[408] Volume ii. of R. W. and A. J. Carlyle’s History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West (1909) maintains that the statements of papal pretensions which were incorporated in the recognized collections of Decretals were less extreme than those emanating from the papacy under stress of controversy.

[409] See Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. by Maitland (Cambridge, 1900), p. 22 sqq. and notes. I would express my indebtedness to this book for these pages on mediaeval political theories. Dunning’s History of Political Theories is a convenient outline; Carlyle’s History of Mediaeval Political Theory gives the sources carefully.

[410] Occasionally studium (knowledge, study, or science) is introduced as a third part or element of the human community or of human life. Thus in the famous statement of Jordanes of Osnabrück—the Romans received the Sacerdotium, the Germans the Imperium, the French the Studium. See Gierke, Political Theories, p. 104, note 8.

[411] Cf. Gierke, o.c. p. 109, note 16. But compare Carlyle, o.c. vol. ii. part ii. chaps. vii.-xi.

[412] Even toward the close of the Middle Ages Marsilius of Padua was almost alone in positing the absolute supremacy of the State, says Gierke.

[413] See Gierke, o.c. p. 144, note 131, and compare notes 132, 133, and 183 for attacks upon the plenary power of the pope.

[414] Gierke, o.c. pp. 31-32, and p. 139, notes 107 and 108.

[415] Dig. i. 4, 1; Gierke, o.c. p. 39 and pp. 146, 147.

[416] Gierke, o.c. p. 64.

[417] Gierke, o.c. p. 172, note 256. Cf. ante, p. 268.

[418] See Gierke, o.c. pp. 73-86, and corresponding notes.

[419] Little will be said in these pages of palpable crass heretics like the Cathari, for example. The philosophic ideas of such seem gathered from the flotsam and jetsam of the later antique world; their stock was not of the best, and bore little interesting fruit for later times. Such mediaeval heresies present no continuous evolution like that of the proper scholasticism. Progress in philosophy and theology came through academic personages, who at all events laid claim to orthodoxy. All lines of advance leading on to later phases of philosophic, scientific, and religious thought, lay within the labours of such, some of whom, however, were suspected or even condemned by the Church, like Eriugena, Abaelard, or Roger Bacon. But these men did not stand apart from orthodox academic circles, and were never cast out by the Church. Thought and learning in the Middle Ages were domiciled in monastic, episcopal, or university circles; and these were at least conventionally orthodox.

It has been said, to be sure, that the heresy of one generation becomes the orthodoxy of another; but this is true only of tendencies like those of Abaelard, which represent the gradual expansion and clearing up of scholastic processes. For the time they may be condemned, perhaps because of the vain and contentious character of the suspected thinker; but in the end they are recognized as admissible.

The Averroists constitute an apparent exception. Yet they were a philosophic and academic sect, whose heresy consisted in an implicit following of Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes. Moreover, they sought to save their orthodoxy by their doctrine of the two kinds of truth, philosophic and theological or dogmatic. It is not clear that much fruitful thought came from their school. The positions of Siger de Brabant, a prominent Averroist and contemporary of Aquinas, are referred to post, Chapter XXXVII. The best account of Averroism is Mandonnet’s Siger de Brabant et l’averroisme latin au XIII^e siècle (a second edition, Louvain, is in preparation). See also De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy (3rd. ed., Longmans, 1909) p. 379 sqq. with authorities cited.

[420] Called also his Summa philosophica, to distinguish it from his Summa theologiae.

[421] Summa theologiae, i. i., quaestio i. art. 1-8.

[422] Post, Chapter XXXVI., I.

[423] Even the Averroists were more mediaeval than Greek, inasmuch as they professed to follow Aristotle implicitly. Cf. post, Chapter XXXVII., at the end.

[424] A touch of “salvation,” or salvation’s need, is on Plato when his “philosophy” becomes a consideration of death (μελέτη θανάτου) and a process of growing as like to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) as man can. Phaedo, 80 E, and Theaetetus, 176 A.

[425] Historia calamitatum, cap. 9 and 10. Cf. post, p. 303.

[426] Post, Chapter XLI.

[427] Ante, p. 298. I cannot avoid referring to Abaelard several times before considering the man and his work more specifically, and in the proper place; post, Chapter XXXVI. I.

[428] Introductio ad theologiam, lib. ii. (Migne 178, col. 1039).

[429] See Denifle, “Die Sentenzen Abaelard’s und die Bearbeitungen seiner Theologia,” Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte, i. p. 402 sqq. and p. 584 sqq. Also Picavet, “Abélard et Alexander de Hales, créateurs de la méthode scholastique,” Bib. de l’école des hautes études, sciences religieuses, t. vii. p. 221 sqq.

[430] Two extracts, one from the Sentences and one from the Summa, touching the same matter, will illustrate the stage in the scholastic process reached by Peter Lombard, about the year 1150, and that attained by Thomas Aquinas a hundred years later.

The Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences are divided into Distinctiones, with sub-titles to the latter. Distinctio xlvi. of the first Book bears the general title: “The opinion (sententia) declaring that the will of God which is himself, cannot be frustrated, seems to be opposed by some opinions.” The first subdivision of the text begins: “Here the question rises. For it is said by the authorities above adduced [the preceding Distinctio had discussed “The will of God which is His essence, one and eternal”] that the will of God, which is himself, and is called His good pleasure (beneplacitum) cannot be frustrated, because by that will fecit quaecumque voluit in caelo et in terra, which—witness the Apostle—nihil resistit. [I leave the Scriptural quotations in Latin, so as to mark them.] It is queried, therefore, how one should understand what the Apostle says concerning the Lord, 1 Tim. 2: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri. For since all are not saved, but many are damned, that which God wills to take place, seems not to take place (become, fieri), the human will obstructing the will of God. The Lord also in the Gospel reproaching the wicked city, Matt, xxiii., says: Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub alis, et noluisti. Thus it might seem from these, that the will of God may be overcome by the will of men, and, resisted by the unwillingness of the weakest, the Most Strong may prove unable to do what He willed. Where then is that omnipotence by which in coelo et terra, according to the Prophet, omnia quaecumque voluit fecit? And how does nothing withstand His will, if He wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not? For these sayings seem indeed to oppose what has been stated.”

The second paragraph proceeds: “But let us see the solution, and first hear how what the Lord said should be understood. For it was not intended to mean (as Augustine says, Enchiridion, c. 97, solving this question) that the Lord wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not do what He willed because she would not; but rather she did not wish her children to be gathered by Him, yet in spite of her unwillingness (qua tamen nolente) He gathered all He willed of her children.... And the sense is: As many as I have gathered by my will, always effective, I have gathered, thou being unwilling. Hence it is evident that these words of the Lord are not opposed to the authorities referred to.”

(Paragraph 3) “Now it remains to see how the aforesaid words do not contradict what the Apostle said of the Lord: Vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Because of these words many have wandered from the truth, saying that God willed many things which did not come to pass. But the saying is not thus to be understood, as if God willed any to be saved, and they were not. For who can be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot change the evil wills of men to good when and where He will? Surely what is said in Psalm 113, Quaecumque voluit fecit, is not true, if He willed anything and did not accomplish it. Or,—(and this is still more shameful) for that reason He did not do it, because what the Omnipotent willed to come to pass, the will of man obstructed. Hence when we read in Holy Scripture velit omnes homines salvos fieri, we should not detract from the will of omnipotent God, but understand the text to mean that no man is saved except whom He wills to be saved: not that there is no man whom He does not will to be saved, but that no man may be saved except whom He wills should be saved.... Thus also is to be understood the text from John i.: Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; not as if there is no man who is not lighted, but that none is lighted save from Him....”

The next and fourth paragraph takes up the problem whether evil, that is sin, takes place by the will of God, or He unwilling (eo nolente). “As to this, divers men thinking diversely have been found in contradiction. For some say that God wills evils to be or become (esse vel fieri) yet does not will evils. But others say that He neither wills evils to be nor to become. Yet these and those agree in declaring that God does not will evils. Yet each with arguments as well as authorities strives to make good his assertion.” We will not follow the Lombard through this thorny problem. He cuts his way with passages from his chief patristic authority, Augustine, and in the end concludes: “Leaving this and other like foolish opinions, and favouring the sounder view, which is more fully sanctioned by the testimonies of the Saints, we may say that God neither wills evils to become, nor wills that they should not become, nor yet is He unwilling (nolle) that they should become. All that He wills to become, becomes, and all that He wills not to become does not become. Yet many things become which He does not will to become, as every evil.”

Thus the Lombard. Now let us see how Thomas, in his Summa theologiae, Pars Prima, Quaestio xix. Articulus ix. expounds the point: utrum voluntas Dei sit malorum.

“As to the ninth articulus thus one proceeds. (1) It seems [Videtur, formula for stating the initial argument which will not be approved] that the will of God is [the cause] of evils. For God wills every good that becomes (i.e. comes into existence). But it is good that evils should come; for Augustine says in the Enchiridion: ‘Although those things which are evils, in so far as they are evils, are not goods; yet it is good (bonum) that there should be not only goods (bona) but evils.’ Therefore God wills evils.”

“(2) Moreover [Praeterea, Thomas’s regular formula for introducing the succeeding arguments, which he will not approve] Dionysius says, iv. cap. de divinis nominibus: ‘There will be evil making for the perfection of the whole.’ And Augustine says in the Enchiridion: ‘Out of all (things) the admirable beauty of the universe arises; wherein even that which is called evil, well ordered and set in its place, commends the good more highly; since the good pleases more, and is the more praiseworthy, when compared with evil.’ But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and grace of the universe; since this is what God chiefly wills in His creation. Therefore God wills evils.”

“(3) Moreover, the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils (mala fieri, et non fieri) are contradictory opposites. But God does not will evils not to occur; because since some evils do occur, the will of God would not be fulfilled. Therefore God wills evils to occur.”

“Sed contra est [Thomas’s formula for stating the opinion which he will approve] what Augustine says in his book of Eighty-three Questions: ‘No wise man is the author of man’s deterioration; yet God is more excellent than any wise man; much less then, is God the author of any one’s deterioration. But He is said to be the author when He is spoken of as willing anything. Therefore man becomes worse, God not willing it. But with every evil, something becomes worse. Therefore God does not will evils.’”

“Respondeo dicendum quod [Thomas’s formula for commencing his elucidation] since the reason (or ground or cause, ratio) of the good is likewise the reason of the desirable (as discussed previously), evil is opposed to good: it is impossible that any evil, as evil, should be desired, either by the natural appetite or the animal, or the intellectual, which is will. But some evil may be desired per accidens, in so far as it conduces to some good. And this is apparent in any appetite. For the natural impulse (agens naturale) does not aim at privation or destruction (corruptio); but at form, to which the privation of another form may be joined (i.e. needed, conjungitur); and at the generation of one, which is the destruction of another. Thus a lion, killing a stag, aims at food, to which is joined the killing of an animal. Likewise the fornicator aims at enjoyment, to which is joined the deformity of guilt.

“Thus evil which is joined to some good, is privation of another good. Never, therefore, is evil desired, not even per accidens, unless the good to which the evil is joined appears greater than the good which is annulled through the evil. But God wills no good more than His goodness; yet He wills some one good more than some other good. Hence the evil of guilt, which destroys relationship to divine good (quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum), God in no way wills. But the evil of natural defect, or the evil of penalty, He wills in willing some good to which such evil is joined; as, in willing righteousness He wills penalty; and in willing that the order of nature be preserved, He wills certain natural corruptions.

“Ad primum ergo dicendum [Thomas’s formula for commencing his reply to the first false argument] that certain ones have said that although God does not will evils, He wills evils to be or become: because, although evils are not goods, yet it is good that evils should be or become. They said this for the reason that those things which are evil in themselves, are ordained for some good; and they deemed this ordainment involved in saying mala esse vel fieri. But that is not said rightly. Because evil is not ordained for good per se but per accidens. For it is beyond the sinner’s intent, that good should come of it; just as it was beyond the intent of the tyrants that from their persecutions the patience of the martyrs should shine forth. And therefore it cannot be said that such ordainment for good is involved in saying that it is good for evil to be or become: because nothing is adjudged according to what pertains to it per accidens but according to what pertains to it per se.”

“Ad secundum dicendum that evil is not wrought for the perfection or beauty of the whole except per accidens, as has been shown. Hence this which Dionysius says that evil makes for the perfection of the whole may lead to an illogical conclusion.”

“Ad tertium dicendum that although the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils are opposed as contradictories; yet to will the occurrence and to will the non-occurrence of evils, are not opposed as contradictories, since both one and the other may be affirmative. God therefore neither wills the occurrence nor the non-occurrence of evils; but wills to permit their occurrence. And this is good.”

[431] Ante, Chapter XII.

[432] Ante, pp. 289 sqq.

[433] The Speculum majus of Vincent of Beauvais will afford the principal example of the resulting hybrid arrangement.

[434] Ludwig Baur, Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903), p. 193 sqq., to which I am indebted for what I have to say in the next few pages.

[435] Migne, Pat. Lat. 64, col. 10 sqq.

[436] These works were written near the middle of the twelfth century. Gundissalinus was Archdeacon of Segovia and drew upon Arab writings.

[437] See L. Baur, Gundissalinus, etc., p. 376 sqq.

[438] The treatise is not printed. Its captions are given by L. Baur in his Gundissalinus, pp. 368-375, from which I have borrowed what I give of them.

[439] Liber de praedicabilibus (tome 1 of Albertus’s works), which in scholastic logic means the five “universals,” genus, species, difference, property, accident, (also called the quinque voces) discussed in Porphyry’s Introduction to the Categories. The Categories themselves are called praedicamenta.

[440] The above gives the arguments of chapters i. and ii. of the work. One notices that Albertus in this exposition of the subject of Porphyry’s treatise, is using the method which Thomas brings to syllogistic perfection in his Summa.

[441] It was printed, more than once, in the late fifteenth century; the most readable edition is that printed at Douai in 1624, in four huge folios.

[442] Boundless as the work appears, neither in mental powers, nor learning, nor in massiveness of achievement, is its author to be compared with Albertus Magnus. The De universo of Rabanus Maurus, Migne 111, col. 9-612, is in its arrangement and method a forerunner of Vincent’s Speculum. Later predecessors were the English Franciscan Bartolomaeus, whose encyclopaedic De proprietatibus rerum was written a little before the middle of the twelfth century (see Felder, Studien in Franciscanerorder, etc., pp. 251-253); and Lambertus Audomarensis (St. Omer) with his Liber floridus, a general digest of knowledge, historical, ecclesiastical, and natural, taken from many writers, an account of which is given in Migne 163, col. 1004 sqq.

[443] Here, of course, we have the hands of Esau, but the voice of Augustine and Orosius!

[444] The above is from cap. 9 of liber i. of the Speculum doctrinale.

[445] Migne, Pat. Lat. 34, col. 246-485.

[446] Ante, p. 290.

[447] The three theological virtues are fides, spes, and caritas. They are called thus because Deum habent pro objecto; and because they are poured (infunduntur) into us by God alone. They are distinguished from the moral and intellectual virtues because their object surpasses our reason, while the object of the moral and intellectual virtues can be comprehended by human reason (Summa, Pars prima secundae, Quaestio lxii., Art. 1-4).

[448] ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, Arist. Nich. Ethics, vi. 4.

[449] One notes that these two, like many other of the vices enumerated, are vices in that they are extremes, in the Aristotelian sense.

[450] We are at Quaestio clxxi. of Secunda secundae.

[451] The order which Thomas would have followed in the unfinished conclusion of his Summa theologiae, may be inferred from the order of the last half of Book IV. of his Contra Gentiles, or indeed from the last part of the fourth Book of the Lombard’s Sentences.

[452] Ante, Chapter XII.

[453] There were, of course, attempts at translation, notably those of Notker the German (see ante, Vol. I., p. 308) and Alfred’s translation of Boëthius’s De consolatione. But such were made only of the popular parts of Scripture (e.g. the Psalms) or of very elementary profane treatises. To what extent Notker’s translations were used, is hard to say. But at all events any one really seeking learning, studied and worked and thought in the medium of Latin; for the bulk of the patristic writings never were translated; and when the works of Aristotle had at last reached the Middle Ages in the Latin tongue, they were studied in that tongue. Because of the crudeness of the vernacular tongues, the Latin classics were even more untranslatable in the tenth or eleventh century than now.

One may add, that it was fortunate for the progress of mediaeval learning that Latin was the one language used by all scholars in all countries. This facilitated the diffusion of knowledge. How slow and painful would have been that diffusion if the different vernacular tongues had been used in their respective countries, for serious writing.

[454] Ante, Chapter XII., I.

[455] Eruditio didascalica, i. cap. 12 (Migne, Pat. Lat. 176, col. 750).

[456] Cf. Abelson, The Seven Liberal Arts (New York, 1906).

[457] I am speaking generally, that is to say, omitting for the present the aberrant or special or intrusive tendencies found in a man like Roger Bacon, for example. They were of importance for what was to come thereafter; but are not broadly representative of the Middle Ages.

[458] St. Anselm, Epist. lib. iii. 41, ad Fulconem (Migne, Pat. Lat. 158, col. 1192). So Roscellin showed in his own case how problems primarily logical could pass over to metaphysics or theology. Likewise, although on the other side of the controversy, one, Odo of Tournai, a good contemporary realist, found realism an efficient aid in explaining the transmission of original sin; since for him all men formed but one substance, which was infected once for all by the sin of the first parents. Cf. Hauréau, Hist. de la philosophie scholastique, i. pp. 297-308; De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy, p. 156, 3rd ed.

[459] Abaelard, Hist. calamitatum, chap. 2.

[460] Ante, Chapter XXV.

[461] Ante, Chapter XII., I.

[462] Abaelard’s Dialectica was published by Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d’Abélard (Paris, 1836). For a thorough exposition of Abaelard’s logic see Prantl, Ges. der Logik, ii. p. 160 sqq.

[463] I.e. as positive, comparative, and superlative.

[464] Cousin, Ouvr. inédits, p. 175. Cf. Aristotle’s Categories, ii. v. 20. The opening of Pars tertia of Abaelard’s Dialectica (in Cousin’s edition, p. 324 sqq.) affords an interesting example of this logical analysis and reconstruction of statement, which seems to originate in sheer grammar, and then advance beyond it.

[465] Cousin, o.c. pp. 190, 192.

[466] Cousin, o.c. p. 331.

[467] Prantl’s Geschichte der Logik, vol. ii., contains an exhaustive discussion of the various phases of this controversy: its language is little less difficult than that of the twelfth-century word-twisters.

[468] Cousin, o.c. pp. 434, 435.

[469] Theologia Christiana, iv. (Migne 178, col. 1284).

[470] Migne, Pat. Lat. 178, col. 1641.

[471] Ante, p. 292.

[472] Scito te ipsum, cap. 13 (Migne 178, col. 653).

[473] Scito te ipsum, cap. 19 (Migne 178, col. 664).

[474] Migne 178, col. 1615.

[475] Ante, pp. 304 sqq.

[476] This has been published by Stölzle: Abaelards 1121 zu Soissons verurteilter Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate divina (1891).

[477] Migne 178, col. 1123-1330; Cousin and Jourdain, P. Abaelardi opera, ii. pp. 357-566 (1859).

[478] Migne 178, col. 979-1114; Cousin and Jourdain, o.c. pp. 1-149.

[479] Ante, Chapter XXXV., I.

[480] Bernard, Ep. 338 (Migne 182, col. 542).

[481] Whose sacramental theory of the Creation has already been given at length, ante, Chapter XXVIII. For the incidents of Hugo’s life see the same chapter. Bibliography, note to page 61. See also Ostler, “Die Psychologie des Hugo von St. Viktor” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1906).

[482] De script. cap. 2 (Migne 175, col. 11).

[483] De script. cap. 2 (Migne 175, col. 10).

[484] Summa sententiarum (Migne 176, col. 42-174); also under title of Tractatus theologicus, wrongly ascribed to Hildebert of Lavardin, in Migne 171, col. 1067-1150.

[485] Migne 176, col. 740-838.

[486] I think of no previous work so closely resembling the Erud. didas. as the Institutiones divinarum et saecularum lectionum of Cassiodorus.

[487] Erud. did. i. 2.

[488] Here one sees the source of much that we quoted from Vincent de Beauvais, ante, Chapter XXXV., 1.

[489] Lib. iii. cap. 13 sqq.

[490] Erud. did. iii. cap. 20. Cf. ante, p. 63.

[491] Ante, Chapter XXVIII.

[492] Migne, Pat. Lat. 175, col. 115 sqq.

[493] Migne, Pat. Lat. 175, col. 923 sqq.

[494] The following consideration of the mysticism of Christian theologians is not intended to include other forms of “mysticism” (Pantheistic, poetical, pathological, neurotic, intellectual, and sensuous) within or without the Christian pale.

[495] Ante, p. 42 sqq.

[496] Ante, Chapter XXVIII.

[497] Migne, Pat. Lat. 176, col. 617-680.

[498] De arca Noe morali, i. cap. 2 (Migne 176, col. 621).

[499] Migne 176, col. 681-703. With Hugo’s pupil, Richard of St. Victor, this constant allegory, especially the constant allegorical use of Scripture names, becomes pedantic, precieux, impossible. See e.g. his Benjamin major in Migne 196, col. 64-202.

[500] De arrha animae, Migne 176, col. 951-970.

[501] Migne 182, col. 727-808. A translation is announced by George Lewis in the Oxford Library of Translations.

[502] De consid. lib. ii. cap. 2.

[503] Migne 183, col. 789 sqq. Chapter XVII., ante, is devoted to Bernard, and his letters and sermons.

[504] Ed. by Willner (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903).

[505] See ante, Chapter XXX., 1.

[506] Bernardus Silvestris, De mundi universitate, i. 2 (ed. by Barach and Wrobel; Innsbrück, 1876). As to Bernard Silvestris, see Clerval, Écoles de Chartres au moyen âge, p. 259 sqq. and passim; also Hauréau (who confuses him with Bernard of Chartres), Hist. de la phil. scholastique, ii. 407 sqq.

[507] See Hauréau, Hist. etc. ii. 447-472; R. L. Poole, Illustrations of Mediaeval Thought, chap. vi. His Liber de sex principiis is printed in Migne 188, col. 1257-1270.

[508] Werner, “Die Kosmologie und Naturlehre des scholastischen Mittelalters, mit specialler Beziehung auf Wilhelm von Conches,” Sitzungsb. K. Akad., philos. Klasse, 1873, Bd. lxxv.; Hauréau, Hist. etc. i. 431-446; ibid. Singularités littéraires, etc.

[509] Ante, Vol. I., p. 251.

[510] Ante, Chapter XXX., I.

[511] Under another title, Moralis philosophia de honesto et utile, it has been ascribed to Hildebert of Lavardin, Migne 171, col. 1007-1056.

[512] For examples of John’s Latin, see ante, p. 173.

[513] See e.g. his treatment of logic in Lib. III. and IV. of the Metalogicus (Migne 199).

[514] Polycraticus, ii. 19-21 sqq. There is now a critical edition of this work by C. C. J. Webb (Joannis Saresberiensis Policratici libri VIII.; Clarendon Press, 1910).

[515] Polycraticus, lib. vii., is devoted to a history of antique philosophy.

[516] Polycraticus, vii. cap. 10.

[517] Polycrat. vii. cap. 11.

[518] Migne 199, col. 955.

[519] Ante, Chapter XXIX., 11. and XXXII., 1.

[520] The works of Alanus are collected in Migne, Pat. Lat. 210. What follows in the text is much indebted to M. Baumgartner, “Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1896).

[521] All this is thoroughly done by Baumgartner, o.c.

[522] See Baumgartner, p. 76 sqq. and citations.

[523] What I have felt obliged to say upon the organization of mediaeval Universities, I have largely drawn from Rashdall’s Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1895). The subject is too large and complex for independent investigation, except of the most lengthy and thorough character. Extracts from illustrative mediaeval documents, with considerable information touching mediaeval Universities, are brought together by Arthur O. Norton in his Mediaeval Universities (Readings in the History of Education, Harvard University, 1909). For the Paris University, the most important source is the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. by Denifle and Chatelain (1889-1891). See also Ch. Thurot, L’Organisation de l’enseignement dans l’Université de Paris (Paris, 1850), and Denifle, Die Universitäten des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1885).

[524] What has been said applies to the Bologna Law University. That had been preceded by a school of Arts, and later there grew up a flourishing school of Medicine, where surgery was also taught. These schools became affiliated Universities, but never equalled the Law University in importance.

[525] The Masters who taught were called Regentes.

[526] Both civil and canon law were studied till 1219, when a Bull of Honorius III. forbade the study of the former at Paris.

[527] See post, p. 399.

[528] Mr. Rashdall’s.

[529] Rashdall, o.c. ii. p. 341.

[530] Oxford lay in the diocese of Lincoln.

[531] For the course of medicine and the list of books studied or lectured on, especially at Montpellier, from which we have the most complete list, see Rashdall, ii. p. 118 sqq. and ibid. p. 780. In Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. xx., 1909, C. H. Haskins publishes An unpublished List of Text-books, belonging to the close of the twelfth century, when classical studies had not as yet been overshadowed by Dialectic. See also, generally, Paetow, The Arts Course at Medieval Universities (Univ. of Illinois, 1910).

[532] See generally, Carra de Vaux, Avicenne (Paris, 1900); also Gazali, by the same author.

[533] Whoever will read the two monographs of the Baron Carra de Vaux, Avicenne and Gazali, will be struck by the closely analogous courses of Moslem and Christian thought; each showing the parallel phases of scholastic rationalism (reliant upon reason and rational authority) and scholastic theological piety, or mysticism (reliant upon the authority of Revelation and sceptical as to the validity of human reason).

[534] See for this matter Mandonnet, O.P., Aristote et la mouvement intellectuel du moyen âge, contained in his Siger de Brabant, and printed separately; De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 3rd ed., pp. 243-253 and authorities; C. Marchesi, L’ Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione medievale (Messina, 1904).

[535] Ante, Chapter V.

[536] Constitutiones des Prediger-Ordens vom Jahre 1228, Prologus; H. Denifle, Archiv für Litt. und Kirchenges. des Mittelalters, Bd i. (1885), p. 194.

[537] See Felder, Wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franciskanerorden, p. 24 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1904); a valuable work.

[538] See Felder, o.c. p. 29.

[539] Constitutiones, etc., cap. 28-31.

[540] Cf. Felder, o.c. p. 107 sqq.

[541] Cf. Felder, o.c. p. 177 sqq.

[542] From Denifle, Universitäten des Mittelalters, i. 99, note 192.

[543] See generally, Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l’averroisme latin au moyen âge (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1899); Baeumker (Beiträge, 1898), Die Impossibilia des Siger von Brabant; De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy, 3rd ed., p. 379 sqq. (Longmans, 1909).

[544] Albert was born probably in 1193, and died in 1280; Bacon was born some twenty years later, and died about 1292. Bonaventura was born in 1221, and Thomas in 1225 or 1227; they both died in 1274.

[545] So Raphael represents them in his “School of Athens.”

[546] Bonaventura, Sermo IV., Quaracchi edition, tome v. p. 572 (cited by De Wulf, Hist. etc. p. 304, note). With all their Augustinian-Platonism, the Franciscans made a good second to the Dominicans in the study of Aristotle, as is proved by the great number of commentaries upon his works by members of the former Order. See Felder, o.c. p. 479.

[547] Epist. de tribus quaestionibus, § 12.

[548] Tome v. (Quaracchi ed.) pp. 319-325.

[549] This is from § 26, the last in the work. Bonaventura has already said (§ 7): “Omnes istae cognitiones ad cognitionem Sacrae Scripturae ordinantur, in ea clauduntur et in illa perficiuntur, et mediante illa ad aeternam illuminationem ordinantur.” (“All kinds of knowledge are ordained for the knowledge of Holy Scripture, are in it enclosed and thereby are perfected; and through its mediation are ordered for eternal illumination.”)

[550] It is contained in tomes i.-iv. of the Quaracchi edition.

[551] T. v. pp. 201-291.

[552] Breviloquium, Prologus.

[553] One feels the reality of Bonaventura’s distinctions here between theology and philosophy. They are enunciations of his religious sense, and possess a stronger validity than any elaborate attempt to distinguish by argument between the two. Thomas distinguishes them with excellent reasoning. It lacks convincingness perhaps from the fact that Thomas’s theology is so largely philosophy, as Roger Bacon said.

[554] As this chapter opens a pars, it begins with a recapitulation of what has preceded and a summary of what is to come. The specific topic of the chapter commences here.

[555] I.e. the desiderative, rational, and irascible elements in man.

[556] Bonaventura closely follows Hugo of St. Victor’s De sacramentis, see ante, Chap. XXVIII., especially p. 72.

[557] Opera, t. v. pp. 295-313.

[558] Vir desideriorum, Dan. ix. 23 (Vulgate).

[559] The Breviloquium and Itinerarium are conveniently edited by Hefele in a little volume (Tübingen, 1861).

[560] Albertus, Metaphysicorum libri XIII., lib. i. tract. 1, cap. 4.

[561] Physic. lib. viii. tract. 1, cap. 14.

[562] Poster. Analyt. lib. i. tract. 1, cap. 1. This and the previous citation are from Mandonnet’s Siger de Brabant.

[563] Ethic. lib. vi. tract. 2, cap. 25.

[564] Carus, Ges. der Zoologie, p. 231.

[565] Ernst Meyer, Ges. der Botanik, Bd. iv. p. 77.

[566] The works of Albertus were edited by the Dominican Jammy in twenty-one volumes (Lyons, 1651); they are reprinted by Borgnet (Paris, 1890 et seq.). My references to volumes follow Jammy’s edition.

[567] See ante, pp. 314 sqq.

[568] Prantl, Ges. der Logik, iii. 89 sqq., calls him an “unklarer Kopf,” incapable of consistent thinking.

[569] This is the view of A. Schneider, Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903). The author presents analytically the disparate elements—Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, and theological-Augustinian, which are found in Albert’s writings.

[570] See Endriss, Albertus Magnus als Interpret der Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Munich, 1886).

[571] The above is mainly drawn from E. Meyer’s Ges. der Botanik, Bd. iv. pp. 38-78.

[572] Ante, Volume I. p. 76.

[573] See Carus, Geschichte der Zoologie, pp. 211-239.

[574] Sum. theol. pars prima, tract. I, quaest. ii.

[575] Ante, Chapter XXXV., I.

[576] Tome xx. p. 41a.

[577] The Vita of Thomas by Guilielmus de Thoco, Acta sanctorum, Martius, tome i. folio 657 sqq. (March 7), is wretchedly confused.

[578] Vita, cap. iii. § 15.

[579] One may see the truth of this by comparing the treatment of a matter in Albert’s Summa theologiae with the corresponding sections in Thomas. For example, compare Albert’s Summa theol. prima, Tract. vii. Quaest. xxx.-xxxiii., on generatio, processio, missio of the divine persons, with Thomas, Sum. theol. prima, Quaest. xxvii. and xliii.

[580] John of Damascus, an important Greek theologian of the eighth century, often cited by Thomas.

[581] Quaestiones are the larger divisions of the argument.

[582] Pars prima, Qu. xvi. Art. 3.

[583] Pars prima, Qu. lxxxii. Art. 3.

[584] Prima sec. Qu. iv. Art. 2.

[585] Prima sec. Qu. iv. Art. 3.

[586] Sum. Phil. contra Gentiles, iii. 37.

[587] One cannot avoid applying the masculine pronouns to God, and to the angels also. But, of course, this is a mere convenience of speech. Thomas ascribes no sex either to God or the angels.

[588] It will, of course, be borne in mind, that Thomas’s use of videre and visio to express man’s perception of God’s essential nature, does not mean a physical but an intellectual seeing.

[589] Given ante, pp. 290 sqq.

[590] Secundum quod est in actu, i.e. in realized actuality as distinguished from potentiality (Aristotelian conceptions).

[591] The foregoing is taken from the thirteen articuli into which Quaestio xii. is divided.

[592] Pars prima, Quaestio xxxii. Art. 1.

[593] Quaestiones disputatae: De Veritate, x. 6. Citing Rom. i. 20.

[594] Prooemium to Qu. xiv. Pars prima.

[595] Qu. xiv. Art. 2—a point which Thomas reasons out in interesting scholastic Aristotelian fashion, but in language too technical to translate.

[596] Pars prima, Qu. xiv. Art. 11.

[597] Pars prima, Qu. xv. Art. 1-3.

[598] Pars prima, Qu. xxvi. Art. 2.

[599] Pars prima, Qu. xliv. Art. 3.

[600] Pars prima, Qu. xlv. Art. 1.

[601] Summa theol. pars prima, Qu. l. As heretofore, I follow the exposition of the Summa theologiae. But Thomas began a large and almost historical treatment of angels in his unfinished Tract. de substantiis separatis, seu de Angelorum natura (unfinished, in Opuscula theol.). He has another and important tractatus, De cognitione Angelorum, Quaestiones disput. de veritate, viii.

[602] Pars prima, Qu. l. Art. 1. Thomas goes on to contradict Aristotle, in holding quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus.

[603] All that has been given concerning the knowledge of angels relates to what they know through their own natures as created. Further enlightenment (as with men) comes through grace as soon as they become beati through turning to good. Pars prima, Qu. lxii. Art. 1 sqq.

[604] Ante, Chapter XXXV., 1.

[605] A burning controversy between the Averroists and the orthodox schoolmen.

[606] This is the substance of Qu. lxxxix. Art. 1.

[607] Pars prima, Qu. xix. Art. 1.

[608] Pars prima, Qu. lxxxii. and lxxxiii.

[609] Pars prima, Qu. xx. 1.

[610] Summa theol., Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xvii. Art 8.

[611] Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xxiv. Art. 8.

[612] Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xxvi. Art. 4 and 5.

[613] Pars prima secundae, Qu. cix. sqq.

[614] Another reading is delectatio, i.e. enjoyment.

[615] Bacon’s Opus majus was edited in incomplete form by Jebb in 1733, and reprinted in 1750 at Venice. This edition is superseded by that of Bridges, in two volumes, published with the Moralis philosophia and Multiplicatio specierum by the Clarendon Press in 1897. The text of this edition had many errors, which have been corrected by a third volume published in 1900 by Williams and Norgate, who are now the publishers of the three volumes. In 1859 Brewer edited the Opus tertium, the Opus minus, and Compendium philosophiae for the Master of the Rolls Series.

“An unpublished Fragment of a work by Roger Bacon” was discovered by F. A. Gasquet in the Vatican Library, and published in the English Historical Review for July 1897. It appears to be a letter to Clement IV., written in 1267.

In 1861 appeared the excellent monograph by Émile Charles, entitled Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines. To this one still must turn for extracts from the Compendium theologiae, and the Communia naturalium. The last-named work, with the Compendium philosophiae and the Multiplicatio specierum (which appears not to be an intrinsic part of the Opus majus), may have been composed as parts of what was to be the writer’s Opus principale. Bacon’s Greek Grammar has been edited by Nolan and Hirsch (Cambridge, 1902).

[616] Opus tertium, chap. xxv. p. 91 (Brewer’s text).

[617] Opus tertium, chap. xvii. (pp. 58-59, Brewer’s ed.).

[618] Brewer, R. Bacon, Opera inedita, p. 1.

[619] Opus tertium, pp. 7 and 8.

[620] In Opus tertium, chap. iii. (Brewer, p. 15), Bacon plainly tells the pope the difficulties in which he had been placed by this injunction of secrecy: “The first cause of delay came through those who are over me. Since you have written nothing to them in my excuse, and I could not reveal to them your secret, they insisted with unspeakable violence that I should obey their will; but I refused, because of the bond of your mandate, which bound me to your work, notwithstanding any order from my prelates. And, of a surety, as I was not excused by you, I met with obstacles too great and many to enumerate.... And another obstacle, enough to defeat the whole business, was the lack of funds.”

[621] These are, of course, the Opus majus, the Opus minus, and the Opus tertium; also the Vatican Fragment, the position of which is not quite clear; but it is part of the writings of this year, and constitutes apparently the introductory letter to Clement.

[622] The authority for this is the Chronica XXIV., Generalium Ordinis Minorum; see Bridges, vol. iii. p. 158.

[623] See Op. tertium, p. 26 sqq. (Brewer).

[624] Opus majus, pars ii. end of chap. v. and beginning of chap. vi. (Bridges, iii. p. 49); see Op. tertium (Brewer), p. 81.

[625] Op. maj. pars ii. chap. xv. (Bridges, iii. p. 71).

[626] Op. tertium, p. 39.

[627] Op. maj. pars ii. (Bridges, iii. pp. 69-70). Cf. ante, p. 180.

[628] The reference seems to be to the Ethics and Politics.

[629] Compendium studii, p. 424 (Brewer).

[630] Op. tertium, p. 14.

[631] Op. tertium, p. 30.

[632] Compendium studii phil., p. 429 (Brewer).

[633] Ibid. p. 398—written in 1271.

[634] I follow the paging of Bridges, vol. iii. These four causes of error are also given in Opus tertium, p. 69, Compendium studii, p. 414 (Brewer), and the Gasquet Fragment, p. 504.