While the Supervisors were making full confessions of their participation in the bribery transactions, and the Grand Jury was dragging from unwilling promoters, capitalists and corporation employees information as to the source of the corruption funds, Ruef’s days and nights were devoted to consideration of plans for his own safety. Ruef, after his arrest and confinement under Elisor Biggy, became one of the scramblers of his broken organization to save himself.
But Ruef was more clever, more far-seeing than any of the Supervisors. His course from the beginning indicates that, in considering confession, he carefully weighed against the power of the regularly constituted authorities of San Francisco to protect him if he testified for the State, the ability of organized corruptionists to punish for betrayal. Ruef realized that although the all-powerful State “machine,” labeled Republican, of which the San Francisco organization labeled Union Labor, which he had built up, was but a part, had for the moment lost control of the San Francisco District Attorney’s office, but the “machine” still dominated the other departments of the municipal government, as well as of the State government[208]. Ruef realized that Langdon might die; that the State Attorney General might set Langdon aside and himself conduct the graft prosecution. And he realized that some day a district attorney other than Langdon would be prosecutor in San Francisco. In any of these events, what would be the lot of the man who had betrayed the scarcely-known captains of the powerful machine?
On the other hand, the hour when the evidence which the District Attorney had accumulated against him would be presented before a trial jury, approached with deadly certainty.
Such considerations led to Ruef devoting his days to resistance of the proceeding against him in the trial court, where a jury to try him on one of the five extortion charges on which he had been indicted, was being impaneled, while his nights were given to scheming to wring from the District Attorney immunity from punishment for the extortions and briberies which had been brought to his door.
The period was one of activity for both District Attorney and Ruef. On the whole, however, the District Attorney had the liveliest time of it.
To be sure, Ruef had been brought before the trial judge; that is to say, the impaneling of a trial jury had begun, but Ruef’s technical fight had not been abandoned for a moment.
The appearance of Ruef under arrest was signal for a fight to have him admitted to bail. But release under bonds Judge Dunne denied him on the ground of the immediate approach of his trial, and because he had attempted to put himself beyond the process of the court. Ruef’s attorneys appealed to the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, but this was denied them. His attorneys filed affidavits alleging bias and prejudice on the part of Judge Dunne against Ruef, and demanding a change of venue. And with these various motions, all of which the District Attorney was called upon to meet, was the appeal from Judge Hebbard’s order to the Federal Supreme Court, which was considered in a previous chapter.
The actual work of drawing a jury to try Ruef began on March 13,[209] eight days later than the date originally set for trial. The State was represented by District Attorney Langdon, Francis J. Heney and Hiram W. Johnson. At the defense end of the table with Schmitz and Ruef were Attorneys Joseph C. Campbell, Samuel M. Shortridge, Henry Ach, Charles A. Fairall and J. J. Barrett. But it developed that one of the four citizens drawn for jury service was not in the courtroom. The defense objected to proceeding during the absence of the venireman. The hearing was accordingly postponed. Because of one technical obstruction and another, the work of impaneling the trial jury was delayed until April 2. Even after that date there were interruptions, but the work of securing the jury[210] went on until May 13, when the twelfth man to try Ruef was accepted.
But while Ruef was making this brave fight in public to head off trial on the extortion charge, behind the scenes he was imploring representatives of the Prosecution to grant him immunity from punishment in return for such confession as he might see fit to make.
As early as March 20, Ruef sent word to Heney through Burns[211] that he was willing to make confession, provided he were given immunity from punishment for all crimes which he had committed or in which he had participated.
Heney refused absolutely to consider any arrangement which involved complete immunity for Ruef. Negotiations on the basis of partial immunity followed.[212]
Heney, on the ground that he did not trust any of Ruef’s lawyers, refused to discuss the matter with them, but stated that he would meet any lawyer in whom he had confidence to negotiate terms of partial immunity, provided that Ruef’s representative were permitted:
(1) To give the names of Ruef’s accomplices who would be involved by his testimony.
(2) To give the general nature of the offenses in which the various accomplices were involved.
(3) To be prepared to assure Heney that Ruef’s evidence against his accomplices could be corroborated, and was sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Ruef at first appeared to be well satisfied with the plan. He sent for a list of San Francisco attorneys, and set himself enthusiastically to the work of selecting a list of the names of attorneys to be submitted to Heney. But he failed to make a selection, urging all the time to Burns that Heney accept Henry Ach. Ruef’s insistence that he deal with Ach convinced Heney that Ruef was not acting in good faith, and he refused to yield to Burns’s urging that he give way to Ruef in this particular and accept Ach as Ruef’s representative.[213]
Under Ruef’s temporizing, negotiations dragged until April 2, the day that, Ruef’s technical obstructions in the main set aside, his trial was to be resumed before Judge Dunne.
On that day, a new actor appeared in the person of Dr. Jacob Nieto, a Jewish Rabbi of some prominence in San Francisco.
Nieto, according to Burns’s statement to Heney, asked the detective if he had any objection to his (Nieto’s) calling upon Ruef. Nieto stated further that he believed that he could get Ruef to confess, and volunteered the theory that the “higher-ups” were endeavoring to make Ruef a scapegoat for all the boodling that had been committed.
Burns reported to Heney that he not only replied to Nieto that he had no objection to Nieto’s visiting Ruef, but would be glad to have the Rabbi endeavor to get Ruef to tell the truth.
When Burns told Heney of this conversation, Heney did not show himself so well pleased with the arrangements as Burns might have expected. The prosecutor took occasion to warn Burns against Nieto. Heney had already had unpleasant experience with Rabbi Nieto.[214] Nevertheless, Nieto visited Ruef. Members of Ruef’s family were called into consultation. Conferences were held between Ach, Ruef and Burns. Heney states in his affidavit that he did not attend these meetings. Finally Burns brought Heney word that Ach and Ruef wanted citations to show that the District Attorney had authority to grant immunity. Heney sent back word that he was confident that the District Attorney had no such power, but with the further statement that if the terms of the immunity agreement were reasonable and in the interest of justice, that the Court, provided it had confidence in the District Attorney, would unquestionably follow such recommendation as that official might make.
Burns brought back word to Heney that Ruef and Ach continued to insist upon complete immunity.
Heney sent back an ultimatum to the effect that Ruef must plead guilty to the extortion case then on trial before Judge Dunne[215] and take his chances with the sentence that would be given him; that if Ruef did this, Heney was willing to arrange for complete immunity in all the other cases, provided Ruef showed to Heney’s satisfaction that his testimony could be sufficiently corroborated and would sustain a conviction of his accomplices other than Supervisors, in cases where members of the Board of Supervisors had been bribed.
In the meantime, the work of selecting a jury to try Ruef on the extortion charge was going on with the deadly certainty of the slide of the knife of a guillotine. The second week of the examination of prospective jurors brought Dr. Nieto to Heney’s office. Burns accompanied the Rabbi.
Nieto[216] described himself as no particular friend of Ruef. He expressed the opinion that Ruef should be punished; that he should restore his ill-gotten gains. Heney stated to Nieto his attitude toward Ruef, as he had expressed it many times before. From that time on Dr. Nieto was a frequent caller at Heney’s office, always for the purpose of discussing the question of Ruef’s confession. During all these meetings Heney did not depart a jot from his original position that the extortion charge against Ruef should not be dismissed.
Later on, a second Rabbi, Dr. Bernard M. Kaplan, joined Nieto in these visits to Heney’s office. Kaplan continued active in the negotiations to secure immunity for the fallen boss.[217] Finally Nieto, Kaplan and Ach sent word to Heney and Langdon by Burns that they desired to meet the District Attorney and his assistant at Heney’s office to discuss the immunity question. Heney and Langdon consented and the meeting was held in the latter part of April.
Ach insisted upon complete immunity, but admitted that he had advised Ruef to take the best he could get.[218] Neither Langdon[219] nor Heney would consent to complete immunity, nor to material change in the stand which Heney had taken. Ach wanted assurance that the Judges before whom the bribery cases were pending would, on motion of the District Attorney, dismiss them as to Ruef, and suggested to Heney that he go to the judges and get them to consent to the proposed agreement. To this Heney made emphatic refusal, stating that the utmost he would do would be to go with Ach to Judges Dunne and Lawlor and ask each of them whether he had confidence in him (Heney) and what the Judge’s general practice was in relation to matters of this kind, generally, when they came before his court.
Other conferences[220] were held, at which Ach continued to urge complete immunity for Ruef, which finally brought out emphatic statement from Heney that he did not trust Ruef and would enter into no agreement with him which did not leave it in the power of the District Attorney to send him to the penitentiary if at any time the District Attorney and himself concluded that during the progress of the matters Ruef was acting in bad faith, or that the information which he might give was not of sufficient importance to the people of the city and the State equitably to entitle him to go without punishment.
Heney takes pains all through his affidavit to make it clear that he treated with Nieto and Kaplan at all times upon the theory that they were Ruef’s special pleaders and special representatives, who believed that Ruef was sure to be convicted upon as many of the felony bribery charges as the District Attorney tried him on, and that he would go to the penitentiary for a term of years equivalent to life.
On the night of April 21,[221] when the work of selecting a jury to try Ruef was nearing completion, Ach, Kaplan and Nieto visited Heney’s office with assurance that Ruef had about concluded to accept Heney’s terms. But, they explained, a new difficulty had come up. Rabbi Nieto was to leave San Francisco the next morning for a trip to Europe. Neither he nor Dr. Kaplan was familiar with the practices of the courts, and while the judges would no doubt consider favorably any recommendation which was made by Mr. Langdon or by Mr. Heney, nevertheless, the two Rabbis would like to hear from Judge Dunne and Judge Lawlor statement as to what the practice of each of these judges was in that respect before they urged Ruef any further to accept the terms which had been offered him. As Dr. Nieto was to leave for Europe early in the morning, they wanted to see the judges that night.
Heney assured his visitors that owing to the lateness of the hour, he was afraid it would be impossible for them to see the judges before morning. But they insisted. Burns was finally sent out to find the judges if he could. He succeeded in locating Judge Lawlor at the theater. Judge Lawlor at first refused to see Nieto and Heney that night, stating that they could appear at his chambers the next morning. But Burns explained that Nieto had to leave for Europe the next morning, adding that he was sure that both Nieto and Heney would consider it a great favor if the Judge would see them that night, as the matter was very important. Lawlor finally consented to see them, but stated that he would do so only at his chambers, if, as he understood it, Heney and Nieto wanted to see him about his duties as judge. Burns took word back to Heney’s office that they could go to Judge Lawlor’s chambers, where the Judge would go as soon as the theater was over.
Heney, Kaplan and Nieto met Lawlor at his chambers. Heney went straight at the purpose of the meeting.
“Judge,” Heney sets forth in his affidavit he said in substance, “we come up here tonight to ask you what the practice of your court is in criminal cases in relation to recommendations which may be made by the District Attorney?”
Judge Lawlor replied in effect that the District Attorney represents the public in the prosecution of crime, and that under the law it was the practice for that official to submit to the court recommendations concerning persons who turn state’s evidence; that the law vests the authority in the Court to determine all such recommendations and that it is proper for the District Attorney to make them; that such recommendations should be carefully considered by the Court; and if they are in the interests of justice they should be followed, otherwise not. Judge Lawlor stated further that he would not consider or discuss any cause or case of any individual except upon a full hearing in open court, and that it would be determined alone upon what was so presented. Final decision, he said, would in every case rest with the Court, and if the application was in the interest of justice, it would be granted, but if not it would be denied.
Immediately after having made this statement Judge Lawlor excused himself and left the building.
Judge Dunne, when finally found by Burns, objected as strongly as had Judge Lawlor to going to the courtroom that night, but finally yielded to the same representations as had been made to Judge Lawlor.
All parties at the meeting with Judge Dunne at the courtroom were agreed and the incident was quickly over.
Heney asked the Judge, in effect, to state for the benefit of Nieto and Kaplan the practice of his court in criminal matters in relation to any recommendations which may be made by the District Attorney’s office in the interest of justice when the defendant becomes a witness on behalf of the State against his accomplices. Heney stated further that the two Rabbis would also like to know whether or not Judge Dunne had confidence in District Attorney Langdon and himself.
Judge Dunne replied in substance: “I have confidence in you, Mr. Heney, and in the District Attorney, and while I have confidence in the District Attorney, whenever a recommendation or suggestion is made by him in a case pending in my department, it is my practice to entertain and be guided by it, provided, of course, it is in the interest or furtherance of justice.”
Kaplan wanted to know what the course would be should a man plead guilty and afterwards ask to change his plea.
“You have heard what I have said, gentlemen, as to my practice,” replied Judge Dunne. “Of course, in all cases of such recommendations, and which I insist shall always be made in open court, whenever the District Attorney fails to convince me that he is well advised, or that good and sufficient grounds exist for his motions, it must be remembered that the final determination must always rest with me. But, of course, I would give great weight to any recommendation either you, Mr. Heney, or Mr. Langdon might make.”
From the courtroom Nieto, Kaplan and Burns went to Ruef, but Ruef still insisted that he should not plead guilty to the extortion charge, “backed and filled,” as Burns expressed it.
Ruef sent word to Heney by Burns, asking an interview. But this Heney refused to grant, bluntly stating that should he meet Ruef, Ruef would misrepresent anything that he might say. Heney instructed Burns to tell Ruef that he could accept the proposition that he had made to him or let it alone as he pleased, that no more time would be wasted on him; that trial of the extortion charge would be pressed to conclusion and regardless of whether conviction were had or not, Ruef would be tried immediately on one of the bribery charges.
Nevertheless, the persistent Ruef got an interview with Heney. He secured it in this way:
After Heney had retired on the night of May 1st, Burns called him up on the telephone, to state that if Heney would give Ruef a moment’s interview that Burns was confident that Ruef would accept Heney’s proposition. Heney granted the hearing.
Ruef plead for complete immunity. He argued that for him to plead guilty to the extortion charge would weaken his testimony in the bribery cases. He urged that public opinion would approve his release. He charged Heney with being prejudiced against him.
Heney listened to him patiently, but refused to consider any suggestion that he alter the original proposition.
By this time ten jurors had been secured to try Ruef. Ruef begged for an interview with Langdon. It was granted, with Heney and others present. The same ground was gone over again; the same denials made. And then Heney bluntly told Ruef in substance: “You must plead guilty in case No. 305 and take your chances on the sentence which will be imposed in that case. This is our ultimatum and you must agree to this before the first witness is sworn in case No. 305, or we will withdraw our proposition and will never again renew it, or any other proposition looking to any sort of leniency or immunity for you.”[222]
The day following, Burns brought word to Heney that Ruef had concluded to accept the Prosecution’s proposition, and had begun his confession by reciting the particulars of the United Railroad’s bribery. Burns recited what Ruef had told him. Burns’s enthusiasm suffered a shock from Heney’s cool analysis of Ruef’s statement.[223]
Heney pointed out that Ruef had made no revelation which the Prosecution had not known before, and further that Ruef was certainly concealing part at least of what had occurred between him and General Ford. Heney was now convinced of Ruef’s treachery.[224] Ruef’s future course tended to strengthen this conviction.
Having agreed to make full statement of his connection with the bribing of the Supervisors, Ruef haggled over the form of immunity contract. He endeavored to force upon the Prosecution a contract of his own drawing. Failing in that he tried to persuade Heney and Langdon to enter into a stipulation that he might withdraw his plea of guilty in the extortion case.
In neither move was he successful. Heney refused to depart a jot from his original proposition. Ruef finally accepted the immunity contract which Heney had submitted.[225]
Even after the immunity contract had been signed, Ruef continued to urge Burns that he be not required to plead guilty. The prosecution was not sure what Ruef would do. The examination of jurors to try him went on. The jury was completed on May 13,[226] and was sworn. But the actual taking of testimony was delayed by Ruef demanding change of venue from Judge Dunne’s court. This motion after the filing of numerous affidavits by both sides, was denied.
However, Ruef’s last motion delayed the taking of testimony for two days more.
Upon Judge Dunne’s ruling the next move would have been the placing of witnesses on the stand. But before this could be done, Ruef whispered to his attorney, Ach. Ach arose and addressed the Court.
“I am requested by our client, your Honor,” Ach said in substance, “that it is his desire to have a conference with his counsel. I would like to draw your Honor’s attention to the fact that up to this time Mr. Ruef has not had a single opportunity to confer with his counsel alone. If the elisor, or the guards, were not in the same room they were quite close by. I think, in view of this fact, that we might be granted an adjournment until say two o’clock of this afternoon so that Mr. Ruef may have this privilege of conferring with us.”
Heney promptly denied Ach’s statement. “What Mr. Ach has stated is not a fact,” said Heney. “Mr. Ruef has always been granted privacy in his conference with counsel.”
On Langdon’s suggestion, a half hour’s recess was granted to allow Ruef to confer with counsel. With his attorneys, Henry Ach, Samuel M. Shortridge, Frank J. Murphy and Judge Fairall, Ruef went into Judge Dunne’s chambers for conference.
On their return to the courtroom, Ach and Shortridge, with Ruef’s consent, withdrew from the case on the ground that they could not agree with Ruef as to the manner in which the case should be conducted. Fairall and Murphy remained by their client.
And then Ruef, the tears streaming down his face, addressed the Court. He stated his intent to acknowledge whatever there may have been of wrong or mistake in his record, and pledged himself, so far as it lay in his power to make it right.[227]
“I desire,” concluded Ruef, “to withdraw my plea of not guilty heretofore entered, and to enter the contrary plea, and at the proper time submit to the Court further suggestions for its consideration.[228]
“If the defendant wishes to change his plea of ‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty,’” said Heney, “the prosecuting attorney will consent to the discharge of the jury, as he requests, but we think the indictment should first be re-read so that he may enter the plea as he wishes.”
The indictment was read.
“What is your plea?” asked Judge Dunne of the prisoner.
And Ruef replied, “Guilty.”[229]
One week after Ruef had plead guilty to the charge of extortion, his co-defendant, Mayor Eugene E. Schmitz, indicted jointly with Ruef, was brought to trial, under indictment No. 305, to which Ruef had entered his plea of guilty.
Hiram W. Johnson and J. J. Dwyer appeared with Heney and Langdon for the Prosecution. The defense was represented by the firm of Campbell, Metson & Drew, assisted by John J. Barrett and Charles Fairall, all prominent at the San Francisco bar.
The preliminaries were not unlike those of the Ruef trial, which, at the point where testimony would have been taken, was stopped by Ruef’s plea of guilty. There were the same allegations of bias, the same attempts to secure change of venue, the same appeals to the higher courts in habeas corpus proceedings. But these moves availed Schmitz as little as they had Ruef. Point by point the upper courts found against the indicted Mayor; step by step he was dragged to proceedings before a trial jury.
The selection of the jury occupied two weeks. But with the swearing of the twelfth juror, Schmitz did not stop proceedings with tearful confession and a plea of guilty. Doggedly the troubled Mayor let the trial go on. The Prosecution called its witnesses to the stand.
One by one Schmitz’s former associates as well as the restaurant men from whom, through Ruef, he had received money, took the stand and told the sordid story of the corruption of the Schmitz-Ruef administration.
The specific charge under which Schmitz was tried was that of extortion from Joseph Malfanti, Charles Kelb and William Lafrenz, proprietors of Delmonico’s Restaurant, of $1,175. The sum was Delmonico’s share of the $5,000 paid to Ruef in 1905, by the French-restaurant keepers to prevent the liquor licenses, without which their establishments could not be successfully conducted, being taken from them.
The testimony showed:
(1) That Schmitz had used his power as Mayor over the Police Commissioners to compel them in the first instance, to withhold French-restaurant liquor licenses, and that later in the latter part of January, 1905, he had exerted himself as actively and effectively to have the licenses granted, even removing from office Police Commissioner Hutton, who was standing out against the French restaurants.
(2) That attorneys, appearing before the Police Commissioners, to present the claims of the French-restaurant keepers for licenses, were unable to secure a hearing. One of these testified to having advised his client, and other French-restaurant keepers that “there is only one man who can help you, and that is Mr. Ruef.”
(3) That a French-restaurant keeper who owed Ruef money, and at whose establishment Ruef had his headquarters, approached his fellow French-restaurant keepers and told them that for $7,000 a year Ruef would represent them and keep them secure in their business for two years. The $7,000 demand was finally reduced to $5,000, $10,000 for the two years.
(4) That the French-restaurant keepers raised $8,000 of the $10,000 demanded, and sent it to Ruef, $5,000 the first year and $3,000 the next.
(5) That Ruef refused to receive anything but currency, would give no receipt for the money, and would deal with one man only.
(6) That Ruef claimed to receive the money as a fee from the “French Restaurant Keepers’ Association,” but that no such association existed in San Francisco.
(7) That after the French-restaurant keepers had satisfied Ruef, Ruef appeared for them before the Police Commissioners and, after Commissioner Hutton had been removed from office by Mayor Schmitz, secured for them their licenses.[230]
Having established its case thus far, the Prosecution rested.
The move was unlooked for. Ruef was known to have confessed; it had been confidently expected that he would be placed on the stand to answer the question, in whatever form it could be forced into the record: Did you divide the money which you received from the French-restaurant keepers with Mayor Schmitz?
But Ruef was not put on the stand. The public marveled, but those behind the scenes knew that Ruef was not the willing witness for the Prosecution that the public thought.
Ruef had confessed to Heney that he had given half the $8,000 which he had received from the French-restaurant keepers to Mayor Schmitz. But Heney, having trapped Ruef in deception, had very good reason for being distrustful of him.
Ruef, forever seeking to justify himself, had told Heney that he had refused to appear before the Police Commissioners on behalf of the French-restaurant keepers, until the San Francisco Bulletin had challenged him to dare represent them, and claim the money he received from them was a fee. Ruef insisted that the Bulletin’s challenge led him to take the case.
In this Heney trapped Ruef in his trickery.
Ruef’s purported contract with the mythical “French Restaurant Keepers’ Association,” under which the French restaurant keepers had paid him $8000, bore date of January 6. Ruef insisted to Heney that January 6 was the true date upon which the contract was signed. The oral agreement had been made January 5. Heney then confronted Ruef with files of the Bulletin which showed that the Bulletin had not mentioned Ruef as appearing on behalf of the French-restaurant keepers until January 7. This was one day after Ruef had signed the purported contract with the mythical French Restaurant Keepers’ Association.
A stormy scene between Ruef and Heney followed this exposure.[231] Heney charged Ruef with falsehood and deception, and declared the immunity agreement canceled. Heney then ordered Ruef from the room, and did not, until long after the Schmitz trial had closed, have conversation with him again.
When Schmitz’s trial opened, District Attorney Langdon, Hiram Johnson, all the rest of Heney’s associates, urged that Ruef be put on the stand, insisting that the case would be greatly strengthened if it could be proved by Ruef that Schmitz had received half the extortion money.
Heney conceded the strength of this contention, but held, on the other hand, that Ruef would lie so much about other things that he would do more harm than good to the case. Personally, Heney insisted, he wanted nothing to do with him.
Thus, in making his opening statement to the jury in the Schmitz case, Heney refrained from stating that he expected to prove Schmitz received any part of the money which had been paid to Ruef.
But of the break between Heney and Ruef, the public knew nothing. San Francisco looked to see Ruef put on the stand. When the Prosecution rested without calling this supposedly star witness, even the Defense was taken by surprise and had to ask continuance until the following day before calling witnesses.
Schmitz took the stand in his own behalf. He denied the statements which his former Police Commissioners had made against him. The Mayor’s story of denial was soon told. Heney, on cross-examination asked:
“Did Ruef pay you any part of the $5,000 that has been testified he received from the French restaurants?” and Schmitz replied: “I didn’t know that Mr. Ruef got any $5,000, nor did I receive any part of it.”[232]
And then, in detail, Schmitz denied that he had received any money from Ruef, or had had any conversation with him regarding a “fee” which Ruef had received from the French-restaurant keepers.
In rebuttal, Ruef was called to the stand.[233] “Did you,” questioned Heney, “in January or February, 1905, in this City and County of San Francisco, at the house of Eugene E. Schmitz, the defendant, at number 2849 Fillmore street, give to Eugene E. Schmitz any money, and if so how much, and in what kind of money?”
“I did,” answered Ruef, “$2500 in currency.”
“Did you, then and there, tell him,” pursued Heney, “that it was his share of the money you had received from the five French-restaurant keepers?” “I didn’t say to him,” replied Ruef, “that it was his share of the money which I had received from the French restaurants. I did say to him that I had received from the French restaurants the sum of $5,000, and that if he would accept half of it I should be glad to give it to him. Thereupon I gave it to him.”
Ruef testified further to paying Schmitz $1500 early in 1906, half of the second payment made to him by the French-restaurant keepers.
The jurors before whom Mayor Schmitz was tried took one ballot only. They found the defendant guilty of extortion as charged in the indictment.
Following the verdict, Schmitz, who eighteen months before had, for the third time been elected Mayor of San Francisco, was, as a convicted felon, confined in the county jail.[234]
The confession of the Supervisors to bribery had no sooner become known than angling for control of the municipal government under its prospective reorganization began.[235]
The public-service corporation that had during the 1905 municipal campaign contributed to the campaign funds of both the Union Labor party and the opposing “Reform” fusion organization, had no care as to who reorganized, or in what name the reorganization was accomplished, so long as they continued in control. These corporations had larger interest in public affairs than ever; there was prospect of their officials being indicted for felonies. But so long as Schmitz continued to be Mayor, neither those who aimed to reorganize for the best interests of San Francisco, nor those who were plotting to continue the old order with new men, in the interests of the corporations, could act. The old order controlled Schmitz; the opposition, having whipped confessions out of the Supervisors, controlled the board. Neither element could undertake reorganization until in control of both Mayor’s office and Supervisors.
This deadlock was brought about by charter provisions empowering the Board of Supervisors to fill vacancies occurring in the mayoralty office, and providing that the Mayor shall fill vacancies on the Board of Supervisors.
Had Mayor Schmitz resigned, the Supervisors, controlled by District Attorney Langdon, would have elected his successor. This would have given the Prosecution the Mayor as well as the Supervisors. On the other hand, had the Supervisors resigned, then Mayor Schmitz would have appointed as their successors men in accord with him and with his policies. Schmitz could then have resigned and the Supervisors of his appointment would have named his successor. This would have permitted the corrupt element to continue the old order in defiance of the Prosecution. Thus, so long as Schmitz held the office of Mayor, the Prosecution, laboring for good government, could not permit the bribe-taking Supervisors to resign. On the other hand, those who had furnished the bribe money did not dare permit Schmitz to give up his office.
In this astonishing situation, that bribe-givers might not gain the upper hand, it was necessary that the sixteen confessed bribe-taking Supervisors should continue in the offices which they had betrayed, so long as Schmitz’s power to appoint their successors continued.[236]
There were, too, further complications. The Prosecution could and did secure the discharge from municipal positions of Ruef’s satellites who held their places under the Board of Supervisors. Thus, soon after the Supervisors had confessed, Charles Keane,[237] Clerk of the Board, was forced from his position. On the other hand, the old-time Schmitz-Ruef followers who owed their appointments to the Mayor, continued secure in their jobs. Thus, former Supervisor Duffey, appointed by Schmitz to head the Board of Public Works, continued in that position, although involved by Gallagher in Gallagher’s confession of the bribery transactions.
The Chief of Police held office under the appointment of the Board of Police Commissioners. But Schmitz controlled the commissioners. The chief had been indicted with Schmitz and Ruef. The city was clamoring for his removal. But in spite of protests, Schmitz’s influence kept the indicted chief in his place at the head of the police department.[238] The situation could not but cause confusion. To the average man on the street, the Supervisors had confessed to bribery. Why, then, were they permitted to remain an hour in office? Why were they not indicted, placed on their defense and sent to the penitentiary?
The graft defense naturally took advantage of this sentiment. “Government by the big stick,” as the hold of the District Attorney’s office over the Supervisors was called, was condemned and ridiculed. One heard, however, little reference to the hold of the beneficiaries of the Ruef administration upon the Mayor’s office. From all sides the Prosecution was importuned to oust the “boodle Supervisors.” But the fact that a “boodle Mayor” would then appoint their successors was not given such wide publicity.
In addition to the complications in the municipal government, due to the Schmitz faction’s dogged resistance to the Prosecution, combined with the unqualified yielding of the Supervisors and the partial confession of Ruef, San Francisco was in a condition of confusion and discord.
At the time Ruef entered his plea of guilty to extortion, a year had passed since the great fire of 1906. Thousands were still living in shacks erected in the ruins of the old city. The principal business streets were littered with building materials. There had come the depression following the activity of rehabilitation and the pouring into San Francisco of millions of insurance money. Titles to real property were confused if not in doubt, much of the records having been destroyed in the fire. Thousands found themselves forced into court to establish their titles. A little later, the community was to suffer a visitation of bubonic plague. There were many authentic plague cases and some deaths. For months the city was in dread of quarantine.
There were labor disturbances which for weeks at a time paralyzed industry. At one period between 7,000 and 10,000 iron-trades workers were out on strike. At the time Schmitz was finally convicted of extortion the telephone girls had been on strike since May 3rd. This alone threw the complex organization of a modern city into extraordinary confusion. The linemen struck. On June 21, telegraph operators in San Francisco and Oakland left their keys.
But by far the most serious labor disturbance was the strike of the street-car conductors and motormen. For weeks the entire street-car system was paralyzed. The first attempt to move a car resulted in riot in which one man was killed outright and twenty-six wounded. A number of the wounded died.
President Calhoun of the United Railroads rejected all offers to compromise, announcing his intention to break the Street Carmen’s Union. He succeeded; in the end the union was broken and scattered, but at frightful cost to Mr. Calhoun’s company and to San Francisco.
During the strike of the carmen the city was filled with gunfighters and thugs admittedly in the employ of the United Railroads. Indeed, there was no attempt made to disguise the fact that the United Railroads had brought them into the city. Clashes between the two factions were of daily occurrence.
Aside from horse-drawn vehicles which had been pressed into service, street transportation was, for a considerable period, practically at an end. The inability of the people to go from place to place paralyzed industry and business. Merchants, hotel keepers, manufacturers, all suffered. There were many failures. Citizens in all walks of life implored Mr. Calhoun to arbitrate his difference with his men. He refused absolutely.[239] Henry T. Scott, president of the Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company, as doggedly refused to submit to arbitration the questions involved in the telephone girls’ strike.
The police seemed utterly unable to deal with the situation, Governor Gillett threatened to call out the militia, and companies at Los Angeles were actually directed to be in readiness to enter San Francisco. But this move was finally abandoned. And through it all, President Calhoun refusing to arbitrate or to compromise, issued numerous proclamations[240] in which he intimated that the Graft Prosecution had brought on the trouble which confronted San Francisco. The Prosecution’s object, Mr. Calhoun held, was to injure him and his railroad company. In this connection, it may be said, that during the searching investigation of the graft trials, not one word of testimony was produced to indicate basis for Mr. Calhoun’s insinuations and open charges that the carmen’s strike was part of a plot to injure him and his company.[241] On the contrary, the strike might have been averted had the United Railroads adopted a more tactful policy in dealing with its men. And, in addition to this, a more conciliatory attitude on the part of President Calhoun would, during the progress of the strike, have brought it to a close at any time. The fact remains, too, that during the 1907 municipal campaign, which opened even while the United Railroads was crushing the carmen’s union, the support of the United Railroads went to the Union Labor party candidate for District Attorney. Heading the Union Labor party ticket was P. H. McCarthy, one of the strongest opponents of the Graft Prosecution, and at the same time ardent backer of the striking carmen.
The efforts of the United Railroads to crush the carmen’s union, while at the same time exerting itself to elect the Union Labor party candidate for District Attorney, indicates the confusion that existed in San Francisco following the confessions of the Supervisors and the revelations made by Ruef. And the efforts of the various factions to seize the municipal government increased this confusion materially.
The day following Ruef’s confession, a committee of businessmen, representing the Merchants’ Association, the Board of Trade, the Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturers’ and Producers’ Association and the Merchants’ Exchange waited upon Spreckels and Heney to enlist the co-operation of the Prosecution in restoring normal conditions. The committee—called the Committee of Seven because of its numbers—[242] already had the endorsement of Mayor Schmitz. The Chronicle, which acted from the start in the capacity of special pleader for this committee, announced in startling headlines in its issue of May 18, that “Mayor Schmitz practically turns reins of government over to citizens. Committee of Seven may run this city.”[243]
“With the exception of the administration of merely routine affairs,” said the Chronicle of that date, “the committee, by Mayor Schmitz’s written agreement, is to all intents and purposes, the Mayor of San Francisco.”
Governor James N. Gillett[244] was reported to be heartily in accord with the committee’s purposes. Finally, in an editorial article, the Chronicle announced that “the public looks to this committee to restore the good name of the city, and to the prosecuting authorities to stand solidly behind them while they do it.”
But in spite of the Chronicle’s insistence, the public gave no evidence of spontaneous outburst in favor of the committee. Instead, there was a general turning to the leaders of the Prosecution to note their attitude. The Prosecution gave no evidence of enthusiastic support; quite the contrary. “The District Attorney,” announced Langdon, “will not act with any committee that is named by Mayor Schmitz to take charge of the government of San Francisco.”
After several conferences with the committee, Rudolph Spreckels refused to join with it on the ground that it had placed itself in a position “to directly or indirectly accomplish results very much desired by Calhoun, Herrin and the coterie who are inimical to the Prosecution.” Mr. Spreckels also expressed his belief that a majority of the committee were sincere men who went on the committee with proper motives, but, Spreckels suggested, “if this committee really has its origin in an honest motive, I do not see why it cannot act on its own volition. I do not see the necessity of this committee demanding that I co-operate with it. If its members want to have a change in the municipal offices and the members of the various municipal commissions, let them go ahead and outline their own programme. I have no desire to dictate who shall constitute the membership of the various city offices. I started out in this graft prosecution to bring all guilty municipal officials to the bar of justice and have them punished. That is my single motive. I have no ulterior designs in this matter regardless of whatever anyone may say to the contrary.”[245]
In spite of the Chronicle’s statement that the public looked to the Prosecution to stand solidly behind the committee, and the protestations of Governor Gillett, the public was content to accept the judgment of Mr. Langdon, Mr. Spreckels and Mr. Heney as final. Without popular demand for it, there was nothing for the committee to do but resign. And it did resign.[246]
The resignation of the Committee of Seven brought from Governor Gillett a statement urging the appointment of “a strong governing body to take charge of affairs.”[247] Acting upon the Governor’s suggested plan, the five commercial bodies decided upon the appointment of a committee of seventy-five, or, as the Chronicle, mouthpiece for the advocates of this course, put it, “Seventy-five prominent citizens are to be appointed to restore order.” The Chronicle went on to say that “It is understood that Mayor Schmitz is ready to agree to act in accordance with the recommendations of the new committee as he did when the Committee of Seven was formed. He would be glad, it is believed, to have the assistance of such a body of men in meeting some of the conditions which he has to face.”[248]
At the time (May 29) of the publication of the Chronicle’s belief that Mayor Schmitz would be glad to have the assistance of such a body of men as had been proposed, the Mayor’s trial was drawing to its close. A fortnight later he was convicted of one of the gravest felonies that can be charged against an executive. Mayor Schmitz’s conviction brought complete change in the situation. It made possible the ousting of the entire corrupt administration. In the ousting, the commercial bodies, as well as the representative labor union organizations, were given opportunity to co-operate. The refusal of the majority of them to participate threw the obligation upon the District Attorney’s office.
When the Jury returned its verdict finding Mayor Schmitz guilty of felony, District Attorney Langdon found himself in an extraordinary position. Upon him, as District Attorney, fell the responsibility of naming the chief executive of San Francisco to succeed the discredited Mayor.
There was no question about a vacancy existing in the Mayor’s office. Under the California laws, a vacancy in office exists upon conviction of the incumbent of felony. The courts had held repeatedly that a jury’s verdict of guilty in a felony case carries conviction.
A vacancy, therefore, existed in the Mayor’s office. Under the municipal charter the Supervisors alone were empowered to fill it. But sixteen of the Supervisors, having confessed to felonies, were taking no steps without the approval of the District Attorney. They would name for Mayor, him whom the District Attorney approved and no other. Naturally, Langdon consulted those associated with him in the Graft Prosecution. No better earnest of the sincerity and disinterestedness of Langdon and those who were assisting him is furnished than in this crisis. They had it within their power to select first Mayor and then Supervisors who would be utterly subservient to them. Instead, they proposed a plan by which representative associations were given opportunity to reorganize the municipal government by naming Mayor Schmitz’s successor.
Nor was there any hasty action. The office of Mayor was not declared vacant until after Schmitz had been sentenced to the penitentiary. But Schmitz was in the county jail and incompetent to act. It was of immediate necessity that a temporary successor be substituted. Until this were done, San Francisco would be without a chief executive. To meet the emergency, the Supervisors named Supervisor Gallagher to be acting Mayor.[249]
After the sentencing of Schmitz the rapidly developing situation made it necessary that the convicted official’s office be declared vacant and his successor appointed. But the successor had not been named, nor had plans for the change in administration been formulated.[250] In this further emergency, it was decided to name one of the Supervisors to be Mayor to serve until a permanent successor of Mayor Schmitz could be named. The unhappy Boxton[251] was decided upon. The Supervisors, by resolution, definitely declared the office of Mayor vacant and elected Supervisor Boxton to be Mayor.
On the day that Boxton was named Mayor of San Francisco, District Attorney Langdon made public a plan for a convention to select a Mayor to serve until the successor of Mayor Schmitz could be elected and qualified. Mr. Langdon proposed that the convention should be made up of thirty members, fifteen to be appointed by organized labor and fifteen by the organized commercial bodies. On the side of Labor were apportioned eight delegates to the Labor Council and seven to the Building Trades Council. The five commercial bodies, the Chamber of Commerce, Merchants’ Association, Board of Trade, Real Estate Board and Merchants’ Exchange, were allowed three delegates each. That the convention might proceed in its choice unhampered, the District Attorney pledged that he and his associates would wholly refrain from participation after the convention had assembled.[252]
But this did not suit the several factions at all. Admittedly, the Prosecution could name the Mayor. Each faction wanted its man named, and while there remained a chance for its man to be named, did not care to see the extraordinary power in the hands of the District Attorney delegated to the uncertainties of a convention.
In the scramble for advantage, the self-control and self-forgetting attitude of the members of the Prosecution, instead of exciting admiration, was condemned. The Examiner, referring to Langdon’s associates, for example, announced: “Their failure to agree on anyone has led to some alarm for fear their divergent political ambitions are making each of them endeavor to secure a place for his personal puppet.” Had the Prosecution named the Examiner’s “personal puppet,” this particular source of criticism would undoubtedly have been silenced and the Examiner’s vilification and abuse of the Prosecution during the years that followed averted. What is true of the Examiner in this regard is true of the other institutions and interests which, in this crisis of the city’s history, were clamoring for “recognition.”[253] District Attorney Langdon’s plan, on the whole, was not received in the spirit in which it was offered.
The Building Trades Council, under the influence of P. H. McCarthy and O. A. Tveitmoe, promptly rejected the District Attorney’s proposal and refused to name delegates.[254] This action influenced the Labor Council, which, on the ground that in the absence of delegates from the Building Trades Council the Labor Council representatives might be outvoted, refused to participate.
Of the five commercial bodies, the Real Estate Board alone promptly accepted the District Attorney’s invitation. The board named its three delegates and so notified the District Attorney.
The Merchants’ Exchange demanded that the number of delegates be increased from thirty to forty-five by the addition of fifteen professional men, and proposed that the convention name a new Board of Supervisors as well as Mayor.[255]
The Board of Trade refused to co-operate unless the delegates be increased in number by the addition of “professional men and others.”
The Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants’ Association finally accepted, but stipulated that a two-thirds vote of the thirty delegates should be required for a choice.
The failure of the several organizations to join in the selection of a Mayor, made it necessary for Langdon himself to proceed with the reorganization. All that Langdon and his associates required was that the new executive should be independent of political control and free of the influence of those public-service corporations that had been trapped in bribe-giving. It was also the aim of the Prosecutor to name as Mayor one whose standing was such that none could be so unfair as to charge him with being in the slightest degree under the influence of the Prosecution.
Langdon and his associates agreed that Dr. John Gallwey was independent of corrupting influences and to Dr. Gallwey the appointment was offered. But Dr. Gallwey declined to accept the responsibilities of the Mayor’s office on the ground that he could not afford to devote his time to the duties of the office to the extent that would be required in order to conduct it properly, and on the further ground that he could be of more service to humanity in the practice of medicine than in the discharge of the duties of Mayor.
The place was then offered to Ralph Harrison, a former member of the Supreme Bench. But Judge Harrison declined on the ground that he thought the duties of the office, under the conditions existing[256] would be too onerous for him to undertake at his time of life.
Dr. Edward R. Taylor,[257] dean of the Hastings College of Law, was then consulted. Dr. Taylor agreed to accept the position. In tendering Dr. Taylor the mayoralty, the Prosecution left him entirely free to conduct the office according to his own judgment. He was assured that no one connected with the Prosecution would expect or ask him to be guided or controlled or influenced in any way by all or any of them.
Boxton, after Taylor had agreed to serve, resigned his office. The Supervisors then elected Dr. Taylor to fill the vacancy.[258]
The next step in the reorganization of the municipal government was the resignation of the sixteen Supervisors who had confessed to bribery and the appointment of their successors. When Mayor Taylor[259] had found sixteen representative citizens willing to serve, the change was made. One by one the discredited officials resigned their positions. After each resignation had been accepted Mayor Taylor named the resigning member’s successor.[260]
The scene was as painful as it was extraordinary. When it was over, the Schmitz-Ruef administration, so far as the legislative and executive branches were concerned, had passed.