The occupation of Cross Lanes was considered by the authorities of the gravest importance. It was contiguous to three fords on the Gauley River, which, when possessed by the Federal forces, was a perfect protection to the left of the army occupying Gauley Bridge. Carnifex Ferry was immediately south two and one-half miles. There was a road leading from the vicinity of Gauley Bridge, on the south bank of the Gauley River, which unites with the Sunday road, crossing the river at this ferry. This road afforded the enemy a means of gaining the left of our forces, at Gauley Bridge. The occupation of Cross Lanes, therefore, by the enemy, would sever the communication between our forces at the above point, and the main army under Rosecrans, occupying the country from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, along Cheat Mountain.
Carnifex Ferry, was a point easily defended against a much superior force. Indeed, it had so many natural defences, that it elicited exclamations of surprise from men accustomed to the selection of places for defence. The current of the river was rapid, while the abrupt rocks on its banks afforded secure hiding places for a considerable body of troops. It was quite impossible to bring artillery to bear in such a manner on the position as to interfere materially with troops concealed there. It seems to be the opinion of most persons familiar with the place, that it would be quite impossible to dislodge a body of troops properly posted on the north bank of the river at this ferry, provided a stubborn resistance was made.
It was for the purpose of preventing the crossing of the enemy at this point that the force of Colonel Tyler was ordered to Cross Lanes. By keeping pickets well on the line of the river, to watch any advance of the enemy, the regiment was entirely safe at its camp, from which it was comparatively easy to re-enforce any portion of the line. But for some reason, the commanding officer failed to visit the ferry in person, until the afternoon of the day on which a peremptory order was received to report with his command at Gauley Bridge. Hitherto he had been entirely unable to give correct information, as to the probability of his being able to hold the ferry. He was ordered to abandon the position, because his dispatches were such, that they created an uneasiness in the minds of Generals Rosecrans and Cox, as to the propriety of trusting him to hold so important a position. Here was the fatal mistake. A lesser error had already been made, in withdrawing all the forces from Tyler, other than the Seventh. Had these forces remained, the position would probably not have been abandoned, as all would have felt secure. When the order to withdraw was received, the commanding officer regretted it as much as any one. But the mischief was already done; the order was imperative. On that evening, Monday, the regiment left Cross Lanes at 11 o'clock P.M., and the next day, by noon, was at Twenty Mile Creek, some eight miles from Gauley Bridge.
On the Wednesday morning following, Colonel Tyler reported in person to General Cox. In the mean time, the general having become satisfied that Colonel Tyler could be trusted to hold Cross Lanes, and being confident that the contemplated attack of the enemy on Gauley Bridge had been abandoned, ordered him to return as soon as the troops were rested, expecting him to start back, at least the next morning. But Tyler did not move. On Friday afternoon, General Cox, on learning that he had not moved, was much excited, and said to an officer present—
"He must move; he must move at once; it is all important that Cross Lanes be held, and Floyd be kept on the other side of the river; ride back to camp and tell him from me, to move early in the morning, and with speed, to secure the position."
The order was delivered in nearly the same language as given, but notwithstanding its directness, he did not move till noon on Saturday, and then made a distance of only fourteen miles, over good roads, encamping at the foot of Panther Mountain, after having fallen back from Peter's Creek, on learning of the presence of the enemy.
On arriving in camp, a dispatch was sent to General Cox, representing to him that the enemy were in force in front, and asking instructions. On Sunday morning at about 3 o'clock, a courier arrived with an order from General Cox, substantially as follows: The force in your front cannot be as large as you estimate it. Advance cautiously, feeling your way; if the enemy is too strong, fall back, if not, occupy Cross Lanes at once, as it is of the utmost importance.
About nine o'clock Sunday morning, August 25th, the regiment moved towards Cross Lanes, casting lots as to which company should be left in charge of the baggage. It fell upon Company F, which was temporarily commanded by Lieutenant Kimball. The entire day was occupied in reaching Cross Lanes. It was not until dark of that day that the regiment went into camp.
In the days' advance some slight skirmishing occurred with the enemy's cavalry videttes, but beyond these few horsemen no enemy was encountered, the regiment encamping in apparent security near the church, after having driven away a cavalry picket of the enemy.
Companies were sent out on picket, as follows: Company A, on the road leading to Summerville; Company K, on the road leading to Carnifex Ferry; Company C, on the road leading in the opposite direction, while Company E was sent on a diagonal road leading to a ferry some distance below Carnifex. The balance of the command remained near headquarters, which were established in the church.
Each company on picket was divided into three reliefs, with instructions to be vigilant.
The silence of the enemy, together with his neglect to attack, created the impression that he had withdrawn his forces to the other side of the river, fearing that this small force was but the advance of a well-equipped army. But these theories were destined to fade into sadder realities, as the shadows of night melted into morning.
Nothing occurred during the night to disturb the general repose. A short time before day fires were kindled, and those who were up had pieces of meat on sticks, which they were roasting. Some had obtained green corn during the night, which they were also roasting. Before day had fairly dawned, the command was almost entirely astir. As it became sufficiently light to distinguish objects at a considerable distance, several musket shots were heard in the direction of the river, followed in quick succession by others. It soon became evident that a determined attack was being made on Company K. About this time a column of rebels was seen advancing from the river road, across the fields, towards Company A's position on the Summerville road. Arriving in the vicinity of this road, the column halted, formed in line of battle, at the same time swinging round its right to the Summerville road, driving Company A back to the point where the roads cross. In the mean time Companies B, D, G, H, and I were ordered to the support of Company K; but on arriving at the cross roads, Company K was seen falling back in some confusion, before a superior force, therefore they remained at that point. Meanwhile a heavy fire was opened from a dense wood opposite the church, to resist which Company K, having been joined by Companies A and C, which had advanced to its support on the ferry road, took position on a hill midway between this belt of timber and the crossing of the roads. From this point these companies delivered several effective volleys, which soon drove the rebels from their position. Taking advantage of this partial check of the enemy, Captain Crane ordered a charge, which resulted in piercing the lines, and the capture of a stand of rebel colors. The three companies now escaped, with a loss, however, of Captain Shurtliff, Lieutenant Wilcox, and Lieutenant Cross, taken prisoners, the latter being severely wounded in the arm.
During this time the rebel column from the direction of Summerville had advanced so as to lap over the road opposite the Ferry road, exposing the companies occupying the road in front of the church to an enfilading fire, at the same time being exposed to a severe fire from the front, from a column of infantry and cavalry coming up the Ferry road. These companies were now ordered to rally on a hill near the church. In executing this movement Companies D and H passed through a corn field, exposed to a deadly fire from almost every direction. Soon after reaching this field Captain Dyer, Company D, fell dead, pierced in the heart by a rifle bullet. Lieutenant Weed succeeded him in command. On reaching the hill these companies attempted to rally, but being in an open field, combated by a much superior and partially hidden foe, were compelled to fall back to a piece of woods skirting the road. The balance of the command, other than those who had followed the fortunes of Captain Crane, now joined them, and soon organized for a systematic retreat.
Captain Crane and his followers, after putting some distance between themselves and the enemy, crossed the Gauley road, and hastened to the mountains, where they would be entirely free from the attacks of cavalry, and where they would have a chance, at least, of partially defending themselves against attack from the rebel infantry.
Arriving in the mountains, they took a direction as nearly as possible towards Gauley Bridge, where they arrived in safety, meeting with little of adventure on the way. Thus a small body of Federals had fought their way out from the very grasp of the enemy, and, eluding pursuit, traversed a mountain range, with no guide, over rocks and deep gorges, arriving safely within the Union lines. Their arrival, however, did little to cheer the hearts of those in camp, for they were a small body compared with those still unheard from.
The news of the sad disaster to the Seventh had already been sent to the friends at home; universal gloom had settled over the camp, and the prospect looked dark for saving the organization, even, of a regiment which was the pride of the Western Reserve.
A flag of truce was sent to Cross Lanes to ascertain, if possible, the fate of those left behind. Chaplain Brown and Surgeon Cushing were selected to undertake this enterprise. They, however, returned without having accomplished their object.
One dark, rainy night, as if nature was in sympathy with the feelings of those in camp, the band commenced playing a patriotic air in front of the colonel's quarters, accompanied with cheers. I knew that this indicated good news. Hastening to the spot I learned that a dispatch had just arrived from Charleston with the comforting news that four hundred of the regiment had arrived in safety on the Elk River, twelve miles from the above place. But let us accompany these four hundred heroes in their march from the battlefield.
Organizing the troops, Major Casement, being first in rank, Colonels Tyler and Creighton having already escaped, assumed command. Losing no time the detachment immediately took up the line of march. Avoiding all highways, and keeping well in the timber, they moved on for some time, when, considering themselves out of immediate danger, they ventured out to the road, to find themselves only three miles from the place of starting. It was now concluded that it was not advisable to attempt reaching Gauley Bridge, as the enemy would be likely to interpose a considerable body of troops between them and that point. It was considered to be more practicable to make in the direction of Elk River, and by this means reach Charleston. This course being adopted, the command crossed the road and took to the mountains. Very soon after a party of rebel cavalry came dashing down as if in pursuit, barely missing the object of their search.
The command, aided by a compass, took their course over the mountains in a direction which they supposed would ultimately lead them to the banks of the Elk River.
During the afternoon Captain W. R. Sterling procured a guide, who conducted them by narrow pathways, in which they were compelled to march single file, towards a house which was situated at some distance on the mountain. Night setting in, before reaching the spot, without even a star visible to light them on the way, the column halted, and passed the word back for a candle. The line extended for nearly half a mile, and it was not until the last company, H, had been reached, that one was procured. On its arriving at the front, it was discovered that the head of the column had arrived on the brink of a deep chasm, into which it would be sure death to plunge. One step more, and the unlucky leader of the line would have been precipitated into the dreadful crater. But these daring adventurers were spared the misfortune of such an accident.
Two hours of valuable time having been lost, the line now pressed forward, each man holding on to the man preceding him. About midnight the house was reached, and the weary band laid themselves down; not, however, to sleep, for the only provisions they had had during the day was roasted corn, for in the morning they were attacked while preparing breakfast, which they were compelled to abandon. The woman of the house was kept cooking the good old-fashioned corn-dodger, and by morning the command was tolerably well fed, and ready for the toilsome as well as hazardous march of the succeeding day.
As the day again dawned, the line moved on. Procuring another guide during the day, they arrived, in early evening, on the banks of the Elk River, without any adventure worth relating. Before halting they forded the river, which was, at the time, waist deep. Company B was sent out on picket, under command of Lieutenant Molyneaux. The instructions were to establish a chain of pickets, at short intervals, along the road leading up the river. In case of an attack, the outer picket to fire and fall back on the next, when another volley was to be delivered, and so continue until the camp should be finally reached. The position selected for the camp was at the base of a range of abrupt hills, which were not accessible to cavalry, while many difficulties would present themselves in the way of a force of infantry advancing to an attack from that direction. The river ran at the very foot of these hills, too deep to cross in the face of an enemy, and sufficiently wide to present a decided obstacle in the way of an attacking party on the opposite shore. The command felt, therefore, comparatively safe in this retreat. As it afterwards proved, they were not mistaken; for it was ascertained that, at the time the pickets were being stationed, seven hundred rebel cavalry were a short distance up the river; indeed, they were so near that a party of rebel officers heard the lieutenant give the instructions to the outer picket. One of these officers, when afterwards taken prisoner, being questioned by Molyneaux as to their reason for not attacking, remarked that it would have been quite impossible for them to reach the camp in case his instructions to the picket should be carried out; and he and his brother-officers agreed in the opinion, that the orders would be carried out; for no body of troops, after having made so stubborn a resistance as at Cross Lanes, would afterwards lose all by a want of vigilance or a disobedience of orders. True it is that they did not attack, but suffered the camp to remain quiet, and the command to move off at leisure in the morning.
A dispatch being sent to Charleston, on the following day a provision-train met them twelve miles from the latter place. In due time the command arrived at Charleston, weary and foot-sore from their long and toilsome march.
The occasion for the affair at Cross Lanes was brought about by a series of blunders. The first blunder was committed by the officer who ordered all the forces, with the exception of the Seventh Ohio, from a position which enabled them to guard the ferries of the Gauley. If it was deemed important to hold these ferries at all, it was certainly advisable to retain a sufficient force to guard against surprise and capture. But then, what would be considered a sufficient force? To settle the question, it is necessary to take into account the size of the army occupying the country, as well as the size of that of the enemy. Neither army was large, and both were much scattered, scarcely more than a brigade occupying one position. A regiment, therefore, may perhaps be considered a sufficient force for an outpost.
The army in Western Virginia was at no time sufficiently large to accomplish any thing, under the best generalship, beyond simply holding the country, and preventing invasion; and it was only for the want of a moderately sized army that the rebel general failed to drive back our forces. But the rebel authorities had no men to spare for the purpose of winning barren victories; so the armies of Western Virginia were left to watch each other, with an occasional skirmish.
At the time the affair at Cross Lanes took place, our army occupied a front of many miles, as did also the rebel army. It was quite impossible to collect, in case of emergency, more than about six thousand men. But, however it may be as to the first point, it is clear, secondly, that the commanding officer at Cross Lanes committed an error in not making a personal inspection of the grounds, adjacent to the camp, immediately on his arrival. It is always considered highly important that those in command should know precisely the ground their commands are expected to defend, and not to trust to chance or a battle to develop favorable points of defence or attack. By reason of this want of knowledge, rumors as to the presence of the enemy in force created uneasiness and alarm, which was entirely natural, although without cause. While in this state of feeling, the commanding officer sent dispatches to Generals Rosecrans and Cox, which created the impression that their author was not to be trusted to hold these ferries. Those generals attributed this alarm to a want of personal courage, they being well informed as to the strength of the position at Cross Lanes. It was not, however, a want of courage, but simply a failure on his part to understand the real strength of the position, by reason of not having visited it in person.
When the order to withdraw came, Colonel Tyler regretted it as much as any one; for he had that day examined the position, and knew that he could hold it against any force the enemy could bring to the attack. But this knowledge was obtained too late: lying on his table was a positive order to withdraw. Reason said hold the position; military law, which was higher in authority, said abandon it; so the place was evacuated. The third and irremediable error was committed in not returning to Cross Lanes when ordered. If that had been done, the consequences resulting from the withdrawal would have been entirely checked. The order to return was given on Wednesday, with the expectation that it would be acted upon as soon as Thursday morning; but it was not until the Saturday noon following that the command started. There was no reason for this delay. The regiment had marched but eighteen miles in as many days, and could, without any injustice being done it, have returned the day the order was given. Even had the command moved as late as Friday, with dispatch, it would not have been too late, as it seems to be well settled that Floyd did not cross over any considerable body of troops until Saturday.
In the way of criticism on this affair, it has been said that, had a spirited dash been made on the enemy on Saturday evening, the rebels could have been driven across the river. I think this claim subject to many doubts. In my opinion a reconnoissance should have been made that night, instead of falling back to Panther Mountain. This would have resulted in the discovery of their position and force, and thus given the command an opportunity to take advantage of the night to withdraw. Had this been done, the ferry might possibly have been reached.
The result of these blunders was the fighting of two engagements, with a heavy Federal loss, while the enemy suffered less. One of these, Carnifex Ferry, has been dignified with the name of battle, while the other is considered but an affair.
After the repulse of the Seventh, Floyd intrenched himself on the bank of the river, near the ferry. About two weeks later, "Rosecrans came down with his legions," comprising about four thousand men. Approaching the vicinity of the ferry, he threw forward General Benham's brigade, with no design of bringing on an engagement, however; but the line unwittingly advanced to within a short distance of the enemy's works, when a sheet of flame shot along their entire line. The unequal contest lasted five hours, when the Union forces withdrew, hungry and supperless, with a loss of fourteen killed, and one hundred and four wounded. The loss of the enemy was about twenty wounded.
The troops awoke in the morning to find the rebel works abandoned. Thus ended the battle of Carnifex Ferry, no less a blunder than Cross Lanes.
General Benham was censured for having attacked their main works, when he was ordered to make a reconnoissance only. But when it is understood that the commanding general sent up reinforcements, the blame, if there was any, attached itself to him.
The loss to the Seventh, at Cross Lanes, was one killed, twenty wounded, and ninety-six taken prisoners. Several of these were recaptured at Carnifex Ferry, when Rosecrans attacked Floyd. Among the number was Lieutenant Cross, Company C. The loss to the enemy has never been known. There is no doubt, however, that it was considerable. They attacked in large numbers, confident of an easy victory, therefore very little caution attended their movements. But instead of a flag of truce, accompanied by an offer to surrender, they were met by a shower of bullets, which must have told fearfully on their heavy columns. The fact that they were thrown into such confusion as to permit our men to escape, shows that they were too severely punished to follow up their victory.
The force of Floyd has been variously estimated: some having placed it as high as six thousand; while, in his official report of the engagement at Carnifex Ferry, Floyd himself places it at only two thousand. His force was probably four thousand, of all arms, with ten pieces of artillery. This entire force must have been in the vicinity at the time of the affair at Cross Lanes.
The following is an unofficial list of the loss in the regiment:
Killed.—Captain John N. Dyer.
Wounded.—Corporal Frank Dutton, N. J. Holly, Thomas Shepley, Thomas J. Scoville, Sergeant H. G. Orton, Joseph W. Collins, B. Yeakins, Lewis J. Jones, Thomas S. Curran, William Meriman, B. F. Gill, William S. Reed, David M. Daily, Robert J. Furguson, James R. Greer, E. J. Kreiger, Sergeant James Grebe, John W. Doll, William W. Ritiche, Fred. W. Steinbauer.
The following is a list of those taken prisoners:
Sergeant W. W. Parmeter, Sergeant E. R. Stiles, Sergeant G. C. C. Ketchum, Sergeant F. F. Wilcoxson, Sergeant Edward Bohn, Sergeant A. Kolman, Sergeant E. W. Morey, Corporal C. F. Mack, Corporal J. G. Turner, Corporal T. A. Mohler, Corporal S. M. Cole, Corporal E. C. Palmer, Corporal Charles Bersett, Privates Albert Osborn, Charles Weber, Alex. Parker, R. Bears, L. Warren, A. M. Halbert, H. Keiser, S. B. Kingsbury, E. Kennedy, A. Hubbell, C. C. Quinn, C. Burrows, E. Evans, W. H. Scott, C. H. Howard, Charles Carrol, T. B. Myers, George Sweet, John Massa, J. F. Curtis, W. E. Bartlett, W. Cherry, John Bark, John Hann, L. M. Blakesly, Z. Fox, J. Butler, F. S. Stillwell, G. W. Downing, G. C. Newton, William Biggs, Mathew Merkle, J. Sheloy, H. Huntoon, G. W. Williams, George C. Robinson, H. Wessenbock, J. C. Rafferty, J. Snyder, W. W. Wheeler, C. Haskell, J. W. Finch, James Johnson, H. Johnson, L. C. Logue, A. Scoville, P. Wildson, F. Boole, John Miller, P. Jenkins, John Smith, J. Wolf, Theodore Burt, A. Schwartz, G. A. Akerman, Charles Sahl, G. W. Thompson, F. Williams, M. H. Whaley, Z. Larkins, T. Hebbig, Z. A. Fuig, F. A. Noble, J. Hettlick, J. McCabe, L. Beles, E. R. Smith, F. A. Rubicon, John Smith, E. Smith, H. Smith, D. N. K. Hubbard, H. Wood, Charles Ottinger, R. S. Beel, N. D. Claghorn, H. Thompson, N. Freidenburg, M. Levullen, S. Gill, fifer.
After the engagement at Cross Lanes, five companies of the regiment remained at Gauley Bridge, while the balance were at Charleston. The latter part was commanded by Colonel Guthrie, of the First Kentucky Regiment. At this time it was the seat of justice for Kanawha County, and contained upwards of three thousand inhabitants. It is a neat village, situated on the north bank of the Kanawha River, at a point where the Elk empties into it. There is a fine suspension bridge over the latter stream, which the rebels undertook to destroy in their flight. Charleston is three hundred and eight miles west of Richmond, and forty-six miles east of the Ohio River. It was named after Charles Clendenin, an early settler, and an owner of the soil on which it is built.
The Valley of the Kanawha is famous for its beautiful scenery. The mountains on either side of the river sometimes rise to the height of five hundred feet and more, and are liberally supplied with rich beds of minerals and coal. At their base is located the famous Kanawha salt works. They commence near Charleston, and extend for about fifteen miles above it. Before the rebellion they gave employment to nearly six thousand persons. The following extract will be of interest:
"It is a curious fact, and worthy of philosophical inquiry, that while the salt water is obtained by boring to a depth of from three hundred to five hundred feet below the bed of the Kanawha, it invariably rises to a level with the river. When the latter is swollen by rains, or the redundant waters of its tributaries, the saline fluid, inclosed in suitable "gums" on the shore, ascends like the mercury in its tube, and only falls when the river returns to its wonted channel. How this mysterious correspondence is produced is a problem which remains to be solved. Theories and speculations I have heard on the subject, but none seem to me to be precisely consonant with the principles of science."
Before the presence of the army interrupted the manufacture of salt, these works yielded about two million bushels annually, and are capable of yielding much more with an increase of capital.
While Colonel Guthrie commanded the post at Charleston a most disgraceful tragedy was enacted. An order had been issued that no liquors of any description should be sold or given to the soldiers or employees of the Government. During the time this order was in force, a party of drunken rowdies from the First Kentucky Regiment stopped at the grocery of an old man, and asked for some beer; when refused, they demanded it. Being again refused they threatened violence, and proceeded to put their threats into force, when a son of the old man, occupying a room above, was brought to the window by the old gentleman's cries for help, and, seeing his father thus set upon by a mob, from the repeated assaults of which his life was endangered, fired a revolver, the contents of which took effect on one of the assaulting party, producing instant death. He was at once arrested and lodged in jail, around which a strong guard was placed to prevent his being taken out and hung.
That night Colonel Guthrie, in a speech made to the excited throng, which had collected around the jail, said, in substance, that the life of the criminal should be taken if he had to do it with his own hand. Similar remarks were made by others, among whom was a captain who afterwards sat as judge-advocate on the trial.
On the morning after the affair the members constituting the court-martial assembled "in all the pomp and pride of glorious war," decorated with all the paraphernalia belonging to an officer's equipment, but to declare a prejudged opinion.
During the trial the prisoner was as immovable as a statue, evincing in his appearance a want of hope, as well as a preparation for the worst. He made no defence. The announcement of the sentence of death produced no change; he preserved a stoical appearance to the last.
When the hour of execution arrived the prisoner was brought to the gallows in a heavy wagon, guarded by a double file of soldiers, who were laughing as gayly as if on their way to some place of amusement. During the afternoon the sun had shone through a cloudless sky; but just before this terrible scene was enacted, the heavens were draped with heavy clouds, and the rain fell in torrents, casting a gloom on all around. The wretched victim ascended the gallows with a firm tread, and addressed a few words, in a fearless tone, to those assembled around. As the rope was being adjusted around his neck, the crowd involuntarily gave way, showing that, although they had been clamorous for the enactment of the scene, yet when the time came, they had not the nerve to witness the death-struggle of their victim. There was but little movement of the body after the fatal drop fell. This last scene was sickening in the extreme, and all of us, moved by a common impulse, turned and walked away in silence, our hearts being too full for utterance.
This is one more testimony against the safety and justice of the death penalty.
On the 19th day of October, Colonel Tyler took command of the post at Charleston. He issued the following proclamation:
"In assuming the command of this post, one of my principal objects will be to maintain order, and to see that the rights of persons and property have the protection guaranteed by general orders from department headquarters. To the faithful execution of this my entire energies, together with the force at my command, will be given. To this end I have established Camp Warren, where officers and soldiers are required to be at all times, except when on duty which calls them away, or on leave of absence, which will only be granted at headquarters. Commissioned and non-commissioned officers will be held personally responsible for any violation of this order by members of their companies. Drunkenness, marauding, boisterous and unsoldierlike conduct are strictly forbidden. To prevent this, the sale of intoxicating liquors, directly or indirectly, to those in the service of the United States, is positively and emphatically prohibited; and I call upon the citizens to aid me in detecting those who violate this order. The quiet of your town, the protection of your property—in fact your lives and the lives of your families—depend much upon the sobriety of our officers and men; therefore, it becomes your duty as well as your interest to lend me your aid in the execution of this order.
"E. B. Tyler,
"Colonel Commanding Post."
Under the rule of Colonel Tyler the post at Charleston assumed order and quiet. Under the former commandant drunkenness was common, while marauding parties were free to patrol the streets on their errands of mischief. The property of the citizens was at the mercy of these gangs, while their lives were not unfrequently placed in jeopardy. The people, therefore, were much gratified with the change of rule. Camps were now established at some distance from the village, while no soldiers were permitted to visit it unless they first obtained a pass from headquarters, which, being established in town, was difficult to procure. A provost-marshal was appointed, with a proper guard subject to his orders. This guard was instructed to arrest all soldiers found in the streets of the village without a proper pass, as well as those committing any depredations on the property or persons of the citizens, with or without a pass.
About the middle of October the companies at Gauley Bridge came down to Charleston. During their stay on the Gauley they performed much duty at the outposts; several times being under the enemy's fire, though none were injured. The detachment suffered severe loss, however, from sickness. Lieutenant Robinson was among the number; he died of fever; his loss was greatly felt by the regiment. When the news of his death reached his company, they wept as for a brother.
Near the last of October General Floyd very suddenly appeared on Cotton Hill, an abrupt eminence lying between the Kanawha and New rivers, at the junction of the Gauley with the latter stream, which form the Kanawha. The enemy immediately commenced shelling Gauley Bridge. General Cox, who was some distance up New River, near the headquarters of General Rosecrans, was ordered to proceed to Gauley Bridge and to assume direction of affairs. He was also ordered to direct General Benham, who was expected to arrive very soon with a brigade, to cross his forces, at night, over the Kanawha River, and to carry the summit of Cotton Hill by storm. A picket post had already been established across the river by direction of General Cox. Benham protested against the movement, and refused to execute the order received through General Cox, but proceeded to confer, by telegraph, with General Rosecrans, receiving in reply the same orders. Benham still protesting against attempting to execute what he termed so hazardous a movement, at his own request was permitted to pass down the river to the mouth of Loop Creek, from whence he was to undertake a flank movement. Colonel Smith joined General Benham in his protest, declaring the attempt to storm these batteries as sheer madness. It is significant that General Cox afterwards stormed and carried Cotton Hill, with barely a regiment of troops.
Floyd had constructed a line of fortifications at Dickerson's, on the road to Fayetteville, which was his only avenue of retreat in case of disaster.
Soon after General Benham arrived opposite Loop Creek, he was joined by five hundred selected men from the Seventh from Charleston. This detachment of the regiment, having arrived on boats, was ordered to disembark, and take up their position at the mouth of Loop Creek. The following morning it moved up the creek some eight or ten miles, where it took up its position at an old log barn. Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton being in command, Colonel Tyler having remained at Charleston, was instructed to picket the roads well in his front, as well as the mountains lying between; and also to scout the country in the vicinity, for the purpose of finding out the position of the camp of the enemy, as well as his numbers. The latter part of the order was well executed, and there can be no doubt that Benham was possessed of accurate information of the enemy.
After the third day of our occupation of this position we were joined by a detachment of the Forty-fourth Ohio, under command of Major Mitchell, and the Thirty-seventh Ohio, under command of Colonel Seibert. Soon after, all of this force, with the exception of eight companies of the Thirty-seventh Regiment, was ordered forward under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton.
Proceeding for some distance on a road leading to the front, we struck into a bridle path, and after passing through a wood, began ascending a mountain. Single file, the command clambered up its steep and rocky sides. Arriving on its summit we could see the heads of a line of men extending for a mile beneath us. Descending the opposite side with some difficulty, we marched some distance from the foot of the mountain, and found ourselves at Cassady's Mills, a point from which the command was to debouch on to the Fayetteville pike, should Floyd attempt a retreat. But the movement, on the part of Benham, was so tardily executed, that the balance of the command never arrived at this point; but instead, the forces, other than the Seventh Ohio, were ordered away that night; leaving a detachment of five hundred men, with no support, within three miles of a well-equipped army of the enemy. We were so near that we could plainly hear the bugle calls in Floyd's camp. Had Benham's entire command been at that point, the retreat of the rebel army could have been intercepted. Previous to this, Floyd had been driven back to his intrenchments at Dickerson's, and all that was necessary to his capture, was an attack on his rear on the part of Benham. But he either feared to make the attack, or was too slow in doing it. The former is probably true. That night the rebel general passed within three miles of our position, and escaped with his entire army, together with the artillery and baggage.
On the 12th of November, Benham arrived at Cotton Hill, but to find the forces of General Cox in possession. On the afternoon of the 13th, he pushed on after Floyd's retreating army, arriving within four miles of Fayetteville, at about eleven o'clock P.M. Here, evidences of the hurried retreat of Floyd began to multiply. The fences were lined with hides, but recently stripped from the carcasses of cattle, while in many places the beef itself was left suspended from the fence.
On the morning of the 4th, we pushed through Fayetteville before day, in the pursuit. Floyd had but a few hours the start. Six miles ahead we took breakfast, consisting of two army crackers to each man. After which we pushed rapidly on. About noon, our skirmishers, the Thirteenth Ohio, overtook the rear-guard of the enemy, when sharp firing occurred, which continued during an advance of several miles, resulting in the mortal wounding of St. George Croghan, colonel of the Second Georgia cavalry, and formerly of the United States Army. The colonel was taken to a house close by and left, where he was found in a dying condition by our men. Having been a class-mate of his at West Point, Benham stopped and passed a few words with him. When recognizing the general, Croghan appeared to be much affected; and is reported to have said that he knew he was fighting in a bad cause, and that he had been driven into the army much against his wishes, for he was still attached to the old flag. He soon after expired.
While this conversation was being carried on between officers so differently circumstanced, the Union forces had pressed the rebels so closely, that the latter, to save their baggage train, were compelled to make a stand. The Seventh Ohio was ordered to act as reserve, but when the action grew hot, was ordered forward, with instructions to send out two companies as skirmishers, which was immediately done; Companies A and K being sent forward.
About this time two pieces of rifled cannon were brought to bear on the rebels, when they turned and fled, leaving six killed on the field. We were so near, that we plainly heard the retreat sounded by their bugles. From this time their retreat became a rout. In their flight, they cast away every thing that would encumber their retreat. We were now on the banks of a stream, over whose rocky cliffs numerous wagons, with their contents, had been hurled. It was supposed, that several pieces of cannon shared the same fate.
The pursuit was continued with much vigor, until a late hour in the evening, when General Schenck, having but just arrived at the front, ordered it discontinued. This was the second error of the campaign. Schenck, with his fresh troops, instead of ordering the pursuit to cease, should have pressed with vigor. The enemy encamped but a short distance in our front, on Three-mile Mountain. This position could have been carried with ease, with the combined forces of Schenck and Benham, with comparatively little loss. But the pursuit being the result of a blunder, resulted in a blunder.
A little after midnight the command fell back, arriving at Fayetteville in the afternoon of the same day, after a fatiguing march over the worst road that could be imagined, and with no provisions other than beef with a very little salt. The Seventh marched to its old camp, four miles out on the road to Cotton Hill. The officers and men lay on the hill-side that night, exposed to a violent snow storm, with no other covering than their blankets, except the snowy sheet that nature spread over them during the long hours of night.
During the night a demonstration was made on a drove of pigs which were lurking close by; and it would not be strange if the soldiers could relate tales of their descent on poultry yards and bee-hives. True it is, that some first-class honey found its way into camp.
The next day, marching over Cotton Hill, we arrived at our camp near the mouth of Loop Creek. Embarking on the following day, we arrived at Charleston on the 18th, after an absence of fourteen days.
While at Charleston, we were deeply impressed with the profound interest the slaves were taking in passing events. That down-trodden race, who had for years suffered every injustice at the hands of their white oppressors, were now the first to assist the Federal commanders. Through darkness and storm, they carried information, and acted as scouts and guides on occasions when it would try the heart and nerve of their white companions.
From my own observation, I am confident that the slaves of the South, were just as well informed with regard to their relation to their masters, as we were. They were, from the very first, impressed with the idea that this rebellion was to work some great change in their condition. They were watching, with great interest, every movement of troops, and were continually asking questions, as to the disposition to be made of them; thus evincing an interest in military affairs, of which their masters little dreamed. It is well enough to talk of the deep devotion of slaves to their masters; but the latter have found ere this, I trust, that this devotion on which they have relied, has not prevented them from cutting their throats, when it was in the line of their duty, and by means of which they could gain their freedom. An instance of this great devotion on the part of a slave for his master, was related to me while at Charleston.
A Mr. R—— owned a colored servant by the name of John; he enjoyed the unlimited confidence of his master, who was in the habit of trusting him as he would one of his children. This confidence was reciprocated by a like devotion on the part of the slave for his master. One day a neighbor told Mr. R—— that his John was about to run away, as he had repeated conversations with his servants on the subject. Mr. R—— flew into a passion, feeling very much grieved that his neighbor should think, for a moment, that his John, whom he had raised from infancy, should prove so ungrateful as to leave him. The only attention he paid to this timely warning was, to put still greater trust in his servant. One day, shortly after this, John was missing; not only this, he had been so ungrateful as to take his wife and three children. The last heard from faithful John was, that he was safe in Ohio. Now Mr. R—— is a very good man and a Christian, and treat his servants very kindly; but that God-given principle, a desire for personal liberty, actuated him in connection with other men of fairer complexion. John, undoubtedly, left his old home and master with regret, but home and friendship, when compared with freedom, were nothing.
I was once told by a colored man, in whom the utmost confidence could be placed, that there has been for years an association among the negroes, which extends throughout the South, the purpose of which was one day to liberate themselves from slavery. He said that hundreds of slaves who, apparently, were as innocent as ignorant, were tolerably well educated, and were secretly bending every energy to bring about an insurrection, which should end in their being released from bondage. When asked if the field-hands were members of this association, he said they were; and although possessing less information than those living in the cities and villages, yet they were aware of what was going on; and after their work was done at night, they often met in their cabins, and talked over the prospect before them. He also said, that in the larger cities of the South this association had regular meetings and officers; that they awaited only the proper time, when a tragedy would be enacted all over the South, that would astonish the world.
When we reflect that revolts have been common in the South, and that they have been attended by partial success, it does not require a great stretch of the imagination to believe that this association did really exist. The fact of the intense feeling of hatred cherished by the people of the South against Northern fanatics, as they were termed, who came amongst them, is strong evidence in favor of the existence of some organized course of policy among the negroes. The outward appearance of the slave is usually gentle in the extreme, although his inward feelings may be agitated to such a degree, that in a white man they would burst forth in the wildest passion. Therefore, this hatred of the South to the opponents of slavery must be traced to a fear of some secret organization, the object of which lay deeply buried in the reticent minds of the slaves. The Southern mind was more deeply agitated, from the fact of the want of this outward emotion on the part of their slaves; for had this strong desire for liberty, which was awakened in them, burst out in wild enthusiasm, it would have been readily checked by the severe punishment of individuals; but it was this secret working of this deep-laid desire for freedom that troubled them. The most guilty were, to all outward appearance, the most innocent.
While the Federal army occupied the country, the slaves were much less guarded in what they said. One of these slaves, an old man, was passing a tent one day, when a soldier said to him that he belonged to Jeff. Davis. With a knowing look, he replied: "I did; but now, massa, I belong to Uncle Sam." A colored woman, who had been a slave for years (as she is very old), came into our room one day, and taking up a paper, asked if we wanted it. Some one said to her, as she was about leaving the room, that she had better not be seen with that paper, as it was not the sort her mistress admired. Said she, "I know what missus likes; I can take care of it;" and slipping it under her apron she left the room. That slave could read and write, and yet her master knew nothing of it. So it is with many others. It may be asked how they acquire this knowledge. They gain it in a great many ways. Many of them learn of their masters' children, with whom house-servants spend a great deal of time. Having acquired a slight knowledge, it stimulates them to greater exertion. They obtain scraps of newspapers and parts of books, and thus gain a great deal of information entirely unobserved. The slave knows how to keep secrets; consequently, any scheme that is on foot is seldom discovered. Few persons, at the commencement of the rebellion, had the least conception of the vast resources and power of the slave population of the South. And it was not until they had fed and clothed the Southern armies for two years, and by this means kept them in the field, that it was acknowledged. Had it not been for its slaves, the South, long ere this, would have been compelled to yield obedience to the Government. The rebels appreciated and used this element of strength from the beginning. The Federal Government, through the influence of weak-minded politicians, rejected it; thus throwing an element of its own strength into the hands of its enemies.
Notwithstanding this harsh treatment, the slaves proved true to the Government; and finally, through the medium of this faithfulness, their vast services were acknowledged, and they have not only been taken into the private service of the country, but they have been admitted into the army, to swell its numbers, until the strength of their mighty arms, and the nerve of their fearless hearts, are felt by the enemies of the country on every battle-field. What a glorious thought! thousands of the oppressed fighting for the redemption from slavery of a race which has ever worn the chain. When it is remembered that by this strife questions are to be settled which have ever disturbed the harmony of this country, and not that only, but questions which, when settled, will release millions of our fellow-men and women from the power of the oppressor, ought we not to be thankful that we are permitted to make great sacrifices in so good a cause?