A woman could not succeed ab intestato to a brother leaving children, grandchildren, or brothers; but when thus excluded from the succession, she was still entitled to alimony. She could not succeed even to her father; but was entitled to receive her dowry from the agnates, and could meanwhile, even if a widow, claim alimony from them.395
It is plain from all these provisions that the woman's rights of succession were very limited; but she was always insured of the wherewithal to live. We find, indeed, from the Florentine statutes, that while the preference given to the agnates increases as time goes on, so too the woman's rights to alimony increase. The statute of 1355 concedes to her the usufruct of the paternal inheritance, on failure of male issue, while under the same circumstances, later statutes deny her this right, allowing her alimony instead.396 Speaking of aliment, and of those bound to supply it, the statute of 1324 says: "Si filius, nepos vel pronepos facultatis abundarent,"397 so that they can commode subvenire, &c.; and the statute of 1355 imposes the same obligation, with the same conditions.398 But the printed statute of 1415 is far more explicit; the father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, great-grandfather, and great-grandmother are all entitled to alimony, and the Podestà is bound to enforce the law. The female inherits ab intestato from her mother or other female ascendants, but only on failure of male issue. Uterine brothers, being of the female line, cannot succeed one another should there be relations of the deceased in the male line as far as the fourth degree,399 these being preferred to the mother and relations in the female line. The Florentine statute goes on to declare that the wife is to be preferred to the public treasury, uxor mariti defuncti præferatur fisco; showing how little the woman's rights were considered, when an express enactment was needed to prevent the revenue authorities from depriving her of her husband's estate. Natural children were also preferred to the treasury, which only succeeded on failure of relations as far as the fourth degree. Relations, however, could succeed to bastards, as though these had been legitimate.400 It should be added that Florentine custom did not allow natural children to be left without some means of support, or without provision for their education, as is shown by many still existing wills. In the case of males, the father generally tried to obtain employment for them; in the case of females, to find them husbands, and he recommended them to the care of his legitimate heirs.
The husband succeeded to his wife's dowry, failing children or other near descendants. Of her extra-dotal property he was entitled to one-third, and the wife could not dispose of her dowry either by will or donation, so as to exclude her husband or children.401
Besides the law of succession, there is another branch of the Italian statutes in which the action of the political idea upon civil law is equally apparent, namely, that which treats of rights between neighbours, and of the obligations in solidum attaching not only to the members of families, but likewise to the members of sects and associations. We have already observed that these are carried so far as to make one member responsible for another's debts, and even for his delicts: this is a law to which we shall have more than once to return and give our attention. When real property is sold, we find that the agnates and cognates have always a preferential right of purchase. In the March of Ancona, the blood-relations of a prisoner condemned to death may be compelled to purchase his estate.402 At Bologna, relations are often made legally responsible for one another, and, by the rules of the corporations of merchants in that city, the brothers of any bankrupt, who have lived in community with him within a month before his failure, are held responsible for his debts—even if they have separated from him since that time.403
According to the Florentine statute, the creditor of any Commune or of any Universitas (corporation) might proceed against it, sicut procedi potest contra alias singulares personas debitrices, in persona. This was carried so far, that it was permissible to proceed against every individual member of the association, and even to have him arrested, liceat ipsi creditori capi et detinere omnes et singulares personas dicti Communis vel Universitatis, quousque fuerit integre satisfactum.404 If landed property had been laid waste or houses burnt, the proprietor was entitled to compensation from the author of the deed; from his associates (consorti), were he a noble, or from his relations, even to the fourth degree, if a commoner. Nay more, the injured person might also proceed against the Commune, University, or district (plebatum) in which the crime had been committed; he was at liberty to follow any of these modes of redress, and if unsuccessful in one to try another.405 The statute prescribed the form of procedure and the terms of the sentence.406 The Commune, University, or district was thus compelled to be always ready to raise the alarm, when similar acts were perpetrated, and to pursue and arrest the criminal, since, in case of failure, they were held responsible.407
In all matters, even such as purchases or sales, great importance was assigned to the condition of the persons concerned. In some cases, where land was to be sold, the law required that it should be sold to a neighbour; commoners, however, were not compelled to sell to magnates.408 Similarly no one might buy, sell, or acquire the usufruct of lands held in common, or any piece of land or house touching another man's wall, without according the joint-owner, associate, or neighbour the right of pre-emption.409
In case of a dispute between relations or associates, qui consortes sint de eadem stirpe, per lineam masculinam usque ad infinitum,410 the judge was bound, at the request of one of the parties concerned, to leave the matter to the decision of arbiters chosen by the parties themselves; but no plebeian could act as arbiter between nobles.411 In reviving a law of much earlier date, the statute of 1355 informs us that arbiters were therein mentioned, as blood-relations.412 Whence it may be inferred that similar compromises began to be customary, at a very remote period, between relations and associates who voluntarily selected arbiters from their own group. Down to the year 1324, the custom had been sanctioned by law; at a later time it lost its primitive character of a voluntary and domestic agreement, and assumed the shape of a regular legal trial.
If we now compare the Florentine Statute Book with those of other Italian cities, we shall find it marked by various distinguishing characteristics, chiefly resulting from the fact that in it democratic freedom was carried to the farthest point obtainable during the Middle Ages. Not only had every feudal privilege gradually disappeared from it, but the great nobles had ended by finding themselves in a position inferior to that of the commonalty. Florence, as we have already seen, was one of the first Italian cities to abolish serfdom in her outlying territory by the law of 1289.413 And although her rural population was always treated much worse than the inhabitants of the city, it nevertheless enjoyed far better conditions than prevailed in a great number of communes. We have proof of this in the contract of Mezzeria, which makes the cultivator of the soil an actual partner with the proprietor, and which still remains a great monument of civilisation and the cynosure of modern economists who have never been able to devise any better system.414
The freedom and strength of associations, the extraordinary ease with which any one might participate in the government of the Commune, all contributed to the triumph of democracy on the widest basis. Another general characteristic to be noted, not only in the Florentine, but in almost all the Italian statutes, is the constant endeavour to shake off the intervention of the ecclesiastical authority, which labours with incredible obstinacy to maintain its privileges undiminished, and even seeks to increase them; but which, nevertheless, finds them gradually reduced almost to zero. The statute of 1415 ordains that "no person, university, or church, no religious or clerical house shall presume to question the jurisdiction of the Commune under pretence of 'benefice' or privilege, and that any one who opposes this enactment shall be imprisoned until he renounce such privilege.415 No excommunication nor interdict shall hinder or diminish the action of the magistrates or the effect of their decrees.416 Every man may freely exercise his rights over all Church property derived from secular sources."417
Turning now to a general view of the Italian statutes, we must remark that although the history of statutory law presents many difficulties, owing to the infinite number of different provisions to be found in it, the diversity of these provisions is chiefly due to accidental and temporary causes, extraneous to the natural and spontaneous development of the law itself, which, examined apart and with reference to its essential characteristics, presents a striking uniformity. It may, however, be noted that in the republics of Northern Italy the Longobard law is far more predominant; while in those of Central and Southern Italy Roman law obtains an early and rapid ascendancy, and, subject to the changes which have been indicated, ends by dominating at all points. This progress becomes more apparent from year to year, so that even in examining the statutes, the very same conflict of antagonistic elements which we have already noted, throughout the entire history of the communes and of Italian civilisation, is brought before our eyes in civil wars, in sanguinary struggles between Guelphs and Ghibellines, in art, in literature, in all things. It is true that the statutes only treat of juridical ideas and enactments; but these seem to strive with the same ardour, and to aim at the same ends, as the men whom they control.
Towards the close of the fourteenth century Italian commerce began to make enormous advance, and this gave a new impetus to Italian legislation. In fact, we find a series of enactments enabling all mercantile affairs to be transacted with much greater celerity, avoiding legal quibbles, releasing merchant's credits from mortgage or sequestration, and severely punishing all frauds and fraudulent bankruptcies. In a word, we clearly discern the inchoation of the modern commercial code with which these enactments are frequently in unison.
But in all these laws we always recognise the consequences of commerce being divided and split into a multitude of separate associations with statutes of their own, judges of their own, and an exuberance of vitality. At the same time, we recognise that the central authority, though aware that its natural rights are threatened and usurped on all sides, continues to exert its influence, without method, indeed, or uniformity, but not without vigour, and occasionally even with violence. At one moment it seems to be vanquished; at another it comes forth victorious. The entire history of the Commune demonstrates a constant tendency to harmonise all these distinct and often jarring elements—political, social, and legislative—but this problem it never succeeds in solving, and ends by relapsing into despotism. A true conception of social unity was wanting; the idea of a due distribution of authority was still unknown, either in real life or in theory; accordingly whoever happened to have a share in the executive authority, also assumed, as necessarily connected with it, a share not only in judicial, but likewise in administrative and legislative functions. Wherefore it seemed that the only way to preserve liberty was to parcel out the government among an infinity of hands, and so to contrive that parties, associations, cliques (consorterie), families, and quarters of the town should each and severally serve as checks upon all the others. In this process of division and subdivision all the elements afterwards constituting modern society were prepared, but the State, in its true sense, was never discovered. Without ballast to steady her, the ship of the Commune, driven hither and thither in a ceaseless storm and buffeted by winds from all quarters, could neither find anchorage nor keep a settled course. No clear and certain conception was ever reached of that law which, by limiting and defining the amount of liberty guaranteed to each individual, secures freedom to all.
The political life of communes, moreover, was always confined within the walls of the dominant cities, since not only the outlying territory was excluded from it, but likewise all towns that had been annexed or conquered. Every form of representative government was as yet unknown. All who enjoyed political rights entered, each in his turn, the Councils of the Republic, and sooner or later nearly all rose to power. This made it necessary that the States should have very circumscribed borders, as otherwise it would have been impossible to govern them at all. The French Revolution, by achieving for the first time, in behalf of the nation at large, what the Italian communes had effected for the cities, was able to proclaim the civil and political equality of all who formed part of the nation, and who were in consequence to be recognised as citizens. From that time democracy became the predominant characteristic of modern societies which, by means of representative institutions, have found it possible to secure freedom, even in large states, reconciling the unity and vigorous action of the central government with personal independence and with local liberty and activity. But the Commune always wavered between the opposing elements of which it was made up and which it never succeeded in fusing into a true political organism.
The history of our republics may, in fact, be summed up in an account of the varying predominance of one or other of the great associations of which they were composed. In Florence, we have, first of all, the conflict of nobles and commons which is maintained with changing fortunes. When the fraternities (consorterie) of the leading magnates obtained such ascendancy as to menace popular liberties and destroy the social balance, notable reforms were made in the statutes; the Commune was completely transformed, and by means of the Ordinances of Justice (of which we shall soon have to speak), the nobles were overthrown and their associations broken up. But as these associations were an integral part of the State, their downfall was followed by a phase of rapid corruption and decay. To the passions and interests of caste succeeded personal ambitions, hatreds and passions of a still more dangerous character. Families began to be at strife; men who were at once powerful and ambitious, came to the front; and Corso Donati, or some other like him, would have soon become master and tyrant of the Republic, save for the fact that a mighty people, enriched by the speedy gains of an extended commerce, devoted to freedom and opposed to the nobility, had first to be disarmed. Thus to the supremacy of the leagues of the magnates succeeded the predominance of the Greater Guilds, between whom and the Lesser Guilds a struggle was entered upon in the course of which the latter obtained, in their turn, a share of power. At a later period, the populace, represented by the plebeian Ciompi, comes to the front, and threatens the utter dissolution of the old social form of the Republic. Then new personal ambitions, more fatal to freedom because more fortunate, occupy the scene. The struggle between the Albizzi, Pitti, and Medici terminates in the triumph of the last-named family in the person of Cosimo the Elder, who slew the Republic. Yet nothing of all this should cause us much surprise. For if we bear in mind the beginnings of the Commune and the elements out of which it was constituted, we may readily see that all that happened was, in the main, unavoidably bound to occur.
THERE are many reasons why the history of Florence in the closing years of the thirteenth century should demand our fullest attention. It was the period of the very important political revolution resulting in the establishment of those Enactments of Justice of which the authorship is attributed to Giano della Bella, and which Bonaini has entitled the Magna Charta of the Florentine Republic. Even should this comparison seem strained, it is certain that those enactments, sometimes strengthened, sometimes modified, and occasionally suspended, remained in vigour nevertheless for more than a century—a fact of no small weight in so mutable a commonwealth as that of Florence. Sooner or later many neighbouring cities imitated these enactments, and in 1338 the Romans sent to request a copy of them, in order to re-organise their city by the same means. On this subject Villani wrote as follows: "It is known how times and conditions change, for the Romans, who of old built the city of Florence and gave it their own laws, now, in our days, have sent to ask laws from the Florentines."419 It is likewise during this period that we behold arts and letters suddenly blossoming to the greatest splendour in the bosom of the Republic. Language, poetry, painting, architecture, sculpture had already put forth their first shoots in various Italian cities; but all are now permanently rooted in Florence, and initiating a new era in the history of the national intellect, suddenly flash forth into a glory of light, irradiating all Europe as well as Italy. Hence it behoves us to investigate most minutely the nature of the favourable conditions, both political and social, which rendered Florence the centre of such marvellous activity and the focus of all those far-spreading beams.
The remark might certainly occur, that although this period has such undoubted claims upon our attention, its history is already very familiar to us; it has been recounted by contemporary writers such as Compagni and Villani, who were not only eye-witnesses, but often active participants in the events they described; it has been corroborated by many original documents, and recently expounded afresh by some most illustrious modern writers. Nevertheless, the attentive student is compelled to recognise that those times are less well known than might be supposed; for even in perusing the works of the newest historians we are perplexed by numerous difficulties and doubts. In point of fact, what is it we learn from Machiavelli, Ammirato, Sismondi, and Napier, and even from Vannucci, Giudici, and Trollope, who wrote subsequently to the publication of many newly discovered original documents? That, after the battle of Campaldino the arrogance of the nobles in Florence exceeded all bounds; that they insulted, oppressed, and trampled on the people; that there arose a daring and generous man named Giano della Bella, a noble devoted to the popular party, who when holding the office of Prior proposed a new law as a permanent remedy for these evils; that this law was passed and sanctioned under the name of Enactments of Justice, and that it excluded the nobles—or, rather, the magnates—from every political post; that it only permitted those really engaged in some trade or craft to share in the government of the Republic; that it punished every grave offence against the people, on the part of the nobles, with exceptionally severe sentences and penalties, such as chopping off hands, death at the block, and, more frequently, by confiscation of property; that slighter offences were only punished by fines; that the magistrates were empowered to chastise any man of the people (popolano) showing hostility to the Republic or breaking its laws, by proclaiming him a noble, and that this sentence immediately excluded him from the government and placed him under the same restrictions to which aristocrats were subject. Furthermore, that if any magnate convicted of offence should escape justice, one of his relations or associates would have to expiate the crime in his stead.420
"A fact without parallel in the world's history!" Giudici exclaims. For truly, although a fundamental law of the Republic, this decree seems rather a freak of revenge solely inspired by the blindest party spirit. Accordingly almost every word of the decree excites our suspicion. How can it be explained that Dante was one of the Priors in office at the time, together with others who undoubtedly were not artisans, or only so in name, if it were true that the enactments excluded all who were not practically exercising some trade? And apart from a thousand lesser doubts, the fact that innocent men were then condemned to death merely because they were relations or fellow associates of criminals who had escaped justice, is a point that we cannot possibly understand. In a period of the densest barbarism, it would be barely comprehensible; in Dante's age, it is a mystery and a contradiction, confusing all our ideas concerning those times. Therefore renewed investigation of the subject cannot be altogether futile. It is requisite to penetrate the true nature of the revolution that had then been accomplished, and of the law that resulted from it, and to bring both into harmony with the times and with the history of Florence.
Towards the end of the thirteenth century the Republic had acquired very high importance throughout Italy as well as Tuscany. The fall of the Hohenstauffens, the coming of the Angevins, the vacancy of the Imperial throne had given an enormous ascendancy to the Guelph party which in Florence was that of the democracy. Its three great Ghibelline rivals, Pisa, Sienna, and Arezzo, had been humiliated and conquered by the subtle diplomacy of Florence and Florentine arms; and these victories had not only re-established the Republic's political authority in Tuscany, but opened and secured to it all the chief highways of commerce. Through Pisa it had access to the sea; through Sienna and Arezzo, to Rome, Umbria, and Southern Italy; it could pass to the north through distant Bologna, peopled with friendly Guelphs. Accordingly the commerce of Florence was then rapidly increased, and this republic of merchants, surrounded by other republics equally devoted to trade and industry, stood at the head of all Tuscany. On the other hand, however, the augmented power of the Angevins was beginning to excite the jealousy of the Popes who had first called them to Italy, and who now turned their eyes towards Germany in order to revive the Imperial pretensions, and thus check the growing ambition of the French king. For Charles of Anjou, whom they had named Senator of Rome and Vicar-Imperial of Tuscany, now seemed determined to follow the daring policy of the Swabian line by aspiring to supremacy over Italy.
During this state of things, the Florentines managed to keep their balance with marvellous finesse, and by leaning this way, or that, frequently turned the scales on the side they preferred. They utilised the king's soldiery to crush Ghibelline cities and Ghibelline nobles; they leaned on the Pope, to check Charles's arrogance; and they showed readiness to favour the Empire, when the Pope tried to assert temporal supremacy, as though, in the present interregnum, he were the natural inheritor of the imperial rights. By this means, the Republic not only preserved its independence, but became a State commanding the fear and respect of all Italy.421 This was all the result of the shrewdness, energy, and intelligence of its burghers, who governed with so much thriftiness and wisdom as to achieve an unparalleled prosperity. "It is a known thing," says Villani, "that down to this time and for long past, such was the tranquillity of Florence, that the City gates stood unlocked by night,422 no duties were exacted in Florence;423 and rather than impose burdens, when money was needed, old walls and bits of land within and without the City were sold to the owners of conterminous portions of the soil."424 With few taxes and no debts, the administration was excellently conducted; it left the citizens unhampered, and increased the general well-being.
Nevertheless, beneath this tranquil surface the seeds of deep-rooted discord lurked in the bosom of the State, and occasionally broke forth in sanguinary conflicts, of which the discontent of the nobles was the principal cause. It would be a serious mistake to believe that they were first excluded from the government in virtue of the Enactments of Justice. The measure had been prepared long before, and although not then rigorously carried out, may be said to have been already sanctioned in 1282, by the decree placing the Priors of the Guild at the head of the Republic. But it should not be thought on this account, that the nobles had lost all actual power in the city at the time. First of all, the new system of warfare, in which municipal armies, composed of artisans, unprovided with cavalry or men-at-arms, proved very incompetent, had made the assistance of the nobles indispensable, and also began to render it necessary to employ foreigners: soldiers of adventure from Germany, France, and Spain, who earned their living by war alone. At Montaperti (1260) the terrible defeat of the Republic's Guelph host had been achieved by Manfred's Germans, and the Ghibelline nobles banished from Florence. At Campaldino (1289) it was Corso Donati, Vieri de' Cerchi, and other Florentine nobles or potentates who had decided the fate of the day. The nobles knew this, and constantly boasted of it, in their contempt for the artisans and people. Being trained to arms, and undisturbed by commercial cares, they sorely chafed against being excluded from the government by rougher folk far less fitted for war than themselves. Accordingly, political animosities became more and more heated; the nobles could neither be still nor leave others in peace.
It should also be remarked that the nobles of the period were no longer the feudal lords of former times, who, isolated in their well-guarded strongholds, like so many sovereigns, depended solely from the Empire and were foes to the Republic. Having been ousted from the territory, and obliged for some time back to reside in the city, they now clung to the latter, but desired to hold rule over it. Being surrounded on all sides by a powerful population banded in trade guilds and masters of the Government; being forcibly made subject to Republican laws refusing all recognition of feudal rights, the nobles had been obliged, in self-defence, to form Associations or Societies of the Towers, which being ruled by custom rather than law, were all the more firmly knit together. Originally, the nobles had been chiefly united by family ties which were still more closely respected on the disintegration of the feudal order, when, in order to maintain their strength, kinsmen banded together in separate castes or associations and gave admittance to a widening circle of members. They clustered together in neighbouring palaces, often lining one or more of the city streets; they lived in the midst of their adherents, squires, domestics, and grooms, and in moments of danger even summoned to their aid the peasantry of their rural estates. Their possessions were always handed down to their families or the Society to which they belonged, and their disputes were settled by chosen arbiters.425 Besides all this, their deeds of vengeance were decided upon in common, and the individuals charged to execute them were always placed in safety by their comrades, the whole association assuming the responsibility of every deed of this kind. Often, between one house and another, or in one of their palace yards, there was an archway under which they administered torture to any one they chose. In fact, speaking of the Bostichi family, Compagni tells us that: "They committed many evil deeds, and continued to do them for long. In their own palaces, situated in the New Market, in the centre of the city, they would string men up, and put them to the torture at mid-day. And it was a common saying in the land that there were too many tribunals; and in counting the places where torture was applied, people said: 'In the Bostichi house, by the Market.'"426 All this continued to be done, notwithstanding the very severe laws already promulgated against the nobles. A man of the people could be flogged, stabbed, or tortured, without the author of the misdeed being brought within the grasp of the law. Out in the country these same nobles used all sorts of devices to perpetuate serfdom, although for many years it had been legally abolished, and by threats or open violence induced their peasants, by means of fictitious contracts, to acknowledge obligations from which they were lawfully exempt.427
Thus citizens, already powerful in virtue of their social position, contrived to retain much strength and great political influence in the Republic, notwithstanding the laws designed to keep them in check. Being excluded from the Signory they could neither enter the Council of One Hundred nor the Councils of the Captain, in which the more important questions were discussed. But they were admitted to those of the Podestà, and this official, being of necessity a knight, often gave judgment in favour of the nobles. Also, they were continually employed as ambassadors, and given the first posts in war; but they enjoyed most prominence in the institution entitled the Guelph Society (Parte Guelfa), and were specially appointed to all its chief offices. This Society, founded, as we have previously shown, in 1267, after the expulsion of Count Guido Novello, was charged with the administration of all confiscated Ghibelline property which had been formed into a monte or mobile, or, as would now be said, capitalised. This property was to be employed for the subjection of the Ghibellines and the support of the Guelphs, of whom Florence was the Tuscan headquarters. It was on this account that Cardinal Ottavio degli Ubandini had exclaimed: "Now that the Guelphs have formed a fund in Florence, the Ghibellines will never return there;" and his prophecy was fulfilled.428 In fact, the Ghibelline party was gradually swept away by the steady persecution to which it was subjected on the complete overthrow of the Suabian line; and Florence, having become exclusively Guelph, was divided between the parties of burghers and populace, and that of the nobles and magnates or grandi. The latter, although excluded from the government, or from honours, to use the phraseology of the time, could never be ousted from the Guelph Society, and continued to administer its large revenues. This Society was ordered in the fashion of a miniature republic, and notwithstanding numerous attempts to introduce an increasing burgher element within its pale, these efforts proved so fruitless and were so invariably thwarted, that the statutes compiled in 1335, and now extant in print, record the fact that money premiums were offered to promote the nomination of new knights. To each of the six knights elected during the year the sum of fifty gold florins were awarded, "so that a city of such great magnificence may be duly glorified by the number of its knights." Thus while, on the one hand, every means was taken to abase the great nobles, almost to the extent of securing their extermination, on the other, this threatened class continually gained reinforcement and support.429
With all these advantages, had the nobles been united, they might have regained their position even after the defeats of '66 and '82 and succeeded in dominating the people. But they were divided, and hotly at strife even among themselves. "There was much warfare" (Villani says) "between the Adimari and Tosinghi, between the Rossi and Tornaquinci, between the Bardi and Mozzi, between the Gherardini and Manieri, between the Cavalcanti and Buondelmonti, and likewise between certain of the Buondelmonti and Giandonati; between the Visdomini and Falconieri, between the Bostichi and Foraboschi, between the Foraboschi and Malespini, and among the Frescobaldi themselves, and between the members of the Donati family, and also among those of many other houses."430 Nor is it surprising that such strong and powerful cliques should have felt jealous of one another. Added to this, the Guelph nobles included the remains of the Ghibelline party, which cherished Imperial tendencies; thus another germ of discord was sown that encouraged and excited the people to prosecute the war of extermination it had already set on foot. The popular party was far better organised and united; it was banded in various guilds forming part of the general constitution of the State, and on every occasion showed an energy and singleness of purpose never possessed by nobles. It is true, that even at this juncture, some seeds of jealousy were beginning to be discernible between the greater and lesser guilds and the populace; but open discord was long delayed. For the moment there was no hint of it. Certain special conventions, drawn up in regular documentary form, had been arranged between the members of one or more of the guilds, and these agreements were designated at the time Legbe, Posture, or Convegni. But their object was chiefly commercial, being designed to keep the price of certain commodities up to a forced standard, and create illegal monopolies, and was seldom the result of political interests or animosities. They were not sanctioned by law, they certainly did not promote concord, but their importance was slight.
Thus the city became increasingly divided and subdivided into groups, and was apparently in danger of falling to pieces. The lower classes were still undoubted rulers of the government, but the nobles were also powerful, if in a different way; hence unity and concord were continually and seriously imperilled. Necessarily, therefore, the chief aim to be pursued, in order to avert a catastrophe, was the attainment of greater equality among the citizens, of greater union and strength in the various societies as well as in the government itself. In fact, for a long time past, Florentine legislation and successive revolutions had alike kept this object in view. The law of August 6, 1289, abolishing serfdom in order to emancipate the peasantry, was also another step towards equality. Those of June 30, and July 3, 1290, prohibited all agreements in any way opposed to the lawful constitution of the guilds. The law of January 31, 1291, imposed a fresh check on the nobles, by obliging all citizens, without any exception, to submit to the jurisdiction of the regular courts, and decreeing the severest penalties on any one asserting, or trying to obtain, the privilege of trial by special tribunals.431
But a more notable point is the fact that every fine decreed in such cases fell upon the fellow-associate or relation of the criminal, should the latter contrive to evade justice. However strange this rule may appear to the modern mind, its explanation is to be found in the account we have already given of the mode in which property was held at the time, and of the constitution of families and associations. When almost the whole of the patrimony was shared by the family in common, it would have been very difficult, and even dangerous, to inflict a fine on any one member of the house while exempting the rest, and for this reason the invariable tendency of the law was to insist on their solidarity. This principle seemed still more logical when it was a question of inflicting fines on nobles banded in closely united associations, and who, keeping all their interests in common, decided on acts of vengeance, and proved their intention of holding all things in common and dividing one another's responsibilities. Where property belonged to the whole family, it was only just that the whole family should be liable for the fine; where an act of vengeance was done in common, and the gravest offences committed in the name, and with the sanction, of the whole kindred, there could be nothing extraordinary in the law compelling one associate or kinsman to be mulcted in lieu of another, beginning with his nearest relations. Precisely for these reasons, it had long been customary in drawing out the list of the nobles, for the law to compel the said nobles to sodare, that is, to compel every one of them to stand surety not merely for himself alone, but also for his relations, by depositing the sum of two thousand lire. In this way, since money-penalties seldom exceeded the said amount, whenever a noble was fined he could use the money he had already deposited, or it could be employed for the same end by the kinsman bound surety for him, in case he should have escaped or contrived to evade the law by some unauthorised device.432 These were exclusively and precisely the principles upon which the Enactments of Justice were also founded. Accordingly it is impossible to consider them the personal invention of Giano della Bella, seeing that they were merely a logical consequence and natural result, inevitably evolved from preceding revolutions, institutions, and laws. Indeed, for the most part they only sum up and arrange older laws, so as to accentuate more plainly their primary and enduring intent.
Giano della Bella was neither a legislator nor a politician, but a man of action. A noble by birth, he had fought at Campaldino, where his horse was killed under him; he afterwards joined the popular side, by reason, it was averred, of a quarrel at San Piero Scheraggio with Piero Frescobaldi, who had dared to strike him in the face, and threaten to cut off his nose.433 Whether this tale were true or not, it is certain that Giano was a man of violent disposition, great daring, small prudence, and disinterested love of freedom; but he was by no means devoid of the passion for revenge that even his admirers laid to his charge. "A forcible and very spirited man" (says Compagni), "he was so daring, that he defended matters forsaken by others, said things others left unspoken, did his utmost to bring justice to bear on the guilty, and was so much feared by the Rectors that they dared not conceal evil deeds."434 According to Villani "he was a most loyal and upright popolano, and more devoted to the public good than any man in Florence, one that gave help to the Commune without seeking his own profit. He was overbearing and obstinate in wreaking revenge, and also achieved some deeds of vengeance on his neighbours, the Abati, by using the authority of the Commune,"435 for which the worthy chronicler severely blames him.
When appointed Podestà of Pistoia, he immediately plunged into party strife, persecuting one side and favouring the other, with so much ardour that, instead of fulfilling his duty of pacifying the different factions, he inflamed their hatred to such a pitch that it was impossible for him to remain there to the end of his official term.436 The whole course of his conduct in Florence proves, as we shall see, that he must have been a man of scant prudence and great impulsiveness. It was precisely these characteristics which made him a leader of the people instead of a legislator, and likewise an implacable enemy of the nobles.
After the battle of Campaldino the latter showed more audacity and growing insolence. "It was we who won the victory at Campaldino," they continually repeated, "and yet you seek our ruin." Bent on forcing their way to the front and gaining command, they daily insulted or injured some man of the people. The law was powerless against them, inasmuch as the offenders could never be unearthed; the latter were carefully sheltered, and no one desired or dared to testify against them. A popolano could be surrounded, attacked, even stabbed, yet nobody had seen the doer of the crime. Or some one would be dragged into the houses of an association, maltreated, beaten or tortured on the cord, yet all that occurred in those places remained unrevealed. If some noble was condemned to a fine, he made haste to declare that he possessed no separate estate, and by his own negligence, or that of the magistrates, had failed to give surety, while his relations repeated the same story.437 Hence it was necessary to recall the old laws into vigour, make them still stricter, and decide on new and sterner measures. So at last the priors in office from the 15th of December, 1292, to the 15th of February, 1293, urged on by the public voice, under Giano's guidance, commissioned three citizens, Donato Ristori, Ubertino della Strozza, and Baldo Aguglioni, to frame a new law fitted, not only to meet present dangers, but to assure greater stability to the Republic in the future. On the 10th of January, the Bill being then drawn up, the Captain of the People assembled the Council of One Hundred, and proposed that the required Councils should be asked to grant them full powers (balìa)438 to proclaim it, if it were approved by the magistrates and by certain citizen worthies. Some proposed, in amendment, that it should be first read and discussed by the councils; but this would have entailed a risk of the whole thing coming to nothing. Accordingly the more practical course was chosen, and by seventy-two votes, against two negatives only, the requested balìa was granted. On the 18th of January the new law, entitled "Ordinamenti," or "Ordini di Giustizia," was proclaimed in the names of the Podestà, captain, and priors, and with the concurrence of the Heads of the Twenty-one Guilds and certain citizen worthies.439 There is every reason to believe that Giano della Bella was one of the worthies in question; but although historians suppose him to have been the creator and initiator of the law, since, as leader of public opinion, he compelled the Signory to pass it, yet he was not in the government at the time, nor does his name appear in any official decree.440 Therefore he was by no means the sole author or compiler of the new law.
What, then, are these enactments? In replying to this question it is requisite to leave the historians aside and turn to the law itself. But there are several old compilations of it, differing so much from each other, that one form only comprises twenty-two rubrics, whereas some have more than a hundred. Accordingly, the first thing to be done is to ascertain which is the genuine and primary law passed on the 18th of January, 1293, since on this alone can an accurate judgment be based, and no other starting-point is possible. There are six of these very different compilations—four in print, and two still inedited. Two of the number may be summarily dealt with as unnecessary to our purpose. One is included in the general collection of Florentine statistics, formed in 1415 by Bartolommeo Volpi and Paolo de Castro, and printed with the false date of Friburg, towards the close of the eighteenth century (1778–1783). This consists of laws of entirely different periods arranged haphazard, without regard to chronology, and including the enactments, but these are given with all the modifications and changes introduced at a later date, and are also confusedly jumbled. No historian engaged on the times of Giano della Bella can make any use of a collection of this kind, since it shows no proof of authenticity. For the same reason we may also reject the Miscellany preserved in the Florence Archives, and that Bonaini calls "a huge medley," containing unconnected laws of different periods, and different tendencies, some enforcing and others modifying the Enactments of Justice. Hence, while possibly of some importance with regard to the history of the "Ordinamenti," this Miscellany cannot help us to discover their primary form.
Four other compilations remain, one of which only is inedited. Examination quickly shows that the one brought out by Bonaini comprises no more than twenty-one rubrics, and that the last of these, forming a general summary, is mutilated; the other compilations contain a greater number of rubrics, but, in all three, the general special enactments of January, 1293, are invariably given under the first twenty-eight rubrics.441 In fact, from the twenty-ninth forward, appendices and posterior laws begin to occur, often separately dated, and seemingly tacked on to the enactments, in order sometimes to modify, sometimes to strengthen them, or again to diminish their effect, or because of their relation to cognate matters. All the laws and statutes of the Republic suffered more or less the same fate. Thus the notable divergences found in the various compilations are reduced to very narrow limits as regards the original body of enactments. Certain doubts still assail us, however, seeing that we not only find twenty-two rubrics on the one hand against twenty-eight on the other, but because these rubrics clash on various points. First of all, then, let us remark that the oldest compilation is undoubtedly the one published by Bonaini in 1855, from the original MS. in the State Archives. The editor felt assured of having discovered the original document of the enactments, but conscientiously preferred to entitle it the original draft,442 seeing that, as Hegel has since ascertained, it is not the actual law that was approved and proclaimed by the magistrates. The codex is of great antiquity, and may be ascribed to Giano della Bella's day. In fact, in one heading, first inscribed and then cancelled, we find the date of 1292 de mense ianuarii (1293, new style).443 The usual formula heading all decrees of the Republic is missing, and the said formula not only gave the date and title, but occasionally added the names of the magistrates promulgating the law. The codex is of small size, full of erasures, alterations, and additions written by different hands: often, too, there are empty spaces left between one rubric and another to allow room for future additions or corrections. Everything plainly shows that this old codex is only a rough copy of the law, standing exactly as it was drawn up, at the request of the magistrates, by the three previously mentioned citizens, and before it had been cast in its final form, or legally sanctioned by those charged to discuss and approve it, prior to its promulgation. Accordingly it is impossible to decide with any certainty whether it was modified at all, or in what degree. But although this rough draft is somewhat anterior to the actual law itself, the existing compilations are all posterior to it, and may consequently include later appendices and modifications. Thus, on examining the Latin compilation edited by Fineschi in 1790, and the Italian one brought out by Giudici in 1853, both derived from old and authentic manuscripts, we find each to have all the characteristics of a regularly proclaimed law. Both begin with the official formula, and are dated the 18th of January, 1292 (1293, new style). On reading the rubrics appended to the second (the Italian copy), which is much longer than the other, we find various dates given, including that of 1324; whereas the first (the Latin version) contains none later than the 6th of July, 1295. Therefore the latter is the older of the two, and the occasional divergences existing even among its first twenty-eight rubrics are undoubtedly caused by amendments introduced at a subsequent time. Nevertheless, even the first rubrics of the Latin compilation evidently contain modifications of an earlier date than the 6th of July, 1295. For instance, in rubric vi. we find the number of witnesses—a point left undecided in the rough draft (rubric v.)—fixed at three in the two posterior compilations, and this point (as we shall see) can be proved on documentary evidence to have been settled by law in July, 1295. Therefore we are justified in concluding that it is the Latin and older compilation that gives the enactments as they stood in July, 1295; while the Italian copy, although proved, by examination of the codex, to be an official translation, occasionally includes alterations of even a later date than 1295. If, however, we only keep in view their first twenty-eight rubrics, and collate these with Bonaini's draft, it will be seen that, saving for the non-appearance in the latter of six rubrics, chiefly of a very insignificant kind, all other divergences are rather formal than substantial. In any case, wherever the three versions are found to agree, we may be sure of possessing the law passed on the 18th of January, 1293, in the precise shape it wore at the time; but wherever, on the contrary, divergences exist, we must seek the aid of the chroniclers and of any new documents, should such be found, before arriving at a definite conclusion.
Following these rules, we may therefore proceed to examine the law.444
What, then, were these Enactments of Justice, as originally framed, and what is to be learnt from them? They work a political and social change in the Republic, for the evident purpose of promoting civil equality, giving greater unity to the government and increased strength to the guilds; also of assuring the harmony and concord of the people, and curbing the arrogance of the nobles. The more strictly political reform is confined to establishing safe rules for the election of Priors, and creating a new and more powerful magistrate, the Gonfalonier of Justice, to sit in junction with the Priors.
By request of the Captain of the People, the Priors authorised him to call a meeting of the Heads, or Consuls of the Twelve Guilds, in order to deliberate as to the safest and most fitting mode of choosing their own successors. All candidates to the priorate had to be enrolled in some guild, and to exercise its trade, as the surest means of proving that they were not of the aristocracy—always the chief point to be ascertained. In fact no one remaining a noble could be eligible to the Signory, even if engaged in trade.445 By means of subtle and often quibbling interpretations of the law, it was possible to compromise as to the actual practice of a craft, but never as to being absolutely free from all taint of aristocracy.446 Thus Giano della Bella, in spite of merely having, as Villani relates, some slight commercial interests in France, was qualified, on discarding his rank and becoming one of the people, to enter the Signory in February, 1293. In July, 1295, as we shall see, the enactments were modified, and it was sufficient for candidates to be enrolled in some guild without practically exercising its trade, always providing they did not belong to the nobility. Many regulations were added to assure an equal division of public posts among all the Sestieri of the city and all the guilds, while prohibiting the nomination of several Priors belonging to the same Sestiere, family, or guild. None leaving office could be re-elected to it within two years, and this prohibition was extended to his relations as well. The office of Prior was held for two months; no one was allowed to ask or intrigue for it, but neither might one refuse to accept it. The Priors had to dwell altogether in one house, where they lived and ate in common, without accepting invitations elsewhere or giving private audiences.447
The next subject considered was the election of the new magistrate, namely, the Gonfalonier of Justice. He was chosen every two months from a different Sestiere of the city, and his electors were the incoming Priors, captains, and guild-masters, with the addition of two worthies of each Sestiere. He was elected on precisely the same terms as the Priors, saving that he might return to office after one year instead of two; he lived with the Priors as primus inter pares; he received the same honorarium of ten soldi per day, expenses included, so that he was practically unremunerated. But having higher attributes in the eyes of the law, he became speedily and of necessity the chief of the Signory.448 At the public parliament the Gonfalon of the People was solemnly consigned to him, and one hundred pavesi, or shields, and twenty-five cross-bows with bolts were placed at his disposal, for the better equipment of part of the thousand popolani yearly selected to serve under him, the Podestà and Captain to preserve order and enforce the execution of the new laws.449 No relation of the Priors in office could be elected to the Gonfaloniership. The creation of this new post certainly serves to prove that the necessity of giving increased unity and supremacy to the Government was already acknowledged. But at that period Republican jealousy was too strong to sanction anything more than a mere show of supremacy. Accordingly, the Gonfalonier was only the most influential of the Priors, and liable to be changed on the same terms, albeit the fact of having the free disposal, at given moments, of the citizen army undoubtedly endued him with higher authority.
In treating of the branch of the enactments bearing on social rather than political cases, we should remark first of all that to these enactments was owed the settled constitution of the Florentine guilds, which now hastened to reframe or renew their own special statutes. The normal number of the guilds was likewise established by the enactments, and from that moment remained fixed at twenty-one.450 In fact, the first rubric decreed that the guilds should take a solemn oath to maintain union and concord among the people. The second rubric annulled and forbade, under heavy penalties, all companies, leagues, promises, conventions, obligations, and sworn pacts, that is, all agreements among the people unprovided or unsanctioned by the laws, and opposed or alien to the constitution of the guilds. Both procurators and stipulators of similar agreements were liable even to capital punishment; and any guild known to be concerned in such agreement would be mulcted in one thousand lire; the consuls of the said guild, and the notary who had drawn the deed, in five hundred lire.451 All this plainly proves that the law was not devised, as once believed and asserted, for the sole purpose of wreaking vengeance on the nobles, but was also framed with the intent of reforming the city and government by solidly organising the guilds and granting them higher political importance. Nevertheless, the humiliation of the leading nobles was certainly one of the principal objects of the law. Therefore we may now proceed to examine the clauses directed to that end.
First of all, to punish the nobles for their continual attacks on the people it was requisite to make them guarantee their collective responsibility, since, in defiance of preceding laws, they frequently contrived to shirk that obligation. Most offences being punishable by fines, persons bound by no guarantees could easily evade the prescribed penalty on some pretext or another: therefore the enactments were framed to prevent such evasion of justice.452 They likewise gave fresh force to old laws which had been too often violated. "Further, to prevent the numerous frauds daily committed by certain leading nobles of the city and territory of Florence with regard to the guarantees pledged, or rather, bound to be pledged by the said nobles according to the terms of the statute of the Florentine Commune, as decreed under the rubric: 'De la securtadi che si debbono fare da' grandi de la città di Firenze,' and beginning with the words: 'Acciò che la isfrenata spezialmente de' grandi,' &c.—it is provided and ordained," &c.453
Consequently, all the nobles already enumerated in the above-mentioned statute, and of whom a new list was then made, were ordered to give guaranty, from the age of fifteen years to seventy, without exception, by the payment of two thousand lire, a sum generally sufficient to cover the highest fines exacted, apart from confiscation, which penalty was not only commonly, but abusively employed. The fact of being enrolled in a guild did not suffice to exempt any of these nobles from the duty of giving guarantees; the privilege of exemption being solely granted to him whose entire family, for this or that reason, even by special indulgence, had been spared the duty of giving guarantees for five years at least, or declared absolutely free (francata). In either case the family was considered to be thoroughly of the people, and entitled to all the advantages deriving therefrom. The Signory was empowered to reduce the sum guaranteed (il sodamento) in the case of the poorer nobles, but it was precisely this clause that opened the door to partiality and fraud.454 The law proceeded to state that the fixed time for giving guarantees was the month of January or February at the latest: any one refusing or delaying obedience, no matter in what way, would be banished, and his nearest kin in the male line compelled to give surety in his stead. The penalty of any crime committed by an unguaranteed person was to fall on that person's relations. But when the penalty was death, and the criminal had fled, his relations must pay three thousand lire instead of the guaranteed two thousand. But in case of mortal feud between the members of a family their obligation of giving surety for one another was cancelled. This plainly shows that when community of interests and passions had ceased to exist the law no longer insisted on the collective responsibility of kinsmen or associates. This assists our better comprehension of the real scope of the enactment.455
When, however, the members of associations acted in common, as one entity, the law framed for the purpose of dissolving those associations made the members reciprocally responsible, obliging them to guarantee and pay for one another. But no penalties save fines, and these only within certain limits, were exacted from relations and fellow associates, since an association was only fined as a collective body. This will explain what Compagni and Villani meant by saying that according to the enactments, "one associate was bound for the other."456 We may see how Machiavelli blundered, or at least exaggerated, in his interpretation of their words when he stated in general terms that "the associates of a criminal were made to suffer the same penalty to which the latter was condemned;"457 and we can also note the mistake committed by modern writers in clinging to an interpretation, that is totally contradicted by the terms of the enactments, which would be otherwise in opposition to the culture of the period and the most fundamental principles of law. The measures specially directed against the nobles may be reduced to two leading clauses, namely the revival in a more rigorous shape of the old laws excluding the nobles from office and obliging them to guarantee and pay one another's fines; and the increased severity of the punishments inflicted on them by—to use Villani's words—"a different mode of doubling ordinary penalties."458 Let us now see what these penalties were in their aggravated form.
According to the enactments, should a noble murder or procure the murder of one of the people, both the noble and the doer of the deed are to be condemned to death by the Podestà, and their property destroyed and made confiscate.459 Should they escape by flight, they are to be sentenced in contumacy, and their property confiscated. Nevertheless their guarantor will have to pay the sum for which he stood surety, but with right of reimbursement from the confiscated and demolished property of the fugitive criminal. All other nobles who, without being direct accomplices in the crime, have had any share in it, are sentenced to a fine of two thousand lire; if failing to pay this, their property is confiscated, and their kinsmen or guarantors bound to pay it in their stead. But when the crime in question was that of inflicting serious bodily hurt, the doer of the deed and its instigators were sentenced to a fine of two thousand lire. If refusing to pay the penalty, their hands were chopped off; if escaping the reach of justice, their possessions were sacked, their funds confiscated, and their guarantors bound to pay the fine, but with the usual right of reimbursement from the sums confiscated by the State. For slighter offences, slighter penalties were adjudged. In every case the guilty were forbidden to hold any public office until five years had elapsed. For murderous attempts, the sworn testimony of the injured person or his nearest relation, together with that of two witnesses to the public voice on the matter (testimoni di pubblica fama), was considered sufficient proof of the crime; nor was it necessary for the two witnesses to have seen the crime actually committed. This was the clause most obnoxious to the nobles. In general they were little disturbed by threatened punishment, even of the severest kind, since they always hoped to escape it. But they were roused to fury as well as alarm, when measures were taken for the rigorous enforcement of the penalties prescribed. And this was precisely the chief intent and soul of the enactments. The whole course of procedure enjoined by them was almost as summary as that of martial law, and allowed much weight to public opinion, which, in the midst of party strife, was no trustworthy guide. The close union prevailing in associations had made ordinary legal procedure very difficult, if not impossible. Hence it was ordained that whenever a crime was perpetrated, the Podestà was bound to discover its author within five, or at most eight days, according to the gravity of the deed, under pain, in case of neglect of loss of office and a fine of five hundred lire for minor offences. In such case, however, the Captain was charged to take the matter in hand, and subject to the same penalties. All shops were then to be closed, the artisans called to arms, and the Gonfalonier to be on the alert to punish all recusants. But when the Podestà discovered the criminal, and it was a case of homicide, he and the Gonfalonier together were to ring the tocsin without waiting for the sentence of the court, and assembling the thousand select men, proceed to demolish the houses belonging to the criminal. The guild-masters were prompt to obey the Captain's summons. When slighter offences were in question the criminal's houses were not destroyed until sentence had been passed.460 It should be remarked that this pulling down of houses was never carried to the point of total demolition, and, particularly in cases of petty crimes, the Gonfalonier and Podestà always settled beforehand what damage should be wrought.461