For the most part the only protection the residents in the valley had against shell-fire were slits cut in the ground covered with waterproof sheets or corrugated iron. By degrees, however, more and more German dug-outs were discovered, until shell-proof accommodation was ultimately found for almost all.
The valley was traversed day and night by a constant stream of traffic. The infantry used overland tracks well clear of the road, and marched in platoon or section groups. All wheeled traffic was, however, restricted to the single road, so that periods of great congestion often occurred.
When the German barrage opened, men, animals, and motor vehicles broke into their best speed. Great columns of white dust, due to the intensity of the summer heat, rose up, choked everything, and made seeing a matter of difficulty. Guns and limbers moved at a stretch gallop, lorries bounded from shell-hole to shell-hole, and every effort was concentrated on getting out of the zone involved in the barrage with as little delay as possible.
The heavily-burdened infantryman on his way to and from the line, however, carried too much on his back to make him think of doubling. He used to plod along at his regulation three miles an hour, trusting that his luck would take him through.
It was no uncommon sight to see direct hits scored on gun-teams, limbers, and groups of infantry. When the barrage ceased and it was possible to take stock of the result, appalling scenes were often disclosed. Teams with their riders lying in a heap, ammunition dumps on fire, riderless and driverless horses and waggons bolting in all directions, and coming down in the midst of old wire entanglements, were daily spectacles in the Happy Valley.
At each pause in the barrage all haste was made to complete the work of succouring the wounded and collecting the dead, and filling in the latest shell-holes in the road before it reopened.
In this valley the conduct of the Royal Army Medical Corps was superb. Other troops could at least make some effort to make their way out of the danger zone as fast as possible, but the bearers of the field ambulances and the regimental stretcher-bearers could not. They slowly pushed their wheeled stretchers from the Crucifix at Bazentin to the dressing station, heedless of the shell-fire and their own security, and careful only to evacuate the wounded with the minimum of discomfort to them.
Similarly ambulance car-drivers could not join in the helter-skelter for security on the road to Fricourt. Day and night they plied slowly along the damaged road with their burden of wounded, returning again and again through the valley as soon as their cars had been cleared.
Had the Germans in those days been in possession of the instantaneous fuze which bursts its shell before it has had time to bury itself in the earth and thus lose much of its missile effect, this road could have been made almost impassable. Happy Valley, with its dust and its flies and its stench of half-buried animals and men, will remain to all who knew it an ineffaceable memory.
The trench lines taken over by the Division consisted of odd, narrow, and shallow trenches which had gradually evolved from the connecting of posts in which troops had dug themselves in during previous engagements.
By means of saps running into High Wood from the trench dug along its southern and western edge, a footing was held in the wood. Between High Wood and Delville Wood the British trenches were hidden from the Germans opposite them and vice versa by the crest line of the upland.
To the left of the wood the trench lines, which were not continuously connected up, curved in a south-westerly direction towards Bazentin-le-Petit, leaving the wood as the apex of an acute salient. In this section of the front the trenches seemed to fulfil no tactical requirements. There was no depth to the defensive system; the trenches were little more than knee-deep, and were choked with dead. Work on a single communication trench—High Alley, running from the Crucifix at Bazentin to High Wood—had been begun. The Germans held a strong redoubt in the eastern corner of High Wood. In this corner the contours were such that there was a depression in the ground similar in shape to a saucer. The Germans had fortified this saucer, and garrisoned it with machine-guns, mostly sited so as to fire to a flank. They could thus, by firing eastwards from this redoubt, rake No Man’s Land in direct enfilade. By firing westwards, they could place an enfilade barrage of low trajectory bullets which swept the rides through the wood. This redoubt was surmounted by wire entanglements, the tops of the pickets being just visible when looked at frontally and from our foremost saps.
Passing through the north-east corner of the wood was a strong switch line, which ran from Flers through High Wood towards Martinpuich. This was a well-dug, heavily-traversed trench protected by wire, but during this period had no completed dug-outs in it. Air photos, however, showed where work on the shafts of several dug-outs had been begun.
The whole of this area had been the scene of repeated encounters, as the ground amply testified. In the undergrowth of the wood, and in the standing corn which covered the whole area, lay the dead of many different regiments.
The result was that, owing to the scorching summer weather, the troops in the line lived in an atmosphere of pollution and in a positive torment of bluebottle flies. In one sap in particular, as one moved along it the flies rose in such clouds that their buzzing sounded as the noise of a threshing-machine. In this sap the sentries could only tolerate the conditions by standing with their handkerchiefs tied over their mouths and nostrils.
By 3 A.M. on 22nd July, the 154th Infantry Brigade had completed the relief of the 33rd Division. The 13th Brigade of the 5th Division were on their right, and the 57th Brigade of the 19th Division on their left.
Of the 154th Brigade two battalions held the line, the remaining two being in support and reserve in Bazentin-le-Grand Wood and Bazentin-le-Grand.
The Divisional artillery were in position in the open, the personnel for the most part living under tarpaulin shelters. Some batteries were in the Mametz Valley, while others were on the high ground south of Bazentin-le-Grand. It is difficult to determine who were most to be sympathised with—the gunners who lived alongside their guns, or the drivers who had to pass two or three times a day through the Happy Valley with ammunition. The batteries in positions in the valley itself probably lived in circumstances which could not have been more hazardous and unpleasant.
The 153rd Brigade in support occupied the area about the south-east corner of Mametz Wood and Caterpillar Wood. The 152nd Brigade in reserve bivouacked between Fricourt Wood and Mametz Wood.
At dawn on the 23rd the Happy Valley barrage, about which the Division had received no information, opened with great intensity. The 153rd and 152nd Brigades were seriously involved in it, and suffered considerable casualties. The 152nd Brigade was immediately fallen-in and marched westwards towards Fricourt, ultimately moving to bivouac in the vicinity of Becourt-Becordel. The 153rd Brigade extended its area so as to diminish the number of casualties.
It was later discovered that numerous shell-proof dug-outs existed in and about Mametz and Fricourt Woods. Apparently no organised reconnaissances of this area had been made, for had this been the case, and had the location of these dug-outs been made known to the Division on its arrival in the area, many unnecessary casualties would have been avoided.
The day on which the relief was concluded, 22nd July, the Division received orders to carry out an attack during the coming night. The objectives given were the north-east and north-west edges of High Wood and the switch trench from the north-east of High Wood to a point five hundred yards north-west of it.
The 154th Brigade was detailed to carry out this operation. As a preliminary the redoubt at the eastern corner of High Wood was to be seized at 10 P.M. in conjunction with the left brigade, 5th Division. The main attack on the German switch line was timed to take place at 1.30 P.M.
The troops engaged in this attack had little or no knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions. They had barely completed the relief by dawn on the previous night. During the day movement was restricted and patrolling impossible. Thus when the attack was launched at 10 P.M., circumstances had afforded the attackers no opportunity of studying the ground, or of forming any detailed plan of action. Added to this the wood was such that the trees prevented a shrapnel barrage from being effective. Further, the “going” within the wood, owing to shell-holes, brambles, dense undergrowth, and wire entanglements, was extremely bad—so bad, in fact, that even many weeks after its capture, to walk from one end of the wood to the other was a laborious process demanding considerable physical effort.
The attack was therefore delivered with an ineffective barrage with which the men were unable to keep up. The result was that the enemy had little inducement to take cover. He was thus able with his machine-guns and riflemen, whom he posted at night in the woods in advance of his trench lines, to defeat the attack completely and inflict heavy losses on the 4th Gordon Highlanders, and the 9th Royal Scots.
At 1.30 A.M. the main attack was delivered, but it met with no better fate. The volume of fire, particularly from the machine-guns in the redoubt, was so intense that no progress could be made. The men had advanced to the attack with great gallantry, but the cross-fire opposed to them rendered success impossible. Morning found them back in their original line, but seriously depleted in numbers.
The day was spent in improving the trenches and in connecting by a trench the southern edge of High Wood with the Windmill north of Bazentin-le-Grand. Both the troops in the line and the brigade in support were heavily shelled during the day, lachrymatory shells and 5·9 howitzers being used profusely.
During the night work was continued on the trench joining High Wood and the Windmill, and in High Alley. By the end of the night the latter was negotiable for traffic to within sixty yards of the wood. The following day the former of these two trenches was heavily and accurately bombarded.
At 7.30 P.M., 24th July, the enemy launched a surprise attack against High Wood and against the left company of the 154th Brigade. For some time the situation was obscure, but by 10 P.M. the artillery had been asked to slacken. It subsequently transpired that our line remained intact, and that the German attackers were falling back.
During the attack the enemy again barraged the new trench mentioned above extremely heavily. He also bombarded High Wood and set it on fire.
By 11.30 P.M. the situation was completely in hand, and work in the trenches was resumed.
Meanwhile orders had been received that the 154th Brigade was to relieve the left battalion of the 5th Division, and thus extend its front towards Longueval. This relief was completed by 6 A.M., and gave the brigade a frontage of some 2500 yards to hold.
On 25th July the enemy bombarded Mametz Valley and Fricourt Wood in a most savage fashion with guns of all calibres. This bombardment opened at noon, and continued until 6 P.M. It was the worst experience of shell-fire which the residents in Happy Valley encountered during the Division’s sojourn in the Somme area. Much material damage and many casualties resulted.
At 9.20 P.M. the 4th Seaforth Highlanders delivered another attack against the German redoubt. It, however, met a worse fate than its predecessor. An intense machine-gun fire was opened on the British trenches at the moment when the attackers were mounting the parapet. The troops suffered such losses from this fire that the attack never materialised.
This operation roused the enemy considerably, and he shelled the forward area throughout the night. In this bombardment he used a considerable number of shells containing phosgene gas. This was one of the earliest occasions on which this form of gas was used. It was particularly insidious, as at first it did not cause any inconvenience, and its smell was not offensive, being similar to that of sweet apples.
Meanwhile the brigade in support had been kept fully occupied. The intense heat created a great demand for water for the first-line troops. The water supply in the forward area was, however, non-existent, so that a dump of petrol tins of water had to be formed in the Happy Valley. From this dump all the water used in the forward area was carried by the supporting brigade. Similarly, with no light railways in repair, every round of S.A.A. bombs, trench-mortar ammunition, Very lights, barbed wire, screw pickets, &c., had to be carried forward by man power. The result was that practically every man in the supporting brigade made at least one journey daily from the dumps at the south-east corner of Mametz Wood to the forward dumps in rear of High Wood. The labour thus entailed, coupled with the fact that the supporting brigade lived in a heavily-shelled area with insufficient dug-out accommodation, meant that the troops had lost much of their fighting efficiency before they went into the line. In the circumstances there was, however, no alternative.
On the 26th July the 153rd Brigade relieved the 154th Brigade, and the 152nd Brigade moved forward to the support position. This relief was considerably interrupted by a further lavish use of phosgene by the Germans.
The work of consolidating and digging more trenches south and south-west of the wood was continued, as until touch in the front line could be obtained on the left, that flank was in the air.
On the 27th the forward area and the supporting brigade (152nd) in Mametz Valley were heavily shelled all night. This shelling was intense, it being estimated that two shells per minute burst in the area close to brigade headquarters alone throughout the night; 77 mm. gas shells were primarily used, but 5·9’s were also from time to time employed freely. As a result of this bombardment the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders alone sustained eighty gas casualties.
During the following day the 153rd Brigade co-operated in an attack on Longueval by rifle and machine-gun and Stokes mortar fire. They, however, took no part in the infantry action.
During the night 27-28th July, connection in the front line was established about 200 yards north-east of the Bazentin Windmill by the 6th Black Watch with the 29th Division. For the first time in this sector a continuous line of defence was presented to the enemy.
The 153rd Infantry Brigade had carried out a number of patrols. They had already had three days in which to reconnoitre the enemy’s position and study the lie of the land when they received orders to attack the enemy’s line from half-way between Delville and High Woods to the western edge of High Wood.
Patrols had located the enemy as occupying various positions, and these were subjected to bombardments during the forty-eight hours previous to the attack. At this stage in the war the shooting of the heavy howitzers had not reached that pitch of accuracy to which it afterwards attained. Nor was the liaison between the infantry and the Corps artillery as close as it became later. These causes and faulty observation made the shooting somewhat erratic at a place where very exact shooting was necessary. To these bombardments the enemy usually replied by shelling the Mametz Valley and the infantry in the line.
The attack was launched at 6.10 P.M., and to the east of the wood proceeded some distance. However, on topping the rise in the middle of No Man’s Land, the troops came under a very severe machine-gun fire, in which the accursed redoubt on the eastern corner of the wood, as usual, played a prominent part.
In the wood itself the advance was again checked by enfilade machine-gun fire, and the result of the action was much the same as it had been in the case of the 154th Brigade.
The net gains were, however, an advance of 200 yards on the right and centre, and of 70 yards in the wood. The men maintained themselves in their new positions in the wood for some time. Finally, however, owing to the intensity of the enemy’s bombardment, they withdrew to their original positions.
The right and centre consolidated their new position in posts, and held their gains.
Orders were meanwhile issued for the attack to be resumed at 9.45 P.M. These orders were, however, not received at Divisional headquarters in sufficient time to enable them to be transmitted to the attacking companies before the attack was due to start. No further action therefore took place.
The 31st July was remarkable for a violent bombardment of the country between Bazentin-le-Grand and Mametz Wood, which was practically continuous throughout the day.
On 1st August, the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieved the 153rd, and the 154th Brigade moved forward to the support brigade area. It had now become quite clear that no good purpose could be served by ordering the Division to carry out any further local attacks. There was no reason to suppose that such attacks would meet with any more success than their predecessors. The 152nd Infantry Brigade was therefore instructed to adopt a vigorous policy of peaceful penetration. By that is meant that the policy was to be the acquisition of more ground by digging and by minor operations, without the delivery of any set piece attack involving a large number of troops.
Orders were thus issued for as much ground as possible to be gained in High Wood by sapping forward. Progress was also to be made between High Wood and the Divisional right boundary, by digging-in posts in advance of the existing front line during the night, and ultimately connecting them up into continuous trenches.
The actual labour of digging in the wood was considerable, as beneath the soil there lay a tangled mass of thick roots, in many cases too stout to be severed by a spade. The work, therefore, was slow and arduous, axes and billhooks having to be employed as well as picks and shovels. The enemy, however, paid little attention to the working parties.
On the right it was considered likely that, as there was no cover, the enemy would interfere considerably with digging operations. An apparatus was therefore employed, known as the Bartlett Forcing Jack. The Bartlett Jack was designed to drive iron pipes loaded with tin canisters of ammonal (containing two lb. of ammonal per foot run) through the ground at a depth of from four to five feet. When a sufficient length of pipe had been driven into the ground in the required direction, the charge was exploded. The explosion blew a fissure in the ground which served as a trench. In this instance the labour of carrying the pipes and ammonal up to the line, and of working the task, proved incommensurate with the results obtained. This was particularly so when it became evident that considerable liberties could be taken by working parties without interference from the Boche.
On the night 3-4th August General Burn decided to employ a considerable working party and boldly “jump” a trench some 200 yards in front of the existing front line. That is to say, instead of sapping forwards and digging “T” heads at the ends of the saps for the posts to occupy, and finally connecting the “T” heads together so as to form a continuous trench, a continuous fire trench was dug in the first instance during the night, and occupied by a garrison at dawn. Subsequently communication trenches were cut to connect this trench with the support line, Seaforth Trench.
The Germans thus on 4th August woke to find that the whole of the Divisional front line, exclusive of the wood, had advanced some 200 yards towards them.
When the Division was relieved on 7th August, more than half High Wood was in our hands and consolidated. The redoubt in the eastern corner was, however, as formidable as ever. To the right of the wood the line had been advanced some 300 yards, while to the left the position had been so consolidated that there was no gap in the lines, and the flank was properly secured.
In addition, High Alley, 1000 yards in length, had been cleared out and made into a first-class communication trench by the 8th Royal Scots. Further east they had also dug a completely new communication trench called Thistle Alley. The digging of these trenches was a considerable task, as the soil for the most part consisted of chalk containing countless large flints or gravel, so that every spadeful had to be loosened by the pick before it could be thrown out of the trench.
On 7th August the 152nd Brigade was relieved by the 100th Brigade, 33rd Division. Owing to the intensity of the enemy’s shelling of the valley at night, it was decided for the first time to carry out the relief in daylight. In spite of some apprehension caused by three German aeroplanes flying low over the lines while the relief was in progress, the experiment proved highly successful. The 152nd Brigade, in fact, did not sustain a single casualty during the operation.
On 8th August the Division remained in bivouacs near Meaulte, in glorious weather. In the evening the “Balmorals,” the Divisional troupe, using the tail-board of a lorry as a stage, gave a performance in the open air, which was attended by practically the entire infantry of the Division. It is doubtful if, in the whole of their highly successful career, any performance given by the “Balmorals” was more appreciated than this one.
The Division had passed from sixteen days of continuous and unsatisfactory strife to an unexpected haven of rest, set in the midst of corn-lands during harvest-time.
It was a real refreshment for the men to sit in the cool of a delightful summer evening and listen to “Stanley” and “Gertie,” both of whom rose to the occasion admirably.
So ended the first offensive operations in which the Division had been employed as a whole unit. The results had been disappointing and dispiriting to all. Over 3500 casualties, including more than 150 officers, had been sustained in two fruitless attempts to carry a German position which remained intact, in spite of many attacks by a succession of Divisions, until 15th September. The Germans had shown that High Wood could not be taken hurriedly by a direct frontal attack.
Three months later General Harper was able to show that the much stronger position of Beaumont Hamel could be stormed frontally after careful preparations and with adequate artillery support.
High Wood was finally overcome by a mine, which shattered the redoubt, and by tanks, which on this occasion were employed for the first time in the Great War.
The mine referred to above was suggested by General Pelham Burn on the morning of 5th August as being the least costly means of subduing the redoubt. His suggestion was at once adopted. Tunnelling officers reported at brigade headquarters the same evening, the actual mining operations beginning on the following morning.
It was most satisfactory to those engaged in High Wood to visit it after the German withdrawal in the Somme area, and see in place of the saucer in which the German redoubt was situated a vast crater. Many graves were in it and round it, and arms, equipment, and ammunition lay scattered about it. In fact, it had all the appearance of having admirably served its purpose.
On the 9th August the Division, less the artillery, which remained in the line, entrained at Edgehill and Mericourt, and was moved to the area Longpré-Pont Remy. The following day it again entrained, and began to move into the Blaringham area.
High Wood now stands in the centre of a vast cemetery. There is barely a portion of ground of the size of a tennis court in all that country-side which does not contain the graves of one or more British soldiers. In the wood itself stand memorials erected to the memory of the fallen of many Divisions which were shattered there. The Highland Division was not by any means the only Division which failed to capture a natural fortress situated at the apex of a salient.
On 15th and 16th August the 153rd and 154th Brigades relieved the 1st New Zealand Division in the line. The new front extended from Chapelle d’Armentières on the right to the river Lys on the left. The 152nd Brigade in reserve was billeted in Armentières. Divisional headquarters opened at 98 Rue Sadi Carnot.
By 19th August the Divisional artillery had arrived from the Somme, and completed the relief of the New Zealand artillery.
The tour of duty in the Armentières sector was remarkable for its tranquillity. The weather was excellent, the breastwork trenches reasonably comfortable, and the enemy’s activity slight. The town of Armentières itself provided many excellent billets for the troops in reserve, and for all three brigade headquarters. The batteries were also for the most part comfortable, some of them being in the unique position of occupying houses for quarters, with their guns in the gardens and conservatories.
Armentières was indeed fairly described by the Jocks as bon. In these days it was still occupied by civilian inhabitants in large numbers. There were in consequence plenty of the beloved “estaminets,” as they were usually called, and numerous shops. The latter all appeared to keep the same articles in stock—“vin blonk,” “oofs”—either to be consumed on the premises or taken home; chips and those wonderful post-cards on which patriotic designs were embroidered in alarmingly coloured silks, and on which were superscribed such mottoes as “To my dear sweetheart,” “To my darling wife.”
The officers were equally well catered for, considering that Armentières was within range of the lightest field-guns. There were a few naturally expensive and equally naturally indifferent tea-shops. There were one or two restaurants where dinner could be obtained, in which the French cooking afforded a relief from the normal efforts of the company’s mess cook. And there was the famous Lucienne’s.
Lucienne lived at a corner house in the Rue Sadi Carnot, and had assisted in the management of a restaurant there since the early days of the war. The majority of the neighbouring houses, including the large church some fifty yards from the restaurant, had at one time or another been struck by shells. Most of Lucienne’s windows had been broken during these bombardments. She, however, still possessed the most buoyant spirits. She had ready wits, and in any form of badinage usually had the last word. She, in fact, resembled a character from a light opera rather than a player in the real drama of war. After the German offensive in April 1918 she was driven out of Armentières, but remained undaunted; and subsequently, after the tide had turned, opened a similar establishment in Amiens. The officers of the Division had to thank Lucienne’s courage for many a pleasant evening spent in Armentières.
The sector, in fact, acted as a tonic to the Division, and with its quiet trenches, wonderful weather, and good billets soon effaced all the bitter memories of the Somme and the weariness of the Labyrinth.
The enemy’s activity, such as it was, was directed chiefly against the town and the suburbs of Houplines, both places being intermittently shelled, particularly the latter. At times the bombardments were severe, Divisional headquarters being ultimately shelled out of their house in Rue Sadi Carnot, and being in consequence moved to Steenwerk.
On 11th September the Division sustained a considerable loss in the death of Brigadier-General C. E. Stewart, C.M.G., commanding the 154th Infantry Brigade. General Stewart and his intelligence officer were walking through Houplines when a chance shell burst within a few feet of them, killing them both. It was a case of the cruellest bad luck, as this was the only shell which fell in that vicinity during the day. General Stewart had commanded the 154th Brigade since its reconstitution as a Highland brigade. His troops were considerably attached to him, and his loss was much felt by them.
On 17th September, Brigadier-General J. G. H. Hamilton, D.S.O., Black Watch, assumed command of the 154th Brigade.
Operations at this sector were for the most part confined on the part of the enemy to a fairly consistent but only moderate activity with the Minenwerfer. At times, too, he was active with his Grenatenwerfer, known to the troops as the “Pineapples” or “Fishtail.” “Yon minnie-wafers” were fortunately clearly visible in the air, and so with a little judgment could be avoided. They had, however, a most devastating effect on breastwork trenches, with the result that, as a rule, more damage was done in a day than could be repaired in twenty-four hours by the troops available. Minenwerfer sentries were posted who, whenever they saw or heard a “minnie” fired, blew a whistle. The troops in the trenches then at once looked into the air to locate the bomb. As soon as they had judged where it was going to fall, they took the necessary steps not to be there at the time of its arrival. Watching the “minnies” in the air rather resembled waiting for a high catch in the deep field at cricket. If there was no wind it was comparatively easy to judge them. If, however, there was a strong breeze blowing, the wind would catch them and alter their flight considerably. The men, however, soon learnt their idiosyncrasies, and it was a rare occurrence for casualties to be inflicted by them.
The Grenatenwerfer was quite a different proposition. This form of projectile was fired from a machine of about the same size and weight as a typewriter, and in consequence it could be moved with ease from place to place after every few rounds. It was thus difficult to locate the position from which it was fired. Further, it was most unusual to be able to see the projectile in the air, so that no steps could be taken to avoid it.
As regards British operations, a discharge of gas from cylinders took place on 31st August. The preparations for this discharge involved a considerable amount of work. The cylinders of gas had to be carried the full length of the communication trenches, each one being supported by two men. The weight of these cylinders was so great that a second pair of men were also required for each cylinder to act as reliefs.
Enormous carrying parties were therefore required to carry the cylinders to the fire-bays in the front line into which they were to be installed by the gas companies. This was always an unpleasant task, as the danger of a bullet or fragment of shell striking a cylinder and causing a leakage of gas in the midst of the carrying party was ever present.
The discharge on this night was followed by a raid half an hour later. The enemy, however, was found to be alert, and he met the raiders with such a heavy machine-gun fire that they were unable to reach the hostile wire.
Subsequently raids became a frequent occurrence. On 15th September four raids were carried out. In each case Bangalore torpedoes—i.e., long tubes of ammonal with a time fuse—were used to destroy the enemy’s wire.
These raids were carried out by the 6th Gordon Highlanders, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, the 7th Gordon Highlanders, and the 7th Black Watch.
Of these, the first and third failed owing to the torpedoes not bursting; the second was an unqualified success, and is described in detail later. The fourth was successful, but only two Germans were found in the trench.
The following night two more raids took place. Of these, one carried out by the 5th Gordon Highlanders was completely successful, and twenty-five Germans are reported to have been killed. The second raid, carried out by the 9th Royal Scots, was also successful, but only one German was found in the trenches. He was killed.
On 22nd September the 6th Gordon Highlanders made a second attempt at the raid which had been unsuccessful on 15th September. However, the enterprise again had to be abandoned, as the torpedo failed to explode and the wire remained uncut.
As raiding became so marked a feature of the war, space forbids that each raid should be described in detail. General Harper was therefore asked to select the raid he considered most suitable for description, and he has chosen that carried out by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on 15th September 1916. This raid is therefore now described in detail.
The area selected for the operation was a most prominent salient formed by the German front line. Through the apex of this salient, and running at right angles to the fronts of the opposing forces, ran the Armentières-Lille Railway. Across the base of the salient ran a well-defined entrenchment.
The general plan was as follows: The raiders were divided up into two parties, each consisting of one officer (Lieutenants J. Sainter and D. F. Jenkins), one sergeant, one corporal, and ten privates, with a blocking party each of one N.C.O. and three men.
The scheme was that each party should cut the wire at its own point of entry by means of Bangalore torpedoes, while the wire was to be cut for a point of exit by the 2-inch mortars.
The two parties were to enter the salient from opposite sides and close to its base. They were then to leave their blocking parties to cover their rear, while they both worked forwards to the apex. By meeting at this point it was hoped that the entire garrison of the salient would be accounted for.
The Bangalore torpedoes, both seventy-five feet in length, were to be placed under the wire thirty minutes before zero, Lieutenants Sainter and Jenkins, each with two men, being responsible for placing the torpedoes in position.
The raiding parties were ordered to leave their trenches and form up in No Man’s Land about thirty yards away from their torpedoes, ready to rush through the gap in the wire as soon as the explosions took place.
The actual trench area to be raided had been reproduced exactly according to scale in a large pasture close to Armentières. It was thus possible to practice the men continually over the course, so that they acquired a true sense of direction, and of the distances they would have to traverse during the raid.
The parties paraded for the raid with their faces and knees blackened, with their bayonets covered in mud, and with their steel helmets encased in sandbags to which grasses and weeds had been sewn. These precautions were necessary, as the men had to lie out in No Man’s Land, where they would be in danger of being observed by a German sentry, so that they could enter the trenches immediately the torpedoes were exploded.
Ropes were also carried, as it was anticipated that there might be some difficulty in getting the prisoners out of the deep breastwork trenches, and it might be necessary to drag them out.
The men wore Dayfield body-shields to protect them from bomb splinters.
The arms carried were as follows: Officers. 1 revolver, 6 bombs, and 1 electric torch; N.C.O.’s, 1 revolver, 10 bombs, and a bludgeon; 4 bayonet men, rifle and bayonet, 6 bombs, electric torch attached to rifle, 30 rounds of ammunition; 8 throwers, 10 bombs and a bludgeon; 8 spare men, a bludgeon, 10 bombs, and a wire-cutter; blocking party, rifles and bayonets, 30 rounds of ammunition, and 10 bombs.
In the first instance the success of the raid was dependent on the gaps being adequately cut in the wire. At the time many persons thought that General Burn’s scheme of using torpedoes seventy-five feet long was too ambitious. Certainly when the torpedoes were constructed and were seen for the first time, they looked awkward things with which to have dealings in No Man’s Land, being as they were considerably longer than a cricket pitch. When the time arrived the torpedoes were hoisted out of the trenches, and the torpedo parties set off with them. Lieutenant Jenkins had little trouble with his; he reached the selected point in the German entanglement without incident, and placed his torpedo in position. This was difficult work. Here were two parties, each of three men, within 70 yards of the German sentries, forcing a metal tube 3 inches in diameter, 75 feet long, and loaded with ammonal, underneath the German entanglements. Very lights were fired by the enemy continually, illuminating the whole country-side and making the work more hazardous than ever.
It was further impossible to place the torpedoes in position without a certain amount of noise being made, which the German sentries might at any time hear. The whole wire entanglement stood in a mass of rank undergrowth, through which the nose of the torpedo had to be forced. The posts supporting the entanglements were not placed in regular rows, so that occasionally as the torpedo was pushed forward its movement was brought to a standstill by a wooden post standing directly in its way, and its course had to be altered. The lower strands of wire also scraped along the upper surface of the torpedoes, and made a horrible grating noise.
In spite of these difficulties, Lieutenant Jenkins placed his torpedo in position exactly as arranged, and in sufficient time to return to the trench and to lead his party out to a point about thirty yards from the German wire. The party followed the fuse which connected the torpedo to the firing mechanism in the trench, so as to ensure joining up in the right place.
Lieutenant Sainter, on the other hand, was completely out of luck. His torpedo came apart at several of its joints on three separate occasions, and had to be repaired by him in No Man’s Land. Sainter reported that had it not been for the German Very lights, he did not think that he could have managed to repair it. Having finally arrived with it intact at the right place, he had forced it nearly through the German wire when it stuck and could be moved forward no farther. He therefore had to extract it and make a second attempt at a different place. On this occasion he was successful. The operation, however, had taken so long that no time was left for Sainter to return to the trench and lead out his party. The party was therefore ordered to advance, following the fuse as Jenkins’ party had done, until they came upon Sainter. This was done, and the party had joined him and was in position just ten minutes before zero.
At zero the two torpedoes were fired almost simultaneously, leaving gaps clear through the German wire 15 feet broad and 25 yards deep. At the same time the barrage opened. Major A. G. Graham, M.C., commanding the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, writes in his account of the operations: “The barrage opened punctually, and can only be described as perfect. All ranks taking part in the raid were unanimous in their praise. The efficacy of the barrage is borne out by the fact that no German machine-gun fired for forty minutes. The casualties caused by the barrage must have been heavy, as both parties report that on entering the trenches parties of the enemy were seen rushing away from the salient into our barrage.”
Immediately the torpedoes exploded, the raiders rushed through the gaps in the wire and into the enemy’s trenches. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. The first sentry encountered by Sainter’s party was bayoneted in the back, while still staring over the parapet in blank amazement at the curious explosion that had just occurred in front of him.
From now onwards all the luck came to Sainter, Jenkins meeting with considerable difficulties. Sainter’s men acted exactly as they had done in the practices. They entered the trench at the point intended; there they killed a couple of sentries. They then found a dug-out containing four Germans, which they bombed until all were killed. At the next dug-out two Germans came out, one being immediately shot by Sainter, the other being killed by a bayonet man. Other Germans were killed in the dug-out with bombs. Four Germans were then found hiding in the trench; three of these were killed, the fourth being kept as a prisoner. Later he refused to leave his trench, and was also killed. A lasso had been put round him to assist in hauling him out of the trench. At this he became so terror-stricken that he became incapable of movement, and so had to be despatched. Unfortunately, his remains were left lying in the trench with the rope still around them. The party then searched the point of exit, where they found the wire well cut by the 2-inch mortars, and returned to our lines, having been in the German trenches six and a half minutes.
Lieutenant Jenkins’ party entered the German trench according to plan; the first fire-bay they entered contained arms and equipment, but no sentries. There was a dummy parados to this trench made of boards, behind which dug-outs were found. Four of these were bombed until all sounds within them ceased. The party then proceeded another ten yards along the trench, where they encountered an organised German bombing party. A bombing fight lasting some two minutes then ensued, the Germans apparently being all knocked out. Lieutenant Jenkins’ party sustained five casualties in this encounter, three men being seriously wounded, and two slightly. Orders were therefore given to retire by the gap at which the trench had been entered. As the retirement was being carried out a second party of Germans attacked. These were heavily bombed; many were killed, the remainder running away. Three Highlanders had, however, caught one of them alive, and hurled him bodily over the parapet, and then jumped after him and pinioned him in a shell-hole. He was finally taken back to the British lines as the solitary prisoner.
On a bugle sounding the two parties began their withdrawal. Sainter’s party regained our trenches without having sustained a casualty. Jenkins on his return found that three of his men were missing. He therefore returned to the German trenches three times with Private A. Macdonald, and each time succeeded in bringing in a wounded man.
The Dayfield body-shields were found to have numerous splinters of bombs sticking into them, and undoubtedly saved the raiders from several casualties.
The German trenches were formed of enormous breastworks 12 to 15 feet wide, and were revetted with brushwood. Let into the parapet were numerous concrete dug-outs, each capable of holding from four to six men. The floor of these dug-outs was level with the bottom of the trench. The effect of a Mills bomb inside these confined spaces was devastating, and there is no doubt that every German inside them was killed. One of the Jocks was asked how he had dealt with these dug-outs. He replied, “Och, we just boomed yon stone boxes until they stopped their blether, and then went to the next one.”
The barrage for this raid was worked out to the minutest detail. All weapons were employed, the following amounts of ammunition being used: 2-inch mortars, 228 rounds; Stokes guns, 981 rounds; Vickers guns, 29,500 rounds; 18-pounders, 1200 rounds; 4·5 howitzers, 100 rounds; and several hundred rounds of rifle grenades.
Every weapon had a particular task given to it. These tasks were arranged (a) so that no fire could be opened by the Germans which might be brought to bear on men crossing No Man’s Land; (b) so that no troops could run away from the area being raided to the rear; (c) so that no troops could counter-attack the area raided over the open either from the rear or flanks; (d) so that no movement could take place in the German trenches within about 800 yards of the raid. Every trench junction and every known trench and mortar position on a front of 1500 yards was steadily bombarded throughout the operation.
The results were beyond all expectations. No Germans were able to reinforce the salient, so that the raiders could deal with its garrison without fear of interruption. The Germans who broke from the salient and fled to the rear ran into a barrage of 18-pounders, 4·5 howitzers, Stokes guns, and 2-inch mortars. Not a single round was fired by the enemy occupying the trenches on the flanks of the salient.
The barrage thus cut off the troops in the area raided from any support which their neighbours might have given them, and enabled the raiders to despatch them just as had been planned.
Many of the Germans on the opening of the barrage had left their arms in the trenches and run into the dug-outs. When the raiders arrived and began bombing a panic seems to have set in. The Boches ran about in terror on seeing the Jocks with their blackened faces and knees and with grasses in their helmets, holding up their hands, crying, “Kamerad Kaffirs, Kamerad Kaffirs!” They had apparently mistaken the Jocks for some species of native troops. This impression and the sight of the ropes reduced many of them to such a condition that they were even too terrified to be carried off as prisoners, and refused to move. In consequence many had to be despatched who might otherwise have been taken back to our lines alive.
The one prisoner captured turned out to be a good one. He volunteered much information about the German position, the positions of headquarters, routes to the trenches, hours of relief, hours and places at which ration and working parties assembled. A series of violent bombardments were accordingly arranged based on the information he had given.
During the remainder of the night the area was occasionally subjected to short intense bursts of artillery and trench-mortar fire for the benefit of any Germans who might be inspecting the damage in the salient.
As a result of their gallant conduct on this raid Lieutenants Sainter and Jenkins were awarded the Military Cross, and four men the Military Medal.
During the remainder of the Division’s sojourn in the Armentières area, the only other noteworthy operations that took place were outbreaks of the most excessive trench-mortar activity on the part of the Jocks.
Organised bombardments of the enemy’s lines were repeatedly taking place, with the result that whole sections of the breastworks were obliterated. Whenever rain occurred and his breastworks became sodden they were heavily bombarded, so as to give them the necessary incentive to collapse and bury the Germans in them.
On one occasion over 1200 rounds of Stokes mortar bombs were fired in a single day by one light trench-mortar battery. It soon transpired that these bombardments produced very little retaliation from the enemy. It was therefore felt that we were in a position really to bully him and make his life a burden to him. The bombardments therefore became more frequent than ever, and he was unmercifully harassed day after day to the great delight of the troops.
It was not a sector in which the Germans were much exposed to view. There was, however, a barricade across a road near Prémesques, where both men and waggons tended to congregate. This barricade could be seen from an O.P. at Square Farm on the extreme right of the sector. An electric bell was therefore rigged up in the gun-pit, with a bell-push in the O.P. A gun was then kept permanently laid on the barricade. Every time the observer saw a reasonable bag of people and waggons collected round the barricade he rang the bell and the gunners fired. This sport, however, became too popular, with the result that, after a day or two, no Boche would show himself anywhere in the vicinity of the barricade.
The holding of the Armentières sector will always be regarded as the most pleasant period of trench life which the Division passed through.
On 12th September 1916 the first Divisional Horse Show was held. It proved an unqualified success, and stimulated a great interest in the condition of horses, harness, and vehicles throughout the Division. To the delight of the Jocks, the officers’ jumping competition was won by General Harper on Charlie, a big bay horse well known to many members of the Division.
In the Armentières sector, the 152nd Infantry Brigade received a large parcel of picture post-cards, displaying types of Russian soldiers, from the 152nd Vladicaucasian Regiment, with the following message printed on them:—