GRANT'S MARCH UPON VICKSBURG.
Grant and Sherman seated on a log on East Bank.
From Painting by J. E. Taylor.
Changes in Command—Restoring Order at Memphis—Sherman's Views of the Situation—Grant's Critical Position—Moving Against Pemberton—Meeting with Porter—The Expedition Against Vicksburg—Why it did not Succeed—The Surrender at Holly Springs—Sherman Removed from Command—The Capture of Arkansas Post—General McClernand.
The meagre honors of the Corinth campaign belonged to Sherman. This fact was recognized at the time by Grant, who wrote: "His services as Division Commander in the advance on Corinth, I will venture to say, were appreciated by General Halleck beyond those of any other division commander." The War Department appreciated them, too, for on May 26th gave him a commission, dated May 1st, as Major-General of Volunteers. It has been said, probably with justice, that had Halleck remained at St. Louis and let Grant conduct the campaign against Corinth, Beauregard and his whole army would have shared the fate of Buckner and his forces at Fort Donelson. But Halleck's over-cautiousness in approaching fortifications that were armed chiefly with "Quaker guns," allowed his prey to escape. And even after the flight of Beauregard from Corinth, Halleck made no important effort to pursue and capture him. Sherman was sent through the town, and a few miles beyond, to see if he could find anybody to fight, and then, finding none, went into camp at Chewalla, where he busied himself for a time with putting railroad rolling stock in order for the use of the army.
And now Halleck dispersed the great army he had gathered. He sent Buell and his troops toward Chattanooga, and Pope to Missouri; while Grant with a fragment was to remain in command in Western Tennessee and Northern Mississippi. Halleck himself had intended doubtless to pursue his march southward to the Gulf of Mexico, hoping to free the Mississippi as he went, for Farragut had already opened the mouth of that river. This was a magnificent programme, but the energy of the Rebel government had materially disarranged it. Jefferson Davis became furiously angry with Beauregard for his defeats at Shiloh and Corinth, and removed him from command, putting Bragg in his place. At the same time conscription enormously swelled the Rebel ranks. McClellan's movements in Virginia did not seem to secure Washington. He, moreover, was soon removed and Halleck was called from the West to take his place. This left Grant in command in Tennessee. Buell as ordered, hurried toward Chattanooga. But Bragg was there before him, and fortified. Not only that, but he gathered such an army as was a menace to Kentucky and Ohio. Buell retreated, and more troops had to be taken from Grant's army to support him. This depletion of his forces made it impossible for Grant to continue the southward march. But his stern tenacity of purpose held him where he was, keeping an unyielding grip, though against great odds, on all that had thus far been gained.
On June 9th, Sherman set out for Grand Junction, an important railroad centre and strategic point, fifty-two miles west of Memphis. He took his own division and Hurlbut's, and on the 13th occupied Grand Junction. The enemy were at Tupelo, Miss., forty-nine miles below Corinth. Sherman remained at or near Grand Junction for some weeks, engaged in repairing and protecting the railroads and in similar work. His experience there was one long wrangle with the planters, who were trying to cultivate the soil, and were constantly complaining of the damage done by the moving armies.
Halleck reached Washington early in July, and on the 15th of that month Grant directed Sherman to proceed to Memphis and take command of that important place. Memphis was in a bad plight. Nearly all the men had left the city to enter the Rebel army or to avoid the Union troops, and the place had fallen into the hands of a horde of speculators. Sherman undertook to establish order and govern the place as a military post. His instructions were few; he was to act upon his own discretion. He assumed command at Memphis on July 21st, and immediately in his vigorous way set about the construction of defenses and the evolution of law and order from the prevailing anarchy. Wherever the head of the family had joined the Rebel army, the family was compelled to go South. All buildings belonging to Rebels were at once seized and rented. The mayor and other civil officers were allowed to continue their functions. No oath of allegiance was enacted from the residents who remained in the city, Sherman regarding the fact of their remaining as a profession of loyalty; but if they aided the Rebel cause in any way, they were treated as spies. Trade in cotton, except on contracts to be paid at the end of the war, was entirely prohibited. The slave question then caused not a little trouble. The Government had not yet fully decided to free them. But Sherman kept careful account of all the work done for him by negroes, so that the Government might pay for their services at the end of the war, if it so decided. Guerrillas he suppressed remorselessly, hunting them down like so many wild beasts. And he enforced the lex talionis. If a loyal family was harassed by Rebels, he visited wrath upon the nearest secessionists. If the property of a loyal man was destroyed, he destroyed an equal amount of enemy's property. For every steamboat attacked by guerrillas, he drove ten secessionist families into exile. These stern measures, which he justified by the laws of war, soon restored order to Memphis.
A capital idea of the situation in that part of the country in the summer of 1862, may be obtained from the following characteristic letter, which Sherman wrote to his brother John under date of Memphis, August 13th:
"My Dear Brother:—I have not written to you for so long that I suppose you think I have dropped the correspondence. For six weeks I was marching along the road from Corinth to Memphis, mending roads, building bridges and all sorts of work. At last I got here and found the city contributing gold, arms, powder, salt and everything the enemy wanted. It was a smart trick on their part, thus to give up Memphis, that the desire of gain to our Northern merchants should supply them with the things needed in war. I stopped this at once, and declared gold, silver, Treasury notes and salt as much contraband of war as powder. I have one man under sentence of death for smuggling arms across the lines, and hope Mr. Lincoln will approve it. But the mercenary spirit of our people is too much, and my orders are reversed and I am ordered to encourage the trade in cotton, and all orders prohibiting gold, silver and notes to be paid for it are annulled by orders from Washington.
"Grant promptly ratified my order, and all military men here saw at once that gold spent for cotton went to the purchase of arms and munitions of war. But what are the lives of our soldiers to the profits of the merchants?
"After a whole year of bungling the country has at last discovered that we want more men. All knew it last fall as well as now; but it was not popular. Now 13,000,000 (the General evidently intended only 1,300,000) men are required when 700,000 was deemed absurd before. It will take time to work up these raw recruits and they will reach us in October, when we should be in Jackson, Meridian and Vicksburg. Still I must not growl. I have purposely put back and have no right to criticise, save that I am glad the papers have at last found out we are at war and have a formidable enemy to combat.
"Of course I approve the Confiscation Act, and would be willing to revolutionize the Government so as to amend that article of the Constitution which forbids the forfeiture of land to the heirs. My full belief is we must colonize the country de novo, beginning with Kentucky and Tennessee, and should remove four million of our people at once south of the Ohio River, taking the farms and plantations of the Rebels. I deplore the war as much as ever, but if the thing has to be done, let the means be adequate. Don't expect to overrun such a country or subdue such a people in one, two or five years. It is the task of half a century.
"Although our army is thus far South, it cannot stir from our garrisons. Our men are killed or captured within sight of our lines. I have two divisions here—mine and Hurlbut's—about 13,000 men; am building a strong fort, and think this is to be one of the depots and bases of operations for future movements.
"The loss of Halleck is almost fatal. We have no one to replace him. Instead of having one head, we have five or six, all independent of each other. I expect our enemies will mass their troops and fall upon our detachments before new reinforcements come. I cannot learn that there are any large bodies of men near us here. There are detachments at Holly Springs near Senatobia, the present termini of the railroads from the South; and all the people of the country are armed as guerrillas. Curtis is at Helena, eighty miles south, and Grant at Corinth. Bragg's army from Tripoli has moved to Chattanooga and proposes to march on Nashville, Lexington and Cincinnati. They will have about 75,000 men. Buell is near Huntsville with about 30,000, and I suppose detachments of the new levies can be put in Kentucky from Ohio and Indiana in time. The weather is very hot, and Bragg cannot move his forces very fast; but I fear he will give trouble. My own opinion is, we ought not to venture too much into the interior until the river is safely in our possession, when we could land at any point and strike inland. To attempt to hold all the South would demand an army too large even to think of. We must colonize and settle as we go South, for in Missouri there is as much strife as ever. Enemies must be killed or transported to some other country.
"Your affectionate brother,
"W. T. Sherman."
Near the end of August, Sherman wrote to Grant as follows:
"The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; one at Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travel to and from the city. I have a strong guard at the lower bridge over Wolf River, by which we can reach the country to the north of that stream; but, as the Confederates have burned their own bridges, I will hold them to my order, and allow no trade over any other road than the one prescribed, using the lower or Randolph road for our own convenience. I am still satisfied there is no large force of Rebels anywhere in the neighborhood. All the navy gunboats are below, except the St. Louis, which lies off the city. When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo, I will try to see him, and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a fleeter boat, not iron-clad; one that can move up and down the river. Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling is carried on. We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace, buttons, etc., but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to the interior somehow. I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter on this point, which will enable us to control it better.
"You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here. There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet and orderly as possible. I traverse the city every day and night, and assert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis, Cincinnati, or New York.
"Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons there was as much whisky here as now, and it would take all my command as custom-house inspectors to break open all the parcels and packages containing liquor. I can destroy all groggeries and shops where soldiers get liquor, just as we would in St. Louis.
"The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick; as base a charge as was ever made. I would not let the Sanitary Committee carry off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to. We have good hospitals here, and plenty of them. Our regimental hospitals are in the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there than in the general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and the regimental surgeons. The civilian doctors would, if permitted, take away our entire command. General Curtis sends his sick up here, but usually no nurses; and it is not right that nurses should be taken from my command for his sick. I think that when we are endeavoring to raise soldiers and to instruct them, it is bad policy to keep them at hospitals as attendants and nurses."
Early in September the Rebels, under Van Dorn, seriously menaced the line held by Grant's depleted army, and Grant had to call upon Sherman for aid. All through that month Sherman held Memphis with a mere handful of troops, and sent the rest of his forces out to make raids and draw Van Dorn's attention away from Grant. But at the opening of October the Rebels struck the blow they had so long threatened. Van Dorn made a furious attack upon Corinth. Rosecrans defended the place with equal vigor, and the Rebels were repulsed with dreadful slaughter. Unfortunately this Union victory was not followed up with sufficient celerity, and Van Dorn managed to retire to Holly Springs and there reorganize his shattered forces. But the victory at Corinth changed the condition of affairs throughout all that region. In Memphis the Secessionists admitted that their cause was lost. The Union army, so long on the defensive, resumed the offensive. Both sides were reinforced, and preparations were made for another act in the great drama. Of the Union reinforcements, two brigades were sent to Sherman, at Memphis, and he began drilling them for more serious work.
At the middle of November, Grant sent for Sherman to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, bringing with him a good map of the country to the southward. At that meeting Grant explained his plans for the winter's campaign. His army now occupied the line from Memphis to Corinth, and he proposed to move at once against Pemberton, who was with the Rebel army near Holly Springs, behind the Tallahatchie River. He would personally move on Holly Springs, and McPherson would meet him there with the forces now at Corinth. Sherman was to leave a small garrison at Memphis, and lead the rest of his forces to meet Grant and McPherson. This movement against Pemberton was preliminary to the greater work of taking Vicksburg. The plan was carefully carried out. The three forces moved simultaneously against Pemberton, and at the same time General C. C. Washburne, under Sherman's orders, crossed the Mississippi with five thousand cavalry, from Helena, Arkansas, and marched toward Grenada, in the rear of Pemberton's army. This movement alarmed Pemberton, and he hastily abandoned his works and retreated to Grenada. Sherman joined Grant at Oxford, Miss., early in December, and then a dispatch came from Halleck, who was at Washington, urging Grant to proceed with the campaign against Vicksburg, with the aid of Porter's fleet and any other available assistance.
Grant and Sherman discussed the proposed movement fully, and finally agreed upon a plan. Sherman was to be heavily reinforced at Memphis, and would have the co-operation of Porter's gunboats. He was to make a swift movement on the Yazoo, and take Vicksburg from the rear, while Grant, at Oxford, held Pemberton in check. Banks was then supposed to be moving up the river from New Orleans, and everything bade fair for the opening of the whole Mississippi. Sherman would have about forty thousand men, and would conduct the campaign almost entirely according to his own discretion, Grant's instructions to him being of the most rudimentary description. So he returned to Memphis and prepared for the work before him.
Sherman and Porter met at Memphis. Porter has left on record his impressions of Sherman, and the latter's appearance and conduct at their first interview there. Porter expected to find Sherman in a full-dress uniform, and accordingly arrayed himself in all the splendor of the Navy. But Sherman, having heard that Porter disliked fuss and feathers, and generally dressed in working clothes, decided to do likewise himself. The result was that when they met Porter was sumptuously arrayed in blue and gold, and Sherman had on an old and much worn suit of flannel, and each was much surprised at the appearance of the other. Sherman's first words were: "Hello, Porter, I'm glad to see you. You got here sooner than I expected, but I guess we can get off to-night. Mighty cold, isn't it? Sit down and get warm." Then he turned to a servant and told him to put some shirts and underclothes in a gripsack, and "don't bother me with a trunk and traps enough for a regiment."
It was intended to set out on December 18th, but the lack of steamboat transportation delayed them until December 20th, when the start was actually made. Before embarking Sherman issued the following unique orders:
"I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military character, and the interests involved are of too important a character to be mixed up with personal and private business. No citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it, unless employed as part of a crew, or as servants to the transports. Female chambermaids to the boats, and nurses to the sick alone, will be allowed, unless the wives of captains and pilots actually belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's or soldier's wife must pass below Helena.
"II. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, on any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any transport, going or returning, the brigade quartermaster, of which the boat forms a part, will take possession of it and invoice it to Captain A. R. Eddy, Chief Quartermaster at Memphis.
"III. Should any cotton or other produce be brought back to Memphis by any chartered boat, Captain Eddy will take possession of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or factor, the quartermaster will furnish him a receipt for the same, to be settled for on proof of his loyalty at the close of the war.
"IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on the arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quartermaster, with a statement of the time, place and name of its owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state of affairs.
"V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below Helena, in violation of those orders, any colonel of a regiment, or captain of a battery, will conscript him into the service of the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If he shows a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the commanding officer present will turn him over to the captain of the boat as a deck-hand, and compel him to work in that capacity, without wages, until the boat returns to Memphis.
"VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the United States or transports, found making reports for publication which might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid and comfort, will be arrested and treated as spies."
Sherman had full command of this expedition, which was organized in three divisions. He appointed A. J. Smith commander of the First Division, Morgan L. Smith of the Second Division, and G. W. Morgan of the Third Division. These forces comprised thirty thousand and sixty-eight officers and men, and at Helena they were joined by Frederick Steele's Division, with twelve thousand three hundred and ten more. On Christmas eve they reached Milliken's Bend, and on Christmas day a portion of the First Division landed and broke up the Vicksburg and Texas Railroad for a long distance near the crossing of the Texas. Sherman meanwhile pushed on and landed the second division opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, to break up the same road at another point, only eight miles from Vicksburg. The next day the remainder of the army, escorted by Porter's gunboats, went up the Yazoo about twelve miles. At noon of December 27th, Sherman's entire command was landed on the south bank of the Yazoo, near the mouth of the Chikasaw Bayou. They were really on an island, densely wooded, and surrounded by swamps and quicksand. They drove the enemy's pickets toward Vicksburg and then began to explore the country, which they found to be the worst piece of land they had ever been on. Nature seemed to have done her utmost to prevent their further movement forward, and the art of the enemy had greatly increased the difficulties of the situation. Several futile attempts were made to advance to a more advantageous position, and then, on the morning of December 29th, Sherman ordered a general show of attack all along the line, while an actual advance across the bayou was to be made at two points.
The movement was as well planned as was possible under the circumstances, and was executed with almost superhuman valor. Sherman's men rushed at the bluffs which were crowned with Rebel batteries, and fought their way up the steep front with desperate valor. They actually with their fingers scooped out hollow caves in which to be sheltered from the fire of the enemy, and all along the line performed prodigies of heroism. But the Rebel works were impregnable, and they had at last to fall back to their old position. Two other attacks were planned, but were abandoned because of the inability of the gunboats to co-operate. Meantime nothing was heard from Grant, who was to have come up before this. So, on January 2d, Sherman reluctantly re-embarked his troops, and returned to Milliken's Bend where, on January 4th, 1863, he relinquished his command to McClernand who had been sent to relieve him. Sherman took leave of his troops through the following farewell order:
"Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed of two 'army corps,' one to be commanded by General G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my own 'corps,' I desire to express to all commanders, to the soldiers and officers recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement, the capturing of Vicksburg, but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined movement in which others were to assist. We were on time. Unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others.
"We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would justify; and having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict, purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity."
It should be explained that Grant had not come up to join in the demonstration against Vicksburg because, on December 20th one of his subordinates had in a most disgraceful manner surrendered Holly Springs, with its immense store of supplies, to the Rebels. The failure of Sherman's expedition caused a great outcry against him throughout the country, and he was charged with incapacity, how unjustly the simple narrative fully demonstrates. Long afterward, when Vicksburg had finally been taken, Grant officially declared: "General Sherman's arrangement, as commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, was admirable. Seeing the ground from the opposite side of the attack afterwards, I saw the impossibility of making it successful." Sherman's losses in the attack were 175 killed, 930 wounded, and 743 prisoners. The Rebel losses were 63 killed, 134 wounded, and 10 prisoners. As a result of this miscarriage, and of the miserable surrender at Holly Springs, Pemberton was left free, with his powerful army, to fall back and occupy Vicksburg, and thus to hold it for a long time against the combined attacks of the Union Army and Navy. Sherman's own estimate of his work, in his farewell orders to his troops, must be regarded as entirely just, and it is amply corroborated by the testimony of Grant and Porter.
"The expedition failed," says General Grant, "more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to remove forces to effectually checkmate further progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo."
Admiral Porter also, in his official report, speaks of the want of means of moving the troops through the bayous, as the chief difficulty; "for," he remarks, "there were never yet any two men who would labor harder than Generals Grant and Sherman to forward an expedition for the overthrow of Vicksburg." He continues: "The army officers worked like horses to enable them to accomplish what was desired.... No other general could have done better, or as well as Sherman, but he had not the means for this peculiar kind of transportation."
Under orders brought by McClernand the Army of the Tennessee was divided in four corps, known as the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth, commanded respectively by McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut and McPherson, Grant remaining commander of the whole. Sherman's corps formed the right wing, and consisted of the First Division, under General Steele, and the Second Division under General David Stuart, in the absence of Morgan L. Smith. Immediately upon arriving at Milliken's Bend, on January 4th, the expedition was sent on in the same boats, escorted by Porter's gunboats, to attack Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman, an old settlement on the north bank of the Arkansas River, fifty miles from its mouth. This Fort was a very strong work, situated on a high bluff at the head of a horseshoe bend in the river. It was strongly armed and garrisoned by five thousand men under General Churchill, who had been directed to hold the place till his last man was dead. Sherman himself suggested the movement against this place, considering the capture of it necessary to the reduction of Vicksburg and freeing of the Mississippi.
On the night of January 4th Sherman and McClernand went into Porter's cabin on the Black Hawk, and discussed the expedition, asking Porter for his co-operation. Porter sat up in his bed and told them that he was short of coal and could not use wood for fuel. He addressed McClernand with a curtness amounting almost to discourtesy and Sherman watched his opportunity to get him to go into another room, and there asked him what he meant by it. Porter replied that he did not like McClernand, that he had long had a strong prejudice against him. Thereupon Sherman begged him, for the sake of the Union cause, to sink all personal feeling and do his best to work in harmony with McClernand. Porter promised to do so, and the discussion with McClernand was resumed. It was finally agreed that both McClernand and Porter were to go along with the expedition.
They proceeded up the White River and through the cut-off to the Arkansas, and thus reached Notrib's farm, three miles from Fort Hindman. There, on the evening of January 9th, they disembarked, and on the next day moved forward to invest the fort. Sherman's men took the advance and Sherman himself during the night crept forward to behind a stump so close to the Rebel lines that he could hear them at work, preparing for defence. He was thus listening to them, when, early in the morning, a Rebel bugler sounded "as pretty a reveille as I ever heard." Early on January 11th Sherman got his forces into position for attack, and told McClernand that he was ready for the assault as soon as the gunboats would open fire. At one P. M. the gunboats began and so did the field batteries. The enemy did not reply, and in about fifteen minutes Sherman ordered his columns forward. The infantry rushed forward with a cheer, dashed across a hundred yards of open ground, and then reached a strip about three hundred yards wide, covered with timber, underbrush and logs, and much cut up with gulleys. Here they encountered a fierce fire from the enemy, and their advance was checked. But by three o'clock they were within a hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchment, and could now see Porter's gunboats close to the fort.
For an hour the fight raged furiously, and then, at four o'clock, the enemy raised white flags all along his line. Sherman instantly ordered his men to stop firing, and at the same time sent General Steele with a brigade down the bayou at the right to prevent the enemy from retreating in that direction. He then sent an officer forward to the enemy's lines and followed in person with his staff. He found that the fire of his troops had destroyed the enemy's intrenchments and that they could resist no longer. Meeting Colonel Garland, Sherman asked him who commanded the fort. Garland replied that General Churchill did. "Where is he?" asked Sherman. "Inside the fort," said Garland. So Sherman rode into the fort, which, he observed, was well built and capable of much further defence. He found it, however, full of soldiers and sailors from Porter's gunboats, and the boats themselves were anchored at the river bank close by.
Sherman found Churchill in conversation with Porter and A. J. Smith. But he had hardly greeted them before a report came in that General Deshler, who commanded a brigade of Rebel forces, had refused to surrender because he had received no orders from Churchill to that effect, and the fighting was therefore likely to be resumed at once. Accordingly Sherman and Churchill personally hurried to the scene. On their way they met Colonel Garland, who had first displayed the white flag, and Churchill angrily asked him why he had done so. Garland replied that one of Churchill's own staff had ordered him to. Churchill denied having authorized any such order, and a quarrel arose between the two men, which Sherman ended by curtly remarking that it made no difference whether Churchill had ordered the surrender or not, for they and their troops were now all his prisoners. Then they went on to where Deshler and his men were still holding out. Sherman rode straight up to Deshler and asked him what he meant by his conduct, telling him that he ought to know better. Deshler replied curtly, that he had not been ordered by his superior officer to surrender. Thereupon Churchill told him that he was in Sherman's power and might as well give in. This ended the episode. Deshler told his men to stack arms, and the capture of Arkansas Post was complete.
The Union loss in this engagement was 129 killed, 831 wounded and 17 missing, the majority being in Sherman's own corps. General Churchill reported the Rebel loss at 75 or 80 wounded and an unknown number killed, but these figures were grossly inaccurate; the Rebel loss was much heavier than that of the Union army. By this surrender there fell into the hands of the Union army five thousand men, seventeen cannon, three thousand small arms in good condition, and forty-six thousand rounds of ammunition. The prisoners were sent to St. Louis, the fortifications were destroyed, and on January 15th the troops re-embarked and returned to Milliken's Bend. Sherman was now anxious to move directly toward Little Rock and drive the scattered Rebel forces south of the river, but McClernand would not agree to this.
McClernand was greatly elated over the result of this expedition, and took the credit practically all to himself. "It is glorious, glorious!" he exclaimed to Sherman, "my star is in the ascendant." He praised the conduct of the troops highly, but almost ignored the Navy, being exceedingly jealous of Porter. Indeed in his official report of the capture, he scarcely mentioned the action of the fleet. This was unjust, for the gunboats rendered highly important services and Porter led the attack in person. McClernand, however, condescended to speak pleasantly of his subordinate officers, saying: "General Sherman exhibited his usual activity and enterprise; General Morgan proved his tactical skill and strategic talent; while Generals Steele, Smith, Osterhaus and Stuart, and the several brigade commanders, displayed the fitting qualities o£ brave and successful officers."
Co-operation of Grant and Porter—Grand Gulf and Sherman's Demonstration on the Yazoo—The Advance on Vicksburg—Capture of Jackson—Gallant Assaults upon the Works at Vicksburg—The Siege—Sherman Holding Johnston at Bay—Surrender of Vicksburg—Flight of Johnston—Important Results of the Campaign—Sherman's Meed of Praise.
The repulse of Sherman's expedition at Milliken's Bend only made Grant the more determined to reduce Vicksburg, and, as he still retained his well-grounded confidence in Sherman, he retained him as his chief aid in the great work. His plan now was to conduct his army by land to New Carthage, twenty-three miles below Milliken's Bend, to run the transports thence through the canal or past the batteries, and then to cross the river and attack Vicksburg from the west and south. McClernand's corps commenced this movement on March 29th, and on account of floods and bad roads made slow progress. Porter entered into the execution of Grant's plans with his customary zeal, and on April 16th ran his fleet and three laden transports past the batteries of Vicksburg. A few days later five more transports and twelve barges were run past the batteries, a number of the barges being badly injured by the enemy's fire.
Grant issued final orders for this campaign on April 20th. McClernand had the right, McPherson the centre, and Sherman the left. The army moved forward slowly until April 26th, when it became evident that the march must be continued beyond New Carthage. Grant then directed Sherman to wait until the roads were in better condition, or the canals were finished.
Two days later he told Sherman that on the next day, April 29th, Grand Gulf was to be attacked, and he suggested that Sherman would do well to make at the same time a feint on the Rebel batteries on the Yazoo, near Haines's Bluff. Sherman undertook to do this, making as great a show of attack as possible, with the object of preventing the Rebels from sending reinforcements from Vicksburg to Grand Gulf. This movement succeeded admirably. Sherman went up the Yazoo with a number of gunboats and on April 30th, early in the morning, began a vigorous fire upon the enemy's batteries. This was continued for four hours. Later in the day he landed his troops in full view of the enemy as though about to order a charge upon their works. The Rebels evidently expected that the charge was to be made, for they kept themselves in a state of preparation to meet it. Sherman's troops, however, contented themselves with keeping up appearances until night, when they returned to the boats. The next day the same manœuvres were continued. Then orders came from Grant to proceed at once to Grand Gulf, and Sherman quietly dropped back from the scene of the sham attack. His losses amounted to one man wounded.
Meantime the Thirteenth Army Corps had been moved down to Grand Gulf, ready to storm the Rebel work as soon as Porter's gunboats had silenced the batteries. A vigorous fire was kept up for more than five hours, but the enemy's batteries proved too strong, and a change of plan was necessary. Grant accordingly took his troops back some distance, disembarked and marched across to the plain just below Grand Gulf. That night the transports and barges were conveyed past the batteries in safety, the gunboats following, and early on the morning of April 30th the troops were taken across the river. Some days of skirmishing and manœuvring followed, and on the third of May it was found that the enemy had fled from Grand Gulf, toward either Vicksburg or Jackson. Grant accordingly halted his army to wait for Sherman's arrival, and personally went back to Grand Gulf.
Sherman reached Young's Point on May 1st, and the next morning sent his Second Division up to Milliken's Bend. Sherman himself with the other two divisions marched on to join Grant. The junction was effected on May 8th. The day before Grant had ordered a general advance, which was now begun. McPherson at the right, was to move by the way of Rocky Springs and Raymond, to Jackson; McClernand at the left, was to go through Willow Springs, keeping as near the Black River as possible; while Sherman was to move on Edward's Station, striking the railroad between that point and Bolton. On May 10th Sherman destroyed the bridge over the Big Black River, and on the 11th he reached Auburn. The next day he dispersed a small force of the enemy at the crossing of Fourteen Mile Creek, and that evening met Grant just beyond the creek and went into camp. Word now came from McPherson that he had defeated two Rebel brigades at Raymond, and that the enemy had retreated to Jackson, where reinforcements were arriving, and where Joseph E. Johnston was to command.
Grant now determined to make sure of Jackson, and to leave no enemy behind him. So he directed Sherman and McClernand to march at once to Raymond. On May 14th Sherman and McPherson met the enemy near Jackson, and a lively engagement ensued. Before night the Rebels were defeated, and were in full flight, and that evening Grant, Sherman and McPherson met near the State House. The next day Sherman set one division of his army to work destroying the railroad, the arsenal, the government foundry, and various other military works. A valuable cotton factory was also destroyed because the machinery it contained, if regained by the Rebels, could be easily converted into hostile uses. The penitentiary was burned by convicts, who had been released by the Rebels, and some other buildings were accidentally destroyed.
The Rebel General, Pemberton, with 25,000 men and 10 batteries, now sallied out from Vicksburg to attack Grant, and the latter accordingly called back all of his corps to assail Pemberton's position near Edward's Depot. Sherman made a forced march of 20 miles, and that night, arriving at Bolton, was ordered to move on Bridgeport to the right. The enemy beaten, turned back to Vicksburg. At Bridgeport Sherman was joined by Blair with his division, and they crossed the Big Black River. Pressing steadily forward, by the morning of May 18th, Sherman was on the Benton Road, commanding the Yazoo, thus putting himself between the enemy at Vicksburg and the forts on the Yazoo. Grant soon came up and placed the whole army in line of battle, Sherman being on the right. When the advance was ordered, Sherman marched on the Haines's Bluff Road, capturing the enemy's works and camp, and taking many prisoners. On the morning of May 19th the army encompassed the enemy north of Vicksburg, Sherman's command resting on the river, within view of the fleet, with Vicksburg itself in plain sight. There was nothing between Sherman and the Rebel army but about four hundred yards of ground, much cut up by almost impassable ravines and intrenchments. Sherman quickly sent a regiment to secure possession of Haines's Bluff, which was done. Communication was thus opened with the fleet, and bridges and roads were constructed, over which to bring up stores from the mouth of the Chickasaw Bayou, where the supply boats were lying. From May 11th to May 18th Sherman's men had literally lived upon the country.
Vicksburg was now as completely invested as was possible with the forces at hand, and the enemy was considerably demoralized. Grant accordingly ordered a general assult at 2 P. M. on May 19th. The attack was made by Sherman's men with great vigor. The ground was very difficult and the enemy's works strong, and at nightfall Sherman had to order his men to fall back a short distance to shelter. The next two days were spent in placing artillery and bringing up supplies to the troops, and on the morning of May 22d another general assult was made all along the line. No men were visible in the hostile works except a few sharpshooters, who were kept pretty quiet by the Union skirmishers. A volunteer storming party led Sherman's column. As they neared the works they had to cross a bit of open ground in full view of the enemy. This they did at double-quick, and reached the salient of the bastion. As they approached the sally-port they were met with by a withering fire. The front ranks wavered. The rear pressed on valiantly, but it was impossible to face the storm of lead and iron, and they had to seek cover. But the head of the column scaled the outer slope of the left face of the bastion, planted their colors, and then literally burrowed into the earth to gain shelter from the flank fire.
Other attacks were made with great vigor by other brigades, Sherman keeping up meantime a furious artillery fire to occupy the attention of the enemy. At one time it was announced that McClernand had captured three of the Rebel forts and that his flag floated over the stronghold of Vicksburg; but this proved untrue. On the strength of this report, however, Sherman ordered General Mower to charge with his brigade. This was done, with results similar to those at first achieved, the colors being planted by the side of those of the first storming party. There they remained until after nightfall, when they were withdrawn by Sherman's orders.
This assault failed simply because the enemy's works were too strong to be taken in that way. The Rebels were able to mass at every point all the men that were needed to defend it, while the nature of the ground made it impossible for more than a few of the Union troops to advance at once. Grant was not, however, discouraged. If he could not take Vicksburg in one way, he would take it in another. If the direct assult failed, he would see what could be done by a siege. At the siege operations the troops worked diligently and cheerfully. The intrenchments were pushed steadily forward until the evening of July 3d. At that time the saps were close to the enemy's ditch and the mines were under his parapet. Everything was ready for the final attack. Grant's army had been strengthened by various reinforcements. Indeed it had been strengthened so much that he was able to spare Sherman from the immediate work of the siege. So he placed him in command of the Ninth Corps at Haines's Bluff to watch J. E. Johnston. The latter had collected a large army at Jackson with the intention of attacking Grant's force in the rear, and thus raising the siege of Vicksburg. Sherman took up a strong position and easily held him at bay. Johnston, however, became desperate in his desire to save Vicksburg from capture, and on June 29th moved out to try conclusions with Sherman. But before his preparations for battle were complete, on July 4th, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered.
In his official report of the operations around Vicksburg, dated July 6th, Grant spoke thus of Sherman's work in holding the enemy at bay: "Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assult on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders, if the assult should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the 4th, two days earlier than I had fixed for the attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force increased by the remainder of both the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Army Corps, and is at present investing Jackston, where Johnston has made a stand."
On July 9th, Sherman appeared before Jackson, having marched through fifty miles of almost desert country. Three days later the town was invested partially, and then Johnston, seeing that it was impossible for him to hold his ground against Sherman's determined army, evacuated the place and retreated to Meridian, a hundred miles away, burning the bridges behind him. Sherman left a small garrison at Jackson, and then returned to the line of the Big Black River. And thus was ended, one hundred and nine days from its commencement, this great campaign. The Union army had captured 37,000 prisoners, including fifteen Generals. They had driven before them and partially dispersed another large army under the ablest of the Rebel leaders. They had captured Vicksburg, the Gibraltar of the South. They had freed the Mississippi River from Rebel control. And they had split the Rebel Confederacy in twain.
Of Sherman's part in the campaign General Grant remarks: "The siege of Vicksburg and last capture of Jackson and dispersion of Johnston's army entitle General Sherman to more credit than usually falls to the lot of one man to earn. His demonstration at Haines's Bluff, in April, to hold the enemy about Vicksburg, while the army was securing a foothold east of the Mississippi; his rapid marches to join the army afterwards; his management at Jackson, Mississippi, in the first attack; his almost unequalled march from Jackson to Bridgeport, and passage of Black River; his securing Walnut Hills on the 18th of May, may attest his great merit as a soldier."
Sherman's Characteristic Letters—Congratulations to Porter at Vicksburg—Views on the Reorganization of the Army—The Conduct of the War and the Spirit of the South—Manners and Morals of the Soldiers—No Wanton Spoliation of the Enemy's Property—The Heroic Cartridge Boy of Vicksburg.
Early in this volume mention was made of Sherman's ability as a letter-writer. Perhaps in no other way can so good an idea be gained of his mental characteristics as by perusing a few of his epistles, penned amid the scenes of war in which he was so important an actor. As soon as Vicksburg had fallen, for example, and before any attempt was made toward the next move in the bloody game, he wrote thus to Admiral Porter, with whom he had formed a strong and lasting friendship:
"I can appreciate the intense satisfaction you must feel at lying before the very monster that has defied us with such deep and malignant hate, and seeing your once disunited fleet again a unit; and better still, the chain that made an inclosed sea of a line in the great river broken forever. In so magnificent a result I stop not to count who did it. It is done, and the day of our nation's birth is consecrated and baptized anew in a victory won by the united Navy and Army of our country. God grant that the harmony and mutual respect that exists between our respective commanders, and shared by all the true men of the joint service, may continue forever and serve to elevate our national character, threatened with shipwreck. Thus I muse as I sit in my solitary camp out in the wood far from the point for which we have justly striven so long and so well, and though personal curiosity would tempt me to go and see the frowning batteries and sunken pits that have defied us so long, and sent to their silent graves so many of our early comrades in the enterprise, I feel that other tasks lie before me, and time must not be lost. Without casting anchor, and despite the heat and the dust and drought, I must go again into the bowels of the land to make the conquest of Vicksburg fulfil all the conditions it should in the progress of this war. Whether success attend my efforts or not, I know that Admiral Porter will ever accord to me the exhibition of a pure and unselfish zeal in the service of our country.
"Though further apart, the navy and army will still act in concert, and I assure you I shall never reach the banks of the river or see a gunboat, but I will think of Admiral Porter, Captain Breese, and the many elegant and accomplished gentlemen it has been my good fortune to meet on armed or unarmed decks of the Mississippi Squadron."
In 1863 new levies were raised for the armies, by conscription. The Conscription Act was resisted by Rebel sympathizers and the criminal classes generally in several places, notably in New York City, where the atrocious "Draft riots" occurred. Elsewhere the call was responded to with patriotic cheerfulness. Sherman had some decided views as to the manner in which the new troops should be employed. He thought it would be a waste of material to organize new regiments, while in the field there were skeleton regiments enough to make, if filled up, a magnificent army. To the Governor of Ohio he wrote on this subject:
"The President of the United States is now clothed with a power that should have been conferred just two years ago, and I feel assured he will use it. He will call for a large mass of men, and they should all be privates, and sent so as to make every regiment in the field equal to one thousand men. Time has convinced all reasonable men that war in theory and practice are two distinct things. Many an honest patriot, full of enthusiasm, zeal, and thirst for glory, has in practice, found himself unequal to the actual requirements of war, and passed to one side, leaving another in his place; and, now, after two years, Ohio has in the field one hundred and twenty-six regiments, whose officers now are qualified, and the men of which would give tone and character to the new recruits. To fill these regiments will require fifty thousand recruits, which are as many as the State could well raise. I therefore hope and pray that you will use your influence against any more new regiments, and consolidation of old ones, but fill up all the old ones to a full standard. Those who talk of prompt and speedy peace know not what they say."
In the same letter he referred to the attitude of the South and the probable future of the war.
"The South to-day is more formidable and arrogant than she was two years ago, and we lose far more by having an insufficient number of men than from any other cause. We are forced to invade—we must keep the war South; they are not only ruined, exhausted, but humbled in pride and spirit. Admitting that our armies to the front are equal to the occasion, which I know is not the case, our lines of communication are ever threatened by their dashes, for which the country, the population, and character of the enemy are all perfectly adapted.
"Since the first hostile shot, the people of the North have had no option, they must conquer or be conquered. There can be no middle course. I have never been concerned about the copperhead squabblings; the South spurns and despises this class worse than we do, and would only accept their overtures to substitute them in their levies, in the cotton and corn-fields, for the slaves who have escaped. I do not pretend, nor have I ever pretended to foresee the end of all this, but I do know that we are yet far from the end of war. I repeat that it is no longer an open question; we must fight it out. The moment we relax, down go all our conquests thus far. I know my views on this point have ever been regarded as extreme, even verging on insanity; but for years I had associated with Bragg, Beauregard and extreme Southern men, and long before others could realize the fact that Americans would raise their hands against our consecrated government, I was forced to know it, to witness it. Two years will not have been spent in vain if the North now, by another magnificent upheaving of the real people, again fill the ranks of your proven and tried regiments, and assure them that, through good report and evil report, you will stand by them. If Ohio will do this, and if the great North will do this, then will our army feel that it has a country and a government worth dying for. As to the poltroons, who falter and cry quits, let them dig and raise the food the army needs—but they should never claim a voice in the councils of the nation."