepe it as
þou wolt. be it corolarie or porisme or mede of coroune
or declarynges ¶ Certys quod she no þing nis fairer. 2568
þan is þe þing þat by resoun sholde ben added to þise
forseide þinges. what þing quod .I. But as happiness seems to be an assemblage of many things, ought we not to consider whether these several things constitute conjointly the body of happiness, or whether there is not some one of these particular things that may complete the substance or essence of it, and to which all the rest have a relation? ¶ So quod she as
it semeþ þat blisfulnesse conteniþ many þinges. it were
forto witen wheþir [þat] alle þise þinges maken or 2572
conioignen as a maner body of blysfulnesse by diuersite
of parties or [of] membris. Or ellys yif any of alle
þilke þingus be swyche þat it acomplise by hym self þe
substaunce of blisfulnesse. so þat alle þise oþer þinges 2576
ben referred and brouȝt to blisfulnesse. þat is to seyne
as to þe chief of hem. B. Illustrate this matter by proper examples. ¶ I wolde quod I þat þou
makedest me clerly to vndirstonde what þou seist. and
þat þou recordest me þe forseide þinges. P. As you grant that happiness is a good, you may say the same of all the other goods; for perfect sufficiency is identical with supreme felicity; so is supreme power, likewise high rank, a shining reputation, and perfect pleasure. ¶ Haue I nat 2580
iuged quod she. þat blisfulnesse is goode. ȝis forsoþe
quod .I. and þat souereyne goode. ¶ Adde þan quod
she þilke goode þat is maked blisfulnes to alle þe forseide
þinges. ¶ For þilke same blisfulnesse þat is 2584
demed to ben souereyne suffisaunce. þilke self is
souereyne power. souereyne reuerence. souereyne clernesse
or noblesse and souereyne delit. What say you, then; are all these things, sufficiency, power, and the rest, to be considered as constituent parts of felicity? or are they to be referred to the sovereign good as their source and principal? what seist þou
þan of alle þise þinges. þat is to seyne. suffisance power 2588
and þise oþer þinges. ben þei þan as membris of blisfulnesse.
or ben þei referred and brouȝt to souereyne good.
¶ Ryȝt as alle þinges þat ben brouȝt to þe chief of hem.

GOOD, THE RULE AND SQUARE OF THINGS DESIRABLE.

B. I see what you are aiming at, and I am desirous to hear your arguments. b. I vndirstonde wel quod .I. what þou purposest to 2592
seke. but I desijr[e] to herkene þat þou shewe it me.
P. If all these things were members of felicity, they would differ one from another, for it is the property of diverse parts to compose one body. p. Take now þus þe discressioun of þis questioun quod
she. yif al þise þinges quod she weren membris to
felicite. þan weren þei diuerse þat oon fro þat oþer. 2596
¶ And swiche is þe nature of parties or of membris.
þat dyuerse membris compounen a body. But it has been well shown that all these things are the same and do not differ—therefore they are not parts, for if they were, happiness might be made up of one member—which is absurd and impossible. ¶ Certis
quod I it haþ wel ben shewed her byforne. þat alle þise
þinges ben alle on þing. þan ben þei none membris quod 2600
she. for ellys it sholde seme þat blisfulnesse were
[* fol. 22.] conioigned *al of one membre alone. but þat is a þing
þat may nat ben doon. B. This I doubt not, but I desire to hear the sequel. þis þing quod .I. nys nat
doutous. but I abide to herkene þe remenaunt of þe 2604
questioun. P. All the things above-mentioned must be tried by Good, as the rule and square. þis is open and clere quod she. þat alle oþer
þinges ben referred and brouȝt to goode. Sufficiency, power, &c., are all desired, because they are esteemed a good. ¶ For þerfore
is suffisaunce requered. For it is demed to ben
good. and forþi is power requered. for men trowen also 2608
þat it be goode. and þis same þing mowe we þinken and
coueiten of reuerence and of noblesse and of delit. Good is the cause why all things are desired. þan
is souereyne good þe soume and þe cause of alle þat
auȝt[e] be desired. For that which contains no good, either in reality or appearance, can never be desired. forwhi þilke þing þat wiþ-holdeþ no 2612
good in it self ne semblaunce of goode it ne may nat
wel in no manere be desired ne requered. On the contrary, things not essentially good are desired because they appear to be real goods. and þe contrarie.
For þouȝ þat þinges by hir nature ne ben nat
goode algates yif men wene þat þei ben goode ȝit ben 2616
þei desired as þouȝ [þat] þei were verrayly goode. Hence, Good is esteemed as the cause and end of all things that we desire. and
þerfore is it þat men auȝten to wene by ryȝt þat bounte
be souereyne fyn and þe cause of alle þinges þat ben to
requeren. That which is the cause of our desiring any thing is itself what we chiefly want. ¶ But certis þilke þat is cause for whiche 2620
men requeren any þing. ¶ it semeþ þat þilke same
þing be most desired. If a man desire to ride on account of health—it is not the ride he wants so much as its salutary effects. as þus yif þat a wyȝt wolde ryde
for cause of hele. he ne desireþ nat so mychel þe
moeuyng to ryden as þe effect of his heele. Since all things are sought after for the sake of Good, they cannot be more desirable than the good itself. Now þan 2624
syn þat alle þinges ben requered for þe grace of good.
þei ne ben [nat] desired of alle folk more þan þe same
good It has been shown that all the aforesaid things are only pursued for the sake of happiness—hence it is clear that good and happiness are essentially the same. ¶ But we han graunted þat blysfulnesse is þat
þing for whiche þat alle þise oþer þinges ben desired. 2628
þan is it þus þat certis only blisfulnesse is requered and
desired ¶ By whiche þing it sheweþ clerely þat good
and blisfulnesse is al oone and þe same substaunce.
B. I see no cause to differ from you. ¶ I se nat quod I wher fore þat men myȝt[en] discorden 2632
in þis. P. It has been proved that God and happiness are identical and inseparable. p. and we han shewed þat god and verrey blysfulnesse
is al oon þing B. That is true. ¶ þat is soþe quod .I. Therefore the substance of God is also the same as that of the Supreme Good. þan
mowe we conclude sikerly þat þe substaunce of god is
set in þilke same good and in noon oþer place. 2636

GOD A HAVEN OF REST.

NUNC OMNES PARITER ETC.

O Comeþ alle Come hither, all ye that are captives—bound and fettered with the chains of earthly desires;—come to this source of goodness, where you shall find rest and security. to-gidre now ȝe þat ben ycauȝt and
ybounde wiþ wicked[e] cheines by þe deceiuable
delit of erþely þinges inhabytynge in ȝoure þouȝt. here
shal ben þe reste of ȝoure laboures. here is þe hauene 2640
stable in peisible quiete. þis al oone is þe open refut to
wreches. [Chaucer’s gloss upon the Text.]  Glosa. þis is to seyn. þat ȝe þat ben combred
and deceyued wiþ worldly affecciouns comeþ now
to þis souereyne good þat is god. þat is refut to hem þat 2644
wolen come to hym. Not the gold of Tagus or of Hermus, nor the gems of India, can clear the mental sight from vain delusions, but rather darken it. Textus. ¶ Alle þe þinges þat þe
ryuere Tagus ȝiueþ ȝow wiþ his golden[e] grauels. or
ellys alle þe þynges þat þe ryuere hermus. ȝiueþ wiþ his
rede brynke. or þat yndus ȝiueþ þat is nexte þe hote 2648
partie of þe worlde. þat medeleþ þe grene stones
(smaragde) wiþ þe white (margarits). ne sholde nat
cleren þe lokynge of ȝoure þoȝt. but hiden raþer ȝoure
blynde corages wiþ inne hire dirkenesse Such sources of our delight are found in the earth’s gloomy caverns,—but the bright light that rules the heavens dispels the darkness of the soul. ¶ Alle þat 2652
likeþ ȝow here and excitiþ and moeueþ ȝoure þouȝtes.
þe erþe haþ noryshed it in hys lowe caues. but þe
shynyng by þe whiche þe heuene is gouerned and
whennes þat it haþ hys strengþe þat chaseþ þe derke 2656
ouerþrowyng of þe soule. He who has seen this light will confess that the beams of the sun are weak and dim. ¶ And who so euer may
knowen þilke lyȝt of blisfulnesse. he shal wel seine þat
þe white bemes of þe sonne ne ben nat cleer.

MEN DO NOT SEEK TRUE FELICITY. 

ASSENCIOR INQUAM CUNCTA. Boice.

I assent[e] B. I assent, and am convinced by the force of your arguments. me quod .I. For alle þise þinges ben 2660
strongly bounden wiþ ryȝt ferme resouns. P. But how greatly would you value it, did you fully know what this good is? how
mychel wilt þou preisen it quod she. yif þat þou
knowe what þilke goode is. B. I should value it infinitely if at the same time I might attain to the knowledge of God, who is the sovereign good. I wol preise it quod I by
price wiþ outen ende. ¶ yif it shal bytyde me to 2664
knowe also to-gidre god þat is good. P. I shall elucidate this matter by incontrovertible reasons if thou wilt grant me those things which I have before laid down as conclusions. ¶ certys quod she
þat shal I do þe by verray resoun. yif þat þo þinges þat
[* fol. 22 b.] I haue conclude[d] a litel her by *forne dwellen oonly
in hir first[e] grauntyng. B. I grant them all. Boice. þei dwellen graunted 2668
to þe quod .I. þis is to seyne as who seiþ .I. graunt þi
forseide conclusiouns. P. Have I not shown that the things which the majority of mankind so eagerly pursue are not true and perfect goods, for they differ from one another; and because where one of them is absent the others cannot confer absolute happiness (or good)? ¶ Haue I nat shewed þe quod
she þat þe þinges þat ben requered of many folke. ne
ben nat verray goodes ne perfit. for þei ben diuerse þat 2672
oon fro þat oþer. and so as eche of hem is lakkyng to
oþer. þei ne han no power to bryngen a good þat is ful
and absolute. Have I not shown, too, that the true and chief good is made up of an assemblage of all the goods in such a way, that if sufficiency is an attribute of this good, ¶ But þan atte arst ben þei verray good
whan þei ben gadred to-gidre al in to a forme and in 2676
to oon wirchyng. so þat þilke þing þat is suffisaunce.

it must at the same time possess power, reverence, &c. þilk same be power and reuerence. and noblesse and
mirþe. If they be not one and the same, why should they be classed among desirable things? ¶ And forsoþe but alle þise þinges ben alle o
same þing þei ne han nat wher by þat þei mowen ben 2680
put in þe noumbre of þinges. þat auȝten ben requered
or desired. b. ¶ It is shewed quod .I. ne her of may
þer no man douten. While these things differ from one another they are not goods; but as soon as they become one then they are made goods.—Do not they owe their being good to their unity? p. þe þinges þan quod she þat ne
ben none goodes whan þei ben diuerse. and whan þei 2684
bygynnen to ben al o þing. þan ben þei goodes. ne
comiþ it hem nat þan by þe getynge of unite þat þei ben
maked goodes. B. So it appears. b. so it semeþ quod .I. P. Do you confess that everything that is good becomes such by the participation of the sovereign good or no? but alle þing þat
is good quod she grauntest þou þat it be good by participacioun 2688
of good or no. B. It is so. ¶ I graunt[e] it quod .I.

UNITY NECESSARY TO EXISTENCE.

P. Then you must own that unity and good are the same (for the substance of those things must be the same, whose effects do not naturally differ). ¶ þan mayst þou graunt[en] it quod she by sembleable
resoun þat oon and good ben o same þing. ¶ For of
þinges [of] whiche þat þe effect nis nat naturely diuerse 2692
nedys þe substaunce mot ben o same þinge. B. I cannot gainsay it. I ne may
nat denye it quod I. P. Do you not perceive that everything which exists is permanent so long as it preserves its unity—but as soon as it loses this, it is dissolved and annihilated? ¶ Hast þou nat knowen wel quod
she. þat al þing þat is haþ so longe his dwellyng and
his substaunce. as longe is it oone. ¶ but whan it 2696
forletiþ to ben oone it mot nedis dien and corrumpe togidre.
B. How so? ¶ In whiche manere quod .I. P. In the animal creation as long as the soul and the body are united and conjoined in one, this being is called an animal or beast, but when the union is dissolved by the separation of these, the animal perishes and is no longer a beast. ¶ Ryȝt as in
beestes quod she. whan þe soule and þe body ben
conioigned in oon and dwellen to-gidre it is cleped a 2700
beest. and whan hire vnite is destroied by disseueraunce
þat oon fram þat oþir. þan sheweþ it wel þat it is a
dede þing. and þat it is no lenger no beste. The same may be said of man and all other things; they subsist while unity is preserved, but as soon as that is destroyed the things themselves lose their existence. and þe
body of a wyȝt while it dwelleþ in oon forme by coniunccioun 2704
of membris it is wel seyn þat it is a figure of
mankynde. and yif þe partyes of þe body ben [so]
diuide[d] and disseuered þat oon fro þat oþir þat þei
destroien vnite. þe body forletiþ to ben þat it was byforne. 2708
¶ And who so wolde renne in þe same manere
by alle þinges he sholde seen þat wiþ outen doute euery
þinge is in his substaunce as longe as it is oon. and
whan it forletiþ to ben oon it dieþ and perissiþ. B. I believe we should find this true in every case. boice. 2712
whan I considre quod I many þinges I see noon oþer.

NATURE SUSTAINS VEGETATION.

P. Is there anything which acts naturally that forgoes this desire of existence and wishes for death and corruption? ¶ Is þer any þing þanne quod she þat in as moche as
it lyueþ naturely. þat forletiþ þe appetit or talent of
hys beynge. and desireþ to come to deeþ and to corrupcioun. 2716
B. I do not find any creature endowed with volition, which, of itself and without constraint, renounces or despises life and self-preservation or willingly hastens to destruction. ¶ yif I considere quod I þe beestes þat han
any manere nature of willynge or of nillynge I ne
fynde no þing. but yif it be constreyned fro wiþ out
forþe. þat forletiþ or dispiseþ to lyue and to duren 2720
or þat wole his þankes hasten hym to dien. ¶ For
euery beest trauayleþ hym to defende and kepe þe
sauuacioun of lijf. and escheweþ deeþ and destruccioun.
But with regard to herbs and trees, I am doubtful whether I ought to have the same opinion of them, for they have no sensitive soul, nor any natural volition like animals. b. but certys I doute me of herbes and of trees. þat is 2724
to seyn þat I am in a doute of swiche þinges as herbes
or trees þat ne han no felyng soule. ne no naturel
wirchynges seruyng to appetite as beestes han wheþer
þei han appetite to dwellen and to duren. P. There is no cause for doubt in respect to these. ¶ Certis 2728
quod she ne þer of þar þe nat doute. Herbs and trees first choose a convenient place to grow in, where, agreeably to their respective natures, they are sure to thrive, and are in no danger of perishing; for some grow on plains, some on mountains, &c.; ¶ Now look
vpon þise herbes and þise trees. þei waxen firste in
swiche place as ben couenable to hem. in whiche place
þei ne mowen nat sone dien ne dryen as longe as hire 2732
nature may defenden hem. ¶ For some of hem waxen
in feldes and some in mountaignes. and oþir waxen in
mareis. [A leaf lost here, and supplied from C.]

[and oothre cleuyn on Roches / and soume waxen plentyuos 2736
in sondes / and if you try to transplant them, they forthwith wither and die. and yif þat any wyht enforce hym to
beryn hem in to oother places / they wexen drye // To everything that vegetates, nature gives what is needful for its subsistence, and takes care that they should not perish before their time. For
nature yeueth to euery thing þat / þat is conuenient to
hym and trauaylith þat they ne dye nat as longe as they 2740
han power to dwellyn and to lyuen // Need I tell you that plants are nourished by their roots (which are so many mouths hid in the earth), and diffuse strength throughout the whole plant, as through their marrow? what woltow seyn
of this / þat they drawen alle hyr norysshynges by hyr
rootes / ryht as they haddyn hyr Mowthes I.-plounged
with in the erthes / and shedyn by hyr maryes (i. medullas) 2744
hyr wode and hyr bark / And further, it is admirably contrived that the pith, the most tender part of plants, is hid in the middle of the trunk, surrounded with hard and solid wood, and with an outer coat of bark to ward off the storms and weather. and what woltow seyn
of this þat thilke thing / þat is ryht softe as the marye (i.
sapp) is / þat is alwey hidd in the feete al with inne and
þat it is defendid fro with owte by the stidefastnesse of 2748
wode // and þat the vttereste bark is put ayenis the destempraunce
of the heuene / as a defendowr myhty to suffren
harm / Admire, too, the diligence of nature in propagating plants by a multiplicity of seeds, which are as a foundation for a building, not to remain for a time, but as it were for ever. and thus certes maystow wel sen / how gret is
the diligence of nature / For alle thinges renouelen and 2752
pupllisen hem with seed .I.-multiplyed / nether nis no man
þat ne wot wel þat they ne ben ryht as a foundement and
edyfice for to duren / nat only for a tyme / but ryht as forto
duren perdurablely by generacyoun // Things inanimate incline to what is most suitable to their beings, and to preserve continuance. and the thinges ek 2756
þat men wenen ne hauen none sowles / ne desire they nat ech
of hem by sem[b]lable resoun to kepyn þat that is hirs / þat
is to seyn þat is acordynge to hyr nature in conseruacioun
of hyr beynge and endurynge // For why should the flame mount upwards by lightness, and the earth tend towards its centre by gravity (weight), unless these motions were agreeable to their respective natures? For wher for elles berith 2760
lythnesse the flaumbes vp / and the weyhte presseth the
erthe a-doun // but For as moche as thilke places and
thilke moeuynges ben couenable to euerich of hem //

THE LOVE OF LIFE IS INSTINCTIVE.

Whatever is agreeable to the nature of a thing preserves it. So what is contrary to its nature destroys it. and forsothe euery thing kepith thilke þat is acordynge 2764
and propre to hym // ryht as thinges þat ben contraryes
and enemys corompen hem // Dense bodies, such as stones, resist an easy separation of parts; whereas the particles of liquid or flowing things, such as air and water, are easily separated and soon reunited. and yit the harde thinges
as stoones clyuen and holden hyr partyes to gydere
ryht faste and harde / and deffenden hem in withstondenge 2768
þat they ne departe nat lyhtly a twyne // and the
thinges þat ben softe and fletynge as is water and Eyr
they departyn lyhtly // and yeuen place to hem þat
brekyn or deuyden hem // but natheles they retornen 2772
sone ayein in to the same thinges fro whennes they ben
arraced // Fire avoids and utterly refuses any such division. but fyr [fleetħ] and refuseth alle deuysyoun /
I am not now treating of the voluntary motion of a conscious soul, but of the natural intention and instinct. ne I. ne trete nat heere now of weleful moeuynges of the
sowle þat is knowynge // but of the naturel entencioun 2776
of thinges // We swallow our meat without thinking of it, and we draw our breath in sleep without perception. As thus ryht as we swolwe the mete þat we
resseyuen and ne thinke nat on it / and as we drawen
owre breth in slepynge þat we wite it nat whil we slepyt //
The love of life in animals is not derived from an intellectual will, but from natural principles implanted in them. For certes in the beestys the loue of hyr lyuynges ne of 2780
hyr beeinges ne comth nat of the wilnynges of the sowle //
but of the bygynnyngis of nature // For the will, induced by powerful reasons, sometimes chooses and embraces death, although nature dreads and abhors it. For certes thorw
constreynynge causes / wil desireth and embraceth ful
ofte tyme / the deth þat nature dredith // that is to seyn 2784
as thus that a man may ben constreynyd so by som
cause that his wil desireth and taketh the deth which
þat nature hateth and dredeth ful sore // And, on the contrary, we see that concupiscence (by which alone the human race is perpetuated) is often restrained by the will. And som tyme
we seeth the contrarye / as thus that the wil of a wight / 2788
destorbeth and constreyneth þat þat nature desireth / and
requereth al-wey // that is to sein the werk of generacioun /
by the whiche generacioun only / dwelleth and is sustenyd
the longe durablete of mortal thinges // Self-love possessed by every creature is not the product of volition, but proceeds from a natural impression or intention of nature. And thus 2792
this charite and this Loue þat euery thing hath to hym
self ne comth nat of the moeuynge of the sowle / but of
the entencioun of nature // Providence has implanted in all created things an instinct, for the purpose of self-preservation, by which they desire to prolong existence to its utmost limits. For the puruyance of god
hat yeuen to thinges þat ben creat of hym / this þat is 2796
a ful gret cause / to lyuen and to duren / for which they
desiren naturelly hyr lyf as longe as euer they mowen //

THE WILL IS SUPERIOR TO INSTINCT.

Doubt not, therefore, that everything which exists desires existence and avoids dissolution. For w[h]ych thou maist nat drede by no manere / that
alle the thinges / that ben anywhere / that they ne requeren 2800
naturelly / the ferme stablenesse of perdurable
dwellynge / and ek the eschuynge of destruccyoun // B. You have made those things perfectly plain and intelligible, which before were obscure and doubtful. B //
now confesse I. wel quod I. that I. see wel now certeynly /
with owte dowtes / the thinges that whylom semeden 2804
vncerteyn to me / P. That which desires to subsist desires also to retain its unity for if this be taken away it cannot continue to exist. P. // but quod she thilke thyng þat
desiretħ to be and to dwellyn perdurablely / he desireth
to ben oon // For yif þat that oon weere destroied // certes
beinge ne shulde ther non dwellyn to no wiht // B. That is very true! that 2808
is sotħ quod I. // P. All things then desire one thing—unity. Thanne quod she desirin alle thinges
oon // B. They do. .I. assente quod .I. // P. Unity then is the same as good. and I haue shewyd quod she
that thilke same oon is thilke that is good // B. Yes. B // ye forsothe
quod I. // P. Thus all things desire good—and it is one and the same good that all creatures desire. Alle thinges thanne quod she requyren 2812
good // And thilke good thanne [þow] maist descryuen
ryht thus // Good is thilke thing þat euery wyht desireth //
B. Nothing is more true. For either all things must be reduced to nothing (or have no relation to anything else), and, destitute of a head, float about without control or order; or if there be anything to which all things tend, that must be the supreme good. Ther ne may be thowht quod .I. no moore
verray thing / for either alle thinges ben referred and 2816
browht to nowht / and floteryn with owte gouernour
despoiled of oon / as of hir propre heued / or elles yif
ther be any thinge / to which þat alle thinges tenden
and hyen / that thing moste ben the souereyn good of 2820
alle goodes / P. I rejoice greatly, my dear pupil, that you so clearly apprehend this truth, of which but just now you were ignorant. P /. thanne seyde she thus // O my norry
quod she I haue gret gladnesse of the // For thow
hast fichched in thin herte the myddel sothtfastnesse //
that is to seyn the prykke // but this thing hath ben 2824
descouered to the / in that thow seydyst þat thow
wystest nat a lytel her by-forn // B. What was that? what was that quod I. //

THE END OF ALL THINGS.

P. The End of all things. And this is what every one desires; but we have shown that good is the thing desired by all, therefore Good is the End of all things. That thow ne wystest nat quod she whych was
the ende of thinges // and Certes that is the thing þat 2828
euery wiht desireth // and for as mochel as we han
gaderid / and comprehendyd that good is thilke thing
that is desired of alle / thanne moten we nedes confessun /
that good is the fyn of alle thinges. 2832