6 However, the wall was broken down in many places, when word was brought, that his successor, having landed his army at Apollonia, was coming through Epirus and Thessaly. The consul came with thirteen thousand foot and five hundred horse. He had already arrived at the Malian bay; and after that, to his messengers sent forward to Hypata, to order a surrender of the city, this response was given, that they would do nothing except by the common consent of the Ætolians: that the siege of Hypata might not detain him while Amphissa was not yet recovered, having sent forward his brother Africanus, he leads his forces to Amphissa. A little before their arrival, the towns-people having abandoned the city, for it was now, for the most part, stripped of its walls; all, armed and unarmed, retired into the citadel, which they deemed an impregnable fortress. The consul pitched his camp at the distance of about six miles from the town; and thither came ambassadors from the Athenians, addressing, first, Publius Scipio, who preceded the main body as before mentioned, and afterwards the consul, with earnest supplications in favour of the Ætolians. They received a milder answer from Africanus, who, wishing for an honourable pretext for relinquishing the Ætolian war, was directing his views towards Asia and king Antiochus, and had recommended to the Athenians to persuade, not only the Romans, but the Ætolians likewise, to prefer peace to war. By the advice of the Athenians a numerous embassy of the Ætolians came speedily from Hypata, and the discourse of Africanus, whom they addressed first, augmented their hopes of peace; for he mentioned, that “many nations and states, first in Spain, and afterwards in Africa, had thrown themselves on his protection; and that, in all of them, he had left greater monuments of clemency and kindness than of military prowess.” The business seemed to be concluded, when the consul, on being applied to, repeated the very same answer with which they had been driven off by the senate. When the Ætolians were thunderstruck at this, as if they had never heard it before, (for they now perceived that no progress was made either from the Athenian embassy or the favourable reply of Africanus,) they said that they wished to consult their countrymen on the affair.

7 They then returned to Hypata, nor were their plans cleared of difficulties. For they had no means of paying the thousand talents; and, in case of an unconditional submission, they dreaded lest cruelty should be inflicted on their persons. They, therefore, ordered the same ambassadors to return to the consul and Africanus, and to request, that if they meant in reality to grant them peace, and not merely to amuse them with a prospect of it, frustrating the hopes of the wretched, they would either remit some part of the money required to be paid, or order that the unconditional submission should not extend to their persons. Nothing was accomplished whereby the consul might change his resolution; and that embassy, also, was dismissed without effect. The Athenian ambassadors accompanied them. And Echedemus, their principal in the embassy, recalled to hope the Ætolians, dejected by so many repulses, and deploring with unavailing lamentations the hard fate of their nation—by advising them to request a suspension of arms for six months, in order that they might send an embassy to Rome. He urged that “the delay could add nothing to their present calamities, which were already severe in the extreme; but that, if time intervened, their present calamities might be alleviated by many chances. Agreeably to this advice of Echedemus, the same ambassadors were sent again; who, making their first application to Publius Scipio, obtained, through him, from the consul, a suspension of arms for the time they desired: and the siege of Amphissa being raised, Manius Acilius, the army being delivered to the consul, left the province; and the consul returned from Amphissa into Thessaly, with intention of leading his troops into Asia through Macedonia and Thrace. Here Africanus said to his brother, Lucius Scipio, “I also, Lucius Scipio, approve of the route which you adopt. But the whole matter rests on the inclinations of Philip; for if he be faithful to our government, he will afford us a passage, and provisions and all things which support and aid an army on a long march. But if he should fail in this, you will find no safety in any part of Thrace. In my opinion, therefore, the king’s disposition ought in the first place to be discovered. He will be best tested if the person who shall be sent will come suddenly upon him, doing nothing by a preconcerted plan.” Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a young man, the most active of all the youths at that time, being selected for this purpose, by means of relays of horses, and travelling with almost incredible expedition, made good the journey from Amphissa, whence he had been despatched, to Pella, on the third day. The king was sitting at a banquet, and was far gone in his cups: that very relaxation of mind removed all suspicion of any intention of changing his measures. His guest was kindly entertained for the present; and next day he saw provisions in abundance already prepared for the army, bridges made over rivers, and roads fortified where the passage was difficult. As he was bringing back this intelligence, with the same speed which he had used in coming, he met the consul at Thaumaci. From this the army rejoicing, marched with more certain and greater hopes into Macedon, where all things were prepared. On their arrival, the king received them with royal magnificence, and accompanied them on their march. Much pleasantry and good humour appeared in him, which recommended him much to Africanus, a man who, as he was unparalleled in other respects, was not averse to courteousness unaccompanied by luxury. Passing from this not only through Macedon, but also through Thrace, they arrived at the Hellespont, Philip escorting them and making every preparation.

8 Antiochus, after the sea-fight at Corycus, when he had the whole winter disengaged to carry on his preparations by land and water, was chiefly intent on the refitting of his ships, lest he should be entirely excluded from the sea. It occurred to him that he had been defeated when the Rhodian fleet was absent; if this fleet were present in an engagement, (and the Rhodians would certainly not be guilty of being late a second time,) he required a vast number of ships to equal the fleet of the enemy, in the strength of their crews and size of their vessels. For this reason, he sent Hannibal into Syria, to bring in the Phœnician navy, and gave orders to Polyxenidas, that, the more unsuccessfully affairs had been managed before, the more diligently he should now repair the ships which he had, and procure others. He himself passed the winter in Phrygia, calling in auxiliaries from every quarter. He had even sent for that purpose to Gallogræcia. The people of that country were then more warlike than at present, retaining the Gallic spirit, as the generation which had emigrated thither was not yet extinct. He had left his son Seleucus with an army in Æolia, to keep in obedience the maritime cities, which on one side Eumenes from Pergamus, on the other, the Romans from Phocæa and Erythræ, were soliciting to revolt. The Roman fleet, as mentioned before, wintered at Canæ; thither, about the middle of the season, came king Eumenes, with two thousand foot and one hundred horse. He, when he affirmed that vast quantities of spoil might be brought off from the enemy’s country round Thyatira; by his persuasions, prevailed on Livius to send with him five thousand soldiers. Those that were sent within a few days carried off an immense booty.

9 Meanwhile a sedition broke out at Phocæa, in consequence of some endeavouring to bring over the multitude to the party of Antiochus. The winter quarters of the ships were burdensome: the tribute was burdensome, because five hundred gowns with five hundred tunics were exacted from them: the scarcity of corn was also galling, on account of which the ships also and garrison of Rome evacuated the place. The faction which laboured in their assemblies to draw the commonalty over to Antiochus, was now freed from all apprehension: the senate, and higher ranks, were of opinion that they should persevere in the alliance with Rome. But the advisers of a revolt had greater influence with the multitude. The Rhodians, the earlier in proportion to their having been too late in the former summer, sent in the vernal equinox, as commander of their fleet, with thirty-six ships, the same Pausistratus. At this time Livius, with thirty ships and seven quadriremes, which king Eumenes had brought with him, was on his passage from Canæ to the Hellespont, in order to prepare every thing necessary for the transportation of the army, which he expected to come by land. He first brought his fleet into the harbour called the Achæan; whence he went up to Ilium, and having offered sacrifice to Minerva, gave a kind reception to the embassies from the states in the neighbourhood, from Elæus, Dardanum, and Rhetæum, surrendering their respective states to him. Then he sailed to the entrance of the Hellespont; and, leaving ten ships stationed opposite to Abydos, he crossed over to Europe with the rest of the fleet, to attack Sestos. As the troops were advancing up to the walls, first of all inspired priests of Cybele,3 in their solemn dress, met them before the gate. These said, that, “by order of the mother of the gods, they, the immediate servants of the goddess, were come to pray the Roman commander to spare the walls and the city.” None of them was injured; and, presently, the whole senate and the magistrates came out to surrender the place. The fleet then sailed over to Abydos; where when, their minds being sounded by conferences, no peaceable answer was given, they prepared themselves for a siege.

10 While these transactions are carried on at the Hellespont, Polyxenidas, the commander of the king’s fleet, (but he was an exile from Rhodes,) having heard that the ships of his countrymen had sailed from home, and that Pausistratus, who commanded them, had, in a public speech, uttered several haughty and contemptuous expressions respecting him, and having conceived a particular jealousy against him, considered nothing else, night or day, than that by his acts he should refute his boastful words. He sent a person, who was known to him, to say, that “if it were allowed, he would be of great service to Pausistratus, and to his native country; and that he might be restored by Pausistratus to his country.” When Pausistratus, in surprise, asked by what means such things could be effected; and pledged his faith to the other, at his request, that he would either concur in the execution of the design, or bury it in silence; the emissary then told him, that “Polyxenidas would deliver into his hands, either the whole of the king’s fleet or the greater part of it; and as a reward, he stipulated for nothing more, than a return to his native country.” The importance of the business had this effect, that he neither believed nor despised his proposition. He sailed to Panormus, in the Samian territory, and stopped there in order to examine thoroughly the business which was proposed to him. Messengers passed rapidly from both parties, nor was confidence inspired into Pausistratus until, in the presence of his messenger, Polyxenidas wrote, with his own hand, an engagement that he would perform all that he had promised, and sent the tablets sealed with his own seal. By such a pledge as this, he thought that the traitor was completely engaged to him. For, “that he who lived under a king would never act so absurdly as to give evidence of guilt against himself, attested by his own signature.” The method of conducting the pretended plot was then settled: Polyxenidas said that “he would neglect every kind of preparation; that he would not keep any considerable numbers on board, either of rowers or mariners; that he would haul up on land some of the ships, under pretence of refitting them; would send away others into the neighbouring ports, and keep a few at sea before the harbour of Ephesus; which, if circumstances made it necessary to come out, he would expose to a battle.” The negligence which Pausistratus heard that Polyxenidas was about to use in his fleet, he himself immediately practised. Part of his ships he sent to Halicarnassus to bring provisions, another part to the city of Samos, while he himself waited at Panormus, that he might be ready when he should receive the signal of attack from the traitor. Polyxenidas encouraged his mistake by counterfeiting neglect; hauled up some ships, and, as if he intended to haul up others, put the docks in repair; he did not call the rowers from their winter quarters to Ephesus, but assembled them secretly at Magnesia.

11 By chance one of Antiochus’s soldiers, when he had come to Samos on account of private business, being seized as a spy, is brought to Panormus to the admiral. This man, it is uncertain whether through fear or treachery towards his countrymen, disclosed all things to him, inquiring what was going on at Ephesus: that the fleet lay in harbour, fully equipped and ready for sea; that all the rowers had been sent to Magnesia (at Sipylus); that very few of the ships had been hauled on land; that the docks were shut, and that never was the business of the fleet conducted with greater diligence. But the mind of Pausistratus, prepossessed by misplaced confidence and vain hopes, caused these things not to be attended to as true. Polyxenidas, having fully adjusted all his measures, having called in the rowers from Magnesia, and launched hastily the ships that were in dock, by night, after wasting the day not so much in preparation as because he was unwilling that the fleet should be seen going to sea, set sail after sun-set with seventy decked ships, and, the wind being contrary, put into the harbour of Pygelia before daylight. Where when he had rested during the day, for the same reason as before, he passed over, in the night to the nearest part of the Samian territory. From this place, having ordered a certain Nicander, a chief pirate, to sail with five decked ships to Palinurus, and thence to lead his armed men by the shortest road through the fields towards Panormus, and so to come behind the enemy; he himself, in the mean time, with his fleet in two divisions, in order that it might command the mouth of the harbour on both sides, proceeded to Panormus. Pausistratus was at first confused for a little, as the thing was unexpected; but afterwards, being an old soldier, having quickly regained his courage, and judging that the enemy would be more easily repelled by land than by sea, he marched his armed forces in two bodies to the promontories, which, by their heads projecting into the deep, formed the harbour; under the impression that he could easily repel the enemy by weapons on both sides, from the two promontories. When the sight of Nicander on the land had disconcerted this undertaking, having suddenly changed his design, he ordered all to go on board the ships. Then truly a great confusion arose among soldiers and sailors alike, and a sort of flight to the ships took place, when they perceived themselves surrounded by land and sea at the same time. Pausistratus supposed that the only way of safety was to force through the narrow entrance of the port, and push out into the open sea; and after that he saw his men embarked, ordering the rest to follow, he himself the first, with ship urged vigorously by the oars, pressed to the mouth of the harbour. Just as his ship was clearing the entrance, Polyxenidas, with three quinqueremes, surrounded it. The vessel, shattered by their beaks, sunk; the crew were overwhelmed with weapons, and, among them, Pausistratus, fighting gallantly, was slain. Of the rest of the ships, some were taken outside of the harbour, some within, and others by Nicander, while they were putting off from the shore. Only five Rhodian and two Coan ships effected an escape, a passage being made for them through the thick of the enemy, by the terror of shining flames; for they carried before them, on two poles projecting from their prows, a great quantity of fire contained in iron vessels. The galleys of Erythræ, after meeting not far from Samos the Rhodian ships, then flying, which they were coming to succour, bore away to the Romans in the direction of the Hellespont. About the same time, Seleucus got possession of Phocæa by treachery, one gate being opened by the sentinels. Cyme, with the other cities on that coast, revolted to him through fear.

12 Whilst these events are taking place in Æolis, after Abydos, which was defended by a garrison of the king’s troops, had sustained a siege of several days, all parties then grew weary of the struggle, and the magistrates, with the permission of Philotas, the commander of the garrison, began to treat with Livius, concerning the terms on which they should surrender the city. Because they could not agree whether the king’s troops should march out with their arms, or without them, this question protracted the matter. When the intelligence of the destruction of the Rhodians interrupted them, treating of these things, the matter was dropped. For Livius, fearing lest Polyxenidas, elated by his recent success in such an important enterprise, might surprise the fleet which lay at Canæ, instantly abandoned the siege of Abydos and the guard of the Hellespont, and drew out the ships that were in dock at Canæ, and Eumenes came to Elæa. Livius, with the whole fleet, to which he had joined two triremes of Mitylene, sailed to Phocæa; but, having learned that this place was held, by a strong garrison of the king’s troops, and that the camp of Seleucus was not far distant, he ravaged the sea-coast, hastily conveying on board the booty, which consisted chiefly of men, and waiting only until Eumenes, with his fleet, came up, he endeavours to reach Samos. Among the Rhodians, the news of their misfortune excited, at first, both consternation, and the greatest grief, at the same time. For, besides the loss of their ships and soldiers, they had lost the flower and strength of their youth; many young men of distinction having been induced, among other motives, by the character of Pausistratus, which was deservedly very high among his countrymen. Afterwards, because they had been circumvented by treachery, and by a countryman of their own, above all men, their grief was changed into anger. They sent out ten ships immediately, and, in a few days, ten more, Eudamus being commander of all; who, though far inferior to Pausistratus in warlike qualifications, they supposed would be a more cautious leader, as he was not of so high a spirit. The Romans, and king Eumenes, put in their fleet, first, at Erythræ; and, having staid there one night, they, on next day, reached Corycus, a promontory in Teios. When they intended to pass over hence, to the nearest part of the Samian territory; not waiting for the rising of the sun, from which the pilots could learn the state of the weather, they exposed themselves to the varying storm. About the middle of the passage, the wind changing from north-east to north, they began to be tossed about on the sea, stormy with billows.

13 Polyxenidas, taking it for granted that the enemy would go to Samos to join the Rhodian fleet, set sail from Ephesus, and stopped first at Myonnesus, from whence he crossed over to the island which they call Macris; in order that, when the enemy’s fleet should sail by, he might be able to attack, with advantage, either any ships that straggled from the main body, or might attack the rear of the fleet itself. After that he saw the fleet dispersed by the storm, first of all he thought this a good opportunity to attack it; but, in a little time, the wind increasing and raising a heavy sea, because he could not possibly come up with them, he steered to the island of Æthalia, that, from thence, he might next day fall on the ships, as they made for Samos, from the main sea. A small number of Roman vessels, just as it grew dark, got into a desert harbour on the Samian coast; the rest, after being tossed about all night, ran into the same harbour. Then when it was learned from the country people, that the enemy’s fleet lay at Æthalia, a consultation was held whether they should attack them immediately, or wait for that of the Rhodian fleet. The attack being deferred, for so they resolved, they sailed away to Corycus, whence they had come. Polyxenidas also, having kept his station for some time, without effecting any thing, returned to Ephesus. On this the Roman ships, the sea being clear of the enemy, sailed to Samos. The Rhodian fleet came to the same place after a few days. And that it might appear that they were only waiting for this, they immediately sailed away to Ephesus, that they should either decide it in a naval contest, or, in case the enemy should decline a battle, to extort from them a confession of fear, which would have the best effect on the minds of the states of Asia. They lay opposite the entrance of the harbour, with the fleet formed in a line abreast of it, but none came out against them; the fleet being divided, one part lay at anchor before the mouth of the harbour, the other landed a body of soldiers. Andronicus, a Macedonian, who was in garrison at Ephesus, then made a sally against them, driving off great booty from the widely-deserted country; when they came near the walls, he stripped them of the greatest part of their plunder, and drove them down to the shore and their ships. On the day following, the Romans, having laid an ambuscade about the middle of the way, marched in a body to the city, in order to entice the Macedonians out of the gates. Then, when that same fear had deterred any one from coming out, the Romans returned to their ships. And the enemy avoiding a contest by land or sea, the fleet sailed back to Samos, whence it came. The prætor then detached two Rhodian triremes, and two belonging to the Italian allies, under the command of Epicrates, a Rhodian, to guard the strait of Cephallenia. Hybristas, a Lacedæmonian, at the head of a band of young Cephallenians, infested it with piracies; and the passage was shut against the convoys from Italy.

14 Epicrates met, at Piræus, Lucius Æmilius Regillus, who was on his way to take the command of the fleet. On hearing of the defeat of the Rhodians, as he had only two quinqueremes, he carried back with him to Asia Epicrates and his four ships. Some undecked vessels of the Athenians followed him. He crossed the Ægean Sea to Chios. To which place came, in the middle of the night, Timasicrates, a Rhodian, with two quadriremes from Samos, and, being presented to Æmilius, he told him that he was despatched for the purpose of convoying him in safety, because the king’s ships, by frequent excursions from the Hellespont and Abydos, rendered the sea on that coast dangerous to transports. Two Rhodian quadriremes met Æmilius on his passage from Chios to Samos, being sent by Livius to attend him, and king Eumenes with two quinqueremes met him. Æmilius, after he arrived at Samos, as soon as he had received the command of the fleet from Livius, and duly performed the usual sacrifices, called a council. Here, Caius Livius, whose opinion was first asked, said, that “no one could give advice with more sincerity than he, who recommended to another what himself would do in the same case. That he had intended to sail with the whole fleet to Ephesus; to take with him ships of burden, heavily laden with ballast, and to sink them in the entrance of the harbour. That the narrow passage might be shut up with less difficulty on this account, because the mouth of the port was like a river, long and narrow, and full of shoals. By this expedient he was about to cut off the enemy’s communication with the sea, and render their fleet useless.”

15 This plan was not approved by any of the council. King Eumenes asked, “What then? when, by sinking the ships, they should have barred the pass to the sea, their own fleet being at liberty, would they depart from the place to bear aid to the allies, and strike terror into their enemies? or whether, with no less ardour, they would block up the port with their whole force? For, if they should withdraw, who could doubt that the enemy would weigh up the masses that were sunk, and open the port with less labour than it had cost to shut it? But if, after all, they were to remain there, what advantage would accrue from the harbour being closed? Nay, on the contrary, the enemy enjoying a safe haven, and an opulent city, furnished, at the same time, with every thing from Asia, would pass the summer at their ease, while the Romans, exposed in the open sea to winds and waves, and in want of every accommodation, must continue on guard, without intermission; and would be themselves tied down, and hindered from doing any thing that ought to be done, rather than to keep the enemy shut up.” Eudamus, commander of the Rhodian fleet, rather showed his disapprobation of the plan proposed, than proposed himself what he thought should be done. Epicrates, the Rhodian, advised, “not to think of Ephesus for the present, but that a part of the fleet should be sent to Lycia, and that Patara, the metropolis of that nation, should be brought into a treaty of alliance. This would conduce to two important purposes: first, the Rhodians, owing to peace being established in the countries opposite to their island, could apply the whole of their strength to the care of the war against Antiochus; and then the fleet which the enemy were fitting out in Lycia, would be blocked up, and prevented from joining Polyxenidas.” This plan influenced the most. Nevertheless, it was determined that Regillus should sail, with the entire fleet, to the harbour of Ephesus, to strike terror into the enemy.

16 Caius Livius was sent to Lycia, with two Roman quinqueremes, four Rhodian quadriremes, and two open vessels of Smyrna; being ordered to proceed, first, to Rhodes, and to communicate all his designs to the government there. The states which he passed in his way, Miletus, Myndus, Halicarnassus, Cnidus, and Cous, diligently executed his orders. When he came to Rhodes, he explained, to the persons in authority, the business on which he was sent, and, at the same time, desired their opinion. All approving his design, and three quadriremes being added to that fleet which he had, he set sail for Patara. The wind being favourable at first, carried them very near the city, and they were in hopes of effecting something by surprise. After that, the wind veering, the sea had begun to roll in heavy waves, they persevered at their oars until they reached the land; but there was no safe anchorage there, nor could they ride in the road, as the sea was rough, and night was coming on. They, therefore, sailed past the city, to the port of Phœnicus, which was not quite two miles distant, and which afforded shelter from the violence of the waves, but high cliffs overlooked it, which the towns-people, joined by the king’s troops which were in garrison, immediately seized. Livius, though the landing-places were rugged and difficult, sent against them a party of the auxiliaries, composed of Issæans, and light infantry of Smyrna. These (whilst they were skirmishing with missile weapons, and in slight attacks on the few who were there at first, rather than engaging in battle) supported the contest sufficiently well. After that greater numbers flocked thither from the city, and at length, the whole multitude pouring out, fear seized Livius, not only that the auxiliaries might be cut off, but that the ships would be in danger from the land. In consequence he led out to the engagement, not only the soldiers, but the marines, and even the crowd of rowers, armed with such weapons as each could find. After all, however, the fight was doubtful; and, besides a considerable number of soldiers, Lucius Apustius fell in this disorderly combat. At last, the Lycians were routed, and driven within their gates; and the Romans, with a bloody victory, returned to their ships. They then proceeded to the gulf of Telmissus, which washes Caria on one side, and Lycia on the other, where all thoughts of any further attempt on Patara were laid aside, the Rhodians were sent home, and Livius, sailing along the coast of Asia, crossed over to Greece, that he might have a meeting with the Scipios, who were at that time in Thessaly, and then take his passage to Italy.

17 Æmilius, although he himself had been driven off from Ephesus by a storm, and had returned to Samos without effecting any thing, after he knew that the expedition to Lycia was dropped, and that Livius had gone to Italy, having thought it disgraceful that Patara should be attacked in vain, resolved to go thither and attack the city with his utmost force. Having sailed past Miletus, and the rest of the coast of the allies, he made a descent in the bay of Bargyllæ, with the design of reducing Jassus. A garrison of the king’s troops held the city, and the Romans made hostile depredations on all the country round. He then sent persons to confer with the magistrates and principal inhabitants, and sound their dispositions. After they answered that nothing was in their power, he advanced to lay siege to the city. There were, with the Romans, some exiles from Jassus, who, in a body, earnestly importuned the Rhodians “not to suffer an unoffending city, which was as well a neighbouring one as also connected with them in consanguinity, to be ruined. They themselves were banished for no other cause than their faithful attachment to the Romans; and those who remained in the place were held in subjection by the same force by which they had been expelled. The wish of the people of Jassus was one, to escape from a state of slavery under the king.” The Rhodians, moved by their entreaties, and calling in the assistance of king Eumenes, by representing, at the same time, their own connexions with them, and also the unfortunate condition of the city, which was kept in bondage by the king’s garrison, prevailed on Æmilius to drop the siege. Departing hence, and coasting along the shore of Asia, the other places being at peace, they arrived at Loryma, a port opposite to Rhodes. Here, at head-quarters, a private conversation arises first among the tribunes of the soldiers, and afterwards reached the ears of Æmilius, that the fleet was going off to a distance from Ephesus, from the war which concerned themselves; so that the enemy, being left behind, without control, might safely make whatever attempts they pleased against so many states of the allies, in their neighbourhood. These remarks moved Æmilius; and calling the Rhodians to him, he asked them, whether the whole fleet could lie in the harbour of Patara: when they answered that it could not, furnished with an excuse for laying aside the design, he sailed back to Samos.

18 In the mean time Seleucus, son of Antiochus, who had kept his army in Ætolia, through the whole of the winter employed, partly, in succouring his allies, partly, in ravaging the lands of those whom he could not seduce to his side, resolved to make an incursion on the territory of king Eumenes, while he, at a great distance from home, was assisting the Romans and Rhodians, in attacks on the maritime parts of Lycia. He advanced with hostile standards, first, to Elæa; afterwards, the design of besieging it being given up, having wasted the country in a hostile manner, he led his army to lay siege to Pergamus, the capital and principal fortress of the kingdom. Attalus, at first, posting advanced guards outside the city, and sending out parties of cavalry and light infantry, harassed rather than withstood the enemy. But, after some time, having discovered, in slight skirmishes, that he was not a match for the enemy in any respect, he drew back his men within the fortifications, and then the city began to be besieged. About this time, Antiochus, leaving Apamea with a vast army compounded of various nations, encamped first at Sardis, and afterwards took post at a small distance from the camp of Seleucus, at the head of the river Caicus. The most formidable part of his force was a body of four thousand Gauls, procured for hire: these, with a few others intermixed, he detached, with orders to waste utterly the country about Pergamus. When news of these transactions arrived at Samos, Eumenes being thus recalled by a war in his own dominions, sailed with his fleet to Elæa; and finding there, in readiness, some light troops of horse and foot, he took them for an escort, and proceeded directly to Pergamus, before the enemy could be apprized of his arrival, or could put themselves in motion. Then again skirmishes began to take place in the sallies, Eumenes undoubtedly shrinking from the risk of a decisive engagement. In a few days after the combined fleet of the Romans and Rhodians came from Samos to Elæa, to support the king. When information was brought to Antiochus that these had landed troops at Elæa, and that so many fleets were assembled in one harbour, and at the same time heard that the consul, with his army, was already in Macedonia, and that the things that were necessary for the passage of the Hellespont were being prepared, he judged that now was the time for negotiation, before he should be pressed on sea and land at once; and with this view he chose for his camp a rising ground opposite to Elæa. Leaving there all the infantry, with his cavalry, amounting to six thousand, he went down into the plains, which lay under the walls of the town, having despatched a herald to Æmilius, to acquaint him that he wished to treat of peace.

19 Æmilius sent to Pergamus for Eumenes, and desiring the Rhodians to be present, held a council on the message. The Rhodians were not averse to a pacification; but Eumenes affirmed that “it was not honourable to treat of peace at that time, nor could an end be put to the thing.” “For,” said he, “how can we, shut up as we are, within our walls, and besieged, with honour accept terms of peace? Or to whom shall that treaty be valid, which we shall conclude, without the presence of the consul, without a vote of the senate, and without an order of the Roman people? For, let me ask, supposing the matter concluded by you, would you immediately go home to Italy, and carry away your fleet and army, or would you wait to know the consul’s determination on the case; what the senate should decree, or the people order? It remains therefore that you must stay in Asia, that your troops being led back again into winter quarters, the war being given over, must exhaust the allies in furnishing provisions; and then, if it seem fit to those who have the power of determining, we must begin the whole war anew, which we are able, with the aid of the gods, to finish before winter, if no relaxation from our present vigorous movements is made by delay.” This opinion prevailed; and the answer given to Antiochus was, that they could not treat of peace before the arrival of the consul. Antiochus, peace being tried for in vain, ravaged, first, the territory of Elæa, then that of Pergamus; and, leaving there his son Seleucus, marched in a hostile manner to Adramyttium, whence he proceeded to a rich tract of country called the Plain of Thebes, a city celebrated in one of Homer’s poems; and in no other place in Asia did the king’s soldiers find such a plenty of booty. At the same time, Æmilius and Eumenes also, sailing round with the fleet, came to Adramyttium, to protect the city.

20 By chance, at this time, one thousand foot with one hundred horse came to Elæa from Achaia, Diophanes being commander of all these forces; whom, on their landing, persons, sent by Eumenes to meet them, conducted by night to Pergamus. Veterans they all were, well skilled in war; and their commander was a disciple of Philopœmen, the most consummate general among the Greeks in that age. They set apart two days to give rest to the men and horses, and, at the same time, to view the posts of the enemy, and to learn at what places, and what times, they advanced and retired. The king’s troops generally approached to the foot of the hill on which the town stands; so that the plundering in the rear was unimpeded, as not a man ever sallied out, even to throw darts from a distance, against their guards. After that they were once driven in, and with fear confined themselves within the walls, a contempt for them arises among the king’s troops, and consequently negligence. The greater number did not keep their horses either saddled or bridled; while few remained under arms, and in the ranks; the rest, slipping away, had scattered themselves every where over the entire plain, some diverting themselves with youthful sports and amusements, others eating in the shade, and some even stretched on the ground asleep. Diophanes, having observed all these particulars from the lofty city of Pergamus, ordered his men to take arms, and to be ready at a particular gate. He himself went to Attalus, and told him that he intended to attack the out-posts of the enemy. Attalus giving his consent with reluctance, as he saw that one hundred horse must fight against six hundred, one thousand foot against four thousand, Diophanes then marched out of the gate, and took post at a small distance from the enemy’s guard, waiting his opportunity. Both the people in Pergamus thought that it was madness rather than daring, and the enemy, after observing his party for a short time, as soon as they saw no movement among them, did not change their usual negligence, ridiculing moreover the smallness of their number. Diophanes for a long time kept his men quiet, as if they had been brought out merely for the purpose of looking about them; but as soon as he perceived that the enemy had quitted their ranks, ordering the infantry to follow as fast as they could, he himself, with his own troop, led the way at the head of the cavalry, and pushing on, with all possible speed, made a sudden charge on the enemy’s party, while a shout was raised by every horseman and footman at once. Not only were the men so attacked terrified, but the horses also; and when they broke their collars, they caused great confusion and tumult throughout. A few of the horses, indeed, stood unaffrighted; but even these the troopers could not easily saddle, or bridle, or mount; for the Achæans struck much greater terror than would be supposed from so small a party of horse. But now the infantry, in due order and preparation, assailed the enemy, dispersed through their own negligence, and almost half asleep; and slaughter and flight ensued in every part of the plain. Diophanes pursued the runaways as far as he could with safety, and then returned into garrison, after acquiring very great honour for the Achæan nation; for not only the men, but also the women, had been spectators from the walls of Pergamus.

21 Next day the enemy’s guard, in more regular and orderly condition, pitched their camp five hundred paces farther from the city, and the Achæans marched out at nearly the same time as before, and to the same place. During many hours, both parties intently awaited the assault, as if it were about to take place immediately. When it was not far from sun-set, the usual time of their returning to the main camp, the king’s troops, forming in close order, began to retire in a body, arranged for a march rather than for a battle. Diophanes did not stir until they were out of sight; and then he rushed on their rear-guard with the same vehemence as before, and again excited such dismay and confusion, that, though the hindmost were put to the sword, not one of them halted to fight; they were driven into their camp in confusion, and scarcely observing any order in their march. These daring exertions of the Achæans obliged Seleucus to decamp, and quit the territory of Pergamus. Antiochus, having learned that the Romans and Eumenes were come to protect Adramyttium, made no attempt on that city, but ravaged the country adjoining. He afterwards reduced Peræa, a colony of Mityleneans; Cotton, Corylenus, Aphrodisias, and Crene, were all taken at the first assault. He then returned through Thyatira to Sardis. Seleucus, remaining on the sea-coast, was a terror to one party, a protection to the other. The Roman fleet, with Eumenes and the Rhodians, retired, first to Mitylene, and then to Elæa, whence they had set out. On their way to Phocæa, they put in at an island called Bachius; it is near the city of Phocæa; and when they had plundered the temples and statues, which they had before spared, (for the island was surpassingly adorned with them,) they then passed over to the city. When they, having divided the quarters among themselves, assaulted it, and saw that it could not be taken by arms and scaling-ladders, without regular works; after that a reinforcement of three thousand soldiers, sent by Antiochus, had got into the city, they immediately broke up the siege, and the fleet retired to the island, without having effected any thing more than the devastation of the enemy’s country in the neighbourhood.

22 It was then resolved that Eumenes should return home, and make every necessary preparation for the passage of the consul and his army over the Hellespont; and that the Roman and Rhodian fleets should sail back to Samos, and remain stationed there, that Polyxenidas might not make any movement from Ephesus. The king returned to Elæa, the Romans and Rhodians to Samos. There, Marcus Æmilius, brother of the prætor, died. After his obsequies were performed, the Rhodians sailed, with thirteen of their own ships, one Coan, and one Cnidian quinquereme, to Rhodes, in order that they might take up a position there, against a fleet which was reported to be coming from Syria. Two days before the arrival of Eudamus and the fleet from Samos, another fleet of thirteen ships, under the command of Pamphilidas, had been sent out against the same Syrian fleet; and taking with them four ships, which had been left to protect Caria, they relieved from blockade Dædala, and several other fortresses of Peræa, which the king’s troops were besieging. It was determined that Eudamus should put to sea directly, and an addition of six undecked ships was made to his fleet. He accordingly set sail; and using all possible expedition, overtook the first squadron at a port called Magiste, from whence they proceeded in one body to Phaselis, resolving to wait there for the enemy.

23 Phaselis stands on the confines of Lycia and Pamphylia; it projects far into the sea, and is the first land seen by persons coming from Cilicia to Rhodes, and from hence ships can be seen at a great distance. For this reason, chiefly, this place was made choice of, that they may lie in the way of the enemy’s fleet. But in consequence of the unwholesomeness of the place, and of the season of the year, (for it was now the middle of summer,) and of the unusual stench, diseases began to spread with violence, particularly among the rowers, an event which they did not foresee. And having left the place from fear of this pestilence, when they were sailing by the Pamphylian bay, their fleet putting into port at the river Eurymedon, they hear from the people of Aspendus, that the enemy are now at Sida. The king’s fleet had been the slower in its passage, the season of the Etesiæ being opposed to them, for this is the periodical time for the north-west winds. The Rhodians had thirty-two quadriremes and four triremes. In the king’s fleet were thirty-seven ships of the larger rates; among which were three of seven, and four of six banks of oars; and besides these, ten triremes. They discovered too, from some watch-tower, that the Rhodians were at hand. Both fleets, at the dawn of the next day, moved out of port, as if resolved to come to an immediate engagement; and, as soon as the Rhodians passed the promontory that stretches into the deep from Sida, they descried the enemy, and were observed by them. On the king’s side, Hannibal had the command of the left squadron, which stretched away seaward; Apollonius, one of the nobles, had the command of the right, and they had their ships already formed in a line a-head. The Rhodians approached in a long line. First was the admiral’s ship, with Eudamus in it; Chariclitus brought up the rear; and Pamphilidas commanded the centre division. When Eudamus saw the enemy’s line formed and ready for battle, he pushed out towards the main, ordering the ships that followed to form, regularly, as they came up, in line of battle. This caused confusion at first; for he had not stretched out to the main far enough for the line of all the ships to form in the direction of the land, and he himself hurrying on with precipitation, with only five ships, engaged with Hannibal; the rest, having received orders to form their line, did not come up. The rear division had no room left for it next to the land; and, while they were in disorder, the fight was already begun on the right against Hannibal.

24 But the goodness of their ships, and the expertness of their men in nautical business, quickly freed the Rhodians from all embarrassment. They pushed out hastily towards the main, and each made room next the land for the one immediately behind; and when any made a stroke with its beak against a ship of the enemy, it either shattered its prow, or swept off its oars; or passing by it in the clear space between the vessels, made an attack on its stern. One of the king’s seven-banked ships being sunk with one stroke, by a Rhodian vessel of much smaller size, discouraged them very much. Therefore the right wing of the enemy was now undoubtedly verging to flight. Hannibal, in the open sea, by means chiefly of his superior number of ships, pressed hard on Eudamus, who surpassed him in every other respect: and he would have surrounded him were it not that, on the signal being given from the admiral’s fleet, (by which it is usual to collect together the fleet when dispersed,) all the ships which had conquered on the right wing came speedily to bear aid to their own party. This made Hannibal himself, with all his division, betake themselves to flight; while the Rhodians could not pursue, because their rowers being most of them sick, were therefore the sooner wearied. When they were recruiting their strength with food on the sea where they brought to, Eudamus, observing the enemy towing, by means of their open vessels, several damaged and crippled ships, and seeing little more than twenty that were going off uninjured, commanded silence from the castle of the commander’s ship, and then called out, “Arise, and feast your eyes with an extraordinary sight.” They all started up, and perceiving the disorderly flight of the enemy, cried out, almost with one voice, that they ought to pursue. Eudamus’s ship was bulged in many places; he therefore ordered Pamphilidas and Chariclitus to pursue as far as they should think it safe. They, accordingly, pursued for a considerable time: but after that Hannibal make-in close to the land, fearing to be wind-bound on an enemy’s coast, they steered back to Eudamus, and with difficulty towed to Phaselis a captured seven-banked ship, which had been damaged in the beginning of the engagement. They then sailed home to Rhodes, not so much exulting in their victory as blaming one another because the entire fleet had not been taken or sunk, when it could have been done. Hannibal, disheartened by the loss of this one battle, did not even then dare to sail past the coast of Lycia, though he wished to join the king’s main fleet as soon as possible. And that this action might not be unimpeded, the Rhodians sent Chariclitus with twenty ships of war to Patara and the harbour of Megiste. They then ordered Eudamus, with seven of the largest vessels belonging to the fleet which he had commanded, to rejoin the Romans at Samos, and to endeavour by every argument, and by all his influence, to prevail on the Romans to besiege Patara.

25 Now first of all the intelligence of the victory, and subsequently the arrival of the Rhodians, caused great joy to the Romans, and it appeared to them that if that anxiety was taken away from the Rhodians, they would when at leisure render the seas of that country safe. But the march of Antiochus from Sardis did not allow them to quit the guard of Ionia and Æolia, lest the maritime cities should be crushed by his arms. However, they sent Pamphilidas, with four decked ships, to join the fleet which was at Patara. Antiochus not only collected aids from the states that lay around, but also sent to Prusias, king of Bithynia, ambassadors and letters, in which he inveighed against the pressing of the Romans into Asia. “They were coming,” he said, “to abolish all kingly governments; so that there should be no empire in any part of the world, save that of Rome. Philip and Nabis were subdued: he was the third object of attack. Thus the conflagration would spread, without interruption, from one to another, as each lay nearest to the one last ruined, until it enveloped them all. From him there was but one step to Bithynia, now that Eumenes had submitted to voluntary servitude.” Though Prusias was greatly affected by these observations, his mind was relieved from all such doubts by a letter from Scipio, the consul, and still more so by one from his brother Africanus, who, besides urging the invariable practice of the Roman people of augmenting, by every honourable addition, the grandeur of kings in alliance with them, by instances taken from his own family, induced Prusias to earn their friendship. “The petty chieftains in Spain,” he said, “who had been received into alliance, he had left kings. Masinissa he had not only re-established in his father’s kingdom, but had put him in possession of that of Syphax, by whom he had been formerly dethroned: so that he was, at the present, not only by far the most powerful of all the kings in Africa, but equal, both in dignity and strength, to any monarch in any part of the world. Philip and Nabis, avowed enemies, were conquered in war by Titus Quintius; nevertheless, they were left in possession of their kingdoms. Philip even had the tributes remitted to him last year, and his son, who was a hostage, restored. Through the indulgence of the Roman commanders, he had also got possession of several states beyond the boundaries of Macedonia. As to Nabis, he might have remained in the same honourable rank, had not first his own madness, and afterwards the treachery of the Ætolians, brought him to ruin.” The king’s resolution was especially confirmed after that Caius Livius, who had commanded the fleet as prætor, came to him as ambassador from Rome, and informed him how much better hope the Romans had of success than Antiochus; and how much more sacred and lasting an alliance with them would be.

26 Antiochus, after he lost the hope of an alliance with Prusias, went from Sardis to Ephesus, to review the fleet which was fitted out, and lay there ready, for several months; rather because he saw it impossible, with his land forces, to make any stand against the Roman army and its commanders, the two Scipios, than that his naval force by itself had ever been tried by him successfully, or afforded at this juncture any great or well-grounded confidence. Yet there was an incentive to hope on the present occasion; for he had heard that a large portion of the Rhodian fleet was at Patara, and that king Eumenes had gone to the Hellespont, with all his ships, to meet the consul. Besides, the destruction of the Rhodian fleet at Samos, on an opportunity prepared by treachery, inspired some degree of confidence. Relying on these things, he sent Polyxenidas with orders to try, at all events, the fortune of a naval engagement; while he himself marched his land forces to Notium. This town, which belongs to Colophon, stands close to the sea, and is distant about two miles from Old Colophon. He wished to get this city into his power, because it was so near to Ephesus that nothing could be done there, on sea or land, that was not open to the view of the Colophonians, and, through them, instantly made known to the Romans; and he had no doubt that the latter, having heard of the siege, would bring their fleet from Samos to the relief of an ally, which would give Polyxenidas an opportunity of coming to action. He therefore began to lay regular siege to the city, making his approaches at the same time on the two sides next the sea; in both places he joined his engines and mounds to the wall, and brought up the rams under covered galleries. By which dangers the Colophonians being terrified, sent envoys to Lucius Æmilius, at Samos, imploring the protection of the prætor and people of Rome. His lying so long inactive at Samos offended Æmilius, thinking nothing more improbable than that Polyxenidas, whom he had twice challenged in vain to fight, should ever offer him battle; and he considered it as dishonourable, that the fleet of Eumenes should assist the consul in conveying the legions into Asia, that he should be fettered by bearing to the besieged Colophon an assistance destined to have an uncertain end. Eudamus, the Rhodian, (who had before prevailed upon him to stay at Samos, when he wished to go to the Hellespont,) with all the other officers, pressed him to comply, representing “how much more eligible it would be, either to relieve confederates from a siege, or to vanquish that fleet which he had vanquished before, and to take from the enemy the entire possession of the sea, than, deserting his allies, and delivering Asia to Antiochus by land and sea, to depart from his own part of the war to the Hellespont, when the fleet of Eumenes was sufficient for that station.”

27 They accordingly, having set sail from Samos in quest of provisions, their stock being consumed, were preparing to pass over to Chios. Samos served as a granary to the Romans, and thither all the store-ships sent from Rome directed their course. When they had sailed round from the city to the back of the island, which looks northward towards Chios and Erythræ, and were preparing to cross over, the prætor is informed by a letter, that a vast quantity of corn had arrived at Chios, from Italy; but that the vessels laden with wine were detained by storms. At the same time accounts were received, that the people of Teos had furnished large supplies of provisions to the king’s fleet, and had promised five thousand vessels of wine. On this the prætor immediately changed his course, and steered away to Teos, resolved either to make use of the provisions prepared for the enemy, with the consent of the inhabitants, or to treat them as foes. When they had turned their prows to the land, about fifteen vessels appeared in sight near Myonnesus, which the prætor at first supposed to belong to the king’s fleet, and hastened to pursue. It appeared afterwards, that they were piratical cutters and galleys. They, having ravaged the sea-coast of Chios, returning with booty of every kind, betook themselves to flight when they saw the fleet on the open sea. They had much the advantage in swiftness, their galleys being lighter and constructed for the purpose, and were nearer the land; therefore before the fleet could overtake them, they made their escape to Myonnesus. And the prætor, unacquainted with the place, followed in expectation of forcing their ships from it out of the harbour. Myonnesus is a promontory between Teos and Samos. It consists of a hill rising from a pretty large base to a sharp top, in the shape of an obelisk. From the land it has access by a narrow path towards the sea, cliffs undermined by the waves terminate it, so that in some places the superimpending rocks project beyond the vessels that lie at anchor. The ships not daring to approach lest they should be exposed to the weapons of the pirates, who stood above on the cliffs, wasted the day to no purpose. At length, after they had desisted from this useless undertaking a little before night, they the next day reached Teos. Here the prætor, after mooring in the port at the back of the city, which the inhabitants call Geræsticum, sent out the soldiers to ravage the land about the city.

28 The Teians, as these ravages passed under their eyes, sent deputies to the Roman commander, carrying fillets, and other badges of suppliants. And when they were exculpating their state from every hostile act or word against the Romans, he strongly charged them with “having assisted the enemy’s fleet with provisions, and with having promised a quantity of wine to Polyxenidas.” He further told them, that “if they would furnish the same supplies to the Roman fleet, he would recall his troops from plundering; otherwise, he would treat them as enemies.” When the deputies carried back this distressing answer, the people were summoned to an assembly by the magistrates, to consult on what they should do. It happened that Polyxenidas, who had sailed with the king’s fleet from Colophon, after he heard that the Romans had left Samos and pursued the pirates to Myonnesus, and that they were laying waste the lands of the Teians, and that their fleet lay in the harbour of Geræsticus, cast anchor, in a retired harbour of an island called by the sailors Macris, opposite to Myonnesus. Then from his neighbouring position, exploring what his enemies were doing, at first he was in great hopes of vanquishing the Roman fleet here, in like manner as he had vanquished the Rhodian at Samos, by besetting the narrow entrance at the mouth of the port. Nor is the nature of the place unlike: by the promontories advancing towards each other, the harbour is enclosed in such a manner, that two ships can scarcely go out together. Polyxenidas intended to seize this narrow pass in the night; and, while ten ships stood at each of the promontories, to attack, from the right and left, both sides of the enemy’s fleet sailing out, having landed his armed men from the fleet, as he had done at Panormus, to overpower the Romans on land and sea at once. And this design would not have been formed by him in vain, had it not appeared to the Romans better for receiving the provisions, when the Teians had promised to execute their commands, that the fleet should pass into that harbour, which is before the city. It is said, also, that Eudamus, the Rhodian, had pointed out the fault of the outer harbour, when two ships broke their oars locked together in the narrow entrance. Among other motives, this too induced the prætor to remove his fleet, because there was danger from the land, as Antiochus kept his camp not far from it.

29 When the fleet was brought round to the city, all being ignorant of the approach of the enemy, both soldiers and sailors went on shore to divide the provisions, and the wine particularly, among the ships; when, about mid-day, a peasant happened to be brought before the prætor, who told him, that the enemy’s fleet was lying at the island of Macris these two days; and that, a little while ago, some of them were observed to be in motion, as if preparing to sail. Greatly alarmed at this unexpected event, the prætor ordered the trumpets to sound, to call in such as might have straggled into the country, and sent the tribunes into the city, to hasten the soldiers and sailors on board. The confusion was not less than if the place were on fire, or taken by an enemy; some running to call out the men; others hurrying to the ships, while the orders of the officers were confounded by irregular shouts, amid which the trumpets raised their din, until at length the crowd collected at the ships. Here scarcely could each know his own ship, or make his way through the tumult; and the disorder would probably have been productive of much mischief, on land and sea had not Æmilius, in the commander’s ship, sailed out first into the main; where, receiving those following, he put each into its own place, so as to form a line abreast: and Eudamus, with the Rhodian fleet, waited at the shore, that the men might be embarked without confusion, and that every ship might leave the harbour as soon as it was ready. By these means, the foremost division formed under the eye of the prætor, while the rear was brought up by the Rhodians; and then the whole line, in as regular order as if within sight of the foe, advanced into the open sea. They were between Myonnesus and the promontory of Corycus, when they first got sight of the enemy. The king’s fleet, which was coming in a long line, with only two vessels abreast, then formed themselves in order of battle, stretching out their left division so far, as that it might enclose the right of the Romans. When Eudamus, who commanded in the rear, perceived that the Romans could not form an equal front, but were just on the point of being surrounded, he pushed up his ships. They were Rhodians, by far the fastest sailers of any of the fleet; and having filled up the deficiency in the extent of the line, he opposed his own ship to the commander’s, on board of which was Polyxenidas.

30 Now the entire fleets in every part were engaged in action. On the side of the Romans eighty ships were fighting, of which twenty-two were Rhodian. The enemy’s fleet consisted of eighty-nine ships, and they had of the largest rates, three of six, and two of seven banks. In the strength of the vessels, and valour of the soldiers, the Romans had greatly the advantage of the king’s party, as had the Rhodians in the activity of their vessels, the skill of the pilots, and the dexterity of the rowers. However, those which carried fire before them were the greatest terror to the enemy: and what was the sole cause of their preservation when they were surrounded at Panormus, proved here the principal means of victory. For when the king’s ships, through fear of the fire, had turned aside, in order to avoid at the same time encountering the enemy’s prow with their own, they could not strike their antagonist with the beaks, but exposed the side of their ships to his strokes; and if any did venture an encounter, it was immediately overspread with the fire that was poured in; while the men were more alarmed at the fire than the battle. However, the bravery of the soldiers, as is generally the case, chiefly availed in deciding the battle. For the Romans, having broke through the centre of the enemy’s line, tacked about and fell upon the rear of the division which was engaged with the Rhodians; and, in an instant of time, both Antiochus’s centre division, and the ships on the left, were surrounded and sunk. The squadron on the right, which was still entire, was terrified rather by the disaster of their friends, than by any immediate danger threatening themselves; but, when they saw the others surrounded, and Polyxenidas’s ship deserting its associates, and sailing away, having quickly hoisted their topsails, they betook themselves to flight, (and they steering for Ephesus had a favourable wind,) having lost forty-two ships in that battle; of which thirteen struck, and fell into the hands of the Romans; the rest were burned or sunk. Two Roman ships were shattered, and several were much damaged. One Rhodian vessel was taken by an extraordinary casualty; for, on its striking a Sidonian ship with its beak, its anchor, thrown out by the force of the shock, caught fast hold of the other’s prow with its fluke, as if it were a grappling-iron thrown in. Great confusion ensuing thereon, when the Rhodians, who wished to disengage themselves from the enemy, pulled back, its cable being dragged forcibly, and at the same time entangled with the oars, swept off one side of them. The very ship, which, when struck, had grappled with it, took the Rhodian galley in its weakened state. The naval battle at Myonnesus was fought principally in this manner.

31 By which Antiochus being terrified, because, as he was driven from the possession of the sea, he despaired of being able to defend his distant possessions, ordered the garrison to be withdrawn from Lysimachia, which plan was ill devised, as the event subsequently proved, lest it should be there cut off by the Romans. As it was easy for him, not only to defend Lysimachia from the first attack of the Romans, but to protract the siege through the whole winter; and by thus prolonging the time, to reduce the besiegers to the extremity of want; and in the mean time try the hope of peace, as opportunities should present themselves. But, after the defeat at sea, he not only gave up Lysimachia, but even raised the siege of Colophon, and retired to Sardis. Here, bending all his thoughts to one single object, that of meeting the enemy in the field, he sent into Cappadocia, to Ariarathes, to request assistance, and to every other place within his power, to collect forces. Æmilius Regillus, after his victory at sea, proceeded to Ephesus, having drawn up his ships before the harbour, when he had extorted from the enemy a final acknowledgment of their having surrendered the dominion of the sea, sailed to Chios, to which he had directed his course from Samos, before the sea-fight. As soon as he had refitted the ships that had been damaged in the battle, he sent off Lucius Æmilius Scaurus, with thirty others, to the Hellespont, to transport the army; and decorating the Rhodian vessels with naval spoils, and allowing them a part of the booty, he ordered them to return home. The Rhodians energetically took the lead, and proceeded to assist in transporting the consul’s forces, and when they had completed that service also, then at length returned to Rhodes. The Roman fleet sailed from Chios to Phocæa. This city stands at the bottom of a bay, and is of an oblong shape. The wall encompasses a space of two miles and a half in length, and then contracts on both sides into a very narrow wedge-like form, which place they call Lampter (or the light-house). The breadth here extends one thousand two hundred paces; and a tongue of land stretching out about a mile into the sea, divides the bay nearly in the middle, as if with a line; where it is connected with the main land by a narrow isthmus, it has two very safe harbours, turned to each side. The one that fronts the south they call Naustathmos, (the station for ships,) from the circumstance of its being capable of containing a vast number of ships; the other is close to Lampter.

32 When the Roman fleet had taken possession of these very safe harbours, the prætor thought proper, before he attempted the fortifications, either by escalade or works, that persons should be sent to sound the disposition of the magistrates and principal people in the place: when he saw them obstinate, he determined to attack the city in two places at the same time. One part was thinly occupied by private dwellings, temples of the gods occupying a great deal of the ground. In that part first, having brought up the battering-ram, he began to shake the wall and towers; and when the multitude within ran thither to defend that spot, the battering-rams were applied in the other quarter, and the walls were now knocked down in both places. On the fall of which, when some of the Roman soldiers were making an assault over the scattered masses of ruins, others attempted to scale walls; the townsmen made such an obstinate resistance, as plainly showed that they had a firmer dependence on their arms and courage, than on their fortifications. The prætor, compelled by the danger of the soldiers, sounded a retreat, that he might not expose them incautious to his opponents, maddened with despair and rage. The fighting being ended, the besieged did not, even then, think of rest; but all hastened from every quarter, to strengthen the walls, and to raise new ones in the place of those that had been demolished. While they were busily employed in this manner, Quintus Antonius, being sent by the prætor, came to them, who, after having blamed their obstinacy, assured them that “the Romans were more anxious than they were themselves that the battle should not be carried on to the destruction of the city. If they would desist from their madness, Æmilius would allow them to capitulate on the same terms on which they had formerly surrendered to Caius Livius.” When they heard this, having taken five days’ time to deliberate, and having in the mean time tried the hope of aid from Antiochus, after that the ambassadors sent to the king had brought back word that there was no aid in him, they opened their gates, stipulating that they should suffer nothing hostile. When the troops were marching into the city, and the prætor had proclaimed that it was his pleasure that the surrendered townsmen should be spared, there arose an universal clamour, “that it was shameful that the Phocæans, who had never been faithful to any alliance, and had always been bitter in enmity, should escape with impunity.” After which words, as if a signal had been given by the prætor, they ran, in parties, every way, to plunder the city. Æmilius, at first, began to resist, and call them back, saying, that “towns taken by storm, and not such as surrendered, were plundered; and that, even with regard to the former, the determination lay with the commander, not with the soldiers.” But rage and avarice were too strong for his authority; wherefore, despatching heralds through all parts of the city, he ordered, that all persons of free condition should come to him in the forum, that they should not be injured: and in all things which were in his power, the promise of the prætor was observed. He restored to them their city, their lands, and their laws; and, as the winter now approached, he chose the harbour of Phocæa for his fleet to pass the winter in.

33 About the same time it was announced to the consul, as he was marching along the frontiers of the Ænians and Maronites, that the king’s fleet was conquered at Myonnesus, and that Lysimachia was evacuated by its garrison. This latter event gave much more satisfaction than even the success at sea; especially after they came thither, and were hospitably received in the city, filled with provisions of all sorts, as if provided for the arrival of the army; when, in besieging the city, they had anticipated extreme want and hardship. There they made a halt for a few days, that the baggage and sick might overtake them, who, overcome by diseases, or the length of the way, had been left behind in all the forts of Thrace. When all had joined, they began again their march through the Chersonese, and arrived at the Hellespont; where every thing requisite for their passage having been previously got ready, by the care of king Eumenes, they crossed over, without confusion, as if to friendly shores, no one opposing, and the ships putting in at several different places. This raised to a high degree the spirits of the Romans, who saw the passage into Asia left open to them; which thing they supposed would cost them a severe struggle. They afterwards remained encamped a considerable time at the Hellespont, because it happened to be a period too holy for marching, during which the sacred shields are moved. The same festival had separated Publius Scipio from the army, as the religious ceremony was more incumbent on him, because he was one of the Salian priests; and he himself was a source of delay, till he overtook the rest of the army.

34 In the mean time an ambassador came from Antiochus to the camp,—Heraclides, a Byzantian, having mandates concerning peace. The delay and tardiness of the Romans gave him great hope that this might be attained; for he had imagined, that as soon as they set foot in Asia, they would advance in a rapid march against the king. He resolved, however, not to address himself to the consul until he had first applied to Publius Scipio, and instructions to that effect were given him by the king. In him he had the greatest hope, besides that his greatness of soul, and the fulness of his glory, tended very much to make him inclined to peace, and it was known to all nations what sort of a conqueror he had been, both in Spain and afterwards in Africa; and also because his son was then a prisoner with Antiochus. Where, and when, and by what accident he became a prisoner, is, like very many other things, not ascertained among writers. Some say, that in the beginning of the war, as he was going from Chalcis to Oreum, he was intercepted by some of the king’s ships; others, that after the army came into Asia, he was sent with a troop of Fregellans to Antiochus’s camp, to gain intelligence; that on the cavalry sallying out against him, he retreated, and having fallen from his horse in the confusion, he was together with two horsemen, overpowered, and thus conducted to the king. This however is fully ascertained, that if peace had still subsisted with the Romans, and likewise a personal friendship between the king and the Scipios, the young man could not have been treated and courted with greater kindness than he was. When the ambassador, for these reasons, had waited the arrival of Publius Scipio, as soon as he came he applied to the consul, and requested that he should hear his instructions.

35 A full council being assembled, audience was given to the ambassador, who said, that, “though many embassies about peace had already been sent backwards and forwards, without producing any effect, yet he conceived strong hopes of obtaining it, because the former ambassadors had obtained nothing. For the objects of contention in those discussions were Smyrna and Lampsacus, Alexandria in the Troad, and Lysimachia in Europe. Of these, the king had already ceded Lysimachia, that they might not say that he possessed any thing in Europe; and those cities which lay in Asia, he was now ready to deliver up as well as any others, which the Romans might wish to render independent of the king’s government, because they belonged to their party. The king was also willing to pay to the Roman people half the expense of the war.” These were the conditions of peace. The rest of his discourse was, “that, mindful of human affairs, they should use with moderation their own good fortune, and not press too severely on the misfortune of others; that they should limit their empire by Europe; that single acquisitions could be made with more ease than that necessary for holding them collectively. But if they would wish to take away some part of Asia, provided that they would define it by indisputable limits, the king, for the sake of peace and harmony, would willingly suffer his own moderate temper to be overcome by the insatiableness of the Romans.” These concessions, which appeared to the ambassador of great moment towards obtaining a peace, the Romans deemed trifling. They thought it just, that “the king should defray the whole expense occasioned by the war, because it was through his fault that it was begun. And that, not only Ionia and Æolia ought to be evacuated by the king’s troops, but as all Greece had been set free, so all the cities of that nation in Asia should also be free. That this could be effected in no other way, than by Antiochus relinquishing the possession of that part of Asia on the hither side of Mount Taurus.”