The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly hard fight on both sides of Langemarck. Throughout the 9th November and during the following night the French delivered heavy attacks there and had been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in front of the III Reserve Corps, on the left wing of which the 9th Reserve Division, now affiliated to the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the line. Making every use of the element of surprise, General von Beseler had ordered the assault to begin at 6.30 A.M. Punctually at this moment, as dawn was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On the right wing the 44th Reserve Division pushed forward till close up to Het Sas, taking prisoner 14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, in reporting this advance, says: ‘West of Langemarck our young regiments advanced against the enemy’s front line singing “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,” and captured it.’ The left wing of the division hung a good way back, as the 5th Reserve Division on its left was unable to push on so rapidly. It had broken into the enemy’s first position, but its eastern wing was completely held up in front of Langemarck. The 6th Reserve Division had attacked the place from north and east, without being able to take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here for a big attack that he himself intended to make on the 10th, and these were now defending every yard of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th Reserve Division had at first made good progress in the direction of St. Julien, but it came under a heavy cross-fire, and was thereby compelled to give up a large part of the ground gained. General von Beseler therefore decided to pull out the main body of the 9th Reserve Division, and move it to his right wing, where the 44th and 5th Reserve Divisions had had a decided success in the direction of Het Sas.

After the first line of trenches had been taken, the attack of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was very soon held up by wire entanglements which had not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line of trenches provided with every modern device. The XXVII Reserve Corps spent most of the day in making such disposition of its forces as would enable it to give the utmost support to the Army Group Linsingen, which was getting ready to attack further south on the morrow.

In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations of Plettenberg’s Corps for an offensive on the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently advanced to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the dense autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. With the concurrence of General von Linsingen, and after arrangement with the neighbouring troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore decided to attack on the 11th November. On the front of Deimling’s (XV) Corps the 10th November, up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a preparatory artillery bombardment; especially good work was done by means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, carried out by a massed group of artillery consisting of three batteries of heavy howitzers, three batteries of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery of long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel Gartmayr, commanding the 1st Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, in co-operation with the II Bavarian Corps fighting on the high ground of St. Eloi, were able to gain some hundreds of yards.

On the 11th November the combined offensive of the Fourth Army and the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the Fourth and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The great efforts made by the Fourth Army on the 10th had considerably weakened it, and further handicapped by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces of the attacking troops, no special success was gained by it on the 11th; nevertheless the enemy was everywhere held to his ground and prevented from transferring any troops to other parts of the front. On the extreme right wing the Marine Division made a successful attack on Nieuport, capturing several hundred prisoners. At the same time the Guard Cavalry Division, affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to the Yser, in order to relieve part of the 4th Ersatz Division, which went into Army Reserve. On the left wing of the Army, the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south flank of the XXVII Reserve Corps attacked in close co-operation with Plettenberg’s Corps.

On the 11th, in pouring rain, the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck began the last phase of this severe and terrible struggle for Ypres; and it was destined to fix the general line on which the opposing armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915.

Von Winckler’s Guard Division fought on the right wing of the Army Group Linsingen, and for us the day was to be a historic, though costly one. In former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of the fray at its most critical stages, and the sons were to show themselves worthy of their fathers. The spirit of Frederick the Great and the glory of St. Privat shone again on the battlefield of Ypres. The British speak of the attack of the Guard as a most brilliant feat of arms.

Before the infantry of the Division could come into immediate contact with the enemy, a broad zone had to be crossed under his artillery fire: through the hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the Guard brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 A.M. the German batteries opened, and a furious bombardment continued for two and a half hours, and then the infantry attack began. It struck against two divisions of the I British Corps, a war experienced foe, whose fighting methods were well adapted to the country.[104] The artillery preparation however had been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy’s superiority in numbers the advance made good progress, so that shortly after 10 A.M. the strong position along the southern edge of the Polygon Wood was in the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.[105]

At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of H.M. the Emperor’s 1st Guard Regiment had forced a way through the wire entanglements and trenches in front of Verbeck farm, and it was taken in the first assault. The regiment had thereby captured an excellent position from which to support the right wing of the attack.[106] Led by its fearless commander, Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed on without a moment’s delay into the wood north-west of the farm. Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment was still engaged along the southern edges of the woods west of Reutel, with its front facing north, and it put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing of the 54th Reserve Division.

The Emperor Francis’ 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment attacked from Veldhoek against the corner of the Herenthage Wood, north of the Ypres-Gheluvelt road, and took its edge. The wood itself gave the infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead in its thick undergrowth, which was over six feet high.[107] Suddenly at a few paces’ distance, machine-guns would open on our troops from behind a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task set the Grenadiers proved to be an extremely difficult one, the more so as they had lost many of their officers and N.C.O.’s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless, the defence-works inside the wood were quickly taken one after another, but more strong points protected by wire entanglements untouched by our artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion forced its way through to the château of Veldhoek, which was surrounded by a marsh and an impenetrable hedge. The men were trying to work their way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in it, when suddenly a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun burst upon them. It came from the château on their right, from some flanking trenches on their left, and from trees behind the line. A number of the few remaining officers fell, and finally the battalion had to retire a short distance in order to reorganise. But it soon came forward once more, and the companies pressed on till they were close up to the château itself, when another annihilating fusillade was opened on them from all sides. Simultaneously the British made a flank attack along the hedge in order to cut off the men who had got through. Machine-guns firing from trees and from the château windows completely stopped any communication with them. Very few only of these foremost troops, who were commanded by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in getting away. Those who did were assembled by Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the wood and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led forward again to the relief of the Fusiliers who were surrounded. The attack of Captain von Sell developed however into small isolated combats, and though the boldest followed their leader nearly up to the château again, they were received there with such heavy fire from right and left that it appeared that they would have to retire again and reorganise. Before this could be carried out, a British counter-attack was launched; but our men, disorganised and mixed up as they were, held fast to their ground and stopped the attack, although at first both their flanks were in the air.[108]

Queen Augusta’s 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, advancing south of the main road, at once suffered such heavy losses that the first two attacks made no headway. When however part of the regiment near the main road pushed forward along it, echeloned behind its sister-regiment on the right, and then turned southwards, the advance made good progress, and a firm footing was gained in Herenthage Wood south of the road. The reverses met with by the Emperor Francis’ 2nd Grenadiers unfortunately enabled the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire to bear on Queen Augusta’s 4th Grenadiers, that their advance had to be stopped.[109]

At 5 P.M. German Guard troops had a tussle with the British Guards. The King’s Liverpool Regiment made a counter-attack from the Nun’s Wood (Nonne Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot Regiment and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers. The point of attack was well chosen, and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, and held up in the woods (Polygon Wood and the eastern part of the Nonne Bosch), with its front facing north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having spent all its energies against the château of Veldhoek, lay with its front facing west.[110] However, the British troops ran into their own artillery fire near the Nonne Bosch, and the attack broke up and came to a standstill in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any further advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was now out of the question.

In the southern part of the Herenthage Wood the 4th Infantry Division pushed on, though here too great difficulties were encountered. Deep trenches, broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined to make our progress slow, especially on the right wing.

The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left wing of the Pomeranians gained ground in the woods near and around Zwarteleen; the capture of Hill 60 near Zwarteleen was of exceptional importance. From this elevation another direct view over the country round Ypres was obtained.

South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much thinned ranks stormed forward again. The bit of wood north-east of Wytschaete, which had already changed hands several times, was now taken by it. The heavy artillery again rendered invaluable services. Several strong hostile counter-attacks were held up chiefly owing to the way in which at the critical moment our guns always protected the infantry lines by a barrage.

In the area near Wytschaete, the 11th November was the day of the heaviest fighting. In the woods north of it, Bavarians and Hessians pressed forward together, slowly but surely. A French battery and four machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry Regiment at a farm about 150 yards north of Wytschaete, but the guns were so firmly embedded in the sodden ground, that they could not be got away by the infantry. When the buildings were evacuated again, owing to the heavy fire of the French on them, the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded here that in the fight for one single farm the Hessians took prisoners belonging to three different regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy had put in to the fight on the Ypres front, and to what an extent he had to concentrate his units to ward off our attacks.

On and to the west of the Messines ridge the line remained almost unaltered during the 11th November. The very severe effect of the enemy’s artillery fire from Mount Kemmel on this front and the enfilade fire of artillery and machine-guns from Ploegsteert Wood compelled our men to remain in their trenches.

Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November were a great success. A series of brilliant feats, many of which it has been impossible even to mention in this short account, far less adequately describe, gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which any concentration of the enemy near Ypres could be seen, and immediately opened on by artillery. It is true, however, that no break through of the enemy’s lines had been accomplished: his numerical superiority and, more especially, the strength of his positions held up our offensive. The weather conditions, storm and rain, had also contributed towards the result.[111]

The furious character of the fighting on the 11th November did not abate on the following day, but on the whole the situation remained unaltered. The general character of the operations on the entire front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, and sapping was eventually resorted to, though here and there successes in open warfare were gained. For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to strengthen its detachments across the Yser at Dixmude, and on the 12th the 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed the enemy’s defences opposite it on the western bank of the Yser, and held them under great difficulties. Constant rain had filled the badly constructed trenches with mud so that our troops had to support the enemy’s bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying in the open.

At Bixschoote the enemy again attempted strong counter-attacks, but they were stopped largely by the muddy state of the country. On the 14th November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting. Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops occupied a reserve position instead of the original front line; by the time the error was discovered, our watchful opponents were already in the front German position. Our men, however, gave them no rest there, for their honour would not suffer the surrender in this manner of their success of the 10th November. Without waiting for any orders from higher authority or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the strong position on the rising ground south-west of Bixschoote. On the front of the Sixth Army Herenthage Wood was completely taken by the Guard on the 14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.[112] After the artillery had prepared the way as far as was possible in that difficult and wooded neighbourhood, the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by no means damped by the events of the 11th November, advanced to the assault. In the château of Herenthage a large number of British snipers surrendered. The XV Corps had another success in the wooded district of Zwarteleen after being reinforced by Hofmann’s composite Division. A strong system of trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large number of prisoners.

On the 13th November the Park of Wytschaete was captured from the French by the Pomeranians and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which the French advanced against our positions shouting, ‘Don’t shoot,’ in German, cost them heavy losses; and the Bavarians, whose tempers were roused by this treachery, drove them back to their original positions.

On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north of Wytschaete, for which such a severe fight had been made on the 11th, was finally captured by us. We thereby obtained a position in the Wytschaete salient which, although overlooked from Mount Kemmel, gave us such a commanding view of all the ground between Mount Kemmel and the Wytschaete-Messines ridge that surprise attacks by the enemy in this district were now out of the question.[113] On the rest of the Flanders front only small fights took place, and on the 17th November the commander of the Fourth Army decided to give up any idea of continuing the offensive; a decision to which he was compelled by the low fighting strength of his troops and the bad autumn weather, which was affecting their health.[114] The frequent downpours of rain during November had caused a constant rising of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were worn out by the constant fighting under such bad weather conditions. Clear signs of exhaustion in the enemy’s ranks on the front opposite the Fourth and Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our gallant Fourth Army gradually to construct a good line of trenches and erect wire entanglements. As soon as these were completed rest-billets were allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet and pleasant quarters in the villages of Flanders untouched by war, with a not unfriendly population. The German General Staff fully concurred in the decision of the commander of the Fourth Army made on the 17th November. They at the same time expressed the hope that the Army would be prepared to hold its positions even against superior hostile forces. This expectation was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and although at that time there were four and one-half French Corps, as well as the 25,000 Belgian troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert of Würtemburg, they never obtained a success of any consequence.

The threat against our right flank ceased soon afterwards. British monitors appeared a few times towards the end of November off the roadstead of Ostend. They bombarded the canal exit and our positions near by: but their fire was as ineffective as before. The ‘glorious’ activities of the British Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to a speedy end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, began to put in an appearance there.[115]

The developments on the front of the Sixth Army during the second half of November 1914 were similar to those of the Fourth Army. For some time the sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards strong detachments were taken from it and entrained for the Eastern Front, where General von Hindenburg was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to bring the Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make it roll back again.

From this time onwards the line of demarcation between the Fourth and Sixth Armies was the Comines-Ypres canal.

CONCLUSION

As the November storms passed and frost and icy winds heralded to the mild climate of Flanders the approach of winter, the unbroken defensive lines of both sides were being slowly strengthened. The effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover in good trenches and behind thick breast-works. As the armament in use became more and more powerful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. At first passive defence was little understood by the German troops, as instruction in the offensive had dominated all other in their peace-training, and in the short period available after they were called up the volunteers had only been trained in the principles of attack. Their sense of superiority over their opponents did not let them rest content with merely holding positions. The high sense of duty in each individual was of assistance, and the methods of defensive warfare were quickly learnt. The continuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in this water-logged country caused great suffering; and the troops sent off to Russia to fight under the great victor of Tannenburg were much envied. The despatch of men eastward showed those left behind that any hope of a final decision at Ypres had disappeared.

The first battle of Ypres was a German victory,[116] for it marked the failure of the enemy’s intention to fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium (thus preventing us from making use of their valuable resources), and to use the Ypres area as a base for the Belgian, French and British advance on the Rhine. The Belgian coast was now firmly in our possession, and offered a good starting-place for naval operations against England. But we had not succeeded in making the decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in the west in our favour during 1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only natural that the German General Staff found it difficult thoroughly to realise this unpleasant fact, and only did so with reluctance; but endeavour has been made in this account to bring out the main reasons which led to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, great things had been accomplished. The Army of Duke Albert of Würtemburg, by its advance and determined attack, had prevented the big offensive planned by the enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies together had forced a superior opponent into the defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the sea to his assistance, had driven him back continually, until positions had been reached which enabled German troops to be spared to carry out an offensive on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of the Marne, so now the spectre of a Russian invasion appeared threateningly before the German Nation, and the whole country knew what it would mean if it should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern Front were far too weak, and even the genius of a Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the masses of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements. Thus it came about that we had to lie and wait in front of the gates of Ypres, while all the available men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland, to help Hindenburg pave the way to victory.

There was never peace on the Ypres front. The belt of steel with which we had invested the town by our operations in October and November 1914, was a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins across the Channel like an apparition whose shadow lay over the British Isles and especially menaced the traffic-routes between England and France. The British therefore continually tried their utmost to free themselves of this menace and their pressure produced counter measures. Thus in December 1914 heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea at Nieuport, and also at Bixschoote and Zwarteleen. On Christmas Eve the French vainly attacked Bixschoote: their hope of catching the Germans dreaming heavily on that evening was of no avail. When spring lifted the mist that hung over Flanders, a German offensive took place during April and May that forced the northern part of the Ypres salient back to within three miles of the town.[117] After this the positions only altered very slightly. In March 1916 the British blew up our front trench positions at St. Eloi by five colossal mines, but were unable to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In 1917 the death-agony of Ypres was renewed, and for months war raged over the plains of Flanders; the fighting was as furious as in October and November 1914. The young soldiers of those days have now become veterans, who know war and do not fear it even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are those same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, in exhorting the troops to battle in 1914, once said: ‘Therefore when you are fighting this particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for having occasioned all this great sacrifice; show him that the Germans are not so easy to wipe out of the world’s history as he imagines, show it by redoubling the strength behind your blows. In front of you is the opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On! at him!’

He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who were so jealous of us, who brought on the war for the sake of their money-bags and spread the conflagration all over the world, who at first hoped that it would be but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to annihilate Germany: all this steeled the hearts of our warriors in Flanders, whose creed was the justice of the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and in blood. The fighting in 1917 was perhaps more severe than that of those stormy autumn days of 1914, but the objective for us was ever the same: to keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this we succeeded in 1917 as in 1914.

Flanders! The word is heard by every one in the German Fatherland with a silent shudder, but also with just and intense pride. It was there that the British were made to realise that German heroism was not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the war material which the whole world had been manufacturing for years. When we read that up to the 14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put into the battle round Ypres by the Western Allies, whilst only 25 German divisions were opposed to them,[118] and that in the course of the Flanders battle of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled in vain against a greatly inferior German force, it says much for our troops. But far from all. For the enemy’s superiority in material, in guns, trench-mortars, machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, and even fourfold. Who can doubt but that a nation whose sons know how to fight like this, must win? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds of blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and splendid fruit for the German Fatherland. This indeed would be the highest reward that could be bestowed on those of us who fought there.

APPENDIX

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY
from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914.

The following units were also attached at various times:—

• 9th Reserve Division.
• 6th Bavarian Reserve Division.
• Marine Division.
• 38th Landwehr Brigade.
• 37th Landwehr Brigade.
• 2nd Ersatz Brigade.
• Guard Cavalry Division.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK
from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN
from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914.