The natural result of this was that unprofitable business was neglected for profitable, and the suppression of heresy was postponed to the trial of civil and criminal cases which yielded fees. We have seen how Cervantes reported that in Barcelona this seemed to be the real duty of the tribunal and that there was nothing else to be attended to; his animadversions produced no amendment and, in 1567, de Soto Salazar repeated the complaint.[1206] This continued unchecked. The project of reform presented to the Suprema, in 1623, expresses the wish that other tribunals would follow the example of Saragossa, where one of the inquisitors was delegated every four months to conduct this business, so that prisoners on trial for heresy could have their cases despatched and not be kept languishing interminably in prison, which, as we shall see, was one of the sorest abuses inflicted on them.[1207] This pious wish was fruitless and the records of the Inquisition for the following century show how large a portion of its activity was devoted to these cases and to the competencias incessantly springing from them.
One feature which aggravated the oppression in these matters, especially in civil suits, was not only the favoritism which inevitably inclined the tribunal to the side of its own people, but the fact that the inquisitors were usually strangers, unfamiliar with the local laws and customs peculiar to each province, which they presumed to interpret and enforce. This justified the frequent demands that inquisitors should be natives—demands which received no attention, for the appointing power thought only of their qualifications as judges of the faith while, to the mass of the population, their duties in this respect were of small account in comparison with their activity in their temporal jurisdiction. Another well-grounded source of complaint was that the inquisitorial habits of secrecy could not be wholly overcome; the parties and their counsel were not allowed to be present, as in the royal courts; witnesses were examined by the inquisitor on lists of interrogatories furnished to him, and there was no cross-examination; written arguments were presented to him which he handed to the other side for reply and the procedure, in both civil and criminal cases, was assimilated as nearly as might be to the secret trials for heresy which was the inquisitorial ideal of the dispensation of justice. The cases were decided by the inquisitors in session together, on a majority vote. In the sixteenth century there was no appeal to the Suprema, even when the vote was not unanimous, but, in 1645, a writer assumes that either side could appeal.[1208]
We have seen how tenaciously the kingdoms of Aragon struggled against the evils of the system. Castile felt them equally but it had not the same institutions and could only remonstrate. The Córtes of Madrid, in 1607-8, represented that those of 1579 and 1586 had petitioned for the reform of the abuses arising from the temporal jurisdiction of the Inquisition to the great injury of the kingdom; that Philip II had promised relief, but had died without granting it, and therefore the request was now repeated in view of the increasing evils. Especially was attention called to the cruelty of imprisoning ordinary offenders, for the people could not distinguish and imagined all prisoners to be heretics, thus entailing infamy upon them and disqualifying them for marriage, wherefore it was asked that they be confined in the public gaols. Philip III promised to do what was proper and of course did nothing. The Córtes of 1611 repeated the petition, with similar lack of result.[1209]
The Council of Castile, the highest tribunal in the land, in a consulta of 1631, represented forcibly the existing evils, especially the prodigal use of censures under which corregidores and other magistrates lay under excommunication for months together, while individuals were impoverished by the long delays in settling competencias. It urged the remedy of permitting appeals to the Council por via de fuerza, in cases not of faith and this it repeated in 1634, 1669 and 1682.[1210] More outspoken was a memorial presented, in 1648, to Philip by a member of the Council, on the abuses of the criminal jurisdiction, those in civil cases being treated in a separate paper. The writer alludes to having repeatedly made the same representations orally and in writing; he dwells upon the interminable delays and other obstacles which impede justice and discourage sufferers from seeking it. The resultant immunity creates audacious criminals; the number of familiars and of soldiers who never serve in the field has increased so greatly that nothing is seen but crimes and the offenders are unpunished. Everywhere men of the most dissolute type and the largest fortunes seek appointment so as to enjoy immunity; the royal revenues are defrauded and prohibited goods are imported, while no corregidor or alcalde dares to curb them, for they are at once excommunicated by the inquisitors, even to casting interdicts over whole communities. Those who suffer remain without redress, so that those who are able are led to take it into their own hands, for they can get it nowhere else. Justice is trampled under foot; there is no alguazil who dares to make an arrest, or scrivener to draw up papers, so many have been slain or wounded for so doing and the death of an alguazil is held at naught, as though the officers of justice were common enemies. If the king would re-establish the jurisdiction of the royal courts there would be an end to the excommunications with which the inquisitors defend their delinquents, as though they were vessels of the Temple; the time of the Councils and of the king would not be consumed by these perpetual competencias and the plagues would cease wherewith God afflicts these kingdoms for the injustice, the violence and the dissolute life of the people.[1211]
These warnings and remonstrances fell on deaf ears. The Suprema was skilled to work upon the piety of the king, and to promise him relief from perils if he would placate God by increasing the privileges of the Inquisition, the very existence of which depended upon its ability to protect its familiars from the law and from the universal hatred in which they were held.
After the fall of Inquisitor-general Nithard, there was a bustling attempt to check the enormous evils admitted to exist. In 1677 Carlos II deprecated the abuses common, both in excessive charges and in forcing his pious subjects to submit by censures which deprived them of the consolations of religion. He declared excommunication to be illegal in matters connected exclusively with laymen and temporal possessions, and forbade its employment, a command which he addressed to the Suprema in 1678 with directions to enforce it and which he repeated in 1691, but without effect.[1212] Then a more comprehensive effort was made to effect a radical reform. In 1696, Carlos was induced to assemble what was known as the Junta Magna, consisting of two members each of the Councils of State, of Aragon, of Castile, of Italy, of Indies and of Orders. The decree creating it recites the disturbance and interference with justice, the continual collisions and competencias between the Inquisition and the courts over question of jurisdiction and privileges, and the necessity of establishing some fixed principles and rules to avert these troubles for the future and to preserve the Holy Office in the love and reverence of the people, without its interfering in matters foreign to its venerable purpose. The Junta was to meet at least once a week and it was furnished with materials from the records of all the Councils, through which it obtained a thorough insight into the evils to be remedied. These labors resulted in a memorial known as the Consulta Magna, drawn up by Doctor Joseph de Ledesma of the Council of Castile.
It constituted a terrible indictment of the abuse, by the Inquisition, of the temporal jurisdiction bestowed on it by the sovereigns, with ample proof of flagrant cases and incidents. Then followed a consideration of possible remedies, of which the most indispensable was declared to be the prohibition of censures, which were so formidable that no one could resist them. Persons arrested for offences not of faith should be confined in the royal prisons to save them from the indelible disgrace of the secret prison. The recurso de fuerza should be admitted when excommunication was used in temporal cases. The fuero should be withdrawn from the servants and commensals of officials whose insolence gave occasion to arrests and censures causing dissensions that scandalized the whole kingdom. It was admitted that familiars now gave little trouble, save in Majorca, where there was no Concordia, but the salaried officials were the source of infinite contention and they should be put on the footing of familiars. A grievance of the greatest magnitude was the interminable delay in the settlement of competencias, during which prisoners languished in confinement and excommunicates could not obtain absolution; this could be averted if the Concordias and royal orders were enforced. As all attempts to curb the Inquisition had proved useless, and in spite of them it had continually increased its abuses, the ultimate remedy of depriving it wholly of the royal jurisdiction might be found necessary, but meanwhile these milder measures might be tried in hope of relief.[1213] These proposed remedies, it will be seen, were moderate enough and in no way limited the Inquisition in its ostensible functions as the preserver of the faith.
This was the most formidable assault that the Inquisition had experienced, coming as it did from the combined forces of all the other organizations of the State, under the auspices of the king, but it was easily averted. Llorente tells us that Inquisitor-general Rocaberti, working through the royal confessor Froilan Diaz, who was ex-officio a member of the Suprema, and also Rocaberti’s subject in the Dominican Order, succeeded in inducing Carlos to consign the consulta to the limbo in which reposed so many previous memorials.[1214] The manner in which this was effected was simple enough. In 1726 Don Santiago Augustin Riol drew up for Philip V a report on the creation and organization of the state councils, in which he states that the consulta was submitted to the Council of Castile for its action; this was delayed by the illness of the governor of the Council; when he returned to duty the matter was forgotten and the consulta disappeared so completely that, when Philip V called for it, in 1701, no copy could be found in the archives, as appeared from a certificate furnished by the archivist.[1215]
This narrow escape did not teach moderation. In 1702 the Valencia tribunal refused even to join in a competencia over a case in which it entertained a suit brought to collect the interest on a censo, by the widow of an alguazil mayor as guardian of her children. It was in vain that the regent of the Audiencia pointed out that, under the Concordia of 1568, the widow of an official only enjoyed the fuero as defendant and not as plaintiff and that the children had no claim whatever, and cited precedents that had been so decided; the tribunal was stubborn and would not even admit that the question could be carried up to the Suprema and Council of Aragon for decision.[1216] It was not long after this, however, that the Suprema was obliged to admit that reforms in the methods of the Holy Office were essential. In its carta acordada of June 27, 1705, is embodied a rebuke of the recklessness with which the tribunals undertook the defence of their officials, resulting in the universal complaints of the abuse of its jurisdiction, so that it was popularly said that everything was made a caso de Inquisicion, to the disrepute of its officials and their families. Therefore, unless the jurisdiction was indisputable, the Suprema must be consulted before assuming the defence, amicable adjustments must always be sought and friendly relations be maintained with the royal officials, thus avoiding competencias which ordinarily arose from passionate conflicts over trifles.[1217]
These were wise admonitions to which as usual scant attention was paid, but in time the tribunals were made to recognize the change which had come in with the Bourbons. There was a highly illustrative case in 1720, at Toledo, where Don Pedro Paniagua, contador or auditor of the tribunal, received in October twenty sacks of cocoa from Cadiz. In the intricate details of the Spanish system of internal imposts, it would be impossible now to say whether he had observed the formalities requisite in the transmission of merchandise, but the local authorities assumed that there was a violation of law and also an infraction of quarantine, imposed in August, owing to an epidemic in Marseilles. The corregidor was prompt; at 2 A.M. of the day following the arrival of the cocoa, he searched Paniagua’s country house and at 9 A.M. his town house and sequestrated the cocoa. The inquisitors responded by imprisoning the civic guards who had been employed. A fortnight later, another visit paid to Paniagua’s house showed that five sacks of the sequestrated article had been removed, whereupon he was confined in the royal prison. Then the inquisitors proceeded against the corregidor and alcalde mayor with censures, and aggravated them so energetically that in twenty-four hours they had an interdict and cessatio a divinis in four parishes of the city. These active demonstrations, however suited to the seventeenth century, were out of place in the eighteenth. As soon as news of them reached Madrid, hurried orders were despatched by the Suprema to remove the interdict, absolve the officials and release the guards, and when the formal report came from the tribunal the orders were repeated, with the addition that the senior inquisitor should start for Madrid within twenty-four hours. Prior to receiving this the inquisitors had written to Inquisitor-general Camargo lamenting his abandonment of them and the dishonor inflicted on the tribunal; they blushed to be accomplices in this ruin and they tendered their resignations. The answer to this was sending the senior Inquisitor of Madrid to take charge of the tribunal, with orders to the two remaining inquisitors to report in Madrid but, on learning that they had obeyed the first orders, they were allowed to remain in Toledo.
How strong had been the pressure exerted on the Suprema to produce this action may be inferred from a protest in which, a month later, it poured forth to Philip V its bitterness of soul. The corregidor had violated the privileges and immunities of the Inquisition; the inquisitors had been perfectly justified in their action, although too speedy in aggravating the censures; they had been humiliated, while the corregidor and his underlings were boasting of their triumph over the Inquisition and of depriving it of the rights granted by the popes and the kings of Spain. The Suprema therefore asked that the senior inquisitor be allowed to return to Toledo, that Paniagua be released by the hands of the inquisitors, that his cocoa be restored and that the corregidor and alcalde mayor be duly punished. This accomplished nothing and two months later it again appealed to the king for the release of Paniagua and the restoration of the senior inquisitor, but this time it professed its zeal to see that in future the tribunals should practise more moderation.[1218] The lesson was a hard one, but it had a still harder one, in 1734, when Philip decided that a salaried official should be tried by the ordinary courts.[1219]
Step by step the old-time privileges were being curtailed. Soon after the accession of Fernando VI, some trouble arose at Llerena over the taxation of familiars. It seems to have been aggravated in the usual manner and, when it reached the king, it was of a character that induced him to issue a decree, October 5, 1747, by which the Council of Castile was given jurisdiction over the officials of the Inquisition. This called forth a heated remonstrance, dated November 1st, which must have proceeded from the Inquisitor-general Prado y Cuesta, for no other subject would have dared thus to address his sovereign. The writer tells him that the decree is unworthy of his name and his faith, nor is it well that the world should see him, in the first year of his reign, discharge such a thunderbolt against the Holy Office, such as it had never received since its foundation, leaving it prostrated by the shock. He affirms before God, and would wish to write it with his blood, that the service of Jesus Christ and the prosperity of the king and his kingdoms require that the decree be returned to the royal hands, without a copy being allowed to remain.[1220]
Although this decree was not effective as to the salaried officials, the Inquisition was falling upon evil days. It no longer inspired the old-time awe; it was no longer striving to extend its prerogatives, but was fighting a losing battle to maintain them. A writer of about this period deplores its decadence; its commissioners and familiars serve without pay and the only reward for their labors and the cost of making their proofs of limpieza is the exemptions of pure honor granted by the kings, but now scarce one of these is observed and no fit persons seek the positions, although they are much needed, for there are not a tenth part of those allowed by the Concordias.[1221] There is probably some truth in this, for Inquisitor-general Prado y Cuesta, in appointing, at the request of the tribunal of Valencia, Fray Vicente Latorre as calificador or censor, asks why, when there are so many learned canons and professors in Valencia, who formerly were eager in seeking the position, it had now fallen so greatly in estimation.[1222]
It was difficult for the Inquisition to reconcile itself to the tendencies of the age and several cases, about this time, in which the tribunal of Valencia refused even to admit competencias, asserting that its combined ecclesiastical and royal jurisdictions rendered it the sole judge of all that concerned its officials, show that the old spirit still lingered and found expression whenever it dared.[1223] Carlos III, however, was even more assertive of the royal prerogative than his brother Fernando. We have seen his orders of 1763 concerning municipal and police regulations which included the prohibitions of carrying concealed weapons and exporting money, in all of which familiars were wholly removed from the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, and in 1775 a competencia in Córdova caused him emphatically to order the inviolable observance of this decree.[1224] All this led to the change in the commissions of familiars as regards carrying arms, which was brought about, in 1777, by the authorities of Alcalá la Real and Seville refusing to register commissions issued by the tribunals of Toledo and Seville, because they were not in accordance with the new regulations. In place, as of old, of blustering and coercing the magistrates, the Suprema collected from all the tribunals the formulas employed by them and framed a new one, phrased in a very different spirit and in accordance with the royal edicts.[1225]
That the endless quarrels which we have been considering ought to be settled in an amicable manner was so self-evident that, from an early period, persistent efforts had been made to accomplish it, resulting in the “competencia” so frequently alluded to above. Originally it would seem that there was no established procedure and that the Inquisition settled for itself all questions arising with the magistrates. After the first opposition had been broken down these were not numerous, until the attribution of the fuero to the officials, and the enormous multiplication of familiars and other unsalaried officers, gave occasion for collisions with the courts. The earliest attempt that I have met to provide a method of settlement is a cédula, issued about 1535 by the empress-regent in the absence of Charles V, ordering that, when there was a dispute about jurisdiction, the president and judges of the royal court should meet the inquisitors and arrange matters harmoniously, so that it should not be known that there had been a difference between them. It was in conformity with this that, in 1542, when Joaquin de Tunes was tried in Barcelona for the murder of Juan Ballell, a familiar, the inquisitor, Miguel Puig, held a conference with the regent and judges of the royal chancellery, prior to the arrest, and the custody of the accused was settled without difficulty. It was impossible, however, to preserve peace between classes mutually jealous, and we have seen (p. 435) the troubles which Prince Philip endeavored to settle by the cédula of May 15, 1545. This favored the royal jurisdiction and produced complaints from the Suprema as when, in 1548, it represented to Charles V that in Granada the judges made the cédula a pretext to intervene in the business of the tribunal, whenever any one made a complaint, requiring the inquisitors to interrupt their work and come to the Audiencia, when they were ordered not to proceed and, if this was disobeyed, the judges raised a great disturbance. All this would cease if the old rule were restored that any one feeling aggrieved must appeal to the Suprema where he would get justice.[1226] Prince Philip’s cédula of 1553 settled this as far as concerned matters of faith, but neither it nor the Castilian Concordia of the same year could prevent disputes over the immunities of the officials and familiars which the Inquisition was persistently endeavoring to extend. The Concordia, however, endeavored to provide for the settlement of these by the process described above (p. 436) which became technically known as competencia. It is remarkable that, in the Valencia Concordia of 1554, there is no such provision, but in that of 1568, for the Aragonese kingdoms, it appears in the slightly different form that the regent of the Audiencia and the senior inquisitor should consult and endeavor to come to some agreement. If they could not do so, the regent was to send his side of the case to the Council of Aragon and the inquisitor his to the Suprema, when the king would arrange how the matter should be decided.[1227] The two formulas were combined in practice and remained the established method of settling conflicts of jurisdiction.
This should have produced peace but we have seen that it only gave occasion for fresh subjects of discord. The inquisitors were restive under any restraint on their arbitrary methods and already in 1560, a carta acordada of November 14th warns them that they are not to proceed with censures against the judges, when the latter offer competencias, but are to send the papers to the Suprema and await the result, under a penalty of twenty ducats for every infraction of the rule.[1228] The inquisitors however avoided competencias as far as they could and, when obliged to concede them, the opportunity was taken of humiliating the royal judges and make them feel their inferiority in a manner most galling to men so tenacious of the respect due to position and so insistent on courtesy. When de Soto Salazar reports of the inquisitors of Barcelona that, when they had occasion to notify the lieutenant of the king or the regent of the Audiencia, they sent a messenger to summon him and then kept him waiting in the antechamber and that sometimes they called the judges before them and scolded them without cause, we can readily appreciate the intensity of the hatred thus excited.[1229]
So, when the Inquisition established its formula for competencias, they were sedulously framed to be as arrogantly insulting as possible. The first mandate inhibits peremptorily the judge from action and orders him to remit the case to the tribunal within twenty-four hours. If an arrest has been made the prisoner is to be discharged on bail to present himself before the inquisitors and any property seized or sequestrated is to be released. If the secular judge has any reason to allege to the contrary he is to present himself in person or by procurator to the tribunal, which will render justice, and all this is under holy obedience and the threat of major excommunication and a heavy fine. If there are any papers in the case the scrivener is ordered to surrender them, and the accuser or plaintiff is to appear within a time specified and receive justice, in default of which the case will be heard without him and without further notice. Then, if a reply is made to this alleging reasons for not obeying, a second mandate is issued pronouncing them insufficient and ordering the first one to be obeyed within a specified time under the above penalties. If the judge then proposes a competencia, a mandate is sent to him reciting the previous ones and saying that, to avoid, troubling the higher powers, he is ordered to surrender all papers and suspend all action, or the excommunication and fine will be enforced on his person and property. The next mandate accepts the competencia, states that the tribunal is ready to forward its papers and orders the judges to send their side within twelve days, adding a threat of excommunication and fine if any additional testimony be taken in the case. All this is phrased in the most mandatory fashion as of a superior addressing a subordinate and all these missives are ordered to be returned to the tribunal. If, after a competencia was formed, the familiar or official accepted the jurisdiction of the secular court, he was deprived of his commission. As we have frequently seen, there was no hesitation, at any stage of the proceedings, to excommunicate the judges, to anathematize them and to lay an interdict on the city, followed by a cessatio a divinis.[1230]
In addition to the gratification of thus humiliating the magistrates, there was also in this truculence the object of rendering the process so offensive as to make them shrink from resisting the encroachments of the Inquisition. When this failed the tribunal had abundant sources of annoyance in raising interminable questions of precedence and formalities, which were sometimes fought so bitterly and long as virtually to supersede the original case. The points that could be raised were endless. In 1602, the Count of Benavente, then Viceroy of Valencia, issued letters ordering a conference over the arrest of Gerónimo Falcon; the tribunal surrendered him, admitting that the case did not pertain to it, but demanded that the viceroy and chancellery should cancel the letters on their records and, on refusal, it excommunicated the regent. The matter was carried up to the Suprema and Council of Aragon, when the king decided that the letters must be expunged and it was done in presence of a secretary of the Inquisition. The same humiliation had been inflicted on the count’s father, when he was viceroy, and also on the Duke of Segorbe.[1231]
This arrogance continued until Carlos III, in his decree of 1775, informed the Inquisition that the royal jurisdiction which it exercised was on precisely the same level as that of his judges and magistrates; there must be entire equality between them; all threats of excommunication and fines must be abandoned; there must be free interchange of papers, mutual courtesy and no assumption of superiority. It was difficult for the tribunals to abandon the formulas which flattered their vanity and a second command was necessary, issued in 1783, on the occasion of a prolonged conflict of the Valencia tribunal with the alcalde of Consentaina. This finally produced obedience and the Suprema transmitted the royal order to Valencia with instructions for its observance.[1232]
While this doubtless diminished the exasperation of these conflicts, it did not check their frequency. They continued to be a constant source of trouble and it was from a desire to diminish this, as well as to extend its authority, that the Suprema, in 1806, forbade the tribunals from instituting them without submitting the case to it and receiving its approval.[1233] When, under the Restoration, the Inquisition was revived, in 1814, the officials naturally claimed the fuero, active and passive, civil and criminal, and Fernando VII, in the decision of a case carried up to him from Seville, announced, February 15, 1815, in no uncertain tones, that they should be protected in its enjoyment, but the cases appear to be rare and the aggressive spirit had disappeared.[1234] When, in Seville, the creditors of Francisco de Paula Esquivol complained of him to the tribunal, in place of defending him, it promptly dismissed him, June 27, 1815, an action which was confirmed by the Suprema.[1235] Even more significant was a case, in 1816, when in Seville Lorenzo Ayllon abused a priest while celebrating mass and endeavored to seize the sacrament, and the secular authorities arrested and proceeded to try him. In such a case there could be no question as to the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, but there was no disturbance, and when the tribunal claimed his transfer to the secret prison the Suprema interposed and ordered that he should be allowed to remain in the public gaol, a detainer being lodged to prevent his discharge during his trial—a concession to the royal jurisdiction which would have petrified Pacheco or Arce y Reynoso.[1236]
There was the same disposition to avoid coming to extremes with the spiritual courts. In 1816 the provisor of the see of Tuy prosecuted Joseph Metzcler for impious, execrable and sacrilegious blasphemies. The tribunal of Santiago applied, in a courteous note, to the provisor for the papers and received a reply without signature. This the Suprema directed it to return and explain that there was no desire to invade the episcopal jurisdiction, but as the blasphemous propositions and acts of Metzcler might be heretical, of which the Inquisition had exclusive cognizance, it must insist on seeing the evidence to extract what appertained to it, after which the papers would be returned. It seems to have obtained the evidence for, on October 15, 1817, it voted to imprison Metzcler, as soon as his trial by the provisor should be ended, but the Suprema instructed it not to wait for this, as the jurisdiction of the Inquisition was privileged.[1237]
There was one peculiarly irritating feature in the position of the Inquisition in these quarrels, which exacerbated them greatly and often neutralized all efforts to maintain harmony—the power which it arrogated to itself of refusing to form competencias on the ground that its rights were too clear to admit of debate. Thus it held that the salaried and titular officials, with their families and servants, were so wholly beyond all secular jurisdiction that it refused to entertain any proceedings in contest of their claims. It was in vain that Philip III, by a royal letter of 1615, declared that if inquisitors refused a conference, on the ground that the matter was too clear to justify it, the regent of the chancellery should form a competencia and forward the papers as usual.[1238] It was equally useless for Philip IV to decree, in 1630, that when a contention was started by either party, the other must entertain it, no matter how clear it might be, under pain, for a first offence, of five hundred ducats and, for a second, of suspension during the royal pleasure. To ensure the imposition of the fine, each Council was to give the other faculties for its collection from offenders, but, when the Suprema forwarded this decree to the tribunals, with orders for its strict observance, it added significantly that it did not apply to cases of salaried and titular officials, though no such exception was made in the decree. It knew that Philip would never summon courage to enforce his law and it was right. When, in 1633, the Council of Aragon endeavored to collect such a fine, the Suprema interposed, asserting that it could only be done by consent of both Councils, which was, in effect, to invalidate the law, and Philip himself violated it, in 1634, when Augustin Vidal, messenger of the tribunal of Valencia, was arrested by the royal court for the murder of Juan Alonso Martínez, a Knight of Santiago and Bayle of Alicante. The tribunal demanded him and refused a competencia, when Philip weakly ordered him to be surrendered “for this time and without prejudice to my royal jurisdiction.”[1239]
The Inquisition carried its point. Philip, by decisions of 1645 and 1658, admitted that there could be no competencias in the case of salaried officials and the Suprema enforced these decisions by a carta acordada of August 7, 1662, pointing out that they must not be entertained where such officials were concerned; at the same time tribunals were warned to exercise moderation and not to employ censures without consulting it, unless delay was inadmissible.[1240] Even Philip however had to intervene against the consequences of his own acts, in 1664, when the portero of the tribunal of Logroño killed in his house a priest, apparently through jealousy. The alcalde mayor prosecuted the murderer and arrested his wife; the tribunal excommunicated the alcalde and cast an interdict on the town. The Council of Aragon formed a competencia and claimed that during it the censures should be raised according to custom, but the Suprema refused on the ground that there could be no competencia. Philip was appealed to and ordered the censures raised for the unanswerable reason that as judges under excommunication could not hold their courts, if it were allowed thus to paralyze all judicial business it would have arbitrary control over all cases and frustrate all legal remedies.[1241] This decision was disregarded. It seems extraordinary that any community would endure for centuries the indefinite stoppage of the administration of justice, constantly occurring through the reckless abuse of the power of excommunication, as when, in 1672, we find the queen-regent applying to the inquisitor-general to know how she is to answer the complaints of the town of Logroño at the prolonged suspension of the powers of the corregidor who lay under excommunication, seeing that there is no conclusion of the competencia which has been so long pending.[1242]
The Inquisition evidently aggravated as far as it could the public distress as a means of establishing its claims. In an effort to limit the abuse of refusing competencias, there was a junta formed, in 1679, from the Suprema and Council of State with the assistance of some theologians. This admitted that there could be no competencia in the cases of salaried officials, except when they held public office and were prosecuted for malfeasance, but it laid down the rule that, when the Suprema refused a competencia, the Council of State could appeal to the king who could appoint a junta to decide this secondary question. A limited time was allowed to the Suprema to state its reasons for refusal and during a competencia the accused was to be liberated on bail and all censures were to be raised.[1243] This removed some of the hardships, but the Suprema seems to have sought to evade it by sullenly refusing to form the juntas with the Royal Councils, for another decree of Carlos II ordered it to attend when summoned so that these affairs might be settled.[1244] It was in vain that, in 1730, the Council of Castile urged that competencias be admitted in all cases, for Philip V decided that the agreement of 1679 should stand.[1245] Probably not much was gained in the latest attempt to settle these perennial quarrels by Carlos IV in 1804, who ordered that when a conflict arose between a royal court and a tribunal, in a matter not of faith concerning an official, the court should refer the case to the governor of the Royal Council and the tribunal to the Suprema. These should then select an examiner who was to report to the Secretaría de Gracia y Justicia for the royal decision.[1246]
The evils of the system were admitted on all hands, but it was so vicious in principle that remedies were impossible. The customary juntas of two members each from the Suprema and the Council of Castile or of Aragon was at best a clumsy device, onerous on the Councils and usually leading only to procrastination. To systematize it, in 1625, a permanent Junta Grande de Competencias was formed of two members from each Council, whose duty it should be to despatch all cases, and rules for it were framed in April, 1626, but it was short-lived. In 1634 Philip IV ordered the formation of a junta of two members each of the Suprema and Council of Castile to formulate a plan of relief, but, on June 9th of that year, the Suprema reported that it had never been able to accomplish a meeting of the Junta. Then, in 1657, the Junta Grande was resuscitated and we meet with an allusion to it in 1659, but it appears to have been abandoned soon afterwards.[1247] Ingenuity was at fault to alleviate the evils inseparable from the permanent antagonism between the rival jurisdictions. Of these evils the one most keenly felt was the interminable delay in the settlement of cases. The councils from which the members were drawn were crowded with their more legitimate business; there was rarely accord in the junta; the matter would be argued without expectation of agreement; each side would be obstinate; perhaps the case would be referred to the king or years would pass before a settlement would be reached; perhaps, indeed, it would be silently dropped without a decision, especially when a decision might be undesirable because one or both sides feared a troublesome precedent. Meanwhile the case remained petrified in the condition existing at the time the competencia was formed. Until the so-called Concordia of 1679 permitted the release of prisoners on bail, if any one had been arrested, he remained in prison, perhaps to die there as sometimes occurred. In 1638 the Inquisition complained of this, when its officers happened to be the prisoners, for competencias were always slow of settlement and the work of the tribunals was crippled for lack of their ministers, while their poverty precluded their giving adequate salaries to substitutes.[1248] It was not until 1721 that a remedy for this procrastination was sought by Philip V in a decree reciting the long delays and the frequency of cases remaining undecided by reason of a dead-lock in the junta, wherefore in future when a junta was formed, he was to be notified in order that he might appoint a fifth member, thus assuring a majority.[1249] It does not seem however that this accomplished its purpose and, when Carlos III consolidated the cumbrous framework of government by instituting the Junta de Estado, composed of the ministers of the several departments, Floridablanca enumerates, among the benefits accruing, the expediting of cases of competencia and avoiding the interminable delays caused by the etiquette of the tribunals and the intrigues of the parties concerned.[1250]
I have dwelt thus in detail on this subject, not only because it absorbed so large a portion of the activity of the Inquisition, but because of its importance in the relations between the Holy Office and the other institutions of Spain and in explaining the detestation which the Inquisition excited. If the people regarded it as a whole with awe and veneration, as the bulwark of the Catholic faith, their hatred was none the less for its members, and the perpetual struggle against the tremendous odds of its power, supported by the unflinching favor of the Hapsburgs, bears equal testimony to the tenacity of the Spanish character and to the magnitude of the evils with which the Inquisition afflicted the nation.
THE preceding chapters illustrate some of the causes that provoked popular hatred of the Inquisition, but these were by no means all. It enjoyed, as we have said, enthusiastic support in the exercise of its appropriate functions in defending the faith, but apart from this, it had infinite ways of exciting hostility. This was the inevitable result of entrusting irresponsible power to men, for the most part overbearing and arrogant, who owed obedience only to the Suprema and who early learned that, while it might disapprove of their acts, it always supported them against complaints and, while it might administer rebuke in secret, it hesitated long before it would compromise the asserted infallibility of the Holy Office by dismissal or any other public demonstration. There was no other power to call them to account and they could rely upon its indulgence. This indulgence they extended to their subordinates, over whom, indeed, they had not the power of removal, and the consequence was that the whole body thoroughly earned the detestation of the people by the abuse of their privileges, creating irritation which was none the less exasperating because its causes might be trivial. The situation finds expression in a carta acordada of October 12, 1561, in which the Suprema begs the tribunals, for the love of God, to inflict no wrong or oppression for, since they are accused when they do right, what is to be expected when they give just grounds of complaint?[1251]
Whether just or not, grounds of complaint were never lacking. The power of the inquisitor had practically scarce any bounds but his own discretion, and the temptation to its abuse was irresistible to the kind of men who mostly filled the position. In the memorial of Llerena to Philip and Juana, in 1506, complaint is made that the officials seized all the houses that they wanted and in one case, when some young orphan girls did not vacate as quickly as ordered, they fastened up the street-door and the occupants were obliged to make an opening in order to leave it.[1252] The same spirit was shown to parties not quite so defenceless in 1642, when its exhibition in Córdova nearly provoked a disastrous tumult. There was a vacant house which Juan de Ribera, one of the inquisitors, talked of renting, but he went to Murcia without taking it. On his return he found that it had been leased to a son of Don Pedro de Cardenas, one of the veinticuatros, or town-councillors. He sent for Cardenas and asked whether he knew that he had engaged the house. Cardenas professed ignorance, adding that, if he had not moved his family into it, he would abandon it. Ribera ordered him to leave it and, on his refusal, the tribunal took up the quarrel by serving on him a notice to quit. As he did not obey, it cited him to appear and forced him to give security. His kinsmen and friends rallied around him and promised to sustain him by force; the matter became town-talk and the tribunal felt its honor engaged to sustain its commands by violence. It assembled the two companies of soldiers which it kept in the alcázar, while the caballeros armed themselves and guarded the house. The corregidor appealed to the tribunal not to drench the city in blood by exposing the poor civic militia to the swords of the gentlemen, and it consented to carry the matter to the king. The Council of Castile ordered that the tenant be maintained in possession, while the Suprema instructed the tribunal not to yield a jot, but to eject him by whatever means it could.[1253] What was the outcome does not appear, but the case illustrates the extent to which the Inquisition magnified its powers and the determination with which it employed them.